

**THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE 21st
CENTURY: NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF NATO**

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21. YÜZYIL TRANSATLANTİK GÜVENLİK İLİŞKİLERİ: YENİ GÜVENLİK
TEHDİTLERİ VE NATO'NUN TRANSFORMASYONU

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Bu tez, 21.yüzyıl transatlantik güvenliği tartışmalarından NATO'nun bu yeni dönemdeki varlığı ve transformasyonunu analiz eder. 20.yüzyıl ile birlikte Soğuk Savaş'ın da ortadan kalkmasıyla, yeni yüzyıl beraberinde, terörizm, kitle imha silahları, bölgesel çatışmalar, devletlerin iflası ve organize suç gibi yeni güvenlik tehditlerini getirmiştir. 21. yüzyılın bu yeni güvenlik tehditleri göz önüne alınırsa, Amerika'nın ve Avrupa'nın hayati güvenlik çıkarlarını ilgilendiren ve transatlantik dayanışma ve NATO'yu gerektiren en az iki ana stratejik konum vardır. Biri Doğu Avrupa'dır. Diğeri ise Orta Doğu'dur. Bu bölgelerle ilgilenebilmek için, transatlantik ittifakın, NATO'nun genişlemesinin devamı ve bu yeni güvenlik tehditlerine karşı çıkmak için alanı dışında görevlendirilebilmesi şartlarını içeren NATO'nun transformasyonunu gerçekleştirilmesi gereklidir.

Anahtar kelimeler: NATO, transformasyon, Doğu Avrupa, Orta Doğu, alan dışı görevler, genişleme

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This thesis analyses one of the most important debates on the transatlantic security in the 21st century, which is the presence of NATO in this new era and its transformation. After the end of the Cold War with the 20th century, the new century brought new security challenges which are mostly terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. Considering these new security challenges of the 21st century, there are at least two major strategic locations that affect vital American and European security interests and require transatlantic cooperation and NATO. One is the eastern Europe. And the other is the Middle East. To deal with these locations, the transatlantic alliance needs to transform NATO which requires the continuation of its enlargement and going out-of its area to counter to new security challenges.

Keywords: NATO, transformation, eastern Europe, Middle East, out-of-area missions, enlargement.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The roots of the strong security alliance between the US and Europe in history date back to the Second World War. From the early onset of the Cold War the alliance became stronger and were further consolidated through the establishment of the US-dominated NATO defense alliance in 1949. Later on, the European dependency on US military power for protection became a fact. A new and more complicated era dawned upon the relationship with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The subsequent break-up of the Soviet Union ended its stronghold on Central and Eastern Europe, heralded the later EU enlargement in May 2004, but also caused the *raison d'être* of NATO to be questioned as the communism and Russia were no longer threats to the transatlantic security. However, the importance of NATO became painfully obvious during the first Balkan war of the early 1990's, when the EU showed its military weakness by waiting around for the Clinton administration's decision to intervene in Europe's own backyard. But consequently, Europe was a united continent again after decades.

However, the beginning of the 21st century was also the beginning of a new era for global security challenges in which even a united Europe was not able to counter by itself. After the terrorist attacks on September 11 in 2001, the US that was the super power of the post-cold war unipolar world, was declaring the 'war on global terror' which could only be succeeded by multilateral action of Europe and the US that required a multilateral institution, in other words the NATO which has already been working since 1949.

Considering these differences in security challenges with the beginning of the 21st century, it is essential to answer these basic questions: What are the changing aspects of security relations of the transatlantic alliance? Is the old security alliance

still valid? If so, then what role for NATO in the 21st century? Does NATO need any transformation to counter the new threats?

The purpose of this study is to analyse one of the most important debates on the transatlantic security in the 21st century, which is the presence of NATO in this new era and its transformation by finding the answers of these questions. My hypothesis is that the presence of a transformed NATO is vital for the transatlantic security alliance in the 21st century. The original purpose of the NATO was to counter Soviet Russia and the threat of communism in the 20th century. However, the collapse of the Soviet Russia could not bring peace to the European continent. The Europeans and the Americans witnessed the conflicts between newly developed states in Eastern Europe which required a military interference for the sake of the continent. Although this region was out of its area, NATO interfered in the region. This was also the beginning of the transformation process of the NATO. Later, this process continued with the enlargement of NATO to the eastern part of Europe. With the EU enlargement parallel to the NATO enlargement, there is not any serious threat to the security of the West coming from within the continent. However, the 21st century has brought new security challenges to the West such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction or regional conflicts. These are threatening not just some but whole states and require a strong transatlantic alliance to counter them. The West already has an old security alliance, NATO. However, today the most important threats lie in the Eastern Europe and the Middle East which are mostly out of NATO's area. Therefore, NATO has to be transformed into an alliance that can act at anywhere that the West faces a threat. Also the enlargement process should be in parallel with the 'out-of-area' missions in NATO's transformation. The enlargement does not only means full membership, but

the accessions of states from especially these regions that the threats come from, to the different programs of NATO such as Partnership for Peace or Mediterranean Dialogue.

In the first chapter, an overview of transatlantic security relations and the position of NATO until the end of the Balkan Wars will be given. The initial purpose of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War and then the discussions about the need for NATO that started with the collapse of the Soviet threat and later the resurfaced importance NATO during the Balkan crisis will be analysed.

In the second chapter, the two major strategic locations, Eastern Europe and the Middle East which affect vital American and European security interests and require transatlantic cooperation and NATO, considering the new security challenges mostly as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime of the 21st century, will be described. Also, to deal with these locations, it will be explained why the transatlantic alliance needs to transform NATO which means to continue enlargement and to go out-of its-area to counter to new security challenges.

Furthermore, in the same chapter, the arguments of the opposite sides discussing the need for NATO in the 21st century will be given under the titles of 'anti-NATO' and 'pro-NATO' groups. Initially, the arguments of the anti-NATO group that are against the continuity of NATO's presence for the security of the West in the 21st century will be analysed. Secondly, the ideas of the pro-NATO group who believe in the necessity of NATO's presence for the sake of the West will be explained.

In the last chapter, the domestic policies of the countries in the transatlantic alliance which are one of the most important facts that forms the security policies will be analysed. Initially, the unilateral American policies during the Afghanistan war

which was backed by the West and later Iraq war which caused a conflict between the US and the Europeans in the transatlantic security alliance will be explained. Later, the reasons behind the shift of United States to multilateralism after Iraq war and lastly the different views of neocons who favor unilateralism and liberals that prefer multilateralism will be demonstrated.

Also, in the same chapter, the different European policies on security issues will be analysed. First the arguments of the Atlanticists that favor the continuity of NATO's presence and the transatlantic security alliance will be given. Secondly, the arguments of the Integrationists that prefer developing their own security institutions in the European Union namely the Common Foreign Security Policy or the European Security and Defence Policy will be explained.

2. BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONS

The roots of the strong security ties between US and Europe in recent history date back to the Second World War. From the early onset of the cold war these ties became stronger and were further consolidated through the establishment of the US-dominated NATO defense alliance in 1949.

Throughout the Cold War period, Europe was an area where the United States engaged. The rationale for US engagement was evident: the US and its allies in Western Europe were in an Atlantic Alliance to confront the greatest threat to Western security posed by the Soviet Union and communism.

2.1. TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR

As World War II neared its end, US and Allies foreign policy goals were to contain the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. Germany would be the point of engagement between the two new global superpowers of US and Soviet Union. World War II ended with US and Allied armies occupying Germany. With the military defeat of Nazi Germany, a power vacuum resulted in Central Europe. Both the US and USSR sought to fill this power vacuum. Following the Potsdam conference of July 17 to August 2, 1945, US President Harry Truman, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill, worked out the occupation and administration of post-war Germany. The US, the UK, the USSR and France would be assigned zones of occupation for Germany as well as the city of Berlin, which was 100 miles inside the Soviet zone.¹

In the initial stages of the US occupation of Germany, the US lacked a policy with regard to the future of Germany. Then, the US policy began to be defined in 1947

¹ McGeehan, Robert. 1971. *The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defence after World War II*. Chicago: UP of Illinois. p.12.

with the emergence of the so-called Truman Doctrine. According to the Truman Doctrine, the US would seek to confront and contain communist and Soviet expansion around the globe. This was the policy of containment directed against the USSR and global communism. Greece and Turkey were the first test cases. The Truman Doctrine entailed the commitment of the US to contain communism and to wage a world-wide war against it.² So, the Cold War had begun.

To contain the USSR in Central Europe, the US needed to strengthen West Germany. But wasn't the US and Western Allies foreign policy goal in West Germany to prevent the resurgence of German militarism? The US faced a dilemma with regard to the occupation of Germany. Should the US demilitarize Germany or should Germany be re-armed? This was the issue that the US foreign policy grappled with in Germany and the US President Harry S. Truman favored a demilitarized Germany.

The Soviet Union, however, sought to fill the power vacuum that resulted from the policy of keeping Germany disarmed. The Soviet Union thus strengthened its military position in Central Europe. The US had to contain the Soviet Union as well. So a policy of double containment began by which the US sought to contain both Germany and the USSR.

The sequence of events leading to the Berlin blockade began on March 17, 1948 when Britain, France, and the Benelux countries signed the Brussels Defense Pact, a mutual defense treaty that was to last for fifty years.³ However, the Brussels Treaty which modified into WEU, would later give its place to larger and geographically extensive framework of NATO.⁴ The Soviet representative walked out of the Allied Control Council meeting in Berlin three days later. Later, the Soviets retaliated with a

² Ibid. p.26.

³ El-Agraa, Ali M. 2001. *The European Union: Economics and Policies*. A.M.El-Agraa, ed. London: Pearson Education. p. 26.

⁴ Rees, G. Wyn. 1998. *Western European Union*. US: Westview Press. p.5.

full land blockade of Berlin. This confrontation over Berlin brought the Westerners closer to a war with the USSR. The Cold War was now in full swing.

What resulted in this US-Soviet confrontation over Germany was the Berlin Blockade, the total land blockade of Berlin beginning on June 24, 1948. The US responded with the Berlin Airlift in which the Western Allies flew approximately 200,000 air sorties into the city to deliver 1.5 million tons of food, coal and other material. The blockade lasted for eleven months. What eventually emerged from this political impasse was the division of the city of Berlin into East and West Berlin.

On September 21, 1949, West Germany was created. US foreign policy sought to fill the power vacuum created in Central Europe with the military defeat and occupation of Germany by creating alliances with West Germany and the other western powers to contain the Soviet Union. The US policy focused on preventing the Soviet Union from taking over West Germany and the other western powers militarily. The US policy also sought to integrate West Germany and the other western powers in a military and economic alliance that would contain Soviet expansionism and thus the spread of communism and ensure economic viability for capitalist, non-communist states. The ultimate goal of the US foreign policy was containment, to contain the Soviet Union militarily in Central Europe. West Germany was vital to the global US policy of containment against the USSR. The result was the creation of NATO.

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty creating NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), a 'defensive' military alliance was signed between the US, UK, Canada, France, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and the Benelux countries. This alliance would be under the leadership of the US and pledged that each nation would provide mutual military assistance and "that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against

them all.”⁵ West Germany, however, was excluded from NATO. Indeed, in November, 1949, the new chancellor of West Germany Konrad Adenauer, signed an Occupation Statute with the high commissioners that mandated the continued demilitarization of Germany and prohibited the formation of armed forces of any sort.⁶ In 1952, Greece and Turkey joined NATO. In 1966 President Charles De Gaulle withdrew France from NATO's integrated military structure.⁷ Spain joined NATO in 1982 and in 1993 France rejoined the military command.

Since its creation in April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been consistently indispensable to the maintenance of cohesion in political and military relations between the United States and its European allies. During the Cold War, for instance, NATO served as an institutional anchor through which the United States committed itself to safeguard Western European territory from attack by the Soviet Union and also to prevent any future threat from Germany. The American security guarantee was formalized in the context of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which mandates that an attack on any one member state of the Alliance is to be treated as an attack on all of its members.⁸

However, Article 5 was never invoked during the Cold War. Ironically it was invoked for the first time on behalf of the United States rather than the Europeans in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Virginia on September 11, 2001.

On May 5, 1955, the occupation of West Germany officially ended and on May 9, West Germany became a member of NATO.⁹ The Soviets responded with the

⁵ The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4 1949. <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>

⁶ McGeehan, Robert. op.cit. p. 14.

⁷ Kulski, W.W.1966. De Gaulle and the World: the Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic. NY: Scyrauce University Press. p. 234.

⁸ The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4 1949. <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>

⁹ McGeehan, Robert. op.cit. p. 237.

signing of the Warsaw Pact Treaty on May 14 in the same year. The treaty was signed by the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The full title was Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.

The Warsaw Pact was a military alliance that the Soviet Union established to counter NATO. The immediate occasion for the Warsaw Pact was the Paris agreement among the Western powers admitting West Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. What emerged in central Europe were two military blocs or alliances. West Germany was a member of NATO while East Germany was a member of the Warsaw Pact.

What the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was for the Western democracies, the Warsaw Pact was for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In other words, the organization was the Soviet bloc's equivalent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Warsaw Pact was, however, the first step in a more systematic plan to strengthen the Soviet hold over its satellites, a program undertaken by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev after his assumption of power early in 1955. The treaty also served as a lever to enhance the bargaining position of the Soviet Union in international diplomacy, an inference that may be drawn by the concluding article of the treaty, which stipulated that the Warsaw agreement would lapse when a general East-West collective-security pact should come into force. Or in other words, as Malcolm Byrne and Vojtech Mastny expressed; "...the pact did not even have a military function...as a putative counterpart to NATO, its original purpose was, ironically, to disappear in return for NATO's dismantling".¹⁰

¹⁰ Byrne, Malcolm, Mastny, Vojtech. May 14, 2005. 'The Warsaw Pact, gone with a whimper'. *International Herald Tribune*. <http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/13/opinion/edbyrne.php>

NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries never engaged an armed conflict with each other, but fought the Cold War for more than 35 years. When it was clear that the Soviet Union would no longer use force to control the Warsaw Pact countries, a series of rapid changes started in Central Europe in 1989, and communism collapsed.

The new governments in Central Europe were much less supportive of the Warsaw Pact, and in January 1991 Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland announced that they would withdraw all support by July 1st that year. Bulgaria followed the suit in February, and it became clear that the pact was effectively dead. After the democratic revolutions of 1989 in eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact was formally declared 'nonexistent' on July 1, 1991, at a final summit meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Prague, Czech. Deployed Soviet troops were gradually withdrawn from the former satellite countries, now politically independent countries; and the decades-long confrontation between eastern and western Europe was formally rejected by members of the Warsaw Pact.¹¹ Beyond ideology, a fundamental lack of realism undermined the pact's ultimate potential. Scenarios of military exercises repeatedly exalted the alliance's performance while underestimating that of the enemy.¹²

On 12 March, 1999, former Warsaw Pact members and successor states the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia followed suit in March 2004. And finally, on May 1st, 2004, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia became members of the European Union.

2.2. POST-COLD WAR EUROPE AND NATO

A new and more complicated era dawned upon the relationship of the Atlantic Alliance with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. The collapse of communism in

¹¹ Pick, Otto. April 10, 2002. 'The Demise Of The Warsaw Pact'.

<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1991/9102-3.htm>

¹² Byrne, Malcolm, Mastny, Vojtech. op.cit.

Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the first debate over a new rationale for the US engagement in Europe and the role of the Europe in its own security. So, the end of the Soviet Union's stronghold on Central and Eastern Europe, which heralded the later EU enlargement in May 2004, also undermined the *raison d'être* of NATO for many. The West was faced with questions about the purpose of this US-European strategic alliance in an age where the old Russian threat was absent, an idea which is the main subject that will be discussed in this thesis.

2.2.1. BALKAN WAR CRISES: RESURFACED IMPORTANCE OF NATO

Indeed, the importance of NATO became painfully obvious during the first Balkan war of the early 1990's, when the EU had to wait around for the Clinton administration's decision to intervene in Europe's own backyard. Europeans still needed US engagement in their continent as their military power was not yet as good as their economy under the EU.

The Bosnian war was an accident waiting to happen ever since Yugoslavia had started to break up in December 1990, when Slovenia had decided to seek its independence. As commentators warned, the complex multiethnic composition of the republic as 44% Muslim, 33% Serb and 17% Croat, was bound to create problems if Yugoslavia was going to be reorganized along ethnic entities. When the fighting broke out in Slovenia in June 1991 and in Croatia in August 1991, the 'international community' became immediately involved and was therefore already present on the scene when the Bosnian war erupted in April 1992. Furthermore, NATO was excluded from the start because of American reluctance to be drawn into what it defined as a 'European' problem and out of NATO's area and the CSCE, which was the first organization involved, soon abdicated its role because its consensual rules gave to Serb-controlled Yugoslavia a veto power which was used to bloc multilateral

procedures.¹³ The Slovenian cease-fire agreement at Brioni was therefore backed by the European Community while the Croatian truce signed in January 1992 needed the UN sponsorship as it involved the deployment of peacekeepers in the disputed so-called pink-zones or the UN Protected Areas temporarily occupied by the Croatian Serbs. The joint EU-UN management of the crisis which was then used as a reference model for at least the first two years of the war was therefore already established before the fighting began.¹⁴

Consequently, NATO intervened in Bosnia only after the United Nations and the European countries were unable to ameliorate the conflict. The failure of the European states to act effectively made it clear that the European states were not prepared to direct and manage European security; the United States' and NATO's involvement was still necessary. Following the Dayton Accords of November 1995, NATO deployed 60,000 troops in Bosnia.¹⁵

Later, Milosevic appeared in 1998 and 1999 to be extending his genocidal policy of 'ethnic cleansing' into Kosovo. These killings concerned Europe and the United States and undoubtedly some policy-makers were reminded of the previous fatalities in Bosnia and were fearful that the number killed in Kosovo could possibly approach that of Bosnia unless action was taken. But who would act? In Bosnia, NATO proved to be the most effective counter to Milosevic. Between March 24 and June 9, 1999, NATO conducted a 78 day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. At the end of this campaign, Milosevic was driven from office and later was arrested and sent to the International War Crimes Trials in the Hague to stand trial for 'crimes against humanity'.

¹³ Park, W., Rees, G. Wyn. op.cit. p.29.

¹⁴ Ibid. p.45.

¹⁵ The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, February 28, 2005.
<http://www.nato.int/issues/sfor/index.html>

Conflicts in the Balkans in the early 1990s caused NATO to re-invent itself. As Anthony Forster and William Wallace have noted; “the eruption in 1991 of conflict within the former Yugoslavia provided a long and painful learning process for the European allies and the United States, from which new concepts of joint task forces and peace-enforcement operations have evolved.”¹⁶

In the 1990s, NATO took on a role that went far beyond its original mission of collective defense. NATO has become the peacekeeper in the Balkans. SFOR, the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has been keeping the peace in Bosnia since it took over from IFOR (Implementation Force) in 1996. KFOR, the Kosovo Force, has been preventing the eruption of war between Albanians and Serbians in Kosovo since the end of the NATO air strikes (Operation Allied Force) in 1999.¹⁷ Finally, NATO has launched various operations to maintain stability in Macedonia. On 31 March Operation Allied Harmony, NATO’s peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, was formally handed over to the European Union.¹⁸

Meanwhile, the European Union has been growing politically and economically more powerful and united. The EU has also been considering expansion into Central and Eastern Europe. But, Russia has not complained nearly as much about EU expansion as they have about NATO expansion, since the EU has not been historically antagonistic to Russia. Throughout the 1990s, the EU has attempted to establish a defense identity for itself independent of the United States. America always reacted negatively, perceiving any move by the EU to establish its own defense institutions as undermining NATO and undermining American influence in Europe. The European effort came during and after NATO action in Kosovo, when an EU Rapid Reaction

¹⁶ Forster, Anthony, Wallace, William. Winter 2001. ‘What is NATO for?’. *Survival*, Vol 43, No 4, p.107.

¹⁷ NATO's role in Kosovo, October 28, 2003. <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/kosovo.htm>

¹⁸ Operation Allied Harmony, August 06, 2004. <http://www.nato.int/fyrom/home.htm>

Force was proposed in Helsinki European Council meeting in 1999. This force would engage in peacekeeping and other humanitarian missions where NATO, essentially the United States, choose not to participate. The American reaction to this proposal was quite hostile. The United States suggested that the Europeans were trying to destroy NATO. In other words, the Europeans were trying to reduce American influence on their continent, and the Americans didn't like it.

However, during the Balkan crisis, there were debates both within NATO and the United States concerning the possibility of getting involved in the Balkans. Some argued that the Balkans did not directly threaten NATO or US interests and that the West should therefore remain uninvolved. Others argued that vital interests were threatened, particularly in Kosovo and Macedonia, because conflict in these areas could easily spread into Greece or Turkey who are NATO members. Ultimately, NATO determined that its interests were threatened and intervened into Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo that were actually 'out-of its area'.

In the post-cold war period, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has focused much of its energy on confronting the challenge of remaining relevant in a transformed European security environment. A key question has been whether or not NATO would be able to successfully transform from a military alliance designed for the threats of 1950s into an an effective security organization capable of responding to new security challenges of the 21st century while also being a consultation body that includes even the former 'dangerous countries' for the stability in the region. Another top concern has been NATO's ability to remain the security institution of choice among the European allies in light of the evaporation of the Soviet threat and growing interest in a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).

