



**ANTI-MINING MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY:  
BERGAMA AND CERATTEPE CASES**

**ELİF AKIN**

Graduate School

Izmir University of Economics

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**ELİF AKIN**

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# ABSTRACT

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Akın, Elif

Master's Program in Political Science and International Relations

Advisor: Prof. Dr. Çiğdem Kentmen ÇİN

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This thesis is an attempt to understand the impact of anti-mining movements at key spheres such as policymaking and civil society in Turkey. By examining two anti-mining movements, Bergama and Cerattepe, the thesis discusses the dynamics of internal mobilization, movement discourse and their impact on movement capacity and success comparatively. To this end, this study conducted a discourse analysis using newspaper articles and press releases and analyzed how they used environmental justice frame. Having reviewed different concepts and theories in the social movement literature, the study has found that both movements have gone through very similar processes and received same negativ

e results of unchanged policies. The thesis will contribute to the growing literature on movements against mining and the discursive opportunity structure model (DOS).

Keywords: Turkey, social movements, anti-mining movements, environmental movements, discursive opportunity structures, environmental justice, discourse analysis



# ÖZET

## TÜRKİYE'DE MADEN KARŞITI HAREKETLER: BERGAMA VE CERATTEPE'DEN ÖRNEKLER

Akın, Elif

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Danışman: Prof. Dr. Çiğdem Kentmen ÇİN

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Bu tez, Türkiye'deki maden karşıtı hareketlerin politika yapımı ve sivil toplum gibi kilit alanlara olan etkilerini anlama girişimidir. Bergama ve Cerattepe'deki madencilik karşıtı hareketlerin yapılanmalarını, söylemlerini ve bu hareketlerin yarattığı etkiler karşılaştırmalı olarak incelenmiştir. Bunun için, gazete haberleri ve basın açıklamaları kullanılarak bir Söylem Analizi gerçekleştirilmiş ve Çevre Adaleti çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. Toplumsal hareket literatürünün farklı konsept ve teorilerini incelenmesinin ardından çalışmanın sonucunda her iki hareketin de çok benzer süreçler geçirdiği ve aynı olumsuz sonuçlarla politika yapımını

etkilemediđi görölmüştür. Bu tez çalışması maden karşıtı hareketler ve söylemsel olanakları inceleyen literatüre katkıda bulunacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Toplumsal Hareketler, Maden Karşıtı Hareketler, Çevre Hareketleri, Söylemsel Olanak, Çevre Adaleti, Söylem Analizi



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## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Social movements are the expressions of how an issue or grievance has been understood by mobilizing actors. The essential elements that make up social movements are first a shared grievance or problem reflected upon their framing, a group or groups of people who have made sense of the relevant issue or grievance, and a collection of strategies or tactics to express a common reaction. However, there is no single pattern for social movements to emerge and grow. Different issues and contexts require different strategies and tactics; it is this diversity that the phenomenon of social movement revolves around.

Dominant theories of social movements were the products of two diverging camps in sociological theory: collective behavior and rational choice traditions. Collective behaviorists have focused on psychological aspects such as predisposed impulses, deprivations, or emotions; however, the influence of such approaches disappeared once the scholars understood the rationality of collective behavior. Social movements reflected the macro processes triggered by micro factors, such as individual motivations or organizational resources, starting from the rational choice models. In line with this trend, two models have become popular: resource mobilization and political process models (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McAdam, 1982). The resource mobilization perspective has prioritized movements' material and institutional resources. However, this approach was limited and could not fully explain, for example, the social movements that emerged in the 1960s in the United States and Western Europe that were not politically or economically-driven or agent-based with resources.

For this reason, the political process model provides an alternative structural explanation for these new social movements. It argued that social movements could trigger a window of opportunity, such as changing socio-economic conditions, new governing coalitions, or natural catastrophes. However, political process models focus only on the movements within one country or region and provide a constrained explanation of the contentious politics. These two structural theories could not explain the new wave of movements of the 1960s, such as civil rights, women's rights, same-sex marriages, and environmental movements. Cultural approaches have introduced a new way of understanding social movements and led to discussing new alternatives using new or revised objects of reference, such as discursive opportunity structures,

networks, emotion, narrative, discourse, and new media studies on social movements. Consequently, the new social movement theory and its theoretical framework combined both contentious politics and political opportunity structure to define movement characteristics (Kriesi et al., 1995). New social movements transform the society's conflict structure to a more individualized manner by breaking up with all structural and cultural ties and creating their own participatory, representative, and issue-specific kind of politics.

Environmental movements fall under the category of new social movements and constitute the main focus of this thesis. As in all social movements, the diversity of power configurations, shifts in the direction of resource mobilizations, and changing interactions within actors in a movement and between the movements, are prevalent in environmental movements. Starting with the 1960s, mobilized groups have organized demonstrations and protests worldwide, driven by 'modern environmental sensibilities' (Doyle, 2004). Because of the circumstances of political contexts that shape them are varied, no social movement is limited to one textbook description. That is why there are various attempts in the literature to define environmental movements from different perspectives, such as their effectiveness, their composition by utilizing new social movement theory, as well as their emergence and growth (Doyle, 2005; Doherty, 2002; Dryzek et al., 2003; Kriesi et al., 1995). These studies range from single case studies to longitudinal single case studies (Brand, 1999; Diani and Donati, 1999; Doyle and Simpson, 2006; Haynes, 1999; Kerenyi and Szabo, 2006; Kulin and Seva, 2020; Özler and Obach, 2018; Rootes, 2006). In the last decade, the adverse effects of human-induced climate change, such as rising CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and greenhouse gases resulting from high levels of industrialization, have become more salient in public opinion. Transnational movements set new social movements apart from past movements, as in the Fridays for Future youth climate action movement (Wahlström et al., 2019; De Moor et al., 2020).

Movements against mining, especially in the developing regions, are one of the most widely studied events where justice-based perspectives are influential. These studies brought together environmental and rights-based concerns through sketching state-company, state-civil society, and state-movement relationships. Being a member of the latter world and as a rapidly industrialized country, Turkey was no exception in this regard: since the mid-1990s, many environmental movements targeted the destructive practices of mostly private mining companies on the environment for the

sake of economic growth, from Bergama (Arsel, 2012; Uncu, 2012) to Cerattepe (Akman, 2019; Çınar, 2019).

This thesis attempts to understand the organizational abilities, outcomes, and protest discourse of Bergama and Cerattepe anti-mining movements in Turkey. The thesis will discuss how the institutionalization of environmental movements in Turkey has taken place, and which frames were used in movement discourses using newspaper articles, and the impact of movement outcomes. By focusing on the role of media coverage, the thesis will contribute to the broader literature by studying these movements from the angle of the discursive opportunity structure model. This meta-theory recently gained prominence in theoretical discussions. To provide a theoretical framework on which the research of social movements is grounded, the first chapter starts with a conceptual review of social movement literature perspectives.

## **CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH**

Mass protests in the post-communist countries, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Western democracies appear almost daily in media coverages (Ekiert and Kubik, 1998; De Waal and Ibreck, 2013). In June 2020, a wave of mobilization had taken place simultaneously in many American states to protest the excessive police violence targeting black people. According to some, this was the largest mobilization in the US history, with the participation of nearly twenty-six million citizens shouting “Black lives matter!” (Daily Mail, 2020). Beginning as a reaction towards police brutality, Black Lives Matter has gone beyond the inclusiveness of the first-wave American civil rights movement by including other disadvantaged communities such as the LGBTQ+ community under the master frame of injustice (USA Today, 2020).

A more recent incident occurred when a group of riots, loyal to the former President of the United States Donald Trump, occupied the Congress to protest the 2020 Presidential election result. Mostly comprised of far-right groups such as the Proud Boys, the mobs stormed the Capitol Hill with the rejection of Democratic Party’s electoral victory in 2020, which became visible when one of the protesters clamored, ‘I just want the real winner to be president’ (BBC News, 2021). The common thing in these two protest events was their seemingly decentralized mobilizing structure which participants organized through social media platforms (Gürçan and Dolduran, 2021; Munn, 2021). This characteristic has implied combining offline and online activism in social movements. An empirical analysis of the recent social movements will contribute to our understanding of the tools and mechanisms used in the formation and dissemination of ideas.

Social movements are powerful and frequent tools of political participation. Scholars thought that social movements could mobilize a large number of people and the more is, the better, as it has been heard during the Orange Revolution in Kyiv’s Independence Square as “Together we are many! We cannot be defeated” (BBC, 2021; Tucker, 2007, p. 505). Yet, studies show that dissidents who are participating or willing to participate in movements are small in number (Biggs, 2018; Kentmen-Çin, 2015). Grievances and discrimination do not automatically lead to collective action; not everyone who experiences hardship joins movements

(Shadmehr, 2014). These would bring the pressing question of why do some individuals abstain from collective action and others do not?

The transition from collective behavior to collective action approach can be taken as a starting point to review the perspectives in social movement research since social movements are one of the forms of collective action. As the logic of collective action has been applied to social movements, scholars from different fields, including sociology, political science, psychology, and economics, have sought to understand the underlying factors in the emergence and growth of social movements. This chapter aims to review the main theoretical perspectives in social movement research and how they are related to one another. It first takes a look at the essential concepts in collective behavior school. Second, by providing an overview of the logic of collective action, it focuses on the major theories of social movements, namely resource mobilization perspective, political process theory, and political opportunity structures. Third, it discusses the nature of the new paradigm in social movement research and different trends introduced to the movement research, which are narrative and discourse analyses, the role of emotions, and network analysis.

### ***2.1. Collective Behavior***

Studies examining individual motivations behind collective action could be traced back to the 19th century, dominated by wars and rebellions around Europe. During that time, there was an effort to understand why unrelated people come together as a collectivity and act similarly. While some scholars have highlighted under which circumstances collective behavior takes place, others have concentrated upon micro-level, individual processes that lead to the involvement of collective behavior (Allport, 1924; Blumer, 1969; Gurr, 1970; Le Bon, 2002; Miller and Dollard, 1941; Park and Burgess, 1921; Turner and Killian 1957). Using the taxonomy of Van Ness and Summers-Effler (2016), prominent strands within the school of collective behavior will be analyzed in this section, starting from the transformation approach.

#### ***2.1.1. Transformational Approach to Collective Behavior***

Le Bon was one of the first authors who tried to understand the psychology of these collectivities. Le Bon calls the people who engage in collective action 'crowds' (Le Bon, 2002). According to this thought, crowds are groups of irrational actors whose strength comes from their size. Le Bon argued that crowds' development has started with the formation of some ideas about an issue, associations of individuals, and their realization of theoretical concepts and that the crowds can

destroy and break down ‘mental unity’ (Le Bon, 2002; Martin, 2015: 12). Although masses agree upon similar concerns and ideas, they cannot create an organized social structure of their own by engaging in collective behavior; they have lost the ability to think analytically and critically. Being unable to make individual decisions in a crowd, Le Bon has argued that crowds are anonymous collectivities since divergences among individuals became blurred once they have combined into one single entity, and that is why their behaviors are irrational (Le Bon, 2002; McPhail, 1989, p. 403).

Following Le Bon, Freud approached the crowd behavior phenomenon from a psychological perspective. Freud (1945, p. 3) has put the individual at the center of his argument, whom he defined as ‘a part of a crowd of people who have been organized into a group at some particular time for some definite purpose’. Freud has reviewed Le Bon’s irrationality argument of crowds in his book *Group Psychology and the Analysis of Ego* (1922), and found that when an individual participates in a group, their mind transforms in line with the characteristics of that group. Crowd behavior is ‘contagious to such a degree that an individual sacrifices his interest to the collective interest’ (Freud, 1922, p.7).

Rather than defending the irrationality of crowds, other scholars have advanced Le Bon’s observations on the transformative power of collective behavior and analyzed the social environment in which such behavior occurs (Park and Burgess, 1921). Park and Burgess (1921) argued that collective behavior occurs when political or economic problems create disturbances for the majority of society. The mental unity of those shared disturbances would lead to a ‘circular reaction’ towards the issues to achieve pre-determined objectives (Park and Burgess, 1921; Van Ness and Sommers-Effler, 2016, p. 530). In this sense, Park and Burgess (1921) did not seem to agree with irrationality. Still, it is familiar with Le Bon’s argument that crowd behavior transforms individual behavior, as they equate the compilation of a crowd to a crisis. Due to the high mobility that the crowds possess, the sudden escalation of psychological processes in individual minds can cause different forms of collective behavior in the urban city, such as ‘strikes and minor revolutionary movements’ (Park and Burgess, 1921, p. 22). Such mobility, and the uncertainty that accompanies, trigger a change in society and lead to new opportunities and experiences to flourish.

The transformation argument of Le Bon and Park has been further voiced more systematically by Blumer (1969). Blumer starts by reasserting Park’s view that collective behavior emerges ‘from the disruption of routine activities or the onslaught



of new impulses or dispositions which the social order cannot accommodate' (Van Ness and Summers-Effler, 2016, p. 530). Choosing not to touch upon the irrationality of collective behavior, Blumer discusses several steps to it. First, an exciting event needs to take place to catch the attention of individuals. As the attention towards that event increases, people gather around it with curiosity to understand the issue at stake. When those impulses go up to the point that becomes costly for bystanders, the crowd that gathers around the event starts to engage in collective behavior (Van Ness and Summers-Effler, 2016). Blumer demonstrated that individuals did not unconsciously behave with a collectivity; they have a purpose and motivation (Blumer, 1939). The objectives might include establishing a new order of life through 'the emergence of new set of values' with 'cultural drifts' such as increased quality of life, women entering labor force, and scientific advancements (Blumer, 1939, pp. 199-200). In short, Blumer used the concept of collective behavior to understand the often-transformative nature of social movements. However, the following criticism on transformation argument has created a new divergent line in the school of collective behavior.

### ***2.1.2. Predisposed Impulses Approach to Collective Behavior***

The scholars who argued for the transformative power of collective behavior have been criticized on two main issues. First, critics called for a need to examine the influence of emotions on engaging in collective behavior, claiming that movements are 'driven by strong emotional responses with tendencies towards violence' (Van Ness and Summers-Effler, 2016, p. 530). Second, the claim that rather than generating new impulses and reactions, pre-existing drives and tendencies reactivate when individuals interact within a collectivity. This reactivation is called 'social facilitation' (Allport, 1924, p. 298).

These criticisms marked a departure from sociological to psychological explanations and were named 'predisposition' (McPhail, 1991). Instead of the transformation that collective behavior has triggered on individuals and groups, Allport (1924) has claimed that 'all individual behavior, inside and outside the crowd, is predisposed by innate or acquired responses to satisfy basic drives or overcome interference with satisfaction' (Allport, 1924; McPhail, 1991, p. 27). Those prepositions can be evidenced in the anger and distress caused by 'rivalry for supremacy in a football match', or violent behavior that a lynching mob engages (Allport, 1924, p. 294). Either by the commandment of a crowd leader, or the planning

of a collective act by the members of crowd, or both at the same time, first reactions ‘begin at some center, and spread in widening circles to the periphery of the crowd’ (Allport, 1924, p. 310).

The central departure in Allport’s reasoning on collective behavior from Le Bon’s was that the collective engagement is not leading people to unreasonable behavior, it is rather about ‘the madness shared in common’ (McPhail, 1991, p. 31). It appears that Allport attempted to rationalize the collective behavior by claiming that ‘the thought process in crowds is used only to serve prepotent interests, and not to direct them’ (Allport, 1924, p. 317). Therefore, people are not inclined to irrational behavior in crowds; they choose to involve in that collectivity because of the shared irrationality.

The interchange of facilitative social interaction in crowds and the emphasis upon emotionality in collective behavior marked a difference with preceding arguments on collective behavior. However, it could not offer much on, for example, how external factors outside of the crowd can shape collective behavior—focusing only on the individual level changes in behavior would likely pervade the understanding of macro changes that affect the behavior of collectivity in question (Gurr, 1970). In addition, only examining collective behavior based on assumptions on how crowds behave has led to the overgeneralization of crowd behavior as violent and homogeneous. Thus, the next strand in collective behavior has refused these observations by examining real-life events.

### ***2.1.3. Emergent Norms and Collective Behavior***

The emergent norm perspective proposes a novel sequencing of events that leads to collective behavior. Rather than how crowds are gathered in response to an immediate crisis, it is interested in what the crowd produces through interaction. Based on Durkheim, Sherif argued (1936) that crowd behavior is not restricted ‘to the breaking down of moral and social norms that regulate one’s daily activities’ but results in the creation of new norms and values by its members (Sherif, 1936, p. ix, 75). In other words, crowd behavior is not limited to one single form of behavior but in multiple forms. These novelties emerge through ‘a situation facing other persons in some definitive relationship’, which means in-group interaction rather than through cases of deprivation or predisposed, irrational impulses (Sherif, 1936, p. 80).

Building upon Sherif’s (1936) argument on emergent norms, Turner and Killian (1987) defined collective behavior as ‘the development and imposition of a

pattern of differential expression that is perceived as unanimity' (Turner and Killian, 1987, p. 26). The authors meant 'differential expression' was the differences of ideas, motivations, experiences, and reactions toward the same event or situation. By these descriptions of group members, collective behavior is accepted neither as the episodes of irrationality nor aggressive behavior against pressing social conditions. For Turner and Killian (1987), 'collective behavior is the consequence of emergent norms that develop from social interaction within extraordinary situations' (McPhail, 1991, p. 71).

Turner and Killian's definition of collective behavior implies that the scope of analysis for collective behavior has extended from individual to group behavior. Based on Turner and Killian's premise that 'people act collectively rather than singly', the approach is less individualist since the central unit of analysis is any type of collectivity, without any limitation to group or crowd (Turner and Killian, 1987, p. 7). The authors have aimed to explain how new ideas, values, or feelings that came out through social interaction would lead to a type of behavior that makes individuals 'transcend, bypass or subvert institutional patterns and structures' (Turner and Killian, 1987, p. 3). They suggest three components of collective behavior: crowd formation, social interaction processes, and the emergence of new norms as the justification of collective behavior.

The first question raised by the studies on collective behavior is about the factors that bring people together at the same place. Emergent norm theory claims that two elements are necessary for crowd formation. First, there needs to be 'a condition of event that is sufficiently outside of "ordinary" happenings'. Second, 'pre-existing social groupings' should be available to quickly respond to that extraordinary event (Turner and Killian, 1987, p. 9). Examples would be the responses of old or new aid organizations or social movement organizations to the disaster situations such as earthquakes (Benini, 1999; McPhail, 1991). However, these two factors alone are inadequate for the collective behavior. It is significant to analyze how this extraordinary event is interpreted and communicated among those social groups because 'people ask questions, pose answers, make assertions, offer characterizations' to make sense of the situation and determine how to behave (McPhail, 1991, p. 76). Another factor in the crowd formation was the divergent motivations of individuals. For Turner and Killian (1987), individuals are either directly affected by the extraordinary events, are concerned about the situation that the

event caused, or are only interested in seeing what is happening or exploiting the event for self-serving purposes. Finally, the collectivity and interaction processes converge in a shared location. The attribution of cultural or symbolic significance to the place can also initiate the interaction process by itself (Turner and Killian, 1987).

After the crowd formation, it comes to how its members interact with one another when they are not sharing the same motives and determine the most appropriate way to behave. For Turner and Killian (1987), there are two interlinked processes for the interaction of collectivities. The first is a process in which 'people ask each other questions about what they have seen and heard and answer with bits of information, guesses and theories', which is called milling (Turner and Killian, 1987, p. 55). The three most common questions asked are about what has happened, what should be done, and who will be the first to act. The diagnosis and prognosis of that extraordinary event by the collectivity members, then, are done through the milling process. The third question that emphasizes the leadership dimension of collective behavior precipitates the second process long before the leadership dimension has entered into social movement research. It is the process of keynoting, which Turner and Killian define as 'the presentation of a positive suggestions in an ambivalent frame of reference'. Usually, committed individuals are stood out as keynoters. They perform the presentation of their interpretation about the situation and suggestions for appropriate actions, so keynoters are also active participants of the milling process. Turner and Killian further argued that if the keynote 'embodies one of the competing images held by the crowd members, it encourages those members to express themselves' (Turner and Killian, 1987, p. 59). In other words, what the majority, if not all, of the crowd, supports which type of interpretation is significant for the direction of collective behavior.

The heterogeneity of motives is one of the central themes in the emergent norm perspective. Based on what Turner and Killian observed, 'the crowd is characterized not by unanimity but by differential expression' (Turner and Killian, 1987 p. 26). However, for the keynoting process that gathers around this heterogeneity to be successful, 'a sufficient number of the concerned' individuals are needed to get the attention of those who are uncertain whether to act or not. Through the participation of some critical mass, it was anticipated to reduce 'uncertainty and hesitation for other members previously reluctant to participate' (McPhail, 1991, p. 82). Therefore, every

form of action or support from the crowd members matters for the mobilization of a passive audience.

The concept of the emergent norm itself is the combination of crowd with the constructed 'common mood and imagery' through milling and keynoting processes (Turner and Killian, 1987, p. 59). It was defined as 'an emergent definition of the situation which encompasses an extensive complex of factors', including problem definition and solution proposition from the milling, and how they were justified in the keynoting process. According to Turner and Killian (1987), the emergent norm is the triggering factor for actualizing collective behavior, but it does not offer the single best way of behaving collectively. It is not limited only to a set of appropriate behaviors, instead 'with each member doing its own thing within the bounds of the emergent norm, is the source of the dynamic, creative quality of collective behavior' (Turner and Killian, 1987, p. 33). Therefore, since 'many crowd participants are suggestible' due to divergent motives for participation, this 'contributes to the spread of emergent norms' (Lemonik Arthur, 2013, p. 1).

There are several limitations of the emergent norm theory that critics have raised over the years. For example, Reicher (1987) have devised a chicken-egg problem for emergent norm by asking whether collective behavior is governed by the norms created through the crowd formation and interaction among its members, or crowd members already bring together norms during the formation. If the former argument that Turner and Killian defended holds, then the emergent norm theory is 'limited by the nature of the individuals involved', thus it is impossible to envision a group coherence when there is an abundance of opinions and orientations within any crowd (Reicher, 1987, p. 179).

For some, emergent norm theory partly explained what can trigger collective behavior, meaning that the emergence of new norms are not prerequisites for individuals to behave the same (Neal and Phillips, 1988; Tilly, 1993; Weller and Quarantelli, 1973). Such criticism has offered that the foundation of collective behavior lies in 'social norms and social relationships' or in the renegotiation of social norms (Weller and Quarantelli, 1973, p. 675). While the proponents of emergent norm theory analyzed the collective behavior just as institutionalized behavior is being analyzed, Weller and Quarantelli (1973) argued in their criticism that not all collective behavior produces new norms and relationships. Contrary to standardized behavior, which is routinized behavior in pre-existing institutions, they defined three

collectivities based on examples. Weller and Quarantelli stressed the differences of collective behavior in search and rescue activities in disaster situations, in lynching mobs during social unrests, and even in seasonal changes of fashion or music. By claiming that new norms emerge in disaster situations and cultural differences, the authors asserted the unnecessary of emergent norms in enacting collective behavior.

In sum, the criteria that Turner and Killian (1987) have provided are inadequate to explain every form of collective behavior. This is because before the emergent norm perspective, ‘most of the theoretical literature focuses on what collective behavior is not, rather than what it is’, and the theory was entrapped by the same lack of clarification (Aguirre and Quarantelli, 1983, p. 207). Instead, what McPhail has offered was based on the assertion that ‘collective behavior should be studied in a lifecourse perspective with an analytic focus on gatherings’ (McPhail, 1991, p. 533). The next section will examine this relatively recent perspective.

#### ***2.1.4. The Life Course Approach to Collective Behavior***

The psychological explanations of Le Bon, Park, and Blumer have been the dominant approach in the study of collective behavior for a long time. Alongside the contagion perspective, some authors thought that collective behavior was the consequence of predisposed impulses that many individuals converged upon, or it was governed under emergent norms (Allport, 1924; Gurr; 1970; Turner and Killian, 1987). However, all of these perspectives have their restraints, and McPhail (1991) provided alternative explanations of collective behavior school, which revealed some of those restraints. McPhail did not reevaluate ‘the traditional psychological explanations nor the ideological biases of early scholars’, but instead drew attention to ‘the study of a continuum of sociological phenomena’ (McPhail, 1991, p. 152). In other words, it is more important to analyze how collective behavior grows and leads to other kinds of behavior, and its consequences, in essence, the life cycle of collective behavior.

The units of analysis in McPhail’s life course argument is ‘gatherings’. Gatherings should not be equated with collective behavior; they are rather ‘opportunities for collective behavior’ (McPhail, 1991, p 153), which contains the possibility to lead to individuals behaving collectively. During the life course of gatherings, there are three sequences: ‘the assembling process, the assembled gathering and the dispersal process’ (McPhail, 1991, p. 153). Since a gathering creates an opportunity for collective behavior, this premise implies that gatherings are temporary, and it is uncertain whether collective behavior occurs due to this gathering.

Three factors determine whether a gathering is temporary or periodic; one of them is the time that individuals are gathered, the capacity of the common location where they gathered, and relatedly the number of individuals who participated in this gathering (McPhail, 1991). As a result, gatherings can be periodic, just as the group of students who take the same course, or people who have a seasonal ticket for the matches of soccer clubs they supported; or nonperiodic, such as demonstrations, riots, or rallies (McPhail and Miller, 1973).

Second, the assembled gathering is the phase between assembling and dispersing. Depending on the form of behavior, many names can be given to such gatherings, such as milling, collective locomotion, queueing, or collective vocalization (McPhail and Wohlstein, 1983; 1986). In addition to these fundamental forms of collective behavior, demonstrations are also referred to as 'gatherings consisting primarily though not exclusively of individual and/or collective behaviors of protest or celebration' (McPhail and Wohlstein, 1983, p. 581). Riots are included as other forms of collective behavior in which elementary forms of collective behavior can be observed, but it might involve collective violence against persons or property as a difference.

Finally, there is also variation in the process of dispersal, which is the response or reaction from either members or an external, institutionalized actor. The dispersals, which are named routine and emergency, are not problematic since they are mostly reactionary and done by the will of members of that gathering (McPhail, 1991). People exiting the stadium after the final whistle can be an example of the routine dispersal or leaving the classroom after the lecture; both of them are done by people without any injury (McPhail, 1969; Miller, 2000). The evacuations of individuals in disaster or extraordinary situations are primary examples of emergency dispersals, and all are done collectively and safely in different locations (Aguirre, Wenger and Vigo, 1998; Aguirre, 2005; Clarke, 2002; Cornwell, 2003; Quarantelli, 2001).

Coerced dispersion by the police force or military for social order control is standing out as a different form of dispersal because such forces 'assumed individuals in crowds had impaired or diminished cognitive capacities to control themselves' (McPhail, 2006, p. 439). Because of this perception, the use of force has been intensified to a degree that the police or military force had resorted to an extreme kind of force led to the killings. Such degree of escalated force was replaced in the 1980s with a concept called as 'negotiated management', in which protesters and police

negotiate prior to the protest event to decrease the conflict (McPhail, Schweingruber and McCarthy, 1998, p. 50; Schweingruber, 2000). Such dimension of gatherings was highlighted as an important item in the study of collective action and social movements, with different conceptualizations, such as repression.

In sum, McPhail has attempted to provide a working definition of collective behavior, which contained several concepts, namely the number of people engaged, type of behavior and how the people involved engaged in it, the commonality of location, and how they have dispersed afterward (McPhail, 1991). Since the life course approach re-interprets nearly all perspectives and concepts discussed throughout the development of collective behavior school, it is difficult to find a critique directed to McPhail. A life-course approach is a comprehensive approach that makes sense of collective behavior school by giving its final shape. This has been confirmed in Lofland (1985, pp. 32-33). He argued that 'the shift from crowds to gatherings partakes of the larger similarity trend only in the special sense of highlighting the ubiquity of collective behavior'.

How McPhail defined, the emergence of collective behavior can be posed as one line of criticism. McPhail (1991) distinguished between elementary and extra-institutional forms of collective behavior; however, the expressions about the concept signaled its spontaneity, which McPhail himself has seen as a myth powered by preceding approaches (McPhail, 1991; Schweingruber and Wolfstein, 2005). Rather than trying 'to modify the extant definitions' of old approaches, McPhail determined its criteria to classify a gathering as collective behavior, but his research method misses some critical points. For example, there was no emphasis on 'how crowd actions are influenced by ongoing historical events' or pre-existed 'sociocultural conditions out of which social protest grows' (Johnson, 1992, p. 239; Oliver, 1989, p. 13).

This section has examined life course, which emerged from the reviews of collective behavior's transformation, predisposition, and emergent norm strands. Despite the fact that it has overlooked the other sources of its emergence, such as the movement context, the life course approach has severed the ties of collective behavior with psychologically dominant explanations. Nevertheless, two approaches attempted to include variations in social and political structures into the concept of collective behavior, namely mass society and value-added theories. In the concluding section of this chapter, the approaches that contained the structural dynamics in collective behavior school will be presented.



### ***2.1.5. Conclusion: Departure from the Collective Behavior School***

The school of collective behavior has come a long way in over hundred years. During this period, its definition has been reformulated several times, from unstructured and spontaneous episodes to concerted collectivities (Blumer, 1939; Lang and Lang, 1961). While the irrationalist tradition broke ‘the link between society and self, and self and behavior’ by equating crowd action with the loss of self-control and deindividuation, individualist tradition emphasized the common individual characteristics and attributes that gathers people together (Allport, 1924; Reicher, 2002, p. 187; Zimbardo, 1969). As opposed to these unsocialized traditions, with emergent norm theory Turner and Killian (1987) pointed out the mutually reinforcing relationship between self-interpretations of the given situation with crowd action. With these theory lines in mind, McPhail (1991) then reviewed and revised all of their premises to reveal a comprehensive approach to collective behavior, which was the life-course perspective.

McPhail’s (1971; 1991) replacement of the concept crowd with gathering and a set of defined collective behavior did not attract much attention from other scholars. The school of collective behavior was the subject of many criticisms (Couch, 1968; Currie and Skolnick, 1970; Lofland, 1985; McPhail, 1991). The commonality found in these critiques was that those early theorizations of collective behavior ‘obscures more than they illuminate’ that the underlying factors if any, and consequences of such behavior are (Currie and Skolnick, 1970, p. 36). In addition, despite changes in the nomenclature, the theorists of collective behavior became too occupied with the forms of collective behavior, which was seen in the discussions that distinguish, or place collective behavior within everyday life rather than strategies or consequences (Lofland, 1985).

Finally, Smelser’s value-added theory was the most significant attempt to analyze social movements into the school of collective behavior. Actually, it marked a transition from collective behavior to organized actions (Smelser, 1962). The involvement of many types of behavior showed how far the school of thought has progressed since Le Bon (Marx, 2012). However, the lack of explanatory and predictive power of components, lack of empirical evidence, and the definitional vagueness in the types of behavior demonstrated Smelser’s theory’s weakness (Aya, 1979; Traugott, 1978).

There were new categorizations on the concept of collective behavior and Marx's (1980, pp. 269-270) was the most mentioned one in the discussions (see Couch, 1968; Weller, and Quarantelli, 1973 for other categorizations). This definition of collective behavior involved its character and direction by defining it as 'not specifically defined in the traditional culture but in which is prohibited', and 'directed towards institutionalizing alternative forms of action'. Such categorization referred to the fundamental characteristics of collective behavior, namely its extra-institutional and variegated forms. The weakness of these categorizations, in general, was their indeterminacy in setting a standard for distinguishing collective behavior from social life. They 'seem to contain so much of what otherwise would be considered normal social life' (Rule, 1992, p. 114).

