

JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS IN EU–TURKEY RELATIONS

Mutual interests but much distrust

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Introduction

Cooperation in justice and home affairs (JHA) is of mutual interest to the EU and Turkey. For the EU, cooperation is important because Turkey has become one of the main transit routes for irregular migration to the EU. In 2013 and 2014, arrivals to the EU directly from Turkey numbered 25,121 and 52,994 respectively. In 2015, this number increased almost sixteen-fold, to 888,457. Around 98 percent of irregular entries occurred via the Greek islands from the nearby Turkish Aegean coast, often facilitated by smugglers. The remaining 2 percent entered via Turkey's land border with Greece and Bulgaria (European Commission 2016a: 79–80). In addition, cooperation is also important in the fight against organized crime and terrorism. For Turkey, in turn, this cooperation is important for burden-sharing reasons, since the country's transformation from a migrant-sending country into a transit and immigration country (Içduygu 2011) has generated high costs. Up until October 2015 Turkey spent \$8 billion on hosting almost three million Syrian refugees, of which international contributions comprise less than half a billion, with the EU's share constituting only one-third of this sum (Kirişçi 2015). Consequently, Turkey has an interest in deeper cooperation with the EU.

This chapter looks at three venues for EU–Turkey cooperation: (1) the accession process; (2) the initiated visa liberalization process in December 2013; and (3) the March 2016 EU–Turkey refugee statement. For each venue, developments and main scholarly debates are summarized.

Turkey's EU accession process

The EU accession process begun on October 3, 2005 is characterized by slow progress, reciprocal mistrust and increasing alienation (Aydın–Düzgit and Kaliber 2016). Regarding justice and home affairs, there has been no progress on opening chapter twenty-four which deals with issues such as border control, illegal migration, drug smuggling and money laundering, organized crime, and police and judicial cooperation. In particular, the Republic of Cyprus has remained determined to block this chapter due to Ankara's refusal to extend the customs union to the Greek part of the island. Consequently, while Turkey completed the screening process for all negotiation chapters on October 13, 2006, the benchmarks to be fulfilled for the opening of chapter twenty-four have never been delivered to Ankara.

Despite the stalemate in the accession process, the European Commission acknowledges Turkey's partial convergence with EU policy priorities in the field of justice and home affairs. In particular, the new law on foreigners and international protection, adopted by the Turkish Parliament on April 4, 2013, has been praised as a comprehensive framework for protecting and assisting all asylum-seekers and refugees, regardless of their country of origin, in line with international standards (European Commission 2013: 64). For instance, the law includes an accentuated commitment to the principle of non-refoulement, and regulates *inter alia* the timely processing of applications, access to translators and lawyers, the right to appeal against rejected asylum applications, access to primary and secondary education and to health services, as well as provisions concerning work permits. Furthermore, it provides for the establishment of a Directorate General of Migration Management at the Ministry of Interior to be responsible for the status determination of asylum-seekers, a competence previously exercised by the Foreigners Department of the National Police. According to the European Commission, this 'establishment of a civilian institution suggests a shift away from the security-oriented approach followed in this field until now' (European Commission 2013: 64).

However, the new law did not lift the geographical limitation of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees. By becoming a signatory of the Convention, Turkey accepted international obligations concerning asylum and refugees, but maintained a geographical limitation on the origin of persons seeking protection. Consequently, non-European asylum-seekers can only apply for a subsidiary protection status, resulting in their inevitable removal: either to resettle in a third country if their applications are accepted, or to return to their country of origin if rejected. The status determination procedure is conducted by the Directorate General for Migration Management of the Interior Ministry; however, since their provincial Directorates have only very recently become fully operational, the UNHCR still continues to undertake its own refugee status determination activities, grounded in UNHCR's mandate, and to make resettlement referrals – 'in tandem' with the recently introduced 'international protection' procedure of the government. Yet, the UNHCR decisions have no direct binding effect (Asylum Information Data Base 2016).