As NATO prepared for its fiftieth anniversary summit in April 1999, one of the key issues related to NATO's transformation had been resolved. The formal accession of three new NATO allies, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland on March 12, 1999 signified the culmination of a decade of efforts to reach out to NATO's former adversaries in the East. Enlargement also epitomized the Alliance's consensus that European security depended on the institutional ability of NATO to address the security interests of both the democratic and democratizing states of the Euro-Atlantic region.

The NATO enlargement process relied on the process created through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program that was launched in January 1994. PfP established a process with membership as the target for some partners. It allowed for self-differentiation among 24 partner states without extending the full benefits of NATO membership to the partners. Also, PfP was one means of carrying out the Alliance's goal of 'exporting stability' as envisioned in the new Strategic Concept. It was believed that such stability would be the result of creating key conditions, such as economic growth and development, for democratic consolidation in postcommunist Europe.¹⁹ PfP attracted several traditionally neutral European democratic states such as Finland, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, and Ireland. NATO also forged special institutional relationships with Russia with the creation of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) that gives Russia a 'voice but not a veto' in NATO and with Ukraine via a distinctive NATO-Ukrainian Charter.²⁰ Through these vehicles, NATO constructed the institutional means to involve all interested members of the Euro-Atlantic community in European security in ways compatible with their strategic interests and means.

¹⁹ The Alliance's Strategic Concept, April 23, 1999. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>

²⁰ Park, W., Rees, G. Wyn. op.cit. p.49.

The Washington Summit was the approval of the NATO's newest Strategic Concept. This update of the 1991 Strategic Concept reflected further adaptations in light of the new security and political developments of the new decade. The new Strategic Concept committed the Alliance to pursue 'a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe' that entails not only ensuring the defense of its members but contributing to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. The new concept decidedly shifted NATO's post-Cold War center of gravity toward exporting stability. It also specifically emphasized the PfP's role in achieving Atlantic security. Furthermore, the new Strategic Concept decisively stated that further enlargement is in the strategic interests of the Alliance. The Strategic Concept also declared that members must be prepared to contribute to conflict prevention goals and to conduct non-Article 5 crisis response operations.²¹

NATO's war against Serbia over Kosovo was a defining moment in the life of the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO emerged victorious, united, capable of confronting 21st century security challenges, and stronger by the addition of its new members.

Consequently, the extent of the change in the world since the end of the Cold War, and of NATO's attempt to adapt, became clear after the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States. NATO invoked Article 5, declaring that the attack on the United States was an attack on all NATO members. Article 5 is the core of NATO's collective defense concept, but it was now being invoked not due to invasion by the Soviet Union but due to attacks by terrorists.

Just after the declaration of the 'war on terror', a new worry for those trying to preserve NATO emerged during the American-led campaign in Afghanistan. Because the Afghanistan mission was the beginning of 'war on terror' that the alliance

²¹ The Alliance's Strategic Concept, April 23, 1999. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>

supported. However, a new question was emerged that whether NATO can go out of its main area or not? This question also resurfaced in February 2003 when NATO faced one of its worst crises after France, Germany and Belgium blocked proposals by the other 16 member countries to bolster Turkey's defences in preparation for war with Iraq. The supporters of NATO's presence in the 21st century insist on its transformation into a body that can go 'out of area' whether anti-NATO thinkers suggest that NATO is about to die just because it can not do this, a discussion that will be analysed in this thesis broader. But as it will be discussed in the next chapter, the strategic locations for the 21st century security challenges are located 'out-of NATO's-area'.

3. CHANGING ASPECTS OF TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE 21st CENTURY

After the Balkan crisis was over with the end of the 20th century, the beginning of the 21st century was also the beginning of a new era for global security challenges in which even recently ‘united’ Europe was not able to counter by itself. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the super power of the post-cold war unipolar world, the US was declaring the ‘war on global terror’ which could only be succeeded by ‘multilateral action’ of the EU and the US.

3.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS OF 9/11 AND DECLARATION OF ‘WAR ON TERROR’

The ‘war on terror’ was launched in response to the September 11 attacks by Al Qaeda, an Islamic militant organization led by Osama bin Laden, and has become a central part of US foreign and domestic policy. It is a controversial campaign led by the US government and some of its allies with the stated goal of ending worldwide terrorism by stopping terrorist groups and ending state sponsorship of terrorism.

Actually, the ‘war on terror’ started after the 9/11 attacks, with the US invasion of Afghanistan that was considered as the ‘shelter’ of Al Qaeda in October 2001. The Bush administration had also considered the Iraqi War as part of the war on terror. The administration claimed that Saddam Hussein had partnered with Islamist terrorist groups, identifying al-Qaeda as one possible partner but not the only one. However, the 9/11 Commission found no evidence of substantial recent cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaeda.²²

For the war against terror, the US government increased military operations, economic measures and political pressure on groups it accused of being terrorists, as

²² The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.htm

well as on governments and countries accused of sheltering them. October 2001 saw the first military action initiated by the US under this policy, when the US invaded Afghanistan in a ongoing attempt to capture Osama bin Laden. Prior to the invasion, the Taliban had refused to hand over bin Laden without evidence of his connection to the attacks. While the primary objective of capturing bin Laden has failed so far, the invasion succeeded in uprooting the Taliban from power, enabling the implementation of a government somewhat more cooperative and supportive in the search for bin Laden and the general war on terror. The US government has also asserted that the US invasion of Iraq is connected to September 11. For instance, President Bush said “The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11, 2001...”²³, and Vice President Dick Cheney suggested that Iraq was involved in the September 11 attack during an interview by saying “Iraq is the geographic base of the terrorists who had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9-11”.²⁴ Also, the U.S. government has continued to maintain that the war on Iraq is critical to the American ‘War on Terrorism’. “In the war on terror, Iraq is now the central front...” said President Bush on December 14, 2005.²⁵

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the United States and other countries around the world were on alert against potential follow-up attacks. The attacks had major world-wide political effects. The attacks prompted numerous memorials and services all over the world. In Berlin, 200,000 Germans marched to show their solidarity with America. The French newspaper Le Monde, typically critical of the United States government, ran a front-page headline reading ‘Nous

²³ Bush, George W. Speech that Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended. May 1, 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html>

²⁴ Cheney, Dick. Interview by Tim Russert. September 14, 2003. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244/>

²⁵ Bush, George W. Speech on Iraqi Elections and Victory in the War on Terror. December 14, 2005. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051214-1.html>

sommes tous Américains’, or ‘We are all Americans’.²⁶ In London, the U.S. national anthem was played at the Changing of the Guard at Buckingham Palace. In the immediate aftermath, support for the United States' right to defend itself was expressed across the world, and by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368.²⁷

Reaction to the attacks in the Muslim world was mixed. The great majority of Muslim political and religious leaders condemned the attacks, the only significant exception was Saddam Hussein, then president of Iraq.

In addition to strong supports for the war on terror, these new security challenges were declared in both 2002 National Security Strategy of US and 2003 EU Security Strategy as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction especially. These two similar reports were the signs of strong security alliance between the United States and Europe in this new era. And the institution already designed for the continuation of this alliance was NATO which had already started to be transformed during and after the Balkan crisis. As declared in the in the Solana Document called ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy’, the transatlantic relationship, of which ‘NATO is important’, is also defined as a core element, not only in the EU’s bilateral interests but also for the international community as a whole.²⁸

However, although declared as ‘important’ in the both security strategies, and had already proved its importance during the Balkan crisis, there are still different views on the future of the transatlantic alliance and relatively the mission of the NATO in this era. But in order to understand these ideas, the strategic locations for the transatlantic security that require this ‘old security alliance’ had to be analysed initially.

²⁶ ‘Nous sommes tous Américains’. September 12, 2001. *Le Monde*.

²⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1368. September 12, 2001.
<http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/othr/2001/4899.htm>

²⁸ Solana, Javier. ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy’. Brussels, December 12, 2003. <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

3.2. STRATEGIC LOCATIONS FOR THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY IN THE NEW SECURITY ERA

Considering the new security challenges in the 21st century, there are at least two major strategic locations which affect vital American and European interests that require trans-Atlantic cooperation and NATO. Central and Eastern European countries had already witnessed the necessity of NATO during the Balkan crisis who have become even members of it. For the stability of the region and the unity of Europe, this security guarantee is vital. However, Middle East is more a problem now than the Central and Eastern Europe. Because that part of the world is the source for the new security challenges as was the Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War era.

3.2.1. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

One of this strategic locations is in the eastern Europe where the countries had been under Soviet pressure during the Cold War era and occupied the transatlantic security alliance with the dissolution of former iron curtain countries . With Central and Eastern Europe successfully integrated into NATO and the European Union, after decades there is no 'war' problem in the continent. The integration of the former 'iron curtain' countries led to a real 'united' Europe at last.

Following World War II, large parts of Europe that were culturally and historically Western became part of the Eastern bloc. Following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War, this distinction has disappeared as those countries that had been Warsaw Pact members became the members of NATO and the European Union.

3.2.1.1. NEW MEMBERS OF THE EU

Today's enlargement is the fifth and the largest in the history of the union and I am convinced that it will not be the last. Other European countries and nations will

decide to join our undertaking until the whole continent is unified in peace and democracy.²⁹

On May 1 2004, eight Central and East European countries; the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, together with the two islands of Cyprus and Malta, officially joined the European Union. This single enlargement almost doubled the number of member states, from 15 to 25, while increasing the total population to over 450 million people, making the EU the world's largest free-trade zone.

Perhaps the greatest victory at this point is psychological. Most of Europe is at peace. The new members have overcome the most significant obstacle in their modern histories by overcoming communism and installing democratic rule. Rather than being on the periphery of the continent, the new members will become players within the Union. After Central and Eastern Europe successfully integrated into NATO and the European Union, after decades there is no 'war' problem in the continent. The integration of the former 'iron curtain' countries led to a real 'united' Europe at last. This was vital for the stability of the region.

The important point is that this process was fully supported by the United States which had exactly the same interests in a united and conflict-free Europe like the Europeans. Besides, East is important for the sake of NATO. So, US gives special importance to these countries. As Rumsfeld launched the debate of 'old' vs 'new' Europe by saying:

You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. That's old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the East. Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem. But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They're not with France and Germany on this, they're with the United States.³⁰

²⁹ Prodi, Romano. EU welcomes ten new members. May 1, 2004.
<http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/04/30/eu.enlargement/index.html>

³⁰ Rumsfeld, Donald. Outrage at old Europe remarks. January 23, 2003.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm>

However, these countries have gains from the both sides of the Atlantic. This is why they both become a member of the EU and NATO at the same; for economic gains the EU and for their security the NATO. As Barry D. Wood says “...post-communist states to the East that to greater or lesser degrees favor a continuing American presence in Europe.”³¹

The reaction within these countries were warmer. Most of the governments have stated that their countries were in Europe and with America, and they wanted to ensure a continued US involvement in Europe as a guarantor of security for the entire continent.³²

The addition of the seven new Eastern European countries increased the number of members to a total of 26 nations. All the new members, aside from Slovenia, as well as the three states that joined in 1999, were previously under Soviet domination. And this latest enlargement reinforced the argument that NATO is far from obsolete as other countries are queuing up to join the Alliance. And despite the endeavors to form a European common security and foreign policy, independent from the United States, the Old Continent is riven by disputes and no uniform platform will be easily realised. Thus, for the East Europeans, NATO remains the only viable organization that can ensure their security in the event of a crisis.

The White House held a ceremony on March 29, 2004 and the President George W. Bush praised the efforts of the acceding states: ‘The countries we welcome today were friends before they were allies, and they were allies in action before becoming

³¹ Wood, Barry. Spring 2003. ‘There Is No Clear Line Between Old and New Europe’. *European Affairs*, Vol 4, No 2.

http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2003_spring/2003_spring_52.php4

³² Staneva, Milena. Spring 2004. ‘Bigger is Beter’. *Europe East*, Vol 4, No 2, p.7.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/europe_eastspring2004final.pdf

allies by treaty. Today, all seven of these nations are helping to bring lasting freedom to Afghanistan and Iraq.³³

Many may think that these states are not big partners in the war on terror. Yet, Poland has proven time and its capabilities and solidarity with the United States. Hungary, Slovakia, and other new democracies may be smaller allies, but they can form a significant community of support inside the European Union.³⁴ This also included post-election Ukraine, which seeks to move westward and forge closer links with the US and the EU.

Also, in order to maintain strong US influence in Europe and promote enduring support for American policies in various unstable regions, the US needs to reinforce ties with the new pro-American European democracies such as Poland and Bulgaria who have put their troops for US missions.³⁵ Similarly, the CEE states seek to increase their leverage within the EU and NATO, as well as their close relations with the US, to pull Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia into the Western orbit. Because the Central Europeans remain concerned about the EU compromises with Russia that could weaken the US role and endanger their own long-term security interests. The fear results from the possibility of new dividing lines in Europe. As Janusz Bugajski wrote; “they contend that such a scenario would damage inter-state relations, undermine economic cooperation, encourage Russian revanchism, obstruct structural reform, and potentially destabilize the region.”³⁶

3.2.1.2. UKRAINE

³³ Bush, George W.. Remarks at the NATO Accession Ceremony. March 29, 2004. <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040329b.htm>

³⁴ Teleki, Ilona. Spring 2005. ‘America in Question’. *Europe East*, Vol 5, No 1, p.1-2. <http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/europaeastspring2005.pdf>

³⁵ Bugajski, Janusz. Spring 2005. ‘Mixed Results For President Bush in Europe’. *Europe East*, Vol 5, No 1, p.4. <http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/europaeastspring2005.pdf>

³⁶ Bugajski, Janusz. Fall 2005. ‘A Wider or a Fractured Europe?’. *Europe East*, Vol 5, No 2, p.1. <http://www.csis.org/media/isis/pubs/csiseuropeeastvol5no2fall2005.pdf>

In addition to new EU members, western democracies must be in contact with Ukraine and Russia to deepen this stability in the region. This means anchoring a democratic Ukraine to the Western alliance and continuing to build a new partnership with Russia. Both the EU and the NATO already have special relationships with these countries. It is unimaginable to think Russia in the EU or in NATO with western democracies. But Ukraine, especially after the victory of pro-westerner Yushchenko in last presidential election, can be one of the members of two institutions, the EU and NATO.

Ukraine considers Euro-Atlantic integration its primary foreign policy objective, but in practice balances its relationship with Europe and the United States with strong ties to Russia. Ukraine's relations with EU started with the European Union's Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which went into force on March 1, 1998.³⁷ The EU Common Strategy toward Ukraine, issued at the EU Summit in December 1999 in Helsinki, recognizes Ukraine's long-term aspirations but does not discuss association.³⁸ On January 31, 1992, Ukraine joined the then-Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and on March 10, 1992, it became a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Ukraine also has a close relationship with NATO and has declared interest in eventual membership. It is the most active member of the Partnership for Peace .

Despite the stronger partnership, Ukraine still needs a clearer prospect for accession to the Union. New EU members such as Poland and Lithuania have stressed the importance for drawing a path for Ukraine's EU membership and President Yushchenko has kept EU aspirations a priority. The beginning of EU accession

³⁷ Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA).
<http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r17002.htm>

³⁸The European Council Summit in Helsinki. December 10-11, 1999.
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm

negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 gave hope to Kyiv that the enlargement process has not stopped. There is no doubt that EU and NATO enlargement will go in parallel in such a case.

Ukraine has struggled with an internal divide for much of its history and the frontrunner candidates for the presidency in the latest elections have highlighted this division. The government candidate, former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, derives most of his support from the country's eastern regions. He has promised to strengthen Ukraine's relations with Russia and to make Russian a second official language if elected. Yanukovich has also vocalized his antagonism to Ukrainian membership in NATO. On the other side, the main opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, has garnered most of his support in western Ukraine. He has advocated an EU and NATO course for the country.

With approximately 48 million citizens, Ukraine, by its size, location, and population, forms the most strategically important European country that emerged from the Soviet Union. It borders with four distinct regions, the Central Europe, the Caucasus, the Black Sea zone, and Russia, most of which face an uncertain future. A Russian dominated Ukraine could become a source of regional insecurity while encouraging Moscow to expand its influences further afield. By contrast, an independent and democratic Ukraine would become a more effective regional power, a barrier against any spillover of instability, and an important model of reform for Belarus and Moldova.

Ukraine's Orange Revolution accelerated prospects for deeper association and even for EU accession. The country's EU aspirations were evident in President Viktor Yushchenko's platform, which called for increased engagement with the EU and the United States and for the initiation of necessary reforms. Framed as a choice between

West and East, the latest presidential elections gave Ukrainian citizens an ideological and strategic choice of a future involving NATO and the European Union instead of stronger ties with Russia. As Europe is 'united' after decades, keeping ties strong with Ukraine is necessary to deepen this stability in the region.

For Ukraine in this situation, the question of the formation of its external policy in relation to European security becomes very important. The geopolitical position of Ukraine is central to this question. A closer or even a member Ukraine means the expansion of the stability zone in Europe. The NATO area is now the most stable region in Europe. Its expansion could mean the enlargement of this region of stability. Besides, NATO enlargement can lead to closer relations between Ukraine and Western Europe.

The development of such relations in the political and economic spheres could allow Ukraine to develop a broader range of relations and not continue to be so strongly orientated to Russia and the CIS. Ukraine became a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on December 8, 1991, but in January 1993 it refused to endorse a draft charter strengthening political, economic, and defense ties among CIS members.³⁹

The relations of the West with Russia is also important for Ukraine's future. Following the elections, the Kremlin views Ukraine as the major problem between the Atlantic and Eurasia. Until relations between NATO and Russia are normalised or other variants are found, Ukraine will find itself virtually surrounded by two confronting powers: NATO from the south and west, Russia from the north and east. At present, Ukraine, according to its Declaration of Sovereignty, is independent of all

³⁹Kramarevsky, Alexander. September/November 1996. 'NATO and Ukraine'. *Perceptions Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 1, Issue 3, p.60.

blocks and is neutral. But it is obvious that for Ukraine, neutrality is not a problem when it comes to membership in NATO.

3.2.1.3. RUSSIA

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Russian Federation became an independent country. Russia was the largest of the fifteen republics that made up the Soviet Union, accounting for over 60 percent of the GDP and over half of the Soviet population. Russians also dominated the Soviet military and the Communist Party. Thus, Russia was widely accepted as the Soviet Union's successor state in diplomatic affairs and it assumed the USSR's permanent membership and veto in the UN Security Council.

Although Russia's leaders now describe the West as its natural ally, Russia opposed the expansion of NATO into the former Soviet bloc nations of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary in 1997 and, particularly, the second NATO expansion into Baltic states in 2004. In 1999, Russia opposed the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia for more than two months, but later joined NATO peace-keeping forces in the Balkans in June 1999.⁴⁰ Relations with the West have also been stained by Russia's relationship with Belarus. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, an authoritarian Soviet-style leader, has shown much interest in aligning his country with Russia, and no interest in deepening ties with the expanding NATO. A union agreement between Russia and Belarus was formed on April 2, 1996. The agreement was tightened and became the Union of Russia and Belarus on April 3, 1997. Further strengthening of the union occurred on December 25, 1998, and in 1999.

Although Russia claims that the alliance is extraneous and ineffective, they sharply criticize NATO's presence closer to Russia's frontiers. This is the proof that

⁴⁰ NATO-Russia relations. <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/nato-rus.htm>

NATO's presence is still frightening Russia even though it poses no threat to Europe anymore. As Russia's Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov asked: "Why is an organization that was designed to oppose the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe still necessary in today's world?" He goes on to give examples of US and NATO failures to consolidate international security. Yet, he defines as worrisome the fact that during the Prague summit in 2002, the alliance gave itself approval to undertake military operations even outside the territory of its member states. With respect to the prospective NATO military presence in the Baltic countries, Minister Ivanov asserts that the alliance will be "gaining greater ability to control and monitor Russian territory."⁴¹ If NATO was truly as obsolete as it is presented, then why worry?

Furthermore, Russia is in strong relations with NATO that is 'obsolete' according to the Russians, through NATO-Russia Council. Since 1994, Russia has been a member of the Partnership for Peace Program. President Bush and the other NATO Heads of State and Government have agreed with Russian President Putin to establish the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).⁴² The creation of the NRC has opened a new era in NATO-Russia relations, providing opportunities for consultation, joint decision, and joint action on a wide range of issues.

The NRC focuses on specific, well-defined projects where NATO and Russia share a common goal. NATO and Russia have agreed on an initial, specific workplan, which includes projects in the following areas like assessment of the terrorist threat, crisis management, non-proliferation, and arms control. Other projects may be added as the NRC develops.

The NRC does not affect NATO's existing responsibilities as a political and military alliance based on collective defense. The NRC does not provide Russia a veto

⁴¹ Ivanov, Sergei. April 7, 2004. 'As NATO Grows, So Do Russia's Worries'. *New York Times*. p.A21.

⁴² NATO-Russia relations. <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/nato-rus.htm>

over NATO decisions or actions. NATO Allies retain the freedom to act, by consensus, on any issue at any time. NATO Allies will decide among themselves on the issues they will address in the NRC, as well as the extent to which they will take a common position on these issues.