Due to all the deficiencies mentioned, the school of collective behavior has lost scholarly interest once it has much received (Rule, 1992). However, the failure of familiarizing collective behavior with routine behavior in social life did something good for the research of social movements (Marx, 1980). The strands of collective behavior discussed in this chapter gave differentiated accounts of how people gather without focusing on the context that made it happen (Blumer, 1957). It was common practice that viewing social movements as a form of collective behavior, but vice versa, was not the case. Hence, such deliberate neglect of movement context has separated the study of social movements from collective behavior. Instead, the scholars who work on social movements started to bring more rational explanations to the emergence of collective action, not behavior (Oberschall, 1973; Oberschall, 1994; Klandermans, 1984).

A summary of thoughts in collective behavior school, and its demise as a result of serious criticisms directed at its basic premises, was the content of this concluding section. Following these criticisms, structural explanations of collective behavior had recurred during the discussion to overcome those criticisms. However, the rationalization of collective behavior started in the mid-1970s with contributions from an unexpected discipline, economics. The next chapter will introduce Olson's (1965) logic of collective action as a new divide in social movement research, from functionalism to rationalism.

## ***2.2. Rational Choice Models***

As highlighted in previous sections, the rationalization of collective behavior has marked a transition from psychologically occupied explanations towards a utilitarian description of collective behavior (Olson, 1965; Oberschall, 1973; Oberschall, 1994; Olson, 1965; McCarthy and Zald, 1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1989; Tarrow, 1998). The main assumptions made by collective behavior theorists were insufficient to illustrate the mobilizations in the 1960s, such as feminist and civil rights protests (McAdam, 1982; Staggenborg, 1989). Therefore, especially from the early 1970s onwards, collective action started to be rationalized by social movement scholars, inspired by Olson's (1965) work on collective action. There were two other theoretical reasons for such a tendency.

This section aims to demonstrate the shift from the explanations of homogenous collective behavior to the focus of different individual participation motivations. To this end, the section will open with the deprivation approach of collective behavior, within which the relative deprivation theory emerged. It will be followed later by introducing Olson's logic of collective action, focusing on the primary arguments that influenced other theories of social movements.

### ***2.2.1. Deprivation Approach***

The rejection of homogenized behavior of crowds and overgeneralization of collective behavior as an extraordinary action were two points of contention that Miller and Dollard (1941) had highlighted. They argued that individual behavior was a result of 'learned tendencies in response to rewards', and thus collective behavior was 'common mass responses which have been learned individually by everyone' (Miller and Dollard, 1941, p. 229; Van Ness and Summers-Effler, 2016, p. 531). Inspired from the learning theory in psychology, the deprivation thesis first defines how individuals learn. According to this theory, individuals learn to develop a behavior through drives, cues, and rewards. Miller and Dollard (1941, p. 20) observed that 'when some one response is followed by a reward, the connection between the stimulus pattern and this response is strengthened, so that the next time the same drive and other cues are present, this response is more likely to occur'.

If the interaction between stimulated response and reward is strong enough, the crowds learn and repeat the behavior. If there is a new obstacle to achieving the reward, the accompanying frustration will produce aggressive behavior. This original formulation of the frustration-aggression mechanism has caused confusion, that any

situation that instigates frustration would be responded to by aggressive behavior. Dollard et al. (1939, p. 338) have revised this argument to overcome non-causal assumptions by arguing that 'frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of responses, one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression'. What is meant by frustration was that 'the non-attainment of an expected gratification' is a barrier that thwarted an individual from achieving a certain goal (Berkowitz, 1989, p. 71). These obstacles can be socially legitimate or illegitimate; they can be directed at a specific person or group. Collective behavior is proposed to eliminate those obstacles to achieve specific goals.

The formulation of frustration-aggression by Miller and Dollard (1941) can be considered an elaboration of individuals' learning patterns to the crowd behavior (McPhail, 1991). Gurr (1968a, 1968b, 1970) developed relative deprivation theory based on the premises of Miller and Dollard's (1941) hypothesis and empirical evidence that supported it (Himmelweit, 1950).

#### ***2.2.1.1. Relative Deprivation Theory***

The discussion points for Miller and Dollard's (1941) deprivation thesis were threefold. First, the thesis has assumed a homogeneity for the crowd engaging in crowd behavior; however, not every member in a collectivity would behave the same way. Second, the unpredictability of crowds made them valuable case studies to examine, which would lead to the second point that there is a lack of emphasis on the complexity of social behaviors in gatherings (McPhail, 1991). Finally, the focus towards the cases of collective violence as units of analysis in studies has allowed collective behavior to be perceived as extraordinary and violent incidents.

Building upon the premises of the frustration-aggression mechanism, Gurr (1968a; 1968b) has attempted to overcome such criticisms in theorizing relative deprivation (RD). Gurr starts his reasoning by reiterating the argument of the frustration-aggression mechanism, which argues that when the perceived frustration increases, the feeling of anger also intensifies (Gurr, 1968). The unit of analysis changed from disorganized single events such as lynching towards more organized ones such as revolutions and riots, but again, collective violence is examined. Gurr summarizes the culmination of anger through frustration as the following:

Three psychological variables affect the level of anger: the extent of a comparative discrepancy, the availability of ways to achieve the goals, and the intensity of expectations. According to these criteria, if the extent of differences in

comparison with those who are better off are great, simultaneously the ways to overcome those discrepancies are blocked, and the will to achieve those goals are intensified, the feelings of anger and distress also rise, so the perception of deprivation (Gurr, 1968b). Those 'goals' and 'expectations' should be legitimate, meaning that the individual should think that they have the right to attain that goal. They might be 'either ascribed or achieved statuses or roles, or the actions that constitute how statuses and roles are achieved' (Morrison, 1971, p. 677). If an individual feels about something that they should be entitled to and deprived of at the same time, this will create 'a type of cognitive dissonance, which becomes activated through the appearance of a structural strain' (Lemonik Arthur, 2013, p. 1). It is the contradiction between legitimate and blocked expectations that affects the psychology of individuals in a way to makes them think they are deprived (Gurr, 1970; Morrison 1971).

The argument mentioned above of the frustration-aggression mechanism has been simplified in Gurr's seminal work *Why Men Rebel* (1970). Gurr (1970, p. 13) defined the concept of relative deprivation as 'a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities'. When the individuals are unable to receive what they think they are entitled to, despite improving overall conditions and expectations, the aroused frustration may lead to collective action (Brinton, 1965). Therefore, just as in the early frustration-aggression mechanism, feelings of anger are motivational forces 'that disposes men to aggression' (Gurr, 1970, p. 37).

Two related questions need to be answered to determine the probability of collective behavior. What are the social conditions that lead to the generation of individual deprivation, and how would its aggregation translate into collective behavior (Sayles 1984)? The answers provide three factors examined in the empirical work of relative deprivation theorists. These are social conditions, individual and collective deprivations, and the sense of illegitimacy within the system.

First, the conditions that create deprivation culminate within the changing social structure. If there is one group of people in the society that has a comparative advantage over another group during rising expectations, it is expected that the disadvantageous group would feel deprivation and blame the system for it (Morrison, 1971; Portes, 1971). The sources of these common deprivations might be 'social injustice, governmental neglect, class privileges and selfishness of powerful groups' (Portes, 1971, p. 713), or short-term setbacks and status inconsistencies (Davies, 1962;

Gurr, 1970; Lenski, 1954; Zagorin, 1982). These deprivations resulted in revolutions or social movements as forms of collective behavior.

The theory of relative deprivation has been tested in various empirical studies (Law and Walsh, 1983; Muller and Jukam, 1983; Opp, 1988; Finkel, Muller and Opp, 1989). However, relative deprivation theory fails to fully explain collective behavior (Useem, 1980; Gurney and Tierney, 1982). The theory was too occupied with explaining individual behavior in the sense that the level of deprivation experienced in a group is disregarded outright (Oberschall, 1978). The reduction of group behavior to individual deprivations shows that the theory heavily relied on emotional and psychological explanations. Second, it could not overcome the tendency to view collective behavior as a unanimous act just as its predecessors like Le Bon and others. All members act the same without any dissent (Brush, 1996; Gurney and Tierney, 1982; Lemonik Arthur, 2013). Third, scholars who study relative deprivation might have ignored factors other than relative deprivation (Brush, 1996). Relative deprivation is not generalizable to all instances of collective behavior (Rule, and Tilly, 1972; Lemonik Arthur, 2013). There are various forms of responses to deprivation other than frustration and collective aggression, such as blaming other individuals rather than the system or withdrawing from action (Lenski, 1954). In sum, even though the concept has lost its popularity over the years due to its mentioned deficiencies, one thing that relative deprivation theory succeeded was the minimization of ‘the distinction between institutionalized and emergent social behavior’ (Gurney and Tierney 1982, p. 44). Critics later stressed this difference in Olson’s logic of collective action, which will be discussed in the next section.

### ***2.2.2. Olson’s Free-Rider Problem***

The scholars of social movement were fascinated about Olson’s work were two-fold. First and foremost, it was its rejection of the claim that ‘people will always act on behalf of claims that they should be making’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2009, p. 268). Second, the cognitive and emotional characteristics of collective behavior was discarded outright by Olson because rational actors are purely self-interested and act upon whether the others are also acting in the same way. Instead, Olson has presented three elements of individual motivation for collective action, which will be the topic of this section.

In his work *The Logic of Collective Action* published in 1965, Olson began formulating his argument by defining its key concepts. Collective good is ‘a good

which individuals cannot consume individually or keep to themselves' (Crossley, 2002, p. 61), something which serves the interests of all (Opp, 2009). Action is not essentially referred to as joining to a group, but the behavior directed towards producing the collective good. Thus, it could be inferred that collective effort is required to achieve collective good. Olson's theory of collective action intends to explain participation in different groups, and scholars have adopted Olson's basic assumptions to social movements (Olson, 1965; Crossley, 2002; Opp, 2009). He argues that in large groups, individuals would not get into action unless (1) the size of the group is small, (2) they are coerced to the action itself, and (3) there are 'selective incentives' (Olson, 1965, p. 51, Opp 2009). Thus, in his theory, Olson refuted the assumption that human beings act collectively by nature concerning sharing in large groups. Environmentalists demand the protection of nature, which all humans share in the world. Similarly, suffragette movement actors did not want voting rights for themselves but for all women (Doyle, 2004; Rosenthal et al., 1985). Thus, there are two types of collective good: a good which is accessible independent from who contributed or not, such as nature, and a good which can only be enjoyed by those who contributed, which is the voting rights for women (Olson, 1965).

Olson has assumed that if a person believes that their contribution in a large group has little or no impact on public good production, they do not contribute to a group where their contribution has little effect (Olson, 1965). An individual can join a group to defend the aims they agreed with but would rather free ride by utilizing the benefits of others in the group. It is expected from this point of view that nobody would contribute if people knew that somebody would, but some people contribute to the provision of public good. This is what was called the free-rider or collective action problem, which inspired many strands that aimed at clarifying the emergence of collective action (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1978). To solve this problem, Olson has identified several factors which affect the possibility of collective action: the size of groups or organizations, the provision of selective incentives, and the cost of participation (Crossley, 2002; Olson, 1965; Opp, 2009).

Group size is an important variable that influences other factors, such as the individual share from the public good (Olson, 1965, pp. 34-38), personal efficacy (Olson, 1965 pp. 12-6, 43-4), and costs of participation indifferently. If the group size is large, it is less likely that collective good is achieved because members cannot scrutinize the actions of one another and detect free riders (Olson, 1965; Opp, 2009).



However, collective action can happen in a smaller group, and the prospect of punishment would deter members from free-riding (Crossley, 2002). Trade unions are good examples of such groups; they could effectively detect and punish those who break the strike. Since Olson has applied his hypotheses predominantly to smaller interest groups in market conditions, he could only have reached analytical conclusions based on expectations drawn from individual perceptions. Olson has also distinguished non-market conditions (Olson, 1965, p. 37), where larger number of groups are tolerated since the production of public good is high because there is no competition.

In his examination on Olson's theory of collective action, Opp (2009) argued that based on Olson's basic assumptions on collective action, 'there is a negative relationship between group size and public goods provision' (Opp, 2009, p. 52). This is because larger groups discourage potential contributors from engaging collective action. To elaborate Olson's theory from a sociological perspective, Oberschall (1973, p. 125) has argued that large groups within networks of collectivities are more able to mobilize rapidly and 'bloc recruitment' more possible because of the existence of those groups who organized before. Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson (1980) confirmed in their findings that the network to which an individual is attributed would contribute movement recruitment. Relying on Oberschall's assumptions, Tilly (1978, p. 84) has also identified the intensity of organization, meaning that 'the extent of common identity and unifying structure among its members', as one of the factors facilitating collective action. Therefore, social ties and prior organization are two factors that can contribute to resolving the free-rider problem.

The availability of selective incentives is the most crucial aspect of Olson's work (1965). Olson (1965, p. 51) has defined selective incentive as something 'that operates, not indiscriminately, like the collective good, upon the group as a whole, but rather *selectively* toward the individuals in a group', because those who contribute for the collective interests are treated differently than those who do not. If the positive incentives of contribution and negative incentives for non-contribution are high, individuals are more inclined to contribute (Opp, 2009). Therefore, selective incentives can be positive or negative in rewards and punishments.

What has been drawn from the proposition of selective incentive is that two factors influence the provision of collective good: the intensity of collective interests and personal efficacy. Personal efficacy is related to how individuals perceive their contribution in terms of the difference it could potentially make (Opp, 2009). If an



individual strongly believes in the collective interests of a group, it is plausible for them to think that their contribution would make a difference (Opp, 2009). Therefore, these two factors are interdependent. Moreover, Olson acknowledged the possibility of other types of incentives for different groups or networks (Olson, 1965, p. 62). Still, these were not really considered as crucial factors in his theory of collective action. Having followed the basic assumptions of collective action theory, Finkel, Muller and Opp (1989) formed a relationship between the personal influence on collective good provision and individual expectation of group success. In a different study, Opp and Gern (1993) found the statistical significance of perceived personal influence on participation when they analyzed the 1989 demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany. For Klandermans (1984, p. 586), personal efficacy is a function of willingness to participate, alongside 'the expected selective costs and benefits and the value of these costs and benefits'. According to this view, willingness to participate is depended on the expectations from the participation of others and their experiences from the past. They are presented as important determinants for the contribution of a collective good.

Olson has formed a negative causality between participation costs and contribution to the collective good. If the cost of participating in a collective action is high, individuals are less likely to contribute to the collective good (Olson, 1965). However, if the individual is resourceful and contribution would not be burdensome, they partake in contribution to the collective good to reduce the cost (Crossley, 2002). If individual share from the common good is decreased as more individuals join the group and the efficacy declines consequently, the cessation of one contributor would be enough to exalt the costs of participation to an intolerable level for other contributors. Hence, they stop contributing to the common good as well (Olson, 1965, p. 48) and benefit from other contributions.

The articulation of the free-rider problem as an impediment for collective action has led to the further development of different models which provided other solutions. The importance of prior organization and social ties (Oberschall, 1973; Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson, 1980; Tilly, 1978) and the effect of perceived personal influence (Finkel, Muller and Opp, 1989; Opp and Gern, 1993) were the first order examples. Moreover, the value-expectancy theory that focused on the willingness to act was presented as the missing component in the collective action theory (Klandermans, 1984). The variables that these models used have paved the way

for theorizing the critical mass logic based on Olson's basic assumptions, and some scholars put those variables into testable hypotheses (Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira, 1985; Oliver and Marwell, 1988; Marwell, Oliver and Prahl, 1988). These two theorized variants of collective action theory, which emerged out of the criticisms directed at Olson (1965), will be analyzed in the following two sections.

### ***2.2.3. Other Variants of Rational Choice Models***

#### ***2.2.3.1. Value-Expectancy Theory***

Olson's (1965) version of rational choice theory, adapted to the collective action in social movements, established a grounded framework on how rationally people decide on acting collectively, using cost-benefit calculations. However, the applications of Olson's assumptions were not the best fit for the mobilizations with political character. In such events, contrary to Olson's argument, participation is mostly voluntary by larger groups (Oberschall, 1994). As mentioned in the previous sections, several different approaches within the rational choice model of collective action exist, for example, the game-theoretical ones or social dimensions in individual participation (Lichbach, 1995; Oberschall, 1973). However, Klandermans' (1984) value-expectancy model of collective action constituted an exception worth examining separately, which links rational and social psychological components of collective action.

When one breaks down the model, value expectancy means the likelihood of obtaining the collective good. While value refers to the collective good, the ultimate goal or item that a group or movement aims to achieve, expectancy is the likelihood of its achievement. Klandermans argued in this model that there is a positive correlation between an individual's willingness to act and their expectation that others will follow (Klandermans, 1984). The more people participate in collective action, the more likely the obtainment of relevant collective good will be possible. Others name this proposition collective rationality (Oliver, 1984; Finkel, Muller and Opp, 1989).

According to the value-expectancy model further, the willingness to participate in any collective action 'is a function of the perceived costs and benefits for participants of involvement in that activity or action' (Klandermans, 1984, p. 107). Three motives have defined that influence how costs and benefits of collective action participation are perceived. Such calculation of costs and benefits include whether the collective good or goal is achieved or not, what are 'the expected reactions from significant others', and what rewards or punishments have resulted in the participation

of that action (Klandermans, 1986, p. 380). The intensity of goal, social and reward motives significantly vary from movement to movement or depends on the characteristics of that specific protest event. Still, the willingness to participate is 'the weighted sum of all' of these three (Klandermans, 1984, p. 108). Moreover, Klandermans found a negative correlation between perceived costs and benefits and willingness to participate. When perceived costs are low, and benefits are high, the desire to participate would be high. Some studies confirmed this hypothesis in the case of union participation. They found that the expectancy of goal achievement and social costs and benefits determined the decision to participate to a great deal and affected the type of collective action (Klandermans, 1986; Flood, 1993).

The value-expectancy model of Klandermans is an important variant in the rational choice model since it has successfully incorporated the often-neglected social psychological concepts such as beliefs and expectations to the cost-benefit calculations of participation decisions. Klandermans further integrated his approach to the successor perspectives in social movement research, as will be seen in the following chapters. Another variation in the rational choice theory of collective action, which will be the next one, was borne out of the criticism directed at Olson that the injections of support from outside of the movement could be an important determinant of collective action.

#### ***2.2.3.2. Critical Mass Theory***

The critical mass theory builds upon Olson's collective action theory (Jenkins, 1982). Critical mass theory claims that resourceful and motivated sub-groups of a larger group control how resources are controlled and responsible for their mobilization (Marwell, Oliver and Prael, 1988). Such motivated groups of individuals produce or bring the collective good and incentives for participation by themselves to reduce the cost of action, and they are called critical mass (Oliver, Marwell and Teixeira, 1985). It was derived from group heterogeneity that in terms of interests, costs, or resources that provide incentives, the absence of social cooperation could impede collective action in larger groups (Heckathorn, 1993). The perspective of critical mass scholars has pointed out the missing part in his solution to the free-rider problem: they have proposed selective incentives to encourage people to contribute but did not explain who would provide them. Since group size affect the provision of incentives is also a collective action (Opp, 2009), it is more problematic than the actual provision of public good. Therefore, the theory is grounded on Olson's fundamental

assumptions of group size effect, the interdependency of actors (Olson, 1965, p. 45), and the impact of 'privileged or intermediate groups' (Olson, 1965, p. 49). Critical mass theory has differed from collective action logic by emphasizing the importance of such groups to encourage others to participate.

The abundance of empirical study built upon Olson's basic assumptions and other rational action theorists made the critical mass theory an important variant of the idea of collective action. Applications of the critical mass theory questioned how involvement from resourceful groups (critical mass) could affect (1) the amount of collective good produced and (2) the mobilization of other members (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). The collective action is a two-step process. Assuming that it is a large group, first, the extent of public good and contributors would be identified, then mobilization is facilitated by a certain number of contributions from critical mass.

The empirical studies have provided different patterns in public goods production to understand different real-life situations such as participation in protests and demonstrations and other types of free riding depended on such patterns and conditions of collective action (McAdam, 2004). Therefore, the critics of collective action theory have puzzled why some groups of individuals participate while others do not. They have found that individual perceptions and soft incentives mattered for larger groups instead of what Olson has anticipated (Muller and Opp, 1986; Opp, 1988; Finkel and Muller, 1998; Chong, 1991; Stürmer et al., 2003). Soft incentives include 'affiliation rewards such as meeting new friends and feeling solidarity with a group', or 'psychological gratification from conforming to the expectations of reference persons', for example, receiving appraisal from leadership cadre of a movement (Muller and Opp, 1986, p. 474).

In general, critical mass theory explains the macro-level actions of individuals. The action of critical mass shapes, first, in-group dynamics, then the action of other mobilizing groups and individuals in the broader context. However, the spontaneous model has suggested a form of collective action without the help of a key group or critical mass (Opp, Voss and Gern, 1995; Pfaff, 2006). The spontaneous model claims that there is already a collective good that emerged from a prolonged problem acknowledged by a majority of people, and these people expect individual participation to make a difference. In the example of anti-regime demonstrations in Eastern Europe, the collective good was freedom from the communist regime (Opp, 2009). Ordinary citizens came together in mass demonstrations without the

mobilization facilitated by a particular group and achieved their collective good with the collapse of the communist regime. Such spontaneousness could not be found in environmental movements. A critical event or decision triggers a mass reaction by a critical mass, which will be discussed later in the case studies.

More recent discussions also underline the notion of sanctioning in groups with strong social ties to create the cooperation norm, preventing undesirable behaviors such as smoking (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Horne, 2007; Opp, 2009). Therefore, the norm of fairness encourages non-contributors to cooperate for the emergence of the sanctioning norm (Horne, 2007). Furthermore, the inclusion of a social network fosters cooperation and sanctioning in a larger group because it is easier to sanction someone with closer social ties than a stranger (Opp, 2009). In recent discussions on network perspectives in social movement research, social movement scholars further discussed the effects of group population and its organization.

#### ***2.2.3.2.1. Network Perspective in Social Movements***

Networks are traditionally defined as 'sets of nodes, linked by some form of relationship, and delimited by some criteria' (Diani, 2003). Individuals, organizations, or other collectivities are included in nodes (Gould, 1995), and they are connected through either direct or indirect ties. These ties are established mainly through physical or symbolic interactions: while direct ties are as a result of direct, face-to-face interactions, indirect ties are formed through shared goals, agendas, and interests (Diani, 2013; Diani and Mische, 2015). Network analysis that focuses on the network-movement link was based on the rejection of the assumption that collective action is organized by individuals who cannot integrate into modernizing society (Diani, 2013). Several studies have shown that individuals are well integrated into networks (Oliver and Marwell, 1993; Kitts, 2000; Rolfe, 2005). Their ties made movement recruitment easier (McAdam and Paulsen, 1993; McAdam, 2003), and most importantly, social settings in which networks exist have provided the basis for movement emergence (Diani, 2013).

The networks generally have two functions in social movements. First, networks are presented as an indicator in the decision of collective action participation (McAdam, 1988; Kitts, 2000) because members of a group are embedded socially in group causes, where their efficacious commitment is based upon (McAdam, 2003). Second, networks provide connections between different organizations and activists due to collective action (Diani, 2013). Being part of a network on individual

participation has been tested as an independent variable (Marwell, Oliver and Prael, 1988). Analyses have shown that it has a range of effects from personal improvement and emotional labor to the macro impacts, such as expanding opportunities for collective action and information dissemination (Oliver and Marwell, 1993; Gould, 2003; Passy, 2003). Speaking of the expansion of opportunities, the ties have also generated different options: while tightly bounded networks pool their resources and exchange information, networks with loose ties expose to the same media and share connections with adherent actors (Diani, 2013).

Networks define the limits of social movements by aggregating the informally linked individuals, groups, and organizations. Such assemblage differs from coalition networks because members of a movement network share a collective identity based on their similarity of targets and objectives (Diani and Bison, 2004). The scope of this shared identity affects the network's density; strong ties are developed with the network if the identity is exclusive, while looser ties lead to multiple memberships in different networks (Carroll and Ratner, 1996; Centola and Macy, 2007). Whether they are heterogenous or homogenous, the composition of networks shapes the movement strategy, as heterogeneous networks reduce the costs of action by selecting mobilizing groups. Another factor is the context where networking occurs: 'spatial proximity' (Diani, 2013) and personal relations impact the spread of movement organizations and possibilities of joint action (Hedström, 1994; Gould, 1995; Hedström, Sandell and Stern, 2000). These factors have contributed to the widening scope of social movements towards transnational activism by transforming networks into complex fields of interaction (Ansell, 2003).

The development of information and communication technologies such as the internet, smartphones, or social network platforms and their utility in collective action has recently entered into the study on networks (van de Donk et al., 2004; Della Porta and Mosca, 2005; Saunders, 2007; Earl, 2010). Such technologies provided opportunities for the cooperation of ideas and resources to articulate and achieve collective objectives. The strengthening of collective identity has facilitated solidarity within a network in return. These technologies have accelerated the speed of information dissemination while giving ample room for alternative sources of information to propagate their ideas that mainstream media ignored (Diani, 2013). Therefore, recently, cyberspace has become the new field of collective action through social media platforms.

To sum up, even though network analysis has been used in social movement research since structural theories, it has only been in the studies of last two decades that networks have been put to the forefront (Centola and Macy, 2007; Della Porta and Mosca, 2005; Diani and Bison, 2004; Diani, 2013; Gould, 2003; Kitts, 2000; Passy, 2003; Rolfe, 2005; Van de Donk et al., 2004). As an attempt to revitalize the critical mass theory, network analysis has proved helpful in explaining a range of topics, from an individual decision to collective action participation to collective identity formation in movements. Finally, the deployment of new technologies in communication has transferred the concept of networks in cyberspace with the establishment of social media platforms (van de Donk et al., 2004). Such transformation in social movement formation has also shaped the media framing, which will be presented in the following sections. The concluding section will summarize the discussion over the basic premises of rational choice theory.

#### ***2.2.4. Conclusion***

It is fair to infer that attempts to solve the free-riding problem missed the actual outcome of individual contribution rather than what is assumed to be. Because individuals could always overestimate the impact of their contribution, there would inevitably be a mismatch between what they have expected and how they ended up (Finkel, Muller and Opp, 1989; Gibson, 1991; Moe, 1980; Opp, 1988; Opp, 1989). Although Olson assumed in the beginning that individuals would know about the contributions of others and themselves (Olson, 1965, p. 62), this puts the applicability of theory to other actors and organizations into question. For instance, according to Finkel and others (1989, p. 901), perception would be misleading to assume individuals' participation because 'such estimations appear to reflect perceptions of political influence and resources can be relevant in stimulating individual and collective political behavior'. Therefore, in contrast to what Olson has anticipated, individual perception of success alone cannot fully explain collective action.

The effect of group size seems to be the primary independent variable that affects other variables. Still, it is ambiguous under which conditions it impacts, say economic or social incentives, remained unexplained in Olson's book. Alongside material benefits and social incentives to motivate people to participate, such as aspirations to gain reputation and respect, Olson also names the 'erotic, psychological and moral incentives' (Olson, 1965, p. 61). These are also nonmaterial as social incentives, but these are not considered triggers of collective action. Olson found them

nonmeasurable and irrelevant for the subjects of his theory, which are smaller interest groups driven by self-centered profit motives. Instead, these nonmaterial incentives are relevant for informal and kinship relations and networks such as family and friendship groups (Olson, 1965, p. 62) that have no place in Olson's discussion. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that individuals are not always rational. Other factors shape their decision to contribute, but Olson's assumptions leave little room for their impact by arguing that such factors are not testable. However, it only implies that self-interested behavior is non-testable either (Opp, 2009), and Olson deemed it unnecessary to measure them since they are irrelevant anyway (Olson, 1965, p. 61). Thus, Olson excludes the possibility that pressure groups could be motivated by social and moral incentives to contribute to the common good.

The lack of empirical data to test Olson's fundamental assumptions has been later filled by the formulation of different incentives into testable variables, named such as 'normative phenomena' (Opp, 1986, p. 91), 'morally central considerations' (Muhlberger, 2000, p. 667), and 'intrinsic motivations' (Hirschman, 1977 in Kyriacou, 2010, p. 824). Overall, these studies have shown that soft incentives could activate norms of cooperation, fairness, or obligation to contribute (Opp, 1986; Opp, 2009; Jasso and Opp, 1997). Soft incentives also facilitate the participation of those who feel the responsibility to act (Fleishman, 1980), or 'antisocial norms' (Kitts, 2006, p. 236) that discourage participation on the contrary (Kitts, 2006; 2008). When testing Olson's assumptions in the later empirical work, it has contradicted chiefly his logic that there is no correlation among independent variables. Because of other intervening variables such as the effect of grievances and repression, perceived group success and individual efficacy have not been significant as expected (Opp and Roehl, 1990). Thus, the studies have found that all variables are interdependent, just as the actors (Opp, 2009: 89).

Another finding that studies on soft incentives have pointed out is that the kind of collective good affects the group size effect: if the interest is not material or divisible, such as the generation of a norm or sanction, smaller groups in larger groups with established networks will increase the share from that collective good, unlike what the logic of collective action has expected (Alencar, Oliveira Siqueira and Yamamoto, 2008). Thus, selective incentives could work in larger groups, and other variables control the effect of group size: the heterogeneity of groups, incentives or resources available to the group, and the networks formed within the group and



outside. The role of social networks (Marwell and Oliver, 1993; Diani and McAdam, 2003) has later become a recently popular perspective to analyze social movements, which was discussed earlier. Therefore, these are related to the internal dynamics of smaller groups (Heckathorn, 1989; Heckathorn, 1993).

It is crucial to translate the theory of collective action into the realm of social movement research. The earlier criticism of Olson's 'utilitarian logic' (Fireman and Gamson, 1977) explained the inapplicability of rational theory in social movement action by emphasizing the need to explain conditions for the success or failure of social movements. Individual decisions to participate (Fireman and Gamson, 1977, p. 8), such as the roles of ideology, common culture or class-based concerns, or solidarity, have been found ineffective by Olson in the case of developed states (Olson, 1965, p. 13). However, he overlooked that not every social movement has rich resources to sustain support, but the non-contributors hamper no widespread movement according to this criticism. Thus, those critical of Olson's theory have observed that both group size effect and free-rider problem are ineffective for social movements (Fireman and Gamson, 1977). However, this criticism did not examine any movement or protest event to prove, only merely pointing to the need for case analysis. Nevertheless, it was significant that the critique of Olson's collective action theory has pioneered many different explanations and models.

Social-psychological explanations such as value-expectancy theory stood out as a significant variant when stressing the need to identify individual motivations for participation (Klandermans, 1984). However, its narrower focus only on the willingness to participate made it difficult to apply to a broader set of social movement events. Similarly, although the critical mass theory has been termed by the scholars of social movement research to build a metaphor and indeed inspired the resource mobilization perspective, it has again fallen short of explaining, say, the spontaneity of collective action (Opp, 2009).

In sum, this section served as an introduction to grasp how the most frequently used social movement theories and their concepts have been developed throughout the years. Especially the resource mobilization theory and political process and opportunity structures have theoretically grounded in the logic of collective action, and their purpose was to solve the free-rider problem posed by Olson. These theories have first attempted to explain the emergence of collective action and then provided solutions to prevent individuals in a collectivity from not contributing to the collective

goal, such as resources and internal organization (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; McAdam, 1982). The first one of these rational theories was the resource mobilization theory, which will be the topic of the next section.