A key scholarly debate concerns the main drivers for Turkey's recent reforms in migration management. Overall, the EU's impact upon Turkey's reforms in the field of asylum and migration policy has been acknowledged, at least for the period between 1999 and 2006 (Bürgin 2016a, 2012; İçduygu 2007; Kirişçi 2012; Özcürümez and Şenses 2011; Tolay 2012). For instance, for Kirişçi (2012), the incorporation of EU demands in national action and strategy plans on migration and asylum illustrates the success of the EU's conditionality strategy. He argues that the EU's *Accession Partnership* documents of 2001 and subsequent years were responsible for Turkish officials recognizing that

Turkey would have to adopt structural, institutional and legislative reforms in order to open the negotiation chapter on migration. [Accordingly] in 2002 the government formed a task force that brought together officials from various agencies, possibly for the first time in their history, to actually discuss what needed to be done to meet the conditions set by these documents.

(Kirişçi 2012: 73)

In addition to the impact of the conditions set by the EU, it is also acknowledged that the EU was successful in triggering socialization and learning processes in twinning projects dealing with asylum policy and border management (Bürgin 2016a; Bürgin and Aşikoğlu 2015; Kirişçi 2012; Tolay 2012). An important step towards legislative reform in this field was the adoption

of a National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration in 2005, and a National Action Plan on Integrated Border Management the following year. Both plans were prepared during twinning projects with EU member states, and each envisaged the establishment of a specialized institution for migration management and border management, respectively. The first step towards the creation of such specialized institutions was the creation, under the under-secretariat of the Ministry of Interior on October 15, 2008, of two Bureaus: the Integrated Border Management Bureau, and the Asylum and Migration Bureau. Both received mandates to prepare the draft laws in the relevant policy areas. Based on interviews with officials from the European Commission, Bürgin and Aşıkoğlu (2015) argue that the preparations of the laws provide evidence for the adoption of a more Europeanized approach, including active civil society involvement and comprehensive communication with other ministries and parliamentarians, which may be attributed to the necessary groundwork having been carried out during previous IPA-financed projects.

In spite of these developments, the EU's impact upon Turkish domestic politics has weakened, with worsening EU–Turkey relations since 2006. In addition to a growing pessimism in Turkey as regards EU membership prospects, Turkish officials were increasingly concerned that the EU intended to shift the responsibility of controlling migration and dealing with asylum applications to the periphery (Içduygu 2008: 15; Kirişçi 2014). This concern has also been raised by scholarly work beyond specifically EU–Turkey relations, pointing more generally to the EU's externalization of migration control via readmission agreements as a new EU foreign policy tool (Lavenex 2006; Sterkx 2008). In particular, the EU's adoption of the asylum procedures Directive in December 2005, which opened the way for asylum-seekers to be transferred to a neighboring country if characterized as a safe third country, led to concern that Turkey would become a buffer zone for irregular immigrants (Tokuzlu 2010: 2).

The continuation of reforms in justice and home affairs, in spite of such obstacles, has been attributed to the impact of other international actors. In particular, the long-term engagement of the UNHCR in formal training programs for governmental officials, as in the status determination process, has been identified as a factor contributing to the socialization of Turkish officials in international refugee norms (Kaya 2009: 21; Kirişçi 2012). Furthermore, recent unfavorable rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have been named as another important driver of the reform of the Turkish asylum policy and practice (Tolay 2012: 47).

In addition, domestic factors explaining the transformation of Turkey's migration policies have been highlighted. A significant rise in the number of asylum applications since the mid-1990s increased the pressure for reform. It was recognized that Turkey hosted the largest refugee population worldwide in both 2014 and 2015, mainly because of its 2.54 million Syrian refugees, but there was also a significant rise in the number of asylum claims from other countries (UNHCR 2016a). The UNHCR registered 133,300 new claims in 2015 compared with 87,800 in 2014, making Turkey the fifth-largest recipient of individual new asylum claims (UNHCR 2016a). Moreover, the need for a general reform of Turkey's migration policy is also reflected in Turkey's transformation from a sending and transit country to a country of destination of legal and illegal migration, a development which is to a certain extent explained by Turkey's prospering economy. This is illustrated by the fact that of the total of 797,000 irregular immigrants apprehended in Turkey between 1995 and 2009, although nearly 58 percent were considered as potential transit migrants, as many as 42 percent intended to stay permanently (Içduygu 2011: 4).

