



**POPULISM, ILLIBERAL FREEDOM PERCEPTION,  
AND DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING IN VENEZUELA  
AND HUNGARY, 2010-2017**

**DUYGU AĞIRGAN**

Master's Thesis

Graduated School  
Izmir University of Economics

İzmir  
2021

**POPULISM, ILLIBERAL FREEDOM PERCEPTION,  
AND DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING IN VENEZUELA  
AND HUNGARY, 2010-2017**

**DUYGU AĞIRGAN**

A Thesis submitted to  
The Graduate School of Izmir University of Economics  
Master of Arts Program in Political Science and International Relations

Izmir  
2021

## ABSTRACT

# POPULISM ILLIBERAL FREEDOM PERCEPTION, AND DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING IN VENEZUELA AND HUNGARY, 2010-2017

Çağırğan, Duygu

Political Science and International Relations

Advison: Asst. Prof. Serhun AL

January, 2021

The correlation of economic freedom, political freedom, and democratic backsliding in populist regimes is mostly attempted to be explained with populists' illiberal freedom interventions that limit the freedoms of the people they represent. By defining

populism as a persuasion-based discursive strategy based on Kazin's (2017) and Bonikowski's (2016) descriptions, this thesis underlines that populists' interventions to people's freedom perception through persuasive illiberal discourses may also cause democratic backsliding. Therefore, this study argues that populists seek to illiberalize people's economic and political freedom perception through populist post-truth propaganda (PPP) which is based on personal instincts rather than facts, thereby causing trends of democratic backsliding. It claims that in doing so, populists gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people and reduce their questionability through the people's will. To control whether these claims may seem to be true for Venezuela and Hungary cases, this study has compared Chávez's, Maduro's, and Orbán's PPP and their illiberal freedom strategies that were shaped under the guise of egalitarianism, nationalism, and nativism. By amalgamating comparative case studies with descriptive data analysis between 2010-2017 when both countries were recognized as at least a hybrid regime, it has applied mixed-method research. Although under conditions like the low number of cases and inabilities to fully observe the consequences of illiberal freedom perceptions, findings revealed that illiberal freedom perception has the potential to cause democratic backsliding by diminishing populists' questionability. It also underlined that Maduro may not fit the populist profile of this study because of not having persuasive rhetoric.

Keywords: Illiberal Freedom Perception, Populist Post-Truth Propaganda (PPP), Democratic Backsliding

# ÖZET

## VENEZUELA VE MACARİSTAN'DA POPÜLİZM, İLLİBERAL ÖZGÜRLÜK ALGISI VE DEMOKRATİK GERİLEME, 2010-2017

Çağırğan, Duygu

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası ilişkiler

Tez Danışmanı: Dr.Ögr. Üyesi Serhun AL

Ocak, 2021

Popülist rejimlerde ekonomik özgürlük, siyasi özgürlük ve demokratik gerileme arasındaki ilişki, çoğunlukla popülistlerin temsil ettikleri insanların özgürlüklerini sınırlayan liberal olmayan özgürlük müdahaleleriyle açıklanmaya çalışılmaktadır. Popülizmi, Kazin'in (2017) ve Bonikowski'nin (2016) tanımlarına dayanan ikna temelli söylemsel bir strateji olarak tanımlayarak bu tez, popülistlerin ikna edici illiberal söylemler yoluyla insanların özgürlük algısına müdahalelerinin de demokratik gerilemeye neden olabileceğinin altını çiziyor. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma popülistlerin

gerçeklerden ziyade kişisel içgüdülere dayanan popülist post-hakikat propaganda (PPP) yoluyla halkın ekonomik ve siyasi özgürlük algısını illiberalleştirmeye çalıştığını ve böylece demokratik gerileme eğilimlerine neden olduğunu savunuyor. Bunu yaparken, popülistlerin halkın gözünde meşruiyet kazandıklarını ve halkın iradesiyle sorgulanabilirliklerini azalttığını iddia ediyor. Bu iddiaların Venezuela ve Macaristan vakaları için doğru görünüp görünmediğini kontrol etmek için bu çalışma, Chávez'in, Maduro'nun ve Orbán'ın PPP'lerini ve onların, eşitlikçilik, milliyetçilik ve yerlileştiricik nedenler kisvesi altında şekillenen ikna edici liberal olmayan özgürlük stratejileri karşılaştırmıştır. Her iki ülkenin de en azından hibrit rejim olarak kabul edildiği 2010-2017 yılları arasında karşılaştırmalı vaka çalışmalarını betimsel veri analizi ile birleştirerek karma yöntem araştırması uygulamıştır. Az sayıdaki vaka ve illiberal özgürlük algılarının sonuçlarını tam olarak gözlemleyememe gibi koşullar altında olmasına rağmen, bulgular, liberal olmayan özgürlük algısının, popülistlerin sorgulanabilirliğini azaltarak demokratik gerilemeye neden olma potansiyeline sahip olduğunu ortaya koydu. Ayrıca Maduro'nun ikna edici retoriğe sahip olmadığı için bu çalışmanın popülist profiline uymayabileceğinin de altını çizdi.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Illiberal Özgürlük Algısı, Populist Hakikat-Sonrası Propaganda (PPP), Demokratik Gerileme

Dedicated to my beloved parents

Yurdagül and Ümit Çağırğan



## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I would like to thank, first and foremost, my thesis supervisor Dr. Serhun AL for his support, excellent guidance, patience, and goodwill to enable me to run this research during the long months. Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr. Sıtkı Egeli, and Dr. Devrim Sezer, for all their professional advice and guidance throughout my time as a graduate student. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents who encouraged me and supported me in writing this thesis.





## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	III
ÖZET.....	V
DEDICATION.....	VII
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	VIII
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	IX
LIST OF TABLES.....	XI
LIST OF FIGURES.....	XII
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	XIII
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	7
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.....	14
3.1. <i>The Populist Challenges to Liberal Democracy: Illiberal Freedom Perception</i> .....	15
3.2. <i>Defining Populist Post-Truth Propaganda (PPP)</i> .....	22
3.3. <i>Conceptualizing of Populist Post-Truth Propaganda</i> .....	27
3.4. <i>As a Key Persuasive Factor for Illiberal Freedom Perception: Populist Post-Truth Propaganda</i> .....	28
3.5. <i>The Impact of Illiberal Freedom Perception on Democratic Backsliding</i> ....	32
<i>Concluding Remarks</i> .....	33
CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL BACKGROUD OF VENEZUELAN AND HUNGARIAN DEMOCRACY.....	34
4.1. <i>Venezuela</i> .....	34
4.1.1. <i>Dictatorship to Democracy (1900-1958)</i> .....	34
4.1.2. <i>Punto Fijo Democracy (1958-1989)</i> .....	36
4.1.3. <i>From Socialist Democracy to Authoritarianism (1998-2017)</i> .....	39
4.2. <i>Hungary</i> .....	43
4.2.1. <i>From Dual Monarchy to Soviet Union (1900-1944)</i> .....	44
4.2.2. <i>From Soviet Democracy to Modern Democracy (1944-1989)</i> .....	46
4.2.3. <i>From Liberal Democracy to Illiberal Democracy (1989-2017)</i> .....	48

CHAPTER 5: CASE ANALYSIS .....	52
5.1. Venezuela.....	52
5.1.1. <i>Left-wing Populists’ Challenges to Liberal Democracy: Chávez and Maduro’s Illiberal Freedom Perception</i> .....	52
5.1.2. <i>Left-wing Populist Post-Truth Propaganda: Anti-Imperialism and Anti-Americanism</i> .....	59
5.1.3. <i>Left-wing Populists’ Illiberal Freedom Perception and Democratic Backsliding</i> .....	64
5.2. Hungary.....	65
5.2.1. <i>Right-wing Populists’ Challenges to Liberal Democracy: Orbán’s Illiberal Freedom Perception</i> .....	65
5.2.2. <i>Right-wing Populist Post-Truth Propaganda: Euroscepticism, Xenophobia, Anti-Soros, and Anti-Immigration</i> .....	71
5.2.3. <i>Right-wing Populists’ Illiberal Freedom Perception and Democratic Backsliding</i> .....	74
CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION.....	76
REFERENCES.....	80

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. An Arrow-Diagram of a Summary of The Theoretical Argument.....	14
Table 2. Comparing Populist Propaganda and Populist Post-Truth Propaganda.....	26
Table 3. Populist Post-Truth Conceptualization.....	27



## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Political and Economic Freedom Rates on Venezuelan Democracy Index (2010-2017).....	53
Figure 2. Political and Economic Freedom Rates on Hungarian Democracy Index (2010-2017).....	66



## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AD: Acción Democrática

COPEI: Comité de Organización Política Election Independent

FIDESZ: Alliance of Young Democrats

FKGP: Independent Smallholders and Citizens Party

KDNP: Christian Democratic People's Party

MBR 200: Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200

MDF: Hungarian Democratic Forum

MSZP: Hungarian Socialist Party

PPP: Populist Post-truth Propaganda

SZDSZ: Alliance of Free Democrats

The EU: European Union

The UK: The United Kingdom

The US: The United States

URD: Democratic Republican Union

## **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION**

According to the annual report published by Freedom House in 2019, it has been experiencing an uninterrupted democratic decline worldwide since 2005 (Freedom House, 2019). Focusing on the rule of law, freedom of expression, civil liberty, political rights, and the separation of powers when defining democracy, Freedom House indicates interventions targeting the fundamental norms of democracies, as the cause of the democratic decline. In addition, this report demonstrates that most of the countries that have been defined as free and democratic made important concessions on personal freedoms, political rights, civil liberties, political participation, political pluralism, and economic rights due to populists' freedom-restrictive policies (Freedom House, 2019).

Political and economic freedoms are important values of liberal democracy that give people the right to take economic and political actions. However, these freedoms are taken under control and restricted with illiberal freedom interventions under the guise of creating illiberal democracy by populists' governments. Therefore, this illiberal democracy model created without rights has been raised some concerns about the sustainability of democracies in populist regimes (Mounk, 2018). Hence, populists' impact on democratic backsliding has generally been associated with their illiberal interventions to the liberal norms underpinning democracy.

As a result of these interventions, the decline in freedom scores was recorded in all parts of the world without exception between 2011 and 2019. However, the biggest decrease was observed in Latin American countries where the left-wing populists dominated. The second biggest decline in freedom occurred in Eastern European countries where right-wing populists in the power during the same period of time (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). Therefore, consolidated democracies in Eastern Europe, especially in Hungary and Poland ruled by right-wing populist governments were at serious risk. Likewise, in countries like Venezuela and Bolivia controlled by left-wing populist governments in Latin America, destabilization trends towards consolidated liberal democracies posed a threat to democracies.

In addition to direct restrictive interventions against freedoms, populists can also indirectly intervene freedom through their communication with the public. Populists have effective communication that can cause significant changes in the opinions, feelings, and behavior of the people (Schulz et al., 2017). This communication is established through an *extra emotional ingredient* such as fear, doubt, or distrust (Canovan, 1999). In this way, populists gain the ability to motivate reactions to liberal values and its advocates in various ways. Therefore, populism is often defined as a flexible mode to persuade people (Kazin, 2017) or a dynamic discursive framing strategy (Bonikowski, 2016). In addition to addressing emotional components, populists also derive their persuasiveness from placing their discourse in a dominant position with a news topic (Wirz et al., 2018). In this regard, left-wing populist leaders in Latin America and right-wing populist leaders in the European continent mostly come to the fore. In Latin America, left-wing populists increase persuasiveness in their discourses against liberalism by linking with fears that are often based on economic problems. Moreover, they reinforce these fears through their problematic relations with the United States (the US) (Edward, 2010). On the other hand, in Eastern Europe, right-wing populists merge their illiberal discourse with xenophobic attitudes towards the refugee crisis by using fears against a dilution of national identity (Wodak, 2015). Thus, both populist sides become able to positively affect their perceptible legitimacy in their respective regions (Bos, Vreese, and Brug, 2011). In other words, they gain the ability to create a perceptual freedom and democracy in line with their illiberal democratic policies. In this context, by gaining legitimacy for their illiberal freedom policies, both populist sides obtain an opportunity to unquestioningly increase their power. In this case, it may pose a danger to the sustainability of democracies, considering populists' commitment to centralized and restrictive freedom policies. Therefore, apart from illiberal restrictive freedom interventions, in this thesis, I think that illiberal freedom perception as an indirect intervention created by populists in the societies also causes democratic backsliding.

By treating populism as a *persuasion-based discursive strategy* parallel to Michael Kazin's and Bart Bonikowski's definitions, in this context, I question that "How do populists create illiberal freedom perception, and how does illiberal freedom perception cause democratic backsliding?". By focusing on left-wing populism in Latin America and right-wing populism in Eastern Europe, I seek to understand how

illiberal perception created over economic and political freedom leads to democratic backsliding under different ideological, regional, and democratic conditions. By specifically examining Venezuela and Hungary, I believe that while analyzing leaders' discourses and illiberal freedom policies and strategies in both countries, this study sheds light on pressure and destruction on freedom in the democratic systems. Within the framework of the findings, I think that a general assessment can be reached about the indirect effects of populists' persuasive side in question on liberal values, causing democratic backsliding.

Liberal democracy is a political system that aims to protect fundamental freedoms such as free and fair elections, the protection of basic liberties, separation of powers, the rule of law, assembly, religion, and property (Zakaria, 1997). However, populism refers that liberal norms and policies seriously attenuate democracy and impair people (Galston, 2018). Thus, any liberal forms that obviate the people from acting democratically in their own interest should be ostracized (Galston, 2018). Therefore, populism tries to construct a new form of democratic politics that opposes established liberal democracy (Pappas, 2019). In building illiberal democracies, even though populists claim that they are not against freedom, they try to centralize and restrict freedom economically or politically. Many of them refer that economic and political freedoms offered by liberalism are factors that undermine to economic rights, national security, and nativist values. Therefore, both freedoms should be kept under control by populists in order to protect the absolute will of the people. Due to their claim that allegedly represent an illiberal democratic reaction to democracy (Galston, 2018), they portray their attitudes towards liberalism as rectifying its deficiency rather than an attack on democracy. Thus, they persuasively essay to break the liberal link between democracy and freedom. One of the methods they use to break this bond is to create an illiberal freedom perception which is generated in favor of illiberal economic and political freedom. In order not to deviate from their claims that they are the true representatives of the people (Mudde, 2004), populists need these perceptions before they intervene in freedoms. Because, in doing so, they can ensure the continuity of their authority by presenting illiberal freedom restrictions as the people's will.

In this thesis, it is claimed that populists create illiberal freedom perception as a result of their discourse strategies applied to ensure that centralized economic and political



freedom is adopted and internalized by the people. Moreover, this perception is based on the idea that illiberalizing people's freedom understanding in order to abandon the economic and political freedom offered by liberal democracy under the guise of the people's will. Therefore, illiberal freedom perception is created with persuasion mechanisms based on sympathy for illiberal values, but negativity against liberalism, its values, and advocates.

One of the reasons why persuasive discursive strategic methods that populists applied to create illiberal freedom perception have become effective is the active role of a new version of propaganda that falsifies facts with alternative facts based on personal instincts. Along with the rise of this new propaganda, leaders began to replace facts with lies for their own interests. As Heuer mentioned that lies have no longer been presented for the allegedly the nation's well-being by the government. Lies are now propagated to change the balance of power by ignoring or belittling the enlightened reality by leaders (Heuer, 2018). This new genre of the lie, which often appears with the leaders' propaganda, paves the way for various conspiracy theories and applies numerous fake news to change facts with alternative facts. The frequent use of this kind of propaganda brings up the concept of post-truth to the agenda.

Post-truth was defined in 2016 by the Oxford Dictionary as a notion that refers to situations in which objective facts are less efficient in shaping public opinion than addressing feelings and personal beliefs. (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). This term came to the fore within the context of the European Union (the EU) referendum in the United Kingdom (the UK) and the presidential election in the US in 2016 (McComiskey, 2017). After these events, post-truth has been started to define as a presumptuous inclination to lie and the straightforward denial to admit evidently documented facts (Hopkin and Rosamond, 2018). Moreover, the concept of post-truth turned into a form of politics frequently used by leaders. Given that the belief system emphasized reason in improving human conditions, post-truth politics became a large-scale problem for liberal democracy (Sim, 2019). Because post-truth politics is not seen as a way to improve society and collective quality of life. On the contrary, it is defined as rather a politics that promotes division and anger in society and creates a toxic atmosphere that does not respect other points of view (Sim, 2019). Especially, due to its widespread use discursively on every occasion by populists, post-truth politics became more

related to populist propaganda as a political discursive strategic element. Generally, the term post-truth has been seen as a suppression of more public discourse, especially on feelings and personal belief with the populist conspiratorial era (Bergmann, 2018). It has actually been stood out as one of a few ways to face the alternative facts as a propaganda type to describe the obvious manifestation of the standard of truth that has been valid so far. Its intertwined use with fake news and conspiracy theories, especially during election periods, led to the emergence of a new era of populist propaganda.

In this thesis, I define this persuasive propaganda of the new generation, which is formed by the combination of alternative facts, conspiracy theories, and fake news, based on outright lies and personal instincts, as a populist post-truth propaganda (PPP). Because of their feature based on personal instincts, PPP comes up as a permanent persuasion mechanism to create a feeling of fear against liberal freedoms. In other words, by persuasively imposing illiberal freedom understanding desired to be created with an instinctive accuracy, PPP allows doubts to persist in society against liberalism and its values and defenders.

PPP establishes illiberal freedom perception in three stages; firstly, it raises doubts for demolishing confidence in liberal freedom. Secondly, it builds economic and political insecurity feeling towards liberal freedom. Lastly, it presents the model of democracy, which depicts illiberal freedom as a guarantee of the security of the people, the protection of the nation and culture, and the economic equality of the people. In order to have their illiberal model of democracy accepted by the people, they try to sanctify it for religious or national reasons. Therefore, the majority of society is prepared to surrender freedom to the populist's decisions while the other part is marginalized because of the effect of fear and insecurity feelings provided by the PPP against the liberal form of freedom and those who defend it.

Based on these explanations, first hypothesis of this thesis is “Illiberal freedom perception is formed as a result of socio-cultural or socio-economic division based on fear against liberal values and its advocates that are marginalized by the PPP.” The second hypothesis is that “illiberal freedom perception reduces populists’ questionability, causing democratic backsliding”.

To test the validity of these hypotheses, in this thesis, illiberal economic and political freedom, strategies, and PPPs of populist leaders of Venezuela and Hungary, who tried to be ruled by ideologically different populists, are compared. Since populism is seen as an alternative situation to democratic politics (Canovan, 2005), this study focuses on between 2010-2017, when both countries were recognized as at least hybrid regimes. In order to test the effects of illiberal freedom perception on democratic backsliding, it is focused on both countries' referendums that proposed to support illiberal freedom understanding. In addition, it is included the results of Pew Research surveys that one of the reputable institutions measuring the impact of the discourses created through issues that PPP focuses on.

Following the introduction, in chapter II, it will be provided with critical and descriptive reviews of the political science literature on democratic backsliding. Then, an analysis of the role of left-wing populism and right-wing populism in democratic backsliding will be included, through specific cases in Latin America and Eastern Europe. In addition, by providing explanations for justifications for methodological choices and case selections, it will be perused the research design based on a comparative case study, descriptive data analysis, and mixed methodology. In chapter III, the central tenets of the theoretical and conceptual framework guiding this research will be elucidated. Firstly, it will be evaluated populism relations with democracy, economic freedom, political freedom. Next, by examining the relation of populists with egalitarianism, nationalism, and nativism, it will be underlined that how these notions assist to create illiberal freedom perception. Then, it will be underlined how liberal and illiberal economic and political freedoms are perceived by left-wing populist leaders in Latin America and right-wing populist leaders in the European continent. Secondly, PPP will be defined and conceptualized by separating from populist propaganda. PPP relations with the left-wing and right-wing populist freedom discursive strategies will be inspected in order to understand how illiberal freedom perception is created and how illiberal freedom perception causes democratic backsliding. In chapter IV, it will be analyzed Venezuela's and Hungary's democratic transformations since the beginning of the 20th century. In chapter V, hypotheses will be tested by comparing Venezuela and Hungary between 2010-2017. In the concluding chapter, the accuracy of the hypotheses, contributions to the literature, the limits of this study and implication, and odds for future research will be discussed.

## **CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

In the political science literature, democratic backsliding is generally expressed as a process in which the deterioration of quality of democracies in democratic regimes or the governance of autocracies (Lust, and Waldner, 2015). This process is addressed by scholars as changes in political institutions that impel the government towards a hybrid or authoritarian regime (Erdmann 2011; Hanley, and Vachudova, 2018). More broadly, Nancy Bermeo (2016) argues that democratic backsliding can be seen as a result of the weakening or abolition of any political institution that sustains an existing democracy by the state. Based on this explanation, Bermeo (2016) scrutinizes democratic backsliding in three different forms; coups d'état, executive aggrandizement, and longer-term strategic harassment and manipulation.

According to Bermeo's analysis, coups were illegal attempts by military or other state elites to overthrow an incumbent ruler that often occurred during and after the Cold War. These coups had leaned towards dictatorship before the Cold War, but after the war, they emerged as coups promising temporary democracy. However, these promise coups did not provide permanent democracies either (Bermeo, 2016).

The second type of democratic backsliding highlighted by Bermeo (2016). is executive aggrandizement. This form is observed more widely than others. It occurs when control over the executive power weakened through legal channels, attempting a series of institutional changes that prevent opposition forces from interfering with executive preferences. In this context, it generally happens without overthrowing incumbents and at a slower velocity comparing with the coups (Bermeo, 2016).

The third form of democratic backsliding, often combined with executive aggrandizement, is long-term strategic harassment and manipulation. Bermeo (2016) defines it as a series of actions aimed at turning elections in favor of incumbents. These often occur in the form of blocking access to the media, keeping opposition candidates away from the ballot, blocking voter registration, using government funds for campaigns, and so forth. In general, these manipulations are carried out where they

can already provide majority support and where the opposition is weakened by performance failures and internal orientations (Bermeo, 2016).

Lust and Waldner (2015) also assert that backsliding can not only occur in the absence of democratic breakdown or regime change. However, according to their perspective, apart from the intervention to executive power, backsliding should be also evaluated as some alterations that impact multiple dimensions of democratic quality such as civil and political liberties, competitive electoral procedures, and accountability.

When democratic transformations in Latin America and Eastern Europe are examined, it has been noted by many scholars that many kinds of democratic backsliding have been observed in both regions since the 20th century. According to Samuel Huntington (1991), some anti-democratic reverse waves occurred in both regions after fascist leaders came to power in 1942. In the first reverse wave, military coups brought the end of their democratic systems in the new countries of Eastern Europe and in some countries such as Portugal, Greece, and Argentina. In the second reverse wave (1960-1975) military coups occurred in many Latin American countries. In Uruguay, civilian and military leadership emerged in a collaboration to end democracy through a mixed administrative-military coup (Huntington, 1991). Huntington interpreted the authoritarianism that emerged in both waves as responses to social and economic development in Latin America and the European continent. In Europe, it was the enlargement of social mobilization and political participation, while in Latin America it was more in the form of lassitude of the import substitution stage of economic improvement (Huntington, 1991).

When the democracies of the 21st century are analyzed, it has been observed that democracies are backsliding around the world. (Lueders and Lust, 2018; Lührmann, and Lindberg, 2019). As one of the signs of democratic backsliding, populist infringements that involve some interference with liberal democracies and their political institutions are frequently brought up as an issue (Arditi, 2007). According to Arditi (2007), these illiberal interventions have been leading to democracies in a danger by undermining the institutions that liberal democracy prioritizes. In the existing literature, it has generally been thought that populist governments, whether from the right or the left, have an extremely negative impact on liberal political

systems and cause a serious risk of democratic backsliding (Kyle and Mounk, 2018). Especially, a serious number of empirical researches and academic reports have been revealed that populist illiberal interventions have been backsliding democracies.