### ***2.3. Resource Mobilization Theory***

Having acknowledged the problem addressed in Olson's (1965) theory of collective action as a focal point, the critics have raised some questions, such as how collective action occurs and the impact of resources or social relations during these processes. The critics of the theory of collective action have started the discussion with the rejection of the dominant view that participation in collective action is only determined by individual or micro factors, such as personal efficacy or deprivations that people experience. They also disagreed with mass society theory (Kornhauser, 1959) and functionalist theories of the Chicago School (Smelser, 1962; Gurr, 1970; Turner and Killian, 1987) which defends the irrationality of collective action and the breakdown in the restraining power of social and political mechanisms (Useem, 1998).

Instead of collective irrationality, resource mobilization theorists defended that the changes in the number of resources controlled or in social and economic conditions at the structural level pave the way to mobilizations and political opportunities (Tilly, 1973; 1978) for collective action and social movements, which both factors have constituted variants within the theory. Instead, resource mobilization theory prioritized the number of resources of any kind that actors have and how much of those resources have been spent on forming collective action. Unlike what mass society theorists have argued, marginalized or alienated groups which could not integrate into society can, in fact, effectively mobilize because they retain their dense networks during their organization (Oberschall, 1973).

McCarthy and Zald (1977) organizational model have provided helpful segmentation of the environment of social movements. By defining social movements as 'preference structures directed towards social change' (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p. 1218) that represented by shared beliefs, the model has focused on the outcomes and deprivations that grievances have caused, rather than its social-psychological aspect (Klandermans and van Stekelenburg, 2013). Resource mobilization theorists rely on social movement organizations (SMO) as the level of analysis. The organizations sharing the same objectives for resolving the same issue comprise the social movement industry (SMI). As the volume of resources these organizations control increases, they play different roles within the industry, ranging from information gathering

organizations to lobbying groups. Social movement sector (SMS) encapsulates organizations and industries with differentiated functions and tackle different issue fields. Examples would be such as women's suffrage (Freeman, 1975; McCammon, 2001), environmental protection (McLaughlin and Khawaja, 2000), homelessness, civil rights movements (McAdam, 1982; Morris, 1984; Minkoff, 1995), and independence movements (Khawaja, 1994).

Different conceptualizations of resources exist in resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, Tilly, 1978; Jenkins, 1983; Oliver and Marwell, 1992; Khawaja, 1994; Edwards and Marullo, 1995; Cress and Snow, 1996; Jenkins and Halcli, 1999). Discretionary resources, such as time and money, can be easily reallocated from philanthropic activities of various individuals and organizations (Corrigan-Brown, 2016; Jenkins and Halcli, 1999; McCarthy and Zald, 1977, p. 1224) or public charities (van Dyke et al., 2001) to support the activities of social movement organizations. Intangible resources, in contrast, stress the characteristics of organizations, for example, with their supporters and leadership skills. The distinction of tangible and intangible assets is the most basic categorization of resources (Fireman, 1979; Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina, 1982).

The resources were further defined by their source, called as 'indigenous resources' (Khawaja, 1994), or 'exogeneous' resources such as sponsorship (McCarthy and Zald, 2002; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977), and generally divided as internal and external resources (Edwards and Marullo, 1995). More recent classifications included both sources and characteristics of resources to the concept, such as individual, societal resources (Jenkins and Form, 2005) and institutions, other kinds of associations and 'conscience constituents', individuals that support movement goals (McCarthy and Zald, 2002, p. 150; Wahlström, Peterson and Wennerhag, 2018).

The commonly used classification of resources are as follows: (1) material resources, (2) human resources, which include labor of participants, movement leadership (Ganz, 2000), and skills and expertise they have, (3) 'social-organizational resources' (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004, p. 117), which are related with the internal dynamics of SMOs, for instance, infrastructures, social networks (Manky, 2018), and coalition preferences (Portos and Carvalho, 2019), and finally (4) cultural and moral resources. Therefore, resources could be derived from anything that social movement actors can control and utilize to achieve common goals. Among those, resource mobilization theorists have primarily focused on material resources, mainly financial

resources and properties, because money or property can easily be converted into other types of resources. Hiring staff and creating a website are examples of such resources (Edwards and Kane, 2016). Social-organizational resources are significant in combining different resources by creating a synthetic resource since their scope is limited to the relevant organization or social movement sector (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004). For example, with an infrastructure accessible to all as the Internet, a social movement organization can consolidate its mobilization potential by gathering support from adherents or sympathizers, thus producing its resource (Yan, Pegoraro and Watanabe, 2018; Zhou and Qiu, 2020).

Although the movement resources are interchangeable, they are scarce and not evenly allocated to all social movement organizations. Therefore, they need help from complementary resources, such as cultural and moral resources. Every movement industry creates its own culture and develops productions such as music, documentaries, or artwork (Corte and Edwards, 2008). These productions could contribute to deploying a collective identity and again consolidate the mobilization base. Coupling with several different resources, social movement organizations legitimize their establishment and actions in the eyes of coalition partners and opponents. Alongside external sympathetic, solidary support, it is a strong encompassing moral resource (Gillham and Edwards, 2011). In sum, there are varying degrees of tangibility and interchangeability between different kinds of resources, and a favorable mix of them can help achieve the movement goals (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004).

Another concept that is equally important as resources is their mobilization. When the resource mobilization supporters criticized Olson's theory of collective action, they have tried to extend the theory to explain political opposition and protests. They concluded that collective action does not occur in repressed or aggrieved societies under the state's iron grip, but when state control is relaxed, individuals can enjoy the freedom of expression (Oberschall, 1973). In addition, the leadership and funding support from outside of movement positively impacts mobilization in contradiction with Olson's (1965) logic (Oberschall, 1973, p. 115).

Having brought the resource and their mobilization together, the subsequent research has examined different types of movement organizations (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992; Oliver, 1993; Minkoff, 1995; Minkoff, 1997; Koopmans and Statham, 1999; van Dyke et al., 2001). The studies have posited different modes of mobilization,

including 'the aggregation of individual choices' into social movement organizations (Oliver, 1993, p. 271), or coalitions of organizations at the 'interorganizational level' (van Dyke et al., 2001, p. 207). Koopmans and Statham's work was different in removing the dichotomies of collective action by connecting states and movement actors in a 'multi organizational field' (Koopmans and Statham, 1999, p. 206).

The puzzle for social movement organizations has always been about how to mobilize resources to achieve common goals, similar to how companies maximize their utility in the business environment as an 'economic metaphor' (Johnston, 2014, p. 42). Differences in organizational strategies distinguished formal and informal social movement organizations and influenced a few variables such as leadership, the distribution of resources, types of resources used and their features, and resource mobilization processes in general (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004a). Among these variables, in formalized SMOs, the strategy is often associated with professionalized leadership (Staggenborg, 1988; Ganz, 2000) because it contributes to the accumulation of 'strategic capacity' (Ganz, 2000, p. 1005) with the provision of financial stability through hired professional staff and established organizational structure. Thus, formal SMOs are more likely to survive than informal or indigenous organizations because of a clear division of labor (Staggenborg, 1989). However, this is not to say that formal, professionalized SMOs have replaced informal ones.

Previous research on social movement organizations has revealed many existing informal social movement organizations, just as the number of formal organizations (Minkoff, 1995; Brulle, 2000; Edwards and Foley, 2003). Scholars explained this situation by mobilizing material resources and social capital (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986) or tactical innovation (Staggenborg, 1989). Those social movement organizations with decentralized organizational structures that operate without external sponsorship have also increased chances for survival because they could attract bystanders through tactical innovation, but short-lived compared to their traditional counterparts (Staggenborg, 1989; Whittier, 1995). Even though informal organizations can draw people from diverse backgrounds and diversify their strategies, the lack of sustainable financial support and internal conflicts has shortened their lives. However, some examples contend that SMOs need to be centralized to become successful; that is why different SMOs with various organizational forms exist (Morris, 1984; Taylor, 1989; Edwards and McCarthy, 2004b).

Alongside the tendency to study local and informal SMOs, another trend in research mobilization perspective is the departure from organization-related issues like professionalization or strategy towards more systematic studies that focus on the proliferation of issue-specific social movement organizations in various movement industries (Minkoff, 1995; Brulle, 2000; Edwards and Foley, 2003; Andrews, 2016). Such studies emphasized the interaction between organizational base and internal dynamics of a social movement organization, such as internal conflicts of interest among movement branches and competition with counter-movements (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996; Balser, 1997). These studies have in common that they did not analyze these relations from a resource mobilization perspective but used political opportunity structures and frame analysis, which will be discussed later in this chapter (Ward, 2017; Della Porta, 2018; McElroy and Coley, 2020).

The insufficiency of resources to clarify social movements' emergence and growth is not the sole point of criticism directed to resource mobilization. Although they extensively make every object a resource, which kind of resources lead to which mobilization strategy has been left unanswered by RM theorists (Piven and Cloward, 1991). It has been presented that protests can occur without mobilizing any specific resource (Rosenthal and Schwartz, 1989; Biggs, 2006). While reframing the protest action as something normal and reactionary, they tend to distinguish protest as normative and non-normative, which is non-normative by nature because it challenges conventional politics. Scholars also did not explain how collectivities turn into rebellious groups (Tilly, 1978; McPhail, 1991).

The current research that utilized resource mobilization theory has moved beyond resources as the object of analysis and tends to use them as an independent variable rather than positioning them as the main subject of research (Hewitt and McCammon, 2004; Martin and Dixon, 2010; Johnson and Frickel, 2011). To put simply, these studies and more utilized different types of resources to explain movement emergence and growth without mentioning the resource mobilization perspective. This tendency is named the 'taken-for-granted nature' of the resource mobilization perspective because it shows that resources have become an inseparable element of social movement research (Edwards and Kane, 2014, p. 208). However, such postulation allows no innovation in the resource mobilization perspective since many studies have focused on different types of resources and their impact on micro and macro mobilization structures, namely the emergence of different SMOs and

movement industries. Thus, what has been observed in the end is that resources have been degraded to one of many aspects in movement formations (Hewitt and McCammon, 2004; Martin and Dixon, 2010; Johnson and Frickel, 2011; Ward, 2017; Della Porta, 2018; McElroy and Coley, 2020).

Social movement organizations need to mobilize the resources they control to achieve goals. When mobilizing the resources, the organizations choose the best strategy according to their tackling issues' preferences and constraints. Therefore, the organizational strategy depends on actors' cost and benefit calculations. In that sense, McCarthy and Zald's (1977) organizational theory appears to extend the rational choice theory to explain social movements (Zald, 1992; Opp, 2009). However, the free-rider problem in rational choice theory, in social movement jargon, is whether selective incentives are provided to movement actors. It seems vague because the resource mobilization perspective has neglected this question.

To sum up, resource mobilization has emphasized the internal elements that make mobilization happen, with resources, organizational basis that define the strategy to mobilize those resources, and the set of strategies and tactics used during mobilization. Despite the trivialization of grievances in favor of resource accumulation (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), their perspective has made way for other methods in social movement research, such as frame and discourse or script analysis (Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson, 1980; 1986; Gamson, 1992; Gamson and Modigliani, 1999).

The organizational theory has experienced a boom of empirical studies on different types of resources in various movement industries, so it has been applied as a formula. However, the tendency of resource mobilization theory to neglect long-term processes that affect the emergence of social movements led to the studies that focused on available political opportunities (or constraints) and long-termed political processes in the emergence of social movements. The following section will depict these two perspectives after the introduction of movement-government relationships in social movement studies with the concept of contentious politics.

## ***2.4. Institutional Explanations of Social Movements***

### ***2.4.1. Early Approaches***

The dominance of psychological approaches in the school of collective behavior had taken its toll when the theory lost its popularity. Nevertheless, other attempts placed collective behavior within the broader social and political structures. These approaches are also classified under strain and breakdown theories in the social movement

research, which is value-added and mass society theories (Smelser, 1962; Kornhauser, 1959). Strain is named for 'the conditions, trends or events that create the mobilizing grievances motivating disruptive collective action', while breakdown is observed 'when the mechanisms of social control lose their restraining power' (Useem, 1998, p. 2015; Moss and Snow 2016, p. 549). Those two theories then tried to explain the type and intensity of collective behavior with the variations in broader structures, which paved the way for developing political opportunity structures perspective and political process theory.

#### ***2.4.1.1. Mass Society Theory***

Mass society theory owed much of its theoretical background to Durkheim's concept of social solidarity. Durkheim presented an ideal type of society where the political, economic, and social division of labor, social cohesion, and organization are based on kinship and family ties. This description resembles the pre-industrial or tribal societies, where populations are divided into tightly knit segments defined by social links and bonds so dense that individual autonomy is eroded. Durkheim observed that economic and political crises lead to abnormal developments in this ideal type of society and disrupt labor division. This is what he called 'anomie', which is 'the state that results from the weakening of the powers of society which regulate social equilibrium by setting the acceptable level of social restraint' (Morrison, 2006, p. 226). Some scholars have elaborated further by linking this observation to changing socio-economic circumstances that brought about the concept of 'mass society' (Kornhauser, 1959; Killian, 1964; Travaglino, 2014).

For the mass society theory, what caused the social change was the rapid industrialization in the late nineteenth century, predominantly in Europe with technological advancements that transformed the modes of production. The expansion of factories that concentrate on mass production universalization of communication techniques with new inventions have led to the concentration of population into newly established urban areas. In his work, Kornhauser (1959) intended to explain how movements driven by extremist ideologies such as Nazism and fascism threatened liberal democracy. Based on the observation that grievances emerge out of 'the disintegration of social life', the work defines several conditions which would pave the way for masses to mobilize, who are not part of a specific formal structure or class but in many of them simultaneously (Moss and Snow, 2016, p. 549). What led to the social disintegration was the disappearance of intermediary organizations that connect



individuals to 'large social institutions', for example, membership to trade unions and community groups (Rule, 1992, p. 109).

The mobilization of masses' pursue remote, extreme objectives and mobilize uprooted, atomized people', due to the loss of traditional social ties and relationships (Kornhauser, 1959, p. 47). Those who migrated from rural and communal areas could not adapt at first because they had lost the sense of community that their former pre-industrial lifestyle had provided. People who have moved from smaller, rural towns to developed cities become socially isolated. While people can form stronger social ties in the small towns with fewer people, this was not the case in larger cities, and a new sense of social isolation was born. Isolated individuals without a job were eager to join any movement to feel a sense of belonging and purpose. The emergence of Nazism, fascism, and Stalinism have taken such social isolation to the extreme and resulted in the Second World War (Kornhauser, 1959). Therefore, since these people are socially isolated, 'they are especially vulnerable to the appeals of extremist movements', such as fascism, totalitarianism, or communism (Buechler, 2013, p. 1). Those affiliated with different clusters and systems are unified as a mass society. Still, it lacks diversity through 'cultural uniformity', when all mass society members agree upon the same beliefs and values (Kornhauser, 1959, p. 103).

Such homogenized societies produce norms through practice in social life that wraps society together, which is called 'mass culture' (Wilensky, 1964, p. 175). In the pluralist systems where 'social pluralism' is not confronted, people are less likely to challenge the social order because different views coexist together without intending to polarize, thanks to intermediate solid channels and spheres such as civil society (Kornhauser, 1959). However, in a community where social ties are loosened, and people are less organized, elites and non-elites are inevitably separated, and the latter is subject to the former's manipulation (Kornhauser, 1959; Swingewood, 1977). Consequently, mass society theory argued that those socially isolated and polarized people came together under extremist and irrational political movements, such as Nazism and fascism in the 1930s (Swingewood, 1977).

According to some scholars, mass society theory was 'the more strictly structural view of the production of militant social movements' (Rule, 1992, p. 108). It was innovative to add social isolation and technological advancements and political and economic grievances to give the general theory of collective behavior some structural dimension. However, it has been realized with mass society theory that

cooperative behavior is still viewed as an irrational act (Rule, 1992). The primary deficiency of mass society was its negligence that the memberships to the intermediary institutions could also lead to the emergence of extremist or radical movements (Marx and Wood, 1975; Rule, 1992). Moreover, those who are marginalized from society are in fact, less likely to engage in collective behavior therefore the debate over collective behavior has been discontinued (Oberschall, 1973; Rule, 1988). Those two premises were fundamental in mass society theory, and succeeding criticisms has seemed to prove the theory wrong.

To sum up, what mass society theory tried to accomplish was to demonstrate that structural variations can also be determining factors in collective behavior theory. However, the theory was flawed in terms of its scope only limited to violent and disruptive collective behavior and entrapped by its premises. In his value-added theory, Smelser pushed structural factors further to the center of theory with a systematic account of the emergence of social action.

#### ***2.4.1.2. Smelser's Value-Added Theory***

The final strand of collective behavior school has made a difference when Smelser (1962) has integrated the concept of strain into his theorization, not as the sole reason that collective behavior occurs, but as one of its components. Smelser (1962, p. 23) first argued that 'collective behavior is analyzable by the same categories as conventional behavior' and defined four necessities for such behavior. These necessities are values, norms, mobilization of organized roles, and situational facilities.

In types of behavior defined as conventional, some individuals prioritize the same values. To realize common values, they then search for the appropriate norms. The roles are appropriately assigned to the collectivity members during such behavior, and finally, the collectivity mobilizes. In contrast to this uninterrupted pattern, collective behavior occurs 'when any of these elements is disturbed' (Rule, 1992, p.161). In his value-added approach, Smelser sought to find 'what happens to these components of action when established ways of acting fail in the face of unstructured situations' (Smelser, 1962, p. 23). To this end, Smelser assumes there are five components of collective behavior: structural conduciveness, the existence of strain, the creation of a generalized belief, a triggering event or events, and finally, the actualization of collective behavior.

Structural conduciveness is basically 'the setting in which behavior takes place' (Rule, 1992, p. 161). However, Smelser realized, by giving the example of a financial

panic, that its scope is open for any behavior to occur (Smelser, 1962). In the case of a financial panic, investors can be threatened by a financial loss if one of the stakeholders dies. The possibility of being unable to find a bank to sell the shares can cause panic sells or run onto the banks, like during the Great Depression of 1929. Therefore, he later defined three factors that made up the setting of behavior: the structure of responsibility, the presence or absence of channels for the expression of grievances, and the facilitation of communication among the aggrieved members of the collectivity (Smelser, 1972). The value-added scheme has prioritized the existence of structural strain as a prerequisite for any collective behavior, and it is considered 'as falling within the scope established by the condition of conduciveness' (Smelser, 1962, p. 16). This component can be likened to the concept of deprivation, as strain is defined as 'an impairment of the relations among and consequently inadequate functioning of the action components' (Smelser, 1962, p. 47).

Smelser argued a hierarchy within the six components of collective behavior, and structural strain is the only component that influences other factors. For instance, while financial losses can lead to 'widespread economic losses', but also might trigger 'a collapse of norms that govern transactions in the money market' (Smelser, 1962, p. 51). Similarly, the process in which a generalized belief grows and spreads to all members of a collectivity takes place before the behavior takes place because individuals should know what they are rising against. This includes identifying what causes the structural strain and what individuals can do to overcome that strain. Between the diagnosis and prognosis of strain, the members attribute 'certain characteristics of the strain'. In essence, it is the reconstruction of the situation that the strain caused by the members of that collectivity (Smelser, 1962, p. 16). At the initial stage, structural strain is defined as an ambiguous situation, and such ambiguity also causes anxiety in some cases (Bartholomew, 1989). According to Smelser, 'generalized beliefs reduced the ambiguity created by conditions of structural strain' (Smelser, 1962, p. 81). The ambiguity is restructured by clarifying what is happening and predictions direction of the mobilization.

If structural conduciveness, structural strain, and generalized beliefs are the main components of any collective behavior, what Smelser named as precipitating factors are events that justify the generalized belief, or 'exaggerate a condition of strain', or 'redefine sharply the conditions of conduciveness (Smelser, 1962, p. 17).

Thanks to these factors, it is observed that 'movement becomes closer to actualization', when the movement begins to mobilize (Weeber and Rodeheaver, 2003, p. 185).

In the mobilization of individuals, Smelser emphasizes the way leaders behave since they determine the direction of the movement. Their roles vary according to the type of collective behavior. For instance, skilled and charismatic leaders are chosen in value-oriented movements such as neo-militia movements, 'because a diffuse, total kind of commitment is needed for the reconstruction of the entire social order' (Weeber and Rodeheaver, 2003, p. 186). Another factor is the internal organization of the collective behavior, which is linked to 'the degree of pre-existing structures and the response from agents of social control (Lewis, 1972, p. 88). For instance, coupled with the pre-existing beliefs on Muslim immigrants and a devastating incident such as September 11 attack had triggered xenophobic violence in the aftermath of the terrorist attack (Springer, Lalasz and Lykes, 2012). Elsewhere, Smelser accepted that mobilization should not be another factor for collective behavior. Since the first three criteria, structural conduciveness, strain, and generalized beliefs, are its minimum requirements, there was no need for a criterion called mobilization (Smelser, 1972).

Finally, the dual role of social control agents in (1) suppressing the collective behavior engaged and (2) minimizing the effects of structural conduciveness and strain encapsulates the other five determinants (Smelser, 1962). After the onset of mobilization, these agents can develop a response quickly, which would affect the type of collective behavior. Dependent on the mobilization situation, Smelser argued that social control agents might be 'the police, the courts, the press, the religious authorities, the community leaders' and the like (Smelser, 1962, p. 17). In the case studies that tested Smelser's value-added theory, social control agents are predominantly the police or security forces of an institution, such as the ones in a university campus, or local authorities in a few (Bartholomew, 1989; Cilliers, 1989; Lewis, 1972; Lewis, 1989; McDaniel, 1971; Rudwick and Maier, 1972).

Following the description of the components of collective behavior, Smelser defined five types of collective behavior: panic, craze, hostile outburst, norm-oriented, and value-oriented movements (Smelser, 1962). Until the work of Smelser, there were attempts to analyze social movements as a form of collective behavior. Still, the case-by-case approach of these studies was insufficient to provide a general model of social movements. What Smelser did was remarkable by laying out a broad framework of social movements and using hostile outbursts, norm, and value-oriented movements

as ideal types. Thus, it would be safe to conclude that Smelser's value-added theory conceptualized social movements.

Although this review is about theorizing the social movement phenomenon, it would be significant to briefly mention the first two types of collective behavior, panics, and crazes, to demonstrate what social movements are not. In panics, 'actors attempt to escape from a stressful situation' when their capabilities are insufficient to overcome it (Ormrod, 2014; Springer, Lalasz and Lykes, 2012, p. 177). While in crazes, there is an effort to find solutions to that stressful situation, which is the main difference between panics and crazes. Another diverging point was the belief that drives such behaviors. For instance, fashion crazes are borne out of 'wish-fulfillment beliefs', which trigger the changes in the fashion cycle from individual to general (Ragone, 1981). In contrast, panics are driven by hysterical beliefs, such as the fear of an airstrike following the sighting of a monoplane (Bartholomew, 1989).

Despite their differences, the paths of development for both panics and crazes are similar. A combination of structural conduciveness, strain, and a generalized belief is 'enough to generate speeding flight behavior' (Ma, Wang and Larranaga, 2011, p. 3). However, panics and crazes cannot be used to theorize social movements. Empirical evidence showed that such classifications are too psychologically dominated and vague. Both types of behavior are found irrational by the applicants of theory, while in fact, Smelser recognized that in his work, he overlooked 'psychological mechanisms in the dynamics of episodes of collective behavior' (Smelser, 1972, p. 98). Therefore, other types of collective behavior are included in the taxonomy, which is more organized and rational than the former two (Johnson, 1987; Mawson, 2007).

The other three types of collective behavior in Smelser's taxonomy were hostile outbursts norm-oriented, and value-oriented movements. First, hostile outbursts are forms of behavior that aim 'a specific group of people as responsible for the problems experienced at the level of social organization' (Ormrod, 2014, p. 189). For example, during the 1990s, neo-militia movement emerged in the US, culminated by the fear that the country will become less powerful in the 'New World Order', which they thought it will be led by the United Nations (Weeber and Rodeheaver, 2003). Moreover, such beliefs are strengthened by the inability to comprehend the new direction that the world was going through with globalization, thus 'sets the stage for

value-oriented movements' or norm-oriented movements (Weeber, and Rodeheaver, 2003, p. 185).

Recent reviews on Smelser's value-added theory tended to compare and contrast value and norm-oriented movements, in which the phenomenon subject to change are similar, which are norms and values (Ormrod, 2014). This is also because of Smelser's assertion that value-oriented movements also involve the reorganization of norms (Smelser, 1962). What aims to be restored, modified, or protected collectively in norm-oriented movements are norms, while values or cultural items in value-oriented movements (Smelser, 1962). Moreover, the elements from other types of collective behavior, panics, crazes, and hostile outbursts are observed in these movements. Apart from their subjects, norm and value-oriented movements are differentiated in generalized beliefs (Geschwender, 1968). In the norm-oriented movements, beliefs are generated from the inadequacy of normative control, and 'this belief becomes directed toward a particular set of laws and customs' (Geschwender, 1968, p. 475). Scholars tracked down this process in the women's movement who demanded governmental agencies or equivalent institutions to revise the educational system for women (Smelser, 1962). In value-oriented movements, cultural values and beliefs, indigenous or imported, old or new, can be restored, perpetuated, or created anew. In this regard, Smelser (1962, p. 315) gave the example of religious movements, in which those beliefs are 'the basis for challenging the legitimacy of established political authority'.

Even though Smelser (1962) has defined characteristics for both types of movements, the distinctions between norm and value-oriented movements are blurred, for example, in the case of environmental movements. Stallings (1973) argued that there was a disagreement among environmentalists on who is responsible for environmental problems. As opposed to Smelser's generalized belief argument, they do not share the same beliefs since the aims and organization of environmental movements are diffuse and 'segmented with members differentially drawn to the various segments' (Stallings, 1973, p. 476). Therefore, beliefs range from 'anxiety over the deteriorating ecological balance' to those which criticize 'the efficacy of normative cures for environmental problems' (Stallings, 1973, p. 469). Such heterogeneity of beliefs makes it difficult to classify environmental movements as norm-oriented or value-oriented movements.

Smelser's inclusion of various collective behavior and their examination with a designated set of criteria had their own merits. Recent accounts claimed that some of the factors in the value-added theory were the prototypes of popular concepts utilized in the social movement research. While structural conduciveness was similar to the model that prioritized political opportunity structures, the process that led to the growth and spread of generalized beliefs was the primitive version of the framing approach perfected by some contemporary scholars (Crossley, 2002; Ormrod, 2014; Snow, Zurcher and Eklund-Olson, 1980). Therefore, the critics argued that Smelser's taxonomy of collective behavior is the most comprehensive one, compared to its predecessors, and inspired its successors (Crossley, 2002; Weller and Quarantelli, 1973).

Many critics found little evidence for Smelser's explanation for the emergence of collective behavior because 'his variables are abstract' and he provided a 'very generalized explanatory model' (Barber, 1965, p. 270; Rule and Tilly, 1972; Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975). Especially the over-reliance on generalized beliefs is noticed by some critics since the concept seemed inapplicable 'to all situations of non-institutionalized, hostile collective action' (Marx, 1970, p. 24). Although there was no distinction made between rationality or irrationality of collective behavior, the types of behavior and their components resemble both irrational crowd action and organized social movements. Thus, due to this confusion, Smelser's theorization 'does not move our understanding beyond earlier approaches of collective behavior' (Couch, 1968; Currie and Skolnick, 1970, p. 37). In addition, the effort to analyze all five types of collective behavior by the same set of variables implies that each form contains elements from one another. For instance, a hostile outburst can involve the characteristics of panic. Thus, it becomes nearly impossible to distinguish one type from another (Marx and Wood, 1975; Stallings, 1973).

Smelser merely touched upon their political dimension in his account on norm-oriented movements. This negligence has made the argument winded up to reduce the politics of collective action to mere epiphenomena of social-cum-psychological strain' (Aya, 1979, p. 60). To put it simply, Smelser seemed unable to determine whether social or psychological strains caused the collective behavior to occur. In addition, the propositions of the value-added theory were not suitable for empirical testing, despite the examples discussed throughout the book to make the premises consistent. Because

there was no empirical testing, there was no 'empirically falsifiable account' on the emergence of collective behavior (Rule, 1992, p. 162).

The purpose of this section was to examine Smelser's value-added theory of collective behavior. It was the most comprehensive taxonomy of collective behavior at that period by bringing together the tradition of crowd behavior with the analysis of purposive collective behavior, which are social movements (Smelser, 1962). However, the forms of behavior that Smelser attempted to unify under one theory were 'so diverse, and the accompanying situational factors so complex', that his causations remained ambiguous and unverifiable (Traugott, 1978, p. 42). Nevertheless, coupled with the mass society theory, value-added theory provided a set of factors for movement participation, which were later conceptualized as political opportunities in the approaches to contentious politics. The following section will add a new dimension to the social movement study, namely the concept of contentious politics.

#### ***2.4.2. Contentious Politics***

From the late 1980s onwards, there was a realization in the social movement research that 'collective action is not independent from politics and history' (Tarrow, 1998, p. 3). This was seen when scholars from such disciplines started developing their accounts on the emergence of social movements. However, these scholars soon understood that social movements are not all about experiencing deprivation that resulted in a violent or extremist confrontation, just like in many revolutions or riots (Tilly, 1978). People may challenge political elites or authorities without resorting to disruptive action repertoires. Moreover, contending against an idea of authority is not a prerequisite for social movements; they can still be effective by building their organizations and mobilizing the people. Therefore, there are more than one form of collective action, and Tarrow used contentious politics as an umbrella term 'for understanding the place of social movements, cycles of contention and revolutions' (Tarrow, 1998, p. 3).

In his foundational work *Power in Movement*, Tarrow (1998) described when a collective action becomes contentious and who these contentious actors are. Either short-termed or sustained, institutionalized or informal, when those 'who lacked regular access to institutions' behaved 'in ways that fundamentally challenges others or authorities', then this action becomes part of contentious politics (Tarrow, 1998, p. 3). Still, the changes in political opportunities or constraints create the main impetus for the sustainment of the movement. Although it is not the only action to take, due to



the poor resources that social movement often has, sometimes contention becomes a movement's only resource. In this way, the contentious politics concept framework thus does not exclude the perspectives of resource mobilization and political opportunities.

The main premises of contentious politics were deeply rooted in Tilly's (1978) polity model. A set of conditions that give way to mobilization was laid out, and it mainly focused on the interlink between collective action and nation-state politics. Following Tilly, Tarrow has also emphasized the role of the state in shaping opportunities to challenge and made it a criterion for a movement to be classified as part of contentious politics (Tarrow, 1998). The constellation of rising political opportunities then determines the organization of unorganized groups to express their demands to a broader political audience instead of those 'politically connected groups' (Johnston, 2014, p. 46), which are better positioned when making their claims salient and resource access. Tilly's work (1978) was more occupied with challenging groups excluded from the political sphere. Because the spread of collective action to different areas strengthens the mobilization and political opportunities, these groups face state repression more than the former (Tilly, 1978). In this regard, contentious politics emphasize social movements' political dimension (Johnston, 2014, p. 49).

Considering the older perspectives such as resource mobilization, the concept of contentious politics is relatively a newer one and indeed the broader. It has progressed with the millennium and expanded by studying 'the aspects of contentious politics that have not been given sufficient attention' (Tarrow, 2001, p. 5), such as emotions, spatial and demographical variations. However, these aspects became operationalized with the proliferation of studies on so-called new social movements that will be discussed, not by Aminzade and others who realized this negligence. For the time being, the transition from social movements to contentious politics was an attempt to rejuvenate older approaches with new items on the social movement agenda.

This chapter will be comprised of three sections. First, political process theory will be introduced, the theorized version of political opportunity structures, once a groundbreaking approach and recently a factor for social movement emergence. Once a variant and critique of resource mobilization, the concept now becomes one of the main perspectives, political opportunity structures will be elaborated with its critiques. The chapter will be concluded with a review of the perspectives' main premises and their shortcomings and what was suggested to overcome them.