Representatives from Moscow first took part in meetings at NATO in 1991, as part of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). In 1997, the NATO-Russia 'Founding Act' established a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). NATO-Russia cooperation since the Founding Act has taken a variety of forms. Russian troops have participated in the NATO-led SFOR and KFOR operations, and discussions in the PJC addressed issues such as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control, and defense reform.

Such relations with Russia is also vital for the future of the Central and Eastern European Countries. As the first new members of NATO and the EU, the Central European states will play a particular role in shaping Russia's relations with the rest of Europe. The breakup of the Soviet Union facilitated the normalization of relations between the Central European states and Russia. The emergence of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states and Moldova as independent states made Central Europe far less vulnerable to Russian influence than it had been to that of the Soviet Union. The prospect of democratization in Russia provided a common political basis for cooperation. In 1992, new bilateral treaties were concluded between Russia and the Central European states, recognizing their independence and borders, pledging non-interference in internal affairs and committing them to cooperation.

Despite this normalization of relations, the Central European states remain concerned about Russia's future development and its ambitions towards them. From the Central European perspective, Russia remains a great power, the largest single

military power on the European mainland and a major nuclear power. Despite its current economic problems, Russia retains the territory, natural resources and productive potential to regenerate itself economically in the longer term, which could also enable it to modernize and expand its armed forces.

For years, the issue of NATO enlargement reinforced existing mistrust between Russia and Central Europe and became the core issue in their mutual relations. The Central European states's desire for NATO membership was driven in significant part by fear of Russia, although this was not their only motivation. Many in the Russia viewed NATO as a threat to Russian security and the Alliance's enlargement as part of an attempt to exclude Russia from European security structures. Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement, however, only confirmed Central European fears that Russia had still not fully accepted their independence, wished to retain a sphere of influence in the region and was willing to use threats and bullying to achieve its goals.

NATO's 1997 decisions on enlargement and its parallel efforts to build cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and other 'left out' states have altered the situation, opening a potentially new era in Central Europe's relations with Russia. While Russia retains its formal opposition to NATO's expansion, the conclusion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the development of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and Russia's continued engagement in the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia all indicate that it is seeking to maintain and deepen its cooperative ties with NATO.

3.2.2. MIDDLE EAST

The second strategic location for the Atlantic alliance is the Middle East which is even more crucial than any other region today. This is the region from which the greatest threats to the United States and Europe are likely to come which they both

declared in 2002 National Security Strategy of US and 2003 EU Security Strategy as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction especially.

3.2.2.1. AFGHANISTAN MISSION: FIRST WAR ON TERROR

After the collapse of the Soviet Union that invaded Afghanistan for years, in 1992 the Islamic State of Afghanistan was declared. However, instability in the country had not ended as the the civil war continued. In reaction to the anarchy the Taliban took control of 90% of the country by 1998, limiting the opposition mostly to a small, largely Tajik corner in the northeast and the Panjshir valley. The opposition formed the Afghan Northern Alliance, which continued to receive diplomatic recognition in the United Nations as the government of Afghanistan.⁴³

Since approximately 1996, Osama bin Laden had been resident in Afghanistan along with other members of al-Qaeda, operating terrorist training camps in a loose alliance with the Taliban. Following the 1998 US embassy bombings in Africa, the Clinton administration fired cruise missiles at these camps with limited effect on their overall operations. After the September 11th attacks, investigators rapidly accumulated evidence implicating bin Laden.

In the weeks prior to the military action in Afghanistan, US President George W. Bush delivered an ultimatum to the Taliban, to deliver Al-Qaeda leaders located in Afghanistan to the United States, release all imprisoned foreign nationals, including American citizens, protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in Afghanistan, close terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and give the US full access to terrorist training camps to verify their closure. President Bush further stated that the demands were not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban's initial responses demanded evidence of bin Laden's culpability in the September 11 attacks and

⁴³ Rashid, Ahmed. November/December 1999. 'The Taliban: Exporting Extremism'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 78, No 6, p.22.

included a proposal to try him in an Islamic court. Later, as the likelihood of military action became more imminent, they offered to extradite bin Laden to a neutral nation. Moderates within the Taliban allegedly met with American embassy officials in Pakistan in mid-October to work out a way to convince Mullah Muhammed Omar to turn bin Laden over to the US and avoid its impending retaliation.⁴⁴ President Bush rejected these offers made by the Taliban as insincere.

The UN Security Council also issued a resolution on September 18, 2001 directed towards the Taliban demanding that they hand over the terrorist Osama bin Laden and close all terrorist training camps immediately and unconditionally. The council demanded the Taliban to turn over bin Laden to the United States or a third country for trial.

The United States government had before announced its intentions to engage in a protracted war against terrorists and states which aid terrorists in response to the attacks. The first target was the Taliban government in Afghanistan, because they did not turn over Osama bin Laden. The Taliban alleged their inability to satisfy this request and demanded their right to examine the evidence on which the United States government based its claims. This was denied and the United States government expressed its unwillingness to enter into any discussion. The United States had made it clear that this war on terrorism would continue until after dealing with whoever is responsible for the September 11 attacks.

In response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States and its coalition allies launched a successful invasion of Afghanistan to oust the Taliban government. The officially stated purpose of the invasion was to target al-Qaeda members, and to

⁴⁴ Cordesman, Anthony H. November 20, 2001. 'Beyond the Bin Laden Hunt: The Real Story in the War Against Terrorism'. Washington: *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. p:2. http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/011120_cordf11.pdf

punish the Taliban government in Afghanistan which had provided support and haven to al-Qaeda which declared:

To kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who is able, in any country where this is possible, until the Aqsa Mosque (in Jerusalem) and the Haram Mosque (in Mecca) are freed from their grip and until their armies, shattered and broken-winged, depart from all the lands of Islam, incapable of threatening any Muslim.⁴⁵

The United States invasion of Afghanistan occurred in October 2001, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, marking the beginning of its war on terrorism campaign. Seeking to oust the Taliban and find Al-Qaeda mastermind Osama bin Laden, the Afghan Northern Alliance provided the majority of forces, and the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, New Zealand, Italy, and Germany provided support. The name of the US military invasion was Operation Enduring Freedom.

The magnitude of the change in the world since the end of the Cold War, and of NATO's attempt to adapt, became clear after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. NATO invoked Article 5, declaring that the attack on the United States was an attack on all NATO members.⁴⁶ Article 5 is the core of NATO's collective defense concept, but it was now being invoked not due to invasion by the Soviet Union but due to attacks by terrorists.

Following the Balkan crisis, NATO's transformation became evident again. The crucial threat to the security of the Atlantic alliance was coming from 'out-of-NATO's area' just like in the case of Balkan crisis. Furthermore, while the Balkan states were near the borders of the Europe, Afghanistan even had not a common border with the EU or the US.

⁴⁵ Lewis, Bernard. November/December 1998. 'License to Kill: Usama bin Ladin's Declaration of Jihad'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 77, No 6, p.14.

⁴⁶ 'Special Report: A Moment of Truth—The Future of NATO'. May 4, 2002. *The Economist*. p.26.

But consequently, it was clear that although the security challenges have changed, the necessity of the Atlantic alliance was clear. With the help of the old alliance, the first war on terror was a victory as on 9 October 2004 and Karzai was elected president in Afghanistan's first ever direct presidential election.

3.2.2.2 IRAQ: FIRST WAR ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Since the end of the Gulf War of 1991, Iraq's relations with the UN, the US, and the UK remained poor. Both the UN and the US enforced numerous economic sanctions against Iraq throughout the Clinton administration. The United States Congress also passed the 'Iraq Liberation Act' in October 1998, which provided \$97 million for Iraqi democratic opposition organizations in order to establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq. Weapons inspectors had been used to gather information on Iraq's WMD (Weapon's of Mass Destruction) program and to enforce the terms of the 1991 cease fire, which forbade Iraq from developing WMD. The information was used in targeting decisions during Operation Desert Fox.

Iraq had ratified the Nuclear Peace Treaty. Nevertheless, before the Gulf War, Iraq had a comprehensive nuclear weapons development program. From April 1991 to December 1998, Iraqi nuclear aspirations were held in check by IAEA/ UNSCOM inspections and monitoring. All known weapons grade fissile material was removed from the country. Iraq would need five or more years and key foreign assistance to rebuild the infrastructure to enrich enough material for a nuclear weapon.⁴⁷

From the 1990s, US officials have constantly voiced concerns about ties between the government of Saddam Hussein and terrorist activities, notably in the context of

⁴⁷ Cordesman, Anthony H. September 23, 2001. 'Defending America: Asymmetric and Terrorist Attacks With Radiological and Nuclear Weapons'. Center for Strategic and International Studies. p.48. <http://www.csis.org/burke/hd/reports/NucTerr010923.pdf>

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁴⁸ The United States Republican Party's campaign platform in the U.S. presidential election 2000, called for 'full implementation' of the Iraq Liberation Act and removal of Saddam Hussein with a focus on rebuilding a coalition, tougher sanctions, reinstating inspections, and support for the pro-democracy, opposition group, Iraqi National Congress then headed by Ahmed Chalabi. Upon the election of George W. Bush as president, the first security council meeting discussed plans on invasion of the country.

One year later, on the day of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the George W. Bush administration announced a War on Terror, accompanied by the doctrine of 'pre-emptive' military action, termed the Bush doctrine.

The United States also began preparations for the invasion of Iraq. Until the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, official US policy was to simply keep Iraq complying with the UN sanctions. After the terrorist attacks by the group around the Osama bin Laden on New York and Washington in the United States in 2001, American foreign policy began to call for the removal of the Ba'ath government in Iraq as a part of the global War on Terrorism. After the attacks, regime change became official policy.

The US urged the United Nations to take military action against Iraq. The US president George Bush stated that Saddam had repeatedly violated UN Security Council resolutions. The Iraqi government rejected Bush's assertions. A team of UN inspectors, led by Swedish diplomat Hans Blix was admitted into the country; their final report stated that Iraq's capability in producing 'weapons of mass destruction' was not significantly different from 1992 when the country dismantled the bulk of their remaining arsenals under terms of the ceasefire agreement with UN forces, but did not completely rule out the possibility that Saddam still had Weapons of Mass Destruction.

⁴⁸ Bengio, Ofra. July/August 2000. 'How Does Saddam Hold On?'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 79, No 4, p. 91.

The United States and the United Kingdom charged that Iraq was hiding Weapons and opposed the team's requests for more time to further investigate the matter, claiming that such investigations had gone on for years without success. Resolution 1441 was passed unanimously by the UN Security Council on November 8, 2002, offering Iraq 'a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations' that had been set out in several previous UN resolutions, threatening 'serious consequences' if the obligations were not fulfilled. The UN Security Council did not issue a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq.⁴⁹

In 2002 the Iraq disarmament crisis arose primarily as a diplomatic situation. In October 2002, with the 'Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq', the United States Congress granted President Bush the authority to 'use any means necessary' against Iraq, based on repeated Bush Administration statements to Congress and the public that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction. The joint resolution allowed the President of the United States to 'defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq.'⁵⁰

In his March 17, 2003, address to the nation, US President George W. Bush demanded that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his two sons Uday and Qusay leave Iraq, giving them a 48-hour deadline⁵¹. This demand was reportedly rejected. Iraq maintained that it had disarmed itself as required. The UN weapons inspectors headed by Hans Blix, who were sent by the UN Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1441, requested more time to complete their report on whether Iraq had

⁴⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 1441. November 8, 2002.

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm>

⁵⁰ Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq. October 2, 2002. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-2.html>

⁵¹ Bush, George W. Address to the nation. March 17, 2003.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/iraq/20030317-7.html>

complied with its obligation to disarm. The International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA reported a level of compliance by Iraq with the disarmament requirements. The attempt of the United Kingdom and the United States to obtain a further Resolution authorizing force failed. Thus, the US-led invasion began without the express approval of the United Nations Security Council, and most legal authorities regard it as a violation of the UN Charter. And several countries protested.

The 2003 Invasion of Iraq began on March 20, consisting primarily of United States and United Kingdom forces; 98% of the forces came from these two countries, although numerous other nations also participated. The 2003 Iraq invasion marked the beginning of what is commonly referred to as the Iraq War. The Iraqi military was defeated, and Baghdad fell on April 9th, 2003. On May 1, 2003, US President George W. Bush declared the end of major combat operations, terminating the Ba'ath Party's rule and removing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from office. Coalition forces ultimately captured Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003.

United States military operations were conducted under the codename Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Bush administration declared that Operation Iraqi Freedom was, as its name implies, intended to provide relief from tyranny and it would promote stability in the region and pre-empt an Iraqi attack on the US. At the time, both major US political parties gave credence to intelligence reports that Iraq possessed and intended to use weapons of mass destruction as Saddam Hussein had exercised on the Kurds. However, the US support were quickly divided following the invasion as the opposing Democratic Party started saying that the invasion would be justified only if WMD were actually found in significant numbers in Iraq.

'Coalition of the Willing' is a phrase which has been used by the administration of US President George W. Bush to refer to the nations whose governments militarilly

supported the United States position in the Iraq disarmament crisis and later the 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent peacekeeping duties. The original list in March 2003 included 48 members. However, as the 90% of the military was from the US and Britain, it was a predominantly Anglo-American force rather than as a coalition.

In a 2004 presidential debate, democratic party's presidential candidate John Kerry questioned the size of the coalition, saying that Bush portrayed the effort as a widespread international consensus when actually only two major allies of the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, had comparatively substantial numbers of soldiers on the ground during the initial invasion. President Bush responded by saying 'Well, actually, he forgot Poland'. The phrase showed that most members of the coalition were not contributing much to the war effort compared to the three main allies. The majority of the population in most countries involved did not support their nation's participation.

For instance, a few days after the 11 March 2004 Madrid attacks, the pro-war government of Spain was voted out of office. The War had been deeply unpopular and the incoming Socialist government withdrew troops from Iraq. Following this, several other nations that once formed the Coalition of the Willing began to reconsider their role. The Dutch refused a US offer to commit their troops to Iraq after 30 June. South Korea kept its troops deployed. Soon after the decisions of withdrawal in the Spring of 2004, the Dominican Republic, Honduran, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Singapore, Thailand, Portugal, Philippines, Bulgaria, Nicaragua and Italy left. Other nations such as Australia, Denmark and Poland continued commitments in Iraq.

At that point, the necessity of NATO which already includes the necessary parts in the 'Coalition of the Willing' acted in the Iraq war becomes clearly obvious. United Nations members are so differently located that the sake of the Middle East is not so

important for them as to the Atlantic Alliance. For instance, On 16 July 2004, the Philippines ordered the withdrawal of all of its troops in Iraq in order to comply with the demands of terrorists holding Filipino citizen Angelo de la Cruz as a hostage. In addition, by the Spring of 2004, the Dominican Republic, Honduran, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Singapore, Thailand, Portugal, Philippines, Bulgaria, Nicaragua and Italy was leaving Iraq most of which are far away from that part of the world. On the other hand, nations such as Denmark and Poland was continuing commitment in Iraq.

The real problem with the Iraq war and NATO surfaced during the crisis with Turkey. The failure of the Turkish Parliament to ratify a decision regarding the deployment of American troops in Turkish territory on March 1, 2003, caused a major shock. However, the underlying problem was again the 'out-of-area' problem of NATO. Although every partner of the US was eager to make 'war on terror', they did not want to participate in Iraq war. Several close allies of the US like Germany, Belgium and France, although mainly sharing the ideas of the United States, opposed a military intervention because they claimed that it would increase rather than decrease the risk of terrorist attacks. Although the UK and governments of other members of the EU and NATO also supported the US position, opinion polls show that in general their populations were against an attack, especially an attack without a clear UN Security Council support.

At that point, Turkish demand of a NATO guarantee for its security was unacceptable. Because the war would not be in NATO's area, the United States proposed to take measures for protection of Turkey against possible attacks in case of a war in Iraq, but could not get full support of allies in the beginning in NATO, which started a year with tension and uncompromising attitudes of some allies stemming

from Iraqi crisis. Belgium, France and Germany which had the view that 'NATO should not interfere in Iraq war' prevented sending defense units to Turkey for a while.

The issue of whether to begin planning defensive assistance to Turkey should it be attacked by Iraq during a US-led coalition attack on Saddam Hussein's regime exploded, threatening the alliance. On January 15, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz formally asked NATO to consider what supporting roles it might play in a US-led war on Iraq. Six areas of assistance were discussed, including sending Patriot missiles and AWACS surveillance planes to defend Turkey, the only NATO member that borders Iraq.

After discussions within the North Atlantic Council, Belgium, France, and Germany announced their opposition to allowing NATO to begin planning to provide military assistance to Turkey. The three allies said that they were not opposed to aiding Istanbul but believed that planning for such action was premature while UN arms inspectors were still seeking to disarm Iraq peacefully. The initiative was seen as an attempt by the United States to get preemptive NATO support for a military action that was not sanctioned by the UN Security Council. The three allies wanted to make it clear that a NATO mandate would not be sufficient to justify military action against Iraq, because the involvement of soldiers from NATO countries was very different from an involvement by NATO as a military alliance.

The choices of the United States to put the issue before the alliance and of the three allies to block the requested planning brought existing political differences over Iraq into NATO.

Donald Rumsfeld, the US secretary of defence, said that France, Germany and Belgium had made a mistake by blocking Nato plans for steps to defend Turkey in the event of a war against Iraq. But he insisted this would not delay a possible attack. The

North Atlantic alliance was thrown into disarray after France, Germany, and Belgium refused to fulfil their treaty obligations to Turkey as a fellow member.

To break this, NATO Secretary General Robertson and some member-states suggested taking the issue to the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), in which France still chooses not to participate. Agreement was finally reached in the French-less DPC when Belgium and Germany dropped their opposition to beginning planning possible military aid to Turkey. After a nearly three-month standoff, and a request by Turkey itself under NATO's consultation mechanism, the Article 4, Germany and Belgium finally agreed to let NATO plan for the deployment of NATO AWACS, air and missile defense systems, and chemical and biological weapons detection units to Turkey. France, not a member of the Defense Planning Committee where the decision was finally taken, stood aside.

Finally, On 28 June 2004, the occupation was formally ended by the US-led coalition, which transferred power to an interim Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Iyyad Alawi. On 16 July 2004, the Philippines ordered the withdrawal of all of its troops in Iraq in order to comply with the demands of terrorists holding Filipino citizen Angelo de la Cruz as a hostage. Many nations that have announced withdrawal plans have stated that they may reconsider if there was a new UN resolution that granted the UN more authority in Iraq.

The US deployed more than seven-eighths of the soldiers in the occupying coalition with further troops coming from the United Kingdom and several other allies. Although their status as 'Occupying Powers' under a UN resolution, changed when the new government asserted its sovereignty on June 28, the mission of the multinational force has decreased only by small numbers.

And the most tragic part in the Iraq war was declared by the words of the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in September 2004; “From our point of view and the UN Charter point of view, it was illegal.”⁵² Actually, despite the discovery of some potential components of WMD manufacturing, no actual weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq.

3.2.2.3. ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a part of the greater Arab-Israeli conflict, is an ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestinians. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not a simple two-sided conflict with all Israelis or even all Israeli Jews sharing one point of view and all Palestinians another. In both communities, some individuals and groups advocate total territorial removal of the other community, some advocate a two-state solution, and some advocate a binational solution of a single secular state encompassing present-day Israel, the Gaza strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. Since the Oslo Accords, the government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) have been officially committed to an eventual two-state solution. The main unresolved issues between these two bodies are: the status and future of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem which comprise the areas for the proposed State of Palestine, Israeli security, Palestinian security, the nature of a future Palestinian state, the fate of the Palestinian refugees, the settlement policies of Israel, and the ultimate fate of settlements, sovereignty over Jerusalem's holy sites, including the Temple Mount and Western Wall (Wailing Wall) complex.⁵³

Certainly, the West is also interested in the conflict. The peace proposal called the Road map for peace was presented by the Quartet of the European Union, Russia,

⁵² Annan, Kofi. Remarks on Iraq War. September 16, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3661134.stm

⁵³ Tocci, Nathalie. March 2005. ‘Conflict Resolution in the Neighbourhood: Comparing the Role of the EU in the Turkish-Kurdish and Israeli-Palestinian Conflicts’. CEPS Working Document, No 221, p.5. http://cms.isn.ch/public/docs/doc_10797_290_en.pdf

the United Nations and the United States on September 17, 2002. Israel has also accepted the road map but with 14 'reservations'. Besides, Israel has currently been implementing a controversial disengagement plan proposed by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. According to plans submitted to the United States, Israel has stated that it will remove its entire 'permanent ... civilian and military presence' in the Gaza Strip, namely 21 Jewish settlements there, and four in the West Bank, but will 'supervise and guard the external envelope on land, will maintain exclusive control in the air space of Gaza, and will continue to conduct military activities in the sea space of the Gaza Strip.' The Israeli government argues that 'as a result, there will be no basis for the claim that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory',⁵⁴.

With the unilateral disengagement plan, the Israeli government's stated intent was to allow Palestinians to create a homeland with minimal Israeli interference while extricating Israel from a situation it believes to be too costly and strategically unsound to maintain over the long run. Many Israelis, including a significant portion of Sharon's own Likud Party were worried that the lack of Israeli military presence in the Gaza Strip would lead to an increase in Rocket launching activity towards Israeli towns around Gaza. A specific concern was that Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, might emerge from the power vacuum of a post-disengagement Gaza as the political powers in the Gaza Strip. And this is further complicated by Hamas's victory in the Palestinian legislative elections.