To understand the relationship between populism and democratic backsliding; Lust and Waldner (2018) focuses on the populists' illiberal intervention that undermined the electoral mechanism. On the other hand, Kyle and Mounk (2018) examine the erosion of many democratic principles that have been caused by populists' illiberal intervention such as; dismantled checks and balances, eroded rule of law, centralized or restricted freedoms.

When interventions against the checks and balances and the rule of law are examined, in Eastern Europe, Hungary has been the subject of considerable academic researches. Hungary's populist right-wing leader Viktor Orbán's replacement of neutral bureaucratic institutions with loyalists and his actions that weaken the country's judicial independence have been considered to be illiberal moves that could pose a threat to Hungarian democracy by some scholars (Mounk, 2018).

On the other hand, in Latin America, Venezuela, which is considered as the center of left populism, has been coming to the fore due to the frequent intervention of the country's leaders in executive power. Especially when Venezuela's populist leader Hugo Chávez rewrote and effectively politicized the constitution of every major institution in the country, most studies has been underlined serious concerns for the country's democratic values (Mounk, 2018). Therefore, it has been thought that populist leaders who rule countries like, Hungary, and Venezuela abolish checks and balances democratically to consolidate a one-party state system (Ignatieff, 2020).

Another populists' intervention that is criticized in both regions is violations of electoral integrity. In many reports, elections chaired by Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro are evaluated far from free and fair status due to corruption, abuse of state resources, and clientelism (LSE, 2017). Clientelism is seen as a method in which left-wing populist leaders and authoritarians in Latin America often reinforce their power in preventing multilateral competition (LSE, 2017).

As another method of violation of electoral integrity, in Europe, it is asserted that electoral malpractice is used to prevent multilateral competition by right-wing populist leaders. Moreover, it is noticed that right-wing populist leaders erode free and fair elections with the enactment of unfair election laws. (Norris, and Grömping, 2017). Especially in Hungary, it is observed that the integrity of the elections is damaged through domestic law regulations. It is pinpointed that widespread forms of malpractices such as voter intimidation, postal manipulation, and voter buying, have been practiced in Hungary since Orbán came to power in 2010 (Goat, and Banuta, 2019). Therefore, the most criticized subjects in Hungary is Viktor Orbán's unfair election laws, gerrymandering, and unequal conditions applied in the 2014 parliamentary elections (LSE, 2017; Norris, and Grömping, 2017).

Another populists' illiberal interventions, which is underlined are restrictive practices on economic freedom and political freedoms that cause democratic backsliding. According to reports and data issued by The Economist Intelligence Unit and Freedom House, there has been a serious decrease in freedoms in free or at less partly democratic countries where populist regimes have risen in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Freedom House, 2019; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). According to the level of democratic change analyzed in both reports, this situation mostly came to the fore especially with the practices of left-wing populists in Latin America and right-wing populists in Eastern Europe (Freedom House, 2019; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). According to Vadlamannati, and Soysa (2017), both left and right populists limited economic and political freedoms, as they advocate anti-globalization, anti-free trade policies, immigration restrictions, and increased social protection for native people. (Vadlamannati, and Soysa, 2017). They asserted that this situation complicates populists' questionability, causes populist governments to be increasingly autocratic and, upset democracy from within (Vadlamannati, and Soysa, 2017).

In this thesis, I underline that the populists' direct action to restrict the economic and political freedoms has an impact on democratic backsliding, as well as populists' indirect action to restrict the economic and political freedoms through people may cause democratic backsliding. In other words, I emphasize that populists intervene freedoms not only with restrictive interventions but also with the illiberal freedom perception created by manipulating people's freedom understanding.

Illiberal freedom perception is a concrete example of populist persuasion. Through illiberal freedom perception, populists can enable the people to support restrictive freedoms. In this case, populists can both legitimize their policies and reduce their questionability through people, which in turn can allow for restrictions, leading to democratic decline. Therefore, in this study, illiberal freedom perception created by populists against liberal values is defined as a continuum of populist discourses or strategy rather than an ideological dichotomy. Since both its formation and its role in democratic backsliding are discussed, Illiberal freedom perception is considered as both a dependent variable and an independent variable. According to the first hypothesis, illiberal freedom perception is taken as dependent variables to examine how they are formed through PPPs. Then, based on the second hypothesis, it is considered as an independent variable in order to briefly discuss larger implications on democratic backsliding.

According to the first hypothesis, the independent variable is PPP. PPP provides an instinctive persuasion mechanism to create illiberal freedom understanding in the people's mind. Firstly, it destroys trust in liberal freedom, owing to its fear-based persuasive discourse. Then, it creates economic or cultural insecurity feelings against liberal freedom and its advocacies. Lastly, it glorifies alternative illiberal freedom models as the only way to protect the people's will and nation's values. In this way, PPP creates illiberal freedom perceptions by catalyzing a fear-based division in society. Therefore, the division based on PPP becomes the intervening variable of the first hypothesis. According to the second hypothesis, the intervening variable is leaders' questionability due to its role in the relationship between the illiberal freedom perception and democratic backsliding. Therefore, the dependent variable is accepted as democratic backsliding in order to understand the effect of the illiberal freedom perception on democratic backsliding.

By cogitating a research design based on these variables, this thesis presents a study focusing on left-wing populism in Latin America and right-wing populism in Eastern Europe. By comparing Venezuela and Hungary, this research relies on a comparative (multiple) case study method that provides a closer look at the dynamic social processes involved in the research setting. (Mills, Durepos, and Wiebe, 2010). Most comparative analyzes focus on the characteristics that define political units and the



relationships between variables measured between them (Peters, 2003). Therefore, as explained in Mill's Method of Agreement (Mill, 2011), this thesis aims to observe two different cases, obtaining a common output. The logic for the comparison of the two countries is that they provide a broad perspective that makes it easier to generalize descriptive inferences and analyze hypotheses. A single case study does not go beyond the specific characteristics of a country, but a multiple case study helps to develop projects that may be of interest to other scholars by covering a few of the many important cases that have similar processes around the world. Therefore, multiple case study is significant to understand and generalize illiberal freedom understanding that causes democratic backsliding cross-regionally.

Being ruled by ideologically different populist regimes, I believe that Venezuela and Hungary are two excellent cases to understand the illiberal freedom perception that creating by populists. However, there are some theoretical compelling reasons for specifically picking these two cases. Among countries dominated by left-wing populism and driving polarization against liberalism in the region, Venezuela is a significant case that has been receiving attention from both academics and media analysts. Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian movement presented the strongest challenge to the hegemony of the liberal model in the region. Chávez allowed socialism to be perceived as the only solution by placing a heavy emphasis on economic class-based divisions. Moreover, he provided the original model that allowed for the formation of the socialist left against liberalism, which was adopted by other left populist leaders. Given the theoretical concerns of the research, it seems appropriate to choose Venezuela, which has firmly embraced left populism.

On the other hand, in Hungary, Viktor Orbán has seriously been embracing and consolidating the idea of illiberal democracy according to other right-wing populists in the European region. He has been ruling the country according to regulations that seem to be fair but actually serve to erode fundamental democratic freedoms. Especially after the 2015 migrant crisis, he resorted to a number of undemocratic practices under the title of protecting the cultural and national values of the Hungarian people, triggering a serious division in the society. Therefore, Hungary is a country that needs to be studied as an example of what can happen to democracy when a populist using laws as a weapon is allowed to rule the country uncontrollably.


This research presents a research design for analyzing and interpreting observations (Yin, 1994), and it proposes to use mixed methods (Creswell, 2014) research design which involves the integration of both quantitative and qualitative research methods. As Robert Yin asserted that mixed-method research can empower researchers to tackle more complex research questions and collect a richer and more strength set of evidence that can be accomplished by any single method alone (Yin, 2009). Therefore, I assume that choosing the mixed method in multiple case studies can play a major role in contributing to the reliability and authenticity of the findings. Therefore, this study uses qualitative and quantitative forms of evidence, including data on the economic freedom, political freedom, and democracy of Venezuela and Hungary from reputable institutions between 2010 and 2017.

This study also reveals that illiberal freedom perception implemented in both countries shares certain partnerships that form the basic conditions of the debate, including different ideological structures, different democratic and freedom statuses, regional differences, and leadership roles. For this reason, it is tried to define the mutual structures that constitute the basic conditions of the debate by analyzing the discourses of leaders on economic and political freedoms with a descriptive analysis. Mostly using online newspapers, interviews, and books that include leaders' discourses, it is examined leaders' perspectives on economic and political freedoms and their propaganda to create illiberal freedom perception. Furthermore, the study includes causal inferences on PPP, illiberal freedom perception, and democratic backsliding by interpreting over the graphics created by combining data using various data sources. Therefore, this thesis is largely based on qualitative owing to used second-hand data. It is aimed to present a theoretical explanation by describing the concepts and relationships in the raw data received from reputable institutions. Therefore, quantitative descriptive analysis is applied to define the main characteristics of the data in this research. The descriptive analysis provides simple summaries of examples along with simple graphic analysis (Mann, 2010). Hence, this study is only described what is the data or what data shows. In order to create and interpret graphics of a combination of political freedom, economic freedom, and democracy rates in Venezuela and Hungary, data is gathered from Freedom House, The Economist Intelligent Unit, Fraser Institute.

### CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

As mentioned before, this study seeks to understand how illiberal freedom perception created over economic and political freedom and how illiberal freedom perception leads to democratic backsliding. Especially by comparing the illiberal freedom strategies and PPPs of left-wing populists in Latin America and right-wing populists in Eastern Europe, it cross-regionally argues the effect of illiberal freedom perception on democratic backsliding. As a response to questions; this thesis firstly claims that Illiberal freedom perception is formed as a result of socio-cultural or/and socio-economic division based on fear against liberal values and its advocates that are marginalized by the PPP. Secondly, it asserts that illiberal freedom perception reduces populists' questionability, causing democratic backsliding.

Table 1. An Arrow-Diagram of a Summary of The Theoretical Argument ((In scheme I., Populist post-truth propaganda is an independent variable, Division is intervening variable Illiberal freedom perception is dependent variable) and (In scheme II., Illiberal freedom perception is independent variable, questionability is intervening variable and Democratic backsliding is dependent variable)).



To scrutinize more clearly, this chapter creates a theoretical and conceptual framework based on the thesis' arguments by comparing (in Latin America) left-wing populists'

and (in Eastern Europe), right-wing populists' illiberal freedom strategies and discourses. Firstly, this chapter examines populist definitions with three categories. In order to demonstrate cross-regionally populism relation with democratic backsliding, it focuses on the most suitable populist approach. Then, it examines left and right populists' views against liberal economic and political freedom. Next, it presents left and right populists' alternative attitudes towards liberal freedom. Secondly, it defines and conceptualized PPP. Then, it discusses the role of PPP in creating illiberal freedom perception. Finally, it analyzes how illiberal freedom perception decreases populists' questionability, causing democratic backsliding.

### ***3.1. The Populist Challenges to Liberal Democracy: Illiberal Freedom Perception***

Before understanding the basis of left and right populists' relation to economic and political freedoms, it is necessary to understand what populism stances for whether ideological strategic, or discursive in this study. Therefore, it is advantageous to start with the main definitions that capture the most basic characteristics of populism to ground the discussion.

In order to define populism, along with myriad different definitions and approaches, several theoretical assumptions, as well as methodological implications, are persevered in by many scholars. While some analysts list the main features to describe populism, others find suspicious links and weak similarities between different populist practices. However, overall, most scholars agree that populism is an ideological concept (Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008). Especially, Cas Mudde (2004) proclaims that populism is a thin ideology that ultimately divides society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "pure people" and "corrupt elites". He considers populism as integral to other thin or thick ideologies such as communism, socialism, nationalism, etc (Mudde, 2004). Likewise, Ben Stanley (2008) also defines populism as an ideology that is receptive for established full ideologies. Yet, there are also those who consider populism as a strategic or discursive term. Betz (2002) argues that populism is a political strategy that political rhetoric is not an ideology, but rather an appeal for the emotions evoked by hidden grievances. In a similar perspective, Weyland (2001) also views populism as a political strategy that leaders seek government power, often based on unmediated institutionalized support. On the other hand, discursive definitions are

generally explained by focusing on Laclau's discourse analysis (Bonikowski, 2016; Kazin, 2017; Aslanidis, 2016). Laclau treats populism as a political logic that constitutes society. He does not reduce populism to the discourse or strategies politicians use to divide the population into two opposing camps. He presents populism as real content that can be described as populist rather than a movement specified with a certain ideology or a social base (Laclau, 2005). Aslandis (2016) states populism can be better identified with the discourse emphasizing the dominance of the people against the corrupt elite when it is removed from Mudde's ideology framework. As another contribution to the discursive view, Bonikowski (2016) believes that populism does not have a consistent philosophy or ideology. According to him, populism is a kind of dynamic discursive framing strategy (Bonikowski, 2016). Kazin (2017) likewise argues that populism emerged as a flexible mode to persuade the public rather than merging with ideology. In this thesis, populism is also considered to be more discursive. Parallel to Kazin's and Bonikowski's views, populism is actually considered as *a discursive strategy based on persuasion*.

Populism transforms politics into a discursive conflict based on fear in society by providing opportunities for rightists, leftists, and those without a coherent ideology to benefit equally. More clearly, populism constructs politics as a moral and ethical struggle between the people and the oligarchy (De la Torre, 2000). The subject they emphasize discursively is often the sovereignty of the people over the corrupt elite (Aslanidis, 2016). For this reason, it directs the public towards populists' own policies perceptually with strategic persuasive discourses, and mobilizes them against the opposing sector and politics. The most effective method of these discourses is to feed them with strong propaganda strategies. However, it does not mean that every propagandist leader could be considered a populist. Populists' propaganda is more related to establishing ties with the people. Therefore, populist discourses should be based on persuading people to be involved in the idea being defended. The defended issue should be able to intertwine with the issues that people care about or worry about. Thus, populist discourses are rarely aside from reality (Hendricks, and Vestergaard, 2019). Isolated facts and news are carefully selected to support a populist cause. In this case, the people become both angry and afraid of the harsh facts they face (Hendricks, and Vestergaard, 2019). In this way, while guiding the people in line with populists' own policies, everything populists are opposed to can be also rejected by

the people. Therefore, evaluating populism as a discursive strategy based on persuasion may allow understanding populists' persuasiveness effect on people and its reflection in democracies. This aspect becomes more evident when populists' perspective against democracy, liberal democracy, liberal values, and its defenders are examined.

Generally speaking, the basic features of democracy are popular sovereignty and majority rule. Liberal democracies are more than just democracies, it is actually a representative democracy in which political elites contest for support for the rule of the majority of the population. However, majority rule is not unlimited in liberal democracies. More precisely, it is kept under control by a complex system of features such as minority rights, rule of law, and separation of powers (Galston, 2018). For this reason, it is often criticized by populists. Because, according to the populists' view, politics must be based on the will of the people and liberal democracy is incapable of meeting this (Mudde, 2017). But in reality, this criticism is based on a different purpose. The populist rule is to gain power by mobilizing and retaining mass voters who are usually free of other political devotions. Therefore, in order to be buttressed by citizens, they often broached that their policies actually are bottomed on *the volonté générale* (general will) of the people (Mudde, 2007). Populists describe themselves as true democrats expressing popular opinions and complaints that are ignored or not recognized by institutionalized policy and media (Canovan, 1999). The others are defined as corrupt liberal elites by them (Mudde, 2004). This liberal antagonism is not only based on anti-elitism but also combined with anti-pluralism and majoritarianism (Mudde, and Kaltwasser, 2017). According to Muller, this liberal antagonism is not only due to anti-elitism but also because populists are anti-pluralist (Müller, 2016). Populists see people as a single judgment, a singular will, and therefore speak and act as if they can improve a singular, decisive authority. Hence, most populist leaders claim that they alone, represent the people as the only legitimate power in society (Müller, 2016). The imposition of populism's assumption of uniformity in society contradicts the modern democracies' idea of living together as pluralistically, free, equal, and also with diverse citizens (Müller, 2016). As most populists display an extremely majoritarian democratic attitude that opposes any group or institution that stands in the way of applying the general will of the people, they tend to create democratic backsliding (Mudde, and Kaltwasser, 2017). They are not afraid to trigger

democratic backsliding to gain the consent of the community and achieve power by manipulating institutions and procedures (Urbinati, 2018). Therefore, to sway the people in line with their centralized economic and political freedom policies under state interventions, populists create a perception mechanism based on persuasion by initiating discourses that cause fear and concern in society. Because they tend to justify illiberal attacks on anyone that threatens their authoritarianism and the homogeneity of the people (Mudde, and Kaltwasser, 2017). Thus, they mostly shape people's freedom perceptions under egalitarianism, nativism, and nationalism in order to illiberalize economic and political freedom in people's minds.

Populists divide the society as people and elite for moral and ethnic reasons (Mudde, 2007). This division has a national and state-based structure as in nationalism. (Heiskanen, 2020). In other words, this division is based on the protection of the nation against the corrupted elite. Therefore populism has coalesced with nationalism (Mudde, 2007). On the other hand, populism and nativism relations are more radical than nationalism. Mudde defines nativism as xenophobic nationalism (Mudde, 2007). It is an ideology that demands the harmony of the political and cultural unit of the state and nation. Nativism is based on the idea that there should be a state for every nation and a nation for every state. Along with its history, culture, values, and religion, nation represents a homogeneous whole. Therefore, the 'purity' of the nation should be protected against all kinds of internal and external threats (Mudde, 2007). The foreign and refugee opposition that emerged with the rise of the populist radical right in Europe is often associated with nativism (Mudde, 2018). Right-wing radical populists adopt the opposition to globalization, the EU, and immigration in a xenophobic attitude. They shape their policies on the promise of restoring the sovereignty of the people against internal and external enemies (Mudde, 2007). Therefore, they often advocate policies that restrict the rights of immigrants and refugees to be embraced by the people (Mudde, 2018). According to Mudde's analysis for European right-wing populists, ethnicity is not part of the populist division between the people and the elite who are part of the same ethnic group. Nativists are neither considered as part of the people nor the elite. On the other hand, left populists in Latin America define the nation as a multicultural unit in which the people and elite are divided according to morality and ethnicity (Mudde, 2007). While right-wing populists merge nativism and populism to accuse the corrupt (native) elites of favoring (alien) immigrants and marginalizing

(native) people in Europe, left-wing populists combine socialism and populism to blame the corrupted elite for looting the country's national resources to the detriment of poor people in Latin America (Mudde, 2007). Therefore, the relationship between populism and egalitarianism is mostly established by left populism.

Populists' perspectives on economic and political freedom are also similar to nativism, nationalism, and egalitarianism. They often emphasize equality, identity, and nation in their discourse, criticizing liberal capitalist systems for their freedom understandings. They attempt to de-qualify liberal values in the eyes of the people by claiming that capitalist liberal systems cause a class division in society. The reference made to people in their discourses is usually in the form of calls to the ordinary class versus the capitalist class (Laclau, 2005b). Class references in left populists' discourse are more pronounced and strategic. Specifically, they mention class references based on economic inequality. In this way, people will hold capitalism and globalization responsible for poverty and inequality in the misfortunes in the region (Edward, 2010). Thus, they will be able to create a new form of society in order to gain popular support for illiberal freedom policies, insisting that more government intervention and regulation are necessary to reduce inequality.

In Eastern Europe, right-wing populists tend to criticize social inequality in society, but often inequality is evaluated mostly socio-culturally due to the nationalist and nativist language that mostly points out traditional values (Greven, 2016). As a reason for social inequality, it is indicated liberal capitalism's tendency to globalize. Liberal capitalism has a global international structure that enables the integration of immigrants, especially from non-European cultures. Therefore, it is often criticized by right-wing populists for the idea that social integration will result in social inequalities and reduced solidarity between social groups (Swank, and Betz, 2018).

Moreover, they try to persuade people to embrace centralized economic and political freedom by introducing his own illiberal regime as the only savior. Because according to populists' believes, freedom provided by the liberal values of democracies besides being insufficient to protect democracy and the economic and political freedoms of the people, also detriment them. Therefore, both left-wing populism in Latin America and right-wing populism in Eastern Europe share negative views against liberal freedoms they glorify the centralized understanding of illiberal freedom.



For instance, Orbán, one of the prominent representatives of right-wing populism in Eastern Europe, defines his illiberal model of freedom as Christian freedom to give a sanctifying meaning. In other words, he tries to establish a bond with the people by using religion. He constantly underlines democracies based on liberal freedom is a system that does no longer make sense to the continent (Hungary Today, 2019). Moreover, He characterizes liberal freedoms as a dangerous factor that threatens people's Christian freedom in the country (Hungary Today, 2019). Therefore, by defending a Christian conception of freedom, Orbán frequently tries to persuade Hungarian people that Christian freedom is a guide for Hungarian people. According to him, Christian freedom shows that;

*“nations are free and should not be subordinated to the laws of a global government, as empires oppress nations and are therefore dangerous and undesirable”* (Hungary Today, 2019).

Therefore, by offering Christian freedom as an alternative to the religious concerns of the people, he underlines that this Christian model is a model of freedom that the people actually want.

On the other hand, Chávez, the prominent representative of the left, defined liberal freedom as a social injustice that supports the US interventionism and the US imperialism that threatens the nation's values (Discursos De Chávez Tomo III, 2014)<sup>1</sup>. He labeled liberalism and its freedom recipes as a brutal model that devastated and threatened millions of people. By launching his movements as a savior to nationalize other strategic sectors such as electricity, energy, and telephony, many times, he asserted that his movements disturbed the liberal system (Discursos De Chávez Tomo III, 2014). He frequently indicated that liberal freedoms would be the imperialist game of powerful countries such as the US. In almost every speech, he claimed that liberal freedom would damage the economy of Latin American countries and turn the continent into a colonial center (Discursos De Chávez Tomo III, 2014). In this respect, he emphasized that the socialist model of democracy was the only salvation by presenting socialist freedom that advocated centralist protectionist freedom against liberalism, which he did not regard as sacred (Discursos De Chávez Tomo III, 2014).

---

<sup>1</sup> As in this document, all of the Spanish resources in this thesis have been translated by the author.

Alternatively, he offered a socialist model that aims to build with broad participation, and broad freedoms to return to Bolivarian roots. He referred to the basic values of twenty-first-century socialism should be based on equality and social justice just like the principles of Christianity (Molina et al., 2018). Especially against most anti-capitalist states, for these values to become reality, the means of production, the market system, and the private ownership of the private property of the pro-capitalist state must change the political and economic institutions (Wilpert, 2007). Chávez equated illiberal socialist freedom with religion and enshrines it in the eyes of the people. More precisely, by bringing the socialist model of freedom to the same level as religion, He enabled people to connect with his model of freedom.

Right-wing populists marginalize liberal capitalism by claiming that it destroys the traditional social ties and values of nations in Europe. Moreover they claim that the liberal political changes that have been injected into the world with capitalism must also be rejected. (Chirot, 1994). In Latin America, left-wing populists call capitalism a false system of another form of inequality and they underline that it is exploitative (Chirot, 1994). Therefore, most of the left-wing populists impose economic and political freedom offered by capitalism as the reason for inequality and imperialism. Liberal political freedom is seen as a distorted concept of freedom by left-wing populists like Chávez (Discursos de Chávez Tomo III, 2014). In Eastern Europe, right-wing populists consider both economic and political freedom as a toxic expansion into the democracy allows immigration policies. Moreover, by applying nationalist and immigrant rhetoric in their practice of rejecting citizenship based on civil liberties and rights. They target Muslims as a threat for their religious, national or traditional identity (Savage, 2018). Therefore, both left and right populists offer centralized freedom policies to protect their people and nation as an alternative to the economic and political freedom offered by the liberal capitalist system.

