

**THE EVOLVING SECURITY DIMENSION
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, FORMATION AND
CHALLENGES**

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**THE EVOLVING SECURITY DIMENSION
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ABSTRACT

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This thesis is a study on the evolution of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the context of European Union (EU). It aims to evaluate the entire process that Common Foreign and Security Policy has experienced, by referring to the historical facts based on the developments during and after the Cold War. In addition, while evaluating developments with respect to the political and military dimensions, the internal divergences within the EU, which is the crucial element on the determination of Common Foreign and Security Policy, will be also emphasized. This thesis intends to answer the causes of the underdevelopment in the Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as EU' s inconsistent and inefficient actions as an international actor comparing to its expected tasks. While analyzing the evolution process of the Common Foreign and Defense Policy, emphasis is put on the Transatlantic and NATO relations especially in the scope of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This study also set the capacity of European Union to establish an effective military force to cope with the crisis management tasks including civilian and military aspects.

Key Words: Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP), European Defense Community(EDC), European Political Cooperation(EPC), European Security and Defense Identity(ESDI), European Security and Defense Policy(ESDP),North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO),Western European Union(WEU).

ÖZET

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ GÜVENLİK BOYUTUNUN GELİŞİMİ: TARİHSEL ARKAPLANI, OLUŞUMU VE ZORLUKLARI

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Bu tez Avrupa Birliği(AB) bağlamında gelişen Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası üzerine yapılmış bir çalışmadır. Soğuk savaş dönemi ve sonrasında gelişen tarihsel olaylar temel alınarak, Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasının geçirmiş olduğu tüm devrelerin değerlendirilmesi amaçlanmıştır. Bununla beraber, gelişmeleri siyasi ve askeri açılarından değerlendirirken, Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasının belirlenmesinde çok önemli unsur olan Avrupa Birliği içerisindeki farklılıklar üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu tez Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasının az gelişmişliğinin nedenleriyle beraber Avrupa Birliğinin uluslar arası bir aktör olarak kendisinden beklenenlerin aksine tutarsız ve yetersiz davranışlarını cevaplamayı amaçlamaktadır. Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasının gelişimini analiz ederken, Avrupa Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikası bağlamında Transatlantik ve NATO ilişkileri üzerinde durulmuştur. Bu çalışma aynı zamanda Avrupa Birliğinin sivil ve askeri boyutlarını içeren kriz yönetimi görevlerinin üstesinden gelebilecek etkin bir askeri güç oluşturma yeteneğini ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası(ODGP), Avrupa Savunma Topluluğu(AST), Avrupa Siyasal İşbirliği(ASİ), Avrupa Savunma ve Güvenlik Politikası(ASGP), Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği(AGSK), Batı Avrupa Birliği (BAB), Kuzey Atlantik İttifakı Anlaşması (NATO).

To My Father, Mehmet Özer KAYACAN

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
CEECs	Central and East European Countries
CESP	Common European Security and Defense Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Common Wealth of Independent States
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CMEA/ Comecon	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
COREU	<i>Correspondance Europeenne</i> telex network
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Community
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defense Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMS	European Monetary System
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ERP	European Recovery Programme
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUROFOR	European Land Forces
EUROMARFOR	European Maritime Force
FAWEU	Forces Answerable to the Western European Union
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OPEC	Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PHARE	Poland/ Hungary: Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
SEA	Single European Act
SU	Soviet Union
TEU	Treaty of European Union
ToA	Treaty of Amsterdam
ToN	Treaty of Nice
TOR	Treaty of Rome
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union

1.INTRODUCTION

European Union, which has originally traced its roots from the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community(ECSC), is certainly the most successful movement with respect to the economic integration in the world' s history. As the European Union has passed five successful decades in accordance with its economic goals, its evolving tendencies on being a significant actor in the politics of international relations under the title of the Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) has to be evaluated carefully. While analyzing the intentions of the European Union for being one of the determinant and strong international actor, emphasis should be put on the European Security and Defense Policy(ESDP) which basically demonstrates the will of the European Union to take more responsibility in order to provide security to its periphery for the continuity of its achieved progress.

The aim of this study is to evaluate the evolution of the EU' s Common Foreign and Security Policy in the context of changing global security environment and the EU' s internal challenges on the determination of acting as one.

The study is consisted of two chapters. In the first chapter special emphasis has been put on the EU' s attempts for collective cooperation on defense. As the European continent is entirely effected from the destructive effects of the World War II, the world has faced a new threat which eventually would cause a more catastrophic results in the period of the Cold War. The

global developments as well the progress in the military technology has made the United States to realize the importance of the European continent for its homeland security. As Europe is divided by a 'Iron Curtain', Central and Eastern European States were became the buffer zone of the Soviet Union. The Western European States also realized the importance of collective action on defense and signed the Brussels Treaty(1948) which established the Western European Union and lead to foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) in 1949. However all the attempts of the European States did not result positively as in the case of the European Defense Community(EDC). As the treaty is signed in 1952, the ratification of the treaty is rejected by the French Assembly in 1954 and postponed European plans to establish an European Army. Between the period of 1954 to the Davignon Report(1970), there are also some initiatives for refreshing the common defense understanding however they were not effective. The foundation of the European Political Cooperation(EPC) in 1970 has paved the way for considering about the future prospects of the Community' s foreign and security policies.

The second chapter of the study gives a detailed and updated perspective on the latest form of the Common Foreign and Security Policy by giving concrete facts. The performance of the European Political Cooperation is evaluated with its strong and weak sides by giving four different cases. While analyzing the each case, besides giving importance to the internal divergences of the EU Member States on deciding a common action, the

relations of the EU with the United States as well as with the NATO are mentioned. The founding treaties of the Common Foreign and Security Policy; the Treaty on European Union (TEU, 1992) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA, 1997) were explained in terms of the CFSP's legal basis, objectives, principles and the instruments. In addition, Nice Treaty (2001) which has aimed to deepen the cooperation in the CFSP as well as in the ESDP will be analyzed in terms of its innovations.

In the last part of the second chapter, European Security and Defense Policy, which is one of the most spectacular elements of the CFSP in the contemporary world's politics will be evaluated. The origins of the ESDP trace to the Hague Summit of 1987 in which European Security and Defense Identity has been launched. As the Cold War is also ended, Europe has faced with new questions for its future especially on the issue of security. At this point the meeting in Saint Malo (1998) between the British and French leaders has opened a new era in the security architecture of the European Union. The meeting of Saint Malo has concluded the necessity of the EU for a credible military force including the capability to cope with the civilian and military aspects of the crisis management tasks. The development of the ESDP has brought both supportive and suspicious comments mainly referring to the possible threats which may weaken the solidarity within the NATO and the EU's military inadequacy comparing to the United States. However those arguments would not change the decision on founding a strong ESDP under the CFSP is a necessity rather than a simple debate to be postponed.

2. THE POLITICAL COOPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION

2.1. The Security Environment of Europe After the World War II

2.1.1. The Polarization of The World

Every experienced memory and evaluated result of the World War II(1939-1945) was devastating. The Allied Forces has defeated the enemy however the entire European Continent was totally in ruins. The term 'devastation' has a common meaning on each of the concepts that will determine the civilization. Each of the European States without looking at their side gave millions of casualties including their most educated, young and valuable population. Every dimension of the European States from military force to their economic conditions were lacking of inadequacies. On the other side the case for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was different. Although USSR has suffered about forty million casualties from the World War II, the general situation of the country was not as bad as the Europeans. The west frontiers has experienced most crucial battles of the war however the inner regions of the country were survived. The population range of the country while comparing to the European States were indicating that USSR has the advantage by younger population ready to work. The resources of the country also has an impact on the development process of the military

and economy. In the light of those developments, USSR has become the fundamental question on how to establish a secure and peaceful environment in Europe or in the world. The United States of America was undoubtedly the key element of the Allied victory. Unlike European States, the United States did not fight on her own land with the exception of Pearl Harbor and with the advantage of this situation the economic conditions of the country was well enough. The concern of the United States towards Europe continued intensively after the World War II and the political developments just after the end of the World War II assured the idea that the security of the United States mutually linked to the security of Europe. A new age, which would be also called as ' Cold War 'was starting within the two superpowers. Both militarily and economically giant actors of the world has started the most stressful act of war on diplomacy, economy and every aspect of life under the shadow of military deterrence. Each member of the international community had to choose and determine her position on this polarized world. The term ' Iron Curtain ' which is expressed by Winston Churchill in 1946 has made the duty of drawing the exact borders of the polarized Europe.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic , an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very

*high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.*¹

2.1.2. The Marshall Plan and Reconstructing Europe

It was clearly understood that the balance sheets of the devastation was terrible when the dusts from the last bombs have settled over. Millions of people from every part of the Continent were homeless, have nothing to eat, have no jobs and have the wounds which would not be recovered by medicine. There could be no returning to life as normal.² The destruction was seen also in the psychology of the people and in order refresh the hope inside all the people, urgent measures and plans have to be conducted. Most of the economists agreed on the idea that Europe was needed at least two decades to regain her economic strength and capacity. This condition is worsened by the movement of large populations within the Europe in order to escape from the Soviet expansionist policies. Industrial production in 1945 was one-third of its level in 1938.³ In addition to that, European agriculture was performing only fifty percent her capacity comparing to the pre-war period. As a result of this low level of production, black markets and scarcity on each good emerged which inevitably triggers the inflation.

Instability and chaotic environment was also dominant in the politics of the post-war Europe. During the World War II, many of the European States had armed communist and anti-communist groups to resist the enemy. But the war was over and the reinstated governments which were mainly in exile

¹Kishlanski, Geary and O' Brien P. 1995. *Civilization in the West : volume II*. New York: Harper Collins College. p:921

²Ibid, p:929

³Ibid, p:930

during the period of 1940-1945 faced with the danger of armed political resistance groups. After liberating each state, the Western Allies tried to disarm the resistance quickly to avoid the danger of reinstated authorities being overturned by communist or other gunmen in Western Europe, as occurred in Greece in 1944.⁴ The other problem for the post-war European politics was the increasing sympathy for the communist tendencies. There were even communist ministers in the national governments of Italy, Belgium and France. The United Kingdom was also facing with the increase of communist movement. The reason of this fact was mainly due to the sympathy towards the USSR coming from her war effort. However in a very short period of time, USSR has achieved a dominance over all the communist parties in the Western Europe.

As it is briefly expressed above, the United States of America(USA) had suffered less casualties when it is compared to the Europeans. The production facilities did not damage during the war and as a result of this advantage by expanding her economic productivity, USA became the chief producer of the Allied forces. In 1945 the United States was producing a full fifty percent of the world's gross national product- a staggering fact to a displaced the Great Britain, whose former trade networks were permanently destroyed. Furthermore, the United States held two- thirds of the world gold.⁵ The United States was seeking to sell her goods to the international markets as a fundamental economic task in order to maintain her growth and economic

⁴Dedman M. J. 1996.*The Origins and Development of the European Union*. London:Routledge. p:35

⁵Kishlanski, Geary and O' Brien P. 1995. *Civilization in the West : volume II*. New York: Harper Collins College. p:931

prosperity. Especially after the Great Depression in 1929, the US gave priority to search for new markets and economic policies to expand her share. During the early 1920's, the US implemented a policy of exporting private loans to Europe expecting that in return the trade would be refreshed. The results of the World War II also provided the environment in accordance with the United States policy of 1920's. Giving reconstruction assistance with economic and humanitarian aid to Europe has opened the way for the US intervention and lift off the trade barriers against the US products. The period between 1945 to 1947 witnessed postwar recovery attempts of the US to Europe. However it was understood that in order to stabilize and recover the European economy new measures have to be taken. The post-war Europe suffered from an acute dollar shortage and USA' s fear in spring 1947 was that European recovery might stop because of a lack of dollars, and given that US industrial capacity had grown so much because of its World War II expansion that US output and employment would suffer badly.⁶ In the spring of 1947, US President Truman declared a doctrine on emergency aid to Greece and Turkey. Following this doctrine, US Secretary of State George Marshall has introduced European Recovery Programme (ERP) which is also known as Marshall Plan in his speech of Harvard University in June 1947.

It is logical that US should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace.(G. Marshall)⁷ The aid was available

⁶Dedman M. J. 1996.*The Origins and Development of the European Union*. London:Routledge. p:46

⁷Kishlanski, Geary and O' Brien P. 1995. *Civilization in the West : volume II*. New York: Harper

for both of the Eastern and Western European States however there were two conditions. First of all, the states which are willing to benefit from the aid have to agree and work on diminishing trade barriers and secondly, the states should be in cooperation by their national economic policies which would lead to the improvement of international monetary system. Fifteen states were benefited from the aid including Turkey, West Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Italy, Luxembourg, Iceland and Netherlands. The Marshall Plan lead European States to realize the importance of central planning. In order to administer the Marshall Plan, Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) is established in 1948. The outcome of the Marshall plan was successful. During the period between 1948 to 1952, twenty-two billion dollars were given to Western Europe which is resulted increase in production and fastened the recovery of the states.⁸

2.1.3. The Influence of the USSR to the Central and Eastern Europe

The USSR gave the highest amount of casualties in the World War II. The victories of the USSR in the west frontiers caused heavy loss of German Army. The greatest war of the world's history made the superpowers of the USSR and the USA allies however the question is now more difficult and unpredictable. In the early days of the postwar period it was clearly understood that the two countries ; Germany and the USSR would lead to big problems in the European Security. Germany with all aspects of its integration

Collins College. p:932

⁸Reproduced from Boyle P.G. 1982. *The British Foreign Office and American Foreign Policy 1947-48*. Journal of American Studies 16-3. p:373

to the international system will be evaluated in the following chapters.

The armies of the USSR and USA were mutually congratulated their victory. However USSR was aware of the United States military superiority. Actually part of the US military superiority was dependent on the US invention of nuclear bomb. The catastrophic destructive effects of the nuclear bomb were practically seen in the Japanese soil of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In addition to that, US economic wealth was enormously high and incompatible for the USSR.

The confrontation between the USA and USSR was started on the issue of economic reconstruction of Europe. The Marshall Plan declared by the USA is evaluated with suspicion and fear of increasing influence on the recipient states by USA in the eyes of USSR. In order to protect its own land from the US influence USSR saw the Eastern Europe as an essential and vital buffer zone.

For these reasons, Stalin refused to allow free elections in Poland and, by force of occupying armies annexed neighboring territories that included Eastern Finland, the Baltic States, East Prussia, Eastern Poland, Ruthenia and Bessarabia. With the exception of Eastern Prussia, these annexations were all limited to territories that had once been part of Tsarist Russia⁹

As a response to the Marshall Plan, USSR launched Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) in 1949 including Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The objective

⁹Kishlanski, Geary and O' Brien P. 1995. *Civilization in the West : volume II*. New York: Harper Collins College. p:920

of Comecon was not giving economic aid as in Marshall Plan. Comecon implemented bilateral agreements with the USSR and the Eastern European States and basically established a system in which the USSR put control to each of the Eastern European States economies. These countries, covering approximately 392,439 square miles with a population of about 87 million non-Russian people and national incomes equivalent to about half that of the USSR, were incorporated into the Soviet empire by a process of 'conquest without war'.¹⁰

Political influence of the USSR over local communist parties rapidly received positive response with the establishment of Soviet-dominated governments in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia in 1947. The situation of Germany also regarded as threat to the Soviet administration and the city of Berlin is blockaded. The death of Joseph Stalin, Soviet's strongest political figure opened the discussions for the elimination of the Soviet repressive politics. However the attempts of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 in order to introduce the reforms in economy and politics were suppressed by Soviet Army. Hungary was inspired from the experience of Poland in 1953. Polish Communist Party leader named Wladislaw Gomulka opposed to the Soviet approaches and supported the riots in his country against the USSR. In 1956 Hungary declared its intent to pull back its existence in the Warsaw Pact. However USSR did not want to loose the control over Eastern Europe and the response came with the sending of Soviet Army. Twelve years later than the Hungarian suppression,

¹⁰<http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/1.htm> accessed on 14 March 2005

Czechoslovakia wanted introduce liberal economic reforms under the nationalist leadership of Alexander Dubcek. Soviet response was the same by sending the troops to Prague and took the control back. It was clearly understood that attempts for rapid change with nationalist tendencies would not be tolerated by the Soviets.

2.2. The Steps For Collective Cooperation on Defense

2.2.1. The Launch of Mutual Defense Understanding

The security environment just after the World War II brought the searches for establishing mutual cooperation on defense in the event of military aggression and attack. Although each part and the country of the European Continent has witnessed the catastrophic effects of the war, France was much sensitive and leading the way to find a solution both to eliminate the threat of Germany permanently and in case of an military attack to find a loyal ally(s) behind.

On the other side the United Kingdom(UK) was also uncomfortable because of the US withdrawal from Europe just after the World War II where the USSR was remaining its forces in full strength. In order to establish a mutual security cooperation and to strengthen the United Kingdom's place in Europe, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin (1945-1951) launched the idea of 'Western Bloc'. Drawing Western European States together would enhance their mutual security and might also serve to strengthen the UK' s world

position *vis-a-vis* the US and the USSR by building up Britain as ' the great European power.'¹¹

Under those conditions France and the United Kingdom, which are represented by Georges Bidault and Ernest Bevin has signed the Treaty of Dunkirk on the 4th of March 1947. The Treaty of Dunkirk was the first mutual and Anglo- French treaty on defense after the World War II. Germany was seen as a potential threat to the European as well as the national security and agreed upon mutual support in the case of German aggression. The starting point was to remedy a previous mistake. It was the signing with France of the Treaty of Dunkirk in 1947 which assured the French that an attack upon them by Germany would be considered as an attack on Britain. This was really the righting of a previous mistake after the World War I when the French had requested guarantees of their security against a German attack and been led to believe by both the United States and Britain that such guarantees would be forthcoming.¹² Another important feature of the Treaty of Dunkirk was, the United Kingdom and France were given the right to conduct a common action against Germany in case of an evaluation of either sides on German disperforming for fulfilling the economic obligations agreed after the World War II.

While examining the steps for the mutual defense understanding the influence and impact of federalist and non- federalist movements in Europe should be analyzed. The roots of the aspiration for uniting Europe politically

¹¹Dedman M. J. 1996.*The Origins and Development of the European Union*. London:Routledge. p:36

¹²http://www.upmf-grenoble.fr/espace/cesice/publication/ares/54/2_Groom.pdf accessed on 16 March 2005

traces to the 17th century. However first official attempts were declared after the World War I (1914-1918). The major reason behind this initiative was to eliminate the crucial rivalry between the European States. In this respect Pan-European Union is established by the efforts of Austrian Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1923 and another organization called the Association for European Co-operation is founded in 1926. In September 1929 Aristide Briand proposed the creation European Federal Union at the Assembly of the League of Nations which was viewed with incomprehension by most other ministers and statesmen, though interestingly not by Winston Churchill, who published articles supporting the idea of a ' United States of Europe ' in 1930 and 1938. Churchill believed, however, that Britain was not part of Europe but should support it from outside and that the French and Germans should create it.¹³ Briand' s proposal was depending on the intent for a closer cooperation between France and Germany. However those federalist assumptions and attempts on Europe were not successful in receiving wide support up to the end of World War II. In this period, the ideologies of nationalism, and in some countries fascism, were far more potent than pan-Europeanism. Although Fascist movements espoused pan-European ideas, these were based on ideas of dominance and national antagonism.¹⁴ The results of the World War II clearly demonstrated the military and economic superiority of the super powers and the weakness of the European nation states in preserving their country against Nazi invasion. Those conditions stipulated public opinion to

¹³Dedman M. J. 1996.*The Origins and Development of the European Union*. London:Routledge. p:16

¹⁴Jones A. R. 1996. *The Politics and Economics of the European Union*. Cheltenham:Edward Elger. p:6

give support for an United Europe.

There is an interesting point has to be expressed here is that war time occupation in Nazi Europe accustomed people to a continental-style unified economy.¹⁵ Although the experiences left from the war was the worst in the history, the people of Europe has seen the possibility of a Single European Economy. The on going attempts and discussions for the Economic Integration or Cooperation of Europe has always took this practical implementation into consideration. In the light of these views, the idea of 'Common Market' is launched in the Conference of 1944, where stressed the importance of interdependence of European National Economies and the significance of German Economic Integration.

As it is mentioned above, the federalist ideas on Europe made a peak just after the World War II. Most of the intellectuals who are supporting federalism and the federalist groups were actively fought within the resistance groups against Nazis during the war. Many of the intellectuals were prisoned as Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi. Spinelli who was prisoned on the island of Ventotene in Italy by Mussolini has written 'Ventotene Manifesto' which asserts that the establishment of the Federal Europe would result the diminish of 'International Anarchy'. In 1944, the European representatives of resistance movements issued a declaration calling for a 'federal union of the European peoples' after the war. The federalist vague in the continental Europe at the end of the war led to the formation of a European Europe of Federalists in

¹⁵Dedman M. J. 1996.*The Origins and Development of the European Union*. London:Routledge. p:17

December 1946.¹⁶ The committee named 'International Committee of the Movements for European Unity' conducted a congress in the Hague in order to deepen the idea of United Europe in 1948. Many politicians and bureaucrats from sixteen states were attended to the congress having the ideas of defending and opposing an United Europe. The result of the congress was in the way of weakening the supporters of the United Europe because there was no single plan or strategy agreed upon. Actually the Federalist ideas have two political obstacles in front. First of all, none of the governments were willing to transfer a part or a whole size of their power to a supranational body and secondly, the people of any state, were not well informed as to know the advantages of uniting the Europe. As the attempts to forge a Federalist institution like European Parliament is eroded, the congress of 1948 paved the way to establish the Council of Europe by the Treaty of Westminster in 1949. The Council's institutional structure comprised a Consultative Assembly of Mp' s, appointed by national parliaments and with no legislative powers, plus a Committee of Ministers of member states.¹⁷ The Council of Europe was aimed to prepare an 'inter-governmental cooperation' basis on the issues of Europe however it had never achieved to perform as an determinant and efficient international organization. On the face of things the Council of Europe has no relevance even to the idea of an European Foreign Policy.¹⁸ The main objective of the Council of Europe was to enhance and protect the

¹⁶Jones A. R. 1996. *The Politics and Economics of the European Union*. Cheltenham:Edward Elger. p:7

¹⁷Ibid, p:8

¹⁸Hill C.and Smith K. 2000. *European Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge p:9

human rights in Europe. In order to fulfill this objective, the European Convention on Human Rights is conducted in 1950 which can be regarded as the fundamental of the European Court of Human Rights.

