

**EU DISUNITY VS. THE US HEGEMONY:  
DIFFERENT FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES OF THE EU MEMBERS  
ON THE EVE OF THE IRAQ WAR**

**AYŞİN ŞENER**

**AUGUST 2005**

**EU DISUNITY VS. THE US HEGEMONY:  
DIFFERENT FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES OF THE EU MEMBERS  
ON THE**

**EVE  
OF THE IRAQ WAR**

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
THE IZMIR UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS

BY

AYŞİN ŞENER

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE  
OF  
MASTER OF ART IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

August 2005

## **ABSTRACT**

**EU DISUNITY VS. THE US HEGEMONY:  
DIFFERENT FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES OF THE EU MEMBERS  
ON THE EVE OF THE IRAQ WAR**

**Şener, Aysin**

**European Studies Master Program, Department of International Relations and  
European Union**

**Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu**

**August 2005, 128 pages**

This thesis presents a multi-dimensional and comparative analysis of the global positions of the USA and the EU in the new world order. Firstly, it evaluates the changes in the world order in the post Cold War era from a neo-realist perspective, then emphasizes on the rise in the US power in the 1990s. It links the US preponderance and its superpower status with the concept of world hegemony, so, in order to make a detailed evaluation, it clarifies the concept of hegemony and the theory of hegemonic stability. Under the light of these concepts, this work discusses whether the changes in the US foreign policy in the post September 11 era include any hegemonic inclinations. Furthermore, it analysis the various stances of some major EU states on the changing nature of the US foreign policy. Due to the different national interests, the EU states could not adopt a common foreign policy during the Iraqi crisis. Therefore, this work argues whether the Iraqi crisis posed a fundamental challenge for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and evaluate the importance of having a common foreign policy for Europe in order to be accepted as a unified power that has a single voice in the world politics, like the

USA. Lastly, this work discusses the possibility of “the EU without a common foreign policy” to turn into a superpower that can challenge the hegemonic position of the USA in the near future.

**Keywords:** structural realism (neo-realism), hegemon, hegemony, hegemonic stability theory, National Security Strategy (NSS), Bush Doctrine, Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP).

## ÖZET

### AMERİKAN HEGEMONYASINA KARŞI AB'DEKİ AYRILIKLAR: AB DEVLETLERİNİN IRAK SAVAŞI'NDAKİ FARKLI DIŞ POLİTİKA YAKLAŞIMLARI

Şener, Aysin

Avrupa Çalışmaları Mastır Programı, Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Avrupa Birliği  
Bölümü

Danışman: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu

Ağustos 2005, 128 sayfa

Bu tez, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Avrupa Birliği'nin yeni dünya düzenindeki küresel konumlarına açıklık getiren çok boyutlu ve karşılaştırmalı bir analiz ortaya koymaktadır. Dünya düzeninde Soğuk Savaş sonrası oluşan değişiklikler neo-realist bir bakış açısıyla değerlendirildikten sonra, ABD'nin gücünde 1990'lardaki artışa değinilmektedir. Bu çalışma, Amerikanın üstünlüğünü ve süper güç konumunu, dünya hegemonyası kavramıyla ilişkilendirmekte ve detaylı bir değerlendirme yapabilmek adına, hegemonya kavramını ve hegemonik istikrar teorisini açıklamaktadır. Bu kavramlar ışığında, 11 Eylül sonrası dönemde ABD dış politikasında meydana gelen değişimlerin hegemonik yönelimler taşıyıp taşımadığı tartışılmaktadır. Ayrıca, ABD dış politikasındaki değişikliklere ve Amerika'nın Irak'a karşı savaş açma kararına karşı, önde gelen AB devletlerinin aldığı farklı tutumlar da analiz edilmektedir. Irak savaşına kadar olan süreçte, AB üyesi devletler, kendi çıkarlarını maksimize edecek stratejiler benimsemiş; birliğin çıkarlarına değil, kendi

ulusal çıkarlarına uygun tepkiler vermiştir. AB devletleri, kriz süresince ortak bir dış politika benimseyememiş, ABD'ye karşı olan tutumlarında birlik sağlayamamışlardır. Bu çalışmada; Irak krizinin AB'nin Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası'nda önemli bir travma yaratıp yaratmadığı irdelenmekte, AB'nin dünya siyasetinde, ABD gibi birleşik bir güç olarak kabul edilmesi için ortak bir dış politikaya sahip olmasının ne derece önemli olduğu üzerinde durulmaktadır. Son olarak, ortak bir dış politikası olmadan, AB'nin ABD karşısında dengeleyici bir unsur olabilme, ABD'nin hegemonik konumunu değiştirebilecek bir süper güce dönüşme olasılığı tartışılmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** neo-realizm, hegemon, hegemonya, hegemonik istikrar teorisi, Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi, Bush Doctrini, Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası.

*To my family...*

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

I express sincere appreciation to my supervisor Asst. Prof. Dr. Yücel Bozdağlıođlu for his guidance, comments and his endeavors throughout the research. I present my gratefulness to my mother Nurçin Şener for her endless support, my father İbrahim Şener for providing me the opportunity to get a masters degree, and my dearest sister Nevşin Şener for her ever smiling face. To the precious person in my life, Cem Mangırođlu, i thank him for his patience, his crisis management and his strong faith in me. Also, I want to thank to the other members of my family, espeacially to my grandmother and my aunt for sharing the most difficult moments of my life and also my friends Erkan Demir and Burcu Güler for their willingness to endure me.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract .....	iii
Özet .....	v
Acknowledgements .....	viii
Table of Contents .....	ix
List of Abbreviations.....	xi
List of Tables.....	xii
I. Introduction.....	1
II. Theoretical and historical overview .....	6
A. Changing World Order and the positions of the USA and Europe .....	6
B. The concept of Hegemony.....	15
C. Rising US power and the evolution of the US hegemony in the new world order .....	22
III. September 11 Attacks and the Changing Nature of the U.S. Foreign Policy in the post September 11 era .....	29
A. The U.S. Responses to the September 11 Attacks.....	31
1. First Step of the “war against terrorism”: The War in Afghanistan.....	32
2. National Security Strategy (NSS) of the USA.....	38
3. U.S-led War Against Iraq .....	49
3.1. Towards the War.....	50
3.2. The attack on Iraq .....	56
B. Evaluation .....	58
IV. The Disunity Among the EU Member States during the Iraqi crisis and the Failure in Adopting a Common European Foreign Policy .....	65
A. Different Threat Perceptions Between the EU and the U.S.A.....	66
B. Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) for the EU vis-a-vis the Iraqi Crisis .....	71

1. Brief History of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).....	71
2. Different foreign policy approaches of the EU members during the Iraqi crisis.....	76
2.1. French and German Axis .....	81
2.2. Pro-US European States in the Iraqi crisis.....	89
2.2.1. British Stance .....	89
2.2.2. Letter of Eight .....	91
2.2.3. The Choice of Central and East Europeans –The Vilinius 10 .....	92
3. CFSP and the Iraqi Crisis .....	94
 V. Can the EU become a potential candidate that might challenge the hegemonic position of the USA before having a common foreign policy?.....	98
 VI. Conclusion .....	113
Bibliography.....	120

### *List of Abbreviations*

CFSP	: Common Foreign and Security Policy.
ESDP	: European Security and Defense Policy.
GATT	: General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade.
IAEA	: International Atomic Energy Agency.
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Neo-cons	: Neo conservatives.
NSS	: National Security Strategy.
UNMOVIC	: United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission.
USSR	: United States of Socialist Republics.
WW II	: Second World War.
WMDs	: Weapons of Mass Destruction.