Finally, the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are considered to be another relevant domestic factor in the reform process, due to their frequent criticism of denial

of international protection rights to asylum-seekers. The recent increase in the numbers and influence of Turkish NGOs in the field of asylum and migration is partly explained by the support they receive from the EU. The EU has not only directly financed several NGO projects but has also supported capacity-building projects for Turkish bureaucracy with an important emphasis on promoting the consultation and participation of NGOs working in this field (Tolay 2012: 48). Furthermore, the UNHCR was also actively involved in training and seminars for Turkish NGOs, enabling them to develop expertise in filing complaints with local courts as well as the ECtHR (Kirişçi 2012: 69).

Readmission agreement and visa liberalization process

With the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Commission received the competence to conclude readmission agreements on behalf of all Schengen EU member states. These agreements set out clear obligations and procedures for the return of those residing irregularly in the EU. As one of the important transit routes for illegal immigrants, Turkey was invited by the European Commission to begin negotiations on a draft text of a readmission agreement in March 2003, which was eventually implemented in March 2004. However, as with most third countries with which the Commission was holding negotiations, Turkey was unwilling to commit to a readmission agreement without clear incentives, due to concerns that it would become the final destination for third-country nationals and stateless persons. Finally, the member states accepted the Commission's demand to link readmission agreements to the prospect of a visa waiver for the Balkan countries (Trauner and Kruse 2008: 11). Consequently, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Moldova and Montenegro signed agreements in January 2008 and the EU lifted the visa obligation for Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins in December 2009, and for Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina the following year. Turkey insisted on a procedure identical to that offered to the Balkan countries, in which a readmission agreement was the starting point for a visa liberalization process, based on a roadmap clearly setting out conditions to be fulfilled leading to the abolition of the visa duty. The Commission finally offered Turkey a visa dialogue with the goal of visa liberalization in return for the signing of a readmission agreement. In the interests of maintaining the credibility of the EU, the Commission argued that, in the light of the abolition of the visa obligation for the Balkan countries, and visa liberalization talks with Russia and Ukraine, it was no longer defensible to deny the linkage between readmission and visa waiver to Turkey. This commitment of the Commission paved the way for negotiations on a readmission agreement text, accepted by Turkey on January 27, 2011 (Bürgin 2012).

However, due to the insistence of opponents of a visa liberalization process, on February 24, 2011, the Justice and Home Affairs Council only invited the Commission to start a dialogue with Turkey on visa facilitations; the target of general visa exemption was excluded (Council of the European Union 2011). Ahmet Davutoğlu, then Turkish Foreign Minister, responded by stating that Ankara would not put into effect the agreement until the EU launched talks aimed at visa liberalization. In the aftermath, the Commission, in close cooperation with the Danish Council Presidency, elaborated a strategy to overcome the resistance of reluctant member states. Their approach was to incorporate into the Council Conclusions about the visa liberalization process a broader dialogue and cooperation framework between the EU and Turkey. This dialogue would include the full range of justice and home affairs policy fields such as, *inter alia*, the combat against terrorism, money laundering and drug trafficking. Reluctant governments had to reconsider two conflicting policy goals: on the one hand, the return of illegal immigrants and the benefits of cooperation with Turkey in justice and home affairs, and, on the other, the security concerns regarding Turkish nationals who overstay the ninety-day period of visa-free

travel. Eventually, in June 2012 the Commission received the backing of the member states to launch a visa liberalization process with Turkey, in exchange for a readmission agreement obliging Ankara to readmit irregular immigrants who passed through Turkey as a transit country. The agreement envisaged an application only to Turkish citizens in the first stage of the implementation, and an extension to third-country nationals three years after the agreement's enactment (Bürgin 2013).