### ***2.4.3. Political Process Theory***

The political process model that McAdam (1982) has developed was based on the critique of two previously acclaimed models: social psychological models of collective action and resource mobilization perspective. The research problem that McAdam has tackled was ‘what set of circumstances is most likely to facilitate the transformation from hopeless submission to oppressive conditions to an aroused readiness to challenge those conditions?’ (McAdam, 1982, p. 34). To put it simply, McAdam has sought to find out under which conditions and processes the dissatisfaction derived from grievances would turn into collective action.

McAdam contended with the former approach that grievances are the only motivation of movement participation. The latter claimed that it is the injection of resources that facilitates the mobilization of social movements. The political process model has not responded to this popular question with the rejection of its predecessors but rather enhanced them by including other factors that make up a set of favorable conditions for collective action. The expansion of political opportunities, when coupled with organizational strength of ‘aggrieved populations’ and ‘cognitive liberation’ (McAdam, 1982, p. 40), paves the way for social movements to emerge. In a recent article from 2017, McAdam revisited his political process model when analyzing the climate justice movement in the United States and referred to those sets of factors as political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes (McAdam, 2017). These aspects will be analyzed one by one throughout this section.

#### ***2.4.3.1. Political Opportunity Structures***

The concept of political opportunity structures is the oldest pillar of the political process model and constitutes the model’s core (Kriesi, 2004). Until McAdam’s work which was published in 1982, it was treated as a distinct model to explain the emergence of social movements, as political scientists have introduced political opportunities into social movement research. By situating social movement organizations as part of a broader and dynamic structure, they argued that these structures contain opportunities and risks that appear as circumstances that cause social and political life (Della Porta, 2013). Coupled with the concept of contentious politics as a critique of resource mobilization model, such studies deemphasized the resources to make room for other factors, such as the strategic choice of tactics (Gamson, 1975; 1989; Tarrow, 1998) and social categories and networks that made up an organization

(Tilly, 1978). Such changes within a movement are interacting with those in the political structure. They would, in turn, have broader implications.

The concept of political opportunity structure was introduced to Eisinger's work (1973) on the riots taking place in the 1960s of the United States. Eisinger's purpose was to show the effects of the political environment on the likelihood of individual political activity success. The structure of political opportunities comprises the factors that affect or risk the success of political activity if they are related to the goal. Therefore, if a change is perceived as a political opportunity, then there is a relationship between the mobilizing potential of political opportunity and the chance of success (Eisinger, 1973).

Eisinger found that the effect of political opportunity structures has a 'curvilinear' pattern (Eisinger, 1973, pp. 17-21). When the opportunities are low, there is no protest because the costs of action are high. Because 'the pace of change does not keep up with expectations' in a political system, sudden deprivations could lead to mobilization (Eisinger, 1973, p. 15). As the opportunities surge for mobilization, the protest activity also increases since they could positively influence mobilization facilitation. After a certain degree that opportunities have arisen, protest activity starts to decline because the political system began to fulfill the demands of mobilizing individuals (Opp, 2009). As opposed to what Eisinger has found, the linear model posited a negative relationship between protest and political opportunity structure. If citizens cannot express their demands through conventional means, meaning that the political system is closed, lower political opportunities result in higher protest activity because it creates discontent. In that sense, protest is a 'frustrated response' (Eisinger, 1973, p. 14), reminding Gurr's (1970) frustration-aggression mechanism.

Inspired by Eisinger's (1973) definition of political opportunity structures like the political environment changes, the analysis of various social movements has enhanced the model. The proponents of such conceptualization have perceived political opportunity structures as encompassing the formal structure of a state, informal procedures, and strategies towards challenging groups and power configurations (McAdam, 1982; Kriesi et al., 1992; Tarrow, 1994). While the political system and strategies shape the mobilization pattern and tactics chosen by challenging groups (Tarrow, 1994), these three factors together determine the state response towards challenging groups (Kriesi et al., 1992), whether it will be facilitation or repression (Tilly, 1978). Officials of the political system make institutional changes,

or their political alignments are shifted; thus, they expand the political opportunities for protest (McAdam, 1986). However, this does not imply that growing political opportunities do not always lead to mobilization if not successful. What is perceived as an opportunity to protest may be a threat. Therefore, mobilizing actors should distinguish between opportunities and threats (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001). Such clustering of opportunities does not apply to the attainment of goals because even the cost of action is low and chances of success are high, groups can avoid protest if they perceive it as a threat. However, the reverse has also happened during the anti-regime movements in Eastern European countries. The mobilizing actors have gone through the protest even the cost of action (the possibility of repression) was extremely high. They perceived it as an opportunity to overthrow the communist regime, which has shaped their individual decision to participate (Opp, Voss and Gern, 1995; van Dyke and Soule, 2002).

The proliferation of studies on political opportunities in which various changes are perceived as political opportunities has been problematic (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004; Gamson and Meyer, 1996). Because the factors that lead to mobilization could also lead to deterrence from mobilization or changes in government policies, it could create inconsistencies for empirical analysis of mobilization on what the aim of movement is. For example, in the US; a mix of non-institutionalized means and political action has been helpful for black civil rights movement actors to raise their voices. In contrast, although they have more voting power in the political arena, environmental movements needed to use media for the visibility of events they organized to convince adherents to mobilize (Costain, 1992). Therefore, it shows that political opportunities are specific to that contested issue or group tackling it and the domain that movement has aimed to influence (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004).

It is also unclear to what extent mobilizing individuals are aware of changes in a political environment and perceive them as an opportunity to mobilize (Tarrow, 1996; 1998; Gamson and Meyer, 1996). Since people tend to misread the changes in those structures, the political opportunities should be the changes that are visible and open to be more effective (Ramos, 2008) and specific to that issue, such as something like an electoral turnover or an appointment to a political office. For instance, in his analysis of Canadian Aboriginal mobilization, Ramos (2008) has found that contentious action has started with the policy change of the federal government in 1969, which intended to remove the special status of Indians in Canada. The lobbying

activities of Aboriginal organizations founded afterward have been successful in recognizing Aboriginal rights under the constitution (Ramos, 2008).

Furthermore, studies in which political opportunity structures are defined as the perceived changes in the political environment have claimed that opportunities are subjective (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001, p. 43). They are not 'visible signals to social and political actors' (Tarrow, 1996, p. 54) that encourage or discourage mobilization by using the available resources from various sources through formal institutions or movement coalitions. These signals are listed as the openness of political power access, the shift of political alignments, the availability of influential allies, and elite cleavages (Kriesi, 1995; Tarrow, 1996). Individuals assess the situation in the political environment and seek to derive opportunities for mobilization or endorsement of a specific policy change (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004). For instance, the perception of a contested election or assessments on an official or president's political alignment is subjective assessments of objective situations. Therefore, the subjective conceptualization of political opportunities is more advantageous since mobilization cannot occur without participation and resources (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001; Opp, 2009).

The criticism can be raised on the assumptions of political opportunity structures from several points. First, it has been falsified by empirical evidence that increasing opportunities do not always lead to a higher possibility of mobilization (Kurzman 1996). Instead, what has happened was the decline in political action since contenders' goal was to achieve their goals once the political opportunities were emerged (Opp and Gern, 1993; Opp, 2009). Therefore, the expansion of political opportunities harmed political mobilization. Second, if the chances of mobilization success are perceived as high, people would not mobilize even the opportunities are expanded because they could find it unnecessary to participate (Finkel, Muller and Opp, 1989). Third, although the treatment of political opportunities as dependent variables by the many proponents of political opportunity structures is widespread (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Tarrow, 1994; Tarrow, 1996). There are case studies that found no expansion of political opportunities, but collective action was facilitated through other means such as movement framing processes or collective identity construction (Einwohner, 2003; Loveman, 1998). Therefore, the expansion of political opportunities alone would not result in collective action. Since the political opportunities models were preoccupied with the characteristics of political systems

that states have adopted, studies that analyzed mobilizations in different contexts. The main focus was on the liberal democracies of the US and Europe (McAdam, 1982; Kriesi et al., 1995; Tarrow, 1994); also, a considerable amount of work on authoritarian or non-democratic states can be found in the literature (Johnston, 2006; 2011).

Apart from the political opportunity structures that Eisinger (1973) formulated, some studies have attempted to suggest an alternative. These alternative structures included discursive, organizational, and cultural opportunities, and they have aimed to avoid the structural bias of political opportunity structures (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Kurzman, 1998; McAdam, 1994). In these studies, the scholars have called out the need to analyze the meaning individuals make from structural changes. Such studies that focus on different opportunities are neither classifications nor definitions of political opportunity structures. Instead those studies were considered attempts to enhance the model by shedding light on other aspects of movement mobilization. The most popularly utilized of these alternative structure models is the 'discursive opportunity structure' (DOS), which will be discussed at later stages of this section.

As noted above, political opportunity structure was an approach posited as an alternative to the resource mobilization perspective (Tarrow, 1996, p. 14). However, political opportunities have become complementary to resource mobilization when resources are included within the political opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1994; Rucht, 1994). In the last two decades, empirical studies that came out under the perspective of resource mobilization and many more have shown the strong link between political opportunities and resource mobilization, despite the objections (Brulle, 2000; Della Porta, 2018; Edwards and Foley, 2003; Hewitt and McCammon, 2004; Johnson and Frickel, 2011; Kitschelt, 1986; Martin and Dixon, 2010; McElroy and Coley, 2020; McAdam, 1988; Ward, 2017).

This review has refrained from describing political opportunities as a variant to resource mobilization (Zald, 1992). It is not a variant but criticism because those who argue that political opportunities are incompatible with resource mobilization have missed that the popularity of perspective was already waned (McAdam, 1988). The constancy of discontent and the number of resources available are two factors dependent on the changes in political opportunity structure, but changes in the political environment could not be controlled by movement, unlike resources. Instead, the

mobilizing actors take advantage of it for goal attainment. It is thus the main difference between resources and political opportunities (Opp, 2009, p. 177).

#### ***2.4.3.2. Mobilizing Structures***

Mobilizing structures combine several important dimensions of collective actions (McCarthy, 1996). The changes in political, economic, or social structures have extended the opportunities for mobilization, and their framing within those indigenous organizations has facilitated it through different strategies for mobilization (Kriesi et al., 1995; Koopmans, 1995; Duyvendak, 1995; Johnston, 2011). Only the changes in conventional politics and opportunities that brought do not lead to successful collective action. Rather, the ability of actors to benefit from that change depends on the organizational strength and resources that the change has rendered available. Therefore, the political process model depicted a causal relationship between organizational resilience and collective action success.

What is meant by mobilizing structures is ‘the collective vehicles through which people initially mobilize and begin to engage in sustained collective action’ (McAdam, 2017, p. 194). These vehicles can be listed differently from movement to movement, but there are at least two vehicles that social movements have in common: organizational strength and contentious repertoires (Garrett, 2005). A social movement organization derives its power from the type of organization that has been agreed upon by members and leadership (Buechler, 1990). From kinship-based and informal networks to professionalized organizations or campaign committees, these forms offer various types of power to be utilized by social movement organizers during mobilization. Although informal networks are the least organized form with weak ties among people, these ‘micro-mobilization contexts’ provide important solidarity and communication structures where people convince others to participate (McAdam, 1988, p. 127). For example, the early mobilizers in the women’s suffrage movement knew each other from past mobilizations (Evans, 1979; Rosenthal et al., 1985). Similarly, smaller pre-existing groups such as labor unions and churches can provide a basis for mobilization which is not associated with the broader context of collective action (McAdam, 1982; 1988; Oberschall, 1973). Therefore, the main function of mobilizing structures is the provision of favorable context for collective action where ‘individual choices can be aggregated’ (McAdam, 1988, p. 138).

Buechler (1990, p. 42) has taken a different approach independent from organizational forms when defining ‘social movement community’. Social movement

communities are not as organized as formal social movement organizations. Still, they consist of ‘informal networks of politicized individuals with fluid boundaries, flexible leadership structures and malleable divisions of labor’ (Buechler, 1990, p. 42). By this concept, Buechler introduced another concept alongside SMOs within social movement industries that first appeared in McCarthy and Zald’s (1973) organizational theory. Buechler has applied the concept of social movement community to the women suffrage movement and found that various movement organizations target different constituencies and deploy different strategies. Besides, the organization-specific goals have been most effective in achieving the broader goal of winning voter rights. In the 1970s, the coexistence of formal and informal movement organizations and connection with lesbian and women’s rights communities with the general women’s movement community has mobilized larger constituencies of women in the United States (Staggenborg, 1998). Thus, organizational strength is one dimension of mobilizing structures upon which collective action is based.

Second, repertoires of contention (Tilly, 1986) has been referred to as a result of long-term carvings of historical processes, such as industrialization and the formation of modern states, on the ways people ‘oppose a public decision they consider unjust or threatening’ (Della Porta, 2013). During history, these means have been practiced and transformed. They are mustered under the term repertoire, ‘claims making routines’ (Tilly and Tarrow, 2006, p. 16) that all movement actors use, regardless of challenging or challenged groups. As the means of protest varied, movement actors also alternated their targets: when it was initially the local authority and powerholders, once the modern states emerged, the protest has been directed to national institutions in the form of strikes, public meetings, marches, insurrections (Tilly, 1986; Della Porta, 2013). These events are organized not depending on conventional routines of politics. Still, through the organizations they formed themselves and unconventional means they devised to express their grievances and demands. Therefore, the nineteenth-century repertoire was national and autonomous (Della Porta, 2013).

Modern repertoires of contention have a modular character based upon the continuation of older repertoire in the contemporary era (Tarrow, 1994). They are used by a variety of actors to attain various goals but in a more indirect way, with the development of communication techniques and new organizations. Thus, the repertoires have been evolved (Tilly and Tarrow, 2006), without departing from the



main forms developed in the previous centuries. For instance, public demonstrations, petition campaigns, boycotts, and barricades were the products of the French Revolution, yet contenders extensively use them in contemporary movements (Tilly, 1986; Traugott, 1993).

While retaining the mentioned characteristics, new elements have been added to the repertoires of contention. First, the scope of mobilizations has expanded to international and transnational levels (Tarrow, 2005; Smith, 2008) through local and global connections. The networks at the local level shape the international mobilization through different incentives in different contexts. In turn, transnational processes alter the forms of action and framing activities of local issues. For example, the sustained campaigning of Socialist International in the United States has led to the recognition of workers' holidays internationally (Tarrow, 2005). Second, the development of communications media has made knowledge access cheaper and more accessible through the Internet and social media platforms. This development has also allowed the mobilizations to be more autonomous with the vast opportunities to gain media attention with digitalized repertoires (Earl and Kimport, 2011; Bennett and Segerberg, 2013). New forms of contention such as hacktivism or online petitions are autonomous because they are not necessarily linked to larger social movements. In a recent study, Liu (2016) has found that digital media is perceived as a repertoire of contention by both online and offline participants of anti-petrochemical protests in China. Under tight government control on traditional mass media and social organizations, Liu (2016, p. 613) concluded that the diffusion of collective action has happened through 'social and group-based applications' and China's social media platforms like *Weibo* and online forums.

Third, the combination of popular means with 'symbolic messages' to attract bystanders rather than directly challenging the targets became preferable for movement actors (Della Porta, 2006, p. 45). Breast cancer and postpartum support movements used women's narratives who shared their experiences with these illnesses to create survivors, strong figures that the public could sympathize with, by garnering attention from mass media (Taylor and van Willigen, 1996). Fourth, the repertoires for contention have turned into more performance-based and theatrical expressions that showed the 'diversity and subjectivity' of contentious action (Della Porta, 2013, p. 3). It included, but was not limited to, public weddings, storytelling, street shows with wearing costumes, and tattooing (Polletta, 2006; Wood, 2007; Taylor et al., 2009).

Thus, the repertoires of contention have diversified by several new elements entered into the mobilization research. Rather than repertoire change, some studies have focused on repertoire selection (Jasper, 2004; Fligstein and McAdam, 2012; Alimi, 2015). They have all stressed the role of agency and interactions with other organizations or movements in making strategic choices to achieve commonly agreed goals.

#### **2.4.3.3. Framing**

The framing was first coined as a term by Goffman to systematically analyze how movement actors perceive ‘what is it that’s going around here’ (Goffman, 1974, p. 8). What he has outlined as systemic frame analysis was not sufficient since his work only pointed out the significance of frame analysis (Gamson, 1975). From a constructionist point of view, the task was not to find out what is going on, but how people could believe ‘in multiple versions of reality’ (Benford, 1997, p. 412). It is because meanings are produced through ‘interactively based interpretive processes’ (Snow, 2004, p. 384). The earliest conceptualization of framing in social movement research has been named ‘frame alignment process’ (Snow et al., 1986, p. 464). It has sought to re-emphasize the relationship between meanings attached to objects, events, actors, and mobilization, the role of interpretive processes previously neglected by dominant perspectives (Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow, 2004). The concept initially appeared to contribute to the utility of cognitive liberation (McAdam, 1982). McAdam has referred to cognitive liberation as the framing process.

The framing perspective was based on Blumer’s (1957) symbolic interactionism, in which the individual meaning-making processes and their interpretation according to subjective values and beliefs. The theory itself did not speak of social movements; however, any collective action is defined as the result of interactions among the interpretations of many individuals on the decision to engage in collective behavior that breaks up with routinized behavior (Blumer, 1957). With further elaborations of framing in social movements by many authors, which built a perspective, the process of framing has been described as the subjective construction of meaning relevant to the goals of movement actors and adherents. (Gamson, Fireman and Rytina, 1982; Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1988; Gerhards and Rucht, 1992; Snow and Benford, 1992; Benford, 1993a; 1993b; Hunt, Benford and Snow, 1994; Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Benford and Snow, 2000; Johnston, 2002).

There are several key concepts developed within the framing perspective of social movements. The defining concept for meaning construction in social movements is collective action frames (Snow and Benford, 1988; Snow and Benford, 2000). Before linking the movement's goals with the goals and interests of adherents and other actors to create those frames, collective action frames have gone through a process of frame alignment (Snow et al., 1986). Initially, two relevant frames are merged with the issue that the movement tackled, then the values and beliefs are amplified in line with this articulation. These goals interpreted with values and beliefs have later extended beyond the movement, and over time they have differentiated from the previous interpretations, thus transformed into collective action frames (Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow, 2004).

The expansion of movement-specific frames of collective action towards more inclusionary applications to different events and patterns has been defined as 'master frame' (Snow and Benford, 1992; Benford and Snow, 2000). The classic example of a master frame is the injustice frame. Deriving its meaning from the transformation of daily inequities into a grievance commonly shared by collectivities, injustice frames are related to 'beliefs about what acts or conditions have caused people to suffer undeserved hardship' (Gamson, 2013, p. 1). Various formations of injustice frames are found in several social movement industries (Gamson, 1992; Benford and Snow, 2000), from nuclear disarmament movements (Benford, 1993a) to environmental movements (Benford, 2005) and abortion rights movements (Ferree et al., 2002). However, Benford and Snow (1988) have argued that more specific and interlinked strategies are needed to facilitate consensus and action within the movement. First, diagnostic framing identifies and re-defines the respective event as unjust (Gamson, 1992; Benford and Snow, 2000); second, prognostic framing proposes solutions to the problem caused by that unjust event and rejects the target group's resolution (Benford, 1993a). Finally, the 'vocabularies of motive' (Snow, 2013, p. 3) are constructed through motivational framing to call for action (Benford, 1993b; Snow and Byrd, 2007).

While the diagnostic and prognostic framing are aimed to achieve consensus mobilization, motivational framing steers the adherents towards action mobilization (Benford and Snow, 1988). Collective action frames vary in terms of the way they identify the problems, their scope, whether inclusive and flexible as master frames, rigid and exclusive, their degree of influence and resonance (Benford and Snow,

2000). Measuring whether the articulated frame fits the characteristics of the targeted audience is referred to as frame resonance by the respective perspective. There are two indicators to determine whether a frame is resonant: whether the claims and actions are credible and whether these are salient, meaning whether they are getting enough attention to create a shared sense of the issue (Snow and Benford, 1988; Benford and Snow, 2000). When creating different versions of reality through interpretive processes to influence audiences, disagreements over framing would inevitably occur due to the inability to bridge between meanings with attributes and events (Goffman, 1974) or simply mismatching these two (Snow and Corrigan-Brown, 2005).

The third and most detailed type of framing hazard is frame disputes (Benford, 1993a), and they are concentrated on three distinct types. First, since all actors cannot share the same frame or interpretation, there could be disagreements over these multiple versions of reality because of the problems of diagnosing the issues and events. Second, the movement's propositions on what should be done to solve the issue may be different from each other. Finally, disputes over 'how reality should be presented' and 'which framing strategies will be most effective' to make the frame resonant could have to prevent effects on collective action (Benford, 1993a, p. 679).

Another dimension of framing processes is the 'discursive fields' (Snow, 2004, p. 380; Steinberg, 1999) generated frames (Snow, 2004). In these fields, frames are connected with events, experiences, ideologies by mostly opinion leaders, for instance, what Martin Luther King's civil rights frame developed through his discourse included elements from Christianity, democratic theory, and Gandhi's philosophy of nonviolence (Morris and Staggenborg, 2004; Snow, 2004). These fields are constructed through everyday conversations, meetings, and written communications between leaders, movement actors, and adherents. The alternative approach, discursive opportunity structures (DOS), encompasses these discursive fields where contested issues and events are re-interpreted through relevant cultural elements (Ferree et al., 2002; Ferree, 2003; Koopmans and Olzak, 2004; McCammon et al., 2007). This alternative, culturally oriented opportunity structure will be introduced next.

#### ***2.4.3.4. Discursive Opportunity Structures***

This variant of political opportunity structure (POS) has gained increasing attention from scholars since the 1990s (Ferree et al., 2002; Koopmans and Statham, 1999). Scholars have mostly agreed with the explanatory power of political opportunity structures, but they found that the role of cultural frameworks is missing

in this model. People perceive and evaluate the objective opportunities based on structural and cultural frameworks, shaping movement actions and identities (Polletta, 2004, p. 97). This section will discuss how the weaknesses of the POS approach paved the way for operationalizing the concept of discursive opportunity structure.

The discursive opportunity structure (hereafter DOS) focuses on how contentious actors demand a specific issue. The constructions of cultural processes are often found ‘in linguistic practices, institutional rules and social rituals’, in essence, the meaning-making processes of any kind (Polletta, 2004, p. 100). Construction means the framing processes of movement actors, and albeit constrained, discursive fields offer such space and tools for framing, such as media coverage (Gamson, 2004; Steinberg, 1999). The studies on DOS have used frame analysis borrowed from Snow and others (1986) to find out how political claims are made through different discourses. For instance, Ferree and others (2002) describe three aspects that make up discursive opportunities: sociocultural, political, and mass media. These are generally described as the formal structure of a state, actor positions on the issue, and how they make their demands visible (Ferree, 2003; Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Koopmans and Olzak, 2004; McCammon et al., 2007). These aspects will be discussed further.

Just as in the political opportunity structures, political aspects include the type of government and the positions of political parties. Additionally, the characteristics of the judicial system in a state are included by Ferree and others (2003) in the case of comparison between the abortion discourses in the United States and Germany. Back in 1999, Koopmans and Statham made ‘an analysis of the role of elite conflict, decision-making and xenophobic violence’ to see whether there is a relation between the violence against asylum-seekers and the political debate on this issue in Germany. Another instance was the study of McCammon and others (2007) on the women’s jury movement in the United States. Just as Ferree (2003) did elsewhere, this study has used legal discourse, court decisions, and relevant articles on citizenship rights in the US Constitution to demonstrate ‘the ways in which key legal institutions and their actors and texts define, develop and maintain hegemonic ideas’, in essence, the frames (McCammon et al., 2007, p. 733). Another case would be the legal mobilization of women’s movements for gender equality. Following Ferree and others (2003), Fuchs (2011) argued that the number of access points of a movement into the political systems, female representation in politics, and ‘strong connections between state-

feminist institutions and society' are defined as politically related factors (Fuchs, 2011, p. 8).

Sociocultural aspects of discursive opportunities are 'a pool of potential legitimating devices for particular ways of framing an issue and justifying one's position on it' (Ferree et al., 2002, p. 70). Such pool contains opinions, values, norms, lines of thinking, experiences, and rules, and these cultural constructs can be institutionally represented or challenged. An often-used aspect is gender, especially in the women's movements, in which gender inequality was deeply rooted in the issues that this movement has brought to the discussion, such as abortion rights and the right to become juries in courts (Ferree et al. 2002; McCammon et al., 2007). With reference to Fuchs (2011), factors such as legal culture, egalitarian tendencies of the society, and differing understandings of gender equality are worth analyzing. Other aspects can be listed as moral, religious, or justice concerns. It can also be local communities' environmental and health concerns over the construction of a highway or hydraulic fracking. Such concerns constitute significant sociocultural motivations in many grassroots environmental movements (Shriver, Adams and Cable, 2012; Vasi et al., 2015).

Political and socio-cultural aspects were briefly discussed above because such elements are borrowed from political opportunity structures. Therefore, in this sense, DOS is not entirely a distinct approach but a combination of political opportunities and media framing. Scholars studying discursive opportunities suggest that mass media makes DOS its specific place in research, while it is a useful ground for movement framing and the cultural side of the concept. There are several roles that were attributed to mass media. It is one of the forums that create the dominant discourse on an issue that is newsworthy and acts as a discursive field by defining the constraints of public discussion. The messages produced within the mass media 'can act as teachers of values, ideologies and beliefs and provide images of interpreting the world' (Gamson, 1992, p. 24). In that sense, media coverages can either stimulate or discourage related frames through many forms, such as narrative and episodic forms, to name a few (Gamson, 1992; Iyengar, 1991). The role of media coverage on social movement mobilization is another aspect of scholarly interest (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004; Walgrave and Massens, 2000), and this will be elaborated more in the following paragraphs.

Many studies that attempted to explain the emergence of social movements by using discursive opportunity structures gave particular importance to Koopmans and Olzak's work (2004). The first study gave a clear definition of DOS and the related aspects and indicators to measure their impact. First, the authors have defined DOS as 'the aspects of the public discourse that determine a message's chances of diffusion in the public sphere' (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004, p. 202). Such notion of a public sphere is a reference to discursive fields, in which multiple movement and non-movement actors compete over how to achieve greater visibility and determined goals through political communication. This public sphere is often associated with mass media. Later, they introduced three discursive elements of the approach: differential public visibility, resonance, and legitimacy (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004).

Public visibility is the main objective of movement actors, their targets, and the movement's potential allies and sympathizers. No matter how well they have expressed their claims from their perspective, those claims go through the filter of 'gatekeepers', which are journalists and editors who create the message and shape the public opinion by prioritizing or dismissing (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004, p. 203). Therefore, the messages conveyed in the media environment are subjective because there might be messages that could not make it to the public sphere, and it isn't easy to trace them. More recent studies have also emphasized the significance of a number of communication mediums that a movement can catch attention, often mass media accompanied by social media in this regard (Gamson, 2007; Nassauer and Vasi, 2018; Wahlström and Törnberg 2021).

The visibility of movement claims in media is determined further by two other factors. Resonance, a familiar concept from the framing perspective, is also essential to see whether the broader audience outside the movement would react to movement claims. Journalists and editors prioritize resonant messages, and in this way, those claims would be more likely to increase their salience in public debate. As some studies have shown, some messages can create dissonance, for example, the negatively resonant claims of radical right movements in Europe that triggered xenophobia and violence (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004; Koopmans and Muis, 2009; Muis, 2015; Wahlström and Törnberg, 2021). Another variant of resonance is consonance, which occurs when 'established political actors express support for a social movement's actions and demands' (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004, p. 204). Again from the case of

radical right populism, consonance was statistically significant in the electoral victory of the movement (Koopmans and Muis, 2009).

Finally, whether a claim is legitimate is determined by whether the broader audience supports it or not. Koopmans and Olzak (2004) have drawn a negative relationship between resonance and legitimacy. In the case of anti-Semitism, which is termed for the hatred against the Jewish community and framed as illegitimate, they proved that high resonance would not always be followed by high legitimacy. The radical right movement's discourse is often directed against immigrants and minorities, which has triggered anti-Semitism to be highly resonant. There are some factors that could strengthen the legitimacy, such as favorable political opportunity structures, using master frames such as human rights and injustice, or quoting from scientific research on a disputed claim (Adams and Shriver, 2010; Hunt, 2021; Nassauer and Vasi, 2018).

In sum, the discursive opportunity structure elaborates the political opportunities model by culturalist perspectives to overcome the criticisms, with the addendum of 'both cultural and institutional elements' (Ferree et al., 2002). Because the model linked political opportunities with framing strategies, in this thesis, the approach of discursive opportunity structures would be the best approach to analyze media coverage on selected case studies. It has been aimed that an analysis of Bergama and Cerattepe movements from the discursive opportunity structures perspective will demonstrate the dynamics of the relationship between movement actors and their targets and the role of media coverage in movement framing processes and shaping public discourse.

#### ***2.4.4. Conclusion***

To sum up, one could argue that social movement actors are not driven by pre-existing elements of ideologies or their psychological state of mind influenced by deprivations. Rather they frame their own 'schemata of interpretation' (Goffman, 1974, p. 21). They articulate their demands based on how the grievance is framed, thus creating the conceptual base for collective action. Framing strategies and tasks which they require are, since they are subjective through interpretive work, bound to change and open to constant discussion and reformulation to maintain action mobilization (Klandermans, 1984). However, the framing perspective is not without issues (Snow, 2013). Because of the abundance of studies on collective action frames and the inability of these studies to include cultural and social psychological factors through



the lens of resource mobilization and political opportunities, the work on framing processes was incomplete, according to some (Steinberg, 1999; Johnston, 2002; Snow, 2004). Nevertheless, several recent studies attempt to the shortcomings of past research (Ferree et al., 2002; Snow and Byrd, 2007).

As the political process model has proposed, the combination of framing activities with cultural perspectives through the expansion of political opportunities, repertoires of contention, and civil society or religiously based mobilizing structures has actualized the contentious political mobilization (Johnston and Carnesecca, 2014; Johnston and Mueller, 2001; Johnston, 1991; McAdam, 1982; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996; Vala and O'Brien, 2007). While the model has accelerated by filling the lacunae its predecessors have left, such effort was seen as conceptual stretching (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). Because the concept of political opportunity structures included many independent variables with every empirical study and a tendency to examine every change as an opportunity. Another criticism would be the fixedness of political opportunity structures and the taken-for-granted approach that not all positive development in the political environment is an opportunity (Johnston, 2014). Subsequent research has found that different industries of social movements can interact with one another, not only with the state, and create their opportunities for mobilization (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996).

Although the political process model has been modified to address the criticisms by bringing a dynamic approach (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 2011), its basic assumptions remained unchanged. The model still based its analysis on political opportunities and assumed that the challenge is mostly directed at states. Therefore, criticisms focused on the interrelatedness of social movement goals, actors, and strategies with various institutions and politics in which power is dispersed among those, as the goals have shifted towards broader social and cultural changes (Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008). Lastly, the frame perspective and constructionist approach it has brought, while revealing the underestimated link between meanings and mobilization, have marked the introduction of cultural analysis in social movement research, especially with the emergence of new social movements paradigm (Klandermans, 1992; Steinberg, 1999; Johnston, 2009). The next section will shed light on new social movements and how cultural processes have affected their mobilization.