At that point, the 'old alliance' can again be a solution for not to further this conflict. Ronald Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson claimed in their article that the solution was the 'NATO and EU membership of Israel'. They said that one of the strategic questions remaining from the twentieth century was the relationship of Israel to a

⁵⁴ The disengagement plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. April 17, 2004.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3634245.stm

Euro-Atlantic community that was coming closer and closer to its borders. Middle East is pulling the Euro-Atlantic community into this region. That is why NATO has embraced its first modest missions in Afghanistan and, to a lesser degree, in Iraq. Then, an upgraded strategic relationship between Israel and Euro-Atlantic institutions like NATO and the EU that would lead to increasingly closer ties and that could include eventual membership is necessary. Such an upgraded relationship could become a crucial part of an overall package aimed at securing a peace settlement as well as a part of an overall reassessment of NATO and EU ties in the region. It would not exclude NATO and the EU from assuming some role in a future peace settlement, but bring Israel closer to and anchor it in the Euro-Atlantic community.⁵⁵

Israel is already close to the West and the ideas of Asmus and Jackson are not impossible. But further, we can discuss the same for Palestine. Because there is a similar example of such a process in NATO's history that can be applied to Palestine. This is the example of Turkish membership of NATO. With the rise of Cold War hostilities in the 1950s, the United States and Western Europe became preoccupied with securing Western Europe from potential Soviet incursions. As a result, Turkey came to be seen as critical to Western security due to its shared borders with the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe. Besides, Turkey was in conflict with Greece just as Palestine with Israel. Such a conflict during the difficult times of the Cold War could not be ignored. For these reasons, Turkey was offered NATO membership in 1952. Greece gained the membership for the same reasons a year before Turkey.

Similarly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long been the focus of transatlantic strategic concerns. The recent shift in focus of American and European foreign policies from defending against international communism to a so-called 'war on terror' has

⁵⁵ Asmus, Ronald D., Jackson, Bruce P. February/March 2005. 'Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO?'. *Policy Review*, No 129, p.50.

only further heightened the importance of Israel and Palestine. Because the area of that war is mostly the Middle East and Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the biggest problems in the region.

The membership of NATO prevented any military conflict between Turkey and Greece during the Cold War. Similarly, NATO can play the same role for easing tensions between Palestine and Israel. However, these two cases have a clear difference that Greece and Turkey were sovereign states while Palestinians have been denied self-governance for generations.

Because of the the clear interest NATO allies have in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, NATO can begin talks with Israel and Palestine regarding membership in order to ensure general conflict resolution. However, it is clear that both the countries can not carry what the NATO membership brings. Maybe Israel can, but if the Israel becomes a NATO member alone this would be a major problem both for Israel and the other NATO members. Israel's membership can only expand the hostilities in the region towards it. And regarding the article 5, these hostilities can cost a lot to the other NATO members.

NATO has already a program dealing with some of the countries in that part of the world. It is the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue which was initiated in 1994 by the North Atlantic Council. It currently involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region that are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

The Dialogue reflects the Alliance's view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. It is an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War security environment, as well as an important component of the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation. Following 11

September 2001, Allies repeatedly stressed the importance of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the new level of attention that NATO as a whole was giving to it. The Mediterranean Dialogue's overall aim is to contribute to regional security and stability, achieve better mutual understanding and dispel any misconceptions about NATO among Dialogue countries.⁵⁶

As one of the parts of the Israel-Palestine conflict, Israel already takes its part in the Mediterranean Dialogue which can help 'to contribute to regional security and stability'. However, this requires the other part of the conflict, the Palestine. The membership of the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue should be offered also to Palestine.

By the Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO could push for Israel's recognition of Palestine's legal borders and end any military incursions into Palestine territory. Because the instability in the Middle East, caused by a failure to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could have significant spillover effects for the North Atlantic community, particularly for the NATO's southern border. NATO could therefore serve, ensuring that Israel and Palestine follow through with their agreements and obligations. Through membership in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, Israel and Palestine would eliminate feelings of distrust on both sides and help to maintain a lasting peace by the program.

As mentioned before, the strategic concept of NATO insists on 'ensuring stability'. The instability problem primarily lies in the Middle East in the 21st century where both the EU and NATO have borders because of Turkey. The enlargement of NATO to Palestine by the Mediterranean Dialogue would be promising for the other Muslim countries in that region. They would prefer living in peace instead of

⁵⁶ NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. April 3, 2006. <http://www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm>

competing with each other for developing 'nuclear weapons'. Just as in the Central and Eastern Europe members, they would at least be more optimistic for their future relations with the West. As one of the most active members of the Partnership for Peace, Ukraine looks forward to become a full member of NATO and in parallel of EU which could not be estimated almost two decades ago as today we can not for Israel and Palestine.

3.2.2.4. IRAN: THE NEW POSSIBLE MISSION OF TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Iran is the most recent problem for the Atlantic alliance in the Middle East. The nuclear development program of Iran is a serious threat to its neighbours, the EU and the US. However, the negotiation efforts have not been successful so far.

The foundations for Iran's nuclear program were laid in the late 1950s under the auspices of the US within the framework of bilateral agreements between the two countries. In 1959 the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) was established, run by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)⁵⁷. Iran signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. With the establishment of Iran's atomic agency and the NPT, plans were drawn by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Iran's leader to construct up to 23 nuclear power stations across the country together with US by the year 2000.⁵⁸

The works were halted with the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Shortly afterwards, Iraq invaded Iran and the nuclear programme was stopped until the end of the war. In 1990, Iran began to look outwards for partners for its nuclear programme; however,

⁵⁷ 'Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance'. <http://nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/frsrnf.shtml>

⁵⁸ Cordesman, Anthony H. December 8, 2004. 'Iran's Developing Military Capabilities'. Washington: *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, p.72. http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/041208_irandevmilcap.pdf

due to a radically different political climate and punitive US economic sanctions, few candidates existed. In 1995 Iran signed a contract with Russia.⁵⁹

It was not until 2002 that the US began to question Iran's nuclear intentions after the MKE, Mujahedin-e Khalq, revealed the existence of the Natanz and Arak facilities.⁶⁰ Since 2002, the US has insisted that Iran does not need nuclear power due to its abundant oil reserves since, it argues, nuclear power is more expensive to generate than oil power.

However, a potential reason behind US resistance lies in Middle Eastern geopolitics. In essence, the US feels that it must guard against even the possibility of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapons capability, because the nuclear technology has a dual-use. It can be used for peaceful energy generation, but the same technology, it is argued, could also be used to develop nuclear weapons, the same sort of situation which resulted in India's own nuclear weapons programme in the 1960s. A nuclear Iran in the region would severely change the balance of power away from the West and into Iran's hands. A nuclear Iran could also potentially act as a catalyst for other middle eastern nations to develop weapons of their own for the same reason.⁶¹

Although the US and the EU countries are often accused of maintaining a double standard between Israel and the Muslim countries, a common belief in the West is that Israel is less likely to initiate a war with Iran than Iran is with Israel. Iran does not formally recognize Israel's right to exist. Iran is also thought to constitute more of a proliferation risk. Accusations that Iran supports Hamas and Islamic Jihad, organizations which many Western countries categorize as terrorist, have been

⁵⁹ Cordesman, Anthony H. 'Iran and Nuclear Weapons'. p.10.

⁶⁰ Cordesman, Anthony H. January, 2001. 'Global Terrorism and the Middle East:A Pattern Analysis'. Washington: *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, p.29.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/me_globalterrorism_me%5B1%5D.pdf

⁶¹ Einhorn, Robert J. Autumn, 2004. 'A Transatlantic Strategy on Iran's Nuclear Program'. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol 27, No 4, p.27.

common in the US, and there are accordingly fears that Iranian nuclear weapons could eventually find their way into the hands of Islamic militants.⁶²

Iran had maintained that the purpose of its nuclear program was the generation of power; any other use being a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which it is a signatory. Iran claims that nuclear power is necessary for a booming population and rapidly industrialising nation. It points to the fact that Iran's population has more than doubled in 20 years, the country regularly imports gasoline and electricity, and that burning fossil fuel in large amounts harms Iran's environment drastically.

Nevertheless, Iran has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT. Iran and many other developing nations who are signatory to the NPT, believe the Western position to be hypocritical, claiming that the NPT's original purpose was universal nuclear disarmament.⁶³ Iran also compares its treatment as a signatory to the NPT with three nations that have not ratified the NPT. Each of these nations developed an indigenous nuclear weapons capability: Israel by 1968, India by 1974, and Pakistan by 1998.⁶⁴

During these discussions, in August 2005, Iran rejected a 34 page European Union proposal that was offered to help Iran build a safe, economically viable and proliferation-proof civil nuclear power generation and research program. The Europeans, with US agreement, hoped to entice Iran into a binding commitment not to build atomic arms by offering to provide fuel and other long-term support that would

⁶² Gasiorowski, Mark. July 9, 2003. 'Iranian support for terrorism'. Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.

http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing3/witness_gasiorowski.htm

⁶³ Karon, Tony. October 20, 2004. 'The Iran Problem Awaiting Bush or Kerry'.

<http://www.time.com/time/article/0,8599,726557,00.htm>

⁶⁴ Cordesman, Anthony H. 'Defending America: Asymmetric and Terrorist Attacks With Radiological and Nuclear Weapons'. p.48.

facilitate electricity generation with nuclear energy.⁶⁵ Although Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment program in November, 2004, it agreed to do so only on a temporary basis, and on August 6 Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi rejected the proposal saying; “We had already announced that any plan has to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium”.⁶⁶ The UN's nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, nonetheless opposes Iran's desire for a uranium enrichment program.

Some pressure has also come from Iran's trade partners to reveal all aspects of its nuclear program that are Europe, Japan, and Russia. In January of 2005, the European Union countries of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom suggested that Iran should be referred to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions. This marked a turning point in the European stance with regard to Iranian nuclear ambitions, an unusual move in recent time which paralleled the United States foreign policy views in the Middle East.

However, after years of continued controversy, international pressure, and a great deal of attention from the Western media, as of January 2005, the IAEA has not found any evidence to support the charges that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. In January of 2005, IAEA Secretary General Mohamed ElBaradei remarked that after three years of inspections, the IAEA could not confirm that Iran's nuclear technology program is for peaceful purposes.⁶⁷

Nevertheless, it seems that Iran will not give up its nuclear activities. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a 2005 speech to the UN General Assembly said;

We are concerned that once certain powerful states completely control nuclear energy resources and technology, they will deny access to other states and thus deepen the divide between powerful countries and the rest of the international

⁶⁵ Gordon, Philip H., Grant, Charles. September 15, 2005. ‘United Against Iranian Nukes’. *International Herald Tribune*. <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2005/09/14/opinion/edgordon.php>

⁶⁶ Iran turns down EU nuclear offer. August 6, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4126572.stm

⁶⁷ Cordesman, Anthony H. ‘Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities’. p.51.

community ... peaceful use of nuclear energy without possession of a nuclear fuel cycle is an empty proposition.⁶⁸

Recently, on February 4, 2006, the 35 member Board of Governors of the IAEA voted 27-3 with five abstentions: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya and South Africa to report Iran to the Security Council. The measure was sponsored by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and it was backed by the United States. Two permanent council members, Russia and China, agreed on condition that the council take no action before March. The three members who voted against were Venezuela, Syria and Cuba.

Despite all these failures, recently, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana even said that they could help Iran with the best and most sophisticated technology while addressing journalists in Brussels following the Council meeting on 15 May 2006 after Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki announced that Tehran would reject any EU proposal aimed at breaking the international deadlock over its nuclear program which called on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment activities. EU would be prepared to support Iran's development of a safe, sustainable and proliferation-proof civilian nuclear programme, if international concerns were fully addressed.⁶⁹

As seen in the case of Iran, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their possible confluence with international terrorism, is arguably the world's most serious security problem now and in the coming decades. The EU and the US should work together, and with Russia and China which have in recent years started to take proliferation seriously.⁷⁰ Certainly, the EU and the US are more interested in Iran than the others. As Turkey is a candidate country, the EU will be a neighbour to the Iran in

⁶⁸ Iranian president's UN speech. September 18, 2005.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4257278.stm

⁶⁹ Solana, Javier. Speech to Foreign and Defence Ministers. Brussels, May 15, 2006.

http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_5969_en.htm

⁷⁰ Orlov, Vladimir A., Vinnikov, Alexander. Spring 2005. 'The Great Guessing Game: Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Issue'. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol 28, No 2, p.49.

the near future and such a nuclear power near its borders, whether for good purposes or not, will always be a big threat to the EU. The peace process attempt of the US and allies in the Middle East will be destroyed if a nuclear weapon competition starts in the region. Further, there is always a possibility for the terrorists in the region to gain these nuclear weapons. This means the combination of the two biggest threats to the transatlantic security in the 21st century; terrorism and nuclear weapons.

Considering the importance of the issue of Iran for especially the transatlantic alliance, NATO is very important both for any possible military action and consultation. For instance, the only platform that includes the western alliance and Russia is the NATO-Russia Council. In the NATO-Russia Council, the members and the Russia can discuss and take a common action for the Iran question.

However, despite its 'consultation' functions, if they decide to take military action, they would probably not use the 'military' functions of NATO. Although the EU's borders that include most powerful members of NATO, are reaching to the Iran, it is out-of NATO's area. NATO's action area is still the same as in 1950s but Russia and communism are not the security threats to its members any more. Weapons of mass destruction, the nuclear weapons and terrorism which are generally located in the Middle East, are the main threats today. These threats can be more dangerous if nuclear weapons and terrorism comes together and no 'alliance' may be enough to counter such a big threat. So, the old Atlantic Alliance needs to go out-of-area if any military action towards Iran is necessary.

3.2.2.5. TURKEY: THE KEY COUNTRY FOR BOTH THE EU AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Taking all these facts into consideration, Turkey can be considered as the most strategic country. Turkey is both neighbour to EU and Middle East and a candidate for

membership in the EU. Turkey stands next to the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, all of which pose potential threats to the security of Europe. Turkey is important for the EU's common foreign and security policy. As a functioning democracy in a predominantly Muslim society, it could inspire neighbouring countries and function as a bridge to the Middle East. This would be the best response to the new challenges the world is facing today.

Official relations between Turkey and the EU date back to 1959 when Turkey applied for association to the European Economic Community (EEC) and its application was accepted. The resulting Association Agreement, the so-called Ankara Agreement, was signed in September 1963. The main element of the Association Agreement was the establishment of a Customs Union. In April 1987, Turkey applied for full EEC membership. In 1989, the country's eligibility was confirmed. However, candidate status was declined due to political and economic shortfalls, as well as concerns over the dispute over Cyprus. The process of establishing a Customs Union also slowed down, only coming into force on 1 January 1996.

In 1999 Turkey's status as a candidate country was officially recognized at the Helsinki Summit. As a result of accelerated reforms, in December 2004 the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 with the provision that Turkey recognize Cyprus, an EU member state from May 2004. Since the 1970s Turkey has recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus instead of Cyprus. To fulfill EU criteria, Turkey signed the Ankara protocol extending its customs union to the new EU member states, including Cyprus. This protocol was sufficient for the European Union. On 3 October 2005, the accession negotiations began with a slight delay due to Austria's objection. The compromise was ensured by

the British EU Presidency, the most important ally of the US in Europe. This signifies the value of Turkey for the transatlantic alliance.

On the side of the US, Turkey has been a very important partner for decades. As mentioned before, Turkey entered NATO in 1952 and serves as the organization's vital eastern anchor, controlling the borders leading from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and sharing a border with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. A NATO headquarters is located in Izmir, and the United States has maintained air forces at a Turkish base called Incirlik that is located in Adana.

During decades, as Turkey has become more capable in diplomatic, economic, and military terms, it has emerged as a more significant strategic partner for the West in troubled parts of the world, especially from the Balkans to the Middle East. Turkey is in the position of being both a contributor to European security in the Alliance context, and a partner in addressing wider problems influencing European, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian security, most of which lie outside the NATO area.⁷¹ Moreover, many of the direct risks facing NATO today are actually on Turkey's borders.

For instance, Turkey has close ties with the Balkan states. The Balkans are important as they are a gateway to continental Europe and also because historical and cultural ties exist among the peoples of both regions. Turkey's closer ties among the Balkan countries would lead to the preservation of peace and stability in the region. Turkey has participated in NATO operations and peacekeeping missions. Turkey has contributed to KFOR and the UN police mission in Kosovo, the EU police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the EU-led police mission in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

⁷¹ Lesser, Ian O. December 21, 2004. 'Turkey In The EU: A New U.S. Relationship'. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.print_doc&doc_id=115892&group_id=115869&topic_id=109941&stoplayout=true

Also, for the reconstruction, Turkey was part of launching the efforts such as Southeastern European Cooperation Process (SEECP), the Multinational Peace Force Southeast Europe (MPFSEE), and Southeastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG). Turkey also plays a role in regional economic initiatives as well as the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe initiated by the EU and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI).

Another troubled area, the Middle East is near Turkish borders. All the developments in the region would have an effect on Turkey's security. For this reason, Turkey wanted to participate and did so in Middle East missions, too, just like it did during the Balkan crisis. For instance Afghanistan mission was important for Turkey. Turkey participated in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since its inception and assumed the command of ISAF II between June 2002 and February 2003 and ISAF VII between February and August 2005. Turkey provides training for the Afghan National Army and Police Force. Turkey has also undertaken a number of reconstruction projects in the fields of education, health and agriculture.

Also, the global dynamics of the post-September 11 era exercised a deep influence on Turkey's fortunes regarding its prospects for the EU membership. First of all, the increase in the intensity of support provided by the US for Turkish membership was clearly motivated by its immediate security priorities. In the long-run, the US favored a strengthening of the 'Turkish model' of a secular democratic state, with a predominantly Muslim population, as a model for the rest of the Arab Middle East. In the short-run, its prime concern was to ensure the full co-operation of Turkey in its quest to overthrow the Saddam regime. The co-operation of Turkey meant the use of Turkish territory and air space as a key base of attack on Iraq from the North.

With these developments in the background, the US administration considered Turkey's full cooperation for its war efforts as inevitable. With its crisis-ridden economy, Turkey was dependent on the direct and indirect financial support from the United States. Furthermore, Turkey's foreign policy initiatives in such diverse areas as EU membership, Cyprus question, were dependent on American support. Yet, such assessments by Washington failed to take into account the NATO's unended 'transformation' discussions.

The failure of the Turkish Parliament to ratify a decision involving the deployment of American troops in Turkish territory on March 1, 2003, thus, caused a major shock among the pro-Turkish Bush administration and the defense establishment in Washington.

However, the underlying problem was again the 'out-of-area' problem of NATO. Although every partner of US was eager to make 'war on terror', they did not want to participate in Iraq war. Several close allies of the US like Germany, Belgium and France opposed a military intervention because they claimed that it would increase rather than decrease the risk of terrorist attacks. Although the UK and governments of other members of the EU and NATO also supported the US position, opinion polls show that in general their populations were against an attack, especially an attack without clear UN Security Council support. Millions of people in the major cities of Europe, and hundreds of thousands in major cities of North America, participated in peace marches on February 15, 2003.

At that situation, Turkish demand for a NATO guarantee for its security was unacceptable, because the war would not be in NATO's area. The United States proposed to take measures for protection of Turkey against possible attacks in case of a war in Iraq, but could not get full support of allies in the beginning in NATO which

started the year with tension and uncompromising attitudes of some allies stemming from Iraqi crisis. Belgium, France and Germany which had the view that 'NATO should not interfere in the Iraq war' prevented sending defense units to Turkey for a while.

After the crisis which took place in NATO in the first weeks of 2003, Turkey applied for the Article 4 of North Atlantic Treaty to be put into effect on February 10. Article 4 enables an ally which feels itself under threat to ask NATO to launch negotiations and preparations in order to take defense measures.⁷² NATO Secretary General George Robertson sent a harsh letter to Belgian, French and German governments as crisis was not overcome despite extraordinary meetings of the council. Robertson said in his letter that those countries were playing a dangerous game on Turkey's security and stated that Turkey was the only NATO ally which was in shooting range of Iraqi weapons. Robertson said that Turkey was really under a threat and stated that NATO should fulfill its obligation.⁷³

After the crisis which lasted seven days after the application of Turkey, the decision which was taken as a result of a compromise after the body of the NATO Defense Planning Committee (DPC) put into effect officially Article 4 of the Treaty. The decision said that all allies confirmed that they would fulfill their duties for the defense of Turkey in conformity with the Treaty.⁷⁴ Extraordinary meetings were held in NATO as the Iraq war started in March and measures which aimed to protect Turkey against possible attacks were put into practice.