Populist leaders often do not rely on the complexity and transparency of institutional mediation. They are skeptical of the pluralism and autonomy of institutions (Brubaker, 2017). These centralized policies are based on the claim to protect the people from threats from above, below, and especially from outside. It is emphasized that this threat is usually from cheap foreign goods to domestic producers, from cheap foreign workers to domestic workers, and from foreign creditors to domestic borrowers (Brubaker, 2017). In particular, they define free-market policies that come with

collectivity as a product of uncontrolled globalization and reflect it as a factor that significantly increases the racial, ethnic, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity of the population (Brubaker, 2017). From a regional perspective, left-wing populists in Latin America interpret limited collectivity in economic or political terms. They define uncontrolled globalization based on foreign trade and American imperialism as an external. In Europe, right-wing populists link economic uncontrolled globalization with the EU and they see collectivity as a threat by external groups or forces (including internal foreigners). Moreover, both left and right populists often emphasize that such liberal economic cooperation will trigger the possible migration wave and change the structure of the labor market (Brubaker, 2017). This makes it easy to discredit the elite in the eyes of the public. Because elites are nation's capitalists and industrialists group that mostly lives in urban and cosmopolitan environments who have constant contact with the country's external enemies for commercial or political reasons. Thus, in a state of low institutional trust, voters see traditional elites as impotent and incapable when they faced many contemporary socio-economic problems (Mudde, 2015). Therefore, regarding which power should be limited and which individual rights should be protected, populist leaders have been considered as a power to challenge common democratic rules, including the rules of liberal democracy (Plattner, 2010).

Populist leaders refer to liberal freedoms are a system imposed as a democratic order. Therefore, they often make discursive references to the political order and introduce people as victims of liberalist deception and repression (Moffitt, and Tormey, 2014). In this context, this illiberal freedom perception, which is provided to make the people turn their back on liberal freedoms, can have a strong effect that changes the understanding of freedom in general. Therefore, populists strategically often resort to populist post-truth propaganda that relies on instinctual truths in order to create illiberal freedom perception in the people's minds.

### ***3.2. Defining Populist Post-Truth Propaganda (PPP)***

According to Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, propaganda is the persuasive method used in the construction of manipulative discourses. Moreover, it tries to propagate a particular ideology or doctrine using emotional factors to serve the propagandist's purposes (Jowett, and O 'Donnell, 2015). The attempt to influence

people's minds and behaviors, the exploitation of socially established behavior patterns, and the efficient use of mass media (Bernays 1928; Jowett, and O'Donnell, 2015), intertwines propaganda with politics and makes propaganda attractive to political leaders.

Propaganda is often deliberately distorted by leaders that support their political interests in order to change the public's view of an issue or event. Therefore, truth and lie are not entirely clear. However, after the 2000s, propaganda has undergone a change based on instincts rather than the distinction between truth and lies. Especially after President George W. Bush announced that he made the decision to start the Iraq War based on his personal instincts (ABC News, 2006), the concept of truthiness<sup>2</sup>, in politics started to cause controversy (Hendricks, and Vestergaard, 2019). Along with the rising of the populist, the proliferation of this kind of propaganda that develops with personal instincts by triggering polarization into society has dragged the debate of truth in politics to a more serious dimension. Although it seemed to advocate the alleged goodness and democracy of the nation, it has turned into a position that only serves the interests of leaders.

Over recent years, this kind of propaganda redefined with post-truth which is a vogue phrase that has emerged in domestic and international politics (Laybats, and Tredinnick, 2016). Although post-truth has been examined as a politics under the populist propaganda (Vatsov, 2018), populist propaganda has emerged as another type of propaganda together with personal instinct gained importance as an alternative fact. More specifically, in this study, the definition of "populist post-truth propaganda" (PPP) was used to define this new type of propaganda. The conceptual meaning of these two terms has not scientifically established yet. However, in this section, both types of propaganda have been studied by taking into consideration the propaganda studies in the past.

---

<sup>2</sup> Truthiness is defined as the quality of seeming or being felt to be true, even if not necessarily true, and coined in the modern sense by the US humorist Stephen Colbert in 2005. Zimmer, B.(2010). 'Truthiness', *The New York Times*, 13 October [Online]. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/magazine/17FOB-onlanguage-t.html> (Accessed: 3 November 2019).

Propaganda has a defensive and offensive form (Erbschloe, 2019). Defensive propaganda is a form of propaganda that validates itself, strives to discredit competitors, and tries to persuade its allies about the validity of a position or action (Erbschloe, 2019). On the other hand, defensive propaganda often contains many factors that lead to false promises, invalid information confusion. It strives to create uncertainty, raise hatred and suspicion, and discredit rivals (Erbschloe, 2019). Populists impose the idea that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people, ultimately dividing the society into two “corrupted elites” against “pure people” (Mudde, 2004). Populists are more prone to seeing and describing the elite as an enemy rather than as an opposing group. In order to evoke fear and suspicion against the elite in society, they try to discredit them in society (Ernst et al., 2017). Therefore, populist propaganda and PPPs against the elites propagated by the populists, who have a political style based on provocations, aggressive language, aggression, and negative emotionality (Oliver and Rahn, 2016), have an offensive structure. On the other hand, such propaganda is not likely to have a defensive form. Because populists are not leaders striving to guarantee the validity and legitimacy of a position or action to the world. Instead, they resort to false policies and follow public persuasion through manipulations.

Propaganda is described as white, gray, or black regarding the accuracy of its source and information (Cole, and Taylor, 1998). White propaganda tends to be accurate in information from a properly-defined source and in the message (Jowett, and O'Donnell, 2015). Gray propaganda is defined somewhere between white and black propaganda, and its sources may or may not be correctly identified. Besides, Its accuracy is uncertain (Jowett, and O'Donnell, 2015). On the other hand, black propaganda is a type in which the source is hidden under the false authority and spread lies, fabrication, and deception. Black propaganda is “big lies” that contain all kinds of creative deception (Jowett, and O'Donnell, 2015). Populist propaganda can be white, gray, and black propaganda. However, PPP is mostly created with black propaganda logic. For example, the propaganda that Viktor Orbán claims immigrants will cause economic distress is gray propaganda. Because there is a possibility that economic distress can be seen as irregular employment due to population growth. Therefore, it is difficult to falsify populist propaganda.

When Orbán portrays immigrants as thieves over billboards it creates perceptions that immigrants are thieves. Even if it is a falsifiable accusation, it contains a conspiracy theory that triggers distrust due to the deception it carries. Moreover, it carries an instinctive context, leading to the identification of immigrants as thieves. Therefore, while this first event is populist propaganda, the second is a good example of PPP.

Other terms used to describe the content of propaganda are disinformation and misinformation (Erbschloe, 2019). Especially for the purpose of disseminating false information, populist leaders frequently create propaganda by including disinformation and misinformation in the content. These two terms are often confused, although both terms have two different meanings. In the literature, misinformation is explicated as the spread of false or misleading information on a mass scale. Misinformation is also a method of disseminating information that has a negative impact on the quality of political decisions made by the citizen (Brown, 2018). It is often defined as false or inaccurate information created or disseminated incorrectly or unintentionally (University of Michigan Library, 2020). However, disinformation is a more sinister term. It is generally defined as false, deficient, or deceptive information that is transferred, established, or approved to a selected person, group, or country (Shultz and Godson, 1984). It is seen as a type of false information that is deliberate to influence the public or to hide the truth (University of Michigan Library, 2020). In other words, while misinformation has content that can be created without realizing it, disinformation has content that is consciously manipulated. Frankly, I do not think that this can be easily understood not only by the propaganda that populists resort to but also in any political propaganda. Therefore, I believe that both PPP and populist propaganda may have false information content. Because, given the populists' hostility to the elite, the existence of misinformation and disinformation in any kind of populist propaganda is not surprising. Populists collocate "ordinary people" with "elites"; they portray "the people as virtuous, and the elite as unresponsive and/or corrupt" (Kessel, Sajuria, and Hauwaert, 2020). In this way, populism builds an 'antagonistic frontier' between people and the elite (Laclau, 2005). Therefore, it is not easy to understand which of the two types of false information is used. However, despite their structure consisting of conspiracy and fake news, PPPs contain unreal content that is not difficult to falsify. It usually consists of personal instincts rather than falsehood. Therefore, it is based on the content that "I kind of feel like that, so it's can be right"


and it is based on a message that “I feel this way, that's why I should act like this”. They target the instinctive fears and doubts of the public, trying to find a kind of alternative fact to the fact. Therefore, PPP is propaganda that is difficult to falsify in people's minds.

Table 2. Comparing Populist Propaganda and Populist Post-Truth Propaganda

Populist Propaganda	Populist Post-truth Propaganda
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Offensive or Defensive</li> <li>• Black / Grey</li> <li>• Disinformation / Misinformation</li> <li>• Would consist of Lies or Truths</li> <li>• Against Elites / External Powers</li> <li>• Difficult to "Falsify"</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mostly Offensive</li> <li>• Black</li> <li>• Disinformation/ Misinformation</li> <li>• Mostly consist of "Lies" and "Alternative Facts" based on personal instincts.</li> <li>• Against Elite / External Powers</li> <li>• Not difficult to "Falsify" but it's difficult to "Falsify" in people's mind</li> </ul>

### 3.3. Conceptualizing of Populist Post-Truth Propaganda

Table 3. Populist Post-Truth Conceptualization



The formation and spread of PPP take place in three stages; alternative facts/personal beliefs, conspiracy, fake news. Firstly, populists create alternative facts that can influence the people's personal beliefs to manipulate their political and economic opinions. This element constitutes the main substance of PPPs. Because this propaganda needs an alternative fact that can be as convincing as the truth about the subject they are against and also will be instinctively correct. The main narrative in populism is that they only represent themselves and the true (proper) will of people (Müller, 2016). Others are corrupted people which have commonly described as elites and external forces (Mudde, and Kaltwasser, 2017). Therefore, populists produce alternative facts by targeting the elites who systematically betray the people and the external forces who desire to manipulate domestic politics and the democracy of people. Yet, the alternative facts based on personal instincts do not provide complete incredibility or it does not mean that there will not be criticism against its truthfulness.

Secondly, PPPs need conspiracy narratives that stimulate fear in order to make alternative facts believable. Because alternative facts become completely believable as long as they come from alternative sources according to one's taste and worldview when critical thought is turned into a conspirator thought (Hendricks, and Vestergaard,



2019). In this way, populists can create skepticism over the role of elite and foreign powers in the security of the nation and democracy. Moreover, they can spread hatred and fear against them. Therefore, in order to work PPP, populists require to create fear-based conspiracy theories against the other. Owing to this element the people begin to look at the elites, the external powers, and their policies with doubt. Moreover, they become more inclined to the idea of freedom proposed by populists.

The third and final element of PPPs is fake news that often intentionally expecting to promote false information which is quite difficult to detect. PPPs based on falsehood, disinformation, and misinformation achieve the expected impact on the public. It builds complete trust against the government policy that is being persuaded. In this way, PPPs are able to easily persuade people's perspectives in line with their own policies by targeting people's instinctive truths.

#### ***3.4. As a Key Persuasive Factor for Illiberal Freedom Perception: Populist Post-Truth Propaganda***

As claimed earlier, populists create fear, distrust, and insecurity feeling against the liberal freedoms under the guise of nativist, nationalist, and egalitarian discourses to create illiberal freedom perceptions. Owing to the instinctive persuasion methods, populists are able to direct people's freedom perceptions in line with their discourses. They can create fear and suspicion against elites and external forces by using current problems that people struggle with while establishing a political trust to consolidate illiberal freedom perception. In this way, populists can cause the elite to be associated with the feeling that they no longer support the public interest in society by creating distrust against elites in people's minds (Geurkink et al., 2019). In this way, while populists become able to illiberalize people's freedom understanding, they also marginalize liberal freedoms in people's minds through the elites. Therefore, populists try to illiberalize the people's freedom perception in order to gain public support and reduce their questionability. By focusing on specific strategy breakthroughs based on their discourse, they try to "demolish confidence in liberal freedom" through the PPPs.

Freedom and democracy are often used interchangeably, but the two are not synonymous (Brennan, 2018). However, undoubtedly, democracy can be seen as a

series of practices and principles that are institutionalized and protect freedom (Brennan, 2018). In general, it can be said that freedom is an important component of democracy, but this is not enough. In current measures, political participation and the functioning of the government should be taken into account (LSE BPP, 2017). In other words, the ability of democratic stability to function depends on the extent to which citizens trust and support democracy as a political regime (Cho, 2014). At this point, the role of freedom is critical. For democratic stability, people must understand and believe the importance of fundamental rights and civil liberties that freedom offers (LSE BPP, 2017). On the other hand, populists aim to rewrite political and economic freedoms in the people's minds through PPPs. They manipulate the people's freedom perception by creating some instinctive reality by making the people afraid of liberal freedoms and their defenders. While right-wing populists apply that mostly under the name of protecting nativist and nationalist values, left-wing populists resort to this fear-based on an egalitarian unifying discourse (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017).

One of the concrete examples of PPP in this regard is anti-George Soros propaganda, which the European right-wing populist leader Viktor Orbán claims to be one of the elites who defend the European Union and its liberal freedom policies. He constantly tries to persuade people by claiming that NGOs funded by Soros want to change the ethnic mix in Hungary (Taylor, 2012). By instinctively trying to convince the people that national identity is at stake, it urges the people to distrust the liberal form of civil liberty and its advocates. Even if NGO's not only helping for resettlement of people but also for compliance with European laws that apply in Hungary (Hungarian spectrum, 2018), the fears, distrust, and insecurity feelings that PPPs create may able to take precedence over the truth.

Likewise, PPPs of Chávez, the prominent representative of the left, was moving on a strategy that tried to persuade the public to the illiberalism by creating fear against liberalism and its freedom policies. Through PPPs, he often labeled liberalism and its freedom methods as a brutal model that devastated and threatened millions of people. By launching his movements as a savior to nationalize other strategic sectors such as electricity, energy, and telephony, many times, he asserted that his movements disturbed the liberal system. Therefore, even it is not the real reason, due to only he believed in that way, he was asserting the liberal system brought down the Caracas

Stock Exchange (Discursos De Chávez Tomo III, 2014). In this way, he remained in power for many years, trying to destroy the trust in liberalism in the eyes of the people by feeding internal fears against liberalism.

Overall, people's freedom understanding has been tried to limit by the illiberalized freedom offered by populists. Worst of all, the expectations of the people from freedom have been tried to be shaped by the fear and suspicion created by the populists.

Apart from demolishing confidence in liberal freedom, populists seek to create a sense of "cultural and economic insecurity" against liberal freedoms through PPPs. Generally feeling economically and culturally safe is an important step for democracies. When the public cannot feel this trust, disquiet comes up in democratic systems. Populists try to keep this doubtfulness alive against liberal freedom. They work to destroy people's trust in liberal values by presenting fears against the unity of the nation in different ways. According to some research, it is predicted that threat perceptions and feelings of insecurity created by this type of populist will lead to hidden authoritarian tendencies (Inglehart and Norris, 2017). Therefore, populists create economic or political insecurity in connection with the problem that prone to being anxious in their country (Obschonka et al., 2016). Hence, they create an opportunity to glorify their own illiberal liberal policies. The issue that populists emphasize on economic insecurity is inequality. In particular, they associate inequality with concerns such as losing or not being able to find a job because of the liberal system. According to the work of Alexander and Welzel (2017), increasing inequality develops rapidly between classes of liberal emancipatory values. Therefore, PPP that contains anti-liberal populist messages become easily persuadable to the people. On the other hand, cultural insecurity created by populists is an issue that frequently associated with increasing heterogeneity in countries. Thus, it sometimes shows itself based on anti-immigrant thoughts, the threat of terrorism and uncontrolled borders, fear of diversity, and of religious pluralism (Norris and Inglehart, 2017). In general, right-wing populists emphasize more cultural insecurity while triggering fear and distrust against liberal freedoms.

Especially Orbán attacks the liberal policies of the EU as well as the Soros' NGO, saying that the influx of Muslim refugees poses a threat to the Christian identity of

Europe (Traynor, 2015). He emphasizes that immigrant Muslims can be terrorists, by suggesting that Soros' NGOs' money could be used for money laundering or terrorism financing (BBC, 2017a). Thus, he tries to ensure the distrust of liberal values in the eyes of the people by targeting organizations such as NGOs promoted by liberal freedom.

On the other hand, Chávez combined the idea of distrust to liberal freedom with a sense of economic inequality. He tried to keep people away from liberal freedom policies with economic inequality discourses by applying a more anti-Americanist attitude. Saying that he believed that the Punto Fijo Pact, which has been applied to liberal practice in the past, cooperates with the United States he asserted liberal values as responsible for the economic crisis that occurred during this period. Moreover, by emphasizing that he just believed American elites were behind the economic crisis and economic inequalities in the country, he sought to cause unrest in the society against the advocates of liberalism (Discursos De Chávez Tomo IV, 2014).

After creating a sense of fear and insecurity against liberal freedom, populists offer an alternative solution through PPPs. People, who seek alternative freedom as a result of the fear and insecurity created against liberalism, meet with populist illiberal freedom surrounded by holiness. Populists strategically associate with discourses that they define as sacred, such as religion or national values through PPPs. They work for the public acceptance of illiberal democracy that containing centralized illiberal freedoms. In particular, Chávez constantly made religious references for the socialist model of democracy and freedom that he proposed during his presidency. He launched capitalism as a way of evil and exploitation. He described Jesus Christ as the first socialist and claimed that looking at things through the eyes of Jesus Christ can only be created by socialism ((Chávez, 2006) quoted in Katz, 2013)). In Eastern Europe, right-wing populist leader Orbán also blended the illiberal Christian democracy and Christian freedom with religious values and he introduced it as a way of liberation. He propagated his Christian freedom as the necessary way to protect Hungary's security and Christian culture (The guardian, 2018).

Overall, as a result of the effect of PPP, especially the part of the society who embrace illiberal freedoms begin to marginalize liberal freedom and sees liberal freedoms as a

danger. With the effect of fear and insecurity created by PPPs, it inevitably causes a division based on fear in society. Research underlines that once these kinds of fears have been activated, they can affect any kinds of decisions of the people, including their voting behavior (Alesina and Passarelli, 2015; Obschonka et al., 2016). Considering economic and political freedom these fears formed through PPPs create an illiberal freedom perception in the society that easily manipulated.

### ***3.5. The Impact of Illiberal Freedom Perception on Democratic Backsliding***

Laclau claims that populism is a discourse that can form a chain of equivalents by combining social groups with different ideas and interests to build a common enemy (Laclau, 2005). Therefore, it is no surprise that liberal elites and external forces that do not view freedom with the same perspective become targets and are declared enemies of freedoms. By this marginalization or different nomenclature; polarization or division may not necessarily be perceived as a threat to democracy. As Dahl said, the formation of many different views is actually one of the distinctive elements of liberal democracy (Dahl, 1989). However, if this polarization in society gets bigger or more extreme, it can lead to a socio-economic or political conflict within the society. In this case, as Hetherington and Rudolph claim, it does not make any compromise possible and prevents the proper functioning of the democratic political system (Hetherington and Rudolph, 2015).

In populist regimes, illiberal freedom perception that hinders the proper functioning of the democratic political system occurs in the fear-based divisions varying for economic and political reasons. Since these divisions are fear-based rather than creating a permanent socio-economic or socio-cultural conflict, they may even be temporary and may not be perceived as a threat to democracy. However, the illiberal freedom perceptions that emerged as a result of the fear-based division are an important factor affecting populists' questionability. In general leaders' ability to pursue a radical corporate change strategy depends on their ability to maintain a high level of public support (Ruth, 2017). Through these perceptions of freedom, populists gain popular support for their restrictive decisions regarding liberal freedom. These perceptions create support for the policies of populists and prevent the public from questioning the decisions of populists. Because the idea of illiberal freedom is

presented under the guise of the people's will, even when populists appeal to referendums, the majority of the people support populists' restrictive freedom decisions. In fact, illiberal freedom perception gives legitimacy to restrictive perceptions of freedom through referendums.

This section emphasizes the claims of theoretical arguments of this thesis. Therefore, in order to test the accuracy of this arguments, a detailed analysis is presented on the Venezuelan and Hungarian examples.

### ***Concluding Remarks***

Overall, this chapter develops a theoretical and conceptual framework to show that populists' indirect actions to restrict economic and political freedoms through people can also cause democratic backsliding. Seeing populism as a discursive strategy based on persuasion, this chapter argues that democratic backsliding in populist regimes may also be linked to people's illiberal freedom perception.

This chapter defines the logic of the populists in creating an illiberal freedom perception as reflecting the illiberal freedom policies to the people as their own will. In this way, claiming that populists gain legitimacy for their restrictive freedom policies, it underlines that illiberal freedom perceptions are created by populist-post-truth propaganda that shaped with under the guise of nationalist nativist and egalitarian reasons that develop depending on the people's fear. It states that combining the PPP, which is defined as alternative facts based on instincts rather than facts, with antagonism of liberalism and people's fears, allows the fear-based division of society. As a result of this division illiberal freedom perception occurs in society. By providing the legitimacy that permits the illiberal freedom restrictive policies of populist leaders, illiberal freedom perception reduces the populists' questionability. As a result of that this chapter claims that illiberal freedom perception is able to cause democratic backsliding by paving the way for populists' restrictive freedom policies. Therefore, the theoretical framework suggested in this study allows the persuasiveness of populists to be seen as an indirect factor for democratic backsliding by influencing people's freedom perceptions.

## CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL BACKGROUD OF VENEZUELAN AND HUNGARIAN DEMOCRACY

### *4.1. Venezuela*

Given past political governments, Venezuela is a country that has been undergoing contradictory democratic experiments under the control of different forms of government since the period of independence. Especially, it had been gone through unsettled democratic periods in the country due to the failure of complex government structures intertwined with democratic and military-based authoritarian regimes (Tarver, Frederick, and Rivas, 2018).

In this chapter, in order to create a comprehensive perspective about the modern democracy of Venezuela, which has been still experiencing a compelling democratization process today, it will be examined Venezuela's democratic transformations between 1900 and 2017 .

#### *4.1.1. Dictatorship to Democracy (1900-1958)*

At the beginning of the 20th century, the appearance of Cipriano Castro (1899-1908) and lieutenant Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935) to power was a key turning point in Venezuelan political life. During the Castro and Gómez's government, Caudillismo<sup>3</sup> lost its power over the Venezuelan political systems. Military was organized to dominate the Venezuelan territory, having been terminated the independence of the regional Caudillos (Caldera, 2013). Especially, Gómez did not allow any caudillos to remain in the country during his presidency. Yet, contrary to this intention, he had become an ideal caudillo for Venezuela by establishing a strong professional army command to govern the country (Caldera, 2013). In this period, political freedom was under great danger, and almost nonexistent. Citizens were not comfortable speaking

---

<sup>3</sup> Caudillismo is a dictatorship-based socio-political system that emerged in Latin America in the 19th century after the wars of independence from Spain. Leaders in this system are defined as the head of the irregular forces that ruled a politically different region with a group of armed men by Encyclopaedia Britannica. Riz, D. R. (2011). *Caudillismo, Latin American politics* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/caudillismo> (Accessed: 1 November 2019).

about Gómez and querying his political regime and decisions (Caldera, 2013). They had a risk to be arrested by the omnipresent secret police force known as La Sagrada (Tarver, Frederick, and Rivas, 2018). All political parties were shut down (Bruni, and Tulio, 2014). Constitution has begun to only work for Gómez dictatorship instead of a political instrument to provide citizens' rights.