A European Federation would ensure peace, avoid extreme nationalism, stop 'European Civil Wars' and allow the exercise of common powers over foreign political security matters and economic planning on a European scale¹⁹ However there were so many opponents of this idea. Undoubtedly, the United Kingdom which is still having the same idea, was the leading opponent of a Federal Europe after the World War II. The major initiative beyond this understanding was, the United Kingdom still regarding itself as a World power. After the World War I, the political conditions lead to the foundation of many nation states. This was an opportunity for the non-federalists especially for the British where mostly like to make states work together through intergovernmental cooperation. Even the notion of the terms on mutual understanding were important for most of the parties. The United Kingdom was insisting to put stress on the term 'European Cooperation' instead of 'European Integration' where 'Integration' is somehow considered as more radical and be evaluated as transfer of some sort of sovereignty.

It was also accepted by the United Kingdom that nation state system in Europe had many failures however in order to make suggestions to replace it, the United Kingdom supported the establishment of international institutions on intergovernmental principle like the OEEC, the Council of Europe and the NATO.

¹⁹Dedman M. J. 1996.*The Origins and Development of the European Union*. London:Routledge. p:18

Especially in the early post-war years, economic and political conditions of the United Kingdom was better than most of the European states. However the United Kingdom wanted to cope with the two big problems of the future of Germany and the USSR through a collective cooperation. There has already been a mutual cooperation going on the OEEC under the chairman of Ernest Bevin. Under those conditions, Ernest Bevin has launched the idea of extending the OEEC in military field on January 1948. The British approach would be summarized as '*Pragmatic cooperation in each particular case in accordance with the needs.*'

Just after the two months of Bevin's speech, the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Defense or Brussels Treaty is signed on 17 March 1948. The United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were the signatories of treaty. The foundation of Brussels Treaty responded to two issues. First of all, Brussels Treaty was a direct response to the Soviet moves and influence over Central European states. Secondly, the future of Germany was one of the main concern for the signatories of the Treaty. Especially Article IV of the Treaty clearly asserted the commitment for mutual defense in case of an armed attack to any of the signatory state.

The signature of the Brussels Treaty of March 1948 marked the determination of five Western European countries – to develop a common defense system and to strengthen the ties between them in a manner which would enable them to resist ideological, political and military threats to their

security.²⁰

The Brussels Treaty was formally linked to the OEEC as a military counterpart. The launch of the treaty was just after the *coup d'etat* happened in Prague under the Soviet influence. However the political situation is worsened by the blockade of Berlin by the USSR. The military superiority of the USSR in comparison to the Brussels Treaty signatories was clear. The signatories were understood that without the military assistance of the USA they could not cope with the threat.

In the light of those developments USA is invited to join to the Brussels Treaty by the Western European States. Actually Berlin Blockade had already alerted the US concerns on Europe however US Government did not have the right to join to the military alliances out of the American continent during the peace period. In order to adjust this political and legal scope, US Senator Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg has submitted a proposal which gives US Government the right to join and sign agreements on military alliance outside the American continent including the peace time period. The Resolution, which is widely known as 'Vandenberg Resolution' is accepted on 11 June 1948 by the US Congress. The negotiations were started rapidly and on 4 April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty is signed in Washington. Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were invited and agreed to accede to the Treaty, which formalized the commitment by the United States and Canada to the defense of Europe. Article 5 of the treaty states an armed attack against one of the signatories shall be considered an attack against them all and that

²⁰NATO Handbook 2001. Belgium: NATO Office of Information and Press. p:29

each party will then take such action as it deems necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.²¹ In order to strengthen and fulfill the North Atlantic treaty with political and military structures, North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) is established in the same year. General Eisenhower became the first Supreme Allied Commander of Europe in the Alliance. As the NATO became the key actor for both the Western Europe and North Atlantic security, the signatories of the Brussels Treaty combined their military organization within the NATO. This development also decreased the significance of the Brussels Treaty.

NATO's essential purpose was to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe based on common values of democracies, human rights and the rule of law.²² NATO was working on inter-governmental understanding and still regarded as the most longstanding institution articulating mutual cooperation on defense. During years of the Cold War, NATO was the determinant element in coping with the Soviet threat and strengthen its effectiveness by enlarging its members. The end of the Cold War and other global developments lead to many questions about NATO's new role for international security. Today NATO has more than a defensive character by adopting new tasks and capabilities with its twenty six members.

²¹www.weu.int accessed on 23 March 2005

²²NATO Handbook 2001. Belgium: NATO Office of Information and Press. p:30

2.2.2. The European Defense Community and Its Failure

On June 25, 1950, a thunderbolt struck that caused everyone to forget the Coal and Steel Community that had just been launched. The North Koreans invaded South Korea. Stalin, blocked, in Iran, in Greece and in Berlin, had opened a new front in Asia. Strategists and diplomats thought it was only a diversion, a prelude to an attack on Europe. There was a world wide panic. From Moscow, Ambassador Harriman sounded the alarm: *The Soviets might move beyond the iron curtain at any moment.*²³

The global confrontation was felt mostly in the European Continent. The Soviet tendencies of invasion lead to the United States and the Western European countries to consider about the measures to defend the borders against a possible Soviet attack. There was a wide common idea that, the Soviet threat should be taken with the idea of 'German Rearmament'. Actually rearming Germany was firstly decided in 1949 when the USSR has tested its first atomic bomb. The United States decided to strengthen the ground defense capability of the Western Europe by rearming West Germany however until 1954 this decision is not seriously passed beyond national conflicts. In 1954, Soviets developed the long- range delivery systems for their atomic bomb as conventional missiles and long- range heavy bombers, so that German rearmament become vital for the global security.

The competition for the influence on European zone lead to the formation of Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and German

²³Bromberger S.M. 1968. *United States of Europe*. New York: Coward&Maccann Inc. p:108

Democratic Republic (East Germany) in 1949. West Germany was administered by a federal government and a parliament, however the sovereignty was concentrated on Allied High Commission. Allied High Commission was founded by representatives of the USA, Britain and France. The entire legislation and foreign affairs were conducted by the Commission. On the other side East Germany was directly influenced by the Soviets where Soviets were successful to cut off all the relations of the country with the Western Europe.

Rearming Germany is started to talk with Korean War. This is also the starting point of the US policy towards rearming Germany for the security of the Western Europe. North Korea has passed through the 38th parallel and wiped out South Korean forces with Soviet- made heavy armed forces. The relations between the USSR and North Korea was similar to the relations between USSR and East Germany, so that Soviet backed invasion of South Korea alarmed Chancellor Adenauer for a possible Soviet backed invasion of East Germany to West Germany. Chancellor Adenauer had totally an anti-militarist tendency however defending the idea of '*Allies disarmed Germany. They must insure her defense.*'

The United States wanted to rearm Germany for military and strategic reasons. First of all, with the rearmament of Germany, the troops of the NATO would be strengthened. Secondly with the rearmament of Germany, the Allies would find the opportunity to deter both the USSR and other communist satellite states. Thirdly, there is a called People's Police Force in East

Germany which was seen as a major threat for West Germany in case of an attack. The force was mainly consisted of veterans who were armed and trained by the USSR. The rearmament of Germany would also be a protective measure against German Democratic Republic. Fourth, the USA was uncomfortable about the political developments happening in France. French Communist and Socialist Parties have increased their support much enough to disturb the United States. The anti- American attitude parallely increased as a result of the conducted politics and this made the USA to consider about taking measures and to balance the political situation. Lastly, Germany as a geographic location was very important for the NATO's defense strategy in Europe. On the other side, the rest of the Western European states under the leadership of France and the UK were rejecting the idea of German rearmament.

Actually the UK was not totally opposing to rearming Germany however defend the assumption to establish a police force just as in East Germany. However France was much clear opponent. For obvious, historical and psychological reasons, there was an abiding antipathy in France to the every existence of German military power: but even in the immediate situation of the summer of 1950 France did not share the sense of urgency felt by the United States, and the ' lesson of Korea ' was not so clear in Paris as in Washington.²⁴ In addition to France, the Netherlands and Belgium were very skeptic about German rearmament.

The launch of 'European Army' firstly mentioned by British Prime

²⁴McGeehan R. 1971.*The German Rearmament Question*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. p:52

Minister Churchill in 1950 during the Korean War. In the light of those events Paul Reuter requested a meeting from Jean Monnet who is the inventor of the ECSC. Paul Reuter was the lawyer of the ECSC. Reuter pointed out that the importance of the ECSC is started to decrease as a result of Korean War. He stressed the importance of finding a way to unify Europe. Reuter asked Monnet to '*organize a Schuman Plan for a European Army.*'

Actually during this period, Chancellor Adenauer was talking about the European Army. He saw the peaceful future only with an integrated Europe. He wanted his country to be with the West in order to protect Germany from any hostile attack and influence.

Secondly, Adenauer who was also opposing to to the reestablishment of German General Staff, wanted an army under the control of the Western command. This intention of Adenauer also holds the fear of the ancient German militarist danger. However all the German public were willing to see the end of Allied occupation The success of those steps would be the opening way for Germany to find a permanent place with the support of the all other states including the United States and the ultimate result would be the German recovered sovereignty and international equality.

Monnet was defending the assumption of '*Its not possible to defend Germany without Germans.*' Both Germans and the other nationals including French, Belgians and Dutches were opposing to the German rearmament. According to Monnet, the only solution should be found on the basis of integrating German troops into an European Army. However Monnet' s

suspicion for German rearmament was coming from the fear of, not only due to the French rejection but also the entire European Continent was worrying about German rearmament so that it might weaken the Alliance. On the other hand, Robert Schuman who is more skeptic for the German rearmament, believed that the NATO itself is not a total guarantee for France against rearmed Germany. NATO has no supranational character at all. However the solution should be found for a permanent period of time where the national armies have remained and continued their presence under NATO.

*We are setting up the Coal and Steel Community, thus preventing another war between Germany and France by integrating their metallurgical production. Why not do likewise, using the same supranational bodies- which remain to be defined- for a Defense Community that would integrate Europe's armies?*²⁵ In this respect, Schuman asserted the same mentality to eliminate all the causes of a possible rivalry in raw material is inspired to form an European Army.

While those developments were happening, in 1950 France has accepted to rearm Germans in the defense of Europe under the NATO Forces by Spofford Compromise. The success of Spofford Compromise is coming from a strategic move organized by US Secretary Acheson. Acheson has declared a package consisting military and defense aids plus rearmament of Germany. Actually the two different issues were not accidentally put into one single package. The United States was aware of the Western European opposition against German rearmament but also concerned about their security

²⁵Bromberger S.M. 1968. *United States of Europe*. New York: Coward&Maccann Inc. p:110

problems. By bringing two of those issues under a single package, the US was eliminating the Western European opposition because the rejection of the package would cause the loss of aids.

The studies of Jean Monnet on the establishment of European Army were not encouraged much by the French government. However Monnet was ready to defend his ideas and insisted on French Premier Plevin that *'If France does not accept German forces, there will be no inter-allied general staff in Europe.'* The United States was also the biggest contributor of this idea and as a consequence French government is convinced for German armament and Monnet' s idea of creating an European Army is became the Plevin Plan.

The Plevin Plan is ratified by the French Parliament on 24 October 1950. It aimed to create an European Army with an European Defense Community, copying the institutional form of the ECSC. It was to be created once the ECSC Treaty had been signed. The European Defense Community (EDC) was to be linked to an European Political Community that would exercise democratic control over the EDC. The EDC would have common forces, a common uniform and a single Ministry of Defense.²⁶ In addition, European Army would be subject to the orders of the Council of Ministers and responsible for the Assembly chosen by High Authority of Coal and Steel Community.

According to the Plevin Plan, divisions were the basic military units of the European Army and each of those divisions would be consisted of various

²⁶Dedman M. J. 1996.*The Origins and Development of the European Union*. London:Routledge. p:74

teams of different nations. However this article is not accepted due to the technical difficulties stressed by the NATO Headquarters and the inclusion of the German units through the direct command of the NATO is approved by the United Kingdom and France with the efforts of the USA. Actually this was not the only problem that had been solved. There were many administrative and technical complexities and difficulties in the Pleven Plan. In order to solve the obstacles many negotiations were conducted and finally on 27 May 1952, the Treaty of European Defense Community is signed by the representatives of the six ECSC states. The only condition for the implementation of the EDC was, each of the signatories would need to ratify the treaty in their national assemblies.

The United Kingdom evaluated the Pleven Plan and its consequence EDC as an establishment of the French hegemony over Europe. The UK was defending German rearmament under the NATO command. The elections of 1951 lead to a government change in the United Kingdom and refreshed the hopes for a policy change towards the EDC. Churchill came to power as a Prime Minister again however his view of *'With Europe not of it'* did not change. Under those political developments, the final declaration of British rejection on being a member of the EDC made on 6 December 1951.

The United Kingdom was founded its strategy for permanent US military force in Europe. In this respect any organization that would lead the US to consider about withdrawing its force from Europe is totally seen as a threat and rejected by the UK. The foundation of the EDC would be the major

threat for the UK that the US might be convinced of Europe's capability of its defense. However the attitude of the US towards the EDC was different than the UK's view. They wanted to deter the USSR and contain any resurgence of the German militarism without the need for permanently stationing the US forces there.²⁷

The clear and strong support of the United States for the EDC enforced the UK at least not to work against the EDC apparently. The UK's policy of 'closest possible association', which asserted that the UK would not be a member of the organization however on the other hand by supporting the EDC from outside she would protect herself from any accusations, started in this period.

Although they have witnessed strong domestic opposition for the ratification of the EDC Treaty in their national parliaments, West Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium have ratified the Treaty in 1953. One year later Luxembourg followed those three. However August 1954 was the period of diminishing the hopes for an important step in the way of uniting Europe. The French National Assembly, Palais Bourbon, rejected the Treaty of EDC with a large majority. The efforts to establish an European Army under EDC has been failed with this veto. In this part the reasons of the veto would be evaluated.

Before coming to the French rejection, one of the most strong opposition has come from Belgium Prime Minister Van Zeeland. Van Zeeland opposed to the joint military budget in which the EDC Treaty required. The

²⁷Ibid, p:78

head of Brussels government opposed an European Army, although Belgium would have only had to pay 3 percent of the cost. Most of the money was being contributed by the United States. The Belgian leader demanded that the joint budget should not exceed the sum of the military budget of each country, and Belgium beat all records for frugality in military expenditures. The attempt to get each country to contribute its share to the common budget failed.²⁸

The Pleven Plan has divided the French Socialists into two groups. The first group was gathered under General De Gaulle and called themselves as Gaullist. Gaullists were arguing that the foundation of the European Army would mean the sacrifice of the French Army. On the other hand, the second Socialist group was defending the idea that, the foundation of the European Army would lead European Forces to serve for the USA.

Charles De Gaulle, was leading the opposition in France against the entire process of the EDC Treaty. He was a former general in the French Army and experienced all the destructive scenes of the war. He has entered into politics just after the war and always taken as a significant political actor. When the first assumptions on European Army were brought, De Gaulle argued that *'before the establishment of European Army, Europe must be integrated on the basis of Franco- German entente.'* In one his speech he stressed the importance of joint defense system and the French inspiration for taking up the leadership and responsibility for this plan under a supreme command consisting of council of nations and general staff.

²⁸Bromberger S.M. 1968. *United States of Europe*. New York: Coward&Maccann Inc. p:114

Secondly, De Gaulle was objecting to give European Army under the command of the US General. De Gaulle was favoring to establish a federation or confederation in Europe where the states would not face with threat of losing sovereignty. De Gaulle wanted to establish a common policy under the leadership of France. This common policy would be based on the Continent's desire for independence. When agreement had been reached on a general defense and economic policy, this unity of thought and will would take the form of a confederation which, like all confederations in the making, would eventually be called a federation.²⁹ However the EDC was requiring the transfer of sovereignty of the member states under a supranational community where he was believing that an European Union is far more to reach. The US command of European Army would increase the influence of the United States and lead to the loss of sovereignty. Actually in some parts, De Gaulle was a bit more emotional on issues. He was still regarding France as a world power and denying the dynamics of the day. The intentions of De Gaulle against the EDC were evaluated as anti- American by most of the authorities including the USA.

Eventually De Gaulle can not be taken as the only reason for the French rejection of the EDC. French military was also not willing to support the Treaty. French General Billotte had submitted a report pointing out the possible risks of the EDC for France. There were important differences between the Pleven Plan and the EDC Treaty. First of all, the Pleven Plan was intending to establish an European Army where France would be forming the

²⁹Ibid,p:121

half of the force. However in the EDC Treaty, Germany would take the one-third of the force. Secondly, the Pleven Plan suggested French command of the European Army. Unlike the Pleven Plan, the EDC Treaty gave the command of the European Army to the Board of Commissioners in which Germans were also the founding members. Thirdly, the EDC Treaty was limiting the production of plutonium by 500 grams for each member country. France was the only country which has the capability to produce and use plutonium for military purposes. However by accepting the EDC Treaty, France was also accepting to limit itself and permit Germany to use plutonium for any purpose in which the treaty stressed '*No discriminatory measures against Germany*'. The last and the most intolerable issue for France was German insistence on the absolute equality. This stated that member states' votes in the EDC Council were weighted by the size of their national contribution to the EDC. More soldiers mean more votes.³⁰ Actually, this condition was very critical for France because of its colonial war in Indo-China. In 1952, France decided to transfer part of its divisions from the EDC force to Indo- China. This transfer would reduce the number of the French divisions in the EDC from fourteen to ten where West Germany had twelve divisions. The consequence of this change would be the German domination of the EDC. Those facts were totally conflicting with the Pleven Plan and supported the arguments of the French opponents towards the EDC.

French society was also opposing to German rearmament just as the French politicians. It was only 25 % of the public that thinking about German

³⁰Dedman M. J. 1996.*The Origins and Development of the European Union*. London:Routledge. p:82

rearmament would not cause any harm. The public tendency towards the EDC might be linked to the increase in the support of the French Socialists and Communists where any plan or idea supported by the USA is rejected under anti- American understanding.

The international developments mainly the armistice in the Korean War also effected the EDC. The beginning of the Korean War has opened the period of mutual defense understanding by including Germany in Europe. However by the solution is reached even through military means, the passion of coming together and forming an European Army lost its importance.

The last cause of the failure of the EDC might be the brief summary of the all. Each state wanted to preserve its own national army during the EDC process. In other words none of the European countries were accepted the supranational control of their defense and security by giving their national army under other's command. The idea of forming the EDC was structurally taken from the High Authority of Steel and Coal Community, which was founded on the principle of highly structured with supranational character.

However the structure of the EDC was not shaping with the founding principle in which the governments were insisting to preserve the control of their national armies and to hide the right of veto in the decision making. 'Commissariat of nine members' was the governing body of the EDC which was supposed to be elected for six years.

But the scope of the supranational authority contemplated for this new agency would not have been comparable to that of the High Authority, the

Commissariat having been greatly limited in its discretion by the powers committed to the Council of National Ministers, the agency whose six members acted as the protectors of the sovereign rights of their respective states.³¹

Perhaps the most serious criticism one might make of the Pleven Plan is that a European army requires a government to head it. And Europe had no leader, no policy; its army neither a European commander nor a flag.³²

Even though Europe has taken a considerable progress through establishing a common defense institution; political, economic, financial and governmental dimensions were needed to be develop under a common policy understanding. De Gaulle's argument for the absence of spiritual entity in Europe would not consolidate a strong common policy where Monnet wanted to overcome this obstacle with the formation of autonomous communities. The failure of the EDC did not stop the US and British intentions of rearming Germany or postpone the European attempts for a common defense policy.