## ***2.5. Cultural Explanations of Social Movements***

Culture is an ‘arena of action’ (Williams, 2004, p. 92) for social movements comprised of, but not limited to; symbols, language; ideas, beliefs, values, identity; and meanings constructed through material sources. These sources can include costumes, narratives and storytelling, installations, graffiti, murals, and the like (Jasper, 1997; Polletta, 2009; Williams, 2013). The cultural turn in social movements research and its theoretical developments could be found in the works of prominent thinkers from Europe in the 1970s and 1980s (Cohen, 1985; Habermas, 1987; Melucci, 1980; Melucci, 1989; Melucci, 1996; Touraine, 1971; Touraine, 1981). These works have constituted the theoretical base for cultural analyses of contemporary social movements, in which cultural, moral, and identity issues were centered (Larana, Johnston and Gusfield, 1994; Johnston and Klandermans, 1995; Darnovsky et al., 1995).

The cultural intervention of new social movements has marked ‘a more radical between past and present societal types and movement forms’ (Buechler, 2013, p. 3). While the Marxist theory has advocated that the material concerns of the working-class define collective action, new social movements were ‘organized around cultural concerns’ (Williams, 2004, p. 92). The new paradigm has denounced the collective action theories, which aimed to solve the free-riding problem, and proposed an approach that searches for how meaning is created and recreated. In doing so, new trends have emerged for analysis: the roles of collective identity, emotions, new media, discourse, and narrativity in movement mobilization.

This section aims to show the intersection of social movement research with cultural perspectives and how environmental movements resemble the characteristics of these new movements. This section introduces a new social movements paradigm, which was the consequence of the culturalist turn in social movements research.

### ***2.5.1. New Social Movements***

According to this novel paradigm, new social movements are an organization in between the spectrum, ranging from crowds to established political parties. Their goals and targets are no longer limited to institutional political change but cultural and ideational (Snow, 2004b). These scholars have agreed that new movements are more cultural. Mobilizing actors generally criticize the manipulation of demands by external forces, such as consumerism in a modern society dictated through advertising techniques. For example, the campaigners of the anti-nuclear movement have called

for a reformulation of the human-nature relationship forced by states and multinational corporations (Wieviorka, 2005).

New social movement theorists from Europe have criticized the Marxist theory and emphasized the cultural elements of social movements, such as the ideological motivations of activists, with a cultural understanding of norms, values, and identities. The critics of classical Marxist theory have rejected the view that capitalist society was born out of the working-class mobilization against those who own the means of production. As societies have modernized, they have passed the process of industrialization, and new issues and conflicts of new social order have produced new movements (Crossley, 2002). Thinkers such as Touraine and Melucci agreed to shift from an industrial to a post-industrial, information-oriented society. Few people are more interested in cultural production than physical goods. However, such a shift does not mean that the concerns are not economically driven anymore. The more dependent the social life on production conditions, the less capable a society of recreating itself, which is called historicity, and less autonomous an individual or community is (Touraine, 2007). Therefore, there is a new conflict between the actors who control political and economic structures and those who refuse to become 'impersonal or rational, to fit in the whole spectrum of societal life-styles' (Touraine, 1971, p. 11). This new conflict is what produced new social movements, initiated by those who attempted to avoid 'the interference of state and economics in everyday life', by creating a collective identity within their informal networks (Edwards, 2014, p. 123; Habermas, 1987; Melucci, 1989; Melucci, 1996).

In general, the new social movements paradigm perceives the phenomenon of social movements 'as a particular subtype of collective mobilization' (Edwards, 2014, p. 120), similar to Smelser's categorizations in collective behavior school that was discussed previously. In the literature, the domination of the older working-class, civil rights, and first-wave feminist movements were challenged by new movements that address new issues or reformulate the older issues. In this regard, second-wave feminism, anti-racism, LGBTIQ+ rights, animal rights, peace, and environmentalism have appeared as new themes (Buechler, 2013). The revolutionary character attributed to labor movements has faded once these movements have been integrated into formal structures and organized in labor parties. However, this is not to say that working-class has lost all its potential to trigger social change. New social movements are not the revivals of older labor movements because those movements have not disappeared in

the first place. Instead, what happened was a change in the place of struggle, for Touraine, from workplaces towards daily life and the public sphere (Edwards, 2014). The new 'mode of historicity', the post-industrial society, has not centered upon a single movement as the main social movement of industrial society was working-class movements (Touraine, 1981).

Which actors that new social movements targeted are often ambiguous because the conflicts of post-industrial society would not create a 'us versus them' dichotomy. Therefore, the adversary becomes 'impersonal, distant, undefined or ill defined' (Wieviorka, 2005, p. 5). The diversity of new social movements' objectives causes dissensus over whether these movements are reactive or progressive. However, many scholars have argued that since every movement is restricted to its historical circumstances, the same movement may be reactionary or progressive at any given period (Buechler, 1995; Cohen, 1985; Habermas, 1987). The theorists did not restrict new social movement theory as a distinct and monolithic approach because the theory is comprised of several variations (Buechler, 1995; Buechler, 2013). However, it is nevertheless possible to outline common characteristics of new social movements.

New social movements are the products of the shift towards a post-industrial society. The transformation of society after industrialization has increased 'the capacity of social actors to construct both a system of knowledge and the technical tools that allow them to intervene in their own functioning makes possible the increasing self-production of society' (Buechler, 1995, p. 444). Thus, a new conflict has arisen between the technocrats who control this knowledge system and consumers who are exposed to it. New movements emerged out of the disagreement over how society should manage itself (Touraine, 1981). While the technocratic elite aim to dominate the society through commodification, new social movements seek to find 'noncommodified forms of collective consumption' (Buechler, 2013, p. 4) and autonomy from dominant structures. Therefore, new social movements are historical reactions to the social formations of advanced capitalism.

New social movements approach and framing perspective have reformulated ideology in their critique of Marxist theory (Oliver and Johnston, 2000), by arguing that ideology is a social construction and continuously contested within movements and by other actors (Snow, 2004). New social movements are centered around collective identities which are once weak and marginalized. This plurality of ideas and values cannot be confined to the Marxist ideology of social action. In terms of social

movements, ideology has been described as ‘highly articulated, self-conscious belief and ritual system, aspiring to offer a unified answer to the problems of social action’ (Swidler, 1985, p. 279).

Several major debates over new social movements discuss their newness, objectives, characterizations, and social base (Buechler 1995). First, North American critics of new social movements have sought to find out what is new in these movements, if there is any (Huntington, 1981; Gusfield, 1994; Lipset, 1996). Their studies have shown that culture was perceived as a mode of understanding the broader social and cultural context that social movements emerge and grow, that grievances and deprivations are also culturally rooted, and the specific role of American culture in shaping mobilization (Lipset, 1996). Apart from this cultural addendum of new social movements to research, these studies could not find a feature separated from working-class movements. Tarrow (2011) has argued that new social movements have overestimated their novelty by examining the movements of the 1960s and 1970s in their early formation. Thus, new social movement theorists overlooked the current and cyclical phase of these movements, which are continuous with past movements (Brandt, 1986).

There is no consensus over the social base associated with new social movements. Contrary to the working-class base of older social movements driven by Marxist ideology, the proponents of new social movements observed a diffused class base where individuals did not identify themselves with a specific socio-economical class. The identifications based on gender, age, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientations are widespread, especially in younger generations. For some scholars, this detachment from the class position made these social movements new (Dalton, Kuechler and Burklin, 1990). In contrast, however, this classless base could render new social movements incomprehensible (Offe, 1985).

Some scholars have pointed out the rise of a new middle class (Kriesi, 1989; Offe, 1985) consisting of educated individuals who have ‘relative economic security and (...) employment in personal-service occupations’ (Offe, 1985, p. 833). Those who fall into the new middle class are driven by post-materialist values and focused on the universal problems, such as environmental protection and world peace, so they are not occupied with class-specific issues (Inglehart, 1995; Offe, 1985). Buechler (1995) neither defended nor rejected these arguments but found this either-or terminology unnecessary, as all movements rest upon some cultural foundation and

take political positions, whether implicitly or explicitly. Several scholars besides Buechler also pointed to the shift of group identities from class to other forms of identity, such as gender, race, or ethnicity.

### ***2.5.1.1. Collective Identity***

It is worth starting to analyze collective identity formation in social movements from its social-psychological explanations that began from the individual level (Reicher, 1996; Klandermans and de Weerd, 2000; Taylor, 2013). Following Marx and Durkheim, social psychologists argued that an individual's identification with a group, in which all members share 'common values, interests, goals and sentiments', is the first step towards collective action (Hunt and Benford, 2004, p. 434). The development of class consciousness has led to different systems of ideas based on political and economic injustices, such as communism, socialism, or fascism. The ideas that these ideologies convey gathered people who experienced similar injustices (Larana, Johnston and Gusfield, 1994). Ideology is a unifying factor for those who experience social distress and try to make meanings out of it. The collective process of making sense of what has been experienced leads to an identity attributed to that collectivity. Thus, the individual meaning-making process spreads to the collective level. At the macro level, people involved in a group would not act according to individually held beliefs, values, ideas; but what the rest of the group believes, values, or thinks (Klandermans and de Weerd, 2000). However, although movement groups are composed of people sharing similar ideas or beliefs, they make sense of broader social or political changes differently. Thus, disagreements over shared understandings are unavoidable, meaning that collective identity is subject to constant re-negotiation (Jenkins, 2004; Melucci, 1989).

Collective identity is different from ideology in two ways. First, unlike ideologies, 'collective identities are expressed through cultural materials' and involve no rational choice like protest participation (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, p. 440). Second, collective identity embraces diversity by being open to individuals from different backgrounds, races, gender, or political orientation, in contrast with the stereotyped member profiles that ideologies create (Hunt and Benford, 2004). The process of collective identity formation initially starts with identification to a group along the lines of their self-categorization (Klandermans and de Weerd, 2000), thereby acting as a bridge between individual and collective identity (Stryker, Owens and White, 2000; Snow, 2013; Taylor, 2013). Collective identities create sameness within social

cleavages and distinctiveness between classes, against their opposing identity and countermovement. For example, labor movements often use strikes to mobilize because collective experiences of a strike from the past shaped the form of collective action through the discussion on its effectiveness (Taylor, 2013).

Bernstein (1997) stresses the strategic dimension of collective identity formation in three ways. First and foremost, collective identity shared by many people is a prerequisite for any mobilization. In addition to sharing an identity, actors may relate themselves to legitimate their participation. For instance, women who joined the anti-mining movements usually identify as mothers, sisters, or coal miners' wives. Second, identity can be determined as a movement goal to be achieved, either to create new identities or to revise the preceding identities. The challenge feminists posed to restrictive categorizations based on gender in the English language could be an example (Bernstein, 1997). Finally, taken together, collective identity can be a part of a political strategy that aims to 'transform mainstream culture, its categories, and values by providing alternative organizational forms' (Bernstein, 1997, p. 538).

The study that Simon and others (1998) conducted on the gay movement in the United States has shown a positive correlation between identification with movement and willingness to participate.

As it was seen, the majority of studies have usually found that the generation of collective identity influences movement participation (Taylor and Whittier, 1992; Bernstein, 1997; Simon et al., 1998; van Stekelenburg, 2013), in which these studies have sought to examine the factors that mobilize people in social cleavages. These factors are listed as the issue's salience, individual embeddedness and shared fate, and the interaction between movement and its counterpart (van Stekelenburg, 2013). First, if the cleavage is salient, the identity is organized because salient cleavages have better access to resources and contain denser social networks (Klandermans and de Weerd, 2000) thus, these identities are more prepared to mobilize larger populations. For instance, Mannarini and others (2009) have shown in their case study of the anti-railway movement in Italy that successful mobilization depended on the locality of the issue that concerned inhabitants in the area. Therefore, the identity that revolved around the community has become more salient by attracting concerned citizens.

The second aspect is individual 'embeddedness into networks, organizations, associations, groups and categories' (van Stekelenburg, 2013, p. 4). Cleavages determine the embeddedness of individuals into these structures; to put simply, they

situate an individual's place in society. Shared experiences and grievances within these cleavages lead to the creation of 'communities of shared fate' (van Stekelenburg, 2013, p. 5), and these communities create their own identity. A compilation of three studies on Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands that Klandermans and others (2008) have measured the impact of social embeddedness on social and political integration of immigrants. The studies have found that immigrants, who think their contribution to an organization would make a difference, are 'more embedded to social networks' (Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg, 2008, p. 1008) and likely to participate in collective action.

Finally, collective identity can be influenced by the relationship between movement and countermovement (Einwohner, 2002). The conflicts between movement and oppositional groups shape the ideas and actions, and each group identifies itself as opposed to a counter group. For instance, the animal rights movement actors have expressed themselves based on how movement opponents have described them. Interviewees in Einwohner's study (2002) opposed the movement did not take animal rights activists seriously because their claims were based not on scientific evidence but emotional. In their account, most activists have defined their motivations from the criticisms of opposing groups. One interviewee, for example, has rejected these criticisms and valued their contribution as 'a universal trait among beings who honored life' (Einwohner, 2002: 263).

Some authors have reformulated the definition of collective identity as subjective, value or beliefs-based connection with broader structures where others accept a shared status and relation in a community (Polletta and Jasper, 2001; Roscigno and Danaher, 2001; Nepstad, 2004). For instance, Nepstad (2004, p. 14) has defined collective identity as 'a group has developed of itself, based on its values, beliefs, interests, social location, and practices'. It has pointed out links between identity and interests, strategies, and politics. Then, it could be argued that collective action is shaped by collective identity, implying that social movements are formed through discursive fields in which adherent communities create their way of understanding movement goals (Taylor, 2013). As seen, the notion of collective identity has been so central as a characteristic of new social movements that it has become an object of analysis in many studies explained above.

The major contributors to new social movement theories have situated social movements in wider social relationships and processes (Habermas, 1987; Melucci,



1989; Melucci, 1996; Touraine, 1981). This new paradigm has thus departed from the Marxist model of politics, which focused on states, revolutionary movements, and political parties (Crossley, 2002). Meanwhile, the new social movement paradigm has also extended ‘the political definition of activism and protest’ by including the transformation of the dominant culture as an end in itself (Crossley, 2002, p. 152). Instead of focusing on under which conditions enable mobilization, just as in resource mobilization and political process theories, new social movement theories are interested in the underlying issues and problems that trigger mobilization. These issues involved more personal and intimate aspects of life, such as in the movements defending LGBTI+ rights and abortion rights (Buechler, 2013).

Rather than reducing the source of collective action to economic concerns caused by capitalist structure or class-based struggles, new social movements have looked at more cultural and value-based explanations for social movements (Buechler, 1995). It has been argued that new social movements are different from utopian movements of the past, which had no intention to influence the wider community. The issues tackled by new social movements concern the mobilizing actors more, which is dissimilar to the struggle of controlling the means of production in the working-class movements. Therefore, the objective of transforming the dominant cultures, lifestyles, and consumer habits is more prioritized by new social movement activists than influencing the political structure (Johnston, 2014). In this way, new social movements have blurred the distinction between public and private spheres by giving civil society autonomy from the practices of formal structures limited by state preferences (Offe, 1985).

In short, the concept of collective identity is rooted in the social-psychological approach of collective behavior as shared understandings and emergent norms. It has been later transformed within class consciousness by creating ideological cleavages. Cultural turn with the new social movements collective identity ‘replaced class consciousness’, which was seen as a catalyst for mobilization (Hunt, and Benford, 2004, p. 437). Alongside the mobilization emergence, collective identity can be a helpful tool to explain individual participation or can be part of a movement goal and strategy (Bernstein, 1997). Another notion that cultural turn in social movement study was the role of emotions, which embraced the similar roles with a collective identity, will be presented in the next section.

### ***2.5.1.2. Emotions***

Emotions have been understudied by preceding approaches and perspectives of social movement research (de Volo, 2006; Gould, 2004; Jasper, 2011). There are two reasons for the neglect in the literature. First, early scholars viewed emotions as irrational collective behavior (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 2004). Dominant theories such as resource mobilization and political process have normalized collective action as rational behavior (Oberschall, 1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; 2002; Gamson, 1975; Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1994; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001). They suggested that structural strains are generalized only to trigger feelings of hostility, anxiety, or fantasy (Le Bon, 2002; Nepstad and Smith, 2001; Smelser 1962). They have neglected the role of emotions by defining the movement actor as a rational calculator without influencing his or her feelings (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2001; Collins, 2001).

The cultural turn in social movement research brought emotions back to the study of social movements. Inspired by symbolic interactionism, some scholars devised a dramaturgical approach, which claimed that ‘most emotions are shaped by cultural understandings and norms’ (Hochschild, 1979; 1983; Zurcher, 1982, p. 2). This approach defended the influence of social conditions on the type and intensity of individuals’ emotional state and that their management of emotions also shapes the decision for action. The findings of recent works also supported significant effects of emotions on collective action formation (Barker, 2001; Groves, 2001; Goodwin and Pfaff, 2001; Cadena-Roa, 2002; Perry, 2002; Kim, 2002). The main focus of these studies was that emotions are presented as a motivational factor that can mobilize more bystanders. These studies have focused on ‘the complex relationship between individual emotions and their collective aggregation and expression’ (Aminzade, and McAdam, 2001, p. 15). In this way, the scholars favored the combination of intensive emotions, cultural expressions and rational action in the study of emotions in social movements research.

Another bulk of studies covered ‘the role of emotions in motivating the actions of other parties during unfolding episodes of contention’ (Aminzade and McAdam, 2001, p. 15). In her work on the insurgency during the civil war in El Salvador, Wood (2001, p. 267) found that the feelings of ‘moral outrage, pride and pleasure’ triggered the peasant mobilization, despite ‘high risk and uncertainty’, and the mobilization was defined as an outcome of emotion-driven action. Similarly, Perry (2002) has studied

the 'emotion work' of the Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution in China and found that their skillful tactics have resulted in mass mobilizations filled with distrust and outrage against the Nationalists (Perry, 2002, p. 123). Similarly, 'dynamic representations of conflict' through emotions have contributed to anti-corruption movements in Mexico (Cadena-Roa, 2002, p. 202). In short, these mentioned scholars perceived emotions as motivational factors for mobilization.

Emotions can be included as a micro-level factor for collective action. If political opportunities are open, collective action will occur because individuals felt hopeful about its success (Goodwin and Pfaff, 2001), or negative feelings such as fear of repression could be preventive on collective action (Aminzade, and McAdam, 2002). The reconstruction of emotions derived from grievances is a frequently used emotion strategy because of its motivational power on collective action facilitation (Galais, and Lorenzini, 2017; Whittier, 2001). Other studies have focused on the meaning-making function of emotions, which refers to what movement actors do with sentiments they feel about a situation (Gould, 2001).

Social and political context conditions may shape the feelings of a particular group, and these feelings in return affect the way they understand society or politics and how to act towards those conditions. Thus, the framing of emotions has affected the degree and strategy of contentious action (Cadena-Roa, 2002; Galais, and Lorenzini, 2017; Groves, 2001; Whittier, 2001). Some other studies discuss how emotions affected the decline of movements (Gould, 2013). Feelings of betrayal, mistrust, or non-recognition could make the movement difficult to sustain (Jasper, 1998; Owens, 2010). Overall, in the majority of studies on emotions, then, the emotional dynamics were at the center of approach to understand other concepts such as collective identity (Russo, 2014), social networks (Goodwin and Pfaff, 2002), and repertoires of contention (Whittier, 2001; Gould, 2001). Thus, the items that new social movements have brought to the research agenda, namely emotions and collective identities, are two interrelated notions. They can coexist in a social movement as mobilizing factors.

As the new social movements paradigm has predicted from the late 1970s, the post-industrial shift has also resulted in new communication technologies in media, such as the Internet. They created a new space for social movements to mobilize and recruit, most notably to reach broader audiences. Whether this relatively recent

concept of new media has produced new types of mobilization for social movements will be the topic of the next section.

### ***2.5.1.3. New Media and New Movements***

There is a consensus over the role of the Internet in shaping collective action in the last two decades (van Aelst and Walgrave, 2002; Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Castells, 1997; van de Donk et al., 2004; Norris, 2000). Information and communication technologies have made participation easier and faster. First, the spread of Internet connection, then social media platforms have become important mediums for social movement organizations because such services have enabled the dissemination of movement ideas and goals to a broader audience, faster than traditional mass media (Rohlinger and Vaccaro, 2013). By shaping the public's perception about the specific issue, new media offers an environment to discuss the reasons and solutions of the issue. Therefore, the role of media on social movements is twofold: as a field of interaction and contention and as part of their tactical repertoire to challenge targets. These two functions are not different from each other, and they are interlinked in this section through the media framing in social movements (Vliegenhart, 2013). The section first starts with mass media and proceeds with new media because while the visibility in the former is still important, the transformation of media towards online space must not be underestimated. The underdevelopment of media framing in social movement literature should also be emphasized here and the combined effects of conventional and new media mediums, which have been frequently used in media framing (van der Donk et al., 2004).

The media framing could be described as the following: the selection of 'some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, and/or treatment recommendation' (Entman, 1993, p. 52). What should be drawn from this definition is that the way the issue is framed and the effect of framing in broader social and political structures across time are two critical aspects of media framing. The impact of media coverage on social movements has been clustered in three functions (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993). First, mass media coverage helps movements gather support from adherents and bystanders to facilitate mobilization. Thus, there is a micro-to-macro relationship between individual and media framing (Gamson, 1992). The second function is the legitimization of the movement. Finally, the scope of

movement enlarges through the alliance formation with actors outside of the movement based on media coverage (Vliegenhart, 2013).

On the other hand, the use of mass media in framing activities has several limitations. Media coverage's selection bias raises the question of why those movements are more newsworthy while others are not (Smith et al., 2001; Myers and Caniglia, 2004; Amenta et al., 2009). Research on social movement organizations has shown that favorable political opportunities for some organizations, such as the enforcement of policies that favor or the resources they have had, considerably impacted their extent of coverage in mass media (Amenta et al., 2009). The descriptive bias applied by media outlets themselves is also a limiting factor for disseminating movement (Weiner, 2011). Even though some movements have attracted the attention of a broader audience while less covered, they are also likely to be portrayed as radicals or outsiders of the dominant structures or culture since their strategies are predominantly non-conventional (Smith et al., 2001). The social movements can alter public opinion by creating their discursive field in cyberspace as a complementary strategy (Snow, 2008; van der Donk et al., 2006). Organizing mailing lists to call for participation in events, founding websites to raise donations for further events, creating an online petition campaign or hashtag campaigns to raise awareness for an issue are the means that are being used by social movement activists (Seegerberg and Bennett, 2011; Mattoni, 2013).

In recent years, however, the visibility of a movement is measured by how active they are in their social media accounts and their posts' content. This implies both movement organizers and actors and bystanders with no direct involvement with the movement (Valenzuela, 2013). Besides, the groups formed in social media platforms have transformed the traditional understanding of networking by connecting people worldwide with similar ideas and interests (Harlow, 2011). While some movements use social media visibility for online activism, others attract potential participants or convert bystanders to participants by calling them to demonstrations via these mediums (Mercea, 2011; Tüfekçi and Wilson, 2012). Thus, while the resources and strategies differentiate across time and space, the use of social media platforms has expanded the opportunities for mobilization.

To sum up, the observation that new media, in general, has expanded the opportunities for mobilization has been confirmed in multiple instances and diverse contexts (Smith et al., 2001; Myers and Caniglia, 2004; Amenta et al., 2009; Harlow,

2011; Mercea, 2011; Tüfekçi and Wilson, 2012; Mercea, 2013). Despite the biases of media coverage and the epidemic of 'fake news', the studies mentioned above have contributed to the link between social media and social movements. A novel approach to mobilization and movement formation has been emphasized. This novel approach revitalized the movement discourse and narrative, especially in the studies of the last decade.

#### *2.5.1.4 Discourse and Narrative Analysis*

In social movement research, discourse refers to the verbal or textual production of a group or community's claims (Johnston, 2013). Discourses derive their meaning from the political or cultural conflicts or divisions in the broader arena of action. A discourse, which is articulated to confront the issue that the group has tackled, contains elements that serve two functions: to receive approval from movement supporters and pose a challenge to opponents of the movement. The sources of discourses that social movements scholars utilize include pamphlets, manifestos, communications, meeting notes, press releases, slogans, speeches, media coverage, and public statements. In his study on the discourse of environmental movements in the United States, Brulle (2000, p. 292) has benefited from the organizations' bylaws and annual reports to verify 'the relationships between organizational form and discourse'.

From a social psychological perspective, it is important to analyze what people say when expressing their opinions, which words, expressions, or idioms they utter. The community of Spokane, Washington, has used the sailor word 'downwind' to locate where the waste contamination issue took place (Peeples, 2011). Concerned citizens have uttered this word for two reasons: to transfer 'the anxiety surrounding nuclear waste to the waste-to-energy project' and 'to emphasize the powerlessness of the community' (Peeples, 2011, pp. 255-256). Influenced by the rhetorical turn, discursive psychologists argue that 'when people speak, they are performing actions' (Billig, 1995, p. 68). Therefore, they are not interested in the hidden meaning behind discourses but the outcomes of these discursive actions for the context. Thus, discourse analysts must examine the entire speech or text to observe the unfolding of themes and targets that the movement has articulated.

Meanwhile, the dialogic perspective has drawn a relationship between social movement discourse and culture and argued that cultural practices shape movements' claims-making process (Steinberg, 2002). The framing and identity deployments of

movement opposition is also a cultural practice and this confrontation against movement shapes movement discourse. These perspectives do not see frames, identities, or discourses as distant from the culture in which they are articulated, because culture itself ‘includes sets of ongoing practices’, and ‘their reality lies not within individual minds nor in ideology, but within ongoing social action itself’ (Steinberg, 2002, p. 211).

The narrative turn in the studies on discourses has introduced the holistic text approach as the unit of analysis (Somers, 1992). Narratives are stories or accounts of individuals in which the events are depicted in order to ‘make a point’ (Polletta, 2013, p. 1). The elements usually found in narratives are (1) orientation which introduces and identifies ‘the participants in action: the time, the place and the initial behavior’ (Labov, 2010, p. 2), (2) ‘a series of complicating actions’ (Polletta, 2013, p. 1) and (3) a conclusion that evaluates the significance of events. Movement actors' verbal or textual productions are analyzed to understand how narratives alter across time and space and how they can be used in the identity formation processes or persuade the third parties to secure external support (Polletta, 2013). The strategic use of narratives in a discourse can mobilize people and foster solidarity networks by engraving the action repertoire and movement interests.

Luker’s book (1985) on pro-life and pro-choice movements in the United States has shown that collective action rises when the story begins to lose the attention it has gathered. The study has found that a series of events, advancements in medical technology, and the liberalization of abortion in California in the 1960s, have made the abortion debate public. These events made abortion a ‘women’s issue’ (Luker, 1985, p.66) and rendered physicians' narrative that depicts them as lifesavers inconsistent (Polletta, 2013). Recently, the studies of discourse analysis have examined user-generated content on social media platforms such as hashtag campaigning on Twitter to observe the articulation of discourses by movement organizations (Bardici, 2012; Castells, 2013; DeLuca, Lawson and Sun 2012; George Mwangi, Bettencourt and Malaney, 2018; Kou, Kow et al., 2017; Reyes-Menendez, Saura and Thomas, 2020). For example, the textual analysis of tweets on the #MeToo movement showed that the repetitive use of words such as ‘we’, ‘women’, or ‘rights’ has contributed to articulating a social identity (Reyes-Menendez, Saura and Thomas, 2020).

In sum, new social movements have brought cultural components of social movement back and prioritized within the structural factors as given. The difference from past cultural approaches was that the recent studies tackled the issues of new social movements with these components and demonstrated the fluidity between them. For example, ideological claims could provide a base for collective identity formation. Even though the collective identity is inclusive, strong emotions such as fear or distress could deter individuals from participating. However, while the emphasis on cultural elements that form the social movements was significant, they are just a limited answer to a much broader question: how micro effects such as individual decisions have resulted in macro processes such as social movements. The concluding section will provide a comparative analysis of previous and new paradigms in social movements research which were discussed throughout this chapter.

Table 1. Social Movements: Theories and concepts, a summary

Collective Behavior Tradition	Transformational Approach		
	Predisposed Impulses		
	Emergent Norms		
	Life-Course Approach		
Collective Action Tradition	Rational Choice Models		
	Resource Mobilization		
	Institutional Explanations	Mass Society Theory	Smelser's Value-Added Theory
	Contentious Politics		
	Political Process Theory	Political Opportunity Structures	Discursive Opportunity Structures
Cultural Approach	New Social Movements	Collective Identity	
		Emotions	
		New Media	
		Discourse and Narrative Analysis	

## 2.6. Conclusion

This review on social movement research has demonstrated how early and recent debates on social movements have interacted and widened their scope. For most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the school of collective behavior was seen as the most effective approach to explaining any collectivity mobilization. However, an attempt to normalize collective behavior from other disciplines has weakened its explanatory power. For example, the rational choice theory has provided the basis for resource



mobilization and the political process model to challenge the existing view on collective action. Each factor that was offered to solve the free-rider problem has become a distinctive approach, such as the mobilization of resources, organizational rationality, and political opportunity structures.

Speaking of the shift from irrational collective behavior to organized collective action, the perception of social movement as a product of broader political, economic, or social processes in institutional structures has constituted another shift. At the same time, the expansion of political opportunity structures shapes civil society in terms of their action repertoire and organizational strength since social movements constitute a form of civil society (Diani and Della Porta, 2011; Foley and Edwards, 1996). By this token, social movements are situated within the sphere of civil society in a state. For this thesis, a particular emphasis was made on the concept of political opportunity structures since an attempt to reconcile the literatures in political science and sociology was aimed.

The recent incorporation of political opportunity structures into political process theory has constituted a wider perspective thanks to prominent political scientists, and they are still widely utilized. While political institutions shape social movements' organizational strategy and identities, 'social movements are bearers of policy ideas, frames and goals' (Andretta, 2013, p. 1). Therefore, the relationship between political processes and social movements is mutually constitutive. However, as discussed in the relevant section of this chapter, the structural bias of political opportunity structures pervades to notice of the not structural factors. As an alternative approach, the concept of discursive opportunity structures stood out as a synthesis of two grand perspectives in social movement research into one approach.

The cultural approach has attempted to provide a new paradigm at the expense of the structural paradigm by introducing how norms, values, and identities affect micro and macro levels. The proponents of this new paradigm have offered a different approach to social movement analysis. They demonstrate the issue of the expansion of movements by dividing them into old and new social movements. Meanwhile, the theoretical and methodological trends that reflected the discursive side of social movements, such as emotion and discourse analysis, have enhanced the debate on social movement emergence beyond movement organizations and state institutions.

The analytic approach has brought back network analysis to explain complex relationships among movement actors and associated with past approaches' cultural

and structural characteristics. Finally, the technological developments have contributed to social movements by combining the preceding conceptualizations and perspectives to show the dynamism in social movement research. Thus, this analysis has been demonstrated that all three dominant theories have overlapping features since they have grown from the critiques raised to one another.

This thesis has aimed to find out why environmental movements, especially anti-mining movements in Turkey, could not influence the policy domain by comparing two examples. By analyzing the resonant frames in the discourse strategies in Bergama and Cerattepe movements, changes in the Turkish political culture can be observed. In the next chapter, environmental movements, one of the most important products of the new social movement paradigm, will be introduced. Its development from different strands of environmentalism will be analyzed.

## CHAPTER 3: ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS

Since the first Earth Day in 1970, environmental movements have a history filled with various mobilization attempts at various levels around the world, driven by a variety of issues and values. Movement actors created new norms in return. This constantly progressing phenomenon required the attention of different disciplines, including sociology, political science, economics. Social movements research combines multiple theoretical approaches to explain diverse organizations, scopes, strategies, action repertoires, and ideologies. Therefore, the reason social movement theory provides a robust theoretical framework to explain the components of environmental movements. To this end, this chapter opens with a review of which perspectives of social movement theory have described environment-related issues and concerns. Later on, an account will be given on the historical development of environmentalism and movements, emphasizing the dominant frames in which anti-mining movements. The chapter concludes with a presentation of a framework to analyze anti-mining movements to understand the case studies from Turkey.