Venezuela's oil dependence has begun in Gómez's era then, all governments attempted to use oil rent to modernize the country and to diversify the economy. Although economy-based modernization has been enhanced in the democratic period (Battaglini, 2012), governments have only been able to create political systems that were sensitive to oil prices. Economy became better after the internal market extended to the incident middle class (Torres, 2009). This instant extension of economic developments to socio-economic classes even made the period of Gómez seem peaceful and stable compared to the independent post-war era (Ímber, 2013). However, optimism for Gómez' government has not lasted long. The fact that the benefits of the oil industry have been actually passed to the army, economic elites, and landowning oligarchies, who were loyal friends of the Gómez government, have created significant conflict and discontent (Ewell, 1984).

After Gómez's government, along with the leadership of General Eleazar Lopez Contreras (1936-41), and General Isaias Medina Angarita (1941-45) transition to the first democratic government occurred in Venezuela. During the transition from dictatorship to democratic rule, new political institutions have revealed in the country (Tarver, Frederick, and Rivas, 2018). Taking on the *El Programa de Febrero* (February Program), Contreras executed significant changes for Venezuelan democratic life. He presented respectable alterations in governmental administration that allowed for the founding of new political organizations. His government has become more explicit about the idea of modern political organizations, media, and discussions among different ideologies (Tarver, Frederick, and Rivas, 2018). Moreover, he gave all citizens the right to relish the wealth of the nation and participate in the political system as part of the society by portraying Venezuela as a democratic community of citizen-landowners (Battaglini, 2012).

General Medina took over the liberalization began by Lopez, confirming overall freedom of expression and empowering political parties to act freely in Venezuela



(Betancourt, 2013). This reformist Medina's government caused the legalization of the influential Communist Party, and the Democratic Action party's (AD) attempt to justify its armed insurrection. These reforms were not carried through as they were planned. It caused the outbreak of rebels and protests, especially after democratic politicians returned from exile. In the face of such threats, Venezuela had to pull back from reforms (Derham, 2002).

In 1945, Medina's government was overthrown due to military discontent by high military ranks. The coup leaders negotiated AD's support in exchange for the party to control the resulting government. Founder of AD, Romulo Betancourt has become the head of the post-coup executive junta. For the first time, Venezuela transitioned to a democratic system in history with the administration of Betancourt (Alexander, 1964).

Along with the increase of modernist approaches that gave importance to political freedoms, the three-years Triennium period began in Venezuela (Salas, 2015). The political mobilization started during this Triennium period, urged the public to redefine the roles of the existing political and social forces in society. The political spectrum was divided into four main political parties for trade unions, students, women, the rural population, the army, the Church, economic interests, and power (Salas, 2015).

In 1952, Perez Jimenez, the most powerful man in the military, came to power with the intention of modernizing the country's infrastructure and re-establishing a new democratic system (Faria, 2008). However, contrary to his claim, he dragged Venezuela into chaos economically and politically (Melcher, 1992). Therefore, Venezuela had to wait until 1958 for another democratic system to be formed again.

#### ***4.1.2. Punto Fijo Democracy (1958-1989)***

Between 1958 and 1998, Jimenez's last military dictatorship regime was replaced by institutionalized two-party democracy (McCoy, 1999). The main political parties that as known as Acción Democrática (AD, Democratic Action), Unión Republicana Democrática (URD, Democratic-Republican Union), and Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI, Independent Committee for Political and Electoral Organization) signed an agreement to build a democratic government known as "*El Pacto de Punto Fijo*" (Marcano and Tyszka, 2007). The purpose of the pact was that regardless of which political group won the election, the others would share

power. Moreover, regardless of the party of the chosen person, the parties of the pact were able to benefit from oil revenues in the same way (Coppedge, 2003). A coalition-style government was formed gathering in the hands of COPEI and AD (Karl, 1987). The first democratic election in the country was held in January 1959, and by the majority of votes, the first president of democratic Venezuela was Romulo Betancourt (1959-1964, AD), leader of the AD party (Tarver, Frederick, and Rivas, 2018,). Along with centralized policies, Betancourt government adopted the import substitution industrialization model, which had dominated almost the entire Latin American continent. During this period, his government established the state-owned Venezuela Petroleum Company (CVP). In addition, his government tried to increase the economic development of Venezuela by transferring the oil revenues from the state-owned oil company to different economic sectors (Coppedge, 2003). Thus, it was inevitable that the political system of the country would provide a solid institutionalization with the material foundations coming from oil.

This pact had minimum ideological and programmatic differentiation and represented a two-party system that ignored minority parties (Ellner, 2003). In this period, Rómulo Betancourt and Rafael Caldera (1969-1974, COPEI) avoided polarized discussions. Because any breakthrough in competitive practice could have created a new coup (Villa, 2005). Between 1964 and 1973, the armed forces remained apolitical (Tarver, Frederick, and Rivas, 2018). The majority of Venezuelan people have become to accept democracy - better or worse - as the only way for national development and political stability. Another factor that could change the political and social landscape in Venezuela that emerged in 1973 was the huge oil income (Tarver, Frederick, and Rivas, 2018). The material basis of the Punto Fijo Pact was provided by the distribution of oil income by customers. The iron, steel, and oil industries were expropriated and, coupled with increases in oil prices, provided the necessary resources to expand the state's existing role (Tarver, Frederick, and Rivas, 2018). Andres Perez, who took the place of Caldera in 1974, played a big role in increasing the income and social welfare policies of the country, which was enriched by the rising oil prices with 73 oil crises. Moreover, this situation gave him a chance to become president again in the 1988 elections (Ellner, 2008).

The fall in oil prices, which rose due to the Oil Crisis in 1973, in the 1980s caused the Venezuelan economy to enter the crisis. Especially after the Black Friday currency

devaluation of 1983, the country's currency had to devalue. (McCoy and Myers, 2004). The Black Friday money devaluation has changed conditions in Venezuela. The behaviors that contributed to regime consolidation in the previous period started to have an opposite effect after this situation. This led most Venezuelans to seek a different kind of democracy (McCoy, and Myers, 2004).

In the aftermath of the 1973 Oil Crisis, Venezuela had been unable to pay its debts and faced economic crises. As a result, they had started to borrow foreign debt while trying to increase domestic production. It was similar to the import substitution industrialization model. In the 80s, these debts exceeded their GDP. The pact gave priority to macroeconomic regulations and followed the measures proposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This situation manifested itself as poverty, social inequality, deteriorating living standards for the poor people, slow economic growth (Castañeda, 2006). However, while many countries faced military coups against these economic crises as a result of their foreign debt, Venezuela was able to continue the democratic process (Tarver, Frederick, and Rivas, 2018).

In the second administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989–93), it was implemented a package of neoliberal programs for economic development proposed by the International Monetary Fund, also known as the Monetary Consensus and the World Bank (McCoy and Myers, 2004). In response to the sharp increase in gasoline prices resulting from this neoliberal package, a popular uprising as known as Caracazo has occurred in Caracas and other major cities in 1989 (Brading, 2013). This protest has become a turning point in Venezuelan politics. Due to the discontent neoliberal reforms created in society, on February 4, 1992, members of the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement party (MBR 200), under the administration of lieutenant Hugo Chávez attempted coups to the Pérez administration. But the coup failed and Chávez and MBR 200 members were arrested (Salas, 2015). However, the coup caused a party pact crisis (Restrepo, 2019).

In the period 1989-1998, the party system abandoned its core values and turned into a self-serving and non-productive mechanism. As a result, It managed to alienate the public. People began to doubt the capacity of the dual party system to solve Venezuela's problems and to make a positive change in this regard. Hence, party

legitimacy had seriously been eroded during this period (Tarver, Frederick, and Rivas, 2018).

#### ***4.1.3. From Socialist Democracy to Authoritarianism (1998-2017)***

From a political perspective, Venezuelan democracy has had indisputable radical ruptures in the past. Various forms of administration were intertwined, whether it was the effect of military intervention in administration or the dominance of a single party in the multi-party system. After political disenchantments of Punto Fijo democracy, the leftist candidate Hugo Chávez proposed a radical anti-neoliberal approach to decrease government corruption, social exclusion, and poverty under the “Bolivarian revolution” label. This stance quickly garnered support, helping him win the Venezuelan presidential election in 1998 (Hybel, Mintz, and Dunn, 2020).

Along with the message of democratic rebirth, he moved into action by replacing Punto Fijo state with a new constitutional order, as known as The Fifth Republic (MVR) (Buxton, 2019). In order to aim to build a more mighty democratic regime, Chávez toppled the old institutions that supported the party hegemony since the Punto Fijo era (Corrales, 2010). Through a national referendum and the approval of the Constituent Assembly, he extended his presidency until 2003, attempting to neutralize the most important institutional controls over the power of the president (Corrales, 2010). Thus, the transition from the electoral democracy to the electoral authoritarian regime began to be observed gradually in the political system of Venezuela (Diamond, 2002). In particular, the new constitution has fundamentally changed the political, economic, and social environments of the country. The power of the executive was significantly under the control of the president (Hybel, Mintz, and Dunn, 2020). All rights have been transferred to the president, from full authority over the armed forces to the right to appoint and remove any of the 25 ministers who form the vice president and cabinet. In addition, the constitution required a 12-year election period without the possibility of re-election and tried to protect the entire judiciary from the influence of political parties by forbidding partisan political activities during its mandate (Hybel, Mintz, and Dunn, 2020). Thus, the institutions led by AD-COPEI party members became easily an area managed by the Bolivarian Revolution supporters in late 2000 (Wilpert, 2007).

The political changes brought by the new constitution. The redistribution policies adopted within the Bolivarian Revolution created a significant resistance from the political, economic, religious media, and union interests that did not want to lose their privileged positions in society (Buxton, 2005). Because Chávez's policies and programs were primarily based on meeting the needs of the marginal population which is Venezuela's almost exclusive support base (Hybel, Mintz, and Dunn, 2020). Prioritizing the interests of the poor compared to privileged groups, Chávez made the losses of one group to the other's gains with the new constitution. This distinction between social groups greatly reduced the likelihood of reconciliation. Thus the intense social polarization and political conflict between the government and opposition supporters manifested itself in a coup in April 2002 (Hybel, Mintz, and Dunn, 2020). In particular, Chávez's idea of bringing foreign workers against the general strike organized by Venezuelan Oil (PDVSA), an organization that produced about 80 percent of Venezuela's export revenues (Hellinger, 2014), was not welcomed by the Workers' Confederations.

After the march of hundreds of thousands of disgruntled citizens in Caracas, the coup occurred in the country (Hybel, Mintz, and Dunn, 2020). However, this coup was not as expected after Chávez's withdrawal. The army failed to fill successfully the emerging "constitutional power vacuum" (Brading, 2014). Pedro Carmona Estanga, a prominent businessman and appointed by the army after Chávez withdrew, removed all constitutional powers and appointed a new government (Brading, 2014). This created fear for the public, especially those who live in the slums. The elimination of Chávez and the abolition of the government were perceived as the signals of the neglect of popular will and the possibility of dictatorship. The public's revolt caused the Estanga to panic and leave the Presidential Palace. The next day, Chávez returned to his position (Brading, 2014).

After the 2002 coup attempt and the 2003 oil industry shutdown, Chávez declared his political program to be socialist with the presidential referendum in August 2004. Moreover, in January 2005, owing to the reform he made in the constitution, he increased his presidency to six years. Although the constitution was regarded by many as a text that guarantees rights after the reformation, it was not. These reforms included the tension between participation and authoritarianism as it strengthened Chávez's presidential power rather than the right to participate to promote democracy. The most

striking feature of this new program was to enable the economy to participate in more self-government in the form of more land reform and more direct democracy at the local level (Wilpert, 2007).

In 2005-2006, Chávez and his government laid out the outline of a new economic model based on the favor of socialism for the redefinition of private property (Ellner, 2013). The Chávez administration, which focused on the nationalization of the basic industry in 2007-2008, started to nationalize many companies so that the government could compete with the private sector after 2009 (Ellner, 2013). On the other hand, along with the socialist program, the restriction of civil liberties and political rights began to be implemented. In 2004, President Chávez managed to restrict press freedom in Venezuela by introducing a new law known as the “Ley Resorte”. Along with this new law, he guaranteed to ban news about protests against the government pressures and to suspend the licenses of media outlets reporting on this issue (Atwood, 2006; De Mesquita, and Downs, 2005).

Socialism began to be associated with values of solidarity, fraternity, justice, freedom, and equality (Gonzalez, 2014). In 2007, in order to draw a clearer image of 21st Century Socialism, Chávez proposed a new political party, the Venezuelan United Socialist Party (PSUV). He asked for the 24 parties supporting his government to be integrated into a single socialist party (Fernandez, 2007). In February 2008, Hugo Chávez was elected president of PSUV. This new party was officially registered with the National Election Council (Venezuelanalysis, 2008). Although Chávez defeated the PSUV opposition coalition and captured the majority of the seats, he decided to establish a new public office with potentially expanding censorship powers. His aim was weakening or intimidating the opposition and put an end to the political playground (Roberts, 2013). In 2009, he launched a referendum, proposing a constitutional amendment for the law that allowed him to remain in office as long as Chávez won the elections. With the constitutional amendment approved in the referendum, his government increased its shares even more (Hausmann and Rodríguez, 2014). Although institutions exist, management was manipulating the system to prevent Chávez's competitors from taking the lead. The existence of democracy is doubtful in this period when Chávez used the laws for his own interests to secure his own administration and prevent any objection against him.

Another Chávez's policy was on restriction of civil liberties and political rights in 2010. He prevented non-governmental organizations that “defend political rights” or “monitor the performance of public institutions” from receiving any international funding by law for the Defense of Political Sovereignty and National Self-Determination. Because of this law, non-governmental organizations became a subject to some extreme sanctions. If their views disturb state institutions or they attack sovereignty of Venezuela, they were able to be expelled from the country. (Corrales, 2016).

In 2010, another important incident was parliamentary elections were held for the National Assembly. This election, in which multi-party candidates participated, was not something prevalent for Venezuela before. Chávez came to power with 55.07 percent of the votes. This was Chávez's last election victory. After he died, he was replaced by his successor Nicolas Maduro in 2013 (Tarver, Frederick, and Rivas, 2018). Maduro's period was a failure in many ways due to the continuity of the unresolved contradictions of the Chavista period. From the moment Maduro was elected, political and economic pressures exerted on Venezuela began to manifest themselves brutally (Foster, 2015). In April 2013, Maduro was duly elected to the presidency with less than 1 percent of his opponent, right-wing opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski (Gonzalez, 2019). However, the result of the elections with a slight difference caused a debate about the reliability of the election results both inside and outside the country. While the United States declared that it would not recognize the election results (Macleod, 2018), on the other hand, the opposition objected to the constitutional court and called thousands of people to protest. When the Constitutional Court ruled that the elections were fair, neither objections from outside or inside was able to prevent Maduro from coming to power (Salas, 2015).

In 2013, an economic slide started in the country with the management of Maduro. Along with inflation reaching 6 percent in April, Venezuela struggled with economic difficulties and began to witness the scarcity of basic products (Brown, 2018). Civil riots and political protest fluctuations began in 2014 right after an increasing scarcity of essential goods. A violent crime, excessive inflation, and the scarcity of essential goods backed by the government's economic policies have become the most challenging issue for the Maduro era (Tarver, Frederick, and Rivas, 2018). Maduro's popularity declined rapidly. This decline caused his party to lag behind conservative

opposition for the first time in the National Assembly elections held in early December 2015. In April 2016, the Supreme Court approved the constitutional amendment, which reduces the presidential term from seven to four years with the proposal of the opponents. However, the court stated that it could not be applied retrospectively to the administration since the change was approved after Maduro was elected. On the other side, The National Election Commission authorized Maduro to initiate the documents necessary to start recalling its opponents. Maduro did not accept and he declared a state of emergency claiming that right-wing workers working with external forces threaten state security. The National Assembly rejected Maduro's decision. In response, Maduro proclaimed that the Assembly was illegitimate and ignored its vote (Hybel, Mintz, and Dunn, 2020). Although it seems to be based on democratic institutions, Venezuela has continued the tradition of modern Caudillo during Chávez and Maduro's presidential term. During the Maduro period, the sustain of democracy in the country has been in jeopardy by being dragged into more authoritarianism.

#### ***4.2. Hungary***

Since the 20th century, Hungary historically lived through extremely powerful political diversity and multiple different regime types; monarchy, authoritarianism, and a parliamentary republic. It has observed multiple political changes of power within those regime types. Between 1900-1944, Hungary typified multiple regimes; the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Hungary's First Republic, the Hungarian Soviet Republic, and the renewed version of the Kingdom of Hungary (until the Nazi invasion). Then, after the end of Nazi-Germany influence, the Communist era began in Hungary with Soviet Union influence until 1989. Since beginning with the first free and multiparty parliamentary election which was happened in 1990, Hungary still continues as a parliamentary republic today.

In order to observe the democratic transitions or democratic reverse moves in Hungary, this section will be examined under three headings. Firstly, it will be focused on the Hungarian parliament under dual monarch then, it will be underlined the Soviet Union's effects on the consolidation of Hungarian democracy between 1900-1944. Then, democratic structures will be examined between 1900-1944. Lastly, the tendency from rising up modern democratic to illiberal populist parliamentarian will be studied between 1989-2017.



#### ***4.2.1. From Dual Monarchy to Soviet Union (1900-1944)***

From 1867 to 1918 as different from all European continent, Hungarian dominant political system was a constitutional monarchy qualified by the form of liberal parliamentarism (Körösényi, 1999). But before Emperor of Austria Francis Joseph's decision to the consolidation of empire, Hungary did not have a parliament. There was governor-general administration to preclude nationalist inclination and to restrain possible revolts against the empire. After the assent of 1867 between Austria and Hungary, the empire was named a combination of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Therefore, Hungary acquired its own elected parliament and its own separated government likewise Austria had (Hill, 2004). While the decision about, finance, defense, and foreign policy were processed by the consensus agreement of representatives by both Hungarian and Austrian parts, other issues mostly left to the interior parliament. Thus, Hungary had a dual monarchy that was supported by landowning aristocrats and the middle-class farmers which were be continuing until the end of World War I. During the dual monarchy, as a combination of left-center nationalism, liberal party was a dominant political organization. Its aim was to keep the social status quo, to support between upper and middle classes. At this time, the only organized opposition was 48 Party (later renamed the Independence Party) (Hill, 2004). Along with the beginning of the collapse of the empire caused by the effect of World War I, the revolution broke out for the purpose to democratize Hungary by Count Mihaly Károlyi, the founder of a new Hungarian Independence Party in 1918 (a fragmented group of the former Independence Party) (Hill, 2004). After the succession of revolution, Hungary's first republic formed along with the Hungarian Independent party swept to power under Károlyi's leadership (Deak, 1968). Together with Hungarian parliament, Károlyi government launched reforms rapidly with great strides to provide democratization in 1918. They have passed some laws guaranteeing freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly to ensure democracy. Furthermore, everyone, who has been a Hungarian citizen for at least six years and who is over 21 years old has been given the right to vote. A secret ballot system, has been established in order to make the elections fair and reliable. Along with these new laws, democracy has become popular with everyone except for landowners who are afraid of losing their power (Hill, 2004). On October 25, the

Independence Party, Social Democratic Party, and leading left-wing movements announced the formation of an opposition front called the Hungarian National Council.

The Dual Monarchy officially ended on November 16, 1918, when the Károlyi government declared Hungary a republic (Hill, 2004). This was considered the starting of Hungary's independence from under the influence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Roman, 2003). The members of the National Council and the Republican cabinet were formed from three parties- the Social Democrats, the left-wing of the Independence Party, and Jászi's Radicals. At the same time, representatives of various radical groups (representatives of press and feminists, among them), were granted the right to represent (Janos, 1982). Besides this democratic coalition, the government has taken a number of democratization steps. First, it removed all war restrictions on the freedom of the press and parliament. Then, it made serious preparations for the land to be distributed among the peasants. However, these good intentions brought little tangible political benefit to the government (Janos, 1982). This new democratic coalition had to deal with the long-standing demands of various groups, which could not be revived as a result of the undeveloped economy in which the war began. The unmet expectations, the existence of constant economic inequalities in the country provided advantages for the rising of communist propaganda. It encouraged both the rural and urban proletariat to take matters into their own hands raised protests in the country (Janos, 1982).

On the other side, Károlyi was trying to establish a democracy in which different ethnic groups within the borders of Hungary could manage themselves under the federal supervision of the Hungarian government. However, it did not go as planned. Ethnic groups became stronger than the federal government and annexed the regions (Paxton, 2007). Along with this incident, the increasing unrest from the communist side prepared Károlyi's resignation and handed over power to the socialists (Janos, 1982). This new socialist government has allied with Soviet Russia and declared the Soviet Republic with the revolutionary Bela Kun administration (Roman, 2003). In addition to the establishment of the Soviet system, all private property was abolished, and after establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, socialists became dominant in Hungary (Balogh, 1976). Bela Kun nationalized all industries. He increased mass executions, harsh human rights practices (Molnar 2001).

When Admiral Miklós Horthy's regime started in Hungary, he applied serious restrictions on civil liberties and political pluralism. Even if the multi-party parliamentary system continued, Hungary actually was in a form of authoritarian democracy (Szarvas, 1993). Only one opposition party (Social Democrats) was legalized this period. It was a typical pluralistic, multiparty system but elections always resulted in the victory of the governing party.

Moreover, as an ally of Nazi Germany, Horthy began conducting violent discrimination campaigns against its Jewish citizens after 1938 (Bozóki, 2002). A group of Hungarian military agents and anti-fascist resistance forces gathered at the Provisional National Assembly, which promised Hungary's democratization (Litvan, 1996). This group chose a temporary government that ruled Hungary. They also cooperated closely with the Soviet forces to support the communist party. Country changed from German influence to Soviet influence with the end of the Second World War. In Hungary, an apparent system of democracy was prevalent until 1944. From 1944 to 1989, the country adopted democracy that other nations had appointed.

#### ***4.2.2. From Soviet Democracy to Modern Democracy (1944-1989)***

After the end of the war in 1945, a period of democratic developments took place in Hungary, which was seized by the Stalinist Sovietization initiated by the occupying forces in 1947-48. In this period, Hungary was also apparently engaged in democratic developments (Bozóki, 2002). Between 1945 and 1947, Hungary's political regime was based on free elections. However, the dominance of Soviet control and its unfavorable attitude to any opposition prevented forming a large coalition and made it difficult to represent every segment of society. Therefore, Hungary was limited to the definition of a semi-democratic system (Bozóki, 2002). In 1948, Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party became a single organization called the Hungarian Workers' Party. Until 1949 all of the opposition parties this time either disappeared or participated in a consolidation called the Independence People's Front. Although this Front acted as a technically opposed party, it was actually an organization that was not independently or politically, controlled by communist power (Hill, 2004).

The communist government developed a system of workers, laborers, and peasants, and its national goal was to establish the path to socialism in Hungary. In order to

consolidate the socialist way, a new Hungarian constitution was prepared, which preserves some democratic features in the country's governance system. So much so that the constitution was able to guarantee individual freedoms only to the extent that it did not violate the socialist program (Roman, 2003). The Soviet government, acting like a police state until the late 1950s, faced the revolt of most of the Hungarians who wanted to break the Soviet chains in 1956 (Hill, 2004).

Until 1953, the leader of the Communist Party in Hungary was Rákosi, but left his post as Prime Minister to Imre Nagy. Nagy thought that citizens could be provided without resorting to such extreme policing measures. Therefore, in October 1956, he started an uprising against the Rákosi government. This uprising quickly gained supporters. Then it led to militias and riots causing Rákosi's administration to collapse. However, Soviet forces invaded Budapest on November 4, killing thousands of Hungarian protesters. Then, the Soviets who defeated the revolt appointed Janos Kádár as the new prime minister (Litvan, 1996).