2.2.3. The Western European Union

Although the idea of establishing an European Army had been risen from the French political scientists and politicians, the rejection of the EDC Treaty by the French National Assembly passed the initiative for finding a way for European Defense to the United Kingdom. The failure of the EDC lead the United Kingdom to search for new alternatives in which Federal

³¹Zurcker A. 1958. *The Struggle to Unite Europe*, New York: NY University Press. p:90

³²Bromberger S.M. 1968. *United States of Europe*. New York: Coward&Maccann Inc. p:121

Republic of Germany would be integrated into the Western European security system. Under the leadership of the United Kingdom, Brussels Treaty powers, United States, Canada, Italy and Federal Republic of Germany were conducted London Conference in September 1954. Italy and Federal Republic of Germany were invited to join to the Brussels Treaty and the conclusion of the conference has come with the Paris Agreement. There has been three new treaties signed in Paris Conference which was met with the efforts of the United Kingdom in 23 October 1954. The first treaty gave back the sovereignty rights to the Federal Republic of Germany and ended the occupation. Federal Republic of Germany was accepted to be a member of NATO with the second treaty and finally with the introduce of the last agreement, the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948 was modified and Western European Union is reactivated with the participation of Italy and Federal Republic of Germany.³³

The signatories of the Western European Union (WEU) set out three objectives in the preamble as;

- To create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery.
- To afford assistance to each other in resisting any policies of aggression.
- To promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe.³⁴

The WEU played an important role in the solution of several matters between the years 1954 - 1973. First of all, the WEU helped to integrate

³³Rees, G. W. 1998. *The Western European Union at the Crossroads: Between Trans- Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration*. Oxford: Westview Press. p:4-5

³⁴<http://www.weu.int> accessed on 23 March 2005

Federal Republic of Germany to the Atlantic Alliance. Secondly, the settlement problem of Saar between Germany and France has been solved by a referendum in which the residents voted for German governance. Thirdly, 'The Agency for the Control of Armaments' and the 'Standing Armaments Committee' is established in order to restore the confidence among the member states. Actually the foundation of the Agency was the final step of the monitoring national armament programs of the member states. The other supportive measures were taken by restricting the production of biological, chemical, nuclear weapons, some other classic weapons of destruction, missiles above the range of thirty- two kilometers, the battleships exceeding three thousand tons and the sub-marines exceeding the weight of three hundred and fifty tons. The final contribution of the WEU was establishing a consultative bridge between the founding members of the ECSC and the United Kingdom.

The Brussels Treaty Organization became the Western European Union of seven members, and members agreed to maximum force levels, ultimately under NATO command. Britain committed itself to maintaining a minimum of four divisions and air support on the continent, and not to withdraw them without the agreement of the majority of the WEU. Thus the chasm which had opened up between the six and the UK was, in one respect at least, closed.³⁵ The WEU's liaison role between the United Kingdom and the ECSC is ended with the UK's participation to the European Community in 1973.

³⁵Hill C. and Smith K.2000. *European Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge. p:40

The foundation of the WEU was one of the most important milestones for the European defense system however it has also increased the challenge in Europe. The USSR gave its response by establishing the Warsaw Pact with Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia in May 1955. Actually those countries were bound to the USSR with bilateral agreements and with the formation of the Warsaw Pact, the division within the Europe and Germany became more obvious.

The WEU did not perform effectively between the years of 1973 to 1984. The WEU's economic, social and cultural roles had been taken over by the OEEC and the Council of Europe. The WEU Council's political activities lost much of their relevance with the development of European Political Cooperation.³⁶

Article IV of the WEU Treaty clearly asserted the close co-operation with the NATO and in order to prevent any confusion, conflict or duplication with respect to their related tasks, it is suggested to the WEU Council give all the information and comments to the military bodies of the NATO. The main reason of this close co-operation was the US priority for the Western European States on the military-security issue. In accordance with this statement, European security is shaped under the NATO sphere during the Cold War years and the WEU is not experienced much on security matters until the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the USSR.

The WEU started to regain its importance by the 1980's. European

³⁶<http://www.weu.int> accessed on 23 March 2005

Political Cooperation(EPC)³⁷ faced with the difficulties due to the economic aspects of the security issues and just one year after in 1981, the Genscher-Colombo Plan which was a German- Italian initiative supported by the United Kingdom on defense and cultural co- operation and cultural identity is failed. In addition to the political developments in Europe, the policies of the United States about Europe started to change. The US decision in 1983 to launch the 'Star Wars' programme without consulting Europe encouraged the EC countries to consider the need for a stronger European dimension to European security.³⁸ Actually the launch of the Star Wars programme was aiming to decrease US military force in the European Continent. The US President Ronald Reagan was supporting the project without giving importance to the European suspicions. In the light of those developments, French and Belgium governments forced the members of the WEU to conduct a meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers in Rome on 26 and 27 October 1984.

The meeting in Rome was the relaunch of the WEU and the preparatory step for the Hague Platform of 1987. It was agreed to conduct the meetings of Foreign and Defense Ministers twice a year and adopted the Rome Declaration. The declaration was indicating the reactivation of the WEU; Continuing necessity to strengthen the Western security, and that better utilization of the WEU would not only contribute to the security of the Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defense of all the

³⁷European Political Cooperation, see page:52

³⁸Jones A. R. 1996. *The Politics and Economics of the European Union*. Cheltenham:Edward Elger. p:267

countries of the Atlantic Alliance.³⁹ The meeting of Rome was also important for the introduction of the concept 'European Security Identity' and the confirmation of the WEU Council's right to consider about the conflicts and crisis in the other parts of the world.

In the following years, the USA and the USSR were agreed to reduce their intermediate nuclear missiles and this led to the WEU States for a closer consultation on European security and defense. The WEU Council has submitted a report on European Security conditions and the WEU's responsibilities within the Alliance. In accordance with the report, the WEU Ministerial Council held a platform in the Hague regarding 'Platform on European Security Interests' in October 1987. The Hague Platform set out the future programme of the WEU focusing on integration of the European States on security and defense aspects and the willingness of the WEU States to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. European States stressed in the Hague platform that, the inspired European Integration would be incomplete if it does not contain security and defense dimensions.

The Hague platform also realized the first joint action of the WEU. The Persian Gulf has been effected from the sea mines as a consequence of the war between Iraq and Iran. The mined area was constituting a threat for the navigation in the international waters. The Strait of Hormuz is cleaned from the mines by the minesweepers provided by WEU under 'The Operation Cleansweep'.

Before mentioning about the WEU Operations, it would be better to

³⁹<http://www.weu.int> accessed on 2 April 2005

evaluate the structure of the organization. There are twenty- eight members of the WEU in four different categories. In the first category there are ten full members which are both the members of the European Union and the NATO. In the second category there are three associate members ; Turkey, Iceland and Norway which are the members of the NATO but not belong to the EU. The third category is consisted of the observer countries; Ireland, Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden. The observer countries were the members of the EU but not belong to the NATO. The final category is the associate partners which are signed 'Europe Agreements' with the EU however still not belong to the EU. After the last EU Enlargement in 2004, there are only two associate partners(Bulgaria and Romania) waiting for the full membership.

Observers may attend to the WEU Council meetings and are invited to working- group meetings where they may, on request, speak. Associate members may take a full part in the Council meetings and in its working groups. They may associate themselves with the decisions of members states and can take part in the WEU military operations. Associate member status excludes security guarantees. Associate partner status involves various forms of consultation and co- operation, but also excludes security guarantees.⁴⁰

The general and important policies of the WEU are decided in the Council of Ministers (WEU Council) which is composed of the foreign and defense ministers of the member states. The Council is chaired for six months

⁴⁰Jones A. R. 1996. *The Politics and Economics of the European Union*. Cheltenham:Edward Elger. p:268

on a rotating basis and has been synchronized with the EU presidency.⁴¹ Besides the WEU Council, there is a Permanent Council composed of the representatives of the member states. The Permanent Council is chaired by the WEU Secretary- General and performs ' day-to-day' management.

There are also two institutions which operate under the WEU. The 'Institute for Strategic Studies' is established to be a consultative (think- tank) organ to the WEU and centered in Paris. Secondly, the WEU has founded a Satellite Center for evaluation of satellite information and intelligence purposes in the crisis.

In order to strengthen the WEU' s military capabilities, 'Defense Planning Cell' and 'Situation Center' are established in October 1992, which are based in Brussels. The 'Planning Cell' was responsible for the Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU). Although the idea of the European Army is failed in 1950's, 'Eurocorps' an Franco- German brigade consisting of fifty-thousand troops is established as a part of FAWEU. Eurocorps is expected to operate in situations outside the remit of NATO, or where NATO has decided not to act. Eurocorps falls under NATO command where defense of NATO territory is required.⁴² Besides to the foundation of Eurocorps, European Land Force (EUROFOR) and European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) were established with the participation of Italy, Spain, France and Portugal. There are also four other multinational forces which are operating under the WEU. Those are Multinational Division, UK- Netherlands Amphibious Force, the

⁴¹Collester J. B. 2000. *The State of The European Union*. New York: Oxford. p:374

⁴²Jones A. R. 1996. *The Politics and Economics of the European Union*. Cheltenham:Edward Elger. p:269

Headquarters of the First German- Netherlands Corps and Italian- Spanish Amphibious Force. The important feature of the FAWEU is, any member can provide the force without looking at their status. Using strategy provided by the WEU Council, the Planning Cell then develops contingency plans to use the FAWEU. Those plans, however, are not designed for a specific country, an Iraq or Bosnia. Instead planning is called generic , and a force-package would be designed using five parameters: Size of threat, distance from deployable force, intensity of the conflict, projected time and the cost of the operation. Generic plans for humanitarian and rescue- type operations, the lower end of the Petersberg tasks, have been written, are available to be used in exercises. Generic plans are now being written for traditional peacekeeping operations and the use of force in crisis management situations.⁴³ There were also two supportive bodies to the Planning Cell ; The Permanent Military Staff and The Military Delegates Committee.

The Maastricht Treaty set out two important tasks for the WEU. According to the declaration in Maastricht, the WEU both would strengthen the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and at the same time regarded as the responsible for the EU' s future defense. However the Maastricht is not given WEU the capability of being EU' s defense arm. In accordance with this development, the WEU meeting in Bonn issued the 'Petersberg Declaration' where the new tasks of the WEU for the future scope including humanitarian and rescue, crisis management and conflict prevention tasks set forth.

Those were called as 'Petersberg Tasks' however the WEU was far

⁴³Collester J. B. 2000. *The State of the European Union*. New York: Oxford. p:375

beyond to afford necessary resources for the operations. In order to carry out the Petersberg Tasks, the WEU was in need of the NATO assets.

One of the most potentially, most useful capabilities of the WEU is actualizing an innovative concept called 'combined, joint task forces' (CJTF), which permits the WEU members, at the EU's behest, and with NATO assent- and NATO assets – to form military task forces structured for a particular operational purpose.⁴⁴

These purposes might include humanitarian relief, peacekeeping or peace enforcement. 'Combined' signifies two or more states (e.g. France and Germany) are participating in a task force, and 'joint' means two or more services (e.g. Army and Navy) are involved. So a CJTF is a deployable multinational and multiservice formation generated and tailored for specific, contingency operations. The CJTF concept allows the WEU, and thus the EU, to avail itself of NATO (and hence US) assets without subjugating itself to the USA.⁴⁵

The introduction of the CJTF also ended the European attempts to downgrade the role and importance of the NATO. There has been several proposals came from France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy in order to develop an independent or autonomous European Institution on Defense.

The implementation of the CJTF has increased the co-operation and co-ordination between the NATO and the WEU-EU.

⁴⁴Gordon P. 1997. *Does the WEU have a Role?* The Washington Quarterly 20/1 p:125-40

⁴⁵Collester J. B. 2000. *The State of the European Union*. New York: Oxford. p:376

The WEU has performed many operations both co-operating with NATO or alone with its own assets under the United Nations Resolutions. As the first the WEU operation 'Cleansweep' is succeeded, the WEU participated to the naval blockade of Iraq with NATO during the Gulf War in 1990-1991. In July 1992, the WEU Council decided to monitor the embargo against former Yugoslavia by its naval force. On June 1993, the WEU and NATO Councils decided to act under joint operation called 'Operation Sharp Guard'. During the 'Operation Sharp Guard' almost six thousand ships were inspected and more than a dozen were caught while breaking the embargo.

In the same year the WEU Council decided to provide assistance to Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania while they were trying to enforce the UN sanctions on Danube. In the context of the assistance, customs and civilian police operations were conducted. Three control areas were founded; Mohacs-Hungary, Ruse-Bulgaria and Calafat-Romania. *'Danube Operation'* was the first concrete example for the co-operation of different parties as the Associate Members within the WEU, OSCE and WEU. The operation is come to an end with the following of Dayton Peace Agreements and withdrawal of the UN arms embargo to Danube.

Due to the political situation in the city of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EC Member States requested assistance from the WEU. The WEU responded to this request by establishing 'Police Contingent' to Mostar in 1994. The aim of the WEU police contingent was to assist the Bosnian and

Croat parties in Mostar to set up a unified police force for Mostar.⁴⁶ The police force has come to its highest strength with the participation of Sweden, Finland and Austria in 1995. In July 1996, the mandate of the EU Administration for Mostar is passed to the EU Special Envoy which would carry out the mission to the end of the year.

The WEU Council also assisted to Albania with the Multinational Advisory Police Element(MAPE) in 1997. As it can be understood from name of the force, the MAPE had aimed to provide advisory and training assistance. There has been about three thousand police officers trained in the centers of Tiran and Durres. In 1999, the WEU decided to enhance the MAPE mission. The WEU' s mission played an important role during the Kosovo refugee crisis from April 1999 by supporting the Albanian police in their responsibilities for receiving, registering, supervising and escorting refugees. The MAPE maintained constant contacts with the Ministry of Public Order. The WEU assisted the Albanians in setting up their own joint crisis center and a 24-hour MAPE presence was provided to support them in its operations and decisions.⁴⁷ The mission of the MAPE is ended in May 2001.

The WEU has performed two more operations ; The WEU De-mining Assistance Mission (WEUDAM) in 1999 and General Security Surveillance Mission in Kosovo in 1999. The WEUDAM is ended by 2001 and the WEU provided technical and advisory support to Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC). The WEU Satellite Center is focused on Kosovo region in

⁴⁶NATO Handbook 2001. Belgium: NATO Office of Information and Press. p:368

⁴⁷www.weu.int accessed on 14 April 2005

'General Security Surveillance Mission' in order to provide information for the EU, NATO and OSCE for monitoring Belgrade Agreements. The mission is ended by 1999.

The Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 laid down three choices for the integration of the WEU to the EU's CFSP. Those were ; rather the WEU would stop to act independently and go into a complete integration or the goal of complete integration would be postponed for a near future by maintaining the WEU structures and lastly, the WEU would maintain its intergovernmental structure and operational capability while developing a stronger relation with NATO. Actually both the gradual integration of the WEU to the EU and the WEU's close co-operation with NATO can be evaluated as the best way for the development of the CFSP and maintaining the Atlantic Alliance. The link between the WEU and the EU is strengthened with the Treaty of Amsterdam. Treaty of Amsterdam succeeded to fasten the integration of WEU to the EU. The details will be discussed in the following chapters.

2.3. The Foundation of the European Political Co-operation

2.3.1. Rising Importance of Political Co-operation over the European Community

The failure of the European Defense Community could be linked to several reasons however the most important as the lack of political infrastructure for the political unification in Europe. Monnet's idea of

establishing an European Army is appeared to be infunclional without a common foreign policy. The implementation of a common foreign policy with the defense and security dimensions would not be considered without the foundation of political control which would include supranational character among all the member states. In order to achieve the success of the European Defense Community , it was agreed to establish a complementary body which lead to the idea of European Political Community in 1953.

The Ad Hoc Assembly in Strasbourg which was set up on the basis of Article 38 of the EDC Treaty went beyond the technicalities of the EDC by boldly proclaiming a supranational European Community in which member states would clearly be relegated to a secondary position, not least in the conduct of external relations. A Legislative Parliament was to be elected with directly elected deputies in the first chamber, and national representatives in the Senate. The Senate was to elect the President of the European Executive Council, who appointed the other members on the principle of not more than two from one country. A 'Council of National Ministers' would seek to ensure harmonization with the actions of Member States. A Single Court would oversee the ECSC, the EDC and this new EC. Other detailed provisions were made for economic and social policy and integration with the ECSC. The provisions for the international relations, included here, are remarkably interesting for the way in which they anticipate the later procedures and problems of the EPC and the CFSP. Their direct statements, such as 'the Community shall ensure that the foreign policies of Member States are co-

ordinated' (Article 69) betray the theoretical nature of the exercise. Not only was there no experience of diplomatic coordination of this kind to fall back on, but also at this time, only eight years after the end of the Second World War, five of the six states in question had barely managed to develop independent foreign policies, and the sixth, France, was preoccupied with colonies in North Africa and Indo- China. In such circumstances such a statement seemed far less problematical than it does today.⁴⁸

The rejection of the EDC Treaty in French National Assembly in 1954 has also failed the European Political Community. It was clearly understood that European Continent needed time to eliminate historical suspicions among themselves and to form a political union. However as the failure of the EDC is lead to the reactivation of the WEU which soon became the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, the failure of the European Political Community also lead to Treaty of Rome (1957) which can be undoubtedly seen as one of the major step for the emerge of the European Political Cooperation with the foundation of the European Economic Community(EEC).

The failure of the EDC is not ended French intergovernmentalist attempts towards establishing foreign policy cooperation. De Gaulle had came to power in 1958 again to France who both aimed to make Europe as the third superpower and defending the policy of '*L' Europe des Patries*'(a Europe of Fatherlands). Although supranational schemes were an anathema to General De Gaulle who believed in the sanctity of the nation state and '*L' Europe des Patries*'(a Europe of Fatherlands) , he nevertheless agreed to honor the French

⁴⁸Hill C. and Smith K., *European Foreign Policy*, Routledge, London, 2000, p:32

commitments to the Treaty of Rome. The early success of the EEC convinced De Gaulle that it could serve French political interests, with French leadership and ideas and a close alliance with West Germany laying the foundations of a new Europe. A Paris-Bonn Axis with France riding the German horse, would ensure French regional leadership in Western Europe, restore French prominence politically and diplomatically and provide a sense of mission post-decolonization.⁴⁹

French President De Gaulle has settled his idea of '*union of states*' on two goals. First of all, De Gaulle wanted France to play a leader role in the cooperation of foreign and defense policies among the EEC states. However while trying to implement this idea he was aiming to realize French leadership by ignoring the institutional frameworks of the NATO and the EEC. Secondly, he wanted to institutionalize Franco- German cooperation. Actually in 1959, the six members of the EEC had agreed to meet three times a year in order to discuss and negotiate the EEC politics in Foreign Ministers level.

Christian Fouchet, French Ambassador to Copenhagen, has started to work on determining principles and alternatives of forming a foreign policy cooperation in the spring of 1961. Fouchet was heading to a study committee and finalized his first plan as the Draft Treaty for the Establishment of an European Political Union in 2 November 1961. The proposed Fouchet Plan had, completely in line with the Gaullist conception of '*Europe des Patries*', basically an intergovernmental structure. It suggested the creation of a council of heads of governments or foreign ministers that would establish the practice

⁴⁹Dedman J.M.,*The Origins and the Development of the EU*, Routledge,London,1996,p:112

of regular summit meetings, the founding of a permanent secretariat composed of officials from the member states and the institution of an assembly whose members would be appointed by the national parliaments. To emphasize the intergovernmental character of the new enterprise, decisions would be taken unanimously.⁵⁰

The first Fouchet Plan was determining that the Union would operate on the basis of constructive abstention and unanimity with its legal personality. The response for the plan came with a strong opposition from the Benelux states. The main reason of the rejection was coming from the fears of the French domination as it was figured in the plan. In addition to that the absence of the United Kingdom was also constituting a suspicion for the Benelux states to adjust the political balance.

The concerns and suspicions of the five states lead Christian Fouchet to continue his studies. The second Fouchet Plan is shaped under these circumstances and submitted by France on 18 January 1962. The first plan has given the sense of subordination of supra- nationality and the second Fouchet Plan was aiming to eliminate this concern as well as strengthening the relations with the United Kingdom and NATO. The response to the second plan was in parallel just as to the first plan. Belgium and the Netherlands refused the proposal and submitted their own ones. Ultimately both proposals were rejected in the negative atmosphere that followed the French veto of the accession of the United Kingdom. When De Gaulle finally left office in 1969

⁵⁰Urwin D.W. 1991. *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration since 1945*. London: Longmans. p:105

it was possible for the Hague Summit of December of the same year to both put the first enlargement on track and finally to approve a modest but nevertheless quite real European Political Cooperation (EPC).⁵¹

The failure of the Fouchet Plans converted De Gaulle's concentration on West Germany, the major West European partner for France and the negotiations between two countries is started with the September of 1962. The Franco- German Treaty of Friendship and Reconciliation which actually be known as Elysee Treaty is signed on 22 January 1963. The Elysee Treaty has two important implications. Firstly, it was a consequence of the failure of the Fouchet Plans where De Gaulle abandoned his plan of broader confederation in Europe. Secondly, it was a show off towards the Benelux States which aimed to refuse the French proposals by fostering supra- nationality and disturbing France with the willingness for British involvement to the EEC.

The Treaty not only formalizes the most important of all the many bilateral relationships which continue to be an important dimension of European diplomacy, even in the CFSP era, but also sets up institutional mechanisms, such as the regular meetings at both official and ministerial level, which prefigure the multilateral versions of the EPC. Coordination presents the same basic problems whether between two or twelve states, and the EEC states were working on both the theory and practice of it well before the Davignon Report of 1970.⁵²

However France was limiting the independent action of Federal

⁵¹Vassalo J., Guide to EU Policies, Blackstone, London, 1998, p:309

⁵²Hill C. and Smith K., European Foreign Policy, Routledge, London, 2000, p:62

Republic of Germany with this Treaty. All the important questions on foreign policy and common interests would be decided under the French initiative and in a sense the provisions of the Fouchet Plans would find the opportunity to perform. The effect of this Treaty was largely nullified though in May 1963 when the *Bundestag*(the FRG' s Parliament) ratified into law a preamble to the Treaty conforming its faith in the Western Alliance and the need to integrate the EEC and the Atlantic Alliance. West Germany refused to accept permanent French leadership at the expense of its relations with the United States.⁵³ Although the consequences of the Elysee Treaty were not effective and essential, it has constructed the basis for the enhanced Franco- German cooperation in the areas of security,economics and politics in the following decades.