## *List of Tables*

Table 1: Comparative Threat Perceptions of the American and European Publics .....	68
Table 2: Public opinions and government positions in the Iraq crisis .....	78
Table 3: Populations of some major countries .....	100
Table 4: GDP of the EU-25 and the USA, in billions of euro, 2003 .....	100

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

The purposes of this thesis are to evaluate the European Union's stance on the hegemonic foreign policies of the U.S.A. in the first term of the Bush Administration with reference to the 2003 US-led war in Iraq and point out the incapability of the EU members to adopt a common foreign policy during the Iraqi crisis. This crisis revealed starkly the primacy of the national interests for the EU members rather than the Union's interest and demonstrated the continuing importance of realist understanding in international relations.

In realist view, distribution of power among states is the most important characteristic of an international system. Neo realists, who have adapted and refined realism, try to explain patterns of international events in terms of the system structure and the international distribution of power. Neo-realism is thus also called "structural realism." Structural realism is the product of Kenneth Waltz who believes that "the effects of the structure" must be considered because the structure of the international system is a major determinant of actor behaviour and shapes all foreign policy choices. Waltz thinks that international politics is "anarchical". It means that there is no central authority to enforce rules and norms or protect the interests of the larger global community. One of the core assumptions of neo-realists is that states are "self-interest" oriented and due to the anarchic structure of the international system, "self help" is necessarily the principle of action.

Power can be distributed in many ways within the international system and described in terms of polarity. It can be diffused among several states (multi polarity), spread between two equivalent states (bipolarity) or concentrated in the hands of one preponderant state (unipolarity). With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the structure of the international system radically changed, and this event fundamentally influenced today's world order. The collapse of the Soviet Union transformed the international system from "bipolarity" to "unipolarity", it removed the most serious source of organized state resistance to US power, changed the context of the world politics and gave the United States a degree of strategic advantage it had never had before. The United States remained alone in the world, as the sole super power.

On the other hand, with the end of the Cold War, Europe began to lose its strategic centrality and the "power gap" between the USA and Europe revealed. With the historic accomplishment of Maastricht Treaty in 1992, it was expected that Europe would be the next superpower, not only economically and politically but also militarily and a "unified Europe" would restore the global multipolarity that had been destroyed by the Cold War. But, although Europe succeeded in the economic and political realms, it could not fulfil the promise of restoring a truly multipolar world. Despite the hopes about establishing Europe as a global superpower, European military capabilities steadily fell behind those of the United States throughout the 1990s. The Balkan conflict at the beginning of the decade revealed European military incapacity and during 1990s it became clear that Europeans could not resolve the problems in their own continent themselves, without the help of the US.

With the demise of the Soviet system, it can be asserted that America's strength increased relative to the rest of the world and hegemonic inclinations of US foreign policy became more apparent. "Hegemony" means the holding by one state of a preponderance of power in the international system and a hegemon is the leader or leader state of a group of states. It is the state that has the capability to enforce the rules of the system, the will to do so, and a commitment to a system that is perceived as mutually beneficial to the major states. Some scholars believe in the necessity of a hegemonic state for the well functioning of the order. They developed a "theory of hegemony" called as "Hegemonic Stability Theory". The central idea behind hegemonic stability in international relations theory is that the world needs a single dominant state to create and enforce the rules (such as free trade) among the other states. They are are skeptical about the advantages of such a multipolarity and believe in a stability constructed under US hegemony.

After the WWII, the US assumed the responsibilities of a hegemon and espeacially, with the end of the Cold War, the United States became undoubtedly the most dominant power in the international system. During the 1990s, world witnessed the dominance of a single power, the USA.

But, in the early years of the new century, the single super power of the world was subjected to tragic terrorist attacks on its soil. After these attacks, there occurred significant changes in the US foreign policy. The USA began to ignore the reactions from the international community and the rules of international institutions that were once established with its initiative, therefore it had undoubtedly turned into a unilateral hegemonic power. The National Security Strategy (NSS) adopted by the

Bush Administration in the post-September 11 era insisted that when America's vital interests are at stake, it would act alone. It stated that the U.S. will never allow its military supremacy to be challenged as it was during the Cold War. American military dominance was accepted as the permanent operating strategy for the U.S. foreign affairs. The NSS, which was also called Bush Doctrine, outlined a new American posture in the world marked by strategic military “preemption” and “unilateralism”. The war in Iraq was the defining aspect of the Bush Doctrine many parts of which included hegemonic ambitions of the USA.

During the Iraqi crisis, the United States and each member of the EU acted consistent with their own national interests. So, the Iraqi crisis caused deep divisions in Europe, influenced the future of a cohesive European Foreign Policy and challenged the European unity. Different foreign policy preferences of the member states underlined the EU’s incoherence on foreign policy and its incapability to act as a unified political power in the world politics. Achieving the political unity among EU member states has a vital importance, because it constitutes the most important defect of the EU project which was expected to become the next superpower or the counterweight against the US.

This thesis starts with explaining the core assumptions of neo-realist view and making a brief overview about the historical developments of the post-Cold War era. Then, in order to evaluate the evolution of the post-Cold War US hegemony, the concept of hegemony and the theory of hegemonic stability will be clarified. Second chapter, will examine the developments in the post September 11 era and the important changes in the US foreign policy in the first term of the Bush



Administration by emphasizing the increasing hegemonic aspects of the US foreign policy and argue whether this new foreign policy approach is the continuation of the one that had prevailed since the end of the Cold War. The US responses to the September 11 attacks that includes a new National Security Strategy for the US and the US's "war against terrorism" campaign will all be evaluated in the context of global hegemony. Next chapter, will examine the failure of the EU states in adopting a common European foreign policy during the Iraqi crisis due to the disunity among the member states' foreign policy preferences. Last chapter will evaluate the importance of having a common European foreign policy for Europe in order to be accepted as a unified power that has a single voice in the world politics, like the USA. The global positions of the USA and the EU will be discussed by exploring the possibility of a "politically divided EU" to turn into a superpower that can challenge the hegemonic position of the USA in the near future.

## **II. Theoretical and Historical Overview**

The demise of the communist system in the 1990s emphasized the extent of US preponderance in the world politics. Despite the expectations that the American supremacy would disappear and trigger the emergence of a new multipolar post Cold War order, the USA began the 1990s as the world's sole global superpower.

This chapter will firstly evaluate the changes in the world order in the post Cold War era from a neo-realist perspective, the positions of the US and Europe in the new order, then, clarify the concept of hegemony and the theory of hegemonic stability in order to truly evaluate the evolution of US hegemony. The rise in the US power will also be discussed in comparison with that of Europe.