The visa liberalization process was based on a roadmap specifying approximately seventy conditions for the visa waiver, including a functioning readmission agreement and reforms in areas of document security, border management, asylum, human rights and cooperation with EU member states and EU agencies. At a EU–Turkey Summit on November 29, 2015, both sides agreed that the readmission agreement would become fully applicable from June 2016, anticipating the entry into application of the provisions related to third-country nationals, thus fulfilling an important condition for the completion of the visa liberalization process and lifting visa requirements for Turkish citizens in the Schengen zone by October 2016. Turkey's progress in fulfilling the benchmarks has been acknowledged by the European Commission. In its second progress reports on March 4, 2016 the Commission (European Commission 2016b) noted that especially after the EU–Turkey Summit on November 29, 2015, Turkey has accelerated the reform process aimed at fulfilling the requirements of the roadmap. The report highlighted four main improvements. First, refugees from Syria have been given access to the labor market, which is expected to facilitate their social inclusion and self-reliance. Second, schooling has been made available for refugee children. Third, stricter visa and admission rules have been introduced regarding nationals coming from countries which are sources of significant irregular onward migration from Turkey to the EU. Finally, there have been continued efforts to strengthen overall border surveillance and management capacities. The report also identifies the measures Turkey should take in order to fulfill all roadmap requirements. Among others, Turkey needs to adopt passports that carry fingerprints, in line with EU standards. The report also calls on Turkey to reduce backlogs in implementing asylum procedures, to intensify cooperation with all member states with shared borders, notably concerning readmission, police and judicial matters, and to intensify efforts to combat corruption and organized crime. Other necessary steps in the roadmap are the adoption of legislation on personal data protection in line with EU standards and the conclusion of cooperation agreements with Europol and Eurojust, as well as the development of comprehensive measures to facilitate the social inclusion of its Roma population. The report further underlined the need for Turkey to align its legislation on terrorism with EU and Council of Europe standards (European Commission 2016b).

Regarding the consequences of a possible visa waiver, skeptical voices in some EU member states are worried about the potential for a significant increase in illegal permanent migration, due to the expectation that many Turkish visitors will ignore the maximum stay of 90 days in a 180-day period. Moreover, the earlier experience with the Balkan countries has led to the expectation of a rise in unfounded asylum requests once the visa requirement is abolished. Another concern is the threat from free travel for terrorists of Turkish origin. However, the basis for these concerns has largely been rejected by scholarly work. According to Kirişçi and Ekim (2015: 2), the fear of a significant increase in illegal migration lacks evidentiary support, arguing that while Turkish immigration into EU countries continued until around the mid-2000s, since then migration movements have turned in the opposite direction, with Turkey serving as an immigration destination for Europeans. One reason for this development is Turkey's positive economic development. The doubling in size of the Turkish economy between 2004 and 2014 reduced migration pressure due to economic reasons. In addition, Bürgin (2016b) argues that the problem of overstayers could be addressed by the introduction of a EU-wide

entry/exit system, which is currently in preparation, making it easier to detect overstayers. Furthermore, the concern of unfounded asylum claims could be eased by the more efficient processing of asylum requests, obliging those who failed to qualify as refugees to be immediately returned to Turkey. Rather than focusing on possible risks of the visa waiver, researchers have highlighted the economic advantages for the EU, with an increase in revenue from Turkish tourists, and improved business relations (Kirişçi and Ekim 2015; Stiglmeier 2012). Furthermore, it has been argued that the granting of visa-free travel could lead to new trust in the EU and motivate the Turkish government to combat irregular transit migration with greater conviction (Kirişçi and Ekim 2015: 3).

EU–Turkey refugee statement

The EU–Turkey statement of March 18, 2016 is another milestone in their cooperation in the management of irregular migration (European Council 2016). Ankara agreed to readmit all new irregular migrants and asylum-seekers arriving from Turkey to the Greek islands, and whose applications for asylum have been declared inadmissible by the Greek authorities. This step will serve as a signal to all potential refugees of the futility in following the route offered by the smugglers. In return, the EU has offered Turkey four main rewards. First, the EU will resettle a Syrian currently resident in Turkey to the EU for every Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek islands. Priority is given to migrants who have not previously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly within the framework of the existing commitments. Second, the fulfillment of the visa liberalization roadmap would be accelerated with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016, provided that the remaining benchmarks have been fulfilled. Third, the EU will increase its financial support under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey from three to six billion euro. Finally, the accession process will be re-energized, with chapter thirty-three to be opened during the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the European Union and preparatory work on the opening of other chapters to continue at an accelerated pace.