### *3.1. Environmental Movements in Social Movement Theory*

Earlier studies on collective behavior did not have a genuine attempt to understand environmental movements. Among them, Stallings' (1973) work focused on the beliefs of environmental groups using Smelser's value-added theory. Following Stallings (1973), the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) examined individual motivations for protest participation. Rather than looking at group size or the existence of selective incentives, this model has mainly focused on group identification, efficacy, collective emotions, and norms that activate participation. SIMCA explains environmental and climate change movements using collective behavior and collective action theories (Fritsche et al., 2018; Haugestad et al., 2021). Studies on emotions also draw attention to how environmentalist groups are more inclined to be motivated by feelings of guilt or anger and more likely to mobilize.

Scholars suggest that the notion of environmental injustice also resembled the concept of relative deprivation and is associated with group identification (Furlong and Vignoles, 2021; Keshavarzi, McGarty and Khajehnoori, 2021). As an alternative approach, resource mobilization theory is interested in organizational dynamics and resources of environmental movements (Diani and Donati, 1999; Brulle, 2000). These studies were mostly characterized as 'population-level analyses' of social movement

organizations, local or national (Brulle et al., 2007). They focus on the assize of environmental movements across different regions. Moreover, resource mobilization studies map the characteristics and forms of environmental organizations alongside the structural factors that led to their emergence. However, despite some exceptions, the resource mobilization theory alone cannot fully explain movement emergence (Johnson and Frickel, 2011).

Political opportunities and process theories are widely used perspectives in the studies of environmental movements (Kitschelt, 1986; Van der Heijden, 1999; Rootes, 1999; McAdam, 2017). These studies have not only incorporated organizational analysis borrowed from resource mobilization, but they have also placed movements within a long-lasting and more exhaustive process in political and social structures. Furthermore, studies that compared environmental movements in different countries became popular using these perspectives (Dryzek et al., 2003; Schreurs, 2002). Differences in culture, geographic conditions, or natural reserves cannot be accounted for why environmental movements flourished and became successful in some countries while others did not. Rather, the ‘institutional structures’ and ‘opportunities and barriers they present to environmental actors’, in essence, the political opportunity structures that shaped their emergence and influence (Schreurs, 2002, p. 23). For example, while environmental movements meant ‘radical social change to ecological modernization’ in the West; they meant national sovereignty and economic development in the post-Communist and post-colonial states of Africa (Van der Heijden, 1999, p. 203)

Environmental movements are predominantly analyzed within the new social movements paradigm, which was emerged in line with the shifts in political, social, and cultural spheres (Donati, 1996; Kriesi et al., 1995; Rootes, 1999). Alongside the rise of a new post-industrial society, the participation of a new middle class in environmental movements comprised of young, educated people in public or service sectors has signaled a cultural shift (Inglehart, 1977; Melucci, 1984; Offe, 1985). This cultural shift was named post-materialism and constituted the social base of environmental movements (Inglehart, 1995; Rootes and Brulle, 2013). It was emerged out of the value shift towards personal, intellectual, and self-emancipatory needs and quality of life concerns of younger generations rather than material concerns of the older (Eckersley, 1992; Masterson-Allen and Brown 1990). Donati (1996) asserted that environmental movement actors voiced the new wave ideals, such as participation,

modernization, and democratization. How value shifts in the cultural sphere shape the movements will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.

The new social movements paradigm has also discussed the organizational characteristics of environmental movements similarly to resource mobilization. Studies that perceived environmental movements as informal networks have coincided with the rise of local and grassroots-based environmental movements in Western Europe (Diani, 1995). Because old, class-based cleavages no longer drive new social movement actors, people from different orientations came together around similar environmental issues and built a collective identity. Diani's early works (1995; 2002) on the alliance networks of environmental movement organizations in Milan showed that 'organizations with similar characteristics tend to choose each other as partners', regardless of scope or issue concerned. Moreover, Diani has gone beyond by arguing that this informally networked structure distinguishes movements from organizations, along with the conflictual interactions between movement actors and opponents and collective identity (Diani, 2002). From a relational perspective, Saunders (2007, p. 233) looked for the 'patterns of networking between different environmental movement organizations' rather than those in similar issue areas. The results of Saunders' study were intriguing since she found patterns of preferences in conservationist, reformist and radical groups, and these preferences were independent of the type of organization. In sum, the network perspective has shown the transformation in the studies of social movements that have moved from assessing formal and centralized organizations to local-based, loosely connected networks of movements.

These discussions have led to the creation of a widely acclaimed definition of environmental movements 'as a loose, noninstitutionalized network of informal interactions. That may include as well as individuals and groups who have no organizational affiliation, organizations, or varying degrees of formality, that are engaged in collective action motivated by shared identity and concern about environmental issues' (Rootes, 2004, p. 610). This definition has summarized all the main premises that social movement theories have asserted throughout this section. The next section will focus on what these theories have analyzed: the movements themselves and their philosophies.

### ***3.2. The History of Environmentalism and Environmental Movements***

The movements concerning environmental protection were a part of the new wave of movements in the 1960s and 1970, which emerged mainly in North America and Europe. However, the view that prioritizes environmental protection was originated way before the twentieth century (Guha, 2000). It is worth discussing which ideas and sets of values have triggered such movements and how they emerged in different parts of the world on various issues. Thus, this section will provide a historical account of environmental movements and the development of environmentalism as a worldview.

The origins of environmentalism and environmental organizations can be found in eighteenth-century English literature. The poets of this era, such as John Ruskin, criticized environmental destruction physically for the sake of industrialization under the influence of romanticism (Guha, 2000). Inspired by those poets' writings, some 'environmental societies' have started to flourish in England. These early views have found ground in countries like Germany and India in the nineteenth century. In Germany, for example, environmental protection was associated with nationalism. The views of Gandhi on sustainable practices in agriculture as an alternative lifestyle in the face of massive industrialization were also known to be inspired by Ruskin's writings.

The nineteenth-century environmentalism was predominantly focused on nature conservation based on scientific knowledge, in which the management of forests and wilderness areas were issue of concern. Especially the protection of wilderness was prioritized in the United States. It was inspired by the writings of Muir on the necessity of saving 'what is left of the forest' (Guha, 2000, p. 51). His efforts to preserve the wilderness of the United States became materialized when he has founded the Sierra Club in 1892, one of the oldest environmental organizations. Muir was concerned with the forests and all the living beings inside them. His views have inspired Aldo Leopold, the founding father of deep ecology and environmental ethics. Like Muir, Leopold also had thought on human and non-human relationships with nature, and any disruption in these relations would harm the civilization altogether (Leopold, 1933). In short, this first wave of environmentalism did not produce mass mobilization. Rather, it was an era in which single issues such as wildlife preservation or land management were concerned, and an environmentally driven intelligentsia was

born to influence other lines of thinking (Eckersley, 1992; Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1997).

Compared with the first wave, it can be argued that the second wave of environmentalism was the time when the actual mobilization began. Many scholars say that it has marked the birth of modern environmentalism due to several reasons. The start of concerns over environmental degradation went back to the 1960s, which was caused mainly by high energy demand for growing population and infrastructural development. Such circumstances have been politicized with a series of critical developments. Likewise, several books have shaped the discourse about environmental destruction in the first wave. Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb*, Hardin's *The Tragedy of the Commons*, and Carson's *Silent Spring* were important works to mention, all of which have focused on different aspects of environmental degradation. These reports were considered a challenge to 'business-as-usual' belief in development, as evidenced in scientific research that highlights the common fate of humanity's survival (Eckersley, 1992). All of these developments generated 'a wider social response, an environmental movement in addition to an environmental debate' (Guha, 2000, p. 79)

The celebrations of the first Earth Day in 1970 in the United States marked the initial mobilization of an environmental movement. According to some accounts, nearly twenty million committed people around the country have joined the protests against the pollution and destruction of their immediate and wider environment. Just as it was the case for other new social movements, environmental movements were 'at the root of a dramatic reversal in how we think about the relationship between economy, society and nature' (Castells, 2004, p. 170). In essence, the ideas, values, or identities that came out of the environmental movements were to re-construct society's relationship with broader structures.

Since environmentalism takes nature as a social construction in which society's interaction shapes its relation, there is no single view on nature. For example, while eco-centrism concerns nature as a whole while excluding human factors, deep ecologists are more radical by holding human activity and population growth as responsible for environmental degradation. Moreover, some scholars found the social base of environmentalism rooted in post-materialism in two ways (Inglehart, 1995; Rootes and Brulle, 2013). The first path was at the individual level, which was emerged out of the value shift towards personal, intellectual, and self-emancipatory

needs and quality of life concerns rather than material concerns of older generations by the younger (Inglehart, 1977; Eckersley, 1992). Such self-actualization has altered how people viewed nature and activated a norm to participate in decisions on the welfare of their community.

Regarding the second path, the shift towards quality-of-life concerns prioritized environmental destruction has led to a critical approach to modern society (Pepper, 1996). The critique has started with the view that environmental problems are consequences of human interventions to nature for developmental purposes because nature is vulnerable. Resource depletion and environmental degradation are inextricably linked with each other in this regard at different levels. At the state level, the countryside has become the backyard for waste disposal of cities and suburbs. Meanwhile, at the macro level, industrialized states' exploitation of already scarce resources in poorer but resource-rich regions is a common practice worldwide. Therefore, Western industrialism has manipulated nature and took their waste from mass production and consumption outside to avoid extra costs of its management (Pepper, 1996). The governments tolerate the operations of multinational corporations in third-world states in these regions for the sake of development. As evidenced by scientific research, what is suggested as a remedy for these problems is a quick recovery through ecological management and acceptance of the limits of growth.

Overall, the roots of green critique lie in the discontent from advanced capitalism and its consequences, such as rapid urbanization, nuclear debate, and hierarchical power relations (Pepper, 1996, p. 15). The widespread protests on the necessity to act against environmental destruction and the published reports such as *A Blueprint for Survival*, *Limits to Growth*, *State of the Earth* challenged the 'business-as-usual' belief on development (Eckersley, 1992). Backed by the scientific evidence that simultaneous increase in population and consumption of resources reached threatening levels for the future of ecosystems, international organizations have started to take environmental issues and their overarching impacts seriously. In the international context, environmental concerns became salient thanks to these efforts when United Nations Conference on Human Environment was held in Stockholm in 1972 (Doyle and Doherty, 2013, p. 58).

The first international conference on environment has shown the differences between the North and South regarding the perceptions over environmental issues. The main concern of global South governments was the exploitation of environmentalism



by the North to become richer in resources, and the South would remain laggard in terms of development. In order to overcome such inequalities, the conference has declared the establishment of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), ‘the global authority that sets the environmental agenda in a variety of thematic areas (UNEP, 2017). These efforts in the international arena were coupled by the introduction and revisions in the constitutions of the US and the UK and their education system, with the pressure of Friends of the Earth actors on policymakers (Doyle and Doherty, 2013). Such activities of environmental action at different levels have been named *reform environmentalism*, a term which has appeared with the introduction of new environmental laws and regulations in Western states. These have been challenged by the critique directed to modern capitalism by the New Left in North America, and Western Europe has evoked the emergence of Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (FoE) that are radical in terms of tactics and strategies they pursue (Devall, 1991).

The direct identification of environmental movements with postmaterialist values is not an empirical conclusion; in fact, some studies have refuted that there is no correlation between the endorsement of such values and organizational membership (Dalton and Rohrschneider, 2002; Dalton, 2005). Still, post-materialism is explanatory enough to articulate demands in environmental movements since it includes both material and non-material concerns and emphasizes the latter over the former. In this way, the environmental movement would bring people together from different social cleavages, economic statuses, educational backgrounds. There are thus two types of collectivities in these movements. On the one hand, highly educated individuals mobilized, driven by postmaterialist concerns of environmental protection and quality of life and concerned citizens. On the other hand, there were localities who were deeply worried over their well-being deteriorating by resource extraction and environmental degradation. This second strand was observable, especially in North America, under the frame of environmental justice (EJ), which became one of the movements' dominant movements.

In the early 1980s, another perspective in environmentalism was born in the rural areas of the United States, with the influence of Rachel Carson's book *Silent Spring* and subsequent incidents of toxic pollution near the residential areas of people of color. From her experience as an aquatic biologist, *Silent Spring* was an overt criticism of how governments give way to the use of highly toxic chemical products

for the sake of profits, and how these substances ‘altered the cellular processes of plants, animals, and by implication, humans’ (Carson, 2002, p. 14). Furthermore, the book has offered a different kind of relationship between humans and nature, one that is interlinked with one another. Alongside humans, all living beings ‘are part of the vast ecosystems of the earth’, therefore if any part of these ecosystems is damaged, so the human health (Carson, 2002, p. 17). The examples of biodiversity loss given in the book due to the contamination of pesticides have alarmed the policymakers in Congress to pass the related legislations to regulate their use.

Although Carson wrote *Silent Spring* in the sixties, when urban-based, post-materialist environmental movements were popular, many incidents in rural America proved Carson right. The incident at the Love Canal in 1977 was the most famous one amongst others, in which the disposal of toxic wastes by the nearing factories contaminated residential areas (Taylor, 1993). After the disaster, residents of Love Canal have started a clean-up campaign by establishing an organization. This campaign, and many more that see environmental problems as deeply seated social problems, were later framed as environmental justice, with inspiration from civil rights movements (Čapek, 1993; Taylor, 2000).

From the other side of the world, the critique on West-centric and Eurocentric has been raised from the global South. Based mostly on Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, ‘environmentalism of the poor’ (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1997) has focused on the conflicts over the control of resources (Delgado and Marín, 2019). Environmentalism of the poor pointed out a problem endemic to developing regions beyond borders and across time and space, which is the ‘conflict between capitalist economy and environment’ (Delgado and Marín, 2019, p. 102) and named as ‘ecological distribution conflicts’ (Martinez-Alier 2002, p. 14). The conflicts over resource control and its ecological implications are valued as violations of human rights, racial discrimination, and uneven distribution of rewards and costs in the South (Martinez-Alier, 2001), when the wilderness movements of the Northern societies had no such concerns over their survival. Therefore, according to this approach, the level of development in industrialized societies is the consequence of environmental deterioration, not the cause.

Grassroots-based, participatory local movements have been analyzed at the expense of the North's postmaterialist, urban-based social movement organizations (Rootes, 2007). These movements aim to resist the change forced by developmental

and corporate interests on natural resources and retrieve resources control, rather than persuade these actors through lobbying activities. That is why they are often classified as not-in-my-backyard movements (NIMBY) because their demands are limited with the area that would be adversely affected by the activity in question. Direct action is an important characteristic through the traditional networks of villages and tribes, and forms of nonviolent protest such as peaceful demonstrations, local gatherings, and hunger strike in the extremes. The participants of the Chipko movement against deforestation by state contractors in India have physically defended the trees by hugging them (Martinez-Alier, 2002), while during the campaign against the hydroelectric power station in Hudoni, the inhabitants of the region went on a hunger strike until the project has been canceled (Amonashvili, 1990). Environmental movements in these contexts, then, are against political or corporate decisions and projects that overlook the welfare of local communities to maintain urban development, which paved the way for deep inequalities across regions. The case studies that will be discussed in this thesis also reflect the characteristics of such grassroots movements that prefer direct action.

Until the millennium, the frame of environmental justice was mostly used by grassroots-based organizations. Movement actors combined ‘the insights of both the civil rights and the environmental groups’ with an aim ‘to improve the quality of life for their residents’ (Bullard, 1993, p. 24). This frame perceived environmental problems as ‘socially constructed that defined through collective processes’, meaning the grassroots protests, and it is constantly revised by the movement actors and alliances (Taylor, 2000, p. 509). Since the mobilization of grassroots movements are limited to the area where localities are affected by the concerned matter, these movements are characterized as not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) movements.

The movement actors are criticized for being ‘egoistic’ while claiming ‘altruistic motives’ (Stern and Dietz, 1994, p. 67). Recently, the frame of environmental justice has been expanded by moving from ‘environmental racism to justice’, which has become more comprehensive to include a multiplicity of issues and actors (Benford, 2005, p. 44). It has been observed that the issues of concern for environmental justice frame ranged from public health concerns and rights-based approaches to demands for political participation and cultural recognition (Martinez-Alier, 2016; Schlosberg, 2003; Taylor, 2000). When the environmental justice frame has extended, environmentalism of the poor perspective has remained as a slightly

nanced Third World version of environmental justice, which rejected both post-materialist and justice-based arguments of environmentalism. Instead, ‘environmental movements of the poor and indigenous are place-based struggles for their own material livelihoods’ (Martinez-Alier, 2016, p. 552).

Post-material environmentalism has become dominant for the nearly first two decades of environmental movements at different levels and contexts. However, its premises were not resonant in regions other than the North. These critical interactions among two camps of environmentalism have brought a new approach to development when sustainable development has become the new buzzword in the international arena (Buttel, 1992). It was a comprehensive development agenda that offered long-term structural changes in production practices while paying utmost regard to equality. As its predecessor first showed, ecological modernization perspective, sustainable development did not build upon a systemic change since it mostly came from the business sector. The perception of corporates towards the environment was ‘external to human beings, an instrumental resource to be used and managed for human purposes’ (Doyle and McEachern, 2008, p. 6). Thus, environmental problems are seen as management problems that the officials should handle to preserve economic growth in a healthy environment and a free market. These views have found support in the international arena with the 1992 Rio World Summit. The Agenda 21 action plan has pointed out ‘new strategies to invest in the future to achieve overall sustainable development in the 21st century’ at different levels and spheres (UN, 1992). Environmental movements of the mid-1990s and 2000s have framed sustainable development by demanding reform on production practices. For example, the international peasant organization *Via Campesina* aimed to achieve an ‘agrarian reform’ based on small-scale production for local markets’ (Petras, and Veltmeyer, p. 190).

The third-world critics have perceived first-world environmentalism, in sum, as a product of a new standard of living for the upper middle class in this sense (Thurow, 1980), while it was not the case in developing regions (Martinez-Alier, 2002). Moreover, both types of environmentalism could be observed in mobilizations around the world independent from their welding place, which makes the classification of environmental movement campaigns more difficult (Della Porta and Rucht, 2002). Overall, the variants of environmentalism differ in terms of the values they attribute to the environment, the context in which they emerge, their social or political means and

ends, and what is taken as an issue (Della Porta and Rucht, 2002). Having accepted the importation of ecological perspective from the Northern environmentalism, the critics have defined two kinds of environmentalism. The interaction between these two camps has blurred their divergences within the frame of environmental justice, which combined different environmentalisms at local and national levels. This makes it challenging to classify environmental movements and their organizations regarding their issue scope. The next section will tackle this issue and provide a typology.

### ***3.3. Forms of Environmental Movement Organizations***

The early classifications of environmental movements were mostly spatial, in which scholars divided the world into two, the movements in the minority world of North, and those located in the majority world of South, or three in some studies (Doyle, 2005; Doyle and McEachern, 2008; Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1997; Van der Heijden, 1999). Post-materialist and conservationist movements of North America have shifted towards environmental protests driven by the views of political ecology that criticized uncontrolled development in western Europe. The politicization of environmental problems has led to the post-industrial movements in eastern Europe, which manifested themselves once the iron grip of repressive governments had been relaxed in the post-Cold War era (Chatterjee and Finger, 2013). Having been influenced by the zeitgeist, American environmentalism has been transformed with the establishment of institutions that embrace cultural diversity (Dowie, 1995). The European version of environmental activism has thus created a different subversion of activism while at the same time influencing environmentalism in the global South (Rohrschneider, 1991; Chatterjee and Finger, 2013). The problem with such classification is a conceptual reduction of environmental movements to geographical dichotomies.

There are common characteristics shared by many movement organizations, regardless of which version of environmentalism is emphasized by actors. Based on his analysis of environmental movements worldwide concerning differentiated issues, Doherty (2002, p. 1) listed those characteristics as collective identity, extra-institutional activity, informal networks, and the rejection of 'dominant forms of power'. In addition, some studies have added the reliance of environmental movements on published science to support their claims (Lang and Xu, 2013; Yearley, 1989; Vesalon and Cretan, 2013). Despite the typology quoted having provided an ideal type (Doherty, 2002) for environmental movements, it is still difficult to come

up with a classification. This difficulty is because of the divergence in their action and claim repertoires, organizational forms, and social and political contexts in which they emerge (Doyle, 2005; Adem, 2005; Kerenyi and Szabo, 2006; Doyle and Simpson, 2006; Urkidi and Walter, 2011; Sun, Huang and Yip, 2017).

The state of environmental movements could be observed within the nonparallel developments of both strands; however, it overlooks the organizations formed by varied networks of individuals with common goals and strategies. Therefore, it is best to classify environmental movements by their scope, demands, and degree of institutionalization. There are institutionalized and internationalized environmental movements on the one hand; and grassroots level, locally-based organizations on the other (Doyle, 2005). However, such diversification does not imply that local movements cannot be institutionalized or professionalized organizations do not help other movement organizations at the local level. For instance, having organized due to a local issue, environmental organizations, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth (FoE), have expanded their scope by their non-conventional style of campaigning around the world (Doherty and Doyle, 2013; Zelko, 2013) and the spread of local branches in many regions. However, the UK-based environmental organization Earth First! has engendered an example of radical environmentalism with its radical action repertoire and relatively limited scope to North America and Europe (Wall, 1999). Thus, it is mostly related to the preference of movement organizations whether to expand their activities beyond local or national borders or not. In addition, there are Green parties especially influential in Europe, which are institutionalized out of nation-wide environmental movements. In the western European states such as Germany, green parties could receive seats to be represented in the parliament or lobbying for national environmental policies by supporting leftist parties as in southern Europe (Kitschelt, 1986; Richardson and Rootes, 1995; Müller-Rommel, 2002; van Haute, 2016).

The growth of environmental movement organizations worldwide has also divided the movement into different sectors based on the issue they tackle (Doyle, 2005). Since national or regional classifications would remain too broad for analysis which includes any environmental movement within borders, it would be more favorable to analyze different movement sectors since they share many characteristics. As shown above, spatial or temporal classifications have demonstrated a more limited picture for environmental movements, heavily reliant on Northern environmentalism.

This review has attempted to reveal how several environmentalisms interacted at differentiated times and places and created a master frame such as environmental justice. Since this thesis tackles movements against mining as case studies, and issue-based typology of environmental movements will be favored. Therefore, O’Neill’s issue-based classification of environmental activism (2012) would be the best approach to analyze anti-mining movements. In this study, four arenas of environmental activism are defined: ‘wilderness and species preservation, access to and use of natural resources, responding to industrial and technological risks’, and ‘communitarian green movements’ (O’Neill, 2012, p. 117-118). According to this typology, the resistances against large-scale mining projects and resource extraction are counted as responses to industrial and technological risks. For this thesis, the dynamics of resistance in anti-mining movements will be discussed next before going forward with the case studies.

Table 2. Many Environmentalisms

Type of environmentalism	Timespan	Popular themes and frames
Post-material environmentalism, first wave	19th century	Conservationism, wilderness protection, deep ecology
Post-industrial environmentalism, second wave	1960s-1970s	Political ecology, working class environmentalism
Environmental justice, environmentalism of affluence	1980s-early 1990s	Environmentalism of the poor, social metabolisms, injustices, public health and land concerns, toxic pollution
Sustainable development	Mid-1990s-present	International environmental regime, global warming, climate change

### ***3.3.1 Anti-Mining Movements Around the World***

Anti-mining movements reflected the environmentalism of the poor perspective and contributed to the development of the environmental justice concept (Urkidi and Walter, 2011; Velicu and Kaika, 2015). It is widespread in developing states that extensive resource extraction activities have turned them into ‘commodity frontiers’ of the North (Moore, 2000). Ecological implications of such activities mostly

threaten the livelihoods of local communities close to where activities take place. Therefore, those who are exposed to negative socio-environmental impacts have the urge to defend their right to live. Concerned communities from different parts of the world mobilize in general against neoliberal policies that center extractive industries as the only way to develop, using eco-centric and community-based discourses and set of strategies for a variety of reasons and agreed objectives (Vesalon and Cretan, 2013; McDonnell, 2014; Middeldorp, Morales and Van Der Haar, 2016; Wayland and Kuniholm, 2016; Oskarsson 2017). Because two case studies of movements against mining were analyzed in the thesis, their common features will be outlined throughout this section.

The centralization of extractive industries caused conflicts between states and corporations and local communities and their alliance with non-governmental organizations (Ballard and Banks, 2003; Zachrisson and Beland Lindahl, 2019). The mobilization of localities, those threatened by displacement and deprivation of things vital to their livelihood (Perrault, 2013), arises at the subsequent stages of the proposed project (Conde, 2017). These people are driven by grievances derived from its potentially adverse, socio-environmental impact on their households and means of living through different ways: the deterioration in air or water quality, dispossession of lands that will be mined, or problems with waste disposal. Therefore, from a Habermasian perspective, they react to the ‘colonization’ of their livelihoods by the neoliberal, pro-development approach of states and corporations (Habermas, 1984; Conde, 2017). The report that the Environmental Justice Atlas (EJOLT) from 2012 has summarized these mentioned effects of mining conflicts worldwide in three aspects. These aspects were the potential of ‘increasing global social metabolism’ in ‘triggering new conflicts around extractive industries throughout the world’, ‘unsustainable patterns of growth’ which same industries create, and the generation of ‘various negative environmental and social impacts for different stakeholders’ (Özkaynak et al., 2012, p. 7-8).

What is at stake for local mobilizations of indigenous communities is their survival and recognition of their political, economic, and social rights (Dwiwedi, 2001; Escobar, 2006). To achieve these ends, they must keep the proposed mining project away from their living area as far as possible or force the mining company to cease their operation altogether. Participation in local decision-making processes is not an option for them because, at this level, they are either underrepresented or local politics



are dominated by landowning elites who are pro-mining (Walter and Martinez-Alier, 2010). Besides, they look for alternative strategies to express themselves (Kuecker, 2007; Mohanty, 2010), because they distrust the mining corporations and state institutions (Horowitz, 2010). These strategies generally include non-violent ways of protest, such as writing complaint letters, demonstrations, gatherings, offline and online campaigning, site occupations, blockades as civil disobedience acts. Moreover, the use of legal action, counter-science that serve to mobilizers' claims and consultations and referendums held in affected regions have been employed as semi-conventional strategies (Bloodworth, Scott and McEvoy, 2009; Middeldorp, Morales, and Van Der Haar, 2016; Yang and Ho, 2018; Yagenova and Garcia, 2009; Zachrisson and Beland-Lindahl, 2019).

Linked with their demands and objectives, mobilizing actors to benefit from different contextual and community-specific discourses shaped by factors internal and external to mobilization using different framing strategies and develop their own collective identity (Buchanan, 2013; Černoch et al., 2019; Faruque, 2018; Haarstad and Floysand, 2007; Horrocks-Taylor, 2018; Liersch, 2019; Özen and Özen, 2010; Urkidi, 2010). Among those strategies, movement or opponents' discourse analyses appeared most frequent (Hovardas, 2017; Oskarsson, 2017; Prause, and Le Billon, 2021). Differences in the discourses of pro-mining and anti-mining actors showed the impact of mobilizations against mining on state and corporate strategies on mining. State governments either revise their legislation on mining and environmental protection, introduce new laws, or retaliate with violence to stop the resistance against the project. In contrast, shifts in resistance strategies moderated the action plans of mining companies; they started to deploy transparent and responsible processes by providing access to their reports and projects as part of corporate social responsibility (Conde, 2017). Nevertheless, most mining conglomerates prefer to minimize public access to information (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011).

Conde (2017), in her review of studies on the resistance movements against mining, has listed several factors that affect the emergence of mining conflicts, which can be divided into two groups. The stage of mining operation in which localities were threatened, the area's geography, and movement actors could be defined as factors internal to the movement. The degree of information access for citizens, commodity type, and the degree of political marginalization, which is related to the degree of

transparency that state institutions or mining companies showed, are exogenous factors and shaped by the broader political culture of the state.

Over 200 studies that Conde has examined, only one study over the anti-mining conflicts from Turkey was mentioned (Özen and Özen, 2010), which was when the framing strategies of movement actors were analyzed. Many studies focused on anti-mining movements around Turkey from different perspectives, ranging from globalization, new social movements, social justice to ecofeminism (Akman, 2019; Çınar, 2019, Pehlevan and Şakacı, 2018; Yaka, 2020). Yet, these studies were single case studies. This thesis aimed to contribute to the growing literature on anti-mining movements, by comparing two anti-mining movements, Bergama and Cerattepe, from Turkey.

Following Conde, a more recent study aimed to provide a pattern in anti-mining resistances came from Prause and Le Billon (2021, p. 2). Their study has tried to find out ‘likely patterns of similarities and differences in resistance motives, physical and narrative practices, as well as outcomes’, by comparing agro-industrial and anti-mining movements in Senegal. What they have found was those discursive strategies of movements and their targets ‘offer distinct incentives or impediments for resistances’ (Prause and Le Billon, 2021, p. 18). Moreover, the outcomes of the movements they discussed are depended on the case and political opportunities. Discursive opportunity structures can reveal the same pattern in the mining resistances by combining framing strategies within the varying political opportunities.

Using the DOS concept, this thesis attempts to trace the changes in mobilizing structures of environmental movements, specifically anti-mining movements in Turkey, and reach broader conclusions about the state of development of environmental civil society under the strong state tradition of Turkey. What differentiates this study from others concerning the same movements is that it has located these movements within the literature of anti-mining movements, primarily reliant on Conde’s (2017) review. For these purposes, the following chapter will provide an account of Turkey's environmental movements. For the time being, the next section will discuss under which circumstances environmental movements are considered successful and how their impact can be observed.

### ***3.4. The Success and Impact of Environmental Movements***

There has been an effort to explain what makes environmental movements successful or fail by indicators such as policy consideration, political support, movement action, and desired changes (Nulman, 2015). The variables used to examine the policy outcomes are linked to the openness of political opportunities to enable the desired change and dynamism in the political context. One framing of movement impact stressed the failure of environmental movements in their inability to stop environmental degradation while acknowledging the success stories in different parts of the world (Rucht, 1999). Despite the formative role of movement organizations on political agenda and individual attitudes and lifestyle cultures by proposing an alternative route, environmental activism has not been able to halt the activities that deteriorate the environment. On the other hand, such framing underestimates the decades-long efforts of environmental activism to create a common sense of environmental problems worldwide at various levels. Therefore, the impact of environmental movements could be analyzed by examining only the relationship between environmental movement organizations and the broader structure within which they act (Janicke, 1992; Rucht, 1999).

Measuring the impact of environmental movements is an arduous task. It has been a controversy in the studies of environmental movements whether the significant improvements in environmental protection policies have been made through the pressure of the movement, or they just have raised awareness about the issue (Rootes and Nulman, 2015). Environmental movement organizations are effective at different levels of policymaking, which depends on the type of action taken and their objective. Environmental activists are more likely to shape policies in their early formation because framing the issue resonant with movement goals (Olzak and Soule, 2009). Still, it is just one of the many factors that affect the trends in public opinion. The others are issue salience, the extent of public concern, and knowledge over the specific issue (Giugni, 2004; Bosso and Guber, 2005). Defining the outcomes achieved by the environmental movements is depended on how the success or failure of movement action is framed when they can change policy and whether movements campaigning has affected public opinion. The studies on the impact of environmental movements on public opinion have demonstrated a correlation between movement discourse and public approval of movement goals (Dunlap and Scarce, 1991; Inglehart, 1995; Rucht, 1999; Agnone, 2007). Moreover, higher levels of support for environmental

movements have a positive impact also on legislative action (Agnone, 2007; Nulman, 2015). The impacts that arose from the consequences of mobilizations in two case studies will be analyzed in the discussion section.