After the suppression of the Hungarian revolution of 1956, communist leadership desisted from the idea of creating a fully politicized society, and the way to mobilize citizens to legitimize the management system (Cox, and Furlong, 1995). Under the attempted dictatorship of Kádár, civil societies were created by developing new groups. Moreover, Kádár introduced New Economic Mechanism policies to decentralize, to move away from the excessive Communist policies of the Soviets, and to achieve economic reforms and political and economic stability (Felkay, 1989). Besides economic reforms, Hungarians have been given the way to gain decisive personal experiences in the 1960s and 1970s. In order to prepare for future leadership roles in the market economy, opportunities for the 15 to 30 age group to travel, work abroad, and network with people in foreign countries became a huge step to the democratic modernization of Hungary (Meusburger, and Jons, 2001).

In the 1980s, strong demands for democratic political institutions began to emerge. There was an increase in the number of clubs and groups that have expressed their demands in this regard. This situation, which is thought to be familiar from the 1956 revolution, was not able to suppress with small economic and political concessions (Cox, and Furlong, 1995). The old reconciliation method was in a situation that could not keep up with the changing world order. Many groups were thinking it was time to

redefine social and political conditions from a more democratic angle (Cox, and Furlong, 1995). Following that, in the second half of the 1980s, it led to a new understanding of politics that favored a kind of policy reinforced by constitutional rights after the opposition agencies had the capacity to create subcultures. The opposition's improved subculture capacity ended the reconciliation, triggering a democratic transition period in Hungary (Korkut, 2012). In this period, the Social Contract, a programmatic explanation of radical reformism, the most important turning point for Hungarian opponents, was requested. This agreement was suggesting that the acceptance of the party's leading role should not limit its progress towards constitutionally guaranteed pluralism (Korkut, 2012). In this way, pluralistic democracy has started based on the party system focused on representing everyone in Hungary since 1989.

#### ***4.2.3. From Liberal Democracy to Illiberal Democracy (1989-2017)***

In 1989, democracy infiltrated Eastern Europe and the communist government ended in Hungary. While communist regimes all across Europe fell one by one in a great wave of democratization, the transitions to democracy for Hungary were also started by the end of the Cold War during the Revolution of 1989. Roundtable discussions were launched in April by the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) as the basis for the transition to a multi-party system of democracy (Wilkin, 2016). After a single-party dictatorship for more than 40 years, the party system was reshaped in Hungary between 1988 and 1989.

In 1990, Hungary passed the multi-party general election system (Racz, 1991) in order to secure multiparty democracy, human rights, and national independence (Litvan, 1996). In line with the constitution, it was agreed to hold new elections every 4 years. In this period, some parties tried to revive the traditions of the period before the transformation in 1949, while others created themselves from scratch. Some of these parties played a significant role in their political profile in the transition process (Litvan, 1996). As a result of different communist historical evolution, the language of political discourse had different connotations than Western European countries in Hungary. Therefore, the left and right dilemmas were also very different from other western countries (Mészáros, Solymosi, and Speiser, 2007). In 1990, Hungary held its first free elections since the end of World War II. (Hill, 2004). As a result of the

elections, the conservative Hungarian Democratic forum received 42.7 percent of the vote and 165 seats. However, it did not constitute an absolute majority. In other words, all other winning parties gained more seats from the forum. For this reason, parties formed coalitions to ensure the absolute majority (Hill, 2004). Hence, after the participation of six important parties and established coalitions in the newly democratic form, democratic transitions were taken for Hungary. These parties that will shape Hungarian democracy in the future were; Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP), Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), and Independent Smallholders and Citizens Party (FKGP) (Racz, 1991).

Another issue that changed the political perspective of Hungary in this period was the constitutional amendment with a constructive no-confidence motion that came with the 1990 elections. With this amendment, the values of democratic socialism were erased from the constitution and the socialist idea was kept away (Litvan, 1996). Moreover, in the aftermath of the beginning of a large number of political parties and free elections in Hungary, government embarked on a series of reformist transformations such as the right to private employment and freedom of press and assembly. The newly elected prime minister, József Antall, privatized the country's initiatives, pushing Hungary towards a free market economy (Roman, 2003).

With Gyula Horn (1994–98) becoming prime minister in the 1994 elections, socialists seized power in Hungary. Despite its socialist ideologies, Horn and the government gladly embraced the free-market economy and encouraged capitalism and foreign investment (Roman, 2003). Then he unexpectedly took a reversal and opened the banking, energy, and telecommunications sectors to foreign direct investment (Hill, 2004). In 1996, socialists introduced a tough austerity program, limiting expenditure on social welfare programs, and increasing taxes, and temporarily imposing an 8 percent surcharge on imported goods (Hill, 2004).

In 1998, Viktor Orbán (1998-2002, 2010-2020), leaders of Fidesz, came to power as the leader of the right-wing politics. During this period, the conflict between the ruling government and its opposition became too intense to be resolved. Emphasizing party loyalty in institutional discourses, Orbán and Fidesz allegedly tried to divide the society using a policy of symbolism during this period (Bozóki, 2011). A series of

liberal tendencies for democracies began to take place during this period. Receiving an official invitation to join the EU in 2002, Hungary made a series of liberal democratic breakthroughs to achieve the final conditions for accession. Government established a solid civil society environment for many NGOs and civic groups, respecting the right of citizens to form associations, strike and establish public institutions. On the other hand, constitution guaranteed freedom of religion and ensured the separation of church and state, and it entrenched courts that guarantee equality before the law. Moreover, It established a long-term anti-corruption strategy by bringing strong criminal sanctions (Freedom House, 2003). In 2004, Hungary joined the EU. Country demonstrated a successful example of democratic consolidation until 2006 (Bozóki, 2011).

In 2006, Hungary's ruling coalition government was re-elected. Major uprisings broke out in the country when Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany (2004-2009) admitted that the government lied to the public on economic performance and other issues. The failure of Gyurcsany's economic reforms made the country vulnerable to the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008. The global financial crisis that started in the autumn of 2008 lost the government's internal political credibility. After Gyurcsány's resignation in spring 2009, Gordon Bajnai (2009-2010) took the office and moved towards long-term reforms with short-term crisis management (Bozóki, 2011). Against this initiated period of reform fatigue, Fidesz and Orbán maximized their votes in the elections with the promise of social patriarchy, large-scale tax cuts, and a pro-market orientation (Deák, 2013). As a result, the government became vulnerable to rising autocrats. This enabled the anti-democratic effort to gain the support of the people in 2010 with the promise of a strong state (Bozóki, 2011).

Overall, between 1990 and 2010 Hungary had a model of liberal democracy that worked in view of the principles and practices of a modern Western-style democracy (Bozóki, 2015). In 2010, the conservative-nationalist Fidesz party, led by Viktor Orbán, came to power, winning the two-thirds supermajority of parliament to change the Hungarian constitution. Right after that, Viktor and his party Fidesz rejected liberal values, assault institutions of pluralism, and did not hesitate to use the economic power of the state for partisan political purposes (Freedom House, 2017).

In the past decade, Orbán and Fidesz have used their superiority to intensify their power and to change the constitution to limit their freedom in Hungary. Between 1990 and 2010, Hungary was one of the important representatives of functional liberal democracy, intertwined with the principles and practices of modern, Western-style democracy. Moreover, Hungary made the least change between new democracies among Eastern European countries. It has not had even a new constitution (Czaky, 2017).

The country has undergone a radical change between 2010 and 2011. These changes included a range of regulations, covering all areas of political and social life. In the first four years alone, the government passed more than 800 laws including election laws and new tax regulations (Czaky, 2017). In 2012, the Hungarian parliament passed another package of electoral legislation containing a number of amendments to the controversial laws on justice and the media (Freedom House, 2013). After Fidesz's electoral victories in 2014, Orbán announced that he started to construct an illiberal state by claiming that democracy is not necessarily to be liberal. In his speech, asserting that democracy can exist without being liberal, Orbán gave the signals of his centralized economic and political policies (Orbán, 2014). During this period, Orbán expanded laws that would increase self-censorship and lead to restrictions on public comments in order to provide centralization (Freedom House, 2016).

In 2015, the problem of immigrants broke out. About a million migrants and refugees flocked to the EU. Hungary was one of the main entry points for those reaching the core of Europe. By violating the EU rules, Orbán and his government introduced new immigration and border control regulations by building a wire fence in southern Hungary against the influx of asylum seekers (Freedom House, 2016). By allowing the Hungarian army to use coercive weapons in enforcing border controls, he caused many civilians' freedoms to be restricted. (Freedom House, 2016). Moreover, he also blocked humanitarian efforts by labeling NGOs wishing to assist migrants and asylum seekers as foreign agents (Freedom House, 2016). Therefore, Orbán and his government have been criticized for this inhuman approach to the refugee crisis and their undemocratic regulations (Bocskor, 2018).



## CHAPTER 5: CASE ANALYSIS

### 5.1. Venezuela

#### 5.1.1. *Left-wing Populists' Challenges to Liberal Democracy: Chávez and Maduro's Illiberal Freedom Perception*

Hugo Chávez was among the consequential left-wing populist representatives of Latin America, who reshaped the freedom meaning in the people's minds in order to overthrow the dominance of liberalism and its values and to spread the socialism in his own country and elsewhere. Along with the war against global capitalism started to be more radicalized with the Bolivarian Revolution in 2007, Chávez believed that liberal freedom provided by capitalism was perilous for democracy and the future of Venezuela. For this reason, creating an illiberal perception of economic and political freedom for Venezuelan democracy, he resorted to some discursive strategies for the acceptance of centralized freedom policies by the people. By applying a historical trump card to create a perception against liberalism, he frequently referred to the economic chaos created by past liberal systems in his rhetoric. Moreover, he highlighted the importance of centralized economic and political freedoms under socialism (Discursos De Chávez Tomo III, 2014).

Liberalism was not really an efficient policy for Venezuela. In 1989, Perez's government attempted to restructure the Venezuelan economy in the liberal line, but could not overcome the difficulties of the liberal economy and international competition (Gott, 2005). Taking advantage of the stumbling of liberalism in the country, Chávez put forward a market that borrowed from both capitalist and socialist models of development, liberated from monopoly control. He advocated a "humanist" mixed economy that borrowed from models of a development state determined to feed national producers, both public and private (Mudde, and Kaltwasser, 2012). While seeking a moderate "third way" between socialism and global capitalism in his early years, Chávez established a more radical socialist model in the last years of his presidency (Corrales, and Penfold, 2011). By defining poverty as the victims of neoliberalism and globalization, Chávez sought to create a new political movement with a broader social base to achieve radicalization (Bethell, 2007). He tried to centralize economic and political freedom, especially with the effect of the socialist

model that started to radicalize after 2007. In other words, Chávez and Maduro, putting Venezuela to the last lines from 2010 to 2017 in the index published in Economic Freedom of the World, and Freedom House, drawn economic and political freedom policies which were scarcely any<sup>4</sup>.




Figure 1. Political and Economic Freedom Rates on Venezuela Democracy Index. Economic Freedom data is provided from The Fraser Institute. It scores shown are out of 10. “0” is the worst “10” is the best score. \* Political Freedom is prepared considering Freedom House data. “7” is the worst “1” is the best score. \* Democracy’s overall score is taken from The Economist Intelligence Unit. The index of democracy scores on a 0 to 10 scale. (Source: The Fraser Institute (2010-2017), Freedom House (2010-2017), and The Economist Intelligence Unit (2010-2017)).

<sup>4</sup> This interpretation was observed after careful examination of Venezuelan economic and political freedom scores in the world rank from 2010 to 2017 in Economic Freedom of the World’s annual publications, and in the Freedom House’s annual reports based on civil liberties and political rights’ rates. \*Freedom House (2010-2017) Publication Archives [Online]. <https://freedomhouse.org/reports/publication-archives> (Accessed: 20 Jan 2020). \*Fraser Institute (2010-2017) Fraser Institute Annual Reports [Online]. <https://www.fraserinstitute.org/about/annual-reports> (Accessed 20 Jan 2020)

According to data from Freedom House and Fraser Institute, Venezuela is economically not-free but politically has a partly free status between 2010 and 2017. While it was democratically defined as a hybrid regime until 2016, it was defined as authoritarian, with the report published at the end of 2017.

When Figure 1. is examined, economic freedom, which was 3.79 in 2010, decreases to 2,72 in 2017 while political freedom decreased from 4,5 to 5.5 in 7 years. In general, when examining the 7-year change in the two freedom ratios, economic freedom continued to be defined as not free while political freedom decreased partly free status to not free status. Along with the decrease in rates of economic and political specificity, it is also observed that there has been a ritualized decrease in the rates of democracy. Although Chávez initially followed a moderate path between socialism and capitalism for the development of freedom policies and democracy, it is clear that after 2010 both Chávez and Maduro chose a more radical democratic path.

Political developments in Venezuela were proof that Hugo Chávez and his political movement had worked to undermine the principles and institutions of liberal democracy while at the same time had been trying to create an alternative political model (Canache, 2012). Having adopted an anti-neoliberal discourse throughout his tenure, Chávez had frequently emphasized in his speeches accusing capitalism as an attitude of poverty, social inequality, and even polarization (Guadilla, and Mallen, 2019). As he mentioned in an interview on the BBC HARD talk program;

*“Democracy is impossible in a capitalist system. Capitalism is the injustice and cruelty of the richest against the poorest”* (Chávez, 2011).

Therefore, while the liberal phenomena and groups that appear to be opponents being declared as enemies of democracy, Chávez portrayed himself as a guardian of freedom. In other words, by adopting a radicalized attitude with the Bolivarian Revolution named after Simón Bolívar, Chávez marginalized liberal policies (De la Torre, 2017).

Moreover, he tried to revive socialism with nationalist discourses in order to propagate the protectionist revisionist model of freedom. Therefore, while he often raised the

Bolivian revolution by dedicating it to the people, he marginalized the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie that the revolution portrayed as the enemy. In order to marginalize elites, Chávez frequently emphasized that criminal gangs accused of crimes such as corruption were prepared by the bourgeoisie who was supported by Yankee Empire (the U.S) (Discursos De Chávez Tomo IV, 2014).

From the beginning of his presidency, he tried to provide hostility between a number of demonstrators associated with the followers of the Bolivarian doctrine, describing opposition in Venezuela as unfaithful, antidemocratic, oligarchic, antipatriotic, traitors, and so forth (Zúquete, 2008). Overall, Chávez used two strategic methods to create a socialist form of illiberal freedom perception against liberal freedom in people's minds; 1. To marginalize liberal elites and external powers, and the forms of liberal democracy with a reformist attitude by guiding the politics of political and economic freedom based on "we versus us" discourses in order to provide internalization of a socialist illiberal model of democracy; 2. To unite the nation under an egalitarian nationalist socialist roof against liberal values which has been considered an imperialist problem with help from traditional cultures and values.

Chávez's attitude to liberal democracy had always been clear. His statements were generally like "I do not support liberal democracy", "I do not believe in change", "I do not vote universally" (Valery, 2010). According to Chávez, revolutions were emerging in the world and this was inevitable (Valery, 2010). He claimed that revolutionary, participatory, direct democracy was democracy to be strengthened, and liberal and representative democracy was losing ground (Valery, 2010). In an interview with Larry King, Chávez underlined that his government and people wanted to move away from liberal democracy, which he claimed that liberalism was for the rich. He emphasized that;

*"I do not want full democracy right now, I want more democracy, and I hope that one day Venezuela will reach full democracy"* (Hugo Chávez, 2013).

He underlined the basic need for this to happen was to transfer power to the people. However, according to him, liberal democracy was lacking from this (Hugo Chávez, 2013). He believed that for the realization of democracy, people must unite under

socialism. Therefore, he often combined his socialist revolutionary discourses with egalitarian rhetoric to impose this idea on people. Then, he seized economic and political freedoms by appealing to more protectionist more centralized systems to impose his radical vision of a more egalitarian and socialist state (Discursos De Chávez Tomo IV, 2014).

In order to create an illiberal freedom perception against liberal freedom understanding, Chávez imposed his freedom politics as the will of the people. Therefore, he applied emotional context in his discourses such as; fear and insecurity feelings against liberalist freedom and its advocates (elites and the U.S). Using this fear of the people, who had the experience of colonization by the imperialist powers in the past, Chávez created a comfort zone with centralized freedoms for the people with the revisionist nationalist egalitarian discourses. He made colonialism the main theme of his ideology against the United States, which he saw as a different imperialist liberalist power (Discursos De Chávez Tomo IV, 2014).

Radically portraying America as imperialist became more visible in 2010 when Hugo Chávez declared “economic war” (Carroll, 2010). Chávez claimed that private firms deceived customers with unfair price increases they created in Latin America, launching these increases as part of a US-backed "fascist oligarchs" plan to destabilize the left experiment. He declared the reason for these high capitalist prices as stealing from the people, claiming that the capitalists were so-called thieves (Carroll, 2010). Chávez promised to lower prices through the economic war which was defined by his own socialist-based freedom policies (Carroll, 2010). The seeds of this war were actually first sown in 2007. Chávez had pursued statist policies in most areas of the economy with the Enabling Laws (Ley Habilitante), which he ordered in 2007 to be launched. These laws became important for evaluating the radical changes taken after 2010 and for better understanding the mechanisms of authorization laws passed after 2010. Chávez believed that “Enabling Laws” were the main engine of Venezuela's socialist revolution (Macías, 2012). According to Chávez's propaganda, these laws were to nationalize all industries that belonged to the Venezuelan which have been privatized before and were also to return the oil projects in the electricity sector, telephone company Orinoco Belt to the public. (Macías, 2012). In other words, he was including the people in her socialist plan by uniting the people under these laws with

an egalitarian discourse. In this way, he made it easier for the people to adopt liberal freedoms. Illiberal freedom perception that Chávez wanted to create was consistent with the populist rhetoric of reclaiming economic sovereignty that he supported despite the imperialist United States and the oil companies. Besides, when he declared economic war against the upper classes of Venezuela because of famine on June 2, 2010 (Macías, 2012), the oil wealth of the country supported socialist liberal freedom perception.

As it is seen that, every criticism of capitalism and laudatory discourse on socialism shapes illiberal perceptions of freedom. For instance; in one of his speeches, Chávez emphasized in one of his speeches that it is no longer valid to see the liberal victory of the capitalist model 20 years ago as the only way for democracy. He argued that;

*“Only capitalism and liberalism were not the only alternative for humanity”, and argued that “capitalism and neoliberalism were the most terrifying perversions of human existence and were indicative of them” (Chávez, 2010) quoted in Discursos De Chávez Tomo IV, 2014).*

Moreover, he claimed socialism rises from the rooftops as an alternative (Discursos De Chávez Tomo IV, 2014). Thus, he tried to create the perception that the freedoms offered by liberalism were not actually democratic while promoting socialism as a rising liberation in the eyes of the people.

After Chávez's death, Maduro tried to continue the socialist democracy he inherited. Although he often criticized liberal democracy and liberal elites, he did not improve a persuasive discursive strategy. In other words, he did not try to persuade the people to adopt illiberal freedoms. On the contrary, he forced the people to adopt illiberal freedom. Moreover, illiberal freedom policies were not presented as a will of the people but were generally imposed as Chávez's legacy. However, freedom was gradually declining economically and politically in Venezuela. There was no oil income left to share with the public. Moreover, Maduro was trying to keep control of social power by concealing difficulties and suppressing social protests but this accelerated crisis (Buxton, 2019). Despite this deteriorating bond with the people, he only resorted to the rhetoric claiming to perpetuate Chávez's legacy (Ellsworth, 2013).

He continued to label the liberal elites, which he described as bourgeois parasites, as the group that harassed the poor and people. He continued to marginalize by defining them as selfish, petty egoists, thieves, and anti-Christians (Norman, 2015). Then, he expropriated a large number of companies to increase state seizures, as did Chávez, and even doubled this transaction (Russo, 2016). He artificially pegged the currency (Bolivar) above the market rate to increase oil revenues and to profit from its protectionist centralized economic policies (Yudiana, 2017). This situation indirectly triggered inflation, poverty, and deprivation of essential goods in the country and caused the country's economic freedoms to inevitably decline.

In 2014, President Maduro, in his interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour, showed the liberal state and elites as the main reason for the economic decline of the Venezuelan people with anti-capitalist rhetoric. In response to Amanpour's question that What do you attribute to Venezuelan financial problems, he said that;

*“Capitalism works in this manner. In Venezuela we are overcoming a capitalism that is dependent solely on rent, and that was very harmful for the exchange rate. I can give you a list. Very soon we are going to publish the list of the owner of companies, capitalists, that stole the money, the dollars, to, that we gave them to meet the needs, and they took the dollars and took it to the US. They have big mansions in the US...”*(Maduro, 2014).

Then, about the popular protests that occurred, he said the following;

*“We were the target of the economic war, because right-wing factions in Venezuela have thought that since President Chávez died it was the end of the revolution. They started an operation to destroy our economy...”* (Maduro, 2014).

In other words, he saw the problems that arise due to economic problems and constraints as a tough battle of Venezuela against the right wing, which he defined as capitalist and liberal (Maduro, 2014). In order to bring peace to Venezuela, which has suffered from these problems and the violent and often deadly protests were organized by the liberal opposition, he proposed a new constitutional change to exclude

opposition parties, following Chávez's path. But rather than applying for a referendum like Chávez, he drew up a fraudulent election process based on specific professional groups so that only his supporters could vote (Bendix, 2017). As a reflection of that, the protests and conflicts between the government and the military increased in the country. He interpreted these actions against the Maduro regime as part of a US-backed conspiracy to overthrow 21st-century socialism (Bendix, 2017). Rather than unite the people with socialism, he marginalized the people with the United States, that was, the people became the group to fear. Moreover, he showed that he established his ties with the people not through socialism, but through threat by asking the growing protests;

*“Votes or bullets, what do people want?..”* (Ulmer and Pons, 2017).

In this case, although he had the same view as Chávez against liberalism, his bond with the people is not the same. Therefore, according to the populism definition created in this thesis, Maduro may not be seen as a populist.

### ***5.1.2. Left-wing Populist Post-Truth Propaganda: Anti-Imperialism and Anti-Americanism***

In order to create illiberal freedom perceptions, Chávez often merged his PPPs with Americanism and anti-imperialism rhetoric. Both are partly overlapping issues yet distinct phenomena. In Latin America, these two concepts have been always used interchangeably. Especially, left-wing populists have been preferring to talk about anti-imperialism rather than anti-Americanism, under the assumption that resistance against US power is a fairly reasonable response to systematic intervention and exploitation. However, it is possible to see that these two notions are often presented as a dangerous figure that reinforces each other in populist leaders' manipulative discourses.

At the turn of the 2000s, along with new populism, anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism have been come up as the most vocalized issues in Latin America. Especially Hugo Chávez was the most well-known leader among Latin America's populist and anti-American leaders. (Edwards, 2010). According to him, the US was an imperial force to destabilize leftist governments (Gill, 2019). Thus, he was working



with the sense of mission to save his country and its region from the periphery of American imperialism and the elites that work for its interest (Zúquete, 2008). With his most known populist attitude, he always emphasized that Venezuela needs to eradicate the impact of American imperialists to protect its lower classes who were mostly wounded by liberal politics. By showing economic freedom as an imperialist tool, he increased the fears of the population against the US and elites through PPPs. Especially, Hugo Chávez was an important propagandist leader who could see how effective PPPs can have on the public. He often used the fears of the people very effectively to create an anti-liberal form of freedom perception by using feelings that are based on instincts. Based on people's fears he created external enemies and caused feelings of betrayal against those who did not support the liberal opposition by generating nationalism within the population. By labeling the countries such as the US as an imperialist foreign enemy through the PPPs, He emphasized that these countries frequently endanger the Venezuelan economy.