De Gaulle's nationalist policies have deep and strong effects towards the European Integration Process beginning with 1950' s to the late 1960's. Actually the EEC was an useful instrument for De Gaulle in order to fasten the industrial development of France through the economic integration. French economic and foreign interests have constituted the core of De Gaulle' s politics. As he leaved the Presidency in 1969, the French political attitude of aiming to be the leader among the member states is continued. However the progressive attempts towards establishing a political cooperation were resulted much positive comparing to De Gaulle's presidency period.

⁵³Dedman J.M. 1996. *The Origins and the Development of the EU*. London:Routledge. p:116

2.3.2. The Launch of the European Political Cooperation

2.3.2.1 The Davignon Report

European attempts of establishing a distinctive common foreign policy including implications on defense feared several European members of the Atlantic Alliance for constituting a threat for the integrity of the NATO. There was a sort of dilemma for the European states that they were totally giving importance and support to the NATO however they were also worrying about the predominant role of the United States in the decision- making process of the Alliance and looking for a solution to counterbalance.

Under those developments Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel submitted a relating document ; 'Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance' which is approved by the NATO Foreign Ministers in the December of 1967. It was important for two things: first, it committed the alliance to following a dual approach, accepting that military defense and deterrence must be balanced by a commitment to political detente – something of crucial importance to the Europeans, only too well aware that if superpower tensions were not defused, any conflict would reduce their countries to ruins. Second, the report epitomized the growing recognition that security guarantees were not enough, and that some means of generating collective foreign policy positions would have to be found. For these two things the Harmel Report remained an important reference point for the rest of the Cold War, but its very existence helped the Europeans to realize that there were limits to the extent to which NATO could be a genuinely multilateral political forum,

partly because of US domination and partly because a military alliance is an unwieldy and static organization, rarely capable of flexible or pro-active policy-making.⁵⁴ In this respect, the Harmel Report triggered European countries to develop European foreign policy cooperation which would be titled as European Political Cooperation in the following years without the US presence and influence.

De Gaulle's departure from his office encouraged the attempts for broadening the European Integration. The Hague Summit of 2 December 1969 is gathered under this political mood of aiming to achieve progress in the political unification and to decide on the enlargement issue. Actually those issues were addressing the way for the Community the cooperation on foreign policy.

At the Hague Conference of 1969 the leaders of the European Economic Community understood that Europe, as such, is absent from the world dialogue.⁵⁵ It was obvious for all of the European states that because of the suspicion towards themselves on articulating national interests Europe was far behind giving a common decision or action towards world politics. Both of the issues were consulted in the Summit and agreed on to study intensively.

The conference is concluded with a declaration known as 'The Hague Summit Declaration 1969'. As the Paragraph 15 of the declaration asserts ; They agreed to instruct the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, within the context

⁵⁴Hill C. and Smith K., *European Foreign Policy*, Routledge, London, 2000, p:68

⁵⁵Ifestos P. 1987. *European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy*. Aldershot: Avebury. p:150

of enlargement. The Ministers would be expected to report before the end of July 1970.⁵⁶ The member states demonstrated their determination to establish a common foreign policy. As The Hague Summit gave the duty to the Foreign Ministers of the members states to form a study committee in order to submit the report on founding a foreign policy cooperation, the Foreign Ministers appointed Belgian Foreign Minister Vicomte Davignon as the Political Director of the study. The efforts of Vicomte Davignon to find a system of foreign policy cooperation were taken some parts of the Fouchet Plans and the Draft of the European Political Community as a guide. Under the leadership of Davignon, the Foreign Ministers have founded a 'Political Committee' and managed to submit the report with four months of delay to the Luxembourg Conference of Foreign Minister on 27 October 1970. Although its official name is 'Luxembourg Report', the efforts and contributions of Belgian Foreign Minister on the study broadly named it as 'Davignon Report'. The report was clearly addressing to form a foreign policy cooperation among the EEC States as a first step for achieving political union. The report is approved in the same day and established the European Political Cooperation(EPC). Indeed, the ambition of creating a European Foreign and Security Policy runs parallel to the entire history of European integration process. Salient themes, conflicts and choices that would later European Defense Community (EDC) of 1950-54 and in the Fouchet Plan of 1961-63.⁵⁷

Before examining and evaluating the EPC deeply, one of the most

⁵⁶The Hague Summit Declaration 2 December 1969, Paragraph 15

⁵⁷Duke S., *The Elusive Quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP*, Macmillan, London,2000

important issue on the distinctive meanings of 'external' and 'foreign' policies for European Integration process should be set forth. The Treaty of Rome (TOR) has both founded and determined the internal structure of the European Community. In addition, the TOR also determined the EC on which issues or fields can perform an international action. However, as the TOR has defined the EC's participation and involvement in a series of international economic questions as an external policy, there was not any implication for developing a role in diplomatic and security issues under the context of foreign policy. There were several factors behind the restriction of the EC's involvement to foreign policy issues. First was a calculation that it was best not to discuss security questions outside the NATO, if the US was to remain fully engaged in the defense of Western Europe and the Soviets denied any opportunity to sow division between the NATO countries. Second was a belief that there was distinction between the 'low politics' of socio-economic policy making where states and their publics would often be prepared to accept sovereignty transfers in order to realize collective welfare gains and the 'high politics' of foreign policy making where sovereignty transfers would be seen as existentially threatening to nation states. Third was a related belief amongst the original policy entrepreneurs of European unification that integration would be best promoted through an incremental process beginning with small-scale acts of economic cooperation.⁵⁸

Although the distinction between the foreign and external policies still continue, at the Hague Summit it was considered that with the report of the

⁵⁸Winn N. and Lord C., *EU Foreign Policy Beyond the Nation State*, Palgrave, New York, 2001, p:21

Foreign Ministers, the cooperation on foreign policy would be based on Community understanding. However as the Davignon Report is declared, the foundation of the EPC was a limited step on forming a foreign policy cooperation behind the expectations. As the EPC was officially founded in 1970 it had no Treaty basis under the EC. This position of the EPC is continued until the Single European Act of 1986. The EPC was suggested to perform as a framework under communities on foreign policy issues by intergovernmental consultation, communication and agreed common actions.

There were many missing parts and weaknesses for the EPC structure which was set through the Davignon Report. The system is developed in an ad hoc way and operated outside the EC' s institutional structures and legislative processes, on the basis of consensus between governments. There was no voting and its provisions were not binding. Nor it did cover military aspects of security.⁵⁹ In addition, the Report did not proposed an EPC Secretariat and suggested minimum participation of The European Parliament and the European Commission to the decision- making process.

The working procedure of the EPC, which was drawn by the Davignon Report also contained inadequacies. The Report was assuming the meeting of the Foreign Ministers for ' at least six months', which makes it twice a year and it did not put suggestion for meetings of the heads of the governments.

Apart from the meetings of the Foreign Ministers, the Davignon Report introduced a Political Committee which would be consisted of the

⁵⁹Jones A. R. , *The Politics and Economics of the European Union*, Edward Elger, Cheltenham,1996,p:262

Political Directors, working in the national foreign ministries of the member states and function as an ad hoc working group. Lastly on the Davignon Report, although the Report did not satisfy the expectations of a communitarian understanding for foreign policy, it has constructed a simple model for the basis of taking progressive steps towards the other reports in the following years.

The Political Committee and the governments of the EC States were started to work on the development of the EPC just after the Luxembourg Summit. As the studies were fastened, it became clear that a Secretariat is needed for the EPC in order to guide the entire Community, which was supposed to be located in Paris or Brussels. As the political attitudes of the European States on the EPC will be explained in the following pages, the absence of De Gaulle is mostly felt by all the member states during the studies on broadening the EPC where as without sticking to the federal- con federal arguments or polarizing the matters. This positive working atmosphere lead the EPC to develop and determine its own path in progress and the idea of 'Revolving Presidency' is accepted by the all members.

In order to evaluate the current institutional developments of the EPC and the enlargement issue, as well as to discuss the relations with the United States and CSCE, it was agreed to gather in Paris by the October of 1972. The EC Member States were met on 21 October 1972 in Paris and announced a declaration widely known as 'Paris Declaration'.

This meeting called for the transformation of 'the whole complex' of

EEC and Member States' relations into a political union before the end of the 1970's, and requested a report to this end from the Community institutions. For their part foreign ministers were asked to report by 30 June 1973 on how to improve the EPC. The EPC was beginning to emerge as a practical, a discrete, form of diplomatic harmonization, rather than an alternative model to the supranational Communities. The next report was anticipated by the announcement that foreign ministers would now meet four times a year.⁶⁰

Apart from those, there is another significant feature of the Paris Conference of 1972. The 7th paragraph of the Conference Declaration introduced the concept of '*European Union*' as a goal for the EC Member States in the search for a possible further political cooperation. It was the first time for launching '*European Union*' which also led to the launch of the concept '*European Identity*'.

As it was agreed for a second report for the EPC, the Copenhagen Report is announced on 23 July 1973. Vicomte Davignon was again the major contributor of the report. It still betrays some signs of the tensions between those who hoped that the EPC would transcend its own limitations and carry the whole integrationist project forward, and those (like the British) who saw it as a pragmatic form of assistance to national foreign policy. In fact, it was less than the first and more than the second.⁶¹

The Copenhagen Report has increased the ministerial and civil level meetings and at the same time founded '*working parties*' and '*correspondents*'

⁶⁰Hill C. and Smith K. 2000.*European Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge. p:80

⁶¹Ibid, p:83

group'. A telex system called COREU(*Correspondence Européenne*) is established in order to provide a continuous exchange of information between the EPC member states. There was not any effort on establishing a collective diplomacy up to the Copenhagen Report. However The Report paved the way for the EPC member states to coordinate and cooperate their positions in the international meetings in which more than one of the member state is participated. This cooperation of the EPC member states in the international institutions also lead the EC embassies to work together in the third countries.

The EC ambassadors (in the third countries) prepared joint reports, shared information and made policy recommendations to officials at home. They also conducted common démarches in third countries, held common debates with high representatives of third countries, and cooperated during crisis situations without much guidance from foreign capitals, links between missions became a vital back-door channel to achieving political cooperation. This was occasionally even resented by Foreign Ministers and by the Political Committee ; the French attempted to put an end to such activity in the 1980's.⁶²

The Copenhagen Report had some blurred parts also. Although the EPC was institutionalized by the Report, the relations of the EPC and the EC were not clearly defined. However by determining the rules of engagement between the EPC and the European Parliament(EP) and requiring annual communication from the EPC Ministers to the European Parliament to

⁶²Smith M.E., Rules, *Transgovernmentalism and the Expansion of EPC*, in Sandholtz W. and A. Stone Sweet A. 1998 *European Integration and Supranational Governance*. Oxford:Oxford University Press. p:314-15

demonstrate 'the progress in work' , have established the links between the EPC and the institutions of the European Community. However the issue of determining the role of the Presidency on taking initiatives and to lead for having a consensus, was not solved.

2.3.2.2.The Declaration on European Identity

The Israeli- Arab conflict constitutes one of the most important weakness of the European Union towards taking a common action. The war of 1973, which generally known as 'Yom Kippur War' created a fragile atmosphere among the EC members towards acting a common foreign policy. The surprise attacks on two fronts from Egypt and Syria began on October 6, 1973, which was Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year for the Jewish people. The tide of the war began to turn on October 10. The Syrians were pushed back and Israel advanced into Syria proper. Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal and surrounded the Egyptian Third Army on October 21. The war started an international crisis when the Soviet Union responded to a plea from Egypt to save its Third Army by threatening to send troops to assist Egypt.⁶³

The interfere and the support of the superpowers brought the war into a dangerous situation. The negotiations were started between the US and Soviet diplomatic authorities to end the war. Finally on October 25, 1973, the cease-fire agreement is signed by the parties. During the war, EC did not manage to declare a common attitude towards any of the party. Actually this short but dangerous war demonstrated the weakness of the EC to itself for its

⁶³<http://campus.northpark.edu/history/WebChron/MiddleEast/YomKippurWar.html> accessed on 5 May 2005

insufficient attempts on common foreign policy. In accordance to those developments, the Foreign Ministers of the EPC were gathered again in Copenhagen after six months of the declaration of the Copenhagen Report on December 1973.

The far reaching attempt of this Declaration to define Europe's place in the world and to look forward (once again) to the construction of a united Europe was a not illogical response to a situation in which the United States appeared bent on pursuing global policies with barely a nod in its allies' direction, while the newly powerful oil-producing states were willing to embargo their European customers for political reasons.⁶⁴

The Declaration on European Identity was also a response to the US Secretary Kissinger's speech of 'Year of Europe'. The term identity is referred as the determination of the process of the EC relations with the other countries. Still the tone of the declaration is noticeably urgent and indicates a recognition that, somehow, the EPC would have to advance rapidly from procedure to substance if it was to serve the distinctive European interests (and values) which now seemed so starkly exposed.⁶⁵

2.3.2.3. Paris Summit of 1974

The relations between the United States and the European Community were damaged because of the political developments like, the different political attitudes towards Middle East War, the conflict within the OPEC and Kissinger's speeches on Trans-Atlantic relations. On one hand, the United

⁶⁴Hill C. and Smith K. 2000. *European Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge. p:92

⁶⁵Ibid, p:92

States was underestimating the role of the EPC and have the opinion of the launch of the 'European Identity' is a European step for separating itself completely from the United States, on the other hand, EC did not want to allow the US to interfere its policy making procedure at any level. In order to make the relations better as before and common external threat from the OPEC, European Foreign Ministers were gathered in an informal meeting at Schloss Gymnich of Rhineland in 10 June 1974. This was the first informal meeting without any officials and written documents. A compromise has been achieved which is widely known as '*Gymnich Formula*' and it is agreed that the United States would be treated as special in contrast to the other third countries. In addition, EC Presidency would consult to the United States on behalf of all its partners. This compromise is also accepted by the United States and the implementation of this agreement avoided numerous unnecessary disputes between the US and the EC.

As Paris Summit of 1972 reflected the inspiration of the EC Member States on having a greater role for the EPC as well as to construct a permanent and systematic relationship, the Member States were gathered for the further steps in Paris again on 10 December 1974.

The foreign policy of the EC became the major activity sphere of the European Council. The European Council, which would play an ever- greater role in the external policy of the EC, was institutionalized at the Paris Summit of 1974.⁶⁶ In addition, in order to provide the continuity of the policies, an arrangement called '*troika*' is started to function. '*Troika*' basically refers to

⁶⁶Vassalo J. 1998. *Guide to EU Policies*. London: Blackstone. p:310

the last, current and next holder of the Council Presidency and aimed to create a consultative atmosphere among those three members.

The Paris Summit of 1974 also ended the dualism on the meetings of the EC and the EPC. The meetings of the EPC(The Conference of Foreign Ministers) were held at different locations and time, however as it is agreed in the Summit it is permitted to make the EPC meetings at the same time in the Council meetings. Lastly for this Summit, Leo Tindemans, the Belgian Prime Minister is appointed to submit a report for the next stages of the European Integration.

2.3.2.4.The Tindemans Report

Leo Tindemans, Belgian PM, was one of the leading European enthusiastic and also a strong supporter of further European Integration. According to Tindemans, European Foreign Policy is the vital need of the EC if she wants to be one of the determinant political actor of the world. His views on European Foreign Policy were mainly based on supranational features rather than federalist assumptions. The Report mentioned about the importance of 'single- decision making body' for the foreign policy issues and proposed the EPC to give a legal status and be the only responsible for the EC' s external relations. Another innovative proposal came with the Tindemans Report was on the voting procedure for the foreign policy issues. Tindemans believed that, in order to achieve unity and to show the determination on foreign policy issues, the voting procedure should be shifted from unanimity to majority voting.

The Tindemans Report on European Union in 1975 advocated many measures, such as direct elections to the European Parliament, a '*Citizens Europe*' and extension of majority voting in the Council of Ministers, which have subsequently adopted.⁶⁷

There was also a good deal of rhetoric on matters of substance, such as the need for Europe to play a major role in the '*new world economic order*', but none of this required any immediate decisions, with the exception of defense and arms manufactures, where Tindemans proposed breaching the taboo on the Community' s right to involve itself in NATO' s traditional province.⁶⁸ The proposals defined by the Tindemans Report has disturbed many European leaders. It was clear that, the enthusiasm for the economic integration of the EC states was not the same for the political union. In this respect, the report is shelved by the European Council at the Hague meeting of 1976. The Hague Meeting of 1976 showed that, the moves to achieve political union would be postponed without any time expectation by putting the issues of European Monetary Union(EMU) and other economic debates in front of the development of the EPC. However The Hague Summit of 1976 has also succeeded a positive step towards the European Integration by putting a clause for the Foreign Ministers to submit annual reports on the progress of the European Union. In accordance with this decision, the first report is submitted at the Brussels Summit of the European Council on December 1977. Actually the first Report on the European Union has demonstrated two

⁶⁷Jones A. R. 1996. *The Politics and Economics of the European Union*. Cheltenham: Edward Elger. p:22

⁶⁸Hill C. and Smith K. 2000. *European Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge. p:100

succeeded steps which are the achievement of common voting of the EC states in the United Nations and the introduce of the Code of Conduct for European firms operating in the South Africa.

The last words on the Tindemans Report would be ; The Report has showed the need of the supranationality for the demonstration of a unified Europe in the international scene. In addition, it has also showed that, as the strength of the EPC would be increased by the supranationality, the consensus on supranationality would be achieved through political union.

2.3.2.5. The London Report

Along with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the completion of Camp David Peace Accords between Israel, Egypt and the United States, the Greek accession to the European Community installed the leaders of the EC with the need to overhaul the mechanisms of the EPC to face the world. This change came by way of the publication of the London Report in 1981. The London Report provided a useful compilation of procedures introduced over the eight years since the last Report and a signal that the Political Cooperation was institutionally on the move again.⁶⁹

As the Report was accepted by the foreign ministers of the ten EPC Member States, the London Report has introduced some institutional innovations. Those were the full association of the EC Commission to the EPC matters, strengthening the role of the Presidency and the establishment of the Troika Secretariat.

⁶⁹Nuttall S. 1992.*European Political Cooperation*. Oxford:Clarendon Press. p:177

Most importantly the leaders agreed that the relationship between the EPC and the European Parliament should become, more formalized. Because of the elected nature of the Parliament and so as to reflect its growing importance, the leaders agreed that resolutions and stances adopted by parliamentarians should appear more frequently in the official statements of the EPC. The end result of these innovations was a permanent staff capable of handling the activism of the organization, a strengthened commitment to the spokesperson of the institution, and the breaking down of the barriers between the EPC and Community institutions.⁷⁰

One other innovation introduced by the Report was, for the first time it is agreed that the EPC would discuss the political aspects of the security, where the matters dealing with security were discussed in the CSCE since 1972. The London Report also added a crisis procedure to the EPC that, if the any of the foreign ministers of the three member states conclude that a matter needs urgent attention then Political Committee or all of the ministers of the EPC would gather in 48 hours.

The London Report ushered in important new tools for the EPC in the shape of sanctions and trade and aid instruments, thus giving the policy more teeth while marking the first major step in the rapprochement between the EPC and pure EC matters.⁷¹ The foreign ministers of the EPC also agreed to go beyond the consultations and to perform joint actions in the London Report.

⁷⁰Federal Republic of Germany 1982. *European Political Cooperation*. Bonn. p:278-9

⁷¹Vassalo J. 1998. *Guide to EU Policies*. London: Routledge. p:310

2.3.2.6. The Genscher- Colombo Plan

German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher and Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo were proposed a plan to the European Parliament, which is generally known as Genscher- Colombo Plan on 12 November 1981. The main goal of the Plan was to take the attention of the EC States from the issues of economics to the area of defense and security outside the NATO sphere. The Plan proposed to establish a council of defense ministers, further studies on cultural cooperation and cultural identity, common action in the area of law and order, expanding the role of the EPC Secretariat and the idea of constructive abstention. In addition, the Plan also proposed to see the EPC as the only responsible for the external relations of the EC. Actually all those proposals were the parts of rejected proposals of the previous attempts.

Genscher and Colombo wanted to succeed an European Act(treaty) which would be seen as the major step for the establishment of the European Union. However the term 'Act' is taken as impossible to use in most of the capitals, especially in London and Copenhagen.

The Act was designed to reinvigorate the European Community and produce greater efficiency though the formal inclusion of quasi-communitarian structures such as EPC into the EC. With reference to the changes that would have affected political cooperation, Genscher proposed that an European Council be created with responsibilities for the European Political Cooperation and that the Parliament be given the right to debate the EPC matters. Issues relating to security and defense policy would also become

the remit of the Council.⁷²

The rejection of the Genscher- Colombo Act by the leaders of the member states illustrates the continual struggle between the forces for and against the (*communitarianization*) of the intergovernmental Political Cooperation process. The Draft Act was perceived as being too much in favor of the former which would necessarily be to the detriment of the intergovernmental member state biased nature of these mechanisms. Changes in the way in which the EPC would relate to the institutions of the European Community would have to wait until the 1984 Doodge Report and ultimately the Single European Act of 1987.⁷³

Although the Act is rejected, The Genscher- Colombo Plan opened up the process for defining the role and the scope of the EPC. This failed Act is strengthened by the Solemn Declaration of 1983 in Stuttgart, in which the political and economic dimensions of the security were also included.