### **A. Changing World Order and the positions of the USA and Europe**

The most important characteristic of an international system in the view of many realists is the “distribution of power among states”.<sup>1</sup> Neo realists, who have adapted and refined realism, try to explain patterns of international events in terms of the system structure and the international distribution of power. Neorealism is thus also called “structural realism.”<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Goldstein, J.S. *International Relations*, Longman, 2003, p.97-98

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

Structural realism which is a version of classical realism was the product of Kenneth Waltz. He believes that “the effects of the structure” must be considered because the structure of the international system is a major determinant of actor behaviour and shapes all foreign policy choices. Waltz suggests that “there are only two ordering principles, “hierarchy” and “anarchy”. A hierarchical system is one where the units stand in a relationship to one another that is constitutionally and legally organized in terms of hierarchy of power. An anarchical system is one where no formal relations are present. There is no central authority to enforce rules and norms or protect the interests of the larger global community. Waltz thinks that the key difference between domestic and international orders lies in their structure; the domestic politics is “hierarchical”, international politics “anarchical”. In the domestic polity citizens do not have to defend themselves.<sup>3</sup> One of the core assumptions of neo-realists is that states are self-interest oriented, and an anarchic and competitive system pushes them to favor self-help over co-operative behaviour.<sup>4</sup> In an anarchic structure, “self help is necessarily the principle of action.”<sup>5</sup> Security can only be realized through “self-help” because in the international system, there is no higher authority to prevent the use of force. In any self help system, “units (states) worry about their survival and the worry conditions their behaviour.”<sup>6</sup> Whether or not by force, “each state plots the course it thinks will best serve its interests.”<sup>7</sup> Survival, in realist understanding, is the first priority for state leaders and at the top of the list of national interests.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> See, Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979

<sup>4</sup> Lamy, S. L. “Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism,” in Baylis and Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, pp.182-188, p.186

<sup>5</sup> Waltz (1979), p.111

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p.105

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p.113

<sup>8</sup> Dunne, T. and Schmidt, B.C., "Realism" in Smith and Baylis (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, pp. 141-161, p.158

According to Waltz, structure is defined by the ordering principle of the international system, which is “anarchy”, and “distribution of capabilities across units, which are states.” For Waltz states are “functionally undifferentiated” and anarchy forces all states to become “like units”.<sup>9</sup> Thus, states are differentiated in the system by their capabilities and not by their function. For neo-realists, power is more than the accumulation of military resources and the ability to use this power to coerce and control other states in the system. Waltz and other neo-realists see power as the combined capabilities of a state. Power gives a state a place or position in the international system and shapes the state’s behaviour.<sup>10</sup> Nye identifies power as possession of relatively large amounts of elements such as population, territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force and political stability.<sup>11</sup>

Neorealists explain any differences of states’ policies by differences in power and capabilities. They believe that all states experience the same constraints presented by the condition of anarchy, for example all of them need security to protect their national interests. But, they reacted to anarchy proportional to their power and capabilities. A powerful state and weaker state may select different policies in order to reach security. A smaller/weaker state may respond to anarchy by joining alliances and taking an activist role in international organizations while a powerful state prefers to pursue a unilateral strategy.<sup>12</sup> In the post September 11 era, the policy choices of some European states which have relative weakness and those of the USA which is accepted as the sole global power supports this understanding.

---

<sup>9</sup> Rengger.N.J., *International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order*, Routledge, London–New York, 2000, p.46

<sup>10</sup> Lamy, p.185

<sup>11</sup> Nye, J. S. , *The Paradox of American Power: Why the world’s only superpower can’t go it alone?*, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.4, 5

<sup>12</sup> Lamy, p. 186

Power can be distributed in many ways within the international system and described in terms of polarity which refers to the number of independent power centers in the system. Power can be diffused among several states, spread between two equivalent states or concentrated in the hands of one preponderant state.<sup>13</sup>

In a multipolar system, there are many centers of power, which are not grouped into alliances. Each state participates independently and on relatively equal terms with others. On the other hand, in a bipolar system, there are two predominant states or two great rival alliance blocs.<sup>14</sup> Cold War period can be the best example for a bipolar world. During the Cold War that started after the end of the World War II, power was spread between two centers and international political system was defined to be a “bipolar system, a system in which no third power is able to challenge the top two.”<sup>15</sup> In this bipolar world; world politics was defined by an ideological-military struggle between two centres of power controlled by two superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union. According to Waltz, “in the great power politics of multipolar worlds, who is danger to whom, and who can be accepted to deal with threats and problems are uncertain. But in bipolar worlds, who is danger to whom is never in doubt. Throughout the Cold War, the United States was the obsessing danger for the Soviet Union”.<sup>16</sup>

Until the 1990s, together with their allies, both the USA and the Soviet Union had shaped their security perceptions according to the military capacities of each other.

---

<sup>13</sup> Kegley, C.W. and Raymond G.A., “Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order”, *International Studies Perspectives*, 2003, Vol. 4, Issue 4, p.390

<sup>14</sup> Goldstein, p.98

<sup>15</sup> Keohane, R., *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press, 1986, p.94

<sup>16</sup> Waltz, p.170

Two super powers were supposed to deter each other from an attack on themselves and their allies through their possession of large stocks of nuclear weapons. The US and the Soviet Union “constrained each other” and the enormous power of nuclear weapons kept the Cold War from turning into a hot war between the two.<sup>17</sup> But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system witnessed radical changes which still has strong impacts on the today’s world order.

According to Michael Cox, the important changes in the international system in the 1990s affected the position of the United States and place it “at the pinnacle of the international system.”<sup>18</sup> He called this period of time “American renaissance”. The collapse of the Soviet system and the end of the Cold War, “transformed the European landscape, altered the whole shape of the international system, led to a profound reconfiguration of the geography of the world system, and changed the ideological ways in which politics were conducted and consequently, laid the foundation for US resurgence in the 1990s”.<sup>19</sup> With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the United States remained alone in the world and would no longer face a major threat to its security. The absence of serious threats to American security gave the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.<sup>20</sup> As Layne put it, “the Soviet Union’s collapse transformed the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity.”<sup>21</sup> A unipolar system has a single centre of power around which all others revolve.