Despite the absence of a catalyzing and common threat as in the Cold War, Turkish relations with the West are still important in the face of the new security challenges. The examples of Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq that I have mentioned

⁷² NATO and Iraq. September 14, 2005. <http://www.nato.int/issues/iraq/evolution.htm>

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

before, are enough to understand the importance of Turkey in that part of the world. The emerging relationship between Turkey and the West is likely to be more balanced than at any time in the past, and certainly more balanced than during the Cold War.⁷⁵ Turkey may wish to hedge between its ties to the United States as a predominant, multiregional superpower and its ties to the EU as a predominant economic partner with growing international aspirations.⁷⁶ Both the EU and US can not give up Turkey in any case because of its importance I have so far analysed. As the former ambassador of US to Turkey, Grossman stated Turkey is indispensable for their security and “America should be ready to fill the void on Turkey if the EU fails to do so.”⁷⁷

3.3. THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATO FOR THE 21st CENTURY SECURITY CHALLENGES : DEBATES ON THE PRESENCE OF NATO IN THE NEW ERA

Upon its creation NATO's mission was defined by a famous metaphor: ‘to keep the Germans down, the Americans in and the Russians out’. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the attempts to define NATO’s new role have produced an intensive debate. At this point, there are two main ideas: one side supports the presence of a ‘transformed’ NATO in the 21st century, the others find it unnecessary to keep the NATO in this new era. These opposite views especially differs on the discussion of NATO’s ‘out-of-area’ discussion. What are the arguments of these two sides and which argument is more realistic for the 21st century? To find the answer of this question, initially the arguments of anti-NATO side who think that NATO is not needed anymore and later the pro-NATO side who believe that NATO

⁷⁵ Lesser, Ian O. ‘Turkey, the U.S. and Europe - A Troubled Triangle’. *American Institute for Contemporary German Studies*. <http://www.aicgs.org/analysis/c/lesser.aspx/>

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Grossman, Mark. September 16, 2005. ‘America should be ready to fill the void on Turkey’. *Financial Times*.

should continue to be the main security institution in the 21st century will be examined.

3.3.1. ANTI-NATO GROUP

Anti-NATO group is against the idea that NATO is needed in the 21st century. They have four main arguments. First of all, they are sure that the end of the Cold War was the end of the NATO, because this old transatlantic alliance was designed for the Cold-war and not needed anymore as the communism and Russia can not cause a threat to the West. Secondly, the enlargement of the NATO has weakened the institution, because the new members are the former iron curtain states that are also the smallest and weakest members of the EU. Also, this enlargement can cause a possible future conflict between the West and Russia. Thirdly, anti-NATO supporters believe that the traditional transatlantic security alliance is not needed anymore. The Europeans should develop their own security institutions, because the cost of this alliance is heavy for the US. And lastly, NATO's original area for action is limited. Although NATO has already started its 'out-of-area' missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, those missions were in the Europe. But, NATO's troop deployment far regions such as in Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran is making the institution useless.

3.3.1.1. DEBATES ABOUT THE NEED FOR NATO

The initial argument is that NATO was designed for the Cold-war and with the end of the Cold War era, NATO remains superficially an impressive organization. The alliance lacks either the cohesion or the seriousness of purpose to play a significant role in the 21st century. NATO was designed to provide a US security shield to a demoralized, war-ravaged Western Europe that was facing an aggressively

expansionist totalitarian adversary. And that situation bears no resemblance to the current or prospective security environment.⁷⁸

However, there is no need to say that the collapse of the Soviet Union does not mean the collapse of the all security threats. As I have mentioned before, 21st century began with the shock of 9/11 which signalled that the world would be in trouble with 'terrorism' instead of 'communism'. Both the Europeans and the Americans need to deal with Eastern Europe and the Middle East for their security. But it is obvious that they see neither the Eastern Europe nor the Middle East as the threats for which NATO is needed.

Furthermore, the Eastern enlargement of NATO is also problematic for this group. They argue that the alliance has become more of a political honor society than an effective military organization by 'taking in a dozen countries in Central and Eastern Europe'. Not merely was the Alliance to be enlarged, but for the first time NATO proposed to undertake security responsibilities in Central and Eastern Europe and with no clear limit to the potential enlargement of the Alliance.⁷⁹

Accordingly, especially for the Americans, the real problem for this enlargement is its potential obligations for the US, because NATO remains a military alliance that is obliged to protect its members from armed attack from any source. As NATO incorporates the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, that obligation could entangle the United States in more parochial disputes involving a new member and one of that member's neighbors. Since Central and Eastern Europe are cauldrons of unresolved

⁷⁸ Carpenter, Ted Galen and et al. 2004. 'The Amorphous New NATO and America's Real European Interests'. *NATO at Fifty: Perspectives on the Future of the Transatlantic Alliance*. Susan Eisenhower, ed. Washington: The Eisenhower Institute.
<http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/securityandterrorism/coalition/usandnato/NATOatFiftyBook/Carpenter.htm>

⁷⁹ Carpenter, Ted Galen. June 28, 2004. 'NATO - A Troubled Transatlantic Marriage'. *CATO Institute*. http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2712&print=Y

religious, ethnic, and territorial problems, such nightmare scenarios are more than remote possibilities.⁸⁰

Accordingly, there is a worry for a future crisis with Russia because of these countries. Russia has important strategic, economic, and cultural interests throughout much of the Eastern Europe, going back generations, and in some cases, centuries. Extending security commitments to nations which Moscow regards as its geopolitical 'backyard' virtually invites a challenge at some point. This is certainly because of their belief that Russia will remain weak forever. Therefore, a Russian challenge in the future would create a horrific dilemma for the West and it would be insane for the United States to risk war with Russia over the strategically and economically irrelevant Baltic countries. It remains to be seen whether the European members of NATO will go along with a move that would greatly provoke Russia.⁸¹

However, we know that Russia is itself a part of NATO now. Although Russia's leaders now describe the West as its natural ally, Russia opposed the expansion of NATO into the former Soviet bloc nations of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary in 1997 and, particularly, the second NATO expansion into Baltic states in 2004. In 1999, Russia opposed the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia for more than two months, but later joined NATO peace-keeping forces in the Balkans in June 1999.⁸²

Besides, Russia is in strong relations with NATO through the NATO-Russia Council. President Bush and the other NATO Heads of State and Government have agreed with Russian President Putin to establish the NATO-Russia Council.⁸³ The creation of the NRC has opened a new era in NATO-Russia relations, providing

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Carpenter, Ted Galen. 2001. 'A superpower doesn't do windows'. Paris Transatlantic Conference: Transatlantic Relations and the Bush Administration. Julian Lindley-French, ed. *Institute for Security Studies of WEU 2001*. p.3. <http://www.iss-eu.org/activ/content/public/tfae.PDF>

⁸² NATO-Russia relations. <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/nato-rus.htm>

⁸³ Ibid.

opportunities for consult with each other, joint decision, and joint action on a wide range of issues.

The third argument of this group is that the traditional old alliance is useless, so both the Americans and the Europeans should act alone on security issues. Especially, the Americans are clearly uncomfortable with the leadership of US as it costs very much to the American public. The proper goal is to protect vital American interests. It is crucial not to miss that both of the armed conflicts in which the United States ultimately intervened were wars involving all of Europe's great powers. Such serious disruptions of the international system had the potential to place important American interests at risk. However, the cost of the American leadership is very much. As the leader of the 'new NATO,' the United States is incurring expensive and thankless responsibilities. The Bosnia mission had already costed American taxpayers nearly \$10 billion.⁸⁴

The solution offered for this problem is handling of European security by the Europeans. It is believed that it is time to insist that the West Europeans provide for their own defense and take responsibility for maintaining security and stability in their own region. Instead of a NATO-centric policy, the United States needs to work with the West European powers to build a flexible, multilayered security architecture for twenty-first-century Europe that can assume responsibility for dealing with conflicts in the Balkans and other regions on the perimeter of the European Union. Under such a system, Europeans would finally have primary responsibility for the security of Europe, and America's risk exposure would be appropriately limited.⁸⁵ Washington should allow the Europeans to prove themselves in security matters and wait to see whether their deeds meet their intentions. And Americans should match their words

⁸⁴ Carpenter, Ted Galen and et al. 2004. 'The Amorphous New NATO and America's Real European Interests'.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

with their actions rather than preaching partnership but acting as a distant and lonely leader.⁸⁶

However, it is missed that the Europeans could never had the full responsibility of their own security after second world war. The concept of a common security policy for Europe is not a new idea. The first attempts at creating a unified Europe occurred shortly after the end of World War II. Western Europe's first attempt at a post-war military alliance was the creation of the Western European Union, founded in 1948. It was even before NATO. However, the WEU was eclipsed the following year by the establishment of NATO, formed in response to a growing fear of Soviet expansionism. Later, anti-NATO supporters, especially French politicians had attempts to create alternatives for NATO as they were not eager to see the US influence in the continent. For instance, Frech proposal of creation of a European Defense Community (EDC) which would unite French and West German forces under a single European command. In the end, it was again the French who rejected the plan. Because whether they like or not US-led NATO was the only way to counter Russian threat in the Cold war era.

But the end of the Cold war did not mean to get rid of any more tension in their continent. Balkan crisis broke up in 1991 when Europeans were still not ready to develop their own security. After that time, the most significant attempt was the European Security and Defence Identity.

The term ESDI had its genesis at the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels when NATO nations agreed that a strengthened European pillar of the Atlantic alliance would enable the European allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defense while reinforcing the transatlantic link. However, the idea of

⁸⁶ Moisi, Dominique. July/August 2001. 'The Real Crisis Over the Atlantic'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 80, No 4, p.153.

ESDI brought discussions on both sides of the Atlantic whether to develop ESDI under NATO or independent from NATO. On EU side, while France was in favor of an independent ESDI, UK and Germany were reluctant to weaken its traditional links with the US and accordingly NATO.

Even today there are obstacles for the EU to establish an independent military force. The reluctance of some EU members are because of the fear that their traditional alliance would fail. Also the EU members had gradually decreased their military spendings and reluctant to increase it. Consequently, although ESDI is an attempt to establish a independent European defence, further development of ESDI outside the framework of NATO, accordingly from the US does not seem to be possible in the current structure of transatlantic relations.

3.3.1.2. DEBATES ABOUT NATO'S 'OUT-OF-AREA' MISSIONS

The last issue under debate is NATO's out-of-area missions. As mentioned in the previous titles, the strategic locations that the West should have to deal for its security are out-of-NATO's area. And as Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher and former Secretary of Defense William Perry suggest, the Alliance becomes an instrument for the projection of force wherever in the world the West's 'collective interests' are threatened.⁸⁷ Similarly, Secretary Albright once stated that NATO should be prepared to deal with unpleasant developments from the Middle East to Central Africa for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction wherever that problem might emerge. Since the Middle East is the most likely arenas for proliferation, the proposed mission would mean that NATO's security role would apparently have no geographic limits.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Christopher, Warren, Perry, William J. October 21, 1997. 'NATO's True Mission'. *New York Times*. p.A27.

⁸⁸ Carpenter, Ted Galen. 'The Amorphous New NATO and America's Real European Interests'.

The Bosnia mission was a stark departure from NATO's original purpose and sending NATO troops into such an 'out-of-area' mission was a dramatic transformation of the Alliance's rationale.⁸⁹ However, anti-NATO supporters are suspicious more on Middle East than Central and Eastern Europe although both are 'out-of' NATO's area. The alliance had actually been moving in that direction for more than a decade, as evidenced by the offensive military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo. But according to this argument, at least those missions were in the European theater. NATO's troop deployment in Afghanistan, and the United States' pressing hard for similar missions in Iraq and Iran are making the institution useless. Because, the farther NATO ventures from its traditional territorial defense mission in Europe, the less competent and united the alliance becomes.⁹⁰

However, if allies did not care much about the Afghanistan mission or the first war on terror, then after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States why did they agree on the NATO's Article 5 to be invoked, declaring that the attack on the United States was an attack on all NATO members? Article 5 is the core of NATO's collective defense concept, but it was now being invoked not due to invasion by the Soviet Union but due to attacks by terrorists. And, the crucial threat to the security of the Atlantic alliance was 'out-of-NATO's area' just like in the case of Balkan crisis. Further, while the Balkan states were near the borders of the Europe, Afghanistan even did not a common border with the EU or the US.

The real problem with the 'out-of-area' missions is that there is no consensus among NATO members about what the organization should do outside of Europe or its 'out of area' missions. The situation resurfaced in the mission to Iraq. Key alliance members, most notably France and Germany, vehemently opposed the US-led war

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Carpenter, Ted Galen. 'NATO: A Troubled Transatlantic Marriage'.

against Saddam Hussein's government. These differences cause inner conflicts among NATO members across the Atlantic, because although Europeans and Americans have the same threat perceptions, this part of world is where they have different attitudes.

For instance, differences over Iraq policy were obvious. The key alliance members, most notably France and Germany, vehemently opposed the US-led war against Saddam Hussein's government. And this caused a transatlantic crisis. But it must not be forgotten even during the times of the Iraq debate in 2003, Philip H. Gordon said in his article that in spite of some real differences, American and European attitudes remain remarkably similar on most key issues.⁹¹

The case of Iran is another example for the problems on the idea of out-of-area missions of NATO. Both the United States and its European allies share the objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, but they have followed different strategies to achieve that goal so far. Whether Washington favors isolating the Islamist regime and applying pressure, most of the European members's choice has been keeping in contact with Iran in different ways like trade or economic aid. However, Iran has become the most important common threat and debate among the US and the EU after Iran declared itself as a major nuclear power in the region. Iran threatens to become the next arena for transatlantic alliance. Although the Bush administration has created deep divisions in the US and strong opposition in Europe about his Middle East policies, Americans and Europeans are willing to support military strategies 'under multilateral institutions' like NATO. In Europe support increases under the

⁹¹ Gordon, Philip H. January/February 2003. 'Bridging the Atlantic Divide'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 82, No 1, p.70.

various modalities from 36% for the US acting alone to 48% for an multilateral action. For the US these percentages are 70 and 79%.⁹²

Consequently, according to this group whatever the course the West choose, the Cold War era of transatlantic solidarity on security issues is over. The task facing statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic is to manage the ever more frequent disagreements and prevent them from poisoning the entire relationship.⁹³

3.3.2. PRO-NATO GROUP

The pro-NATO group have arguments that support the presence of NATO. Initially, unlike anti-NATO group they believe that as during the Cold War, today the West needs their alliance and the NATO to counter the challenges of the new century. So, NATO's presence is necessary in the 21st century. And further, to be capable of confronting new security challenges in this new era, NATO has to be transformed. Secondly, as part of this transformation NATO's enlargement with the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries is a positive development. Unlike anti-NATO group, this group believes that the enlargement of NATO would not undermine the relations with Russia, because Russia recognized the importance the unity of the continent of Europe and peaceful relations with the West. Thirdly, they insist that the United States and the Europeans desperately needs strategic partners given the problems the west faces today, and claims that Europe and US are natural coalition partners. And the already-settled multilateral institution that can serve for this need is NATO. Instead of spending time, money and energy for an autonomous institution, the Europeans should take a more active role within NATO. And lastly, they believe that

⁹² Asmus, Ronald, Everts, Philip P., Isernia, Pierangelo. 2003. 'Power, War and Public Opinion: Thoughts on the Nature and Structure of the Trans-Atlantic Divide'. *Transatlantic Trends* 2003. p.4. http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/2003_english_essay.pdf

⁹³ Carpenter, Ted Galen. May 2-3, 2003. 'After Iraq: Permanent Transatlantic Tensions'. Informal General Affairs and External Relations Council 2-3/5/03: Contribution on the issue of EU-US Relations. <http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/9/2752/>

the consensus that NATO can act 'out of area' only within Europe must be revisited, because it is entirely consistent with the alliance's founding purpose for NATO to work outside of the transatlantic area to protect its members and their core security interests.

3.3.2.1. DEBATES ABOUT THE NEED FOR NATO

The initial argument is that as during the Cold War, today Western democracies need their alliance and the NATO to counter the challenges of the new century. This is similar to the situation in the Cold War era. At the end of World War II, Western governments created new international institutions because they lacked the expertise and institutions required to meet the strategic and moral challenges of the Cold War. NATO was created not only to deter a Soviet threat but also to provide a security umbrella under which fragile, postwar Western European democracies could establish themselves.

However, the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of the need for the old transatlantic alliance or the NATO. With the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the United States and its European allies took a transatlantic relationship that was forged during the Cold War and designed to contain Soviet power and transformed it into a new partnership focused on consolidating democracy in central and eastern Europe, halting ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, and building a new partnership with Russia.

Furthermore, the need to consolidate newly developing democracies was also a key factor leading NATO and the EU to extend a security umbrella toward central and eastern Europe after the Cold War came to an end. The anchoring of Central and Eastern Europe to the West has been largely resolved. Europe today is at peace with itself and more democratic and secure than at any time in history.

Besides, this close relationship with the Central and Eastern European countries is not a reason for the possible future conflicts with Russia. The West has already developed a close relationship within NATO after the Cold War. Both the US and the EU want to convince Russia to stop looking at this part of Europe as an invasion route but to view this region as a trading route and a gateway to the West. Involving Russia in regional cooperation is Russia's own interest. As mentioned before, Russia is in close relations with NATO members on several issues like terrorist threat, crisis management, non-proliferation, and arms control through NATO-Russia Council. Thus, NATO is the institution that brings the West and 'old enemy' together.

In spite of these positive developments within the European continent which was the 'only' problem for the West for decades, unfortunately, the extraordinary accomplishment of the Atlantic alliance does not mean that America and Europe are now safe and secure. Success on the continent has been matched by the emergence of new threats from beyond. September 11 has brought potentially very dangerous threats to the West. These threats were already mentioned as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction rogue states etc in the security strategies of both the US and the EU as almost the same.

Today as both the US and the EU face the same threats again, their old alliance still has a great value. This relationship must again be overhauled so that it can meet a new set of challenges wherever these threats come from. NATO has worked as a successful military alliance because its members share common values and interests. Already, the terrorist attack of 9/11 had focused America's and Europe's attention on the value of this old alliance. Just 24 hours after the September 11 attacks on America, NATO allies offered to invoke their mutual defense clause for the first time in the alliance's 52-year history which says that 'an armed attack against one shall be

considered an attack against all' and that each member will assist the country under attack with such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.' This declaration was significant because it showed that NATO was still an alliance in which America and Europe help defend each other. So, unlike the anti-NATO group, this group insists that Europe remains indispensable to a multilateral US foreign policy as a true partner, in political and military matters as well as in economics. The transatlantic relations in the last decade have centered on redefining the US-European partnership for the post-Cold War world. The most striking characteristic of the relationship today is continuity rather than change.⁹⁴ As in the 20th century, the United States and the Europeans should cooperate, because the developments in the Middle East today profoundly affect the security of the United States and Europe.

3.3.2.2. DEBATES ABOUT NATO'S 'OUT-OF-AREA' MISSIONS

The last argument of the pro-NATO group is that NATO is a military alliance whose focus is too narrow to meet these new threats. So, this old alliance needs a transformation which means its shift towards out-of-area missions.⁹⁵ This reflects the recognition that the Alliance had to reorganize itself to address the problems of projecting stability beyond its borders because that was where the real and potential problems lay. The transformation of this old alliance and its reorientation toward terrorism and other new missions and threats have already started years ago.

September 11 demonstrated that threats to the area's peace and security can originate from anywhere in the world. NATO's original *raison d'être* was collective self-defense in the event of an attack on a member's territory. As it was once said, NATO was created to ensure Europe's security to 'keep the Russians out, the

⁹⁴ Wallace, William. May/June 2001. 'Europe, the Necessary Partner' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 80, No 3, p.17.

⁹⁵ Asmus, et. al. Spring 2005. 'A Transatlantic Strategy to Promote Democratic Development in the Broader Middle East'. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol 28, No 2, p.20.

Americans in, and the Germans down' in the beginning. However this slogan is changed to match the present situation of NATO by Ronald Asmus as; "NATO is to keep the Europe and America together, the aggressors out and terrorists down."⁹⁶

As mentioned before, on the issue of out-of-area missions of NATO the anti-NATO group insists that Balkan missions were at least within Europe but going beyond the alliance's borders is impossible. But the pro-NATO group argues that the idea that NATO can act 'out of area' only within Europe must be revisited. It is entirely consistent with the alliance's founding purpose for NATO to work outside of the transatlantic area to protect its members and their core security interests.⁹⁷

The greatest threats to Western security are likely to emanate from the Greater Middle East in the future. It is the problems of this region that are likely to preoccupy the West in the 21st century just like the problems of Europe and Russia preoccupied for most of the 20th century.⁹⁸ The geopolitical conflicts in the region that must be addressed are long and well known as the Israeli-Arab conflict, turmoil in Iraq, addressing the nuclear threat from Iran, and ensuring success in Afghanistan. Besides, the EU has already taken a key step forward in fully anchoring a secular and democratic Turkey which is vital for the sake of the region, by deciding to open accession negotiations.⁹⁹ But the Iraq war showed that the Europeans and the Americans have different attitudes towards war. If Americans and Europeans both

⁹⁶ Asmus, et al. 15 March 2004. 'A trans-Atlantic plan for democracy: A joint plan to help the Greater Middle East'. *International Herald Tribune*.

[http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/03/15/edasmus_ed3 .php](http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/03/15/edasmus_ed3.php)

⁹⁷ Asmus, Blinken, Rosner. November/December 2001. 'A New Mission for NATO'. *Blueprint Magazine*. Issue 13. <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/article.cfm?id=73>

⁹⁸ Asmus, Ronald. November 14-15, 2003. 'Europe and the US in the Face of Common Challenges'. Contribution to the panel discussion on "Does NATO Still Matter?" on the occasion of the International Conference 'Transatlantic Relations and the Global Security Agenda'. Warsaw: *Center for International Relations*.
<http://www.csm.org.pl/pl/files/Europe%20and%20the%20US%20in%20the%20face%20of%20common%20challenges.pdf>

⁹⁹ Asmus, et. al. Spring 2005. 'A Transatlantic Strategy to Promote Democratic Development in the Broader Middle East'. p.14.

want to be engaged in the world, still basically like one another, would like to work together as partners and also see the threats facing both sides of the Atlantic in similar ways. But how and why did they end up with such a dramatic divergence in debate and public opinion on the war in Iraq?