According to Chávez, debt in Venezuela is 14.3% of Gross Domestic Product, while US debt is five times the gross domestic product of the economy. That's why the US economy has been collapsing and sinking half the world due to its global capitalist economic management (Discursos De Chávez Tomo IV, 2014). In other words, he created the perception that America's capitalist economy should be avoided for the sake of Venezuela. Otherwise, he signaled that they would collapse, like the US, and he underlined that the public should stay away from the liberal economy. At the same time, by defining these liberal economic policies as an imperialist power, he triggered the people's fear of colonialism. He stated that it will always be the target of the imperialists, especially since it is a country with an oil economy. By citing the example of Mexico (he claimed the US invades Mexico and that they took half of its territory, especially the oil field) (Discursos De Chávez Tomo IV, 2014), he warned the people the same situation could happen to Bolivar by breaking the public's trust in liberalism with imperialism and the US enmity (Discursos De Chávez Tomo IV, 2014). Another PPP on this issue focused on seizing the integrity and economy of the country.

Another issue that Chávez frequently emphasized in his PPPs was inequality and the socialist revolution, which he saw as the savior of inequality. Moreover, while spreading a sense of fear and distrust of liberal freedoms shaped by anti-imperialism

and anti-Americanism, Chávez glorified socialism. According to him, it should be a social vehicle that guarantees the equality of citizens in society against liberal elites and external forces, which he defined as autocratic and anarchic danger. His answer to that;

*“Socialist Revolution !.. “Where I go, and where Venezuelans should go” (Chávez, 2010 quoted in Discursos De Chávez Tomo IV, 2014).*

Moreover, he tried to give holiness to socialism with the PPPs by creating on the basis of social, cultural, and religious excuses to make sure that socialism appears as the only alternative. He defined socialism, which he saw as the only way, as the kingdom of God, the kingdom of Christ, as socialism, and therefore thought that inequality must be reduced to make socialism a reality. Then, he explained this through PPP as follows;

*“I am sure the Monsignor will not agree with those who condemn me for saying this, I apologize if any Christian is offended by this, but I am speaking the truth that I believe” (Chávez, 2011 quoted in Discursos De Chávez Tomo IV, 2014).*

In other words, by using religious and cultural elements, he created a sacred perception that should be protected against liberalism and the people's glorification of socialism with instinctive realities.

In order to further strengthen the fearful and distrustful perception against liberal freedoms and to legitimize with the hands of the people that the only way is socialism, He chose a plebiscite path, as many populist leaders have resorted to. Along with the effect of the PPPs, which imposed liberalism as a kind of brutal inhuman life for the Venezuelan people, the people extended the term of the socialist revolutionary Chávez, whom he saw as the savior, with these referendums. In other words, they declared Chávez as the legitimate protector so that he could make decisions on every issue that would affect their freedom economically and politically. In this way, Chávez was able to overthrow the bourgeois liberal institutions and change the political elite through referendums (De la Torre, 2016).

This plebiscitarian method was a core of the Chávez presidency. He frequently launched referendums to gain mass support in order to control so-called imperialism danger over the nation. However, in reality, his real aims were to concentrate power in the hands of the president, promote immediate reelection whenever he wanted to dissipate checks and balances, and reshape some established institutions that generally independent from government. Because the repetition of referendums is actually part of this dynamic. The constant dialogue of the leaders with their followers is what helps those who feel excluded from the past feel that they are involved in the current political debate (Zúquete, 2008). Therefore, this plebiscitary way was an inevitable opportunity for Chávez to prove that socialist democracy was true democracy and the real voice of the people, as claimed to the public. This new, direct, participatory democracy project was a step in restructuring the meanings of democracy and freedom in Venezuela by replacing previous representative democracy.

Maduro was not effective propagandist as Chávez. He could not establish a personal bond with people like Chávez. Chávez even had a TV show called *Aló Presidente* that had aired between 1999 and 2012 just for close relation with people. Maduro remained weaker in this regard. Some claimed that he could not provide the necessary competence because he was not as charismatic as Chávez (Gottberg, 2013). In many ways, Chávez enabled socialism to be adopted and liberalism to be perceived as imperialist, especially with the *Aló Presidente* program. This program was not only reflected the truth, it was also affecting the truth. Whatever he said in the broadcast, whatever he ordered, or decided to spend public money, it was immediately becoming law and policy (Nolan, 2012).

However, Maduro did not have this competence of Chávez, although he claimed to be the continuation of the *Chavista* movement. While Chávez's left-wing populism has benefited from the rise in oil prices to finance major social programs mainly addressing the needs of the poor majority of the population, this was unlikely for Maduro due to the socio-economic crises experienced. When Maduro came to power, he faced a socio-economic situation ready to collapse due to the scarcity of imported basic goods, and the expansion of the black market due to contraband (Stavrakakis et al. 2016). Moreover, the global oil price decline had a huge impact on the economy (BBC, 2014). Therefore, Maduro generally focused on anti-Americanist and anti-imperialist post-truth propaganda due to economic problems. He targeted the US and oil companies as

the reason why Venezuela's oil export price dropped in the second half of 2014 (Cawthorne, 2014). He first described this situation as an economic war waged by the US against the Russian nation (Cawthorne, 2014). He later made the propaganda that this situation was a strategically planned war against the Venezuelan nation. He accused the US of trying to destroy the socialist revolution and cause an economic collapse in the Venezuela (Cawthorne, 2014). However, as Maduro failed to develop illiberal freedom perception intended to be created against liberal freedoms and their advocates, his anti-Americanist or anti-imperialist post-truth propaganda was not successful as much as Chávez's to create an illiberal perception of freedom in peoples' mind.

In Spring 2014, The Pew Research Center released a global report to confirm that. According to research, most Venezuelans were not anti-Americanists in spring 2014 global survey. While 62% of Venezuelans were more positive, only 31% opposed it (Devlin, 2014). For this reason, Maduro, who tried to cover up his unsuccessful propaganda by using his party (PSUV), began to work for the development of PPPs by establishing a National Propaganda, Agitation, and Communication Commission in 2014. Setting off from Chávez's propaganda, which has been understood as a powerful mobilizing factor, this commission enabled post-truth propaganda to spread on the streets in order to make a moral idea (Psuv, 2015). Therefore, by aiming to prevent propaganda controlled by the economic interests of those who maintain existing exploitation and capitalist domination relations in the world, this commission made propaganda that liberal freedom frequently should be controlled over the people (Psuv, 2015). In this way, Maduro tried to reduce his questionability by the public for the decisions he would take against liberal freedoms by trying to build fear and distrust towards freedom. However, voters vehemently opposed the government's plans for a new constituent assembly with the power to leave the National Assembly and rewrite the constitution by the illegal referendum held in 2017 (BBC, 2017). Although it did not seem to be a valid result because it was defined as illegal, Maduro could not create an effective perception of illiberal freedom on the public like Chávez.

### ***5.1.3. Left-wing Populists' Illiberal Freedom Perception and Democratic Backsliding***

Illiberal freedom perceptions, reinforced by the anti-imperialist ideas developed by Chávez, tend to marginalize liberal models of freedom and its advocates. Chávez's instinctive fears of liberal institutions have a discursive strategy that persuades the people to embrace socialism. He presented socialism as a defender, savior of the liberal imperialist system by applying discursive strategies to persuade people socially, economically, culturally, and religiously.

Chávez's aggressive attitude towards liberal elites, which he labeled as imperialists, triggered an animosity against liberal elites in society and raised optimism against socialism. This illiberal freedom perception, which was established with economic fear and distrust especially towards liberal elites, was based on the people's abstraction of liberal elites. Therefore, people would somehow prevent elites' representation of their own will and avoid the liberal conception of freedom. In this way, these perceptions insidiously led to a split based on fear. This perception that excluded the representation of elites by linking the people to socialism did not create a liberation as Venezuelan claimed for democracy but a division. This perception, which harms the pluralistic nature of democracies, was an important discursive strategy that Chávez has been implementing since he took office. By using referendums, Chávez reflected these restrictions as the public will, in this way, he was accepted as the true representative of the people. By introducing himself as a true representative of democracy, he continued to receive the support of the public, despite his actions that became more radical, especially since 2007. During Chávez's rule, the public's perception of him and socialism as an alternative to liberalism appeared in various referendums.

However, Chávez did not hold a referendum between 2010 and 2013, but he showed how he successfully concluded his illiberal freedom perception with the referendum in 2009. In order to ensure the continuity of socialism's war against liberalism and liberal elites, this referendum abolished the term limits of office of the president, state governors, mayors, and deputies of the National Assembly. Approved by 54% of voters, with around 70% of registered voters participating (BBC, 2009) this referendum guaranteed Chávez to remain in power as the advocate leader of socialism until 2030 (Carroll, 2013). Moreover, it allowed Chávez to take measures against

liberal elites and liberal politics, allowing his illiberal interventions. In other words, illiberal interventions in democracies emerged as failures as a result of the damage that illiberal freedom perception inflicted on the pluralistic structure of democracy.

On the other hand, Maduro does not fit the populists' discursive strategic definition based on persuasion. Moreover, as he imposed illiberal freedoms on the people rather than convincing the people, he draws a more authoritative leader profile. Therefore, liberal freedom interventions can be considered as a factor of the democratic regression caused by Maduro.

## ***5.2. Hungary***

### ***5.2.1. Right-wing Populists' Challenges to Liberal Democracy: Orbán's Illiberal Freedom Perception***

During the post-democratic transformation period in Eastern Europe, Hungary was an example of a rapid and smooth democratic transition among the other former communist countries. Between 1990 and 2010 Hungary had well-functioning liberal democracy which supporting civil rights and participation of civil society. However, since Viktor Orbán's election victory in 2010, Hungary has been dealing with a deep democratic crisis (Bozóki, 2012). Between 2010 and 2017, Hungary suffered a number of severe economic and political freedom restrictions. Hence, the ideas were on the agenda that Orbán's usual political policies and prudential freedom struggle will lead to political isolation and drive the economy into stagnation and state bankruptcy (Financial Times, 2012; Economist, 2011).




Figure 2. Political and Economic Freedom Rates on Hungary Democracy Index. Economic Freedom data is provided from The Fraser Institute. It scores shown are out of 10. “0” is the worst “10” is the best score. \* Political Freedom is prepared considering Freedom House data. “7” is the worst “1” is the best score. \* Democracy’s overall score is taken from The Economist Intelligence Unit. The index of democracy scores on a 0 to 10 scale. (Source: The Fraser Institute (2010-2017), Freedom House (2010-2017), and The Economist Intelligence Unit (2010-2017)).

However, between 2010 and 2017, according to data from Freedom House and Fraser Institute, compared to Venezuela, Hungary is an economically and politically free country. When Figure 2. is examined, economic freedom, which was 7.6 in 2010, decreases to 7.53 in 2017, while political freedom decreased from 1 to 2.5 in 7 years. However, the decrease in both economic and political freedom rates does not seem to prevent the country from being defined as free by both institutions during this period. Moreover, when the democracy rates of the country are examined, even a ritualized decline is observed in the rates of democracy. Besides, it is not a sharp and serious decline comparing Venezuela. However, it is still defined in the category of flawed democracy. Therefore, Hungary can be seen as one of the countries with the possibility of democratic backsliding in the long term. This possibility has been increasingly

justified, especially since Orbán came to power. The main reason for his criticism was his attitude towards liberal democracy. As soon as he took office, he resorted to a few practices that ignored the values of liberal democracy. By belittling the failure of liberal democracies to respond to the 2008 financial crises, Orbán underlined that Hungary should break with the liberal principles and methods of social organization (Orbán, 2014). Including liberal freedoms in his statement, he claimed that he did not deny the fundamental values of liberalism such as freedom, but did not take freedom as a fundamental element (Orbán, 2014). Therefore, he created illiberal freedom perception in order to spread his freedom understanding in the society as well.

Orbán's resorted to illiberal freedom perception under the guise of nationalist and nativist attitudes to create protectionist and centralized economic and political freedoms. Creating illiberal freedom perceptions, provided him not only approval for his policies, but also provided long-term support. Moreover, it gave him an ability to reduce his questionability. In order to create this illiberal freedom perception in the society, Orbán focused on three important methods; 1. Persuading to orient the politics of political freedom with protectionist policies; 2. Resorting to unconventional economic freedom policies based on illiberal and protectionist systems and changing the liberal elite by focusing on the concept of the central political power field; 3. By uniting the nation under a traditional cultural and religious roof in order to persuade the people of illiberal freedom policies.

Before Orbán took office, there were clear signals in his speeches of the goal of creating a central arena of power (Bozóki, 2015). In order to achieve this goal, after he took office, he focused on the integrity of the nation in the policies towards which economic and political freedoms. As the Tavares Report presented in 2013, Hungary deviated from the liberal values of the EU. In the report, it was stated that the rule of law, the basic democratic principles, and the separation of powers have been damaged since 2010 in Hungary (Tavares, 2013). For this reason, Orbán, who was frequently criticized by the EU, hid behind nationalist values and attacked the liberal political freedom policies of the EU. Reflecting the critique of democratic backsliding in Hungary as a critique of the Hungarian people, he fostered nationalism among the people. When the Hungarian constitution was criticized he claimed that ;



*“It is not the government the European Union has a problem with, much as they want us to believe..., the truth is they attack Hungary” [(Orbán, 2013) quoted in Batory, 2015].*

Thus, Orbán made it easier to portray constitutional changes based on protective political freedoms as a kind of defense against the EU. By assessing the vulnerability of public anger and distrust against the failures of liberal policies, Orbán presented a highly illiberal but capitalist system to create his own system. This system, in which the logic of private property and profit still prevailed, had only the state bureaucracy and institutions, and an attitude towards the enrichment of the national economic elite (Scheiring, 2018). To fund this new economic elite, Orbán dissolved or centralized important democratic institutions and silenced institutions he saw as obstacles, such as NGOs (Scheiring, 2018). To normalize this in the eyes of the public, Orbán created the perception that (Christian) moral values needed to be rediscovered, as well as the return of the state on economic issues. (Fabry, 2019). By taking authoritarian-ethnic measures to manipulate popular feelings of expropriation and disenfranchisement against the internal and external 'enemies' of a balanced Hungarian nation, he focused on making him adopt authoritarian capitalism away from liberal capitalism (Fabry, 2019). As János Kornai, one of the comprehensive analysts of the Hungarian economic system, pointed out in his article on Hungary's U-turn, this model of illiberal capitalism shows that the Orbán regime is extremely opportunistic and one of the example of old “Divide and rule” (Kornai, 2015). Orbán, who does not want to play with the liberal economic freedom rules of the EU, created a dilemma by making “strategic agreements” with other foreign companies, while giving a hard blow to some sectors with predominantly foreign capital with a nationalist attitude (Kornai, 2015). In other words, Orbán, who created new foreign-backed economic elites for himself, covered this dilemma by imposing it with nationalist ideas. When had the majority of qualified voters in the National Assembly, he centralized the government and passed the unilaterally proposed constitution by significantly undermining the balance of power (Bozóki, 2015). Because, according to Orbán, the previous constitution was a form of reconciliation, prepared under fear to serve the interests of the communists. At the same time, Orbán often said that a new constitution was needed, with the pretext of withdrawing elitism, partocracy, increasing people's power, and developing democracy. However, contrary to what was claimed, this new constitution led to a

decline in democracy and strengthening of the partocracy (Korkut, 2012). The most striking thing about the constitution completed in 2012 was that all Hungarian ethnicities go beyond those living under the jurisdiction of Hungarian law. It was explicitly claimed that minorities living in Hungary were excluded (Korkut, 2012). In addition, this new constitution and cultural, religious, moral, and economic policies, including issues such as public debt and pension, was placed in the “*cardinal law*” category. Generally, it requires a two-thirds majority for any changes to be made in Cardinal laws. Therefore, changes to these policies were almost impossible unless implemented by Fidesz (Freedom House, 2012; Bánkuti, Halmai, and Scheppele, 2015).

Along with the rise of Orbán's influence, Hungary applied a general trend towards the centralization of power. This current regime, which included limiting controls and balances and gaining more political control, was on the path to re-nationalizing some of the privatized assets after 1989. After Orbán managed to expand its control over state-owned media, the influence of the strong right-wing populism on the elite and the private media sector gradually expanded (Bocskor, 2018). According to Orbán, the state of law based on the liberal order established in 1989 was an elite project that emerged in the activism of the constitutional court, which did not belong to the people and brought legalism to the former communist elites. Moreover, ordinary people were based on the assumption that they were abandoned and disregarded (Pap, 2018). To embrace the economic and political freedoms of liberal democracy meant to embrace the elites. This was at odds with the idea that Hungary belongs to Hungarians (Bozóki, 2011) what he advocated. Because this meant, in other words, there was no room for liberal defensive elites.

Along with the elites, another danger for the Hungarian nation that is seen by Orbán is NGOs. Especially due to the migrant crisis that broke out in 2015, he targeted many NGOs and the elites as two kinds of traitors of the nation. In fact, he constantly has two targets that frequently blamed in this regard; American- Jewish billionaire George Soros and his NGOs and the EU. Hungarian dignitaries have darkly asserted that Soros might have some secret plans to destroy the country but they struggled to explain. Moreover, Orbán's spokesman Zoltán Kovács argued it as a political declaration of war against Hungary. By arguing that NGO work was political activism camouflaged,

he further asserted that this was also one of the purposes of Soros's NGOs (Walker, 2017). Therefore, along with a new NGO law banning external funding, the Orbán regime with its images of seductive and hostile propaganda provoked hatred against Soros, functionally shutting down his Open Society Foundation. In addition, Orbán's government took control of the ownership of research institutes owned by Soros (Ash, 2019).

Another thing that Orbán claimed as a danger for the nation was the EU and its liberal policies. First, the tension between the EU Commission and Hungary started with Orbán's enactment of laws controlling political freedoms started in 2011 and then, manifested itself with the refugee/migration crisis in 2015. As an answer for EU critics against him, he started to apply a serious perception policy by defining the EU as imperial bureaucrats who wanted to take freedom out of the Hungarian nation and reach nation-states (Fabry, 2018). He made a few descriptive differences after the immigration/ refugee crisis while preserving his skeptical attitude towards the European Union's freedom policies, by presenting the Hungarian people as “the people” against the EU, who were described as the “corrupt elite”. Aiming to raise the enthusiasm of nationalism against the warnings of the European Union Commission by defining “the people” as we, the people of Europe, Orbán launched his policies of economic and political freedom to protect the people's ownership of the ruling sovereign nations (Orbán, 2016a).

Orbán's attitude towards economic and political freedom has not actually taken over the state in the traditional sense (Kornai, 2015). His method was to gain control by ensuring the legitimacy of his decisions by the people. In other words, it was centralization using democracy. Therefore, he created freedom perceptions that the decisions he makes on freedom are actually “the will of the people” before applied any freedom restriction or taking any decision that has a possibility to criticize. The most prominent issue in his attitude is the anti-immigrant perspective. This attitude towards immigrants triggers xenophobia and angry opposition to all religions except Christianity. By imposing this attitude on the people, he imposed an illiberal model of economics and political freedom. Firstly, he criticized the EU and its liberal form of freedom in these anti-immigrant policies, which have often been formed by creating fear and insecurity. Like this question he asked in a speech in 2016, by emphasizing nationalism, he internalized the perception that he aimed to create;

*“Do you want the European Union to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary without the consent of the National Assembly?”* (Orbán, 2016a).

By attacking EU decisions, Orbán sowed suspicion and distrust of the EU's globalizing economic and political freedom policies. He considered the arrival of more than 390,000 asylum-seekers to Hungary, most of them Muslims, not a humanitarian issue, but as a Muslim invasion threatening the national security, social cohesion, and Christian identity of the Hungarian nation. In order to ensure that this idea has been adopted by the people, he built the fear of the "other" and made a series of anti-immigrant actions and policies inevitable (Goździak, 2019). In order to strengthen and perpetuate the illiberal freedom perception that he created with this sense of fear and insecurity, he resorted to PPPs based on personal beliefs beyond truth, a little different from normal populist propaganda. In this way, he perceived these powerful perceptions of illiberal freedom that threaten democracies in the minds of the people.

### ***5.2.2. Right-wing Populist Post-Truth Propaganda: Euroscepticism, Xenophobia, Anti-Soros, and Anti-Immigration***

Euroscepticism, xenophobia, anti-immigration, and anti-Soros stance were all key elements of the Hungarian government's intense propaganda that have been frequently applied by Orbán. The main purpose of this kind of propaganda, which contained an infrastructure of opposition to the liberal form of democracy, was to oppose its libertarian structure with some kind of nationalist traditional pretexts. He often created the perception of the PPPs that economic and political freedom can undermine Hungary's national and cultural values, which were difficult to falsify but may be instinctively correct. These national manipulative developments often strengthened the perceptions of freedom he willing to create by using populist post-truth propaganda that developed instinctively. In order to create an instinctive sense of correctness with PPPs, by establishing these pretexts often in connection with the traces of the past, Orbán often addressed the attempts to implement a second Trianon, issues of border security, self-determination, and, in this context, reluctance to submit to the demands of outsiders (Brussels' and liberal Western Europeans) (Toomey, 2018). To reinforce these perceptions, first, Orbán broke down the public's trust in liberal economic and political freedom, then made them believe that they were economically and politically

unsafe. Lastly, together with the Fidesz government, they presented the decisions they took or wanted to take to the people as if they were their own opinions. In other words, they took the vote of the people who have become insecure through the referendum and increase their authority. As a result, they acquired a strong illiberal freedom perception in society.

As soon as Orbán took office, he accused the EU of Euro-colonialism, and imposed the Union as "an institution that insisted on how Hungarians should live" due to it criticized the constitution prepared by him (Müller, 2015). In this way, he supported the insecurity feelings that he created against EU freedom policies with the distrust by building the perception of colonial Europe in the minds of the people. He sought to legitimize illiberal freedom in the eyes of the people, by claiming freedom means the people to decide on the laws governing the lives of the Hungarian people. (Orbán, 2012). In general, these PPPs, which were critical of the libertarian nature of the EU, are also matched with anti-immigration policies as well.

On the other hand, using PPPs to offer alternatives to liberal economic and political freedoms, Orbán was not only criticized the liberal attitude of EU institutions, but in many cases questions the liberal values of Europe. Orbán attacked the EU in many of his speeches for its liberal values and especially its migration policies. He accused the EU of subjugating a relativizing liberal ideology that's an insult to families (Tait, 2017). Especially with the claim that the EU has been breaking families with its immigration policies, Orbán raised fears and concerns by spreading PPPs that encourage Hungarians to have more children to reverse the long-term population decline (Tait, 2017).

He also argued that some European values such as democracy and respect for the rule of law can be understood in different ways, not just as the EU and its institutions define it (Füredi, 2018). In other words, in addition to spreading fear and insecurity feelings, he pointed to the illiberal policies that he resorted to as a remedy or an alternative to liberal democracy. At the same time, Orbán argued against the EU's critical attitude towards this illiberal democracy model, which was presented as an alternative.

One example of this is the EU's infringement procedure initiated in response to the Hungarian NGO Law. According to Orbán, the Brussels bureaucrats have been aiming

to use legal procedures to force a political decision (Orbán, 2017b). Stating that member states have been insulted, for this reason, Orbán is trying to create an illiberal perception based on marginalization in the society by presenting the EU as an unreliable institution that does not respect the libertarian decisions of Hungary. In general, these PPPs, which were critical of the libertarian nature of the EU, are also matched with anti-immigration policies as well. In line with these thoughts, in a speech in which he voiced his PPP, Orbán claimed that;

*“The Hungarian government’s standpoint on migration policy is that to date what we in Europe have been doing has failed, that migration policy has resulted in trouble, terrorism, violence, and fear..”* (Orbán, 2016c).

In other words, his PPP caused the EU to be perceived as a center for unacceptable, illegal, unenforceable liberal policies. As a result of this, according to a study by Pew Research Center, it was observed that European skepticism has increased dramatically in Hungary, largely due to the sharp nationalist propaganda of the Fidesz government and Orbán (Novak, 2014).