2.3.2.7.Solemn Declaration

As the Genscher- Colombo Plan is failed due to the intentions for further integration in Europe, The European Council demonstrated its will for establishing the European Union by Solemn Declaration in Stuttgart 1983. Actually the announcement of the Declaration does not seem as a further step due to its generalities. However one important innovative feature came with the inclusion of political and economic aspects to the security concept.

Even so, both Denmark and Greece entered formal reservations as

⁷²European Community 1984. *Official Journal of the European Parliament*. Brussels. p:48-9

⁷³Bronstone A. 2000. *European Security in the 21st Century*. Aldershot: Ashgate. p:161

footnotes, thus initiating the concept of 'footnote countries'. Second, the Stuttgart Declaration talked of the importance of '*consistent action*' between the EPC and the Communities, thus anticipating the provisions of the Single European Act four years later. Third, following the Genscher- Colombo Plan, there was a reference to the need for concerted action on '*international problems of law and order*', thus preparing the ground for an eventual incorporation of political cooperation over internal affairs into the legal structure of the Union, as it was indeed to become in 1990s. Finally, the ratchet mechanism which was an integral part of the Monnet method and which had been present in EPC from the outset, notwithstanding its wholly intergovernmental character, was manifest in the decision to review the Declaration not later than five years from its signature.⁷⁴

2.3.2.8. The Single European Act

Actually, before coming up to the Single European Act, which has officially institutionalized the EPC, there are two more important developments for the European Foreign Policy. The first one was the Draft Treaty on European Union which was ratified on February 1984. The Draft Treaty was the intention to refresh the pessimistic atmosphere of the Tindemans Report, however there is a very small room for the foreign policy. The major initiative of the Draft Treaty was to increase the supranational character by providing legal personality to the European Union. In addition, it was presumed to increase the all powers of the European Parliament which has stated the European Community should hold its position and assumptions

⁷⁴Hill C. and Smith K. 2000. *European Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge. p:125

clear in the international arena.

The second development was the Dooge Report of 1985 which has been submitted by Jim Dooge. The Fontainebleau European Council of 1984 has formed a committee under the presidency of Former Irish Foreign Minister Jim Dooge and appointed him to make further studies for the institutional affairs of the European Community. The Dooge Report has been submitted in 1985 and it has stressed the importance of the '*Common Market*' for the EC and also pointed that the EC Treaties should be revised for the further integration.

The Heads of State and Governments of the Twelve Member States were gathered in The Hague on 28 February 1986 in order to agree on the '*Single Market*' and the cooperation procedure between the Community institutions. The Single European Act was born out the desire to complete the single market, political union and take Community- wide advantage of the French inspired Eureka Project.⁷⁵ Although they have largely agreed on the Single European Act, it is not ratified until the July of 1987. Although the Single European Act (SEA) has important innovations for the European Foreign Policy, the SEA served as a half- way for the ones who desired to hold the national foreign policy initiative and the ones who desired to perform European foreign policy on treaty basis.

The EPC is given a treaty base by the SEA in 1987. Although there was little in the SEA that was not already established practice, and the relevant clauses were unenforceable by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the effect

⁷⁵Nuttall S. 1992. *European Political Cooperation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p:247

of bringing into the Treaty was at least to give it some protection against attempts to neglect or abandon it on the grounds that it was a purely voluntary extra to the EC membership.⁷⁶

The Title I of the SEA has codified the EPC and defined the relationship between the EPC and other institutions of the Community. The adoption of the SEA has brought the second pillar to the EC by formalizing the EPC. However unlike the Community' s supranational character on economic matters, Title III of the SEA has strongly emphasized the intergovernmental character of the EPC. One other important innovation brought by the SEA was, the required consistency between the EC external relations and the EPC. Beyond the EC Commission being fully associated with the proceedings of Political Cooperation, consistency should be maintained between the policies of the Community and EPC.⁷⁷

In addition, Title III also introduced member states to consult and inform each other on 'any foreign policy matters'⁷⁸. Actually this has broadened the scope of the EPC where it was decided that the member states should unanimously agree on any topic related to the foreign policy in the Hague Summit of 1969.

The SEA has led to the formation of the EPC Secretariat to be based in Brussels in order to help the Presidency. However the scale of the EPC Secretariat is found as insufficient by the French President Francois Mitterand

⁷⁶Ifestos P. 1987.*European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy*. Aldershot: Avebury. p:358

⁷⁷European Community, Single European Act 1986. Brussels. p:18

⁷⁸Ibid, p:18

who wanted a high – profile political secretariat with the eligibility to respond to the European Council itself. The intentions of the French President did not get support from the other members. Apart from the EPC Secretariat, The European Council received for the first time a treaty- based status, though still a very loose legal standing, in the SEA.⁷⁹

While mentioning about the innovations that Title III of the SEA has introduced to the EPC, there is also one important missing element about the cooperation on internal security where EPC fostered relation with 'Trevi Arrangements' on anti- terrorism since 1976. The ratification of the SEA made the political aspects of the security as a part of the EPC task and also mentioned about the importance of close cooperation of the EPC with the WEU and NATO.

In general, Title III codified the EPC and linked it explicitly to the Communities. In so doing it constructed a cross- roads at which member states could make choices for their future direction in the foreign policy. As the products of political bargaining, it contained both intergovernmental and communitarian elements which did, however, sit uneasily together in a single framework. It is, for example, sometimes forgotten that the SEA gave the European Parliament what became known as a new assent power over enlargement and over association agreements. This was rather more important form of foreign policy accountability than anything the parliament has achieved with respect to the EPC. But EPC was not yet capable by itself of generating agreements or treaties to be assented to, and the two forms of

⁷⁹Soetendorp B. 1999. *Foreign Policy in the European Union*. London: Pearson. p:71

activity remained in their separate compartments.⁸⁰

⁸⁰Hill C. and Smith K. 2000. *European Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge. p:139

3. SECURITY PILLAR IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: EVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY, SECURITY AND DEFENSE DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

3.1. Analyzing the Strong and Weak Aspects of the EPC

3.1.1 The Strength of the EPC

For most of its features and the resulted performances of the EPC has been graded positively. It has been praised, first, for the flexibility and inventiveness with which it assembled coordinating procedures of significant problem solving capacity without creating an integrated foreign policy bureaucracy; second, for seducing member states into a slow yet substantial convergence in their national foreign policies, where premature attempts to form a common foreign policy could have entrenched particular countries into fixed positions on either side of cleavages, defined either by attitudes to national sovereignty in foreign policy, or by differences about the kind of international actor the EC should aim to be, or by disagreements on priorities to be given to other parts of the world in the EC' s external relationships. A third argument in favor of the approach adopted by EPC was that it concentrated on consensus methods that increased the probability that states would only commit themselves to those things they were prepared to deliver ; a fourth is that it at least provided the EC countries with a 'regime of common aversion' capable of alerting member states to cases where their national foreign policies would duplicate, cancel each other out, or produce other

mutually sub- optimal outcomes that could be improved by coordination. A fifth claim is that EPC went beyond the mere reduction of policy inconsistency between member states to provide some benefits of scale and collective action; and a sixth is that by using reassuring civilian methods, limiting its pretensions, and evolving gradually, it allowed the EC countries to begin to develop a collective actorness without opposition from elsewhere in the international system.⁸¹ In the light of those supportive arguments, it would be essential to examine the first practical case of the EPC, which is widely accepted as a success of the EC with respect to different tendencies of its member states towards the Middle East.

3.1.1.1. The Euro- Arab Dialogue

The EPC was the first step for the EC to establish a common foreign policy, which in progress tried to include all the security and foreign policy aspects. The performance of the EPC has succeeded some positive outputs. One of those was the development of European reflex and attitude towards international affairs. The first practice of the EPC on forming a common policy was the Euro- Arab dialogue. In spite of the original views among the member states with respect to the Arab- Israeli conflict, the EC member states managed during several years to bridge their differences and to compromise on a common foreign policy towards the Arab- Israeli conflict and preferred course of action to solve this conflict. Moreover, this common foreign policy was a deliberate effort to follow an independent course towards the Arab- Israeli conflict and the resolution of that conflict, by which the EC as such

⁸¹Winn N. and Lord C. 2001. *EU Foreign Policy Beyond the Nation State*. New York: Palgrave. p:34

distinguished itself from the other major Western player in the Middle East, the United States.⁸²

The two strong countries of the EC; France and the UK played a determinant role while shaping the EPC' s policy towards the Israeli- Arab conflict. So in order to understand and examine the Middle East case effectively, a brief and historical-diplomatic information would be beneficial. When it is compared to the other European countries, France and the UK have the longest relations with the Middle East, including most of the Mediterranean Arab countries. But while Britain' s foreign policy towards the Middle East was dominated by the strategic importance of the region as a link between Europe and the former British colonies in Asia and East Africa and the significance of the oil reserves in the region, France was much more concerned about the control over its Mediterranean backyard, even though the French recognized the magnitude of the oil resources in the Middle East.⁸³ The collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the World War I, made the division of the region by these imperial powers, easier than it is expected. As a result of this new allocation, France get the control over Syria, Lebanon and Maghreb countries(Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria) where as, the UK established its authority over Egypt, Persian Gulf, Iraq, Palestine and Jordan. This new political environment in the Middle East strongly effected the Arab-Israeli conflict by the governance of two different imperial powers with their different interests.

⁸²Soetendorp B.1999. *Foreign Policy in the European Union*. London: Pearson. p:93

⁸³Ibid, p:94

Due to the UN partition plan of 1947, Palestine is divided into a Jewish and Arab state. The UK is blamed for this partition by the entire Arab world for many years. Just before the partition plan, the UK was decided to withdraw from the Palestine and leave those fighting parties. The main reason of the British withdrawal was the US pressure on British government about the establishment of an independent Jewish state and on the other hand the Arabs pressure to stop the entry of Jewish immigrants to Palestine. As the UK has pulled its forces, the Arab military lost the battle for occupying the territory against militarily poor Jewish community. This humiliating defeat shocked all the Arab world and increased hostility towards the British.

Gamal Abdel Nasser, who combined Arab nationalism with Arab socialism, became the leader of Egypt in 1950' s. He was mainly concerned with the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The ideas of Nasser considered as major threats for both the UK and France. As long as the UK and France aimed to downfall Nasser, he defended his post with the supports of the USA and the SU. Moreover, the influence of Nasser triggered the revolutions in Libya and Syria and Iraq, a civil war in Yemen and a coup d'etat in Jordan. Most importantly, Nasser helped to the entry of the Soviets in the Middle East. The penetration of the SU has also changed the political balance where the UK became the guardian of the Western interests appointed by the USA.

Both France and the UK were aimed to penetrate the Middle East oil by establishing friendly connections with the Arab leaders until the 1973 oil crisis. After the June War of 1967, France ended, in a demonstrative manner,

a period of very close relations with Israel. France not only became, after the Suez crisis, the main source of arms supplies for Israel, but it also cooperated with Israel in a nuclear research programme. As a matter of fact, Israel helped France to build its own bomb and France delivered to Israel the necessary components for the construction of an Israeli nuclear reactor. With the coming to power of President de Gaulle, France stopped its participation in the building of the nuclear facility in the early 1960s. By then the French bomb was ready so that de Gaulle could easily suspend the French- Israeli nuclear connection.⁸⁴

As the dependency of France and the UK increased to the Arab oil, both of the countries give more importance to the good relations with the Arabs than Israelis. In accordance to that both of them stopped to sell weapons to Israel and became one of the major arms supplier of the Arab countries. In addition, in order to be an active participant, France proposed four-power(USA, SU, UK and France) talks on the Middle East settlement process. However the four- power talks did not give any positive results.

As the EC wanted to coordinate the foreign policy issues under the EPC in the early 1970s, the Arab- Israel conflict was on the top of the agenda. The French were not only the initiators of the EPC, they were also resolved to use the EPC framework to promote their own foreign policy goals. France was determined to bring its partners closer to the French position and strengthen European support support for the Arab cause, which would in addition express

⁸⁴Aronson S. 1992. *The Politics and the Strategy of the Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East : Opacity, Theory and Reality: An Israeli Perspective*. Albany: State University of NY Press. p:61-2

European independence of American foreign policy.⁸⁵

The recognition of their dependency on the Middle East oil led to a change in the positions of the other European States on Arab- Israeli conflict. So that most of the EPC members were shifted to the Arab side under the French leadership. The consensus of this case is formalized with the voting of Benelux countries, Italy, France and Britain for the first time in UN with a collective character in favor of the Palestinian recognition. Such voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly on issues related to the Middle East conflict was, until the October war of 1973, rather an exception. The EC member-states did not actually make much progress on a joint policy towards the Arab- Israeli conflict and the real breakthrough came only as a result of the Arab use of the oil weapon during this war.⁸⁶

The war of 1973 between Egypt- Syria against Israel has changed the political climate and affected the economies of the Western European countries. The oil producing Arab countries tried to use the petroleum in order to convince the European countries to force Israel to withdraw from the occupied areas. Moreover, in order to be more effective, Arab countries were established the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries(OAPEC) and categorized the countries into two depending their position on Israeli-Arab conflict. The political pressure mainly coming from the economic means had fastened the efforts of the EPC to take a common joint declaration. The declaration was announced on 17 October 1973 and besides to call the parties

⁸⁵Nuttall S.J. 1992. *European Political Cooperation*. Oxford:Clarendon Press. p:56

⁸⁶Soetendorp B. 1999. *Foreign Policy in the European Union*. London: Pearson. p:100

for the ceasefire, the nine member states have recognized the existence of Palestinian State with legitimate rights. The declaration of the EPC has showed its effect with the decision of the OAPEC only two days later. The OAPEC decided to cut off the full oil embargo with the exception of the Netherlands. The Netherlands was the most effected country from the embargo due to its policy against the Arab countries.

In 1975, the members of the EPC has announced their statement on Palestinians that, they were the right to have and live in their homeland. A complementary action is followed with another declaration on the European Council of 1977 which stressed the importance of Palestinian national identity and their participation during the negotiations.

During a meeting of the European Council in Venice in June 1980, the heads of the government stated that the Palestinians are entitled to exercise fully their right to self- determination besides the right of Israel to existence and to security. They also declared for the first time that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) has to be associated with the negotiations on a peace settlement, even though they stopped short of recognizing the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.⁸⁷ Actually this declaration was mainly demonstrating the French views which stressed the importance of the recognition of Palestinian rights were the major step for the consolidation of peace in the Middle East.

Although the efforts and the role of the EPC stayed as secondary when

⁸⁷Lukacs Y. 1992. *The Israeli- Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p:17-19

comparing to the role of the USA, the EPC did not give up its willingness to be a part of the Middle East Peace Process. In this respect, EPC has submitted the Venice declaration as a supportive element to the US Camp David Peace Process. As a result of the Venice declaration, the EC member states managed to establish close ties with Arabs however it has deepened the gap with Israel.

To sum up this case, although the EPC could not be seen as one of the determinant actors of the Middle East Peace and Settlement Process, the efforts and in parallel the collective statements of the EPC states strengthened European Identity even by gaining experience in the international arena for the future .

3.1.1.2. The Code of Conduct on South Africa

South Africa was one of the very first cases of foreign policy where the European Community succeeded in adopting common political positions. The Community's policy on South Africa dates back to the 1970s, to the time of apartheid.⁸⁸ In the 1970s, the Member States regularly condemned apartheid but were less able to agree on active measures. Some Member States wanted to take a tough stance, others were concerned about their economic interests in the Africa's richest state. Three Member States in particular (the UK, Portugal and West Germany) opposed sanctions. The compromise first reached was the Code of Conduct for EC firms operating in South Africa on September 1977. The Code was not legally binding and at most 200,000 workers benefited from the guidelines urging desegregation and higher levels of pay for black

⁸⁸<http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12200.htm> accessed on 20 May 2005

workers. Black workers were to be free to join or form trade unions, and company funds could be used to provide social welfare measures such as housing, transport and medical insurance.⁸⁹

The deterioration of the situation in South Africa led the Community to adopt in 1985 and 1986 a twin-track policy of restrictive and positive measures with a view to exerting pressure on the regime. The restrictive measures included an embargo on trade in arms, the cessation of oil exports, an end to cultural and sporting exchanges and, subsequently, an embargo on new investments. The main positive measures involved financial aid for the victims of apartheid and the countries of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference(SADCC) that had suffered from South African destabilization.⁹⁰

As the situation in the South Africa did not improve, the European Council decided to impose further restrictive actions. However the efforts of the EPC did not get enough support from the other industrialized countries. In 1986, the EPC demonstrated its willingness for stabilizing the South Africa by proposing to act collectively with African National Congress(ANC) however the ANC discredited this proposal due to the EC' s failure on imposing sanctions. For instance, during this period only a slight rate of the trade between the EC and South Africa is affected. Especially the coal exports, which constituted the major share of their trade remained untouched.

In 1990, the release of Nelson Mandela and the introduction of a multi-

⁸⁹Hill C. and Smith K. 2000.*European Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge. p:400

⁹⁰<http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12200.htm> accessed on 25 May 2005

party system resulted in the gradual lifting of the sanctions of the European Union. In October 1993, relations with South Africa were incorporated in the areas for joint action under the Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) recently established by the Maastricht Treaty. In this context, the Commission took responsibility in April 1994 for the coordination of an electoral assistance programme drawn up for the historic elections.

On 10 May 1994, Nelson Mandela was elected as the President through the first democratic elections in the history of South Africa. Following the success of the South African electoral process, the European Union adopted immediate measures including trade measures and a development aid programme. After that, the Community was able to enter into a closer, long-term relationship with South Africa; a simplified cooperation agreement was signed in October 1994. This was an elementary text which basically contained a mutual undertaking to cooperate in all the areas of respective competence. In addition, the agreement provided the necessary framework for the European Investment Bank(EIB) operations in South Africa. As with many agreements the Community has signed with third countries, the agreement contains a strong human rights and suspension clause.⁹¹

3.1.2. The Vulnerability of the EPC

The main goal of EPC, to demonstrate Europe as a one cohesive body in the international politics and to act as one did not perform exactly in accordance with the Communitarian understanding. First of all, the EPC was

⁹¹<http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12200.htm> accessed on 25 May 2005

not an active system and did not able to give response to the crisis situations. During imposition of Martial Law in Poland, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and in Falklands crisis, the EPC lost its solidarity and showed its weakness.

The USSR had invaded Afghanistan on 26 December 1979. As a reaction, USA restricted the exports to the USSR and put a grain embargo. However the EC Foreign Ministers failed to meet within three weeks and finally announced a declaration as a condemnation for the Soviet invasion. The EPC States also failed for further action due to their divergent decisions.

Poland had a fragile political atmosphere in the early 1980's. In order to protect Poland against Soviet interference, the European Council warned the USSR in December 1980 and March 1981. However Polish government imposed the martial law and slipped down the EPC efforts. As a reaction, USA declared sanctions on Poland and the USSR and wanted the same action from the EC States. Although the foreign ministers of the member states issued a strong declaration to Poland for ending the martial law unless they would impose economic measures, the member states did not agree on economic measures. Especially Greece and Denmark opposed for the further measures and EC only put a limited embargo to Soviet imports.

Secondly, as the EPC was found on intergovernmental basis, it is became a victim of the divergences between the Member States. During the Gulf War of 1990 and Yugoslav crisis, the EPC did not manage to set a consensus where the Member States were on the different sides. Finally, the EPC was rather following a declaratory policy than aiming to perform a

common action. It has been charged with treating procedure as a substitute for policy and the issuing of statements as a substitute for taking of decisions. Because it lacked direct powers to mobilize economic or military resources, it often contended itself with statements of common positions could not always be distilled into clear and consistent signals, since they had to be pitched at a high level of generality, or punched through exceptions and circumlocutions, given the consensus methods by which EPC was constrained to proceed.⁹² Consequently, the Summits of the EC/EPC mainly gave decisions on the global developments however did not manage to succeed to perform a common action.

As the EPC has managed to succeed several outcomes, the dynamics of the changing world needed more. Besides the inadequates of the EPC as it is mentioned above, the revolutions of 1989 ; the collapse of the USSR, the retreat of Soviet influence from Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany as well as the two major crisis in the Gulf and Yugoslavia, strengthened the decision for establishing a more consistent and stronger institution. The period between 1989 up to the imposition of the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) can be regarded as a transition period for the EC' s foreign and security policy. In this part of the study, the external relations of the EC within the scope of the EPC towards the international crisis during the transition period of EPC to the CFSP would be examined.

⁹²Winn N. and Lord C.2001. *EU Foreign Policy Beyond the Nation State*.New York: Palgrave. p:35

3.1.2.1. The EPC' s Policy on Central and Eastern Europe and The Yugoslavian Civil War

As the Yugoslavian Civil War demonstrated the vulnerability of the EPC, the roots of the weakness are strongly related with the EC' s insufficient and shallow experience on the one of the most divergent country in the Balkans. Before examining the Civil War in Yugoslavia, it would be better to mention briefly about the EPC' s policy towards the Central and Eastern Europe as a supportive information.

During the period of the EPC, the EC did not establish a dialogue with the Eastern European States except the USSR. However the relations with the USSR did not go beyond a limited trade actions. The political developments between 1989-1991 lead to the collapse of Communism, the Warsaw Pact and finally the USSR.