---

<sup>17</sup> Leffler, M. P., “Cold War and Global Hegemony, 1945-1991”, *OAH Magazine of History*, March, 2005, p.69

<sup>18</sup> See Cox, M., “American power before and after 11 September: dizzy with success?”, *International Affairs* 78, 2002, pp.261-276, p.265

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Waltz (2000), p.29

<sup>21</sup> Layne, C., “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise”, *International Security*, Vol 17, No.4, Spring 2003, pp.5-51, p.5

However, in the light of structural theory, unipolarity is accepted as the least durable of international configurations because of two main reasons. One is that, dominant powers take on too many responsibilities beyond their own borders, thus, these tasks weaken them in the long run. The other reason for the short duration of unipolarity is that, even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. When states face with unbalanced power, they may either prefer trying to increase their own strength or ally with others to bring the international distribution of power into balance. Because unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is perceived as a potential danger by other states. As Waltz mentions, “concentrated power invites distrust and leads to reactions because it can so easily be misused.”<sup>22</sup>

Huntington says that the superpower or hegemon in a unipolar order, lacking any powers challenging it, is normally able to maintain its dominance over minor states for a long time until it is weakened by internal decay or by forces from outside the system.<sup>23</sup>

For neo-realists, like classical realists, the central mechanism for order in the system is “balance of power”. Unipolarity is the very state of affairs balance-of-power policies are supposed to prevent. Realists consider it a “law of nature in international politics that if one nation becomes too strong, others will team up to balance its power.”<sup>24</sup> On the classical realist understanding, “the balance of power is the only

---

<sup>22</sup> See, Waltz, K. “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, *International Security*, Vol.25, No.1, Summer 2000, pp.5–41, p.28, 29

<sup>23</sup> Huntington, S. P., “The Lonely Superpower: US military and cultural hegemony resented by other powers”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.78, Issue.2, March 1999, p.35

<sup>24</sup> Nye(2002), p.2

tool that can promote order”.<sup>25</sup> In *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau referred to the balance of power as a natural and inevitable outgrowth of power politics.<sup>26</sup> Similarly, Waltz argues that “balancing” is central to any anarchic system with functionally undifferentiated units. The balance of power holds that “if the survival of a state is threatened by a hegemonic state or coalition of stronger states, they should join forces, establish a formal alliance, and seek to preserve their own independence by checking the power of the opposing side.”<sup>27</sup>

For Waltz, states have only two alternatives in terms of general systemic behaviour: balancing against another state or states, or bandwagoning, which means going along with. He found “balancing is far the likelier option.”<sup>28</sup> According to him, bandwagoning may sometimes seem a less demanding and a more rewarding strategy than balancing, requiring less effort and extracting lower costs while promising concrete rewards.<sup>29</sup> However, it can not be ignored that, since states are rational actors in the realist understanding, they select strategies that maximize benefits and minimise loss.

According to Balance of Power theory, in the case of unipolarity, states seek to balance power, thus the preponderance of power in the hands of a single state will stimulate the rise of new great powers, and possibly coalitions of powers, determined to balance the dominant state.<sup>30</sup> As Layne put it, “in unipolar systems, states do

---

<sup>25</sup> Rengger, p.43

<sup>26</sup> See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and Peace*, Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1965, p.187

<sup>27</sup> Dunne and Schmidt, p.144

<sup>28</sup> Rengger, p.47

<sup>29</sup> Waltz (2000), p.38

<sup>30</sup> Mastanduno, p.54



indeed balance against the hegemon's unchecked power"<sup>31</sup> Because; left unbalanced, hegemonic power threatens the security of the other major states in the international system. According to Cristopher Layne, hegemons almost automatically cause universal resistance. He presumed that, in the first few decades of the twenty-first century, "U.S. primacy will likely be challenged, new great powers will emerge to offset U.S. power, and these new great powers will coalesce to check U.S. hegemonic ambitions."<sup>32</sup> The formation of the European Union and the creation of a common European currency after the end of the Cold War can undoubtedly be accepted as the most important move toward an "antihegemonic coalition against the dominant state"<sup>33</sup> which is the US. These developments in political and economic areas were considered as a "major challenge to the US and to the role of the dollar as the dominant reserve currency."<sup>34</sup>

But, when the position of Europe in the post Cold War period is examined; the *power gap* between the USA and Europe can easily be observed. During the Cold War; a weakened Europe served as the *central strategic theater* of the worldwide struggle between *communism* and *democratic capitalism*. Its sole but vital strategic mission was to defend its own territory against any Soviet offensive, at least until the Americans arrived. With the end of the Cold War, Europe began to loose its strategic centrality. It would no longer face the threat of a massive attack by conventional and nuclear weapons. But as the Balkan conflicts had shown, the EU was confronted by a range of risks which threatens Europe's stability. Since the Europeans did not want

---

<sup>31</sup> Layne(2003), p.13

<sup>32</sup> Layne, C., "Offshore Balancing Revisited", The Washington Quarterly, Vol.25, No.2, Spring 2002, p.238

<sup>33</sup> Huntington, p.5

<sup>34</sup> Nye, J. S.Jr., "The US and Europe: continental drift?", *International Affairs* Vol.76, No.1, 2000, p.53

the US to intervene in every regional crisis on the continent, they wished to take the lead and equip themselves with the tools needed to promote their common set of values and to defend their interest. These factors led the EU to lay down the foundations of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty of 1993.<sup>35</sup>

With the historic accomplishment of Maastricht Treaty in 1992, it was expected that “Europe would be the next superpower, not only economically and politically but also militarily and a unified Europe would restore the global multipolarity that had been destroyed by the Cold War”.<sup>36</sup> But; although Europe “produced miracles in the economic and political realms, it could not fulfil the promise of restoring a truly multipolar world.”<sup>37</sup> Despite the hopes about establishing Europe as a global superpower, European military capabilities steadily fell behind those of the United States throughout the 1990s. According to Kagan, “ the 1990s witnessed not the rise of the rise of a European superpower but the further decline of Europe into relative military weakness compared to the United States”. The Balkan conflict at the beginning of the decade revealed European military incapacity and political disarray; the 1999 Kosovo conflict, “exposed a transatlantic gap in military technology and ability to wage modern warfare”.<sup>38</sup> US intervention in Kosovo crystallized European “fears of U.S. hegemony”<sup>39</sup> and it underlined the need for greater independent European military capabilities. It prompted Europe to take serious steps to increase its military capabilities it needs to act independently of the United States.

---

<sup>35</sup> See European Commission official publication, *The European Union and the World*, Brussels, 2001.

<sup>36</sup> Kagan, R. , *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, Atlantic Books, London, 2003, p. 20

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. p.21

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.p.22

<sup>39</sup> Layne(2002), p.240

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) project was launched in the Cologne Summit of 1999. Although the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and launching of the ESDP were seen as important steps towards a separate European capacity to wield and project power that will diverge from that of the United States<sup>40</sup>, during 1990s, it became clear that Europeans could not resolve the problems in their own continent themselves, without the help of the US. According to Michael Cox, “the 1990s, tended to confirm US hegemony in Europe”<sup>41</sup>

It can be asserted that hegemonic position of the USA revealed, in some extent, in the aftermath of the World War II. However, the undeniable truth was that with the collapse of the Soviet empire, America’s strength increased relative to the rest of the world and hegemonic inclinations of US foreign policy became more apparent.

## **B. The concept of Hegemony**

Hegemonia, in the original Greek sense, means leadership. It means the holding by one state of a preponderance of power in the international system.<sup>42</sup> Hegemony is the influence a great power able to establish on other states in the system.