This is about the domestic policies of the countries on both sides of the Atlantic. The political dimension in a country certainly affects the foreign policies of the states. For instance, in the United States, Hawks constitute more than one-in five Americans or 22% and also 33% of Republicans. They are three times as numerous as in Europe. They are, in turn, complemented by Pragmatists who constitute nearly a two-thirds majority at 65%. In contrast, Doves are a small minority at 10% and Isolationists are 3%.¹⁰⁰

When it comes to the structure of public opinion in Europe, in most of the countries, the two dominant groups are the Pragmatists and Doves. Moreover, these two groups basically balance each other at 43% and 42% respectively. Both the Hawks and Isolationist groups are small minorities as 7% and 8% when one aggregates the European countries surveyed.¹⁰¹

But what does these numbers mean? This means that the dominant political views in Europe and US are different than each other on the policies about the Middle East. For instance, Hawks are more likely to support the Iraq war and to judge it was worth the costs than any other group, followed closely by Pragmatists and only at a distance by Isolationists and Doves. 55% of the Hawks and 48% of the Pragmatists 'think the war in Iraq was worth the loss of life and other costs,' while only 12% of the

¹⁰⁰ Asmus, Ronald, Everts, Philip P., Isernia, Pierangelo. 2003. 'Power, War and Public Opinion: Thoughts on the Nature and Structure of the Trans-Atlantic Divide'. *Transatlantic Trends* 2003. p.5.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

Doves and 15% of the Isolationists think so.¹⁰² Then, it is not very difficult to understand, why Europe was hesitant of Iraq war while US could act unilaterally.

This is also related the issue of ‘use of military force’. Hawks are more likely to support the use of military force than Doves in all the scenarios. They are also more likely to prefer military action to economic sanctions across different scenarios. 58% of the Hawks are willing to impose economic sanctions in a hypothetical international crisis, while 71% are willing to do so among the Pragmatists and 79% among the Doves. Then, Instead of using force, Europeans prefer economic sanctions, diplomacy etc.¹⁰³

However, Europe is not completely far away from military action. Suprisingly, support for the use of force increases if the operation is conducted under a multilateral aegis, such as NATO and UN. In Europe support increases under the various modalities from 36% for the US acting alone to 48% for an multilateral action. For the US these percentages are 70 and 79% respectively.¹⁰⁴

In beside of these different views across the Atlantic, there are diffrences among European Union members. These overall European numbers mask some noteworthy differences among the countries. In the case of the United Kingdom, for example, the structure of public opinion is similar to that of the United States. However, it is quite different in a country like Germany which has the smallest percentage of both Hawks and Pragmatists as well as the largest number of Doves. Whereas in the United Kingdom, Hawks and Pragmatists combine for a total of 77%, in Germany they amount to less than half of that at 39%. Apart from the United Kingdom, the other European countries where the Pragmatists are more strongly represented are the

¹⁰² Ibid. p.4.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

Netherlands and Poland. In both of these countries, the combination of Hawks and Pragmatists adds up to a potential slim majority.¹⁰⁵

However, we can be optimistic about the future of the transatlantic alliance because of the shift of each side towards each other after Iraq war. The US is turning back to Europe for several reasons. Most importantly, because the costs and limitations of unilateralism are becoming increasingly and vividly clear.

In addition to these views, we see that head politicians on both side of the Atlantic, can be categorised in the pro-NATO and pro-alliance group in this discussion. They seem to be keen on continuing the old alliance and NATO in spite of all the disputes they have. On the American side, Bush said, ‘All that we seek to achieve in the world requires that America and Europe remain close partners’.¹⁰⁶ EU side also agrees with him as we understand from the speeches. As Jean-Claude Juncker at the EU-US summit said in EU-US summit in June 2005: ‘The United States is not only a strategic partner of the European Union, but also its most important partner’.¹⁰⁷

4. DOMESTIC POLICIES OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND PUBLIC OPINIONS

4.1. AMERICAN POLICIES

Following the September 11 attacks, world witnessed the shift of American foreign and security policy to unilateralism and their Afghanistan mission alone. However, this mission was backed by the Europeans and the other allies from different parts of the world. Later, US’s intention for a second war with Iraq caused a

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. p.5-6.

¹⁰⁶ President and Prime Minister Blair Discussed Iraq, Middle East. November 11, 2004. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041112-5.html>

¹⁰⁷ Juncker, Jean-Claude. Speech at the European Parliament on the outcome of the Luxembourg Presidency and the European Council. June 22, 2005. <http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/communiqués/2005/06/20ue-us/index.html>

transatlantic division. But, this division could not make Americans to give up their intention. However, after the Iraq war, US recognised the heavy cost of unilateralism which is favored by the neocons. After the Iraq war, US has returned to multilateralism which is preferred by liberals.

4.1.1. UNILATERAL APPROACH AFTER 9/11

After the September 11 attacks, Americans acted unilaterally in both Afghanistan and Iraq missions. Although they were backed by the Europeans in Afghanistan mission, Iraq war caused a transatlantic conflict.

4.1.1.1. AFGHANISTAN MISSION

Unilateralism is a doctrine that supports one-sided action that may be in disregard for other parties. The term can refer to the foreign policy of a country that can be preferred in the instances when it's assumed to be the most efficient, like in international problems that can be solved without cooperation.

Unilateralism has had a long history in the United States. US foreign policy has traditionally been driven by unilateralism. The advocates of US unilateralism argue that other countries should not have 'veto power' over matters of US national security through multilateral institutions like the UN or NATO. For instance, former presidential candidate John Kerry received heavy political heat after saying during a presidential debate that American national security actions must pass a 'global test'.¹⁰⁸ This was interpreted by Kerry's opponents as a proposal to submit US foreign policy to the approval of other countries. Proponents of the US unilateralism generally hesitates about the multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations if its not in America's interest. But, as Condoleezza Rice said; "US interestscan be promoted

¹⁰⁸ Dinan, Stephen. 'Kerry forced to explain 'global test' of legitimacy'.
<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20041005-013030-2689r.htm>

within the UN and other multilateral organizations, as well as through well-crafted international agreements” if it is “in America's interest”.¹⁰⁹

The unilateralist approach was the choice of the US after, a series of coordinated terrorist attacks against the United States killed over 3000 people on September 11. The US president George W. Bush responded by declaring a campaign against terrorist organizations and the supporters of terrorists, which he called the ‘War on Terrorism’. This term meant for now two major initiatives of the Bush administration; the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Within days of the September 11 events, it was widely agreed that the attacks were carried out by al-Qaida. The dissenters of this view were mostly Muslims. Al-Qaida responsibility for the attacks was a minority view in the majority of the Muslim countries, though not among Muslims in the US.¹¹⁰ A small segment of the left also called this belief into question both in the US and elsewhere.

However, the majority of the left was somewhat fragmented with respect to the invasion of Afghanistan. US liberals who would soon oppose the invasion of Iraq, voted to authorize military action against Afghanistan, although they would later characterize it as a ‘disaster’.¹¹¹

Within a few weeks after September 11, it became clear that the Bush administration's ‘war on terror’ were to be a set of changes in the US foreign policy which marked a shift to unilateral policy. An international anti-war movement began to arise which constituted a loose coalition of groups united in their opposition to the US military campaigns in the Middle East, most of which were leftists, pacifists, Arabs and Muslims. In addition to many non-leftist Arabs and Muslims in the movement,

¹⁰⁹ Rice, Condoleezza. January/February 2000, ‘Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest’. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 79, No 1, p. 49.

¹¹⁰ ‘Poll: Muslims call US ‘ruthless, arrogant’’. <http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/02/26/gallup.muslims>

¹¹¹ America Is In a Military Mood. September 14, 2001.

<http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,174941,00.html>

there were also European nationalists uncomfortable with the US unilateralism whose numbers would greatly increase in the run up to the invasion of Iraq. Almost all of the anti war movements opposed the invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent invasion of Iraq on the ground that the war was illegal under international law and US was acting unilaterally.

On the contrary, there was widespread and passionate support for the US in Europe after the September 11 attacks, and little opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan and moves against the Al'Qaeda network. However, a large anti war movement began to develop when the American government started a campaign for the invasion of Iraq. Before and during the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, opposition to George W. Bush and the war was widespread in Europe.¹¹² Many were angered by what was seen as a stubborn unilateralism practiced by successive American governments culminating in the Bush administration and especially the neoconservatives within it.

The commonly articulated reasons against the war were the beliefs that the UN process should be allowed to reach its natural conclusion that the threat posed by Iraq was being exaggerated, a preference for multilateralism and fear of the uncertain and unpredictable consequences of invading another country.

The scale of the change in the attitudes of Europeans between September 11 and late 2002 was astonishing as support of the immediate September 11 period having been greatly eroded. Changes in the Republic of Ireland are an example of this. In the aftermath of the destruction of the World Trade Center, Ireland declared an unprecedented full national day of mourning for the victims. The reaction was two-

¹¹² Horsley, William. February 11, 2003. 'Polls find Europeans oppose Iraq war'. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2747175.stm>

fold; horror at the deaths but also a strong degree of sympathy for the United States.¹¹³ By February 2003, the public reaction to the Bush administration actions over Iraq had changed America's image utterly. Instead of being seen in a positive light, the United States under Bush was seen as determined to force the international community to accept its demand for a war against Iraq, and if necessary ignore the international community in the United Nations. Hence, an estimated 100,000 people took part in an anti war march in Dublin with demands that the United States be refused permission to use Shannon Airport as a stop over point when flying their soldiers from the United States to countries bordering Iraq. Yet opinion polls showed that the Irish would support a war if it had United Nations approval. What they would not support was a non-UN-sanctioned war declared in defiance of the UN by the Bush administration.¹¹⁴

Such 'anti-Bush' and 'anti-war' sentiments were reflected in many western European countries even when politicians in a given country like the UK and Spain aligned themselves with the US position. The general populations of France and Germany were opposed to the war and it would have been difficult for their governments had they failed to reflect those sentiments in policy. France's position in particular has been very much maligned within the US. After the first UN resolution, France advised the US that it had sufficient UN support to launch a war and that it need not return to the UN for a second resolution. Nonetheless, the US and the UK did push for a second resolution to help Blair gain support for the war within the UK and France reversed its earlier positions, unable then to agree on what was proposed. The

¹¹³ Miller, Rory. October 18, 2005. 'From 11 September 2001 to the War in Iraq: Irish Responses to the Global War on Terrorism'. *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol 16, p.159.

<http://www.ria.ie/cgi-bin/ria/papers/100540.pdf>

¹¹⁴ Ibid. p.168.

French government took the position that the UN inspection process should be allowed to be completed.¹¹⁵

Many critics of the American war on terror did not believe that American actions would help to end terror, and believed that they would actually increase the ranks and capabilities of terrorist groups. Some believed that during the war and immediate post-war period there would be a greatly increased risk that weapons of mass destruction would fall into the wrong hands including Al-Qaida.

Perhaps the most commonly heard criticism, at least outside of the US, was that the Bush Administration's reason for going to war with Saddam was to gain control over Iraqi natural resources like oil. Though few doubt that nuclear and WMD proliferation were serious threats to stability and well-being, many felt that a war in Iraq would not aid in eliminating this threat.

Ironically, these popular oppositions in Europe to war on Iraq led to a wave of anti war rallies that took place in countries that were part of the 'coalition of the willing'.

4.1.1.2. TRANSATLANTIC DIVISION ON IRAQ MISSION

In 2002, the United States began a campaign for the overthrow of Iraq's dictatorial president, Saddam Hussein. The United States, under the administration of George W. Bush, argued that Saddam Hussein was a threat to global peace, a vicious tyrant, and a sponsor of international terrorism. The Bush Administration also argued that they had a reason to believe that Saddam Hussein was developing Weapons of Mass Destruction, something he had been forbidden to do since the end of the 1991 Gulf War.

The opinions on the war were greatly divided between nations. While, some

¹¹⁵ Housez, Cédric. October 12, 2005. 'France: The "war on terror" makes its entrance into the presidential campaign'. <http://www.voltairenet.org/article129522.html>

countries were against any war with Iraq as the United States failed to prove that Hussein had an active weapons program, the other ones argued that Saddam Hussein was one of the 20th Century's worst despots and should be removed from power.

The US has also repeatedly claimed that they would provide evidence for Iraqi deception, stating that it more than justifies an invasion. The UN weapons inspectors and several countries have criticized the US's decision to hold on to evidence as long as it has. In late January, the US government announced that Colin Powell would meet with the UN to show them the newly evidence that the US intelligence has collected. Powell's speech on February 5 showed that Iraq had made numerous efforts to obstruct the work of inspectors, and to develop and hide weapons of mass destruction. His speech also cited the quantities of chemical and biological weapons, and missiles, Iraq was known to possess in 1998 through the UN inspections, most of which has not been accounted for and is simply missing. Powell's evidence included recorded phone conversations and satellite photos.¹¹⁶ However, on April 2, 2004, Colin Powell "voiced new doubt... on the administration's assertions of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, saying the description in his UN presentation of mobile biological weapons laboratories appears to have been based on faulty sources".¹¹⁷

Support for the US plan to invade Iraq started out very high in early 2002, but began to slip later in the year. However, overall support for an invasion to remove Saddam Hussein from power received a boost after President George W. Bush's 2003 State of the Union Address and Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the UN Security Council. By mid-2004, polls began indicating growing public dissatisfaction with the war as well as growing skepticism about the administration's

¹¹⁶ Powell, Colin. Address to the United Nations Security Council. February 5, 2003. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,889531,00.html>

¹¹⁷ Powell admits Iraq evidence mistake. April 3, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3596033.stm

original justifications for going to war.¹¹⁸ At the end of 2005, public scrutiny increased regarding use of secret prisons and torture to obtain information.¹¹⁹

The debates about unilateralism recently came to the forefront with the Iraq War. While over 30 countries have supported the US policy, some previous American allies, such as France, Germany and Turkey, have not been participating. Many opponents of the war have argued that the United States is 'going it alone' in Iraq without the support of multilateral institutions, in this case NATO and the United Nations, which America has supported since the end of World War II.¹²⁰

Shortly before the Iraq war began, the US government announced that 49 countries were joined in the 'coalition of the willing' in favor of forcibly removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, with some number of other countries expressing their support in private. Of these, Australia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States had an active or participant role, by providing either significant troops or political support. Some newspapers and organizations questioned what 'willing' meant in this context, or whether these countries' populations or even their governments were actually in favor of the plan to remove Saddam Hussein.¹²¹ Many of the supporting countries are extremely poor and, to this day, rely on US military or development aid. In no country other than the US did opinion polls show that a majority of the population was in favor of the war when it started. Also it was criticised why the United States sought for the support of such questionable governments as those of Azerbaijan, Rwanda, Uganda, Ukraine or Uzbekistan when trying to install a stable democracy in Iraq.

¹¹⁸ Transatlantic Trends 2004. p.24-25. http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/2004_english_key.pdf

¹¹⁹ Transatlantic Trends 2005. p.14. <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/doc/TTKeyFindings2005.pdf>

¹²⁰ Daalder, Ivo H. op.cit. p.155-156.

¹²¹ Brookes, Emma . March 20, 2003. 'What can Eritrea possibly do to help the US in Iraq?'. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,3604,917741,00.html>

In late January 2003, countries like Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Hungary, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic showed support for the US, saying that Saddam should not be allowed to violate UN resolutions. They supported that Saddam was a clear threat to world security and urged Europe to unite with the United States to ensure that the Iraqi regime is disarmed.

Later, the Eastern European countries, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, all now members of the EU, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Croatia, and the Republic of Macedonia issued another statement on Iraq, in general support of the US's position but not commenting on the possibility of a war without support of the UN Security Council.¹²² But, this created a new crisis in the EU. French President Jacques Chirac commented on the statement of ten Eastern European countries saying: "It is not well brought up behavior. They missed a good opportunity to keep quiet".¹²³

On the other hand, prior to the war, several countries called on the US to wait for the weapons inspectors to complete their investigations. However, the US and its allies maintained that reasonable patience had been given to Saddam and that it was clear that he was not willing to cooperate with the inspectors whenever the weapons of mass destruction issue came up.

On January 29, 2003, the European Parliament passed a nonbinding resolution opposing unilateral military action against Iraq by the United States. According to the resolution, 'a pre-emptive strike would not be in accordance with international law and the UN Charter and would lead to a deeper crisis involving other countries in the region'.¹²⁴

France, Germany and Russia were publicly opposed to US war plans at all

¹²² Daalder, Ivo H. op.cit. p.159.

¹²³ Chirac lashes out at 'new Europe'. February 18, 2003.
<http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/18/sprj.irq.chirac/>

¹²⁴ Presidency Conclusions. January 29, 2003.
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf

levels. As the US took a more militaristic position, these countries became increasingly opposed to the invasion. In the end, France made it clear that it would use its UN Security Council veto against a proposed resolution for war in Iraq. Further, the US and Britain stated that they would not submit a resolution to the Security Council as they did not have enough votes to force France or Russia to use a veto. In fact, only Bulgaria and Spain in addition to the US and UK declared outright that they wanted to vote for the US-UK resolution, while a few more nations, such as Chile and Guinea, had only said they would consider supporting it. Russia and China expressed that they likely would have supported the UN resolution if some more diplomatic channels had been exercised first.

Then, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made his opposition to the invasion an issue in his electoral campaign led to Schröder's victory on September 22 to tapping a broad anti-war sentiment among the German people. His critics and the proponents of the Iraq war suggested that he was using the controversy of the war and appealing to the anti-American sentiment for the sole purpose of gaining popularity and winning. This notion deeply offended the American people and government and led to a straining of relations between the two nations. However, Schröder met Colin Powell and a rapprochement was established after the Iraqi regime was overturned.¹²⁵

Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Greece, Austria, Liechtenstein, and Serbia also condemned the war.¹²⁶ In Finland, Anneli Jäätteenmäki of the Center Party won the elections after she had accused her rival Paavo Lipponen, who was prime minister at the time, of allying neutral Finland with the United States in the war in Iraq during a meeting with President George W. Bush. Lipponen denied the claims and

¹²⁵ Powell to Germany: We Will Stand Together. May 16, 2003. *Die Welt*.
<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,869215,00.html>

¹²⁶ Iraq: Europe enters summit split. February 16, 2003.
<http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/16/sprj.irq.eu/index.html>

declared that they supported the UN and the UN Secretary-General. Jäätteenmäki resigned as prime minister after two months in office and accused that she had lied about the leak of the documents about the meeting between Bush and Lipponen.¹²⁷ Consequently, the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy issued a statement according to which the use of force against Iraq would not be acceptable without the authority of the UN Security Council.

4.1.2. THE RETURN OF THE US TO MULTILATERAL APPROACH AFTER THE IRAQ WAR

After the transatlantic drift in the Iraq war, the ‘unilateralist’ behaviour of the US left its place to a more ‘multilateral’ approach. Multilateralism strengthens the bonds between nations and peoples, and for the US and the other nations reduces the risk of conflicts by increasing the size and unity of the alliance. According to that approach, the proper goal for American foreign policy, then, must be to encourage a multipolarity characterized by cooperation and concert rather than competition and conflict. As Haass said; “in such a world, order would not be limited to peace based on a balance of power or a fear of escalation, but would be founded in a broader agreement on global purposes and problems’”.¹²⁸

The most important sign that showed US shift to multilateral approach was the Brussels visit of President Bush after his reelection. He told European leaders that trans-Atlantic unity was essential to take on shared challenges including Middle East peace. Bush told European officials gathered in Brussels that disagreements like the one over the invasion of Iraq should not divide the trans-Atlantic alliance. On the first day of his tour through Europe, Bush met with French President Jacques Chirac, who

¹²⁷ Leak scandal sinks Finnish PM. June 18, 2003.
<http://newssearch01.thdo.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3001812.stm>

¹²⁸ Haass, Richard N. September/October 1999. What to Do With American Primacy’. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 78, No 5, p.38.

was among the most vocal critics of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Speaking briefly to the media alongside Chirac, Bush said making this his first dinner in Europe since he won re-election shows how important his relationship with Chirac is for him personally and for his country. Chirac said the United States and France have the same approach in the struggle against weapons of mass destruction and terrorism which was the sign that Iraq crisis was about to end. Bush's these words were significant for US shift towards multilateralism: "When Europe and America stand together, no problem can stand against us. As past debates fade, as great duties become clear, let us begin a new era of trans-Atlantic unity."¹²⁹

Not only the US, but both sides of the Atlantic were making obvious efforts to repair the rift that had formed between them. The EU and American leaders alike repeatedly stressed the importance of the EU-US relationship, citing common values, interests and threats. There was a growing opinion that EU-US cooperation was strategically necessary and far more valuable and sensible than European opposition to the US.