The end of the Cold War coincided with a very dynamic period in the Community' s history. When communism began to fail in the Eastern Europe, the Single European Act had been signed, the Single European Market was under construction, economic and monetary union was under consideration, and Spain and Portugal had been admitted as new members. The Community seemed much more able to act collectively, on a wider world stage. It seemed natural that the Community would assume a leading role in transforming Europe. Certainly, the East European countries looked to the Community for leadership, and the United States encouraged the Community to provide it. But within the space of only a few years, the European Union seemed less

able to deal effectively with the end of the Cold War, which clearly was not going to be an era of worldwide peace. Enlargement to the Central and Eastern Europe, which was supposed to spread stability and security eastward, seemed to depend on intergovernmental agreement on fundamental reform of the EU, yet the member states continued to put forward different visions of the future shape of the EU. What is more, the EU was divided over how to deal with Russia in the post- Cold War period, unable to supplant the crucial US-Russian relationship.⁹³

Until the beginning of the political and economic reforms in the Eastern Europe in the mid- 1980's, relations between the countries in the western and eastern Europe were conducted essentially on a bilateral basis. The EC as such did not even have a formal relationship with its eastern counterpart the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance(CMEA), also known as Comecon. As the Soviet Union refused to recognize the EC as a distinct political entity and official relations between the EC and the Soviet Union (SU) or any of its satellite states were out of the question. The EC itself also had, for its parts, little interest in a close relationship with the eastern countries or the Comecon. The quantity of trade between the two economic blocs was not significant and the Comecon itself had no competence in the handling of the trade relations of the eastern countries. The only exceptions were Yugoslavia and Romania which followed a foreign policy course independently of the SU. The EC signed a trade and cooperation agreement with Yugoslavia in 1970, and concluded a trade agreement with Romania in

⁹³Hill C. and Smith K. 2000. *European Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge. p:268

1980.⁹⁴

The first official contacts between the EC and the Comecon were established in 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the SU. The normalization of the relations were followed with the mutual recognition of the two parties and Soviet permission to the individual eastern countries to establish official relations with the EC. In 1988, the EC signed trade and cooperation agreement with Hungary and just after one year the same agreement is signed with Poland and the SU. The EC members were welcoming the changing spirit of the Eastern European countries under the Soviet leadership. During the European Council Meetings of Rhodes 1988 and Madrid 1989, EC leaders concluded EC support and promotion of reforms to those countries. In addition, the leaders also pointed out the connection between the economic help and the foundation of democratic institutions with the creation of market economies. This approach became the EC' s official policy towards the transition in the Eastern Europe as it is declared in the European Council of Strasbourg of 1989.

In accordance with this policy, the EC started to establish new initiatives for the transformation of former Eastern planned economies to market economies. In this respect the EC launched the PHARE Programme (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring Economies) to support the economic and political reforms in those countries in 1989. The sphere of the PHARE Programme is extended in 1990 to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and East Germany until its unification. The latest stage

⁹⁴Soetendorp B. 1999. *Foreign Policy in the European Union*. London: Pearson, p:120-1

was completed with the inclusion of Baltic States, Albania, Slovenia and Croatia to the programme. The PHARE Programme offered the Central and Eastern European countries immediate food aid, tariff- free access to the EC market for a large number of products, technical and financial training necessary for the management of market- oriented economies, support for the development of the private sector, contribution in the financing of projects aimed at economic restructuring, assistance to major infrastructure projects and help in the process of democratic institution building.⁹⁵

While the discussions were continuing on the European New Security Architecture, the Yugoslavian crisis had risen in 1991 with demonstrating the all brutalities of a diverse Europe. As the crisis in Yugoslavia showed the ultimate weaknesses of the EC/EU States on political and military sides, it has also showed the importance of NATO for the EC/EU, where most of the European States supposed NATO as a Cold War institution.

The Yugoslav Federation gave the signals of disintegration in the spring of 1991. Although the international community including the USA and the EC Member States tried to convince the six republics to stay together due to the possible fatal consequences of the disintegration, the war broke out in June 1991. The leaders of the EC States immediately showed their ambition as acting as a mediator in the Yugoslav crisis. Frustrated by the EU' s inability to play a major mediating role in the Middle East Peace process, but encouraged by its ability to play a leading role in the transformation process in eastern and central Europe, the EU leaders were sure that this was the hour of Europe, a

⁹⁵Ibid, p:122

chance to show the world that the EU is able to cope with the crisis in its own backyard.⁹⁶ This attitude was strengthened with the declarations of the President of the Commission and President of the Council of Ministers of the EC. The main idea in the EC was, Yugoslavia is an European country so that the problem could be solved by the Europeans not with anybody else. It was also obviously stressed that the EC did not want any US help or support in this crisis. The starting date of the war was on the transition period of the EPC to the CFSP. In the first days of the war, the EU intended to manage solutions with the parties .Actually the EC/EU was too confident about itself to take the control of the situation through acting as a diplomatic mediator and using the economic, financial aid programmes to convince the parties for the agreement. The efforts of the EC resulted with the negotiations on ceasefire and new political settlement between the former Yugoslavian Republics. The negotiations were held in the Hague however it did not much delay the retaking of the war. As the EC has established unarmed teams called European Community Monitoring Mission(ECMM) in the first days of the war, France was defending the idea of military intervention to end up the war and to bring stability. However the French proposal to send peacekeeping force by using the WEU is not supported by the other WEU members. The WEU established groups for studying the alternatives and options of the French proposal. The options varied from logistic support for the EC monitors to the protection and escort of the monitors by the armed forces, lightly armed peacekeeping forces

⁹⁶Ibid, p:128

and a fully fledged peacekeeping force.⁹⁷ Although all of these plans were held in the WEU Council of 1992, neither of them were adopted.

The failure of the EU on taking a common decision to intervene in Yugoslav War under the WEU led the EU Member States to find a solution under the United Nations. This marked in fact, the end of an independent EU intervention in the former Yugoslavia. From then on any involvement any of the EU member states would be part of the international effort to seek a peaceful solution to the war in former Yugoslavia, through successive international conferences which were co- chaired by the EU and the UN, or by means of mediation carried out by a joint team composed of an EU and a UN representative.⁹⁸

The efforts resulted with the creation of UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on February 1992 by the UN Security Council. The main task of the UNPROFOR was to enforce and monitor the ceasefire agreement between the Serbs and Croats. The major contribution for the functioning of UNPROFOR was given by France and the UK so that it has once understood the significance of these two countries for the European security. As the performance of the UNPROFOR demonstrated its success, the regional responsibility is extended to Macedonia and Bosnia.

At this point, it is impossible to deny the central and crucial role of the NATO for the European security. The Yugoslavian War has showed all the weaknesses of the European Foreign Policy in all aspects. The operations of

⁹⁷Gow J.1997. *Triumph of the Lack of Will, International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*. London: Hurst&Co. p:160-2

⁹⁸Soetendorp B.1999. *Foreign Policy in the European Union*. London: Pearson. p:142

the UNPROFOR were all performed by the NATO' s Northern Army Group Forward Headquarters under the UN command.

Despite of those supportive efforts on peace, the situation in Sarajevo worsened. In order to prevent the attacks of Bosnian Serbs against Muslim civilians, a joint ultimatum came from the USA and France. As it is not obeyed to the ultimatum, a powerful air strike is started out by the NATO Air Forces. The Yugoslavian War also brought an interesting development with the joining of the French military to the NATO forces. As well as the French Naval Forces, French Air Force also participated to the NATO operations under UN command. The consequence of the air strike lead to the peace settlement negotiations in Dayton, US military base.

There are many significant consequences of the Yugoslavian War on the EC/EU Foreign Policy, European Security and Transatlantic relations. To start with the Transatlantic relations, the war has been settled down with the strong, diplomatic and military efforts of the USA so that the significance and the weight of the USA reasserted. The EU has also realized how successfully they have performed and organized under the NATO structure. Secondly, the lost of four years without performing a single joint action independently made the EU clearly aware of its political weakness on foreign policy even in the European Continent. Thirdly, as the WEU is supposed to be the military arm of the EU, the failure even on taking a common decision in the WEU Council showed the EU' s dilemma to not to organize militarily without the US participation. In other words, the EU has realized the direct link between a

credible foreign policy with a strong and effective military force.

3.1.2.2.The Gulf War

As Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the reaction of the EPC was not strong as the previous urgent cases. The EPC announced a condemnation for the invasion and it is followed by the embargoes on arms selling to Iraq and oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait. In order to decrease the amount of financial loss due to the embargo on Iraq and Kuwait for oil exports, Members States of the EC decided to give financial aid to the most affected countries of Turkey, Jordan and Egypt. However this aid could not be received by the affected countries due to the disagreements of the Member States on allocation.

One important step came with the decision of the WEU to coordinate the military forces of the Member States in the Gulf region. The Member States responded positively and several of them sent their troops in varied numbers and under the WEU control and guidance the troops were deployed in the Gulf countries.

The United Nations Security Council has declared an ultimatum to Iraq on 29 November 1990, which clearly stated the authorization of the UN Member States to use force unless Iraq obeys to the resolution of UN Security Council. Following this ultimatum, European Council has declared its support to the decision of UN Security Council and continued its efforts to convince the Iraqi government to pull back its forces from Kuwait. However the EC' s

efforts to convince the Iraqi government were turned down by the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tarek Aziz. The last attempt to prevent the war is made by the French government by proposing a six- point peace plan to the UN Security Council. The French proposal is rejected in the UN Security Council and moreover it has also demonstrated the weakness of the EPC. The institutional weaknesses of the EPC were probably most evident at the time that the member states began to arrange its transformation into the CFSP. The fragility of the obligation to consult was demonstrated in January 1991 when the French Government tabled a Gulf crisis peace plan at the UN that had not been discussed in the EPC.⁹⁹

The air strike against Iraq is started on 17 January 1991, on the same day the European Council declared their regret for using military force and invited the international community to conduct an international conference on the settlement of peace in the Middle East. During the air operations French, British and Italian Air Forces were actively took part under the US command. Iraqi government accepted the UN Resolution just after the three days of the land offensive began. As the EC welcomed the withdraw of the Iraq, it has continued the efforts to stabilize the region after the war. In order to protect the Kurds and the Shiites from the repressive policies of Saddam, the British and French forces established protection zones and deployed their troops under the UN auspices.

⁹⁹Janning J. "Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy" in F. Algieri, J.Janning and D. Rumberg(eds) 1996. *Managing Security in Europe: The European Union and challenge of Enlargement*. Gutersloh:Bertelsmann. p:35

3.2. The Replacement of EPC to Common Foreign and Security Policy

3.2.1. The Need for a Strong Institution in the new Security Architecture

It is still difficult to explain the evolution of the EPC to the CFSP by using the statements as: '*The Transformation of the EPC to the CFSP*'; '*The Replacement of EPC with the CFSP*' or '*The Incremental Development of the EPC to the CFSP*'. It is clear that, both the experiences during the years of the EPC regarding the failures due to the weaknesses and inadequacies, as well as the changing political environment of the world lead the European countries to think about a new architecture for the EC/EU's foreign and security policy.

There were at least two difficulties with leaving it to member states to respond individually to such changes: first, that would have meant foregoing benefits of collective action; and, second, German unification upset the post-1949 equilibrium in the West European states system. Under such conditions, unilateralism threatened to create security dilemmas between the European states themselves: situations, in other words, in which one state could only make itself more secure by increasing the security of others. This would have diverted resources available for the Western European countries to assume greater international responsibilities.¹⁰⁰

There are also other factors for the need to establish a new institution. First of all, the EPC has reached to its maximum capacity to produce and support common action. The intergovernmental style of cooperation has been suffering from the conflict between the existing intergovernmental and

¹⁰⁰Ibid. p:232

inspired supranational system. For this reason, the common foreign and security policy needed a formulated, systematized sets of document and effective institutional bodies to execute this written documents.

Moreover, the success in the implementation of Single Market Programme strengthen the decision for the EC as an economic giant but a political dwarf. In this respect, the EC should increase its efforts to establish a effective and essential foreign policy, which would also be a protective measure for the possible threats to the EC' s economic interests. Actually most of the political scientists realized the fact that, if the conflicts on establishing European Foreign Policy between the member states would continue, then the Community would face a more dangerous challenge then the erosion of the solidarity. So that, instead of a single Europe with a single center of authority, there would be many Europes, composed of different sets of members, as well as multiple regional institutions acting autonomously and producing different common policies. This may lead to the creation of a 'trading Europe', a 'diplomatic Europe', a 'military Europe' and an 'environmental Europe', each with a different level and and intensity of the integration.¹⁰¹

Actually the validity of this assumption is in practice supported by the terminologies as; ' a la carte Europe', 'multispeed Europe', 'variable geometry', 'core Europe' and 'flexible Europe' which are all introduced by the participant of the European Integration. As it is mentioned above, one of the most important failure of the EPC was the minimal efforts for its

¹⁰¹Traxler F. and Schmitter P.C. 1995. "The emerging Euro- polity and organized interests" European Journal of International Relations. vol.1, no:2. p:197

institutionalization. The degree of institutionalization is in fact very much related to the question of the willingness of the member states to cooperate in a common foreign policy. We may argue that the degree of institutionalization in each regime reflects in essence the extent to which the member states are willing to cooperate in a certain policy sector. After all, the main function of a regime is actually to clarify the rules in a certain issue area according to which governments (or any other actor involved in the policy making process) should behave.¹⁰²

Under those intentions of finding a way or a safeguard against the fear of eroding the national sovereignty in the foreign policy of Europe, the EC has entered to a new age by the introduce and the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, that better to say , the treaty transforming the European Community to the European Union.

The EC Member States were agreed on the Treaty of European Union (TEU) in the European Council of Maastricht on December 1991 however the signification of the Treaty delayed to February 1992. Finally the TEU has entered into force by 1 November 1993 with a wide range of doubts coming from the populations of the UK, France and Denmark. The 'democratic deficit' had already been a popular topic before Maastricht, and the TEU opened as many questions as it resolved .All of this was demonstrated vividly when the Danes narrowly voted against ratification in June 1992, followed by the tiny majority in favor in France in September. At the Edinburgh European Council in December, special arrangements and clarifications were made for

¹⁰²Soetendorp B. 1999. *Foreign Policy in the European Union*. London: Pearson. p:10

the Danes, allowing them to vote narrowly in favor in May 1993. Finally in November 1993, the TEU came into force, almost two years after its signature, and after a particularly tricky passage through the UK Parliament and a reference to the German Constitutional Court.¹⁰³

Although a progressive step towards the European Union did not manage by the mid- 1980's, a majority of member states gave their support for the further integration. In order to study for the further integration of the Community, the European Council of Fontainebleau on June 1984 has created two committees under the presidencies of James Dooge and Pietro Adonnino. As the Dooge Committee focused on institutional questions, it has submitted two reports called majority and minority reports. The majority report of the committee supported the idea of strengthening the EC institutions and the foundation of the Single European Market. On the other hand, Adonnino committee tried to solve the problem of Community' s deficit on democracy and submitted many proposals on '*Citizens Europe*'.

Most reform proposals in this period fell by the wayside because they were too radical and contentious for the time. Others such as '*Citizens Europe*' were perhaps too fuzzy to catch on. But the idea of a Single European Market(SEM) programme commanded a broad measure of support amongst national governments and business groups, for several reasons: it offered a practical solution to the perceived common problem of '*Eurosclerosis*' (manifested in widening gaps in the Community' s economic performance

¹⁰³Usherwood S. 1998. *Guide to EU Policies*. London: Blackstone Press Limited. p:23

relative to those of Japan and the USA)¹⁰⁴

Moreover, the elections of the 1980's favored the market- oriented governments, which were totally defending the SEM programme. In general terms, the SEM programme was decided to lift off the trade barriers between the member states so that, the UK, which is one of the strongest opponent of the further integration agreed to adopt the programme under Mrs. Thatcher' s government.

There is no doubt that, the SEM programme has paved the way for taking courageous steps on the further integration. Although the opponents of the further integration declared their ideas for rejecting a single European currency, Social Charter and common foreign and security policy, they were increasingly at odds.

3.2.2.The Objectives, Goals and Interests of the CFSP

There are maximalist and minimalist conceptions of what the CFSP should involve. The maximalist conception implies, a unified, supranational foreign policy, with the EU eventually having its own foreign ministry and its own defense forces under a single command. The minimalist conception interprets CFSP as being limited to cooperation between member states on matters of mutual interest .¹⁰⁵

As the TEU clearly defined the three pillars of the EU, the CFSP is became the second pillar of the EU, which would function outside the Community rules and perform on intergovernmental basis.

¹⁰⁴Jones A. R. 1996. *The Politics and Economics of the European Union*. Cheltenham: Edward Elger. p:22-3

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p:260

The implementation of the TEU introduced several innovations on European Foreign Policy by including all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.¹⁰⁶ In accordance with this, the TEU pointed out the objectives of the CFSP as;

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the European Union
- To strengthen the security of the Union and its member states
- To promote international cooperation
- To preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Act
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.¹⁰⁷

These rather ambitious objectives are put into perspective by the decisions of the European Heads of government during the post- Maastricht European Councils to narrow the scope for their joint activities. They decided that, instead of making the entire world potential for joint action, priority will be given in the application of joint actions to a limited number of areas and issues where member states have important interests in common. The purpose is to reach consensus among member states on objectives in a particular area and to facilitate rapid and coherent reaction to events when they occur. The main rule for deciding whether a certain area or issue will be subject to joint

¹⁰⁶TEU, article J.4, Maastricht, 1991.

¹⁰⁷Ibid

action is geographic closeness, that is to say, member states deal first with issues and interests arising in the immediate neighborhood. Besides geographical proximity, the other criteria are the extent to which the Union has an important interest in the political and economic stability of a region or a country and the existence of threats for the security interests of the Union.¹⁰⁸

In accordance with this tendency the European Council stated the Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean countries and the Middle East as the regions for demonstrating the EU's joint action.

Another explicit goal of the CFSP also came with the Treaty of Amsterdam by stating '*CFSP shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council of heads of state so decide.*' (Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.7) As the CFSP clearly added military and defense component, the Treaty of Amsterdam set out the determination of establishing a common military capacity. Moreover, as a complementary to the common defense policy, the European Council is agreed to found ad hoc working groups to identify the vital security interests of the EU, which would minimize all aspects of the threats and risks for the Union and its member states.

While the CFSP was aiming to succeed those, it has followed two principles. The TEU Art.J.1.4 lays down the good faith principle, which obliges the Member States to commit themselves to the objectives of the policy. They must support the Union's external and security policy actively

¹⁰⁸Buchan D.1993. *Europe: The Strange Superpower*. Aldershot :Dartmouth. p:46-7

and unreservedly, and refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.¹⁰⁹ The second principle was the consistency between the first and second pillars, which in other words stress the importance of conformity in the working of the European Council with the Commission.

3.2.3. Decision Regime and the Instruments of CFSP

3.2.3.1. The Key Actors of the CFSP

- **The European Council:** As the European Council is established in 1975, it has first gained its treaty- based status in the SEA. However the TEU has authorized the directing role of the European Council and it is became the highest decision making organ of the CFSP. Although the CFSP is remained on intergovernmental level, the general political guidelines of the CFSP were decided under the European Council.

- **The Council of Ministers and Presidency:** The Council of Ministers which is composed of the foreign ministers of the EU member states had three main functions;

- To define the principles and guidelines of the CFSP
- To ensure unity, consistency and efficiency of the Union's activities
- To decide by unanimity on measures to be taken to implement the policy¹¹⁰

The management of the CFSP is given to the member state which holds the Council Presidency and moreover as the Article J.8 stipulates the country holding the presidency also represents the EU internationally and acts as

¹⁰⁹Vassalo J. 1998.*Guide to EU Policies*. London:Blackstone. p:299

¹¹⁰Ibid

spokesman for the member states in international conferences and international organizations. Also, in order to strengthen the coherence of the EU's foreign policy, a new post called High Representative for the CFSP has been established both to assist to the President and the Council. The High Representative of the CFSP is nominated by the European Council and elected on unanimity and he would be assisted by the Deputy Secretary General. As the Article J.8(3) and J.16 of the Treaty of Amsterdam mentions, High Representative of the CFSP is given the right to negotiate with the third countries on behalf of the Union with the request of the Presidency. In addition, the ToA and TEU also given the Council the right of appointing special representatives to the specific foreign policy issues. So far special envoys have been designated to act as representatives of the EU in specific crisis zones such as former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, Cyprus and the Central Africa. They function as the foreign ministers' eyes and ears in the troubled spots of the world, and present the EU with a voice and a face in these regions.¹¹¹

-The Political Committee and COREPER: The Council has performs its decision making duty under two bodies called, the Political Committee and the Committee of the Permanent Representatives which is generally called as the COREPER. Although the role of the COREPER is limited, its main duty is to prepare the decision making of the Council. In other words, the COREPER deals with the technical side of the Council. On the other hand, the Political

¹¹¹Peterson J. and Sjursen H.(eds) 1998. *A Common Foreign Policy to Europe? Competing Visions of CFSP*. London: Routledge. p:57

Committee is the major body for the preparation of common positions and joint actions in the Council. The Political Committee is composed of the high ranking directors of the national foreign ministries and as the Article J.15 of the ToA mentions, the Political Committee monitors the international situation in the areas covered by the CFSP and makes, in principal, all the policy proposals to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative, including the the observation of the implementation of the agreed polices. At this point, the COREPER may attach its own evaluations and recommendations to the proposals of the Political Committee while passing it to the Council' s agenda.