Mass media, recently called new media, is a significant tool in consolidating public opinion and persuading governments, as seen in many examples in social movement studies (Zelko, 2013; Hatzisavvidou, 2017). The use of printed and social media could have many functions, as a moral resource for legitimation and as a means for mobilization and recruitment networks (Deng and Peng, 2018; McLaughlin and Khawaja, 2000), Marques et al., 2020; Segerberg and Bennett, 2011). Besides the strategies and tactics deployed by organizations, the impact of environmental movements is influenced by macro elements, namely the constraints and opportunities political systems created. The constraining effect of non-governmental organizations on corporations has made movements successful in developed regions. In contrast, since elite interests often match with those of corporate on economic development, activists in developing regions face more difficulty in exerting pressure. Thus, the strength of movement targets in opposing environmental protection policies is another part of the equation.

This thesis will predominantly use media coverage on two anti-mining movements and other discursive resources, such as memoirs, interviews with actors, and documentaries about these movements. While utilizing the concept of discursive opportunity structures requires such data analysis, the ultimate aim is to demonstrate which frames were legitimately used by movement actors and their targets and how the movement visibility changed over time. Examples exist on environmental movement studies using discursive opportunity structures, but they are few in number (Bröer and Duyvendak, 2009; Motta, 2014; Shriver, Adams and Cable, 2012; Vasi et al., 2015). Shriver and others' (2012, p. 878) study on environmental activism in the Czech Republic was remarkable in revealing the framing strategies of movement targets, namely 'state officials and counter-movement members'. Although there are studies that used discursive analysis, it has been found that there was no prior study that used the concept of discursive opportunity structures (Özen and Özen, 2016). In this regard, another purpose of the thesis is to contribute to this expanding literature on alternative opportunity structures.

As outlined throughout this section, whether an environmental mobilization is successful is dependent on different factors and actor strategies. At the same time, it is

ambivalent about creating a set of indicators to measure their impact on different spheres. This thesis will analyze two cases of anti-gold mining movements using the media coverage about these movements in newspapers, books written by independent groups or movement actors themselves, and documentaries that told their stories. It is important to analyze these discursive resources to find out the resonant frames and whether these framing strategies followed the trend of other movements around the world. Before engaging with the case studies, this chapter will be concluded with an overview of the environmental movements discussed above.

### ***3.5. Conclusion***

Environmental movements are the most influential among the new social movements, which had ‘the most enduring effect on politics’ (Rootes, 1999, p. 1). The analysis of different social movement theories, especially resource mobilization and political opportunity structures, has best captured the fluidity of organizational dynamics and contextual changes in these movements (O’Neill, 2012). Environmental movements are fluid because the tactics or types of organization planned in the North can also appear in the South, or vice versa. The movements characterized as environmental justice in the US can be given as examples of how movement dynamics can interact across different regions and combine different elements. Moreover, this review has demonstrated that as the institutionalization increases in the environmental movement organizations, the actors refrained from direct action but involved in lobbying activities. However, this does not mean that grassroots or radical movement organizations have disappeared. The environmental movement sector became more transnational, and they are densely networked regardless of being institutionalized or not (Saunders, 2007).

Since environmental movements, or social movements in general, are structured as networks, classifying them based on their type of organization has become unimportant. Rather, as the shifts in the varieties of environmentalism have shown, as the number of environmental issues increased around the world, it has been realized that there are different perspectives on the relationship between humans and nature. While post-materialists saw environmental conservation as something that comes next after fundamental needs that affect the life quality, more affluent arguments equated environmental crisis as a situation of survival due to the unequal conditions and its threatening effect on their livelihoods (Mayerl, and Best, 2018). Therefore, rather than focusing on the type of organization or resource availability,

discursive opportunity structures are used in this thesis to demonstrate the changes in issue salience and frame resonance within long-term structural changes. The globalization of environmental movements on the issues of global warming and climate change, moreover, emphasized the fact that environmental problems concern all living beings at the same rate. However, this still does not mean that these issues affect them regardless of the geographical conditions or level of development. Such fundamental inequality strengthened the resonance of the environmental justice frame around the world.

Movements against mining are the objects of analysis for this thesis, and they offer the most favorable case studies to test whether the frame of environmental justice is resonant in the discursive strategies of these movements. As argued in the previous sections, the environmental justice frame was extended to cover more issues, and it was extensively studied within the context of anti-mining movements for several reasons (Hicks, 2011; Lyra, 2019). First, mining activities have ‘a number of potential ramifications directly related to ecological wellbeing and human health’ (White, 2013, p. 50). Related to these concerns, movement actors usually claim that the disregard of state government and corporate authorities of environmental concerns disproportionately threatens those who live in the project area. Therefore, the environmental justice frame is relevant for most of the cases of anti-mining movements and the Turkish context (Aydın et al., 2017; Urkidi and Walter 2018). The next chapter will concentrate on the contextual factors that influence the salience of this frame in Turkey.

## CHAPTER 4: ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY

The previous chapters introduced the dominant theories and recent trends in social movement theory, and the environmental movement was chosen as a sub-sector to locate the movements against mining. In order to understand under which circumstances the movements analyzed for this thesis have emerged, it is crucial to becoming knowledgeable of the Turkish context, its civil society sector in particular, within which social movements operate (Gready and Robbins, 2017). As some scholars have noted, social movements can transform the civil society sphere by challenging authorities to gain autonomy (Chandhoke, 2010). New social movements with a renewed understanding of civil society have shown that both can offer alternatives to mainstream social or political structures. For instance, both through disruptive and non-disruptive actions, the human rights movement in Nepal has dissented the existing civil society while addressing the failure of non-governmental organizations to frame the issue ‘in ways that resonate with populations affected by violations’ (Gready and Robbins, 2017, p. 968).

Social movements and civil society are not separate objects of analysis. Instead, their interests could be converged through the co-existence of contestation and collaboration (de Bakker et al., 2013). Turkish civil society was already established before environmental movements appeared after the 1980 military coup; however, political opportunities were limited for social movements for various reasons. This chapter will analyze environmental movements in Turkey by situating them within the sphere of civil society and emerging or declining opportunities in broader political and economic structures.

### *4.1. The History of Environmental Movements in Turkey*

The experience with movements against environmental deterioration and extractive practices in Turkey rather reflected another civil society argument, which is defined as a sphere of action (Foley and Edwards, 1996). The transformation of political culture has only been possible by rejecting the Ottoman Empire's pre-modern social and political system. As such, ‘the conversion of the nationalities of the empire to nationalism’ (Rustow, 1998, p. 176) accelerated with the efforts of the military elite. However, such transformation from above was only intended for the population in relatively developed cities, and the rural population has remained attached to religious consciousness rather than national.

The confusion over political tradition has divided the political culture into geographically based sub-cultures, and the discrepancies over such cultural clusters were inevitable. From the republican era on, every ruling elite has created its economic elite and adherents to these powerholders from different parts of society. Therefore, state-led modernization has not paved the way for an effective civil society in Turkey; on the contrary, it caused a selective approach by permitting the civil society organizations to be less dangerous to the state (Heper and Yıldırım, 2010). However, strong state tradition is not only one factor that affected the emergence and growth of environmental movements and organizations.

It is inevitable to say that the emergence and growth of environmental movements in Turkey were influenced by the development of these organizations around the world. What makes the Turkish context interesting is that environmental movements and organizations in Turkey have exceeded the success of other civil society organizations. However, this growing autonomous space was insufficient to create a nationwide environmental movement in Turkey for reasons outlined in this section. In her review, Adem (2005) divides the development of environmental movements in Turkey into two, pre-1980 and post-1980 periods.

#### ***4.1.1. Pre-1980s: The Emergence of a Green Civil Society***

During the single-party period between 1923 and 1946, conservationist organizations focused solely on beautifying popular spots have started to be established. Since these organizations did not intend to mobilize people around environmental issues, their impact is limited to the area or region they were based. Only after 1946, did environmental organizations in Turkey start to grow in number. In the 1950s, there was a growing realization that environmental problems were triggered by rapid urbanization around the world. The organization *Türkiye Tabiatını Koruma Derneği* (TTKD) was established in 1955 as the first organization addressing environmental issues. It has collaborated with the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and other member organizations of the newly emerging international environmental network.

In comparison with the associations of earlier era, the mission statement of TTKD was more encompassing. The organization has aimed ‘to ensure the management of natural resources without causing any harm, identify the reasons behind environmental problems and take necessary cautions, and preserve the natural beauties to pass onto the next generations to come’ (TTKD, 2021). Therefore, rather



than focusing on the environment of a specific area or region, TTKD includes Turkey's all-natural resources. During the same period, urban-based environmental organizations have also started to be established, for example, *Ankara Struggle against Air Pollution Association* in 1969 (Adem, 2005).

Just as in North America and Europe, the 1970s marked the emergence of environmental activism in Turkey and expedited the institutionalization of environmental movement associations and organizations. *Environmental Protection and Greenification Association* (1972), *The Society for the Protection of Nature* (1975), which later became WWF Turkey in 2001, and *Environmental Association Foundation of Turkey* (1978) are important examples of such organizations. These organizations have voluntary associations with a nationwide character, and their members are experts and professionals from different fields and occupations. In addition, the 1970s have witnessed the first locally based environmental protests in Samsun (1975) and Izmir (1978) against air and water pollution. These protests have defined the reason behind such pollution. The shift from export to import-substitution model started from the 1950s and the rapid industrialization followed to integrate the Turkish economy into international economic structures.

#### ***4.1.2. Post-1980s: The Era of Direct Mobilization***

The institutionalization process of environmental movement organizations has reached its peak after 1980. This has been first hinted at by the mention of the environment in Article 56 of the 1982 Constitution. It has declared 'the right to live in a healthy and balanced environment,' and the duty of the state is to improve 'the environment and protecting environmental health and environmental pollution' (Şahin, 2015). This has been followed by the introduction of Environmental Law in 1983, which regulated the management of natural resources and cultural heritage, conservation of all living beings in its wider environment, prevention of air, soil, or water pollution. The law has also guaranteed intergenerational equity by agreeing to take necessary cautions to provide a safer and healthier environment for the next generations.

Moreover, this period has witnessed Turkey's first green political party in 1988, with the efforts of different environmental groups such as *Izmir Greens Group*, *Association for Fighting Air Pollution*, and *Green Solidarity* (Şahin, 2015). As part of

the Global Greens, the Greens Party has mostly focused on environmental issues of developed cities of Turkey and the preservation of their cultural and natural heritage. It has presented itself as an alternative to the failure of political parties to include environmental issues in their agenda. Despite the alternative and optimistic vision that brought political ecology under the influence, the Green Party had a turbulent political life in Turkey. According to the party's chairman Bilge Cantepe, the Constitutional Court ruled the closure of their party in 1994 on the grounds that they could not bill 79 Turkish lira expenditure (Cihan News Agency, 2010). The party was reestablished in 2008 by merging the Equality and Democracy Party and the Green and Left Future Party, but it was closed on 25 November 2012. This party has prioritized the principles of harmony with nature, the global struggle for sustainable life, rejection of male domination and violence, direct democracy, locality, fair sharing, right to live, and diversity.

Another group that has attempted to form a political party was the *Radical Democratic Greens*, but it has never happened. This organization's principles reflected radical environmentalist thought, including 'anti-authoritarianism, eco-centrism and civil freedoms' (Şahin, 2015, p. 451). In the eyes of public opinion, these parties caused controversy due to the values they have embodied and named as a 'party of homosexuals' (Şahin, 2015) since both have overtly defended the LGBTI+ rights. Although their impact was limited, the politicization of environmental issues with the green parties has encouraged more widespread environmental activism in the 1980s, such as the movements against nuclear and thermal power plants in Akkuyu and Aliğa. For example, the Greens Party, partnered with the Social Democratic People's Party members, has undertaken the organization of the 1990 protest the coal power plant in Aliğa, Izmir. During this protest, Şahin (2015, p. 453) wrote that local people and activists had created a seventy-kilometer-long human chain of nearly one hundred thousand people, and this protest has led to the cancellation of the project.

As seen from the events of this era, environmental activism in Turkey has developed only in the last few years of the 1980s because of the military intervention that transformed Turkish political culture and civil society expansion consequently (Aydın 2005). However, civil society organizations have grown in number despite the deregulation of all spheres of life forced by the military government. These organizations have tackled 'the radical consequences of modernity' (Giddens, 1987; Keyman and İçduygu, 2003, p. 220).

The reforms to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria mandated by the EU membership process have enabled such mushrooming of the civil society sphere. However, such expansion of an autonomous societal sphere was not a positive development because it has made civil society vulnerable to the abuse of the discursive arena that culminated with the coexistence of both pro-democratic and religious or fundamentalist discourse. Environmental movements and civil society could be an exception in this regard because although there is dissensus between modern and Islamist environmentalists over how to act against destructive practices on the environment. The latter has remained marginal in public debates, and environmental civil society did not suffer from a polarization deeply rooted in Turkish political culture. The state's indifference to the discussions among civil society organizations could be explained by how national institutions frame environmental issues and whether it has changed over time.

At the national level, the Turkish state has started to make reforms by establishing the Ministry of Environment in 1991, an Environmental Commission in the Turkish Grand National Assembly was created. Turkey's Seventh Five-Year Development Plan (1996-2000) has called for the necessity of an environmental strategy; thus, the first National Environmental Action Plan was introduced three years later, which was prepared with the partnership of the World Bank. The plan has presented the facilitation of collaboration among relevant organizations, whether national or international, as one of the key elements for developing an environmental strategy. In this regard, the involvement of state institutions such as the State Planning Organization (SPO) and the Ministry of Environment and different industrial sectors, private sector, academia, and non-governmental organizations have been highlighted as important achievements. Specifically, environmental organizations are indicated as responsible for public awareness of environmental issues. From these years on, the concerns over environmental deterioration have been incorporated into the developmental plans of the Turkish government.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Environment has actively participated in international environmental protection and climate change conventions. This recognition by the international regime had influenced the civil society sphere positively when the HABITAT II conference of 1996 was held in Istanbul. The formation of a national committee named 'Turkish Habitat Forum' was a first step towards identifying problems and strategies in policies that affect the environment by

including all relevant stakeholders, from government agencies environmental NGOs to media institutions, which are employed with different tasks. The voluntary initiative 'Sub-commission of Turkey Habitat Forum for Governance' by civil society organizations and representatives of voluntary groups has provided a perfect ground for developing an environmental civil society by forming networks and alliances (NCEP, 1999).

In line with positive development on environmental policymaking, a new wave of environmental activism was flourished in the 1990s with new organizations. These organizations were comprised of informal networks with weak ties, such as citizen initiatives. Ankara-based *Environmental Solidarity Group* and Izmir-based *Izmir Environmental Lawyers Group* are important examples of such organizations. Especially the latter group has provided legal support for ongoing environmental movements at that time, in Akkuyu, Yatağan, Bergama and the struggle of a shopping mall construction in Izmir that threatened the area's environment. Among those, the Akkuyu movement was the first anti-nuclear movement in Turkey.

The Akkuyu movement has gathered citizens from various backgrounds and expertise. At the same time, it has created polarization due to the nature of the issue. Umbrella organizations were new for this era; they have addressed region-based issues and are involved in awareness-raising activities of other organizations (Adem, 2005). Despite their growth in number and expansion in scope, environmental organizations have mostly retained their grassroots character and not-in-my-backyard vision, such as anti-mining movements. For example, campaigning against constructing a thermic power plant in Gökova has forced the responsible company to make improvements; it was a victory limited to the respective area. Another deficiency is the inability of environmental activism on environmental policymaking. Despite widespread campaigning supported by Greenpeace, debates over Akkuyu nuclear power plant have been resurfaced in the second half of the millennium and resulted in the permittance of the proposed nuclear power plant. Thus, an analysis of movement discourses could help address the shortcomings of environmental movements in Turkey.

In general, Turkey's environmental movements have revolved around several key themes, as the issues tackled have expanded in number and scope (Szasz, 1994). The collaboration of different environmental organizations has succeeded in changing the policies through issue-specific campaigns, such as the amendment of laws on

forestry and toxic substances. Even though their scope is limited, mobilizations on land-use conflicts, urban planning issues, and energy debates have triggered wider debates on industrialization and democratization (Adem, 2005). Among these, anti-mining movements are significant because these movements resemble the struggle against West-centric, capitalist development, which is what environmentalism of the poor was based upon. The next section will give a literature review on anti-mining movements in Turkey.

#### ***4.2. Anti-Mining Movements in Turkey***

Many movements in Turkish environmental history are local and grassroots-based movements, driven by the environmental concerns over developmental projects of extractive industries, such as mining (Özen and Özen, 2009). These movements have also constituted the earliest phases of environmental activism. The 1971 resistance and legal struggle against copper mining in Murgul and Artvin are early environmental responses. The struggles against gold mining in Bergama and Cerattepe have a particular place in Turkey's history of environmental efforts. Especially the discourse created by the local people and the movements' action repertoires has set an example for other movements by attempting to shift the focus from the local to the national level (Arsel, 2012). In the next section, based on the social movement theories discussed, a comparative account on two case studies, Bergama and Cerattepe, will be presented to show the evolution of environmental civil society and activism against gold mining in Turkey, and how they stand out as important milestones in its history of environmental civil society.

The development of an environmental civil society in Turkey cannot be considered separately from movements against mining, especially the struggles in Bergama and Cerattepe. How and why such grassroots movements emerged and what made them special and worth examining can be explained using the social movement theories and varieties of environmentalism discussed in the previous chapters. Social movement theories provide “a theoretical structure to what could be overly ad hoc or descriptive accounts of movement organizations and their impacts” (O’Neill, 2012, p. 122). This thesis relies on a political opportunity structure approach to understanding how environmental movements emerge and develop in Turkey. The motivations and impact of such movements cannot be considered separately from the political context in which they have arisen (McAdam, 2017). Two environmental movements will be compared in their internal organization, discourses, and implications.

#### ***4.2.1. Political Opportunities in the Anti-Mining Movements of Turkey***

Recent studies that utilized political opportunity structures in environmental movements have defined several movement-related variables, such as the openness or closure of political opportunities, the existence of influential allies, elite strategies towards protest, or power configurations of targeted formal institutions (McAdam, 2017; Rootes and Nulman, 2015; Rucht, 1999; Xi and van der Heijden, 2010). Before comparing Bergama and Cerattepe, this section will outline which political opportunities have enabled these mobilizations against gold mining within the Turkish political context.

Although the decade between 1960 and 1970 was defined as a time when Turkish politics was liberalized with the 1961 Constitution. The constitution gave broader rights to form associations or cooperatives; these organizations did not pose much of a threat to any state practice. In parallel with the development of environmental movements worldwide, starting from the 1970s, there was an increase in the number of environmental movement organizations (Çınar, 2018). The military coup of 1980 was considered a turning point in every sector of Turkish political history. First, the return to civilian politics has marked the beginning of a new period in Turkey's history of environmental activism. In the aftermath of military intervention, Aydın (2005, p. 81) has argued that the rise of environmental NGOs 'is largely due to the new political accommodation between the state and civil society'. The legislative changes in the aftermath of the military coup have created a new political opportunity for anti-mining movements. In line with Turkey's transition towards a free-market economy during president Turgut Özal's tenure, those changes were predominantly on the laws concerning environmental management and mining practices (Arsel, 2005; Aydın, 2005). In order to grasp the impact of these legislative changes, one should review under which circumstances these legislations came about in the first place.

The legislative history of mining law goes back to the final years of the Ottoman state. The mining exploration activities are regulated by an institution equivalent to a mining ministry. In the first years of the Turkish Republic, the existing law on mining explorations and management was revised in 1922 to protect mining workers' rights and working conditions in Zonguldak. During the 1923 Izmir Economic Congress, the mining sector's importance was re-emphasized. The then government as part of the nationalized vision to protect the wealth created from the

processing of natural resources. The subsequent establishments of the General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration and ETİBANK have complemented the executives' intention to nationalize the mining sector through law-making. In the 1950s, this policy was replaced by appropriating the law on mining with the expectation to direct foreign investment to Turkey by allowing foreign companies to invest in mining operations just as government enterprises. However, such expectation has not been realized because the enforcement of mining law has impeded the development of the mining sector with the bureaucratic workload it has created (Arsel, 2005; Yıldız, 2012).

Starting from the first Five-Year Economic Plan in 1961, the government has returned to its previous intention to keep mining operations under state control, as highlighted in the related law in the 1961 Constitution. With the negative impact of the oil crisis in 1973 on energy supply, states were compelled to take protectionist measures in their economies, especially in the developing regions such as Latin America. Just like in Chile, Mexico, or Peru, the mining operation permit held by some private companies was given to the government in 1978 with Law No. 2172 named 'Law on the Mines to be Operated by the State' in Turkey (Topaloğlu, 2018; Yıldız, 2012). Therefore, it was not a coincidence that the resistance against mining projects rose in these states once the protectionist measures were lifted in the neoliberal economic trends of the 1980s (McDonnell, 2014; Tetreault, 2019; Urkidi, 2010). However, the state-owned companies proved the projected model inefficient due to disinterest in investing in innovative exploration and extraction technologies and high labour costs (Topaloğlu, 2018).

When privatization and energy policies became common in states' economic policies in the 1980s, Turkey followed this trend as a developing country and caveated the existing Law No. 2172. The laws enacted before 1980 have been replaced by Law No. 3213 in 1985 to make the mining sector time-efficient and productive (Yıldız, 2012). In this regard, the responsibilities of the government have been minimized by removing the institutions that decelerate the processes of obtaining mining licenses and other related activities. This has caused an abundance of mining projects to be approved and licensed very quickly and started to affect the people living in wider regions as the number of projects has increased. Thus, it can be concluded that the redefinition of state-society relations and alterations in mining law in Turkey has enabled opportunities for mobilization in Bergama (Uncu 2012).

Meanwhile, the 1980s were also a decade of utmost significance in legal reforms on environmental protection. Article 56 of the 1982 Constitution has indirectly mentioned environmental rights by associating the right to life with a 'healthy and balanced environment' (Yağlı, 2007, p. 49). According to Kaboğlu (1995), a mandate on environmental protection deals with how the state is responsible for managing environmental problems by guiding judges and administrators for resolution and gives privilege for environmental values in case of conflict. The other articles on environmental problems are Article 169 on forestry, Article 44 on erosion, and Article 45 on pasturage.

There were mainly two political opportunities that affected the first emergence of anti-mining movements in Turkey. These are the comparative relaxation of political and civil spheres after the 1980 coup and legislative changes concerning environment and mining practices. However, despite the positive development of the respective legislatures in the Turkish constitution, it is hard to say whether an environmental right has been taken into consideration by the administrative courts in Bergama and Cerattepe cases. It has rendered visible from the court decisions that the dilemma of environmental protection and economic growth the state faces also influenced the judgment of courts (Gönenç, 2021; Yağlı, 2007). Therefore, development in any broader structure, which was perceived as a political opportunity by movement actors, can be a constraint for the movement. This point will be elaborated further when Bergama and Cerattepe movements will be compared in their internal organization, framing strategies, and impacts.

#### ***4.2.1.1. Internal Organization***

At the very beginning, various studies have shown that both Bergama and Cerattepe struggles were emerged out of the concerns raised over possible environmental hazards of gold mining operations (Akman, 2019; Çınar, 2018; Özen and Özen, 2011; Özen, 2018; Uncu, 2012). In the initial steps of mining projects in both regions, when they have heard that the gold mining project was announced, the villagers have supported it with the expectation of more prosperity for the country's economy with the influx of foreign direct investments (Arsel, 2005). However, the level of mobilization has begun to increase as the villagers learned that the gold ore would be extracted with cyanide leaching, a method in which its waste is known to contaminate ground and surface water and agricultural lands (The Turkish Medical Association, 2001).



#### **4.2.1.1.1. Bergama**

There are several stages of mobilization in Bergama (Uncu, 2012). At the initial stage, with the realization of the gold mining project in the region, the mayor Sefa Taşkın has started researching the possible environmental impact of mining with cyanide leaching through technical consultations with engineers. These activities were being done in a department established under the Bergama municipality, responsible for collecting scientific knowledge on this mining method. As a civil engineer himself, Taşkın has created a network of engineers, politicians, environmental lawyers, and grassroots organizations and networks in İzmir such as *Çev-Der*. Once the environmental hazards of cyanide leaching on the region and livelihoods have been understood, with the support of Bergama municipality, these networks came together in various panels and meetings. The purpose of their gathering was to share their concerns over the project to inform the population by sharing the results of this scientific research. Therefore, in line with Conde (2017, p. 86), the early accumulation of scientific knowledge before the mining project started ‘can drive the local population to reject the project outright’.

During the years, from 1994 to 1996, there was no protest activity but publicity and awareness-raising activities to increase knowledge on mining. From 15 November 1996 on, when the mining project started to materialize with the company cutting trees in the region, the struggle in Bergama has turned into a ‘full-fledged movement based on various grassroots forms of protest’ (Uncu, 2012, p. 118), with road blockades and other civil disobedience acts. As the popular mobilizations emerged in the region with the participation of environmental activists, the initially elite and urban-based network has expanded to include the peasants from 17 villages in Bergama and other politicians, scientists, and civil society organizations from other regions even other countries. With actors from different backgrounds and places, the Bergama movement has been compartmentalized. In each of these departments, the related actors are responsible for legal action, the accumulation of scientific knowledge, relations with relevant political actors, transnational activities, and protest mobilization at the local level.

The source of such support to the resistance against gold mining in Bergama can be explained by improving Turkey’s democratization process after the military regime. The ban on political parties was gradually removed, and the government allowed more space for civil society and interest group organizations with the

amendment of new laws on forming an association and foundation. In addition, Turkish civil society has benefited greatly from the positive relationship with the EU after Turkey received candidate status in 1999, in the form of ‘legal, financial and technical support as well as its normative context’ (Boşnak, 2016, p. 79).

For instance, during the first phase of the Bergama movement, environmental knowledge-sharing with organizations such as Minewatch from the United Kingdom, Friends of the Earth (FoE) Europe, Mineral Policy Center from the United States, and Hellenic Mining Watch has led the movement to take the issue to streets more quickly. Moreover, the movement has made its voice heard for a broader audience and received support from national and international professional organizations, such as Global Response, Food First Information, and Action Network Germany. The peak of international support was the representation of Bergama movement by the SOS Bergama group with Friends of the Earth in the protests against World Economic Forum in Melbourne on 11 September 2000 (Global Nonviolent Action Database, 2000). These efforts combined have widened the scope of the Bergama movement from local to transnational. It has begun to be characterized as a NIABY (not-in-anyone s-backyard) movement rather than NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard).

#### ***4.2.1.1.2. Cerattepe***

Meanwhile, the Cerattepe movement was also able to enjoy positive opportunities in the Turkish political context as much as Bergama protesters did, at least until the 2000s. However, it is important to pinpoint the exact starting point of the Cerattepe struggle since the earliest mobilization in June and September 1997 was intended to resist the mining project in Kafkasör Plateau, not Cerattepe. This is needed because Cerattepe is located at a critical point within Kafkasör Plateau and near the Hatila Plateau. Once the Hatila Plateau, which is located in Artvin and has rich biodiversity comprised of variegated flora and fauna, was declared a national park in 1994 by excluding Cerattepe from the plan, drilling activities of mining company began, so as the consolidation movement actors.

The struggle in Cerattepe has gone through several processes in which the movement actors had to start from scratch. In the 1980s, there were two attempts of different mining companies to operate in the region. However, these projects were never realized thanks to the successful legal action taken by the villagers and environmental lawyers from different parts of Turkey. However, the Cerattepe

movement started to take shape with the establishment of the Green Artvin Association in 1995, a grassroots organization that aimed to inform the local population about the hazards of gold mining. Therefore, just like in Bergama, no protest event has taken place in the formative stages of the Cerattepe movement as well.

The panels, conferences, and meetings about the environmental impacts of mining in Artvin were supported by foundations and civil society organizations from other cities in Turkey. The first mass mobilization was organized on 7 June 1997 and followed by Zülfü Livaneli concert on 28 August (Hürriyet, 1997). Such events were accompanied by petition campaigning, calling out for the support of other stakeholders around Turkey to stop the mining project in Cerattepe, and over 10.000 signatures were collected (Akman, 2019). Grassroots mobilization managed to draw the attention of government officials, and Cerattepe protesters have met with the officials from the Ministry of Environment with the support of political parties and civil society organizations, but the struggle remained unresolved.

Until the early 2010s, Artvin has witnessed the mining companies' informative campaigns on the economic benefits of gold mining on the one hand and the counter-mobilizations of the Cerattepe movement using different repertoires of contention on the other. Indeed, movement actors in Cerattepe had to take another legal action against the mining company, and their resistance has managed to affect the court decision that cancelled the operating license of Inmet in 2008 (Sol News, 2014). This victory has not lasted long, since the changes made in the law on mining has triggered new mining operations on the region.

When the court has given Cengiz Holding the permittance for mining operations in 2012, the struggle in Cerattepe has started again and the villagers have actually mobilized in this second phase of movemen (Pehlevan and Şakacı, 2018; T24 News, 2015). However, this time participants were experienced enough about the organization, the villagers have started legal action, and at the same time, they continued to organize mass mobilizations and petitioning. The largest demonstration was with 14.000 people at the center of Artvin on 6 April 2013. Even the traditional Kafkasör Bullfights has become a space for movement actors to make press statements about the unlawful bid (Centre of Spatial Justice, 2019). Moreover, by 2015 the waves of protest have spread to the whole city of Artvin in the form of road blockades and standing guard in the mining area at the heights. Mass demonstrations at the city center

with people making noise with pots and pans, a form of protest which became popular after the Gezi Park protests (T24 News, 2016). The state discourse has also likened Cerattepe protesters to the ones protested against the cutting of trees at the Gezi Park back in 2013. The then-president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that those who are protesting in Cerattepe are ‘juvenile Gezists’ (*yavru Geziciler*) (Cumhuriyet, 2016).

At the national level, the resistance has been conveyed to Turkish Grand National Assembly by Uğur Bayraktutan, who have become one of the voices of protesters as an Artvin MP from the Republican’s People Party (CHP). The other MPs from the CHP has also joined Bayraktutan to protest cutting trees for mining project in Cerattepe, who has declared to stay in the Assembly for 24 hours if the tree cutting Cerattepe continues (BBC News, 2015). Simultaneously, the degree of state repression has been intensified during these protests; the police have tried to disband the protest events using tear gas and plastic bullets.

Another turning point in the Cerattepe movement was the 2016 failed military coup attempt. However, this was not an opportunity for the protesters to mobilize but to demobilize them. A state of emergency has been declared in Turkey and based on this decision, the rights of meetings and protests are suspended through statutory decrees; therefore, the administration did not allow Cerattepe protesters to organize demonstrations. It is no doubt that such an extraordinary turn of events in Turkish political history has brought the mobilizations in Cerattepe to a halt. However, Green Artvin Association has continued its activities nevertheless through other channels, in partnership with most residents in Artvin.