Another issue that Orbán has been frequently using to strengthen the perception of freedom against liberalism he wanted to create through PPP was xenophobia. In this regard, he linked xenophobia with Islamophobia, anti-immigration, and anti-Soros issues. He often based his nationalist violent PPPs on these three issues. Especially, along with an unprecedented number of asylum seekers arriving from Hungary in 2015, this problem manifested itself all too often. His dominance over public discourse based on media domination and mass propaganda contributes greatly to the spread of PPPs against the values of liberal democracies over the issue of the immigration crisis. Moreover, He turned hostility towards immigrants into a pillar of “illiberal democracy” through PPPs. One of the reasons for that is the marginalization of liberal freedom policies by emphasizing the importance of illiberalism in the protection of cultural, religious, and traditional identities of nations. For instance; Orbán has been considering the migration crisis as a war of Hungarian Christians against Muslim immigrants, backed by the EU left-liberal elite. Therefore, he has been claiming that Christian democracy should replace liberal democracy (Boffey, 2018). Besides, he has been presenting the civil rights given to immigrants with the freedoms offered by liberalism as a culturally destructive element.

Therefore, by declaring most of the immigrants as terrorists (citing Paris attack example) because they were Muslims, liberal freedom has basically been touted as a secret weapon of foreign powers or institutions such as the EU, planting the seeds of fear and suspicion in the public (Kaminski, 2015).

Another issue that associated with the immigration is George Soros. Orbán portrayed billionaire investor George Soros as one of the "activists" supporting refugees traveling to the continent from the Middle East and beyond, and trying to weaken European nations (Gergely, 2015). In other words, he accused immigration and planning to change Hungarian society by supporting liberal ideas (Plenta, 2020). The reasons why Soros was often labeled as a foreign agent and portrayed as an enemy of the Hungarian people; his American origin, his support for many NGOs, and his being one of the strong advocates of liberalism (Byrne, 2017).

Taking everything into account, PPP created with the subject of immigration play an important role in the development of illiberal freedom perception against the suspicion and distrust of liberal freedom. As seen by Pew's research in 2016, it is obvious that Orbán's PPP's made Hungary one of the countries where more concerns and negative views have been expressed about refugees and minority groups in general (Wike, Stokes, and Simmons, 2016). After the fear and trust phase, It is clear that Orbán has been creating illiberal freedom perception to gain the legitimacy of the people to his policies since 2010.

### ***5.2.3. Right-wing Populists' Illiberal Freedom Perception and Democratic Backsliding***

Illiberal freedom perception, which has been established against liberal freedom caused alarm bells start to ring in the society by using people's fears of dilution of ethnic and national values. By defining liberal elites like Soros as activists trying to weaken the ethnicity, tradition, and religion of the Hungarian people, PPP triggered distrust and fear against the liberal part of society. These fears were exactly what Orbán aimed to create in order to set up illiberal freedom perception in the people's minds. The fact that this illiberal freedom perception threatened ethnic and religious diversity instinctively caused more public concern about refugees. Moreover, as seen in Pew research's survey results, the public who adopt Orbán's illiberal stance became

to be less enthusiastic about a diverse society, while increasing their negative attitude towards minorities. In this case, it made inevitable the division in society stemming from fear-based marginalization.

This illiberal freedom perception, which constitutes a model of freedom that disregards pluralism, has been adopted by the public in such a way that the people try to marginalize the policies and defenses that propose liberal freedom. The biggest proof of this was despite the low participation rate, which makes it invalid, around 98% of the respondents supported the government's call to reject the EU plan in Orbán's EU immigration referendum (BBC, 2016). Moreover, although Orbán has often been implemented restrictive freedom policies, in a study conducted by Pew research in 2019, more than twice the population in Hungary were more satisfied with the democracy that has been existing since Orbán came to power than 10 years ago (Wike et al., 2019).

As a result, this situation demonstrates that as the people's freedom perception has been necessarily combined with that of Orbán, he gained the opportunity to reduce his questionability in decisions over the democracy. In this case, illiberal freedom perception has become an important discursive persuasion strategy that enabled Orbán to remain in power and gain legitimacy for restrictive freedom interventions that cause democratic backsliding.



## CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION

In the aftermath of rising populists to power in the 21st century, several democratic problems came up in both regions such as election day fraud, strategic erosion to rule of law and checks and balances, and restrictions on economic and political freedoms. From the beginning of these deteriorations, it has been interpreted by many scholars as a populists' restrictive intervention in executive power, or as some changes that are applied by populists that affect many dimensions of democratic quality.

This study presents an assessment that populists' indirect interventions to economic and political freedoms through the people also cause democratic backsliding. It basically claims that populists' create an illiberal perception based on economic and political freedom in people's minds, leading to democratic backsliding. By defining populism as a persuasion-based discursive strategy parallel to Michael Kazin's and Bart Bonikowski's definitions, this thesis draws attention to the active role of "Populist Post-truth Propaganda" (PPP) based on personal instincts rather than facts in shaping illiberal freedom perception. Therefore, this thesis analyzes how illiberal freedom perception is formed through populist post-truth propaganda (PPP), and how illiberal freedom perception causes democratic backsliding.

A cross-regional study was presented with the concern that the illiberal freedom perception based on populists' hostility towards liberal freedoms in a single case study could not go beyond the specific characteristics of the country. By examining populists' illiberal strategies and their PPPs, this study focused left-wing populists in Latin America and right-wing populists in Eastern Europe, who have caused to decline in the quality of democracies. Therefore, by testing the illiberal freedom perception role on democratic backsliding under different ideological, regional, and democratic conditions, this analysis compared Hungary and Venezuela between 2010-2017 when both countries had at least hybrid democracy.

First of all, the relation of both left and right populism with democracy, nativism, nationalism, and egalitarianism has briefly been scrutinized. By examining these dynamics, it has been tried to understand how illiberal freedom perception is generally shaped under different ideological and regional conditions. Secondly, it has been elucidated how PPP combined liberal freedom understanding with specific problems

that both region have been faced by triggering a fear-based division against liberalism in society. Thirdly, it has been observed that illiberal freedom perception can reduce populists' questionability and cause democratic backsliding.

In this thesis, the main purpose in creating illiberal freedom perception has been expounded as illiberalizing people's freedom understanding in order to abandon the economic and political freedom offered by liberal democracy under the guise of "the people's will". There were mainly three focal points in this study that were allegedly used to create an illiberal freedom perception through PPPs that consisting of alternative facts, fake news, and conspiracy theories.

Accordingly, first, populists demolish confidence in liberal freedom with fear and secondly, they create economic and political insecurity feelings against liberal freedom and its defenders. Third, they portray illiberal freedom as an alternative solution against liberal freedom. In this context, it is underlined that populists try to establish ties with the people by using persuasive discourses. When selected cases have been scrutinized in both countries, it has also been observed that whether leaders use persuasive discourse strategies to illiberalize people's perceptions of freedom. Both Chávez and Orbán have promoted their own alternative freedom perceptions by attempting religious and national discourses in order to direct the people to the illiberal freedom perception. Moreover, they instinctively have sought to connect with the values of the people, and they portrayed liberal freedom and its advocates as corrupt by applying nativist, nationalist, and egalitarian discourses. By promoting the people as part of the illiberal transformation, they enabled the people to adopt illiberal freedom as people's will. Despite the narrow scope of this research due to limited discursive data, it was noticed that Maduro was far from the profile that used persuasion-based discursive strategies. While he claimed to follow Chávez's footsteps, Maduro's rhetoric did not involve the people in the illiberal transformation as much as Chávez's. He applied more dictatorial rhetoric rather than being persuasive.

On the other hand, Chávez and Orbán underlined three important points when creating an illiberal freedom perception in both Latin America and Eastern Europe; 1. Liberal freedom is the enemy of the nation. In general, this idea was associated with national economic problems for Venezuela, while it was more associated with national identity issues in Hungary; 2. Liberal freedom does not represent the real people and

jeopardizes people's economic and political freedoms. While Chávez introduced liberal freedom as a capitalist-imperialist threat, Orbán tried to persuade the people that liberal freedom was a part of the liberal capitalist model that aimed to destroy European identity; 3. The illiberal form of freedom was the savior of the nation against the liberal danger. It was socialism-based centralized illiberal freedom in Venezuela, but it was introduced as Christianity-based illiberal freedom in Europe. Therefore, both leaders gave liberal freedom perception a justified legitimacy by using a number of historical problematic issues to attach the people to illiberal freedom perception through PPP.

Chávez focused on anti-American and anti-imperialist PPPs which were fed with fears of Americanist colonialism from the past, creating economic insecurity, and developing illiberal freedom perception. However, Orbán mostly emphasized socio-cultural distrust created against liberalism by applying to the anti-immigration, anti-European Union, and anti-Soros PPPs. Thus, PPPs established with doubt, fear, and distrust against liberal freedom, facilitated people's attachment to alternative illiberal freedoms by creating a serious marginalization against liberal freedom and its defenders in both regions. In other words, this illiberal freedom perception makes it easier to convince the people for illiberal freedom interventions.

Chávez built illiberal freedom perceptions through socialism, which he offered as an alternative. It caused marginalization based on the fear and distrust against the liberal part of society. By damaging the pluralistic nature of Venezuela's democracy, he gained the people's approval for restrictive or centralized illiberal interventions against liberalism through illiberal freedom perception. Moreover, thanks to this perception, he reached a political comfort in which he can apply illiberal interventions on freedom by extending his term of office through referendums.

On the other hand, in Eastern Europe, Orbán imposed illiberal freedom perception by emphasizing various ethnic and cultural values. By taking advantage of the people's fears of liberal freedom coming with the migration crisis, and their distrust against the liberal EU policies, he gained the strength to carry out illiberal interventions.

In this way, both leaders actually made people perceive that the idea of illiberal freedom actually was people's own idea. Especially through internalized PPPs, people

saw the marginalization of liberalist freedoms as a part of religious sanctity or an effect of nationalism. Therefore, gaining confidence with the idea of illiberal freedom that emerged as the only way out, these two leaders also gained the opportunity to reduce their questionability.

In general, illiberal freedom perception which increases the populists' power by damaging the pluralistic structure of democracy through PPP is proof that the way of perceiving actually comes to the fore before freedom interventions. In other words, populists' persuasive effects on freedom determine the course of today's democracies rather than the effects of ideological or regional differences in both regions.

It is enunciated that populists' restrictive interventions to freedoms cause democratic backsliding. However, in this thesis, it is revealed that populists can also lead to democratic backsliding indirectly by interfering to people's freedom perception. More broadly, it has been exposed that populists have persuasiveness that causes democratic backsliding by reducing leaders' questionability through illiberal freedom perception which gives legitimacy to restrictive freedom policies. On the other hand, It has been stated many times that the nativist, nationalist and egalitarian discourses of populists can create polarization in society. However, in this thesis, it has been underlined that these discourses can actually be a part of a persuasion-based perception policy that can increase populist accountability.

Overall, data and time constraints and the limited findings of this study can be expanded over wider temporal intervals to investigate whether there is a link between Orbán's and Chávez's other illiberal interventions and illiberal freedom perceptions that have led to a decline in democracies. Moreover, while there is a possibility that many contemporary democracies of today will be either ruled or in the near future by "populist" leaders, any future research should not be limited to Venezuela and Hungary, but also to ideological and regional boundaries.

## REFERENCES

‘Budging Budapest’. (2012). *Financial Times*, 16 March [Online]. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/76477058-6eaf-11e1-b1b2-00144feab49a> (Accessed: 13 May 2019).

‘Viktor Orbán: our duty is to protect Hungary's Christian culture’. (2018). *The Guardian*, 7 May [Online]. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/07/viktor-orban-hungary-preserve-christian-culture> (Accessed: 24 Jun 2020).

[Hugo Chávez]. (2010, Jun 21) *Hugo Chávez BBC HARDtalk Part 1*, Interview by Stephen Sackur [Video File] Accessed: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DROnWLTx6WI> (Accessed: 12 February 2020).

[Hugo Chávez].(2013, March 05) *Larry King Live - 2009: Larry King interviews Hugo Chávez, Interview by L. King* [Video File] Accessed : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hGtzb-PunXI> (Accessed: 20 January 2020).

ABC News. (2006). *Bush Charts Course With Instincts, Advisers* [Online]. Available at: <https://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=123552&page=1>. (Accessed: 7 December 2019).

Alesina, A. and Passarelli, F. (2015) *Loss aversion in politics*. National Bureau of Economic Research No. w21077.

Alexander, R J. (1964) *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution: A Profile of the Regime of Rómulo Betancourt*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Alexander, A. and Welzel, C. (2017) *The Myth of Deconsolidation: Rising Liberalism and the Populist Reaction*, ILE Working Paper Series, Vol.10. pp.1-15.

Arditi, B. (2007) *Politics on the Edges of Liberalism: Difference, Populism, Revolution, Agitation: Difference, Populism, Revolution, Agitation*. Edinburgh University Press.

Ash, T. (2019). 'Europe must stop this disgrace: Viktor Orbán is dismantling democracy', *The Guardian*, 20 Jun [Online]. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jun/20/viktor-orban-democracy-hungary-eu-funding> (Accessed: 12 November 2019).

Aslanidis, P. (2016) *Is populism an ideology? A refutation and a new perspective*, *Political Studies*, Vol. 64 (1), pp. 88-104.

Atwood, R. (2006) *Media Crackdown: Chávez and Censorship*, *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 7 (1), pp.25-32.

Balogh, S. E. (1976) *The Hungarian Social Democratic Centre and the Fall of Béla Kun*, *Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes*, Vol. 18(1), pp. 15-35.

Bánkúti, M. and Halmai, G. and Scheppele, L.K. (2015) *Broken Democracy, Predatory State, and Nationalist Populism*. Edited by Péter Krasztes and Jon Van Til. Budapest : Central European University Press.

Batory, A. (2015) *Populists in government? Hungary's system of national cooperation*, *Democratization*, Vol. 23(2), pp. 283–303.

Battaglini, O. (2012) *De la Guerra Federal al Gomecismo, 1859-1935*. Caracas: Editorial Galac.

BBC. (2009). *Venezuelan leader wins key reform* [Online]. Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7891856.stm> (Accessed: 17 March 2020).

BBC. (2014). *Venezuela recession confirmed as Maduro attacks US 'oil* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-30638770> (Accessed: 7 March 2019).

BBC. (2016). *Hungary PM claims EU migrant quota referendum victory* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37528325>. (Accessed: 16 October 2020).

BBC. (2017a). *Hungary approves strict regulations on foreign-funded NGOs* [Online].

Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40258922> (Accessed: 15 March 2020).

BBC. (2017). *Venezuela referendum: Big show of support for opposition* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40624313> (Accessed: 17 March 2020).

Bendix, A. (2017). *Maduro Plans to Rewrite Venezuela's Constitution* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/05/maduro-plans-to-rewrite-venezuelas-constitution/528033/> (Accessed: 15 November 2019).

Bergmann, E. (2018) *Conspiracy & Populism: The Politics of Misinformation*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bermeo, N. (2016) *On Democratic Backsliding*, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 27(1), pp. 5-19.

Bernays, E. (1928) *Propaganda*. New York: Horace Liveright.

Betancourt, R. (2013) *Venezuela, Política y Petróleo*, Tomo I. Caracas: Editorial Alfa.

Bethell, L. (2007) *Conceptual and Historical Perspectives*, in Arnson, J.C., ed., *The 'New Left' and Democratic Governance in Latin America*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Betz, H. (2002) *Conditions Favoring the Success and Failure of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies*. Edited by Yves Mény and Yves Surel. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bocskor, Á. (2018) *Anti-Immigration Discourses in Hungary during the Crisis' Year: The Orbán Government's National Consultation Campaign of 2015*, *Sociology*, Vol. 52(3), pp. 551–568.

Boffey, D. (2018). 'Orbán Claims Hungary is Last Bastion Against Islamisation of Europe', *The Guardian*, 18 February [Online]. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/18/orban-claims-hungary-is-last-bastion-against-islamisation-of-europe> (Accessed: 15 January 2019).

Bonikowski, B. (2016) *Three lessons of contemporary populism in Europe and the United States*, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 23(9). pp. 9-24.

Bos, L., Van der Brug, W. and De Vreese, C. H. (2011) *How the media shape perceptions of right-wing populist leaders*. *Political Communication*, Vol. 28(2), pp.182–206.

Bozóki, A. (2002) *The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy: Analysis and Documents*. Central European University Press.

Bozóki, A. (2011) *Occupy the State: The Orbán Regime in Hungary*, In *Debate*, Vol. 19(3), pp. 1-23.

Bozóki, A. (2012) *The Transition from Liberal Democracy: The Political Crisis in Hungary*, *Mediations*, Vol. 26(1), pp.1-23.

Bozóki, A. (2015) *Broken Democracy, Predatory State, and Nationalist Populism*. Edited by Péter Krasztev and Jon Van Til.. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Brading, R. (2013) *Populism in Venezuela*. Oxon: Routledge.

Brading, R. (2014) *From Passive to Radical Revolution in Venezuela's Populist Project*, *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 41(6), pp. 48–64.

Brennan, J. (2018) *Democracy and Freedom*. Edited by David Schmitz and Carmen E. Pavel. New York: Oxford University Press.

Brown, J. (2018) *Escaping the Confines of Market Democracy: Lessons From Venezuela*, *Socialism and Democracy*, Vol. 32(2), pp. 214-231.

Brubaker, R. (2017) *Why populism?*, *Theor Soc*, Vol. 46, pp. 357–385.

Bruni, C. and Tulio, M. (2014) *El 18 de Octubre de 1945*. Caracas: Editorial La Hoja del Norte.

Buxton, J. (2005) *Venezuela's Contemporary Political Crisis in Historical Context*, *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 24(3), pp. 328–347.



Buxton, J. (2019) *Continuity and change in Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution*, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 41(8), pp.1371-1387.

Byrne, A. (2017) 'Orbán Takes Aim at Soros and Hungarian NGOs', *Financial Times*, 13 January [Online]. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/20d291f8-d87b-11e6-944b-e7eb37a6aa8e> (Accessed 16 November 2019).

Caldera, R. (2013) *De Carabobo a Puntofijo: Los Causahabientes*. Caracas: Editorial Libros Marcados.

Canache, D. (2012) *The Meanings of Democracy in Venezuela: Citizen Perceptions and Structural Change*, Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 54(3), pp. 95–122.

Canovan, M. (1999) *Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy*. Political Studies, Vol. 47(1), pp. 2–16.

Canovan, M. (2005) *The People*. Cambridge: Polity.

Carroll, R. (2010). "Venezuela's private retailers targeted as Hugo Chávez declares economic war", *The Guardian*, 27 Jun [Online]. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/27/venezuela-hugo-chavez-private-retailers> (Accessed: 14 January 2020).

Carroll, R. (2013) *Comandante: The Life and Legacy of Hugo Chavez*. USA: The Penguin Press.

Castañeda, J. G. (2006) *Latin America's left turn*, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85 (3), pp. 28-43.

Cawthorne, A. (2014). *Maduro blames plunging oil prices on U.S. 'war' vs Russia, Venezuela* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-oil-idUSKBN0K802020141230> (Accessed: 12 November 2019).

Chirot, D. (1994) *Modern Tyrants: The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Cho, Y. (2014) *To Know Democracy Is to Love It: A Cross-National Analysis of Democratic Understanding and Political Support for Democracy*, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 67(3). pp. 478-488.
- Cívik, M. and Hardoš, P. (2020) *Conspiracy theories and reasonable pluralism*, European Journal of Political Theory, pp. 1-21.
- Cole, R. and Taylor, P. (1998) *The Encyclopedia of propaganda*. New York: Sharpe Inc.
- Coppedge, M. (2003) *Popular Sovereignty versus Liberal Democracy in Venezuela*. Edited by Michael Shifter and Jorge I. Domínguez. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Corrales, J. (2010) *The Repeating Revolution: Chávez's New Politics and Old Economics*. Edited by Kurt Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid, and Wendy Hunter, W New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Corrales, J. and Penfold, M. (2011) *Dragon in the Tropics: Venezuela and the Legacy of Hugo Chávez*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.
- Corrales, J. (2016) *Autocratic Legalism in Venezuela*. Edited by Marc F. Plattner, Chris Walker, Larry Diamond. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Cox, T. and Furlong, A. (1995) *Hungary: The politics of Transition*. London: Frank Class.
- Creswell, J. W. (2014) *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. California, USA: Sage Publications.
- Czaky, Z. (2017). *How Orban Redrew Hungary's Media Map to Solidify His Power*, [Online]. Available at: <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/21440/how-orban-redrew-hungary-s-media-map-to-solidify-his-power> (Accessed: 12 November 2019).
- Dahl, R. A. (1989) *Democracy and its critics*. New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press.

Deak, I. (1968) *Budapest and the Hungarian Revolutions of 1918-1919*, The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 46(106), pp. 129-140.

Deák, A. (2013) *Hungarian Dances – The Origins and the Future of Viktor Orbán's Revolution*, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, Vol. 11(1), pp.145-168.

De la Torre, C. (2000) *Populist seduction in Latin America: the Ecuadorian experience*. United States of America: Ohio University Press.

De la Torre, C. (2016) *Left-wing Populism: Inclusion and Authoritarianism in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador*, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 21(1), pp. 61-76.

De la Torre, C. (2017) *Hugo Chávez and the diffusion of Bolivarianism, Democratization*, Vol. 24(7), pp. 1271-1288.

De Mesquita, B. B. and Downs W. G. (2005) *Development and democracy*, Foreign Affairs, vol.84, no. 5, pp. 77-86.

Derham, M. (2002) *Undemocratic Democracy: Venezuela and the Distorting of History*, Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 21(2), pp. 270-289.

Devlin, K. (2014). *Despite rocky diplomatic relations, Venezuelan public prefers U.S. to Cuba* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/26/despite-rocky-diplomatic-relations-venezuelan-public-prefers-u-s-to-cuba/> (Accessed: 22 May 2020).

Diamond, L. J. (2002) *Thinking About Hybrid Regimes*, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13(2), pp. 21-35.

Discursos De Chávez Tomo IV (2014). *Caracas: Fundación Fondo Editorial de la Asamblea Nacional Willian Lara*.

Discursos De Chávez Tomo IV (2014). *Caracas: Fundación Fondo Editorial de la Asamblea Nacional Willian Lara*.

Edwards, S. (2010) *Left behind: Latin America and the false promise of populism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ellner, S. (2003) *Organized labor movement and the challenge of chavismo*. Edited by Steven Ellner, and Daniel Hellinger. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Ellner, S. (2008) *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chavez Phenomenon*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Ellner, S. (2013) *Social and Political Diversity and the Democratic Road to Change in Venezuela*, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 40 (3), pp.63-82.

Ellsworth, B. (2013). *Ghost of Chavez dominates Venezuela election campaign*, [Online]. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-election-chavez-idUSBRE9300BN20130401> (Accessed: 20 May 2020).

Erbschloe, M. (2019) *Extremist Propaganda in Social Media: A Threat to Homeland Security*. Boca Raton, FL, USA: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group.

Erdmann, G. (2011) *Decline of Democracy: Loss of Quality, Hybridisation and Breakdown of Democracy*. Edited by Gero Erdmann, and Marianne Kneuer Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

Ewell, J. (1984) *Venezuela, A Century of Change*. London: C. Hurst & Company.

Fabry, A. (2018) *Neoliberalism, crisis and authoritarian–ethnicist reaction: The ascendancy of the Orbán regime*, Competition & Change, pp.1-27.

Fabry, A. (2019) *The Political Economy of Hungary: From State Capitalism to Authoritarian Neoliberalism*. Switzerland : Palgrave MacMillan.

Faria, H. J. (2008) *Hugo Chávez Against the Backdrop of Venezuelan Economic and Political History*, The Independent Review, Vol. 12(4), pp. 519–535.

Felkay, A. (1989) *Hungary and the USSR, 1956-1988: Kadar's Political Leadership*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Fernandez, S. (2007). *Political Parties and Social Change in Venezuela* [Online]. Available at: <http://www.venezuelanalvsis.com/analysis/2295> (Accessed:12 July 2019).