-The European Commission: The establishment of the EU has also modified the role of the Commission in the CFSP. As the Articles J.17 and J.8(4) mentions, the Commission is fully associated with the work carried out in the CFSP field. Although the Commission is given the right to the involvement of both preparing and executing the CFSP, in practice the role of the Commission does not go beyond to participating all the meting in all levels. To move the institutional balance in favor of the Commission, the former president of the Commission Jacques Delors tried to create a quasi foreign office within the Commission by the appointment in 1993 of a special commissioner with responsibility for external political relations. Such an ambition was actually undermined two years later by the next president of the Commission, Jacques Santer, who had to satisfy the need to find employment for another three commissioners representing the three new member states. In

the new Commission the responsibility for the external relations of the EU were divided between four members of the Commission, each in charge of the economic as well as the political relations with countries in specific geographical regions in the world or certain international organizations.¹¹²

- **The European Parliament:** Although the developments on the CFSP is required to inform by both the Presidency and the Commission, the European Parliament has no significant place in the making of the CFSP. The EP has a Security, Foreign Affairs and Defense Policy Committee which meets regularly four times a year with the Presidency for giving consultation on main aspects of the CFSP. However those consultations have no enforcement on the Presidency and the European Council. The power of the EP is risen with the imposition of the ToA which gave the EP the budgetary power.

- **The WEU and NATO:** Although it is both defined in the TEU and ToA, the CFSP would deal with the all questions about the EU' s defense including humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management. However in a very short period of time it is clearly understood that, without the WEU and NATO, the CFSP has no force to handle the EU' s defense matters. The WEU is established as the decision making organ for the EU' s defense policy under the TEU. In accordance, the ToA reassured the role of the WEU as the integral part of the EU with its operational capability. However the contradiction is risen with the Article J.7 of the ToA which states, the security policy of the Union should

¹¹²Soetendorp B.1999. *Foreign Policy in the European Union*. London: Pearson p:74-5

respect the obligations that certain member states do have within the NATO and should take into account the common security and defense policy established within the NATO. The dilemma for not determining a single institution for the security of Europe led the member states of the EU to find a way to make these two institutions closer. This is resulted with the assuming of the WEU as an European pillar of the Alliance and the launch of European Security and Defense Identity. Although the WEU is taken as a military arm of the EU, it was too far from a full- scaled military organization thus can not perform independently. So it is agreed that the WEU would use the military capabilities of the NATO in the WEU operations where most of the NATO assets were under the US confirmation.

On the basis of discussion regarding the question of who makes the CFSP decisions, we may summarize the procedural decision rules as follows:

- The European Council defines the overall principles of the CFSP and specifies the general guidelines for the common positions and joint actions.
- The Council of Ministers takes the actual decisions necessary for the adoption and implementation of the common positions and the joint actions.
- The Presidency, assisted by the High Representative for the CFSP, acts as the executive in the area of the CFSP and represents the Union in issues that fall under the CFSP.
- The EU as such does not deal with defense matters. The WEU functions as the military organization designated to carry out the defense policy of the

EU.

To these set of formal decision rules we may add two informal decision rules :

- The Political Committee is still responsible for the preparation and implementation of the Council' s decisions on the CFSP matters.
- Because of the WEU' s limited military resources and capabilities, NATO remains the essential military organization for major crisis management and peace keeping operations.

Hence, it is clear that the national governments, through the Presidency, continue to operate as the central managers of the CFSP. When collective administrative capabilities are created, they are placed within the Council Secretariat. That way the member states maintain their pre- dominance over the Community in situations and make sure that they hold control over any development towards some kind of a European Foreign Ministry. However, neither the creation of the function of High representative for the CFSP, nor the establishment of the policy planning and early warning unit in addition to the existing CFSP unit, indicates a willingness on the part of the member states to move the authority in foreign policy making from the national ministries to an evolving European Foreign Ministry located in the Council of Ministers. It is just another manifestation after growing tendency among member states to choose Brussels instead of the national capitals as the main venue for European Foreign Policy making, a trend that some observers of European policy making call the '*Brusselization*' of European Foreign Policy

making.¹¹³

Whether or not the ToA proves to be simple stepping stone for the integration of the WEU into the EU it is clear that the relationship between the two organizations has been strengthened. While the wording of the TEU speaks of the Union 'requesting' the WEU to carry out specific tasks, the ToA refers to the Union 'availing itself' of the WEU in a manner which suggests a more integrated WEU than was the previous case.¹¹⁴

3.2.3.2.The Instruments of the CFSP

Until the adaptation of the TEU, one of the fatal failure of the European Foreign Policy was its declaratory character. The EU has showed its ambition for converting its tendency from declaration to action with the imposition of two innovative instruments. Those were 'common positions', which defined the EU' s tendency towards a specific issue and 'joint actions' which defined the time schedule and conditions of the EU' s participation. More importantly, in order to eliminate any reasons to shadow down the success of the CFSP, the member states were obliged to conform their national policies with the common positions. The Treaty of Amsterdam has added a new policy instrument to the existing ones namely, common strategies. The European Council defines, by consensus, common strategies in areas where the Member States have important interests in common. A common strategy specifies the objectives, duration and means to be made available by the Union and Member States. In this respect, it forms the general framework for actions

¹¹³European Voice, (4 -10 September 1997) The Economist Group,Brussels.

¹¹⁴Vassalo J. 1998.*Guide to EU Policies*. London:Blackstone. p:308

under the Union' s three pillars, which ensures consistency in its external relations and enables the Council to implement common strategies through joint actions and common positions adopted by a qualified majority. The Council is also responsible for recommending common strategies to the European Council, as happened in the case of Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean countries in December 1998. The first common strategy for Russia is adopted by the Cologne European Council six months later.¹¹⁵

In addition, Article J.2 of the ToA also put two more objectives as;

- Defining the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy.
- Strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of the policy.¹¹⁶

At this point it will be better to mention about the importance of the ToA for the modification of the CFSP. Besides the introduce of common strategy as a new instrument, there are several significant changes came with the ToA as;

- the possibility of constructive abstention, to allow one or more Member States to opt out of a common position without preventing the whole policy going a head(ToA, Art.J.13)
- The incorporation of the Petersberg Tasks into the Treaty and thereby further specifying the link between the WEU and CFSP(ToA, Art.J.7.2)
- The Secretary General of the Council adds to his responsibilities the new

¹¹⁵<http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/printversion/en/lvb/r00001.htm> accessed on 29 May 2005

¹¹⁶Treaty of Amsterdam, Art. J.2, 1997

function of High Representative for the CFSP, with the aim of working towards a new working troika, consisting of the Presidency foreign minister, the High Representative, and a senior representative of the Commission.(ToA, Art.J.8)

- A Policy Planning and Early Warning unit is set up under the High Representative, with personal drawn from EU institutions, the Member States and the WEU.
- The financing of the CFSP is clarified, with the EC budget becoming the default setting, apart from military and defense operations and where the Council decides unanimously otherwise; as with QMV, the onus is reserved, to the disadvantage of intergovernmentalism.
- The Presidency is given the power to negotiate international agreements in pursuit of the CFSP, assisted by the Commission as appropriate (ToA, Art. J.14) : the agreements will be concluded unanimously by the Council and the EU still does not have a legal personality.¹¹⁷

3.2.4.Nice Treaty: The Introduce of Enhanced Cooperation

As the ToA launched many innovative steps for establishing a collaborative action for common and security policy, the notion 'closer cooperation' remained one of the most ambiguous issue. This tendency is remained untouched until the Nice Treaty of 2001, which launched the concept of '*enhanced cooperation*'. Another important issue was the flexibility of the CFSP. As the territory and the dynamics of the Union is expanded and

¹¹⁷Hill C. and Smith K. 2000.*European Foreign Policy*. London:Blackstone. p:169

changed, the term increased flexibility has gained more importance. Although the Union aimed to gain a global significance through a strong CFSP, the unanimous decision regime in the CFSP always became the major obstacle. The divergent views of the Member States on foreign policy also enforced the EU Treaty to adopt escape ways for the Member States which does not want to participate in the collective CFSP actions.

The Nice Treaty signed by the Heads of State on March 10, 2001 modified some of the sections contained in the Amsterdam Treaty related to a Common Foreign and Security Policy and added a number of annexes dealing with the ESDP, whose implementation are not subject to Treaty Ratification. These annexes are known as the Presidency Report on the ESDP. As a result the role that the EU plays in security and defense has changed, though the three pillars structure has been maintained.¹¹⁸

The Treaty of Nice has many key differences compared to the ToA. First, the defense aspects of Europe's common foreign and security policy will no longer be framed by the EU's former defense arm, the WEU, but by the EU itself.¹¹⁹ So that, the Treaty of Nice transferred most of the functions of the WEU to the EU. In accordance, new military and political structures were established within the EU. The European Union Military Committee(EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff(EUMS) were the new military institutions and Political Security Committee(PSC) became the new political structure of the Union. Secondly, the EU has decided to develop an EU

¹¹⁸www.europeansecurity.net/Documents/documents/ESDP&Democracy.pdf accessed on May 2005

¹¹⁹Nice Treaty, Art.17, see also <http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom> accessed on 03.06.05

military force of up to 60,000 troops able to be deployed at 60 days notice and with the ability to sustain itself for at least one year. This force has to be able to undertake a large spectrum of tasks ranging from peace-keeping to peace-making.¹²⁰

Thirdly, arrangements have been agreed for EU- NATO consultation and for involvement of non- EU NATO members candidate countries and other partners in EU- led crisis management operations.¹²¹ The fourth innovative step was, the EU' s taking responsibility on conflict prevention and crisis management, which were aiming to strengthen the EU civilian capabilities.

Besides those innovative steps, the Treaty of Nice has launched the concept '*Enhanced Cooperation*' with Article 27a-e, which allows groups of states the right to push ahead in a specific policy area without the consensus of all the EU member states. The Amsterdam provisions requires that 'at least a majority' of member states have to be involved, while amended article 24 of the Nice Treaty will require a minimum of eight member states.¹²²

Constructive abstention in particular can not be substitute for the inclusion of enhanced cooperation provisions. Firstly, it implies a opposing position to a given initiative on the part of whoever exercises it. The enhanced cooperation in contrast is linked to the idea that those who want to, can go further – without consequently eliciting the rejection of those who do not wish or are unable to participate. Enhanced cooperation is thus less negative than

¹²⁰EU Council(December 2000),Presidency Report on ESDP, Part I Press Release Nr:14056/2/00

¹²¹Ibid, Part IV, VI and Annex VI and VII .

¹²²www.europeansecurity.net/Documents/documents/ESDP&Democracy.pdf accessed on 03.05.05

constructive abstention.¹²³

Moreover, enhanced cooperation encourages member states not participating in a cooperative venture from the beginning to join in later. Constructive abstention further does not provide any mechanism nor exact incentives to reconcile member states' s interests. Finally, since enhanced cooperation as agreed at Nice does, unlike constructive abstention, apply only regarding the implementation of a previously agreed policy, it may indeed limit the danger of fragmentation of foreign policy.¹²⁴

However the Treaty of Nice (ToN) has also determined the limitations for the enhanced cooperation of CFSP. Article 27b of the ToN limits the enhanced cooperation on CFSP by stating that the implementation of joint actions and common positions can be conducted only if they do not include military and defense implications. Article 27c on the other hand stipulates markedly more difficult procedural arrangements than the First and Third Pillar provisions, by retaining, or rather introducing, the veto right for reluctant member states in the procedure to authorize cooperation, which was previously known from the ToA as the 'emergency brake' mechanism, but abolished by the Treaty of Nice in the other Pillars. These limits stem from the consideration that even if member states which are not participating in enhanced cooperation are not, except or the purely negative minimum obligation not to impede the cooperation of the others, bound legally by it internationally, nevertheless action under enhanced cooperation is presented

¹²³Jaeger T.2002.*Enhanced Cooperation n the Treaty of Nice and Flexibility in the CFSP*. European Foreign Affairs Review 7 p:302

¹²⁴Peers S. 2001.*CFSP 1999-2000*. Yearbook of European law p:552

as that of the Union.¹²⁵

The Nice Treaty introduces changes in the Council's vote weighting system that will make it more difficult to achieve a qualified majority and accordingly easier to gathering a blocking minority.¹²⁶ In addition, The Nice Treaty introduced Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and limited the unanimity in certain areas. For example, with the imposition of Nice Treaty, unanimity clause for opening negotiations were removed. As the new political and military structures introduced by the Nice Treaty were briefly mentioned above, it will be better to evaluate them in details to understand the new CFSP understanding.

3.2.4.1. The Political Security Committee (PSC)

The PSC is the highest decision making body of the CFSP and ESDP, which executes crisis monitoring and crisis management tasks. Besides those duties, the PSC also decides the the guidelines of the other committees which deals with CFSP issue. Under such circumstances, the PSC will examine all the options available and will exercise ' political control and strategic direction of the EU's military response to the crisis'. This means that, whilst it will take into account the opinions of the COREPER and the Commission, it will have overall political authority. It will also evaluate the opinions and recommendations of the Military Committee and in particular 'the essential elements'(strategic military options including the chain of command, operation

¹²⁵Ibid. p:552

¹²⁶Miller, V.2001 *The Treaty of Nice and the Future of Europe*.House of Commons Research Paper01/49, London. p:22-3

concept, operation plan) to be submitted to the Council.¹²⁷ The Secretary General / High Representative can govern the PSC during a crisis and in the guidance of the Military Committee. The PSC can also send a recommendation to the Council for the implementation of a joint action.

3.2.4.2. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC)

As the EUMC is composed of the Chiefs of Defense, it is the highest military body inside the Council. The EUMC is responsible for the every military direction of the activities and submits military advice to the PSC when it is needed. Upon the PSC's request, it issues an Initiating Directive to the Director General of the EUMS to draw up and present strategic military options. It evaluates the strategic military options developed by the EUMS and forwards them to the PSC together with its evaluation and military advice. On the basis of the military option selected by the Council, it authorizes an Initial Planning Directive for the Operation Commander. Based on the EUMS evaluation, it provides advice and recommendations to the PSC: on the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) developed by the Operation Commander- on the draft Operation Plan(OPLAN) drawn up by the Operation Commander. It gives advice to the PSC on the termination option for an operation.¹²⁸

The military staff which will serve to the EUMC have two main objectives. Firstly to implement the decisions of the Military Committee and secondly to establish early warning and planning for the implementation of Petersberg tasks. Actually in order to execute the Petersberg tasks, the EU

¹²⁷EU Council(December 2000),Presidency Report on ESDP, Annex III, Press Release Nr:14056/2/00

¹²⁸EU Council(December 2000),Presidency Report on ESDP,Annex IV,Press Release Nr:14056/2/00

Rapid Reaction Force has been founded in the year of 2003, which would deploy about 60,000 troops within 60 days. This force would be supported by combat planes and ground forces and have an autonomous command.

3.3.The Evolution of the European Security and Defense Policy

3.3.1.The Launch of European Security and Defense Identity

From the beginning of the World War II, many attempts were conducted to establish an autonomous European Security and Defense Identity(ESDI). Actually, Howorth evaluates this decision with four different but related comments. First, the notion of the European Integration embraces all bilateral and multilateral activities between and among the states of Europe. It is much more than the history of the EEC/EC/EU: but it is much less than the advent of the something many British commentators call 'federalism'. Second, the ESDI is internally as well as externally was the primary motivation for European integration in the first place, and also in the sense that most of the landmarks of the integration process have been accompanied by a security dimension. Third, the ESDI concept itself requires several comments. Pressure for its gestation has come overwhelmingly from France. The delightfully equivocal notion of identity is a semantic attempt not to tread on any institutional toes. The ESDI is an assertion by the European states of the desirability and legitimacy of their quest for more concerted influence over issues affecting European security. However, and this is the fourth clarification point, the assertion of that concerted influence has always been qualified by the parallel contention that Europe' s security can ultimately

be guaranteed only through the Atlantic Alliance.¹²⁹

All those comments of Howorth, also supports his notion of '*relative autonomy*' of the Europe to Washington. Actually this has been also officially confirmed by the member states of the WEU in the Hague 1987.

*It is our conviction that a more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the Alliance, to the benefit of Western security as a whole. This will enhance the European role in the Alliance and ensure the basis for a balanced partnership across the Atlantic. We are resolved to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance.*¹³⁰

During the mid 1990's, several proposals were submitted for the development of the ESDI and the CJTF. However it is important to mention that, ESDI is asserted as an identity under the NATO rather than a separate policy or institution. The ESDI was unofficially launched at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Brussels in January 1994. It was initially conceived largely as a technical- military arrangement that would allow the Europeans to assume a greater share of the burden for security missions.- that is to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance- by providing the WEU with access to those NATO assets and capabilities that European Member States did not possess.¹³¹ For instance, it is clearly seen that a stronger and clear participation of the EU would be welcomed both by the NATO and its most contributing country, the United States.

¹²⁹Howorth J.1997. *The EU and National Defense Policy: National Defense and European Security Integration*. London: Routledge. p:10

¹³⁰The Hague Platform on European Security Interests 1987, WEU: 41

¹³¹Howorth J. 2000.*European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge*. WEU-ISS Chaillot Paper 43, Paris.

NATO' s Berlin meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers on 1996 is the most important point for evolution of the ESDI. In an apparent breakthrough, an agreement was reached involving an US commitment to support a meaningful European military capacity through CJTF' s and a French commitment to move toward full integration of a restructured Atlantic Alliance.¹³²

This would enable all the European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance. It would allow them to act themselves as required and would simultaneously reinforce the transatlantic partnership.¹³³ So that, the EU has taken the initiative to operate itself under the WEU command by using the NATO assets in which the Alliance entirely do not involve, so that 'separable but not separate' forces have been identified.

The implementation of Berlin Agreement has both political and military consequences. Firstly, during the 'Berlin Plus' period, the US objections for European- only access to the US assets were risen due to the European willings on putting the ESDI/CJTF to a separate ground within the NATO and aim to use the capabilities as well as the equipments of the Alliance. Moreover the EU also favoring to establish separate European Chain of Command. Second, at the first real test of '*Europeanization*' of the Alliance structures- the French bid for NATO' s Southern

¹³²Ibid. p:24

¹³³www.nato.int/doc/handbook/2001hb0401.htm accessed on 24 May 2005

Command(AFSouth)- the whole house of cards came tumbling down.¹³⁴

The bargain on the AFSouth demonstrated the limits as well as the flexibility of the US policy over Eastern Mediterranean. The conclusion on the proposal of the AFSouth would not only lead to sharing the tasks but also sharing the leadership. As Europe has itself witnessed the crucial role of the US for ending up the Bosnian War in 1995, the British government under newly elected Tony Blair also supported the idea that an EU-WEU initiative might weaken the Alliance, and the ESDI' s path for evolving apart from the existing system is not matured.

The third important step for the ESDI has been determined in the NATO Washington Summit of 1999 . As the ESDI' s primary aim was the improvement of European military capabilities, the Washington Summit has decided some arrangements, which are better known as Berlin Plus Arrangements as follows;

- The provisions of assured EU access to the NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for the EU-led operations.
- The presumption of availability to the EU of pre- identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in the EU- led operations.
- The identification of a range of European command options for the EU- led operations and further developing the role of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities

¹³⁴Guillaume P. *'NATO: Lost Opportunities '* in Brenner M. and Guillaume P. (eds.) 2002. *US- French relations in the New Era*. Washington: Brookings cited in Howorth J. and Keeler J. (ed.) 2003. *Defending Europe*. New York:Macmillan p:9

- The further adaptation of NATO' s defense planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for the EU- led operations.

3.3.2. The Transformation to the European Security and Defense Policy

3.3.2.1. Historical Evolution of the ESDP

The EU has experienced two different initiatives concerning to the improvement of the EU' s role on security and defense in December 1998. The first initiative was launched by France and Germany at Postdam on 1st December 1998. In their announcement they stressed the importance of the CFSP for the future development the EU and they stated their study on defining the Common Defense Policy(CDP). In addition, the Franco – German initiative also confirmed the significance of strengthening the military and operational capabilities of the EU as well as the efficacy of integrating the WEU into the EU. These means were to be developed from either the WEU, multinational forces, such as the Eurocorps, or via capabilities made available by NATO, as agreed at the North Atlantic Council at Berlin in June 1996. At the same time both countries urged the need for the mobilization of conflict prevention measures.¹³⁵

The second and most important step, concerning the European Security and Defense Policy was came from France and Britain. A radical change occurred in the evolving of the European security dimension with the Franco-British Joint declaration on European Defense in Saint- Malo. The first overt use of the word 'autonomous' in any European security blueprint was in Saint-

¹³⁵Franco- German Summit 'communiqué' reproduced in Rutten, op.cit. p:4, cited in www.europeansecurity.net/Documents/documents/ESDP&Democracy.pdf

Malo declaration.¹³⁶

The Saint- Malo declaration paved a new way for European defense. It is also finalized the process of establishing an autonomous security and defense initiative which is stated in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The biggest military forces of the EU; France and the United Kingdom agreed to establish a credible military force, including all combat and peace- keeping implications for the support of the EU' s autonomous action capacity. The Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without necessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military needs.¹³⁷

The evolution of the ESDP has been strengthened by the decisions taken in the following EU Summits. After the Saint- Malo Declaration, the fifteen member states of the EU adopted the formula and declared their determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions on security and defense issues at the EU summits in Cologne, Helsinki, Feira and Nice.¹³⁸

Germany, one of the most strong contributor for the development of the ESDP, has intensified its study during its EU Presidency especially in the period between mid December 1998 to March 1999. The German Presidency

¹³⁶Howorth J. "Britain, France and European Defense Initiative." *Survival*, Vol.42,no:2(Summer 2000). p:43 cited in Özen Ç. 2003. *ESDP-NATO Relations:Considerations on the Future of European Security Architecture*. A.Ü. Basımevi, Vol.33. p:237

¹³⁷British- French Summit St. Malo, 3-4 December 1998 reproduced in Rutten, op.cit. P:8-9, cited in www.europeansecurity.net/Documents/documents/ESDP&Democracy.pdf

¹³⁸Özen Ç. 2003. *ESDP-NATO Relations:Considerations on the Future of European Security Architecture*. A.Ü. Basımevi, Vol.33. p:238

outlined some guiding principles that included the statement that for CFSP to be a credible policy, the EU should not just be endowed with military capabilities but also with appropriate decision- making bodies.¹³⁹

At the European Council in Cologne(June 1999), the EU announced its intention to develop an ESDP and outlined an institutional framework for the new policy that would be put in place by March 2000.¹⁴⁰ In this context new institutions on security and defense were introduced as a High Representative for the CFSP, a Political and Security Committee(PSC), a European Military Committee(EUMC), and a European Military Staff(EUMS).