“To become hegemonic, a state would have to found and protect a world order which was universal in conception, *i.e.*, not an order in which one state directly exploits others but an order which most other states (or at least those within reach of the

---

<sup>40</sup> Nye, J.S.Jr., “The US and Europe: continental drift?”, *International Affairs*, Vol.76, No.1, 2000, p.51

<sup>41</sup> Cox (2002), p. 268

<sup>42</sup> Goldstein, p.99

hegemony) could find compatible with their interests. World hegemony is describable as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it simply cannot be one of these things but must be all three.”<sup>43</sup>

In order to perform the role of hegemon, a dominant state needs a number of different power resources. In addition to military power, it requires control over world economic resources like raw materials, capital, markets, and the hegemon's competitive advantage in the production of goods. The ability to shape other states' preferences and interest is also just as important as the hegemon's ability to command raw power resources.

According to Keohane, when a world system is dominated by one state, that state can be referred as a hegemon. “A combination of material resources and ideological appeal gives these countries extra ordinary influence.”<sup>44</sup> Hegemony denotes the overwhelming military, economic, and diplomatic preponderance of a single great power in international politics.<sup>45</sup> Hegemony is not self sufficient. It is a unique political relationship that exists between one large dominant state and other states within a given interstate system, which is itself the product of specific historical and political circumstances.

In international relations, a hegemon is the leader or leader state of a group of states.

It is the state that has the capability to enforce the rules of the system, the will to do

---

<sup>43</sup> Cox, R.W., “Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: An essay in method”, *Millennium* 12, 1983, pp.162-175 in Mark Beason, “The Rise of the ‘Neocons’ and the Evolution of American Foreign Policy”, University of Queensland, Asia Research Centre Working Paper No.107, August 2004.

<sup>44</sup> Keohane, R.O., “The United States and Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony?”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.28, No.4, 1991, p.438

<sup>45</sup> Layne(2002), p.233

so, and a commitment to a system that is perceived as mutually beneficial to the major states. In turn, capability rests upon three attributes; a large growing economy, dominance in leading technological or economic sectors and “political power” backed up by the “military power”.<sup>46</sup> Morgenthau identifies “political power as a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised”.<sup>47</sup> He thinks that “arm strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation.”<sup>48</sup>

Realist theories of hegemony argue that “order is a result of the concentration of material power capabilities in a single state, which uses its commanding position to create and maintain order”<sup>49</sup>

The scholars who believe in the necessity of a hegemonic state for the well functioning of the order, developed a *theory of hegemony* called as *Hegemonic Stability Theory*. This theory was developed in the 1970s and 1980s by American scholars who identified the distribution of power among states as a central factor in explaining the openness and stability of international economy.<sup>50</sup> This theory is a realist based explanation for cooperation that argues that a dominant state is necessary to ensure a liberal international economy and free trade.

---

<sup>46</sup> Krasner, S., “State Power and the Structure of International Trade”, *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1976, p.317-345

<sup>47</sup> Morgenthau, p. 29

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ikenberry J.G. , “Liberal Hegemony and the future of American postwar order” in T.V.Paul and John A. Hall (Eds.), *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.123

<sup>50</sup> Grunberg, I., “Exploring the Myth of Hegemonic Stability”, *International Organization* 44, Autumn 1990

The central idea behind hegemonic stability in international relations theory is that the world needs a single dominant state to create and enforce the rules (such as free trade) among the other states. The theory of hegemonic stability holds that “hegemony provides some order in international system, reducing anarchy, and provides some functions similar to a central government like deterring aggression, promoting free trade”.<sup>51</sup> So, hegemonic powers are believed to provide order and stability for the system.

According to hegemonic stability theory, hegemony provides both the ability and the motivation to maintain regimes that provide a stable political framework for free international trade. Although free trade or economic openness is not necessarily preferred by all states, it is strongly desired by the hegemon. The hegemon favors free trade and use its power to achieve free trade because, as the largest international trader, it has an inherent interest in the promotion of integrated world markets (where the hegemon will tend to dominate). The hegemon gains most from a smoothly functioning system. It does not fear competition with industries in other states, because it is the most advanced state in productivity and technology.<sup>52</sup> Thus, it is in favor of the hegemon to create and sustain a liberal international economy. For example; after the WWII, the US assumed the responsibilities of a hegemon because it was in its economic, political, strategic and ideological interest to do so.

This theory is classified as belonging in the realist tradition because of its focus on the importance of power structures in international politics. It says that regimes are most effective when power in the international system is most concentrated. On the

---

<sup>51</sup> Goldstein, p.100

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. p.122

other hand, the problem is that power alone cannot explain why some states choose to follow or acquiesce to one hegemon while others vigorously opposing and forming counter-alliances against it. Thus, when international relations theorists employ the concept of hegemonic stability, they supplement it with “the concept of legitimacy”.<sup>53</sup> Liberal hegemony heavily depends on the consent that comes from “acceptance of legitimacy of systemic leadership”.<sup>54</sup>

Legitimacy in international society refers simply to the perceived justice of international system. Hegemonies are prone to exploit their position for their own nationalistic ends but they have been most stable when they support their power with legitimacy. Hegemony without legitimacy is insufficient to deter violent challenges to the international order, and may provoke attempts to build counter-alliances against the hegemon. Hegemonic authority which accepts the principle of the independence of states and treats states with a relative degree of benevolence is more easily accepted.

“If a state achieves to make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes.”<sup>55</sup> If its culture and ideology are attractive and if it can establish international rules that are consistent with the society, other states more willingly follow the leading state. For example, Britain in the nineteenth century and America in the second half of the twentieth century increased their power by creating liberal international economic rules and institutions that were

---

<sup>53</sup> Goh, E., “Hegemonic Constraints”, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.57, No.1, 2003, pp.77-97

<sup>54</sup> Wallace, W. “Living with the Hegemon: European Dilemmas”, Social Science Research Council, available at [http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/wallace\\_text\\_only.htm](http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/wallace_text_only.htm)

<sup>55</sup> See Nye (2002), p.10

consistent with the liberal and democratic structures of British and American capitalism. Britain promoted free trade and established the gold standard, and America led to the establishment of many institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization.<sup>56</sup>

The “theory of hegemonic stability” claims that the presence of a single, strongly dominant actor in international politics leads to collectively desirable outcomes for all states in the international system. Conversely, the absence of a hegemon is associated with disorder in the world system and undesirable outcomes for individual states.<sup>57</sup>

When conditions specified in the theory of hegemonic stability apply, all states will welcome leadership and seek to take a *free ride* on it. In other circumstances, when power is distributed asymmetrically, but hegemony is exercised in ways that do not benefit all states, subordinate states will chafe under coercive leadership. While smaller powers will continue to support a declining hegemonic leader in the former case, in the latter case they will work to hasten its demise.<sup>58</sup>

The Theory of Hegemonic stability argues that an open market economy constitutes a collective or public good. Collective or public goods have two special characteristics. The first one is the *jointness of supply*. “Jointness requires that different states be able simultaneously to consume the same produced unit of a

---

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Duncan, S., “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory”, *International Organization* 39 (4), 1985, pp.579-614, p.579

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. p. 582



good”.<sup>59</sup> In other words, if a good is supplied to any member of a group then it is supplied to all members of that group; it also means that if new members are added to the group, the other members who also consume the good will not receive a diminished amount. For example, a sidewalk, or nuclear deterrence. The second key characteristic of public goods is *nonexclusiveness*. It concerns “the inability of members of a group of states to prevent noncontributors from benefiting from the collective good.”<sup>60</sup> For example, the US can not exclude any person in the US territory, who does not pay taxes from nuclear attack.