Thus far the statement has reached its goals, reducing the number of attempts to cross the Aegean and associated deaths. According to a European Commission report (European Commission 2016c), published on September 28, 2016, around 1740 migrants made the Aegean crossing to the Greek islands daily in the weeks before the implementation of the Statement. By contrast, since March 21, this figure is down to 94 and the number of lives lost in the Aegean Sea has fallen to 11, compared to 270 in 2015. Furthermore, the European Commission sees no evidence that new routes are developing directly as a result of the EU–Turkey Statement. So far, 1614 Syrian refugees have been resettled from Turkey to Europe, and 578 irregular migrants have been returned from the Greek islands. The organization of the resettlement requires that an initial list of resettlement candidates is prepared by the Turkish authorities on the basis of vulnerability criteria. This list is then assessed by the UNHCR in order to identify the cases that meet the criteria for application to EU member states for resettlement. Member states make the final decision on UNHCR submissions and carry out their own security checks. Of the overall €3 billion, €2.239 billion was allocated in September 2016, divided between humanitarian and non-humanitarian assistance, and €1.252 billion of this amount has been contracted. Of this contracted €1.252 billion, €467 million has been disbursed to date. Accession negotiations on chapter thirty-three (Financial and Budgetary Provisions) were opened on June 30 in accordance with the EU–Turkey Statement (European Commission 2016c).

However, one key demand by Turkey, namely visa liberalization, has not been realized at the time of writing (July 2017). In May 2016, the Commission proposed the lifting of the visa

duty, provided that the few remaining requirements will be fulfilled by Turkey. The European Parliament stressed that the proposal will be dealt with only after the fulfillment of all benchmarks, in particular the requirement to change anti-terror laws, which the EP considers are being exploited to constrain the freedom of expression (European Parliament 2016a). The visa waiver has to be approved by a qualified majority in the Council and a simple majority in the EP. The Turkish President has responded by stressing that no changes will be made to anti-terror legislation, and, should the visa waiver not be realized in the near future, has threatened to withdraw from the commitment to readmit irregular immigrants from the EU (*The Guardian* 2016a).

The attempted coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016, and the reaction of the Turkish government, have further increased political tensions between the two sides, reducing the chances of a prompt realization of a visa waiver. In its 2016 Turkey report, the Commission expressed its concerns over the functioning of democracy: ‘There has been backsliding in the past year, in particular with regard to the independence of the judiciary. The extensive changes to the structures and composition of high courts are of serious concern and are not in line with European standards’ (European Commission 2016d). Regarding the freedom of expression, the Commission attests a similarly serious reversal in the past year:

Selective and arbitrary application of the law, especially of the provisions on national security and the fight against terrorism, is having a negative impact on freedom of expression. Ongoing and new criminal cases against journalists, writers or social media users, withdrawal of accreditations, high numbers of arrests of journalists as well as closure of numerous media outlets in the aftermath of the July attempted coup are of serious concern.

(European Commission 2016d)

In the EP, in turn, a broad coalition of MEPs voted for a suspension of the accession talks on November 23, 2016, condemning the ‘disproportionate repressive measures’ taken by the Turkish government since the failed coup attempt in July 2016 (European Parliament 2016b). The resolution is non-binding; a temporary freeze of accession negotiations has to be initiated either by the Commission or one-third of the MS, who need to secure a qualified majority in favor of taking such a step. So far, both the Commission and the majority of the member states prefer a continuation of the dialogue. Subsequently, the Turkish President announced his intention to drop the refugee deal should the Council follow the EP’s recommendation (*The Guardian* 2016b).

The statement has also triggered a debate about the legal nature of the deal. According to the Commission, the deal fully respects EU and international law, as requests for asylum are individually assessed (European Commission 2016c). However, EU asylum rules allow, in certain clearly defined circumstances, member states to declare an application ‘inadmissible’; that is to say, to reject the application without examining the substance, after a fast-track procedure, and thereby accelerate application processing. There are two legal criteria that may be used for declaring asylum applications inadmissible in relation to Turkey: (1) first country of asylum (Article 35 of the Asylum Procedures Directive): where the person has already been recognized as a refugee in that country or otherwise enjoys sufficient protection there; (2) safe third country (Article 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive): where the person has not already received protection in the third country but the third country can guarantee effective access to protection to the readmitted person. The Commission regards Turkey as a safe third country, as the Turkish authorities have provided assurances that all returned Syrians will be granted temporary

protection; and that each non-Syrian who seeks international protection in Turkey will enjoy protection from refoulement, in line with international standards and in accordance with the applicable Law on Foreigners and International Protection (European Commission 2016c).