As all the EU member states demonstrated their determination for an autonomous ESDP, none of them, including France wanted to weaken the Atlantic Alliance or enter to a competition with the United States. For instance, even to prevent any misunderstanding the EU members treated so sensitively on terminology by stressing the concept '*autonomy*' rather than a much assertive one '*independent*'.

From the perspective of Washington, nevertheless, the launch of the ESDP could be read as a reckless leap into the dark on the part of an EU that had totally inadequate military capacity, no significant plans to raise military budgets and that appeared obsessed with institutional engineering in Brussels rather than with the more serious business of acquiring the wherewithal to

¹³⁹German Presidency Paper. Bonn. 24 February 1999 and Informal Meeting of EU foreign ministers Eltville,13-14 March 1999 cited in;
www.europeansecurity.net/Documents/documents/ESDP&Democracy.pdf

¹⁴⁰Howorth J. 2000.*European Integration and Defense: The Ultimate Challenge*. WEU-ISS Chaillot Paper 43, Paris. p:32-33

deliver genuine security in the European theater.¹⁴¹ In other words, the US was aware of the EU's disturbance on US hegemony on their relations, however they were also aware of that the EU had no option to change the balance of power or compete with it.

Just after the six months, the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, has managed very important moves to the ESDP by launching new institutions and a military headline goal. The headline goal was a clear strategy to encourage the EU members to integrate their defense spending and the European Defense industry in order to give the EU an operational military capacity to carry out its own military interventions.¹⁴² It is decided to establish an Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) which would be deployed in sixty days in the size of 60,000 troops and this force would perform in humanitarian and crisis management tasks which eventually could participate in peace maintaining operations by the year 2003. During the Summits, new modalities for closer cooperation between NATO and EU is discussed and the Presidency conclusion stressed that the decisions for establishing an European Armed Force should not be evaluated as the creation of an European Army.

The Helsinki Summit of 1999 clearly showed the EU's intention for being a both regional and global military actor, however this brought the debates for the future Transatlantic relations and the coherence within the NATO. The question was rather the EU members will try to achieve the

¹⁴¹Howorth J and Keeler J. 2003. *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*. New York: Macmillan. p:11

¹⁴²Heisbourg F., Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The limits of Ambiguity, Survival, Vol. 42, no:2, Summer 2000, p:12-3 cited in Özen Ç. 2003. *ESDP-NATO Relations: Considerations on the Future of European Security Architecture*. A.Ü. Basımevi, Vol.33. p:240

Headline Goal by providing significant new defense resources, or (more likely) will they seek to do so by re- allocating current defense resources at the expense of the present commitments to NATO?¹⁴³

3.3.2.2.The Consequences of September 11 over Transatlantic Relations in the Context of ESDP

The terrorist attacks of Al- Qaeda on New York and Washington opened a new debate for the members of the Atlantic Alliance to rethink about themselves in the new security environment. Whereas in the initial weeks after the attacks the Bush administration appeared to have abandoned unilateralism in favor of coalition building, consultation and restraint, the European Allies appeared to have taken the opposite course, engaging in a de facto form of renationalization of their security thinking.¹⁴⁴ The leaders of the European countries declared support and solidarity with the USA against the war on terrorism and proposed their military assets for the use of US homeland security. In addition, European leaders under the leadership of Tony Blair, declared their respect for the Muslim nations and Islam and stressed that in order to cope with this terrorist attacks, more attention must be given to the roots causing terrorism.

This heterogeneity of response was best symbolized by two highly publicized events. The first was the October 2002 European Council meeting

¹⁴³Croft,Howorth,Terriff,Weber, *NATO's Triple Challenge*. p:516 cited in Özen Ç. 2003. *ESDP- NATO Relations:Considerations on the Future of European Security Architecture*. A.Ü. Basımevi, Vol.33. p:241

¹⁴⁴Howorth J and Keeler J. 2003. *Defending Europe:The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*. New York:Macmillan. p:13

in Ghent, which was preceded by a tripartite conclave featuring Chirac/ Jospin, Blair and Schröder to discuss the military involvement of their respective military forces in Afghanistan.¹⁴⁵ As the leaders were agreed to gather on November 5 in London, this attempt is crashed by the divergences between on the basis of 'militarists' or 'pacifists' and 'allies' or 'neutrals'. This divisiveness between the EU members were also strengthened with Blair's tendency and action while talking with NATO's Secretary- General as if he was the spokesman of the EU. As a result of this conversation between Blair and Lord Robertson, NATO proposed the invocation of Article 5. Those debates were also hardened the work of Belgian Presidency, which tried to enforce its authority on three bigs of the EU.

During the 1990s, several US attempts were tried for calling NATO to go 'out of area or out of business'. They did not perceive Europe to be central to US security interests, they proposed a global deal where by Europe can maintain regional security in exchange for political and possibly even military support for US policy across the globe.¹⁴⁶

As the Operation to Afghanistan seems like a NATO operation including the support of European states, in fact both the contributions of NATO and the EU were very less and it was a unilateral US move on 'out of area'. For instance the unilateral move of the United States to 'out of area' worried most of the European members for the survival of the Alliance in the future. However those suspicions for the future of the Alliance were

¹⁴⁵Ibid, p:13

¹⁴⁶Reproduced in : Larrabee S. B. and Gompert D. 1997. *America and Europe: A Partnership for a new Era*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

disappeared with NATO' s Prague Summit of 2002, which stated the enlargement of the NATO through Central and Eastern Europe and transforming itself to a collective security institution as well as strengthening the political dimension of its structure. It clear that, the events of September 11 has compelled the conditions for the ESDP, however the consequences can be evaluated as progressive in terms of the evolution of the EU' s collective action. Those can be shortly expressed as; in a very short period of time, a global coalition has been set against terrorism and secondly, the EU leaders started shuttle diplomacy by visiting Central and South Asia countries for setting a dialogue as well as Middle East for reactivate the peace plan.

Moreover the EU has also started to deepen its relations with Russia, Turkey and Mediterranean countries through diplomacy. In consequence, those efforts concluded positive outcomes. The EU started to cooperate with Russia both in the area of trade and security. In addition, it is decided to establish meetings between Russia and the EU' s COPS in every month. A Euro- Mediterranean Conference of foreign ministers highlighted a commonality of purpose in the fields of economic development, anti-terrorism, cultural exchanges and security. Above all, an apparent breakthrough was finally announced in the long standing impasse over Turkey' s refusal to play ball with ESDP.¹⁴⁷

The evolution of the ESDP was one of the vital question for the security of Turkey concerning the relations with its surrounding

¹⁴⁷Howorth J and Keeler J. 2003. *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*. New York: Macmillan. p:15

neighborhood. Turkey, which is the second biggest force in NATO and a candidate country to the EU, did not want the possibility of the ESDP being used against its security interests. In other words, Turkey is concerned that without its full involvement, the EU- performed Petersberg type operations might take place in its neighboring regions and conflicts such as the Cyprus, Turkish- Greek bilateral disputes, Northern Iraq and developments leading toward a Kurdish State, and the Armenia- Azerbaijan territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabag.¹⁴⁸ Turkey' s concerns were fulfilled by the 'Ankara Document' which is signed in December 2001. 'Ankara Document' has assured Turkey' s security interests by the EU' s two commitments '*ESDP would not be used in disputes between NATO allies*' and '*ESDP would not be used in any condition or crisis against Turkey*'.

3.3.2.3.Critics on European Security and Defense Policy

Although the ESDP developed positively after St. Malo, there were important questions for the future. Even it is mentioned briefly above, the evolution of the ESDP would be a threat for the solidarity of the Transatlantic relations. Secondly, there was common suspicion for the EU in how efficiently they would manage to fulfill in the defense sphere without sufficient military resource and finally whether the evolution of the ESDP would weaken the partnership of the EU with NATO.

When the financial dimension of the ESDP is examined, it is clear that most of the EU members were not willing to fund European Defense

¹⁴⁸Özen Ç. 2003. *ESDP-NATO Relations: Considerations on the Future of European Security Architecture*. A.Ü. Basımevi, Vol.33. p:248

plannings. Although building a full- scale military capacity needs a strong financial support, the defense budgets of the EU States were in decline especially after the 1990s. A truly autonomous ESDP- that is, one that is not reliant on American military hardware- would necessitate the West Europeans equipping themselves not only with the requisite forces, but also with means to transport them and to provide them with accurate intelligence. A RAND study carried out in 1993 estimated that a force of 50,000 would cost between 18 and 49 billion dollars to equip over twenty-five years., with an additional bill of 9-25 billion dollars for the creation of a satellite intelligence capability.¹⁴⁹ At this point,it is not possible for the EU states to be convinced for a increase in defense budgets. European States were not comfortable with the fiscal conditions including payments of pension debts and costs of public services so that increasing defense spendings would not take a priority.

Secondly, the developments of the ESDP was carefully monitored by the USA. Ironically, therefore, the real danger of ESDP is that it threatens to antagonize and disillusion even those American officials who are generally supportive of European efforts to develop into an effective partner of America, and who have attempted to convince skeptical colleagues that this time Europe really means business.¹⁵⁰

Another important problem for the ESDP was the process of taking defense decisions in the existing EU institutions. The decisions on defense were taken on unanimity in which, each of the member state would block a

¹⁴⁹Menon A. 2003. "Why ESDP is Misguided and Dangerous for the Alliance" in Howorth J. and Keeler J. (ed.) 2003. *Defending Europe*. New York:Macmillan. p:204

¹⁵⁰Ibid, p:206

decision through a veto. For instance if the historical background of Europe would be evaluated, there are many different ideas for each European state on defense policy understanding. For example, the tendency of Sweden and Finland could not be compared with France or Hungary however all those states were expected to gather and decide on unanimity. Apart from these, the founders of the ESDP; France and Britain had completely different ideas on the relationship between the EU and NATO. On the one hand, France wanted to increase the global role of the EU and in favor of European autonomy. On the other hand, Britain was stressing the cooperation between NATO and the EU and saw NATO as the priority in the security sphere.

Another problem for the functioning of the ESDP was the leadership problem. When NATO is evaluated, although it is a totally intergovernmental organization and the decisions are taken by unanimity, no one can deny the special position of the United States. Actually the US leadership can be also seen as one of the positive aspect for the consolidated structure of the NATO against conflicts. However in Europe there is an absence of US-type leadership. Besides having a leading power, France, Britain and Germany has overriding military superiority when it is compared to the other European states. However this inequality between the member states are adjusted by the voting procedure, giving the smaller states the right to veto, which indeed would form a new dilemma for the evolution of ESDP.

Besides the need of a leading country, the EU also needed a leading institution on the progress of ESDP. As the EU Commission is regarded to be

a most important body for the crucial matters of the EU, its role did not match with its performance and participation in the development of the ESDP. The lack of institutional support leads to inconsistency and the lack of expertise. In terms of consistency, the fact that the presidency rotates every six months is a cause of profound instability. It is no surprise that, in its dealings with the external world, the EU flits effortlessly from pursuing a northern dimension(Finnish presidency) to agonizing about a Mediterranean strategy(several French presidencies).¹⁵¹ Apart from that, each member state had different attitude and evaluation in the context of defense policy. To illustrate this by an example, France always give priority in separating the NATO and the EU, where for Sweden the main concern is given to conflict prevention.

In addition, the institutional cavity caused a lack of expertise especially on the ESDP. As most of the member states generally provided the necessary personnel from their national administration, most of the smaller states could not managed to find the necessary number of expertise for the related posts.

The last criticisms on the ESDP would be addressed to its annoying development for the USA which would weaken the cohesion and the solidarity of the Alliance eventually the EU- NATO relations. As the USA was monitoring the developments of the CFSP including the ESDP, the EU' s tendency towards aiming to achieve autonomous policy at the end of the 1990s alerted most of the US institutions. The reality is that the US and the EU have different positions *vis-a-vis* the ESDP. For the American, this could

¹⁵¹Ibid, p:210

be an instrument of burden-sharing without affecting the central political and military role of the NATO in the security field. For the EU members, this is the way to achieve a considerable political- strategic capability apart from the US in the international arena.¹⁵²

Most of the institutional problems between the NATO and the ESDP were solved with the efforts of Lord Robertson¹⁵³ and Javier Solana¹⁵⁴, significant debates were depended on the division of labor between those two institutions. Broadly speaking, three kinds of military mission are foreseen by European policy makers. First, normal NATO missions; second, so-called Berlin plus missions, or those undertaken by Europeans in the way foreseen by the Berlin Summit, using NATO assets and command structures; finally, European- only missions, separate from NATO and not drawing on any NATO assets.¹⁵⁵

The views for European- only missions, no undoubtedly would lead a possible threat for the duplication and eventually the dissolution of the European Pillar of the NATO. The debates for the future of the relations between the NATO and the ESDP has been completely diverted and in a sense ended at least for a long period of time with the break of the war in Macedonia and Kosovo. Especially in Macedonia, Eu took responsibility in the areas of crisis management and prevention in which NATO is not expertized. In contrast, NATO, despite its obvious flaws, is a relatively effective military

¹⁵²Özen Ç. 2003. *ESDP-NATO Relations: Considerations on the Future of European Security Architecture*. A.Ü. Basımevi, Vol.33. p:241-2

¹⁵³Secretary- General of NATO(retired)

¹⁵⁴High Representative for CFSP

¹⁵⁵Menon A. 2003. "Why ESDP is Misguided and Dangerous for the Alliance" cited in Howorth J. and Keeler J. (ed.) 2003. *Defending Europe*. New York:Macmillan. p:213

organization. It is hard to envisage a purely European force managing a military dimension of the Kosovo affair as effectively as did NATO, not only because the enormous majority of the hardware was American, but because NATO has systems and procedures in place to deal effectively with crisis situations.¹⁵⁶

To sum up, the operations in Kosovo and Macedonia has showed that NATO and the EU may share the responsibilities of the different sides of the same tasks. However European efforts aiming to counter balance the US leadership in the new security environment continued.

3.3.2.4.ESDP as Essential Move For the Future of the EU

At this part of the study, it is intended to demonstrate the positive outcomes of the ESDP in a constructive and pragmatist vision. Although there are many reasons for the implementation of the ESDP, it should not be treated as impossible to achieve. As the number of its members currently twenty- five and will be increased to twenty- eight soon ,which are coming from different historical and military backgrounds, the possibility for establishing a common understanding on security and defense should be seen as a real fact. It will be a major challenge to bring the existing cultures together into something approaching a workable synthesis. But the forging of a common European security culture- highly desirable in its own right- it is not impossible, indeed some progress has already been made in a positive direction.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶Ibid,p:214

¹⁵⁷Howorth J. "The CESDP and the Forging of European Security Culture". *Politique Europeenne* 8, Summer 2002 cited in Howorth J and Keeler J.(ed.) 2003. *Defending Europe: Why ESDP is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance*. New York:Macmillan. p:220

Secondly, as the ESDP is suffering from a institutional complexity and inefficiency, it should be treated as the natural steps for the on going progress of such a unique organization where twenty- five different members are intending to become under one common security and defense policy. As it is mentioned above, the European Union is a unique and on going political experiment. It has taken the roots from the transformation of common market to single market with the implementation of monetary union under a single currency. In a period of time it has increased its scope for the internal affairs as well as a common foreign and security policy. In this respect the efforts for establishing an autonomous security and defense policy by this understanding of acting as one in the global scene can be evaluated as a necessity.

Throughout the 1990s, the United States proposed to its allies a 'global deal' where by the Europeans should take care of their own backyard and the Americans should concentrate on the rest of the world.¹⁵⁸

As a consequence, the EU has introduced its project of the CFSP which eventually showed the EU' s weaknesses and incapacibilities after the resolution of Yugoslavia. The passivity of the EU on the implementation of the CFSP as well as the poor performance of the WEU, lead Europe to arrange for a new policy building. In this process the EU had to tackle with the three important problems.

First, to introduce new institutions into the Union allowing its member states collectively to address issues of security and defense efficiently and

¹⁵⁸Medcalf J. 2002. *Going Global? NATO and the Extra European Challenge*. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Bath. cited in Howorth J and Keeler J. (ed.) 2003. *Defending Europe: Why ESDP is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance*. New York:Macmillan. p:222

expeditiously. Second, to develop significant military capacity by new approaches both to procurement and to budgets. Third, to ensure that the new arrangements were conducted in harmony with NATO and with the United States.¹⁵⁹

Although the institutionalization is constituting one of the vital step for supporting the military capacity, some of the institutions like Political and Security Committee (COPS) hardened the cooperation process due to its level of representation compared to the NAC of NATO. However in its short period of activity COPS has managed to establish an efficient balance of relationship with the all other international agencies including the NAC.

However there are two big problems. The tension between national capitals and 'Brussels' , and the issue of cross-pillar coherence. The former involves the interaction between entrenched national practices and preferences and a strangely unfamiliar new collective ethos slowly emerging out of the dialectical process itself. The fundamental reasons why the EU states agreed to pool their resources and deliver security collectively are strong guarantees that the process will continue to evolve.¹⁶⁰ The other problem was the cross-pillar coherence. Although the participation of the Commission on the ESDP is essential, the posts of Commissioner for External Relations and High Representative for the CFSP were constituting possible threats for the lost of cohesion among the pillars. As some of the leading EU members proposed the 'presidentialization' of the post of High Representative for CFSP, which

¹⁵⁹Howorth J. 2003.*Why ESDP is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance*. Howorth J. and Keeler J. (ed.) 2003.*Defending Europe*. New York:Macmillan. p:223

¹⁶⁰Ibid, p:226

aiming to elect European President by the European Council for five years, the proposal has remained premature.

Lastly, it will be essential to evaluate the indications of the military capacity of the EU. As the EU stressed its intention for not to divide or duplicate the NATO structure, many military analysts tried to project EU's military progress comparing to the US military. The fundamental divergences between the US and EU military lies in the technology. It is very clear that, the US military on every branch of its forces based on high technology and served under the '*zero casualty*' policy. In contrast, the EU military capabilities settled in low technology and would possibly take casualties. The gap for improving its technology would be closed in not less than ten years however the important point, to what extent the EU society will accept the casualties of its military in a possible military operation. Besides the technological superiority of the US, EU is also not experienced in combat missions where the US forces had engaged in several battles through out the world. The creation of the European Defense Industry including aerospace and electronics may be seen as a fragile element in Transatlantic relations. Although each of the governments concerning the US and the EU as a whole aims to protect their defense and market share, they inevitably cooperate on the basis of technology research and the share of industrial strategy. The creation of two defense 'fortresses' would be a body blow to Alliance solidarity. But the conditions under which significant transatlantic mergers would take place remained difficult to perceive and the US regulations on

technology transfer and export licenses will need drastic liberalization for the cooperation to flourish.¹⁶¹

¹⁶¹Ibid, p:234

4. CONCLUSION

Although the debates on efficiency and the evolution of the CFSP are going on, the EU's progress on establishing a common foreign policy, which is also supported by the security and defense implications, deserves celebrations. As EU has achieved more over the expectations in its early times, it has also realized the importance of political cohesion and solidarity under a common voice in the international relations. Moreover the global developments were also demonstrated the importance of a strong and efficient military force as a complementary element for the strength of the political influence over the debates.

The changes in the global security environment, as well as the increasing economic rivalry between the economic poles, lead the EU to consider on effective political measures to protect its own economic interests in the international arena. However the EU's successful performance on Communitarian understanding could not be implemented on the CFSP easily, due to the cross cuttings of the national interests of its member states.

As the divergences in the national policies of the member states were increased by additional ten, with the latest enlargement, the foundation of the ESDP under the title of CFSP is a necessity. At this point, two questions are to be answered; Firstly, can the EU achieve an internal cohesion for the ESDP eventually through a supranational understanding and secondly, does the evolving ESDP will threaten or strengthen the relations with the NATO *vis-a-vis* the USA.

Apart from those, the questions on the consistency of the EU' s actions referring to the decisions that are taken, should be evaluated within the political and military capacity of the EU. As the linkage between political strength and military capacity is clearly explained above, the EU' s military capacity has much way to develop. However it should not be forgotten that, without the political support and intensive cooperation on military capacity building within the context of the ESDP, it would be impossible for the EU to improve its military capability.

Undoubtedly, the EU is an on going project and this project is composed of many variables. Moreover, the external actors and the conditions have direct effect for the future prospects of the Union. As it is seen in this study, in most of the cases, the Union severally came next to the dangerous ends however the spirit of forging itself for the further integration kept the Union' s enthusiasm alive.

In conclusion, each international institution is founded on specific principles and legal basis in order to execute the required objectives. However as the dynamics of the international relations change, the objectives might be disappeared and the institution may suffer existence problems. The ESDP is in its very early days when it is compared to the EU' s history. Moreover, the EU should go through its ambition to consolidate its political and military capacity so that, an effective and strong EU, which can enforce its initiatives will be more beneficial for region and the rest of the world.

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