Costs imposed on subordinate states by the hegemon may exceed the benefits that those states receive from provision of the public good. By Gilpin’s logic, subordinate states will accept their exploitation as long as the costs of being exploited are less than the costs of overthrowing the hegemonic power.<sup>61</sup>

According to Gilpin, as long as a hegemon maintains a preponderance of power, other states are inclined to accept its leadership, since challenging a hegemon can be risky. However, it is not able to maintain its position indefinitely; dominance entails new and rising costs. So, there has always been shifts in power preponderance over time. Other states begin to rise in power, and the hegemon declines relatively or absolutely. When a rising power or powers sees an opportunity to challenge and displace an existing hegemon, the risk of major war is high. The hegemonic wars

---

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. p.590

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Gilpin, R., *War and Change in the World Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981

involve contests between declining dominant powers and ascending challengers that determine who will govern the system and how it will be governed.<sup>62</sup>

### **C. Rising US power and the evolution of US hegemony in the new world order**

In order to evaluate the U.S. post–Cold War hegemony, we should put the issue of U.S. hegemony in a broader perspective.

Great Britain during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century was one of the major historical examples of liberal hegemons. It was a global trading power, imperial power and had a profound interest in maintaining an open world economy based on free trade. But, Britain lost its position of hegemony in the early twentieth century when other powers began to rival and surpass it. British hegemony was undermined partly by its loss of markets, and of industrial and technological leadership, to Germany.<sup>63</sup>

In the aftermath of World War II, the US was revealed to be the most powerful country on the planet and American hegemony became undoubtedly clear. United States accepted “the burdens, along with the privileges of being a hegemonic power which means having both the willingness and the ability to make and maintain rules for world politics”.<sup>64</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p.186-210

<sup>63</sup> Wallace, “Living with the Hegemon: European Dilemmas”.

<sup>64</sup> Keohane, R. , “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics” in Robert Keohane(ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics*, Colombia, 1986, pp.1-25, p.9

Hegemony and credibility requires superior military capabilities<sup>65</sup> and America possessed huge military capabilities needed to deter enemies, control allies and preserve influence. Military power of the US constituted the most important pillar of US hegemony. Military expenditure of the US has always been far more than its allies.<sup>66</sup> In addition to military capabilities, power was also measured in economic, political or even cultural terms; and it can be said that, after the World War II (WW II), in all areas, “the US outstripped its rivals and began to dominate international affairs.”<sup>67</sup> The US after World War II was considered as a hegemon. Its ability and willingness to resume a role as hegemon, as after World War II, were important factors that would shape the world order.

After the World War II, the US took the lead in setting up new institutions of a reformed liberal world economy: the IMF, the World Bank, the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (the OECD). According to Ikenberry; there was an “ongoing trade-off at the heart of the American post war hegemonic order: the United States agreed to operate within an institutionalized political process and, in turn its partners agreed to be willing participants.”<sup>68</sup> The hegemonic state gives up some freedom on the use of its power in exchange for a durable and predictable order that safeguards its interests

---

<sup>65</sup> Leffler, p.69

<sup>66</sup> For detailed information, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database [http://first.sipri.org/non\\_first/result\\_milex.php?send](http://first.sipri.org/non_first/result_milex.php?send)

<sup>67</sup> Beason, M., “The Rise of the ‘Neocons’ and the Evolution of American Foreign Policy”, University of Queensland, Asia Research Centre Working Paper No.107, August 2004

<sup>68</sup> Ikenberry J.G., “Liberal Hegemony and the future of American postwar order” in TV. Paul and John A. Hall (Eds.), *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.130

in the future.<sup>69</sup> So, it was in the United States' own interest to restore the liberal world economy based on new institutions which it could largely control.

The system that the US created after WW II had functioned well because the connecting and restraining aspects of democracy and institutions had reduced the incentives for Western nations to engage in strategic rivalry or balance against US hegemony.<sup>70</sup>

The United States's preeminence had always been a well known fact since the end of the Second World War, even in the bipolar world of the Cold War. According to Melvyn Leffler, there was a "peculiar bipolarity"<sup>71</sup> during the Cold War years. He asserted that, although the U.S. and the Soviet Union emerged as the two strongest nations in the world and as exemplars of competing models of political economy at the end of World War II, the U.S. was incontestably the most powerful nation on the earth. It alone possessed the atomic bomb and a navy that could project power across the oceans and an air force that could reach across the continents. The U.S. was also the richest nation in the world. It possessed two-thirds of the world's gold reserves and three-fourths of its invested capital. Its gross national product was three times that of the Soviet Union. Its wealth had grown enormously during the war while the Soviet Union had been devastated by the occupation by Nazi Germany. Compared with the Soviet Union, the USA was stronger.<sup>72</sup>

---

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. p.131

<sup>70</sup> Griffiths, M., "Self-Inflicted Wounds – US Grand Strategy and the War on Terror", refereed paper presented to the Australian Political Studies Association Conference, September-October 2003, available at <http://www.utas.edu.au/government/APSAMGriffithsfinal.pdf>

<sup>71</sup> Leffler, p.66

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

The conventional wisdom was that with the demise of the Soviet empire, the bipolarity of the second half of the 20th century would yield to multipolarity. But this kind of presumptions was proved to be wrong. The collapse of the Soviet Union effectively removed “the most serious source of organized state resistance to US power”<sup>73</sup>, changed the context of the world politics and gave the United States a degree of strategic advantage it had never had before. This event “elevated the United States to a historically unprecedented position of primacy in international politics”.<sup>74</sup> The collapse of the Communist system and the US’s apparent economic renaissance during the 1990s consolidated its pre-eminent position and appeared to lock-in US dominance for the foreseeable future.<sup>75</sup> With the erasure of the USSR, there was no longer any countervailing force on earth capable of withstanding US military might<sup>76</sup> and the United States had become the “dominant power in the international system”.<sup>77</sup> The end of the Cold War emphasized the extent of US preponderance. Many scholars identified the post Cold War period the beginning of a “unipolar moment.”<sup>78</sup>

In the new order, the gap in power between the leading nation, the USA, and all the others was so unprecedented that it constituted a “unique international structure”: “unipolarity.”<sup>79</sup>

---

<sup>73</sup> Cox (2002), p.267

<sup>74</sup> Layne (2002), p.236

<sup>75</sup> Mark Beason, “The Rise of the ‘Neocons’ and the Evolution of American Foreign Policy”, University of Queensland, Asia Research Centre Working Paper No.107, August 2004.