The organization has continued to file cases to the Constitutional Court on the second environmental impact assessment report that gave the operating permit to the company. When villagers have been told that the construction of mining site was begun, Green Artvin Association took the responsibility to visit the site to examine the water whether it was polluted, and a video of polluted stream has been uploaded to the organization’s YouTube channel. CHP MP Uğur Bayraktutan, who acted as a spokesperson of the Cerattepe movement in the Turkish, has decided to establish a parliamentary investigation committee for Cerattepe. This motion has been supported by CHP, MHP, and HDP, a consensus seen rare in the history of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. At the same time, the Cerattepe movement was recognized by transnational environmental networks. The international peasants’ movement La Via

Campesina (LVC) has organized its biannual meeting in Izmir between 21-25 February 2016. At the end of this meeting, the spokespersons of LVC have expressed their support to the struggle in Cerattepe, by rejecting environmentally dangerous extractivist projects, and police violence against those who protest them (BIA News, 2016). Moreover, the movement was represented at the transnational level at a 2018 conference organized by International Cooperation for Development and Solidarity (CIDSE) titled 'International Gathering of Women Resisting Extractivism' in Canada (CIDSE, 2018). Thus, despite the repression and turbulent political environment, the Cerattepe movement has managed to overcome these disadvantages through any means available.

#### ***4.2.1.2. Framing Strategies***

The perturbation of villagers of Bergama and Cerattepe on gold mining was expected, and such commonality has been echoed in both movement discourses. Özen (2009, p. 409) observed that the resistance in Bergama 'owed much to the ability of the movement to constitute a discourse which represented the social demands of several social groups at the local and national levels'. It started with an urge to protect the environment from environmentally hazardous effects of cyanide leaching and mining waste on the surface and underground (Özen and Özen, 2018). Such concerns over public health due to deterioration and pollution, which has been proved by scientific research, triggered participation from different segments of society and overcame the limitations of the locals (Çobanoğlu, 2014). Uncu (2012, p. 177) also adds that the Bergama protesters saw the environmental conflict as a violation of human rights since their livelihoods and 'rights to clean air, land, water and healthy environment are infringed' by these developmental projects.

The operations of a foreign company and their resource extraction activities have been characterized by movement actors as imperialism because of the foreign origin of the mining company Eurogold. By associating the frames of environmental injustice and anti-imperialism frames, the Bergama protesters heavily criticized the mining project and declared Eurogold as the enemy of the natural environment. On the one hand, using cyanide-based methods on gold ore extraction has been associated with pollution and death due to public health concerns. On the other hand, the quest to protect the natural environment from the interventions of French-Canadian Eurogold

has contributed to the anti-mining discourse further and expanded its scope towards the national level.

Even though this thesis has focused more on the mobilizations between the mid-1990s and early millennium in Ovacık, Çamköy and Narlıca villages in Bergama (Kökalan Çımrın, 2015), the anti-mining movement in Bergama had revived three years ago. The operating permit was given to Koza Altın for new mining areas in the villages of Kozak Plateau, a place known for its pine nut trees and natural parks (Özipekçi, 2018). It is possible to observe a reappearance of the anti-gold mining discourse despite the years passed. Starting from 2018, the villagers started their mobilizations by attending its informative meetings to protest the positive environmental impact assessment reports. The movement has a Facebook group called Bergama Environmental Platform (*Bergama Çevre Platformu*), which reports the latest news from the movement and calls a wider audience to court hearings to support the movement and resistance in other parts of Turkey.

The resistance movement in Cerattepe has followed the footsteps of the discourse in the Bergama movement, within a scope limited to Artvin. Özgökçeler and Sevgi (2016) argued that at the initial formation of the movement, the concerns over gold mining operation in Cerattepe have revolved around the risks of public health, the potential loss of cultural and touristic value of Kafkasör Plateau, and displacement of localities living in the region. What the people of Artvin have attempted to prevent as a collective was the irreversible effects and hazards of gold mining on the livelihoods of villagers located in Cerattepe. By following Castells' (2008, p. 503) typology of grassroots groups in environmental movements, they have characterized Cerattepe protesters as 'actors who aimed to protect the space of their own'. This was because of their movement discourse that called out a defense for residential areas against the destructive activities of the mining company. Therefore, the opposition against gold mining in Cerattepe has built its discourse upon the environmental justice frame by highlighting 'the need for the people to be involved in policy-making processes' (Doğu, 2019, p. 624). These notions will be more visible when the media framing of Bergama and Cerattepe movements is discussed in the following sections.

Although Green Artvin Association's vision aimed to reach beyond the region by evoking a view that sees Cerattepe as a local proletarian movement that struggles with neoliberal practices, the movement's radius of action was restricted to Artvin mainly. The intention of Cerattepe resistance was never to involve in party

politics. Their objectives were distant from conventional politics; however the political developments in Turkey since 2016 have forced the movement to change its stance. The turbulent political environment of Turkey, after the failed coup attempt in 2016, might be suggested as the sole reason for the locality of Cerattepe resistance. Still, nevertheless, the discourse was inclusive enough compared to that of Bergama's. For example, when analyzing the press statements of Green Artvin Association between 2014 to 2016, the necessity to oppose cyanide-based gold mining practices not just in Artvin but around Turkey, was clearly emphasized: '(...) Our strength and faith was never diminished, and recently, the contributions of Artvin residents and environmentalist friends from all over of our country have supported our cause in this struggle' (Green Artvin Association, 2016). However, from 2016 to 2020, such inclusive language of Green Artvin Association was not visible, as the media attention that Cerattepe resistance has previously received has decreased. In the local politics, Green Artvin Association has been accused of taking advantage of environmental movement by involving in the talks of oppositional party alliances, claimed by the officials of National Action Party (MHP) in 2020. The association has responded to these allegations by controverting those claims and gave details of their meeting with an official of People's Democratic Party (HDP) to respond these allegations (Green Artvin Association, 2016):

*“The Nationalist Movement Party and many people who supported this party in the past have made a great contribution to the Cerattepe struggle and our association and continue to do so. We remember them and we are grateful for their contributions. However, the administration that makes this statement will see the necessary reaction from the people themselves by turning its back on this struggle and the accusation of disloyalty directed to their supporters will be discussed by the public”.*

The restrictions towards demonstrations and meetings due to a declared state of emergency in 2016 lasted until July 2018. Recently, the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic limited all outdoor activities since March 2020 has also weakened the potential impact of movement discourse; thus, mobilization was impossible in Cerattepe. Nevertheless, the Cerattepe resistance movement was able to put forward a

discourse that focused on the dangers of gold mining in terms of public health, social and natural environment, and stayed outside of local and national politics as much as possible, as shown in their press releases and interviews.

In order to reveal the media framing strategies that were at play in Bergama and Cerattepe movements, this thesis analyzed a total of 778 newspaper articles compiled from two newspapers with a large circulation in Turkey, Cumhuriyet, and Milliyet. In addition to the newspaper analysis, the press releases of Green Artvin Association, the official movement organization of Cerattepe resistance, and publications written by witnesses or movement actors themselves. These publications included memoirs, interviews with protesters, and fieldworks of civil society organizations, such as the Centre for Spatial Justice (*Mekanda Adalet Derneği, MAD*). Other resources were social media posts of key movement figures, especially during the Cerattepe resistance and two documentaries made about those movements. The next section will discuss the findings of the analysis.

#### ***4.2.1.2.1. The Discussion of Discursive Analysis***

The previous chapter argued that the environmental justice perspective was accounted for several environmental injustices that disadvantaged populations experience. This has been situated within the master frame of injustice ‘to articulate concerns about intergenerational equity, sustainable development, and sustainable urban and rural communities’ (Snow et al., 1986; Taylor, 2000, p. 541). As for the mining conflicts, these injustices are environmental due to the operations of extractive industries controlled by the developed states’ corporations in the environments of poor and low-income livelihoods. Environmental justice frames first and foremost accept environmental problems as social constructions that are emerged during collective learning processes that involve different actors and opportunity structures that shape the issue framing (Taylor, 2000). Despite the spatial and temporal changes in movement actors' claims, several themes have recurred in many movements.

Following Čapek (1993)’s characterization of environmental grievances, Taylor (2000) argued that the themes of cultural loss, discrimination, health concerns caused by environmental catastrophe, and rights-based demands had been bridged to create a single frame and claims are amplified by scientific evidence. What was found in the discursive analysis was that both Bergama and Cerattepe movements have somehow used environmental justice frames to support their claims. The appearance



of many of these themes can be supported by how they were covered in the media. For example, the pollution of the cyanide leaching method in gold mining in Bergama, alongside its health risks, was an integral part of movement's discourse from its beginning. As stated before, the preliminary research done by the Environment Department of Bergama municipality has demonstrated that such risks were unavoidable if the Ministry permitted the mining project. In contrast, there were also some articles in newspapers that defended the mining project and the possible economic benefits that it would bring (Bilgen and İnce, 1997; Çizmeci, 1995). The scientific dissensus over the usage of cyanide in gold mining also made it to the headlines (Abacıoğlu, 1997). Similar concerns were also at stake from the early stages of Cerattepe resistance, and the media again stressed the need to use valuable gold reserves in Artvin (Helvacı, 1992). Thus, in line with the concept of discursive opportunity structures, movement framing was legitimated with health and rights-based considerations on the environment, and environmental justice frame was the most resonant in both movements.

The repertoires of action were more diversified in Bergama than Cerattepe. Movement actors were creative enough to gather the attention of state officials, with a mixture of conventional and unconventional methods. They have started with moderate-sized demonstrations and legal action to cancel Eurogold's operating license. In 1997, the villagers even held a public referendum to decide whether the mining company should continue its operations in Bergama or not. The reason behind such action was the resolution of the UN Conference on Economics and Development back in 1989. Also known as the Bergen Declaration, this resolution emphasized that before a company begins its operations in an area where its environment would be affected, the inhabitants living near or in that area should be consulted. In order to learn their opinion about the operation, a referendum under the guidance of a UN representative should be held, and the company should receive the support of more than half of the people. In the Bergama referendum, however, Eurogold could not get such support, 3187 out of 3604 people from eight villages voted against (Bilgen and İnce, 1997).

Especially in the mid-1990s, when the license of mining operation granted to Eurogold, Bergama protesters became more aggressive in terms of collective action and resorted to more direct action. Protests with torches, the 'Apache protest', their

breaking into the meetings of Eurogold organized for the Consulate General of Australia were named as some examples (Milliyet, 1997a; Milliyet, 1997b; Reinert, 2003). Road blockages and human chain protests, and their refusal to be included in the census, especially after the non-implementation of the Council of State's decision that canceled the mining operation, have appeared as instances of civil disobedience. While the protesters wanted to show the broader audience that they wished to be included in the decision-making processes over the fate of their livelihoods. However, the media has covered their way of protesting rather than what they meant.

The media coverage for Cerattepe resistance was scarce compared to Bergama, judging from the dataset compiled for this thesis. However, the mining project in Kafkasör Valley and Cerattepe was known from the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, the Bergama movement was also following the developments in Artvin with other places in Turkey and its wider neighborhood. The media has not widely covered the resistance in Cerattepe as it did for Bergama, although their early stages have coincided with one another. Moreover, Cerattepe was seen as following the footsteps of Bergama (Yıldırım, 1997). This could be true for the early stages only, since the same health and environmental concerns, as well as the potential loss of biodiversity (Milliyet, 1995). The villagers led by Green Artvin Association mobilized through demonstrations and protest events. Simultaneously, their legal action has succeeded, leading Inmet Mining to withdraw its operations from the region in 2008. However, changing political opportunity structures has changed the direction of the Cerattepe movement.

After Cengiz İnşaat's subsidiary Eti Bakır took over the operating license from Özaltın in 2012, both the strategies of the resistance movement and their targets became more aggressive. Following this takeover, activists and 30 lawyers have filed cases to cancel positive EIA report. Rize Administrative Court refused the case in 2013 and removed the stay of execution, which allowed Eti Bakır to continue its mining operations. The Green Artvin Association has filed a counter case against the positive EIA report in the same year, and their legal action was succeeded in 2014. Rize Administrative Court suspended the execution of the previous decision because the project will potentially harm the wildlife and the surface and groundwater resources and pose the risk of floods (Aksu and Korkut, 2017). With this decision, it was seen that the court had considered protesters' concerns. After the cancellation of the positive

EIA report, the Ministry has made changes in the EIA Regulation that included excluding some areas of investment from the scope of EIA and introducing acceptable level principle. According to this principle, if the negative environmental impact of a proposed project is at an adequate level, there would be no need for an EIA report. Moreover, removing investor companies' obligation to publish their application file has damaged the transparency of the stakeholder participation process.

These developments in the legal process have reflected upon the direction of mobilization of the Cerattepe resistance. Alongside the demonstrations and road blockades, in 2015 the protesters have filed a new case with the participation of 760 people, which became the largest environmental case in Turkey (Milliyet, 2015). The level of activism had heightened towards the end of 2015 and reached its peak in 2016 when the Council of State decided that Cerattepe is suitable for mining operations. This decision has coincided with the failed coup of 15 July and led the movement to enter a decline period, with the prohibitions on association and demonstrations by the Governorship of Artvin. The mining company has benefited from movement decline and legal changes, receiving a positive EIA, and started constructing roads and tunnels, polluting stream beds and the valley. The media has continued reporting the news from Cerattepe, but the number of such news decreased further, and the language of coverage has not gone beyond mere reporting. Nevertheless, despite the bans, the movement org Green Artvin has continued to organize panels, informative meetings, and press releases to make people aware of the negative environmental impact of gold mining on Cerattepe.

In contrast with the environmental justice movements in the US, racial factors that caused the discrimination was not observed for Bergama and Cerattepe cases. The mobilizing actors are settled in the villages within or near the regions in question, as seen in interviews conducted in the field works on Bergama and Cerattepe (Centre for Spatial Justice, 2019; Şakacı and Pehlevan, 2018; Uncu, 2012). While Uncu (2012) has categorized the sample size as Sunni or Alevi populations, he has found that ethnic differences are irrelevant when mobilization against gold mining to protect their livelihoods. This claim has been supported by an interviewee's statement that says, 'When it is a matter of life and death, there is no Alevism or Sunnism. The mine will affect us all' (Uncu, 2012, p. 166). Besides their dependence on land crops and water resources for a living, the villagers have identified themselves as the real inhabitants

of the region and ‘the guardians of historically significant region Pergamon’, an ancient city located in Bergama (Uncu, 2012, p. 167).

Similar to the cultural and historical valuation language used by Bergama protesters, such language was also apparent in the views of Granny Erzade (*Erzade Nine*), who became the symbol of the movement. In the interview done by the Centre of Spatial Justice in Cerattepe, she defined herself as one of the locals rooted in Artvin. She spoke about her observations on how nature has deteriorated after mining corporations started their operations. Upon the question which aspects in Cerattepe worth defending, she responded with a question, stating that ‘Is anything worth turning the land our forbearers left us into a desert?’, after giving examples of depreciating apiculture and polluted plateau lands (Central for Spatial Justice, 2019, p. 94).

From her words, the main motivation of Granny Erzade was to leave a healthy, green environment to her grand and great-grandchildren with clean air and water, just as she experienced in the past. In this regard, she emphasized the responsibility to protect the livelihoods for the sake of intergenerational equity (Taylor, 2000). The concerns of agricultural production akin to Granny Erzade’s were also seen in other interviews in Şakacı and Pehlevan (2018). One interviewee in this fieldwork has associated environmental justice with social justice by pointing out the uneven distribution of economic growth caused by import-oriented policies. Such policies were based on exporting extracted raw materials and agricultural products to lower prices and instead of importing staple food, such as grain (Şakacı and Pehlevan, 2018).

Because of the extractive projects that threaten the livelihoods and mainstay of these disadvantaged groups and the state’s inability to provide them ‘a seat at the table’, the defense of these fundamental needs and rights has become a struggle for survival by their resources (Anguelovski, 2008; Schlosberg, 2003, p. 93). The special relations of indigenous peoples to their land were something that corporations and state authorities have failed to consider. Measures such as compensation and land rehabilitation are inadequate and mostly unacceptable for grassroots groups since the hazards are well known through scientific reports from research institutes or academia. The popular slogan such as ‘What is above the ground is worth more than what’s underneath’, with a reference to gold in its Turkish meaning, is another clear reference to environmental justice perspective that prioritizes the defense of livelihoods and aims to bring justice for all (Cumhuriyet, 2020).

The strong female presence is also another significant aspect of anti-mining movements. Because of the concerns of relocation or land contamination, women became entitled to the provision of needs for the family's survival (Anguelovski, 2008). In the Cerattepe movement, this feature has been more visible, as the main movement organization Green Artvin Association has been under the leadership of Nur Neşe Karahan. Her transformation from a shopkeeper who retired from public service to a movement leader was inspiring for other women in the movement. According to an interview she gave, Karahan has started to work for the protection of natural beauty of Artvin when the properties were started to be bought by mining companies (Vardar, 2017). She and her husband have consulted with local government officials and academics to learn about the dangers of gold mining in Cerattepe and how to stop it. After losing her husband in a car accident, Karahan continued to resist and founded Green Artvin Association in 1995. By the time the organization was institutionalized and began to mobilize against mining companies, she became an admired and respected figure of the Cerattepe movement.

From an ecofeminist perspective, Çınar (2019, p. 147) called the local women who joined the protests in Cerattepe 'rightful resisters', because they justified their position as an obligation to protect their livelihoods and children from the destructive mining operations. In addition, when women are leading the mobilization during a protest event, police or gendarmerie would be more likely to refrain from using excessive power for repression, as some interviewees have observed in the Bergama protests (Uncu, 2012). This observation has become a mobilization strategy during the Bergama movement, and women were seen as the leading groups marching to the region to stop the mining operations. Thus, retrospectively, it can be argued that the relatively passive role of women in Bergama has been evolved to a more active and integral part of environmental movements in general.

In sum, the movement discourses in Bergama and Cerattepe were confined with the elements of environmental justice perspective specifically. Environmental and public health concerns were associated with the notions of cultural loss, the maldistribution of benefits and harms from mining projects, the state's accountability and transparency, alongside its respect of the rule of law (Nisbet and Newman, 2014; Schlosberg, 2003). These themes were first emerged in Bergama and then recurred during the protests in Cerattepe. As the window of opportunities for protest became

more available, movement actors in both cases were courageous enough to refuse and resist the mining practices that harmed their livelihoods, just as its counterparts both North and the global South. These opportunity structures were become available with the state's reluctance to implement court decisions and its repressive force against the protesters, as it has appeared in media coverage and press releases of movement actors. For the case studies discussed, while the type of protests and their occurrence made the issue more salient and made the Bergama movement more visible, the same was not the case in Cerattepe due to the relatively restricted opportunity structures and state repression. The last section of this chapter will seek to understand which kind of impact can be rendered visible in Bergama and Cerattepe movements.

#### ***4.2.1.3. The Impact of Bergama and Cerattepe Anti-Mining Movements***

The outcomes of social movements can influence different spheres, and impact studies specifically focus on these impacts (Giugni, 1998; Giugni, McAdam and Tilly, 1999; Tindall, Cormier and Diani, 2012). Movements can lead to changes in policy outcomes, legislative action, personal development of movement actors, and 'large-scale cultural and values shifts that result from social movement activity' (Tindall, Cormier and Diani, 2012, p. 1, Rochon 1998). The majority of studies are on the political success of social movements; it can be either policy change (Burstein, 1999). However, some movement outcomes can also influence the cultural sphere and the whole movement culture, just as the Bergama movement did in the case of Cerattepe and other movements against mining practices. This last section will assess the outcomes of these two movements at different spheres and conclude the analysis.

For example, according to Meyer (1999), anti-war movements were influential by directly causing a change in foreign policy in the short run. Alternatively, they can constrain the policymaking process 'by altering the political alliances and political culture, making the maintenance of an aggressive security policy politically untenable' (Meyer, 1999, p. 184). Meyer gave the example of peace and anti-nuclear movements for the latter from different contexts, and the German case was supportive in this regard. As part of the new wave of social movements that arose in the 1960s and 1970s, the peace movement in West Germany, having opposed to the deployment of new missiles by NATO, has led to the start of research institutions working on war and peace, which funded by the ruling party SPD. Meyer has argued further that peace activists have utilized this affinity with a strong political party to indirectly influence

the party's vision of foreign policy (Meyer 1999). By the same token, Burstein (1999, p. 4) has pointed out competition among political parties for votes and 'limited attention that citizens and legislators pay for many issues' as two impediments for direct influence on policymaking.

McAdam's works on biographical impacts (1989; 1999) have brought biographical outcomes of social movements to the forefront and underlined the impact of micro-level changes. McAdam has found from his survey research on the participation in the Civil Rights and New Left movements that in the longer run, 'activism had the potential to trigger a process of alternation that can affect many aspects of the participants' lives' (McAdam, 1989, p. 758). In his 1999 book chapter, McAdam gave a review on a limited number of works that studied biographical outcomes of civil rights protest events while comparing with his study on the Mississippi Freedom Summer project and stressed the difficulty to conduct longitudinal studies of specific cohorts since it is not easy to interview the same subjects after a certain time (McAdam, 1999).

Studies on the cultural consequences of movements have received as much scholarly attention as studies on political outcomes in the last two or three decades as the number of studies on new social movements increased (Earl, 2004; Rochon, 1998). The recent wave of new social movements has shown that value shifts led by critical communities can cause a cultural change in the longer run (Melucci, 1994; Meyer and Whittier, 1994). As a subject of a new paradigm in social movement research, 'environmental movements have been centrally concerned with contesting values, opinions, and beliefs' (Earl, 2004, p. 513). The centrality of the environmental justice frame in both case studies has shown the conflict between economic growth and environmental protection in this regard. The impacts of these two environmental movements could be associated with how much they moved beyond the grassroots and how they have gathered national attention. Unfortunately, both movements could not push the attention of conventional national media and public opinion for too long because of the reasons related to in and out of the movements. Therefore, the influence of these movements in the social and political sphere were also the factor behind why these movements were ramped down.

The efforts of conventional media to frame it as part of an incident encouraged by external forces to influence the political environment in Turkey has negatively affected the Bergama movement by creating distrust among protesters and supporters.

There has been an allegation that the German state financially controlled the Bergama movement to obtain revenues from gold mining, according to Necip Hablemitoğlu's 2001 book titled *German NGOs and the Bergama Case*. The book claimed that the inclusion of the Bergama movement to the transnational environmental networks in Europe had been justified by Germany's intention to halt the gold production in Turkey, and the protesters have worked with these organizations to support this aim.

As soon as this book made it to the news, a case was filed against the Bergama protesters that accused them of espionage activities against the Turkish state (Uncu, 2012). German foundations and NGOs that operate in Turkey have started to be investigated by the State Security Court due to their possible 'involvement in activities against the national unity and secular structure of the country' (European Commission, 2002, p. 36). Despite such accusations in their home country, the support from the international environmental network has not come to an end. Even the issue has made it to the EU's progress report of Turkey that year (European Commission, 2002).

Meanwhile, the mining company has legitimized its operations with a positive environmental impact assessment report from TÜBİTAK and started hiring for mining areas. The members of movement organizations became a minority community in the region compared to the villagers who increasingly started working for mining companies due to economic wellbeing concerns (Kökalan Çımrın, 2015). Therefore, the mining company has continued its operations in the proposed areas of Bergama despite the court decisions that mandated the reverse. This meant that the movement had not been able to influence the social and political sphere to achieve its aim, which was to stop the gold extraction using cyanide.

Being one of the first organized environmental movements in Turkey, the Bergama movement has contributed to cultural change by combining knowledge provided by a critical community that included academic scientists (Rochon, 1998). In this case, the scientific research that revealed the hazards of the cyanide leaching method in mining has triggered the beginning of mobilization. The mobilizing actors have framed the issue according to the information gathered from critical communities (Earl, 2004). As the analysis has demonstrated, the dilemma between maintaining economic development and protecting livelihoods, which was the basic premise of environmental justice, has been observed first in the Bergama movement then spread to the other movements in the region, and Cerattepe.



Even though opportunity structures for mobilization were less available, the Cerattepe movement has utilized the prior movement experience from Bergama to win over legal victories and create public awareness on environmentally hazardous mining practices. However, the same political opportunities have also led the movement to depart from an impartial position outside of party politics. The victories at the legal ground and successful protest events such as the infamous 245-day watch to prevent the mining operations to begin have not yielded to the expected results, since the company has obtained the license to operate (Green Artvin Association, 2017). Therefore, the movement has not brought about any long-term changes in policymaking whatsoever. Nevertheless, this reformulation of movement's role has given it a different strength that was not seen in Bergama, which was the ability to shape local government decisions (Central for Spatial Justice, 2019). In terms of its cultural impact, its enriched repertoire of contention aimed to be influential in both physical and virtual protest events. With the ability of the environmental justice frame to involve material and post-material concerns of low-income or poor communities, it can certainly be argued that the Cerattepe became a comprehensive example of environmental activism while embracing the legacy of the Bergama movement.

#### **4.3. Conclusion**

This thesis's comparison of Bergama and Cerattepe movements in terms of internal movement dynamics shows that neither of these movements was spontaneous collective actions. They were rather highly organized and planned at the grassroots level. There was no professionalized leadership in both Bergama and Cerattepe, but resourceful individuals and groups who are skilled and involved in networks and relationships could be useful for achieving movement goals (Uncu, 2012; Şakacı and Pehlevan, 2018). In this regard, the mayor, Sefa Taşkın, in Bergama, and Nur Neşe Karahan, of the Green Artvin Association in Cerattepe, had prominent roles in forming and growing collective action. Therefore, these individuals and groups have acted as critical masses to bring larger, bystander masses and become mobilizers.

Apart from their similarity, the movements in Bergama and Cerattepe share similarities with other resistances against gold mining around the world. Among them, it could be argued that the *Save Roşia Montană Campaign* in Romania was the most similar one (Mercea, 2018). Public concerns over the environmental hazards of cyanide-based gold mining and the risk of displacement since 2000 have started a resistance in 2007. When the mining company started visiting the area for research,

the residents who disagreed with selling their lands established their organizations (Velicu and Kaika, 2015). This resistance has gained support from national and international non-governmental organizations, such as the Romanian Academy, churches and universities, Greenpeace, Mining Watch, and Friends of the Earth, jumping from local to transnational level. The amendment of change in mining legislation in 2013 has sparked a new wave of protest. Thousands of people joined demonstrations to oppose the government's pro-mining decisions. From the other part of the world, the intersection of milk and gold production in the Conga mine of Peru has left the localities to choose between their livelihoods and the economic wealth of their country (Silva-Macher and Ferrell, 2014). Compared with the support that both Bergama and Cerattepe movements received from local academia and civil society organizations at different levels, a pattern of protest cycles of movements against gold mining around the world (Conde 2017). The same pattern could also be available for movement discourses.

This section has also demonstrated that the issues of concern were nearly identical from Bergama to Cerattepe when resisting the environmental destruction of mining. In both movements, the effective use of the environmental justice frame to consolidate the movement position and demands has resulted in similar impacts and negative results. However, it would be unfair to argue that anti-mining activism was unsuccessful. By referring to the outcome studies, Meyer and Whittier (1994) have advised not to overlook the long-lasting cultural impacts of contemporary movements and their spillover effect on other movements. Moving from this aspect, the movement experience from Bergama has been spilled over to the Cerattepe movement in terms of initial mobilization but evolved into a more extensive and inclusive environment by all means. This shows how the Bergama movement became such a pioneering mobilization and created a movement culture. In the concluding section, the reformulation of environmental movements and how much room is filled by movements against mining will be discussed in the Turkish context, along with policy recommendations for state-civil society relationships in Turkey.

## CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

By using discursive opportunity structures perspective, the purpose of this thesis was to compare Bergama and Cerattepe movements in terms of their internal organization, discourses, and implications. Political opportunities theory explains the shifts in broader political and social structures and their impact on social movements. Discursive opportunity structures have taken one step further by effectively combining political opportunity structures and framing strategies and providing a more comprehensive theoretical framework. Through the discursive analysis of media coverage and other resources, this thesis found that although Bergama and Cerattepe movements could not influence the policymaking on resource extraction, these movements have created a movement culture and stressed the importance of civil society.

The review of social movement research has demonstrated how early and recent debates on social movements have interacted with one another. For example, the rational choice theory has provided the basis for resource mobilization and political process model to challenge the existing view on collective action and included the mobilization of resources, organizational rationality, and political opportunity structures in the scholarly discussions. The cultural approach has attempted to provide a new paradigm at the expense of structural explanations by introducing norms, values, and identities into micro and macro models. The new social movement paradigm proponents have offered a different approach to social movement analysis. They demonstrate the issue of the expansion of movements by dividing them into old and new social movements.

Meanwhile, the theoretical and methodological trends that reflected the discursive side of social movements, such as emotion and discourse analysis, have enhanced the debate on social movement emergence beyond movement organizations and state institutions. The analytic approach has brought back network analysis to explain complex relationships among movement actors and associated with past approaches' cultural and structural characteristics. Finally, the technological developments have contributed to social movements by combining the preceding conceptualizations and perspectives to show the dynamism in social movement research. Thus, this analysis has shown that all three dominant theories have overlapping features since they have grown from the critiques raised to one another.

Following the global developments in the environmental movement sector, the limited number of themes that environmental movements in Turkey have been revolved around has been increased and included the climate movements in recent years. For example, Fridays for Future Turkey has become an important pressure group that has aimed to reconstruct the outdated climate policies of Turkey in line with the international agreements that the country has signed in the past. In this regard, the national campaign launched by FFF Turkey for Ministry of Environment and Urbanization to sign the Paris Climate Agreement to contribute to carbon emissions regimes worldwide. The inclusion of climate change into Turkish elementary and high schools' syllabi is another significant campaign that the FFF has organized. This is not to say that grassroots-based mobilizations have faded. In fact, local movements also realized that a rapidly changing climate would likely exacerbate environmental degradation. Therefore, compared to its counterparts in the 1980s and 1990s, environmental movements, in general, were more aware of the emergent climate conditions that threaten the lifeworld. It requires an all-out struggle that includes the whole environmental movement sector. Just as the global trend shows it, there is a transition from community-based movements towards not-in-anyones-backyard (NIABY) movements, regardless of the issue at stake.

Discursive resources produced by movement actors and bystanders in Bergama and Cerattepe have highlighted the association of economic injustice with environmental injustices and stressed the necessity to struggle for the control of resources that made up their livelihood. This analysis has shown that the mobilizing structures of Bergama and Cerattepe movements have fitted into the pattern of the anti-mining movements sector within environmental movements around the world (Conde, 2017). The experiences of these movements have created its movement sector in Turkey against the extractive industry that threatens livelihoods. Recently, these movements and their successors combined have contributed to creating a Turkish environmental movement network called Ecology Association (*Ekoloji Birliđi*). There are currently 64 member organizations from different regions of Turkey, and they organize annual meetings where the state of environmental activism in Turkey is discussed. By adopting a discourse analysis on two anti-mining movements in Turkey, the interaction between civil society and political culture has become apparent as mutually reinforcing.

When taking a closer look at the development of social movement research, the distinctive role of political science is worth discussing. Collective action repertoire, political opportunity structure, and political process theory have constituted a wider perspective thanks to prominent political scientists, and they are still widely utilized. While political institutions shape social movements' organizational strategy and identities, 'social movements are bearers of policy ideas, frames and goals' (Andretta, 2013, p. 1). Therefore, the relationship between political processes and social movements is mutually constitutive. In this thesis, the fluctuations of political opportunities were shown with the analysis of Bergama and Cerattepe cases, using these two as pioneering events in creating movement culture.

The thesis has also aimed to find out why environmental movements, especially anti-mining movements in Turkey, could not influence the policy domain. Through analyzing the similarities or alterations in framing strategies of movement actors, the evolution of Turkish politics in the last two decades could be observed. While the discursive opportunity structure approach was operational to this end, the usage of only movement-produced materials and newspaper data might be limited and biased. By adopting a protest case analysis on two anti-mining movements in Turkey, supported by a discursive analysis, the interaction between civil society and political culture could be rendered visible.

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