Foster, J. B. (2015) *Chávez and the Communal State: On the Transition to Socialism in Venezuela*, Monthly Review, Vol. 66 (11), pp. 1–17.

Freedom House. (2003). *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties* [Online]. Available at: [https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom\\_in\\_the\\_World\\_2003\\_complete\\_book.pdf](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2003_complete_book.pdf) (Accessed:15 April 2019).

Freedom House. (2012). *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties* [Online]. Available at: [https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom\\_in\\_the\\_World\\_2012\\_complete\\_book.pdf](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2012_complete_book.pdf) (Accessed:15 April 2019).

Freedom House. (2013). *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties* [Online]. Available at: [https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom\\_in\\_the\\_World\\_2013\\_complete\\_book.pdf](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2013_complete_book.pdf) (Accessed:15 April 2019).

Freedom House. (2016). *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties* [Online]. Available at: [https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH\\_FITW\\_Report\\_2016.pdf](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf) (Accessed:15 April 2019).

Freedom House. (2017). *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties* [Online]. Available at: [https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH\\_FIW\\_2017\\_Report\\_Final.pdf](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FIW_2017_Report_Final.pdf) (Accessed:15 April 2019).

Freedom House. (2019). *Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties* [Online]. Available at:

[https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Feb2019\\_FH\\_FITW\\_2019\\_Report\\_ForWeb-compressed.pdf](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWeb-compressed.pdf) (Accessed:15 April 2019).

Füredi, F. (2018) *Who decides Europe's values?*. Edited by Frank Füredi. Abingdon: Routledge.

Galston, W. (2018) *The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy*, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 29(2), pp. 5-19.

Gergely, A. (2015). *A Orban Accuses Soros of Stoking Refugee Wave to Weaken Europe* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-30/orban-accuses-soros-of-stoking-refugee-wave-to-weaken-europe> (Accessed:15 November 2019).

Geurkink, B., Zaslove, A., Sluiter, R. and Jacobs, K. (2019) *Populist Attitudes, Political Trust, and External Political Efficacy: Old Wine in New Bottles?*, 68 (1), pp. 247-267.

Gill, M. T. (2019) *Shifting Imperial Strategies in Contemporary Latin America: The U.S. Empire and Venezuela under Hugo Chávez*, *J Hist Sociol*, Vol. 32(3), pp. 1–17.

Goat, E. and Banuta, Z. (2019). *Fresh evidence of Hungary vote-rigging raises concerns of fraud in European elections* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/breaking-fresh-evidence-hungary-vote-rigging-raises-concerns-fraud-european-elections/> (Accessed 20 April 2020).

Gonzalez, M. (2014) *Chavismo y oposición: categorías y significados*, *Cuadernos de Pensamiento Político*, No. 44, pp. 89-101.

Gonzalez, M. (2019) *The Ebb of the Pink Tide; The Decline of the Left in Latin America*. London: Pluto Press.

Gott, R. (2005) *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*. London: Verso.

Gottberg, L. D. (2013) *After Chávez: Re-Shifting the Focus*, *Journal of Latin American, Cultural Studies: Travesia*, Vol. 22( 2), pp. 239–41.

Goździak, E. (2019). *Using Fear of the “Other,” Orbán Reshapes Migration Policy in a Hungary Built on Cultural Diversity* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/orban-reshapes-migration-policy-hungary> (Accessed: 7 November 2019).

Greven, T. (2016) *The Rise of Right-wing Populism in Europe and the United States A Comparative Perspective*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, pp.1-9.

Guadilla, P. M. and Mallen, A. (2019) *Polarization, Participatory Democracy, and Democratic Erosion in Venezuela’s Twenty-First Century Socialism*, *The Annals of the American Academy*, Vol. 681. no. 1. pp. 62-77.

Hanley, S. and Vachudova, M. A. (2018) *Understanding the illiberal turn: democratic backsliding in the Czech Republic*, *East European Politics*, Vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 276–296.

Hausmann, R. and Rodríguez, F. (2014) *Venezuela Before Chávez: Anatomy of an Economic Collapse*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press University.

Heiskanen, J. (2020) *The nationalism-populism matrix*, *Journal of political ideologies*, pp.1-21.

Hellinger, C. D. (2014) *Comparative politics of Latin America: democracy at last?*. Oxon: Taylor & Francis Group.

Hendricks, V. F. and Vestergaard, M. (2019) *Reality Lost: Markets of Attention, Misinformation and Manipulation*. Switzerland: Springer.

Heuer, W. (2018) *The Temptations of Lying*, *Russian Sociological Review*, Vol. 17(4), pp. 25-36.

Hetherington, M. J. and Rudolph, T. J. (2015) *Why Washington won’t work*. Chicago, IL, and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Hill, R. (2004) *In Nations in Transition: Hungary*. New York, USA: Facts on File.

Hopkin, J. and Rosamond, B. (2018) *Post-truth Politics, Bullshit and Bad Ideas: Deficit Fetishism in the UK*, *New Political Economy*, Vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 641-655.

Hungarian spectrum. (2018). *Observer: Viktor ORBÁN'S 100 LIES* [Online]. Available at <https://hungarianspectrum.org/2018/06/01/observer-viktor-orbans-100-lies/> (Accessed: 25 January 2019).

Hungary Today. (2019). *Orbán: Liberal Freedom-Based Democracies Can No Longer Give Sense to Europe* [Online]. Available at: <https://hungarytoday.hu/orban-liberal-freedom-based-democracies-can-no-longer-give-sense-to-europe/> (Accessed: 25 January 2020).

Huntington, S. P. (1991) *Democracy's Third Wave*, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 2(2), pp.12-34.

Hybel, R.A., Mintz, M. Z. and Dunn, E. H. (2020) *The Challenges of Creating Democracies in the Americas*. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ignatieff, M. (2020) *Democracy Versus Democracy: The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy*, *LSE Public Policy Review*, Vol 1(1) pp. 1–5.

Ímber, F. (2013) *El Estado Mágico: Naturaleza, Dinero y Modernidad en Venezuela*. Caracas: Editorial Alfa.

Janos, A. C. (1982) *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary: 1825-1945*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Jowett, G. S. and O'Donnell, V. (2015) *Propaganda & Persuasion*. Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage.

Kaminski, M. (2015). *All the terrorists are migrants* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-interview-terrorists-migrants-eu-russia-putin-borders-schengen/> (Accessed: 25 November 2019).

Karl, T. (1987) *Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela*, *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 22(1), pp. 63-94.



Katz, A. (2013). *Chávez, on Christ's economic views, in 2006* [Online]. Available at: <https://world.time.com/2013/03/05/remembering-hugo-chavez-a-demagogues-career-in-quotes/> (Accessed: 2 October 2019).

Kazin, M. (2017) *The populist persuasion: An American history*. Cornell University Press.

Kessel, S. Sajuria, J. and Hauwaert, S. M. (2020) *Informed, uninformed or misinformed? A cross-national analysis of populist party supporters across European democracies*, *West European Politics*, pp.1-26.

Korkut, U. (2012) *Liberalization Challenges in Hungary, Elitism, Progressivism, and Populism*. New York : Palgrave Macmillan.

Kornai, J. (2015) *Hungary's U-Turn*, *Capitalism and Society*, Vol.10(2), pp.1-24.

Körösényi, A. (1999) *Government and Politics in Hungary*. Budapest: Ceupress.

Kyle, J. and Mounk, Y. (2018) *The Populist Harm to Democracy: An Empirical Assessment*. London: Tony Blair Institute for Global Change.

Laclau, E. (2005) *Populism: What's in a Name?*. Edited by Francisco Panizza. London: Verso.

Laclau, E. (2005b) *On populist reason*. London: Verso.

Laybats, C. and Tredinnick, L. (2016) *Post truth, information, and emotion*, *Business Information Review*, Vol. 33. no.4, pp.204-206.

Litvan, G. (1996) *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956*. London: Longman Group.

Lueders, H. and Lust, E. (2018) *Multiple measurements, elusive agreement, and unstable outcomes in the study of regime change*, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 80, no. 2, pp.736-741.

LSE (2017, May 16). Why populism is a threat to electoral integrity [blog] Available at <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/05/16/why-populism-is-a-threat-to-electoral-integrity/>

LSE (2019, May 17). *Why populism is a threat to electoral integrity* [blog] Available at: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/05/16/why-populism-is-a-threat-to-electoral-integrity/>

LSE BPP (2017, August 25). *Is citizen participation actually good for democracy?* [blog] Available at: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/is-citizen-participation-actually-good-for-democracy/>

Lust, E. and Waldner, D. (2015) *Unwelcome Change: Understanding, Evaluating, and Extending Theories of Democratic Backsliding*, U.S. Agency for International Development, pp. 1-90.

Lust, E. and Waldner, D. (2018) *Unwelcome Change: Coming to Terms with Democratic Backsliding*, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. no. 21, pp. 93-113.

Lührmann, A. and Lindberg, I. S. (2019) *A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here: What is New About It ?*, Democratization, Vol. 26. no.7, pp.1095-1113.

Macias, F. A. G. (2012) *After Neoliberalism? The Left And Economic Reforms In Latin America*. New York: Oxford University Press

MacLeod, A. (2018) *Bad news from Venezuela: Twenty Years of Fake News and Misreporting*. Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge.

Maduro, N. (2014) *Full Interview: Nicholas Maduro [Interview by C. Amanpour]*. Accessed April 14, 2019, Available at: <http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/03/07/full-transcript-nicolas-maduro/>

Mann, P. S. (2010) *Introductory Statistics*. Massachusetts, USA: Wiley.

Marcano, C. and Tyszka, A. A. (2007) *Chávez sin uniforme*, 2nd edition. Mexico City: Debate.

McComiskey, B. (2017) *Post-Truth Rhetoric and Composition*. Colorado: Utah State University Press.

McCoy, J.L. (1999) *Latin America's Imperiled Progress: Chávez and the End of "Partyarchy" in Venezuela*. *Journal of Democracy* 10(3), 64-77.

McCoy, J. L. and Myers, D. J. (2004) *The Unraveling of Democracy in Venezuela*. Maryland: John Hopkins University Press.

Melcher, D. (1992) *Estado y movimiento obrero en Venezuela: represión e integración hasta 1948*. Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia.

Mészáros, J., Solymosi, N., Speiser, F. (2007) *Spatial distribution of political parties in Hungary 1990–2006*, *Political Geography* V.26, pp. 804–823.

Meusburger, P. and Jons, H. (2001) *Transformations in Hungary: Essays in Economy and Society*. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

Mills, A. J., Durepos, G. and Wiebe, E. (2010) *In Encyclopedia of Case Study Research*. Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: SAGE Publications.

Mill, A.J. (2011) *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Moffitt, B. and Tormey, S. (2014) *Rethinking populism: Politics, mediatisation and political style*, *Political studies*, Vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 381-397.

Molina, V. P., Roloff, A. M. and Madrid, C.C. J. (2018) *Hugo Chávez y los principios del Socialismo del Siglo XXI: una indagación discursiva (2005-2013)*, *Izquierdas*, no. 42, pp. 224-250.

Molnar, M. (2001) *A Concise History of Hungary*. Translated by Anna Magyar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mounk, Y. (2018) *The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It*. First edition. Cambridge MA, and London: Harvard University Press.

Mudde, C. (2004) *The populist zeitgeist*, Government and Opposition, Vol. 39(4), pp. 542–563.

Mudde, C. (2007) *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser, R. C. (2012) *Populism in Europe and the Americas Threat or Corrective for Democracy ?*. New York : Cambridge Press.

Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser, R. C. (2013) *Exclusionary vs. inclusionary populism: comparing contemporary Europe and Latin America*, Government and Opposition, Vol. 48, pp.147–174.

Mudde, C. (2015). *Populism in Europe: a primer* [online]. Available at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/populism-in-europe-primer/> (Accessed: 13 January 2019).

Mudde, C. (2017). ‘Populism isn’t dead. Here are five things you need to know about it’, *The Guardian*, 7 July [Online]. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/07/populism-dead-european-victories-centrists> (Accessed: 15 January 2019).

Mudde, C. and Kaltwasser, R. C. (2017) *Populism : a very short introduction*. New York: Oxford Press.

Mudde, C. (2018). “How populism became the concept that defines our age”, *The Guardian*, 22 November [Online]. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/22/populism-concept-defines-our-age> (Accessed: 20 April 2020).

Müller, J. W. (2015) *Should the EU protect democracy and the rule of law inside member states?*, European Law Journal, Vol. 21(2), pp. 141–60.

Müller, J. W. (2016) *What is Populism?*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Nolan, R. (2012). “The Realest Reality Show in the World”, *The New York Times*, May 4 [Online]. Available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/magazine/hugo-chavez-s-totally-bizarre-talk-show.html> (Accessed: 20 February, 2020).

Norman, K. (2015) *A Hero's Curse: The Perpetual Liberation of Venezuela*. London: Hurst & Co.

Norris, P. and Inglehart, R. (2017) *Trump and the Populist Authoritarian parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse*, American Political Science Association, Vol 15 no. 2, pp. 443-454

Norris, P. and Grömping, M. (2017) *Populist Threats to Electoral Integrity: The Year in Elections, 2016-2017*, Faculty Research Working Paper Series, pp. 1-50.

Novak, B. (2014). ‘The many faces of Euroscepticism in Hungary and Central Europe’, *The Budapest Beacon*, 23 May [Online]. Available at: <https://budapestbeacon.com/many-faces-euroscepticism-hungary-central-europe/> (Accessed: 7 November, 2019).

Obschonka, M., Stuetzer, M., Rentfrow, J. P., Lee, N. Potter, J. and Gosling, D. S. (2018) *Fear, populism, and the geopolitical landscape: the “sleeping effect” of neurotic personality traits on regional voting behavior in the 2016 Brexit and Trump elections*, *Social Psychological and Personality Science*. pp.1-47.

Oliver, J.E. and Rahn, W.M. (2016) *Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 Election*, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 667, no.1, pp.189–206.

Orbán, V. (2014). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 25th Balvanyos Summer Free University and Student Camp* [Online]. Available at <https://kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp> (Accessed: 3 May 2019).

Orbán, V. (2016a). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech in parliament before the start of daily business* [Online]. Available at <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-ministers-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-address-in-parliament-before-the-start-of-dailybusiness-2016100> (Accessed: 4 January 2019).

Orbán, V. (2016). *The Prime Minister of Hungary, In the Autumn of 2016* [Online]. Available at <http://www.ceemr.uw.edu.pl/vol-7-no-2-2018/special-section/where-wild-things-are-fear-islam-and-anti-refugee-rhetoric-hungary> (Accessed: 23 April, 2019).

Orbán, V. (2016b). *Orbán's part of interview for EU interference in national day speech*, [Online] Available at <http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/brussels-is-implementing-the-soros-plan/> (Accessed : 20 November 2019).

Orbán, V.(2016c). *Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's press statement following the meeting of the Visegrád Group* [Online]. Available at <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-press-statement-following-the-meeting-of-the-visegrad-group> Accessed: 23 April, 2019).

Oxford Languages. (2016). *Word of the Year 2016* [Online]. Available at: <https://languages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/2016/> (Accessed: 1 May 2019).

Pap, A. (2018) *Democratic Decline in Hungary: Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy*. Oxon: Routledge.

Pappas, T. S. (2019) *Populism and Liberal Democracy, A Comparative and Theoretical Analysis*. New York, United States of America: Oxford University Press.

Paxton, R. O. (2007) *The Anatomy of Fascism*. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.

Peters, B.G. (2003) *Comparative Politics: Theory and Methods*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave.

Plattner, M. F. (2010) *Populism, pluralism, and liberal democracy*, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21(1), pp. 81–92.

Plenta, P. (2020) *Conspiracy theories as a political instrument: utilization of anti-Soros narratives in Central Europe*, Contemporary Politics, Vol. 26 (5), pp. 512-530.

PSUV. (2015). *Comisión de Comunicación, Propaganda y Agitación* [Online]. Available at: <http://www.psuv.org.ve/comunicacion-propaganda-agitacion/> (Accessed: 17 March 2020).

Racz, B. (1991) *Political pluralisation in Hungary: The 1990 elections*. Journal Soviet Studies Vol. 43(1), pp. 107-136.

Restrepo-Márquez, L.M. (2019) *Historia, nación y hegemonía: La Revolución Bolivariana en Venezuela 1999-2012; Historia Hegemonía en Los Relatos de la nación Venezolana*. Bogota: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.

Roberts, K. (2013) *Populism and democracy in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez*, Edited by Cas Mudde. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roman, E. (2003) *Austria-Hungary and the Successor States: A Reference Guide from the Renaissance to the Present*. New York, USA: Facts On File.

Russo, J. (2016). *The Problem With Nationalism: North Korea, Syria, Venezuela and England* [Online]. Available at: <https://observer.com/2016/07/the-problem-with-nationalism-north-korea-syria-venezuela-and-england/> (Accessed: 14 January 2020).

Ruth, P. S. (2017) *Populism and the Erosion of Horizontal Accountability in Latin America*, Political Studies, pp. 1-20.

Salas, Tinker, M. (2015) *Venezuela, What Everybody Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Savage, R. (2018) *Populist Discourse in Venezuela and the United States: American Unexceptionalism and Political Identity Formation*. Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan.

Scheiring, G. (2018). *Hungary's regime is proof that capitalism can be deeply authoritarian* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/hungary-s-regime-is-proof-that-capitalism-can-be-deeply-authorita/> (Accessed: March 3, 2019).

Schulz, A., Müller, P., Schemer, C., Wirz, D. S., Wettstein, M. and Wirth, W. (2017) *Measuring populist attitudes on three dimensions*, *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 30(2), pp. 316–326.

Shultz, R. H. and Godson, R. (1984) *Dezinformatsia: Active measures in Soviet strategy*. Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's.

Sim, S. (2019) *Post-Truth, Scepticism & Power*. Switzerland : Palgrave Macmillan.

Stanley, B. (2008) *The thin ideology of populism*, *Journal of political ideologies*, Vol. 13(1), pp. 95-110.

Stavrakakis, Y., Kioupiolis, A., Katsambekis, G., Nikisianis, N. and Siomos, T. (2016) *Contemporary Left-wing Populism in Latin America: Leadership, Horizontalism, and Postdemocracy in Chávez's Venezuela*, *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 58(3), pp. 51-76.

Swank, D. and Betz, H. G. *Globalization, the Welfare State, and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*. Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association. Boston, MA. August 30 – September 2, 2018.

Szarvas, L. (1993) *Translation period in Hungary- The Chances for democracy*, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 5(2), pp. 267-276.

Tait, R. (2017). 'Hungary's prime minister welcomes US 'anti-LGBT hate group'', *The Guardian*, 26 May [Online]. Available at:



<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/26/hungary-lgbt-world-congress-families-viktor-orban> (Accessed: 15 January 2019).

Tarver, M. D. H., Frederick, J. C. and Rivas, A. A. (2018) *The history of Venezuela*. Santa Barbara, CA, USA: Greenwood.

Tavares, R. (2013). *Situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary* [Online]. Available at: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-7-2013-0229-AM-001-001\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-7-2013-0229-AM-001-001_EN.pdf). (Accessed: 17 January 2020).

Taylor, S. (2012). *Orbán accuses EU of colonialism* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/orban-accuses-eu-of-colonialism/> (Accessed: 25 November 2019).

The Economist Intelligence Unit. (2019). *Democracy Index 2019: A year of democratic setbacks and popular protest* [Online]. Available at: <http://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index/> (Accessed: 21 October 2020).

The Economist. (2011). *Planet Orban* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.economist.com/europe/2011/11/26/planet-orban> (Accessed: 13 January 2019).

Torres, A. (2009) *La Herencia de la tribu: del mito de la independencia a la revolucion bolivariana*. Caracas: Editorial Alfa.

Toomey, M. (2018) *History, Nationalism and Democracy: Myth and Narrative in Viktor Orban's 'Illiberal Hungary'*, *New Perspectives*, Vol. 25 (1), pp. 1-23.

Traynor, I. (2012). Orbán's part of speech for EU interference in national day speech, *The Guardian*, 15 March [Online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/15/hungary-prime-minister-orban-eu> (Accessed: 3 April 2019).

Traynor, I. (2015). 'Migration crisis: Hungary PM says Europe in grip of madness', *The Guardian*, 3 September [Online]. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/03/migration-crisis-hungary-pm-viktor-orban-europe-response-madness> (Accessed: 20 January 2020).

Ulmer, A. and Pons, C. (2017) *As Venezuela unrest spreads, Maduro presses on with plans to rewrite charter* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-idUSKBN18J320> (Accessed: 14 November 2019).

University of Michigan Library. (2020). *Fake News, Lies and Propaganda: How to Sort Fact from Fiction* [Online]. Available at: <https://guides.lib.umich.edu/fakenews>. (Accessed: 24 Jun 2020).

Urbinati, N. (2018) *Political theory of populism*, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 22, pp. 111-127.

Vadlamannati, C. K. and Soysa, D. I. (2017) *Economic Freedom, Social Protections, and Electoral Support for Anti-Immigrant Populist Parties in 27 Industrial Democracies*, in Gwartney, J., ed., *Economic Freedom of the World: 2017 Annual Report*. Canada, Fraser Institute, 213-243.

Valery, Y. (2010). *El marxismo según Chávez* [Online]. Available at: [https://www.bbc.com/mundo/america\\_latina/2010/01/100123\\_chavez\\_marx\\_amab](https://www.bbc.com/mundo/america_latina/2010/01/100123_chavez_marx_amab) (Accessed: 14 January 2020).

Vatsov, D. (2018) *Logic of Propaganda: Dangerous Liaison and Family Resemblances*, Critique & Humanism, vol. 49(1), pp. 71-106.

Venezuelanalysis.com. (2008). *PSUV Delegates Designate Chávez as Party President* [Online]. Available at: <http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/newsbrief/3194> (Accessed: 15 September 2019).

Villa, D. R. (2005) *Venezuela: political changes in the Chávez era*, Estudios avanzados, Vol. 19 (55), pp. 153-172.

Walker S. (2017). 'A useful punching bag': why Hungary's Viktor Orbán has turned on George Soros' *The Guardian*, 22 Jun [Online]. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/22/hungary-viktor-orban-george-soros> (Accessed: 13 July 2019).

Weyland, K. (2001) *Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics*, Comparative Politics, Vol. 34(1), pp. 1–22.

Wike, R., Stokes, B. and Simmons, K. (2016) *Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/> (Accessed: 12 March 2020).

Wike, R., Poushter, J., Silver, L., Devlin, K., Fetterolf, J. Castillo, A. and Huang, C.(2019) 3. *Democratic satisfaction* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/democratic-satisfaction/> (Accessed: 12 March 2020).

Wilkin, P. (2016) *Hungary's Crisis of Democracy: The Road to Serfdom*. Lexington Books.

Wilpert, G. (2007). *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power: The History and Policies of the Chávez Government*. London, UK: Verso.

Wirz, S. D., Wettstein, M., Müller, P., Schemer, C., Ernst, N., Esser, F. and Wirth, W. (2018) *The Effects of Right-Wing Populist Communication on Emotions and Cognitions toward Immigrants*, The International Journal of Press/Politics, 23 (3), pp. 1-21.

Wodak, R. (2015) *The Politics of Fear. What Right-wing Populist Discourses Mean*. London.

Yin, R.K. (1994) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. 2nd edition. London, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Yin, R. K. (2009) *Case study research: Design and methods*. 4th edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Yudiana, N. (2017, October 11). *Venezuela: The cautionary tale of consumption-based economic policy* [Blog]. Available at <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lseupr/2017/10/11/venezuela-the-cautionary-tale-of-consumption-based-economic-policy/>

Zakaria, F. (1997) *The Rise of Illiberal Democracy*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76(6), pp. 22-43.

Zúquete, J. P. (2008) *The Missionary Politics of Hugo Chávez*, *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 50 (1), pp. 91-121.