<sup>76</sup> Anderson, P., “Force and Consent”, *New Left Review* 17, Sep-Oct.2002, p.7

<sup>77</sup> Mastanduno, M., “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War”, *International Security*, Vol.21, No.4, Spring 1997, p. 50

<sup>78</sup> Krauthammer, C. “The Unipolar Moment”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.70, No.1, Winter 1990-1991, pp. 23-33; Lane C., “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise”, *International Security*, Vol.17, No.4, Spring 1993, pp.5-51

<sup>79</sup> Krauthammer, C., “The Unipolar Moment Revisited”, *The National Interest* 70, Winter-2002/2003, p.5

During the 1990s, world witnessed the dominance of a single power. “Japan, whose claim to power rested exclusively on economics, went into economic decline. Germany stagnated. The Soviet Union ceased to exist, contracting into a weakened Russia. China grew in strength but it could not reach the capacity to challenge American primacy”.<sup>80</sup> And the European Union, “turned inward toward the great project of integration and built a strong social infrastructure at the expense of military capacity”.<sup>81</sup> It can be asserted that unipolarity accelerated throughout the 1990s.

Mastanduno argued that, after the Cold War, US officials have followed a consistent strategy in pursuit of a clear objective- the preservation of the United States’ preeminent global position.<sup>82</sup>

In the early 1990s, President George Bush had announced the beginning of a new world order organized under US hegemonic leadership and the reality was that; in this new order, “America would begin to intervene abroad more frequently than it had throughout most of the Cold War.”<sup>83</sup> This was a natural consequence of the collapse of the Soviet system which was the single adversary of the US. American military arsenal which was once sufficient to balance Soviet power can now be deployed in a unipolar world organized under US leadership. So, this made the United States more willing to use force abroad. US oversees military interventions began during the first Bush administration with the invasion of Panama in 1989, the

---

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., p.6

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Mastanduno, p. 51

<sup>83</sup> Cronin, B., “The Paradox of Hegemony”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.7 (1), 2001, pp.103-130, p.104

Persian Gulf War in 1991, and the humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992, and continued during the Clinton administration with interventions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosova.<sup>84</sup>

Robert Kagan and William Kristol wrote in 2000 that “today’s international system is built not around a balance of power but American hegemony.”<sup>85</sup> Huntington saw the United States as the sole state with preeminence in every domain of power-economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, technological, and cultural- with the reach and capabilities to promote its interests in virtually every part of the world.<sup>86</sup>

But in the early years of the new century, the United States was subjected to tragic terrorist attacks on Pentagon and the World Trade Center (WTC) which are the symbols of the US power. Although America had long been perceived as invulnerable, the events of September 11, and the subsequent *war on terror* provided a dramatic reminder of both the US’s continuing vulnerability, and about the extent of US unilateralism which is strongly related to the extent of US power. In the same way that the international struggle against communism led to an expansion of American influence in the aftermath of the World War II, the war against the new global enemy known as terrorism helped extend American power after September 11.<sup>87</sup>

---

<sup>84</sup> Kagan (2003), p.27

<sup>85</sup> Kagan, R. and Kristol, W., “The Present Danger”, *The National Interest*, No.59, Spring 2000

<sup>86</sup> Huntington(1999), p.35

<sup>87</sup> Cox (2002, April), p.272, see also, Lieven, A., “Fighting against terrorism: lessons from the Cold War”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief no.7, October 2002

After the terrorist attacks, there occurred significant changes in the US foreign policy. A *new grand strategy* advanced both as a response to terrorism and also in order to constitute a broader view about how the United States should wield power and organize world order. According to this new strategy, America would be less bound to its partners and to global rules and institutions. It would play a more unilateral role in attacking terrorist threats and confronting rogue states seeking WMD.<sup>88</sup> The United States would exercise its unrivaled military power in pursuit of its interests without the backing of the international community<sup>89</sup> and wield its power to manage the global order.

Next chapter will examine the developments in the post September 11 era, the important changes in the US foreign policy shaped under Bush Administration which is criticized for including some hegemonic inclinations and argue whether this new foreign policy approach of the US is the continuation of the one that had prevailed since the end of the Cold War.

---

<sup>88</sup> See Ikenberry G.J., "America's Imperial Ambition", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.81, No.5, 2002, pp.44-60, p.48

<sup>89</sup> Agnew, J., "American Hegemony Into American Empire? Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq", *Antipode*, Vol.35, Issue 5, p.873, November 2003



### **III. September 11 Attacks and the Changing Nature of U.S. Foreign Policy in the post September 11 era**

In this chapter, the main aspects of the U.S. foreign policy in the first term of the George W. Bush administration will be evaluated with reference to the important changes in the post September 11 era. After explaining the general perspectives of the responses of the today's super power to the terrorist attacks by emphasizing the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the USA (the Bush Doctrine) and the USA's war against terrorism; the reasons behind USA's decisiveness about attacking Iraq will be evaluated in the context of *global hegemony*.

On the day of September 11th, 2001; for the first time in history, the US homeland was subject to a direct terrorist attack. And with this terrorist attacks, Americans witnessed the deaths of thousands of their compatriots and they faced the reality that no amount of power could bring them either the security they sought, or the security they thought they had already acquired. The terrorist assaults on the US soil revealed a truth for Americans that "there were many people living out of the USA who not only did not share their world view but actually hated what the United States represented."<sup>90</sup>

---

<sup>90</sup> Cox (2002, April), p. 270

On 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the terrorist attacks against the United States, NATO declared that the attacks were considered to be an attack against all the 19 NATO member countries, and ; for the first time in NATO's history, the Allies invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that: *“an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”*.<sup>91</sup>

There are two different views about the new characteristics of the US foreign policy after 9/11 and what kind of world order and power structure would emerge from this moment. According to the first approach; the terrorist attacks were a critical turning point for the US foreign policy and for the world politics. Rahman claims that “it is now clear that September 11 fundamentally changed the nature of international relations and US foreign policy”<sup>92</sup>. Also, John Ikenberry claims that the extent of the change since 9:11 has been profound and dramatic.<sup>93</sup> On the other hand, second approach entails the idea that September 11 did not cause a dramatic change in US foreign policy and the hegemonic behavior of the United States can not be attributed

---

<sup>91</sup> NATO official website: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm#Art05>

<sup>92</sup> Rahman, S. 2002, Summer. “Another New World Order? Multilateralism in the Aftermath of September 11”, *Harvard International Review*, Summer 2002, available at <http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/953/>

<sup>93</sup> Ikenberry, J., ‘America’s Imperial Ambition’, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.81, No.5, Sep./Oct. 2002, pp.44-60

to the September 11 attacks. According to the second point of view, the responses of the US in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks were not showing a *new* policy inclination toward a hegemonic power; it was the collapse of the Soviet system that caused the US to emerge as the single super power.<sup>94</sup> Francis Fukuyama, for example, admitted that September 11 was a carnage on a grand scale, but this doesn't necessarily make it a "defining moment".<sup>95</sup>

In the new millenium, after the the tragedy of terrorist attacks, anti-communism which lasted during the Cold War has been replaced by anti-terrorism as a concept.<sup>96</sup> It was thought by the Bush administration that this replacement would provide the US with an additional rationale to use unilateral force and the opportunity to increase its military, political and economic expansion over the world which would also strengthen its hegemonic power.