At the European Council Summit in Thessaloniki in June 2003, Javier Solana, the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, presented what is considered as the EU's new security strategy. Solana identified terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and failed states as the three main threats to European security, similar to the threats outlined in the US's National Security Strategy presented in September 2002. Solana asserted that the means to counter these threats are multilateralism and 'pre-emptive engagement' and; "The best protection of our security is a world of well-governed democratic states...Trade and development

¹²⁹ Bush, George W. Speech on American and European Alliance in Belgium. February 21, 2005. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050221.html>

policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform...Pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future.’¹³⁰

In Solana’s strategic blueprint for the EU, the concept of ‘pre-emptive engagement’ was particularly noteworthy because it echoed the US’s ‘pre-emptive’ action, but advocated trade and development policies instead of military action as the primary means of dealing with these threats.

Further in June 2004 at the Istanbul Summit NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said in his speech that the ‘multilateral’ approach needed the old alliance to act:

The reason why we witness a return to realism is that the extreme views that used to dominate so much of the Iraq debate have become increasingly discredited. Those US unilateralists who thought that the United States didn’t really need Allies have come to realise that the US not only needs Allies, but also the Alliance.¹³¹

4.1.3. VIEWS OF THE NEOCONS AND LIBERALS

The war on terror and accordingly the Afghanistan and Iraq missions had supporters and non-supporters within US. While the neoconservatives favored the US to counter the new security threats unilaterally, liberals preferred multilateral action of the transatlantic alliance towards the threats.

The ‘unilateral’ approach of the US was the result of the rise of neoconservatism in the country. Neoconservatism refers to the political movement, ideology, and public policy goals of ‘new conservatives’ in the United States, who are mainly characterized by critics as having relatively interventionist and hawkish views on foreign policy.¹³²

In the context of US foreign policy, neoconservative are people who advocates the use

¹³⁰ Solana, Javier. Speech on the State of the Union. June 30, 2003.

http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_2495_en.htm

¹³¹ Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop. ‘A New Atlanticism for the 21st Century’. Speech by NATO Secretary General, Istanbul, Turkey. June 27, 2004.

<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/home.htm>

¹³² Higgott, Richard. May 2000. ‘US Foreign Policy After the Election: Will it Make a Difference Who Wins?’. *Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR)*, Working Paper No 50, p.7. <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/workingpapers/2000/wp5000.pdf/>

of military force unilaterally if necessary, to replace autocratic regimes with democratic ones.

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the influence of neoconservatism in the Bush administration appears to have found its purpose in the shift to the threat of Islamic terrorism, because neoconservatives describe their shared view as a belief that national security is best attained by promoting freedom and democracy abroad through the support of pro-democracy movements, foreign aid and in certain cases military intervention.¹³³ The Bush Doctrine, declared after September 11, incorporates both the idea of considering nations that harbor terrorists as enemies of the United States, as well as the view that pre-emptive military action, unilateral if necessary, is justified to protect the United States from the threat of terrorism or attack. So, the neoconservatives won a landmark victory with the Bush Doctrine after September 11.

As the Iraq mission was supported by the ‘unilateralist’ neocons, the success of the mission would affect the future policies of them. The Iraq war can be considered as a test of the validity of neoconservative thinking and principles. If the war in Iraq is successful in stabilizing Iraq and the Middle East, then the neoconservative ideas will be achieved a victory. If the Iraq War is successful in establishing a liberal democracy in Iraq as the neocons claim, then the influence of neoconservative thinking on the Republican party will likely solidify. However, if the war in Iraq requiring an excessive expenditure of American lives and money further destabilizes the Middle East or establishes a weak or ineffective Iraqi government unable to control terrorism, then the influence of neoconservatives within the Republican party will likely be greatly diminished in the future.

¹³³ Hagel, Chuck. July/August 2004. ‘A Republican Foreign Policy’. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 83, No 4, p.69-70.

Conversely, the Liberals oppose neocons' ideas especially on unilateralism and use of force, instead they prefer diplomacy. They are politically closer to the Democrat Party. The Democratic Party is one of two major political parties in the United States. Currently, the Democratic Party is the minority party in the United States Senate and the House of Representatives. Democrats control 20 state legislatures. In 2005, the Democrats regained a plurality of legislative seats nationwide; however, the seat count is still much lower than it was ten years ago.

During the presidential election of 2000, the Democrats choosed Vice President Al Gore to be the Party's candidate for the presidency. Gore and George W. Bush, the Republican candidate, clearly disagreed on a number of issues, including gun politics, foreign policy.¹³⁴ The result was the Governor Bush's margin of victory.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the nation's focus was changed to issues of national security. All but one Democrat voted with their Republican counterparts to authorize President Bush's 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. However, the Democrats were split over entering Iraq in 2003 and increasingly expressed concerns about both the justification and progress of the war on terror and the domestic effects including threats to civil rights and civil liberties from the US Patriot Act.

By 2004, the failure of George W. Bush's administration to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and the lack of any end point for the war on terror were frequently debated issues in the election. That year, Democrats generally campaigned on solving the Iraq crisis, and fighting terrorism more efficiently. However, the result was the defeat of the Democrats again although the anti-war sentiment had led to a number of large protests in the US. A minority of politicians, mostly Liberals, opposed

¹³⁴ Higgott, Richard. op.cit. p.9.

the invasion of Iraq. But, John Kerry, the Democratic nominee for Presidency in 2004, had voted to authorize the invasion, and said during his campaign that he stood by his vote. And during the campaign, Kerry was unable to reconcile his initial support of the Iraq war with his opposition to the war in 2004 and manage the deep split in the Democratic Party between those who favored and opposed the war.

The supporters of Afghanistan and Iraq missions within the liberals are so called 'neoliberals'. Though neoliberal Democrats differ on a variety of issues, they typically foster a mix of political views and ideas. Compared to other Democratic factions, they are mostly more supportive of the use of military force, including the war in Iraq. Neoliberals argue that their ideas are more in line with the majority of Americans. Members often identify themselves under the title 'New Democrat'. Prominent neoliberals include Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton, and Al Gore. The neoliberals express their beliefs in political preemption first and military preemption only as a last resort. They supported the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq because force was the only way to lance these boils.¹³⁵

4.2. EUROPEAN POLICIES

On the foreign and security policy issues, the European have two main side; one of them is the Atlanticists and the other is Integrationists. While Atlanticists are closer the United States and favor the old transatlantic alliance, the Integrationists Project is an European Union that can act in all areas on its own.

4.2.1. NATO AND CFSP/ESDP

Although the EU has been developed rapidly since its creation, the security issue is stil a taboo within the institution. The Atlanticists and the Integrationists have

¹³⁵ Asmus, Ronald D., Pollack, Kenneth. July 22, 2003. 'The Neoliberal Take on the Middle East'. *The Washington Post*. p.A17.

different arguments about their security. The Atlanticists favor the old alliance and certainly NATO. However, the Integrationists insist that the EU must have its own security institutions and they favor the further development of CFSP/ESDP.

4.2.1.1. ATLANTICISTS

Atlanticism is a philosophy of cooperation that favors the strong ties among European and North American nations regarding political, economic, and defense issues. Although the core European countries chose to be united under a supranational institution for their sake, the security and defence issues are still a taboo within the union. There are two main sides namely the Atlanticists and the Integrationists. On the issue of security, while Atlanticists favor NATO, the Integrationists prefer Europeans to develop their own security and defence institutions namely the CFSP/ESDP.

The most important Atlanticist organization is NATO. For the Atlanticists, NATO and transatlantic alliance are still vital for the sake of European security. Europe still has to be the most important partner of the US in the 21st century. To do this, Europeans must spend more on defence and further develop their own defence institutions to be strong partner of the US not a counterweight to the US. The idea of being a counterweight to the US means the development of the CFSP or ESDP as a rival to NATO, which is the preference of Integrationists.

The Atlanticist attitude was widespread among Europeans immediately after the 9/11 shock. The collective reaction of the North Atlantic Alliance to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 was the proof that North America and Europe remained united as a security community. In invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time, all members have agreed that the attack on the United States was an attack on all. This demonstrates solidarity in facing common challenges together. While Article 5 and solidarity are the bedrock of the Alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization has remained the central element of European security through five decades. According to the Atlanticists, it should be an indispensable part of the transatlantic security relationship in the new century.

The most important example of Atlanticists in Europe would be England and Tony Blair. Although the UK favors the development of European Security and Defence Policy like the Integrationists since the St.Malo Summit, it is clear that the UK tries to use the ESDP for the immediate strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance and to avoid a major rift in European-American relations, which for London means to contribute to consultation and collaboration with the US.¹³⁶ Another example of Atlanticists in Europe would be Javier Solana. Spain's former Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar also took a strong Atlanticist stand.¹³⁷

In addition, on continental Europe, many Eastern European countries profess a strong Atlanticist view; for example, Poland. They are taking part in the process for the 60.000 men of the EU Rapid Reaction Force which makes them quasi-members of a security organisation outside of NATO. However, it is needless to say that most of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe are more enthusiastic about military collaboration with the US than within the EU. They prefer to engage rather in NATO than in the building-up of separate European assets. This can be considered in many cases as a result of the US's strong fight against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. And most importantly, the interest of the US in the security of these states during Balkan crisis while Europeans were just watching as neighbours, is the other reason for these countries to be Atlanticists.

The Istanbul Summit of NATO held in June 2004, was the answer to all these debates and the declaration of the 'A New Atlanticism for the 21st Century'. The

¹³⁶ Daalder, Ivo H. op.cit. p.152.

¹³⁷ Ibid. p.160.

speech of NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer provided new arguments for the pro-Atlanticism and accordingly the necessity of NATO in the new security era especially after the Iraq war crisis across the Atlantic.¹³⁸ He said that, after the major frictions across the Atlantic, there is a new momentum in transatlantic security cooperation. And there is a reappraisal of NATO as the major instrument for that cooperation. Europe and North America can disagree but they remain the world's closest community. The fact of the matter is that America remains Europe's number one strategic partner and that Washington's need for likeminded Allies would inevitably lead it to Europe. The US unilateralists who thought that the United States did not really need Allies have come to realise that the US not only needs Allies, but also the Alliance. At the same time, notions of turning Europe into a 'counterweight' to the United States have also floundered according to Scheffer, because Europe simply does not want to define itself in opposition to the United States.¹³⁹

Besides, Secretary General said that meeting the new security challenges like terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and failed states requires continued transatlantic cooperation. And it requires a framework like NATO, a framework that offers more predictability and consistency than any 'coalition of the willing' could ever provide. Also Scheffer claimed that countering these challenges mean being ready to act outside of Europe for NATO. There was a time when even going to the Balkans was seen as revolutionary. Today, NATO is leading ISAF in Afghanistan and that is widely seen as the right thing to do. The NATO is finally turning into a framework for transatlantic action wherever the security interests demand it. And this fact holds enormous potential for the future of NATO as a transatlantic instrument.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop. 'A New Atlanticism for the 21st Century'.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

In addition to these, the Secretary General expressed the need to engage in North Africa and the broader Middle East, and a coherent and comprehensive transatlantic policy for this region is therefore essential. He gave example of this engagement in the Middle East that sixteen allies were on the ground in Iraq. Then, there was broad agreement that a stable Iraq is in the interest of all allies. That is why the transatlantic community is united in its commitment to a peaceful and democratic future for Iraq.¹⁴¹

Consequently, the Secretary General claimed that the old Atlanticism is dead with the Cold War. But something new is being put in its place; a new Atlanticism for the 21st century which looks to the challenges of today and tomorrow, not those of yesterday and also an Atlanticism that also looks beyond Europe.¹⁴² And accordingly, a transformed NATO is the place where this new Atlanticism is translated into common action.

4.2.1.2. INTEGRATIONISTS

European Integrationists favor the European Union and seeks to uphold or develop it through supporting European integration and the aims of the European Union. On the security issues, the Integrationists supports the development of CFSP/ESDP unlike pro-NATO Atlanticists.

Many of them believe that, in the present world where the US stands as the world's premier power, such European unity makes more sense than ever, making a united and independent Europe more and more necessary. Nearly all support supranational union in Europe. They are usually not entirely satisfied with the organization and working of the EU institutions, but they think the solution is not in destroying what has been built, but on the contrary to push for more unity.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

Sometimes, the Integrationists can be accused of anti-Americanism for their doubts about the sustainability of NATO. They resent what they feel is American ‘sabotage’ of attempts to strengthen European common defence through organisations such as the Western European Union. Also, not all EU member states are members of NATO, and not all NATO member states in Europe are member states of the EU. Furthermore, the Integrationists generally support the idea of a European Union seat at the United Nations Security Council as part of the development of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The response to conflict in critical regions of the world and to threats from nuclear weapons, as well as the fight against international terrorism, are setting high demands for western countries. But while the EU is struggling to meet the most basic requirements for coordinated action in conflict prevention and crisis management, the US defines its defence and security tasks as increasingly far-reaching. Yet because of the differences with Washington, the Europeans are setting their own ambitious goal of autonomous action using their project on European Security and Defence Policy as a prime vehicle.¹⁴³

The European Security and Defence Policy is considered a major element of the CFSP. The Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP was established as the second of the three pillars of the European Union in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, and further defined and broadened in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. It superseded the European Political Cooperation.

The CFSP sees NATO responsible for territorial defence of Europe and ‘peace-making’ while since 1999 the European Union is responsible for the implementation of missions like peace-keeping, policing of treaties etc.

¹⁴³ Rummel, Reinhardt. Winter, 2002. ‘From Weakness to Power with the ESDP?’. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol 7, p. 454.

The ESDP was initiated by provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam which stipulated the progressive framing of a common security and defence policy that could deal with humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. These are called Petersberg tasks.

According to the Integrationists, with the help of ESDP, the EU takes another step in the direction of a fully built Union. The ESDP extends the European process of integration and cooperation to defence matters, which in effect deepens the build-up of the Union or as Integrationists believe it would compete with NATO in areas of traditional defence.

However, whether and when the EU can reach this ambitious stage of development is unknown at this point of time. This is true regardless of the fact that its embryonic rapid reaction force has already been declared partly operational. The range of tasks has not yet been adequately defined, such as who among the EU member states should contribute to which mission, and how the commands should be given.

Further, the plans for the ESDP were developed within the intergovernmental sector of the Union, the Second Pillar. The intergovernmental decision-making structure of the Second Pillar permits specific cooperation for individual Member States as long as they do not deviate from collectively worked-out positions.¹⁴⁴ The future decisionmaking structure of the ESDP also remains, for the time being, as a primarily intergovernmental nature. Thus, this requires the unanimous approval to act in any case which makes the ESDP or CFSP inefficient. However, supranationalism seems impossible in the security and defence issues within the EU. The international dynamics since September 11 do not allow indifference any longer. It may not be

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. p.459.

attractive for some of the European capitals to give up sovereignty in a highly sensitive field to a drastically expanded membership.

Moreover, parallel to the building of the ESDP, EU enlargement thought lend the ESDP more weight, especially since all the newly entering states are more or less supporters of this new course of integration. Already a few of them were taking part in the pledging process for the 60 000 men of the EU Rapid Reaction Force which makes them quasi-members of a security organisation outside of NATO. However, it is needless to say that most of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe are more enthusiastic about military collaboration with the US than within the EU. They prefer to engage rather in the modernization of NATO than in the building-up of separate European assets from scratch.¹⁴⁵ And if they continue to choose NATO, the capacity of the ESDP will hardly be strengthened. But also, most of the new countries are not adequately equipped to satisfy the demands of the ESDP technologically or even to bring it forward.

Also, the core states are very important for the future of CFSP/ESDP plan. As an illustration, without Prime Minister Blair and President Chirac initiating and leading the process, the ESDP would have been a non-starter. This is not only because of hesitant Member States but also due to bureaucratic resistance at home. To a certain extent, the two political leaders had to surprise their own administrations to keep the project going. But no need to say that France is traditionally anti-American and that is why it supports such a project now.¹⁴⁶ France views the ESDP not only as a step towards emancipation from the US, but also as a playing ground for French influence on the strategic orientation of the Union. The UK follows similar plans but, in addition, tries to use the ESDP for the immediate strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance and to

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. p.457.

¹⁴⁶ Meunier, Sophie. July/August 2000. 'The French Exception'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 79, No 4, p.116.

avoid a major rift in European-American relations, which for them means to contribute to consultation and collaboration with the US.

These differing driving elements for the building of the ESDP ultimately go back to the traditional difference between 'Europeanists' and 'Atlanticists'. This ensures that the direction of any future development of the ESDP remains ambivalent. Very soon after its creation in the 1950s, the EU suffered from the fact that it was mainly conceptualized as an economic community. Foreign policy comprises more than trade and development. The Fouchet Plans of the 1960s were supposed to add a political component to the Union. The European Political Cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s was seen as a timid attempt to speak with one voice in the international arena. The Common Foreign and Security Policy in the beginning of the 1990s dared to advance into the field of new security policies, until, at last, the ESDP was proposed at the turn of the century to cope with the Petersberg tasks. However, the next step would be the inclusion of territorial defence against new risks to the Union as a whole. And certainly to do this, the EU armed forces would be needed. But this is impossible for now because of the facts that are mentioned above.

Still, a majority of the Member States believes that the Union will gain the capacity to act forcefully in foreign and security politics when it has a military instrument that it can operate without having to obtain the agreement of a third party. But taking all these facts into consideration, it is clear that Robert Kagan is right when he claims that the Union needs the morality and the desirability of power.¹⁴⁷ Also he is right when he claims that the Europeans are structurally incapable of generating and projecting power.¹⁴⁸ In fact, the EU's goal of 'autonomous action' is difficult to reach. Autonomous action in areas of the EU like currency, trade, development, environment

¹⁴⁷ Kagan, Robert. June/July 2002. 'Power and Weakness'. *Policy Review*, No 113, <http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html>

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

is by now taken for granted, but in defence and security matters autonomy remains a difficult project-in-development.

5. CONCLUSION

In this thesis, one of the most important debates on the transatlantic security in the 21st century, which is the presence of NATO in this new era and its transformation have been analysed. My hypothesis is that the presence of a transformed NATO is vital for the transatlantic security alliance in the 21st century. NATO's original purpose was to counter Soviet Russia and the threat of communism in the 20th century. Later, the threat of communism and the Soviet thrates disappears. However, the collapse of the Soviet Russia could not bring peace to the European continent, because the newly developed states in Eastern Europe caused regional conflicts that required a military interference for the sake of the continent. Although this region was out of its area, NATO interfered in the region. This can be considered as the beginning of the transformation process of the NATO. Later, this process continued with the enlargement of NATO to the eastern part of Europe after the peace had come to the continent. With the EU enlargement parallel to the NATO enlargement, today there is not any serious threat to the security of the West coming from within the continent. However, September 11 terrorist attacks was a sign that the 21st century was bringing new security challenges to the West such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction or regional conflicts which require a strong transatlantic alliance. The West already has an old security alliance, NATO. However, today these threats lie in the Eastern Europe and the Middle East which are out of NATO's area. Therefore, NATO has to be transformed into an alliance that can act at anywhere that the West faces a threat. Besides, the enlargement process must be in parallel with the 'out-of-area' missions in NATO's transformation. The enlargement does not only means full membership, but also the accessions of states from especially these regions that the threats come from, to the different programs of NATO such as Partnership for Peace or Mediterreanean

Dialogue.

In the first chapter, an overview of transatlantic security relations and the position of NATO until the end of the Balkan Wars is given. The roots of the strong security ties between US and Europe in recent history date back to the Second World War. Then, these ties became stronger and were further consolidated through the establishment of the NATO defense alliance in 1949. The rationale was that the West was in an Atlantic Alliance to confront the greatest threat to Western security posed by the Soviet Union and communism.

A new and more complicated era dawned upon the relationship of Atlantic Alliance with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. The collapse of communism in Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the first debate over a new rationale for US engagement in Europe and the role of the Europe in its own security and also undermined the *raison d'être* of NATO for many. The West was faced with questions about the purpose of this US-European strategic alliance in an age where the old Russian threat was absent.

However, the importance of NATO became painfully obvious during the first Balkan war of the early 1990's, when the EU had to wait around for US decision to intervene in Europe's own backyard. Europeans still needed US engagement in their continent as their military power was not yet as good as their economy under the EU.

However, NATO's interference in Eastern Europe was a defining moment in the life of the North Atlantic Alliance, because during the Balkan crisis there was debates both within NATO and the United States concerning the possibility of getting involved in the Balkans. Some argued that the Balkans did not directly threaten NATO or the US interests and that the West should therefore remain uninvolved. Others argued that vital interests were threatened, particularly in Kosovo and Macedonia, because conflict

in these areas could easily spread into Greece or Turkey who are NATO members. Ultimately, NATO determined that its interests were threatened and intervened into Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo that were actually in 'out-of its area'. Later, after the conflicts resolved, Central and Eastern European countries accessed to NATO through Partnership for Peace Programs or formally as Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland did in 1999 in the NATO's fiftieth anniversary. Taking all these facts into consideration, I have concluded that NATO emerged victorious, united, capable of confronting 21st century security challenges, and stronger by the addition of its new members.

In the second chapter, the two major strategic locations, Eastern Europe and the Middle East have been analysed which affect vital American and European security interests and require transatlantic cooperation and NATO, considering the new security challenges mostly as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime of the 21st century.