Nevertheless, civil society organizations, legal experts, the Council of Europe and the UNHCR have all criticized the application of the safe third-country principle with respect to Turkey, especially due to cases of refoulement (Carrera and Guild 2016; Greene and Kelemen 2016; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 2016; UNHCR 2016b). Furthermore, criticisms have been made of the Syrian refugees' temporary protection status, which leaves them in a state of uncertainty (Baban *et al.* 2016). Finally, it has been argued that non-Syrian asylum-seekers are subject to a largely dysfunctional international protection procedure. It has been stated that despite recent reforms, the Directorate General for Migration Management still lacks the capacity to process asylum applications, while numerous barriers to state funded legal aid, coupled with resource constraints upon NGOs, leave asylum-seekers without legal representation or advice (European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2016).

Another debate emerged about the appropriateness of reviving the accession process through the opening of new accession chapters. It has been argued that upgrading Turkey's relationship with the EU by opening new negotiation chapters is undeserved due to Ankara's deviation from the EU's political values, reflected in regressive steps regarding freedom of speech and freedom of the press (Paul 2016). From this perspective, the EU's readiness to accelerate accession negotiations represents an unacceptable compromise over European values. Hakura (2016) argues that Turkey's lack of reliable alternative partners and its struggling economy, and long-term stagnation would actually have afforded the EU a tougher bargaining position.

The defenders of the deal reject the claim that the EU is kowtowing to President Erdoğan. It has been argued that, while the EU has lost its leverage on Turkish domestic politics in recent years, the opening of new negotiation chapters dealing with sensitive issues such as the freedom of the press or the independence of the judiciary would bring the EU a renewed influence over Turkish domestic politics, and could therefore contribute to a *rapprochement* between the EU and Turkey (Gedikaya 2016). Consequently, the opening of new chapters cannot be said to represent a retreat by the EU on political standards (Bürgin 2016b). Furthermore, the closing of a chapter is more significant than its opening, and it is impossible to make progress in an accession process without reform and concrete improvements (Seufert 2016: 7).

Conclusion

The overview of EU–Turkey relations in the field of justice and home affairs has shown that the mutual benefits of cooperation have triggered positive results, despite an overall political atmosphere characterized by mutual mistrust. With EU support, Turkey has improved its asylum standards and border management capacities. After ten years of negotiations, in 2013, a readmission agreement was finally concluded. The 2016 EU–Turkey refugee statement has contributed to a significant decrease in the numbers of irregular immigrants reaching the EU via Turkey.

In particular, the most recent refugee statement represents interesting avenues for further research, which could address the following issues. From a theoretical perspective, it would be valuable to explore what this deal represents for the normative power of the EU (for a discussion of the normative power concept see Diez 2005; Manners 2002). Does it represent a break with a norm-based relationship with Turkey? If so, does it signify that Turkey is now considered more as a strategic partner rather than as a candidate country? Another avenue for further research is the role of the Commission in the EU's relationship with Turkey. The Commission's

agency in the visa liberalization process illustrates a critical but fair approach towards Turkey by ensuring that both sides abide by the rules. However, there is still a lack of investigation into the extent to which the European Commission is able to establish mutual trust and lasting policy networks in its frequent interactions with officials in Turkish ministries, and the extent to which the Commission is able to influence Turkey-related positions in the European Parliament and in the Council.

Finally, linked to the topic of the Commission's agency, softer mechanisms of EU influence, such as policy learning and socialization, deserve more attention. In the face of the stalled EU accession talks, policy learning processes outside of the framework of official accession negotiations represent an opportunity to keep the Europeanization process in Turkey alive. Such studies would also attract stronger attention to the role of Turkish bureaucracy, NGOs and policy networks at local and national level. These factors are often neglected by the Europeanization literature on Turkey, which rather tends to focus on the behavior of the political elite and the ruling party in particular when discussing the successes and failures of Europeanization processes. From an empirical perspective, the effects of the refugee statement could be investigated to determine whether the statement actually leads to fewer refugees, or rather to a shifting of refugee routes. Other questions include: Have the EU funds improved the situation of refugees in Turkey? Will Turkey continue taking back refugees from the Greek islands in the event that visa liberalization for Turkish citizens is not realized in the near future? If so, what are the reasons, and if not, what will be the consequences for EU–Turkey relations?

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