Considering the new security challenges in the 21st century, there are at least two major strategic locations which affect vital American and European interests that require trans-Atlantic cooperation and NATO. Central and Eastern European countries had already witnessed the necessity of NATO during the Balkan crisis who have become even members of it. For the stability of the region and the unity of Europe, this security guarantee is vital. The addition of the seven new Eastern European countries increased the number of members to a total of 26 nations. All the new members, aside from Slovenia, as well as the three states that joined in 1999, were previously under Soviet domination. This enlargement reinforced the argument that NATO is far from obsolete as other countries are queuing up to join the Alliance. And despite the endeavors to form a European common security and foreign policy, independent from

the United States, for the East Europeans, NATO remains the only viable organization that can ensure their security in the event of a crisis.

In addition to new EU members, western democracies must be in contact with Ukraine and Russia to deepen this stability in the region. Ukraine borders with four important regions; the Central Europe, the Caucasus, the Black Sea zone, and Russia. A Russian dominated Ukraine could become a source of regional insecurity while encouraging Moscow to expand its influences further afield. By contrast, an independent and democratic Ukraine would become a more effective regional power, a barrier against any spillover of instability, and an important model of reform for Belarus and Moldova. Framed as a choice between West and East, the latest presidential elections gave Ukrainian citizens an ideological and strategic choice of a future involving NATO and the European Union instead of stronger ties with Russia. For Ukraine in this situation, the question of the formation of its external policy in relation to European security becomes very important. The geopolitical position of Ukraine is central to this question. A closer or even a member Ukraine means the expansion of the stability zone in Europe. The NATO area is now the most stable region in Europe. Its expansion could mean the enlargement of this region of stability. Besides, NATO enlargement can lead to closer relations between Ukraine and Western Europe. Ukraine is already one of the most active members of Partnership for Peace Program of NATO and its relations can be more consolidated through full membership.

Similarly, Russia is the other important factor in the region. Although Russia claims that the alliance is extraneous and ineffective, it is in strong relations with NATO through NATO-Russia Council. The creation of the NRC has opened a new era in NATO-Russia relations, providing opportunities for consultation, joint decision, and

joint action on a wide range of issues. The NRC focuses on specific, well-defined projects where NATO and Russia share a common goal. NATO and Russia have agreed on an initial, specific workplan, which includes projects in the following areas like assessment of the terrorist threat, crisis management, non-proliferation, and arms control.

NATO's 1997 decisions on enlargement and its parallel efforts to build cooperation with Russia, Ukraine and other 'left out' states have altered the situation, opening a potentially new era in Central Europe's relations with Russia. While Russia retains its formal opposition to NATO's expansion, the conclusion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the development of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and Russia's continued engagement in the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia all indicate that it is seeking to maintain and deepen its cooperative ties with NATO.

Strong relations with Russia is also vital for the future of the Central and Eastern European Countries. The breakup of the Soviet Union has changed the relations between the Central European states and Russia. However, despite this normalization of relations, the Central European states remain concerned about Russia's future development and its ambitions towards them. From the Central European perspective, Russia remains a great power, the largest single military power on the European mainland and a major nuclear power. Despite its current economic problems, Russia retains the territory, natural resources and productive potential to regenerate itself economically in the longer term, which could also enable it to modernize and expand its armed forces.

However, Middle East is a bigger problem now than the Central and Eastern Europe. Because that part of the world is the main source for the new security

challenges as was the Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War era. This is the region from which the greatest threats to the United States and Europe are likely to come which they both declared in 2002 National Security Strategy of US and 2003 EU Security Strategy as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction especially.

In the thesis, the major conflicts in the Middle East are examined in parallel with the NATO's out-of-area discussions. After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, NATO invoked Article 5, declaring that the attack on the United States was an attack on all NATO members. Article 5 is the core of NATO's collective defense concept, but it was now being invoked not due to invasion by the Soviet Union but due to attacks by terrorists. Following the Balkan crisis, NATO's transformation became evident again. The crucial threat to the security of the Atlantic alliance was from 'out-of-NATO's area' just like in the case of Balkan crisis. Further, while the Balkan states were near the borders of the Europe, Afghanistan even had not a common border with EU or US. But consequently, it was clear that although the security challenges have changed, the necessity of the Atlantic alliance was clear. With the help of the old alliance, the first war on terror was a victory.

The war on terror continued with Iraq war that was fought by a 'Coalition of the Willing' which is a phrase used by the administration of US President George W. Bush to refer to the nations whose governments militarily supported the United States position in the Iraq disarmament crisis and later the 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent peacekeeping duties. The original list in March 2003 included 48 members. However, as the 90% of the military was from the US and Britain, it was a predominantly Anglo-American force rather than as a coalition. Already later, most of the countries that are located out of America and European continents left the war. Therefore, the necessity of NATO which already includes the necessary parts in the

'Coalition of the Willing' acted in the Iraq war became clearly obvious. United Nations members are so differently located that the sake of the Middle East is not so important for them as to the Atlantic Alliance. However, the action of soldiers from the countries that are already members of the NATO is different from the fight in the war as NATO. The real problem with the Iraq war and NATO surfaced during the crisis with Turkey. The failure of the Turkish Parliament to ratify a decision regarding the deployment of American troops in Turkish territory on March 1, 2003, caused a major shock. However, the underlying problem was again the 'out-of-area' problem of NATO. Although every partner of US was eager to make 'war on terror', they did not want to participate in Iraq war. Several close allies of the US like Germany, Belgium and France, although mainly sharing the ideas of the United States, opposed a military intervention because they claimed that it would increase rather than decrease the risk of terrorist attacks. The North Atlantic alliance was thrown into disarray after France, Germany, and Belgium refused to fulfil their treaty obligations to Turkey as a fellow member which was the activation of Article 4 which enables an ally which feels itself under threat to ask NATO to launch negotiations and preparations in order to take defense measures.

Another problem that takes attention of the West in the region is Israel-Palestine conflict. Both the European and the Americans discussed and proposed different solutions to the problem such as the Road Map for Peace in 2002 by the Quartet of the European Union, Russia, the United Nations and the United States. In this thesis, for this conflict the active role of an enlarged NATO is insisted comparing with a similar example in NATO's history . Israel is already close to the West and is a member of the Mediterranean Dialogue of NATO. But further, we can discuss the same for Palestine. Because there is a similar example of such a process in NATO's history that can be

applied to the Palestine. This is the example of Turkish membership of NATO. With the rise of Cold War hostilities in the 1950s, the United States and Western Europe became preoccupied with securing Western Europe from potential Soviet incursions. As a result, Turkey came to be seen as critical to Western security due to its shared borders with the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe. Besides, Turkey was in conflict with Greece just as Palestine with Israel. Such a conflict during the difficult times of the Cold War could not be ignored. Similarly, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has long been the focus of transatlantic strategic concerns. The recent shift in focus of American and European foreign policies from defending against international communism to a so-called 'War on Terror' has only further heightened the importance of Israel and Palestine. Because the area of that war is mostly the Middle East and Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the biggest problems in the region. The membership of NATO prevented any military conflict between Turkey and Greece during the Cold War. Similarly, NATO can play the same role for easing tensions between Palestine and Israel. Because of the clear interest NATO allies have in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, NATO can begin talks with Israel and Palestine regarding membership in order to ensure general conflict resolution. However, it is clear that both the countries can not carry what the NATO membership brings. Maybe Israel can, but if the Israel becomes a NATO member alone this would be a major problem both for Israel and the other NATO members. Israel's membership can only expand the hostilities in the region towards it. And regarding the article 5, these hostilities can cost a lot to the other NATO members.

NATO has already a program dealing with some of the countries in that part of the world. It is the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue which currently involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region that are Algeria, Egypt, Israel,

Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The Dialogue reflects the Alliance's view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. It is an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War security environment, as well as an important component of the Alliance's policy of outreach and cooperation. The Mediterranean Dialogue's overall aim is to contribute to regional security and stability, achieve better mutual understanding and dispel any misconceptions about NATO among Dialogue countries. As one of the parts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel already takes its part in the Mediterranean Dialogue which can help 'to contribute to regional security and stability'. However, this requires the other part of the conflict, the Palestine. The membership of the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue should be offered also to the Palestine. By the Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO could push for Israel's recognition of the Palestine's legal borders and end any military incursions into Palestine territory, because the instability in the Middle East, caused by a failure to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could have significant spillover effects for the North Atlantic community, particularly for the NATO's southern border. NATO could therefore serve, ensuring that Israel and Palestine follow through with their agreements and obligations. Through membership in NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, Israel and Palestine would eliminate feelings of distrust on both sides and help to maintain a lasting peace by the program. Also, the accession of Palestine to the the Mediterranean Dialogue would be promising for the other Muslim countries in that region. They would prefer living in peace instead of competing with each other for developing 'nuclear weapons'. Just as in the Central and Eastern Europe members, they would at least be more optimistic for their future relations with the West.

Iran is the new possible mission of the West. Iran is the most recent problem for the Atlantic alliance in the Middle East. The nuclear development program of Iran is a serious threat to its neighbours, the EU and the US. However, the negotiation efforts have not been successful so far. As seen in the case of Iran, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their possible confluence with international terrorism, is arguably the world's most serious security problem now and in the coming decades. The EU and the US should work together, and also with Russia and China which have started to take proliferation seriously in recent years. Certainly, the EU and the US are more interested in Iran than the others. As Turkey is a candidate country, the EU will be a neighbour to the Iran in the near future and such a nuclear power near its borders, whether for good purposes or not, will always be a big threat to the EU. The peace process attempt of the US and allies in the Middle East will be destroyed if a nuclear weapon competition starts in the region. Further, there is always a possibility for the terrorists in the region to gain these nuclear weapons. This means the combination of the two biggest threats to the transatlantic security in the 21st century; terrorism and nuclear weapons.

Considering these facts, NATO is very important both for any possible military action and consultation. For instance, the platform that includes the western alliance and Russia is the NATO-Russia Council. In the NATO-Russia Council, the members and the Russia can discuss and take a common action for the Iran question. However, despite its 'consultation' functions, if they decide to take military action, it would be problematic to use military functions of NATO as was in the case of Iraq. Although the EU's borders that include most powerful members of NATO, are reaching to the Iran, it is 'out-of' NATO's area. So, the old Atlantic Alliance needs to go out-of-area if any military action towards Iran is necessary, to prevent any transatlantic drift as happened

in the Iraq war.

Taking all these facts into consideration, Turkey can be considered as the most strategic country. Turkey is both neighbour to EU and Middle East and a candidate for membership in the EU. Turkey stands next to the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, all of which pose potential threats to the security of Europe. Turkey is important for the EU's common foreign and security policy. As a functioning democracy in a predominantly Muslim society, it could inspire neighbouring countries and function as a bridge to the Middle East. This would be the best response to the new challenges the world is facing today. Turkey is in the position of being both a contributor to European security in the Alliance context, and a partner in addressing wider problems influencing European, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian security, most of which lie outside the NATO area. Moreover, many of the direct risks facing NATO today are actually on Turkey's borders.

For instance, Turkey has close ties with the Balkan states. The Balkans are important as they are a gateway to continental Europe and also because historical and cultural ties exist among the peoples of both regions. Turkey's closer ties among the Balkan countries would lead to the preservation of peace and stability in the region. Turkey has participated in NATO operations and peacekeeping missions and reconstruction activities. Another troubled area, the Middle East is near Turkish borders. All the developments in the region would have an effect on Turkey's security. But Turkey would have an affect for the sake of the region. In the long-run, strengthening of the 'Turkish model' of a secular democratic state, with a predominantly Muslim population, as a model for the rest of the Arab Middle East is important. In the short-run, as intended in the Iraq war the full co-operation of Turkey would be useful, because the co-operation of Turkey meant the use of Turkish territory

and air space as a key base of attack on Iraq from the North. However, this plan failed as it had not take into account the NATO's unended 'transformation' discussions with the crisis which took place in NATO in the first weeks of 2003 after Turkey applied for the Article 4 of North Atlantic Treaty to be put into effect which enables an ally which feels itself under threat to ask NATO to launch negotiations and preparations in order to take defense measures.

Despite the absence of a catalyzing and common threat as in the Cold War, Turkish relations with the West are still important in the face of the new security challenges. The examples of Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq that are mentioned before, are enough to understand the importance of Turkey in that part of the world. The emerging relationship between Turkey and the West is likely to be more balanced than at any time in the past, and certainly more important than during the Cold War.

Under the title of the 'the debates on the presence of NATO in the new era', the analysis of the arguments about the NATO in the 21st century is made by dividing the ideas into two groups as anti-NATO and pro-NATO. Anti-NATO group is against the idea that NATO is needed in the 21st century. First of all, they are sure that the end of the Cold War was the end of the NATO, because this old transatlantic alliance was designed for the Cold-war and not needed anymore as the communism and Russia can not cause a threat to the West. Secondly, the enlargement of the NATO has weakened the institution, because the new members are the former iron curtain states that are also the smallest and weakest members of the EU. Also, this enlargement can cause a possible future conflict between the West and Russia. Thirdly, anti-NATO supporters believe that the traditional transatlantic security alliance is not needed anymore. The Europeans should develop their own security institutions, because the cost of this alliance is heavy for the US. And lastly, NATO's original area for action is limited.

Although NATO has already started its 'out-of-area' missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, those missions were in the Europe. But, NATO's troop deployment far regions such as in Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran is making the institution useless.

Later, the arguments of the pro-NATO group are analysed. Initially, unlike anti-NATO group they believe that as during the Cold War, today the West needs their alliance and the NATO to counter the challenges of the new century. So, NATO's presence is necessary in the 21st century. And further, to be capable of confronting new security challenges in this new era, NATO has to be transformed. Secondly, as part of this transformation NATO's enlargement with the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries is a positive development. Unlike anti-NATO group, this group believes that the enlargement of NATO would not undermine the relations with Russia, because Russia recognized the importance the unity of the continent of Europe and peaceful relations with the West. Thirdly, they insist that the United States and the Europeans desperately needs strategic partners given the problems the west faces today, and claims that Europe and US are natural coalition partners. And the already-settled multilateral institution that can serve for this need is NATO. Instead of spending time, money and energy for an autonomous institution, the Europeans should take a more active role within NATO. And lastly, they believe that the consensus that NATO can act 'out of area' only within Europe must be revisited, because it is entirely consistent with the alliance's founding purpose for NATO to work outside of the transatlantic area to protect its members and their core security interests.

In the last part of the thesis, the domestic policies of the Unites States and the Euroepan Union which form the two parts of the NATO are analysed. These policies are directly effecting the NATO and the discussions about its activites. Following the September 11 attacks, world witnessed the shift of American foreign and security

policy to unilateralism and their Afghanistan mission alone. However, this mission was backed by the Europeans and the other allies from different parts of the world. Later, the US's intention for a second war with Iraq caused a transatlantic division. But, this division could not make Americans to give up their intention. However, after the Iraq war, the US recognised the heavy cost of unilateralism which is favored by the neocons. After the Iraq war, the US has returned to multilateralism which is preferred by liberals. The problem for NATO is the different attitudes of unilateralism and multilateralism towards institutions like NATO or the UN. Unilateralism is a doctrine that supports one-sided action that may be in disregard for other parties. The term refers to the foreign policy of a country that prefers solving international problems without cooperation. US foreign policy has traditionally been driven by unilateralism. The advocates of US unilateralism argue that other countries should not have 'veto power' over matters of US national security through multilateral institutions like the UN or NATO. During the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, US was acting unilaterally. However, both economically and psychologically the cost of unilateralism is heavy and it is nonsense to carry all these costs alone while the threats were confronting all the West. As these were also realised by the US and after the transatlantic drift in the Iraq war, the 'unilateralist' behaviour of the US left its place to a more 'multilateral' approach. Multilateralism strengthens the bonds between nations and peoples and reduces the risk of conflicts by increasing the size and unity of the alliance. This shift will certainly increase the value of NATO for the US and the EU.

For the European policies, NATO and CFSP/ESDP discussions between the Atlanticists and the Integrationists are analysed. On the foreign and security policy issues, the Europeans have two main side; one of them is the Atlanticists and the other is Integrationists. Although the EU has been developed rapidly since its creation, the

security issue is still a taboo within the institution. The Atlanticists and the Integrationists have different arguments about their security. The Atlanticists favor the old alliance and certainly NATO. However, the Integrationists insist that the EU must have its own security institutions and they favor the further development of CFSP/ESDP.

Atlanticism is a philosophy of cooperation that favors the strong ties among European and North American nations regarding political, economic, and defense issues. Although the core European countries chose to be united under a supranational institution, the security and defence issues are still a taboo within the union. The most important Atlanticist organization is NATO. For the Atlanticists, NATO and Transatlantic alliance are still vital for the sake of European security. Europe still has to be the most important partner of the US in the 21st century. The Atlanticist attitude was widespread among Europeans immediately after the 9/11 shock and it can be clearly stated that it will be so in the near future. The collective reaction of the North Atlantic Alliance to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 was the proof that North America and Europe remained united as a security community. In invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time, all members have agreed that the attack on the United States was an attack on all. This demonstrates solidarity in facing common challenges together.

On the other hand, European Integrationists favor the EU and seek to uphold or develop it through supporting European integration and the aims of the European Union. On the security issues, the Integrationists support the development of CFSP/ESDP unlike pro-NATO Atlanticists. In the present world where the US stands as the world's premier power, such European unity makes more sense than ever, making a united and independent Europe more and more necessary. Nearly all support

supranational union in Europe. They are usually not entirely satisfied with the organization and working of the EU institutions, but they think the solution is not in destroying what has been built, but on the contrary to push for more unity.

However, there are many reasons that makes Integrationists arguments nonsense. Firstly, they demand a seat at the UN as EU by developing CFSP. How can a CFSP which has proven its weakness during the Balkan crisis, response to conflict in critical regions of the world and to threats from nuclear weapons, as well as the fight against international terrorism? Besides, the CFSP sees NATO responsible for territorial defence of Europe and 'peace-making' while since 1999 the European Union is responsible for the implementation of missions like peace-keeping, policing of treaties etc. Also, the ESDP stipulated the progressive framing of a common security and defence policy that could deal with humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking which are called Petersberg tasks. According to the Integrationists, with the help of ESDP, the EU takes another step in the direction of a fully built Union by extending the European process of integration and cooperation to defence matters that would compete with NATO in areas of traditional defence. However, whether and when the EU can reach this ambitious stage of development is unknown at this point of time. The range of tasks has not yet been adequately defined, such as who among the EU member states should contribute to which mission, and how the commands should be given. Further, the plans for the CFSP/ESDP were developed within the intergovernmental sector of the Union, the Second Pillar. The intergovernmental decision-making structure of the Second Pillar that requires the unanimous approval to act in any case which makes the ESDP or CFSP inefficient. However, supranationalism seems impossible in the security and defence issues within the EU. The international dynamics since 11

September do not allow indifference any longer. It may not be attractive for some of the European capitals to give up sovereignty in a highly sensitive field to a drastically expanded membership.

Moreover, although the eastern enlargement of the EU thought to lend the ESDP more weight, especially, it is needless to say that most of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe are more enthusiastic about military collaboration with the US than within the EU. They prefer to engage rather in the modernization of NATO than in the building-up of separate European assets. Also, most of the new countries are not adequately equipped to satisfy the demands of the ESDP technologically or even to bring it forward.

Lastly, the core states are very important for the future of CFSP/ESDP plan. There is no need to say that France is traditionally anti-American and that is why it supports such a project now. France views the ESDP not only as a step towards emancipation from the US, but also as a playing ground for French influence on the strategic orientation of the Union. On the other hand although UK supports ESDP, it also tries to use the ESDP for the immediate strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance and to avoid a major rift in European-American relations, which for them means to contribute to consultation and collaboration with the US. In the present situation of the world security, it seems impossible for UK to give up NATO and to support the development of CFSP/ESDP as a counterweight to NATO and the US.

Taking all these facts into consideration, it can be said that the presence of a transformed NATO is vital for the transatlantic security alliance in the 21st century. Confronting the Soviet threat was the initial purpose of NATO and the collapse of the communism thought to be end of the alliance. However, the conflicts occurred in the former 'iron curtain' region resurfaced the importance of NATO. Despite all the

discussions, this was the beginning of NATO's transformation by going out-of-area and further consolidated with the enlargement of NATO towards Eastern Europe. After the September 11 attacks, the West realised that the threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction will replace communism and Soviet threat in the 21st century. However, during Afghanistan and Iraq wars that were fought against these threats, the West still had the question of transformation of the old alliance in mind. But considering the new challenges the West needs the help of NATO to deal with Eastern Europe and the Middle East. At that point, the pro-NATO arguments are more realistic if compared with those of the anti-NATO group. Furthermore, following the Iraq crisis, the US has already shifted towards multilateral approach that means to return to the atlantic alliance and NATO. On the European side, there seems to be no other chance but to accompany the US in the alliance.

These findings opens new areas for the future research. The major area to further this research may be the recent difficult relations of the West with Iran. Iran is insisting on continuity of developing its nuclear program and both the US and the EU and the other big states like Russia and China are getting nervous. On the issue of 'using force' the EU seems to get closer to the US in the case of Iran. At that point the question that whether they would again form a 'coalition of the willing' as in the Iraq War or act as 'NATO' becomes very important for the future of the institution. If NATO is not used as Iran is 'out-of-area', a research can be made about the possible future of NATO. If the war would be under the command of NATO, then the future of the EU's CFSP can be analysed at a time when NATO is so important.