### **A. The U.S. Responses to the September 11 Attacks**

It is a well known fact that, for decades, the US tolerated repressive governments throughout the Arab world/ Middle East as long as those governments sold oil at reasonable prices to the West, acted as strategic allies of the US, respected for US power and not threaten the Middle East regional order. But, in the long-term, with the terrorist attacks in 9/11, the disadvantages of such a policy surfaced. The US policy makers began to consider that the status quo in the Middle East was no longer

---

<sup>94</sup> Çakmak, C., "American Foreign Policy and September 11", *Perceptions*, Vol.8, No.1, March-May 2003, p.203.

<sup>95</sup> The Fukuyama comment about 9:11 in David Osborne, "The future ain't what it used to be", *Independent Review*, April 7, 2003, p.4

<sup>96</sup> Selfa, L. "Behind the Fog of Deception / Washington's real war aims", *International Socialist Review*, Nov./Dec., 2001, available at [http://www.isreview.org/issues/20/washingtons\\_aims.shtml](http://www.isreview.org/issues/20/washingtons_aims.shtml)

tolerable and the alienation, resentment, and hatred for the West in the Middle East, primarily caused by US policies, had fueled terrorism.<sup>97</sup>

These attacks had serious impact on Americans, on the US foreign policy and therefore, on the entire world. Of course, declaring a war against international terrorism was the predicted response of today's superpower. Although there are many people who thought that declaring such a war was not a very well chosen response and there were other solutions that might have been more appropriate; many people on the other hand, thought that the threat of the international terrorism can not be met with negotiation and compromise and the US, if necessary, should adopt more unilateral approaches which exclude the cooperation of international community. The latter approach which allowed a more independent policy making and included hegemonic inclinations were much more effective in the U.S Administration.

### **1. First Step of the “war against terrorism”: The War in Afghanistan**

Bush Administration perceived Afghanistan as a serious threat for its homeland security and also thought that the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was not only repressing its own people, but also it was threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and supplying terrorists. President Bush decided to strike Afghanistan firstly in the War on Terrorism. The war on terrorism was prompted by the climate of fear and anger following the terrorist attacks on the U.S. soil. Besides, protecting U.S interests was an effective factor while taking the decision of going to a war against

---

<sup>97</sup> Gordon-Shapiro, p.84

Afghanistan. Because all political decisions are set in order to obtain the maximum benefit and satisfaction, the American foreign policy pretended to formulate a *war against terrorism* so as to maximise its benefits.<sup>98</sup> In this regard, the defence of American economic and geopolitical interests worldwide was the main underlying reason of the American war against terrorism.

Under the theme of a “war on terrorism”, the US thought that it would emerge stronger, have a better position to influence world events. In order to be successful in such a war, it would have to increase its military and intelligence expenditure. By doing so, it would acquire the ability to impose leadership on allies and a stronger position to provide leadership in world politics. In that sense, fighting terrorism became apparently “the new grand cause underlying US foreign policy after 9/11.”<sup>99</sup>

Prior to the military action in Afghanistan, on September 18, 2001, the UN Security Council, with referring the UN Resolution 1333, issued a resolution directed towards the Taliban demanding that they hand over the terrorist Osama bin Laden and close all terrorist training camps immediately and unconditionally.<sup>100</sup> Then, in a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, US President George W. Bush delivered an ultimatum to the Taliban regime. He wanted the Taliban to deliver Al-Qaida leaders located in Afghanistan to the United States, to release all imprisoned foreign nationals, including American citizens, to protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in Afghanistan, to close terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and to

---

<sup>98</sup> Çakmak, p. 193

<sup>99</sup> Smith, S. “The End of the Unipolar Moment: September 11 and the Future of World Order” , available at [http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/smith\\_text\\_only.htm](http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/smith_text_only.htm)

<sup>100</sup> See United Nations Security Council Resolutions, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm>

give the US full access to terrorist training camps to verify their closure.<sup>101</sup> Also, President Bush stated that the demands were not open to negotiation or discussion. He was decisive about seizing terrorists' financial assets and disrupting their network.

Initially, the Taliban refused to speak to Bush, stated that any operation would be an insult to Islam but made statements through their Pakistan embassy. The Taliban regime demanded evidence of bin Laden's guilt in the September 11th attacks and offered to try him in an Islamic court. Later, as the likelihood of military action became more imminent, they offered to extradite bin Laden to a neutral country. The moderates within the Taliban worked out a lot in order to avoid retaliation from the United States but President Bush found the offers made by the Taliban insincere and rejected them.

The United States, with support from the United Kingdom, Australia and the Northern Alliance, invaded Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 as part of its *war on terrorism* campaign.<sup>102</sup> The short term goals of the military action included the capture of Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, the prevention of further attacks by al Qaeda, the end of Afghanistan's harboring of terrorists, their training camps and infrastructure, and the removal of Mullah Omar and the Taliban Regime. Long term goals include the end of terrorism, the deterrence of state sponsorship of terrorism, and the reintegration of Afghanistan into the international community. This mission and future missions would require a series of coalitions ready to take on the challenges and assume the risks of such an operation. But even some of America's

---

<sup>101</sup> Transcript of President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001 at <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/>

<sup>102</sup> The name of the military campaign, led by U.S. general Tommy Franks was "Operation Enduring Freedom". British military operations against Afghanistan were codenamed "Operation Veritas".

closest long time-allies took very strong stands against the US idea of preemption. The American decision to use force against Iraq was viewed as illegal and dangerous. The relatively small size and composition of the coalition reinforced the impression that the United States acted almost alone against the wishes of the international community. Of the 46 coalition partners, only the UK and Australia provided substantial numbers of troops.<sup>103</sup>

The Taliban condemned the attacks and called them *an attack on Islam* but the US government intended to justify these attacks as a response to the September 11 and the failure of the Taliban to meet any US demands. By mid-March 2002, Northern Alliance and US allies, supported by intense U.S. airstrikes, routed Taliban forces throughout Afghanistan. The Taliban had completely been removed from power and the Al Qaida network in Afghanistan had been destroyed.<sup>104</sup>

In January 29, 2002, after winning the war in Afghanistan, the President hinted at a new phase in the war on terror. *Axis of evil* which includes some countries like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea was denounced by President Bush. He warned that the United States would not “permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten the US with the world’s most destructive weapons.”<sup>105</sup> Then, President Bush’s speech in June 2002 at West Point which outlined the doctrine of military preemption, had made military action against Iraq more likely and more imminent. On the other hand, a growing domestic and international debate about whether to attack Iraq or about the need to get UN support for such an attack was continuing.

---

<sup>103</sup> Dombrovski, P. and Payne, R.A., “Global Debate and the Limits of the Bush Doctrine”, *International Studies Perspectives*, Issue 4, 2003, p.398

<sup>104</sup> <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/03/11/gen.six.months/index.html>

<sup>105</sup> George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address”, Washington, D.C., January 29,2002, at [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html)

Apart from the debates about the legitimacy of the US operations in Afghanistan, many analysts thought that the plans for an American intervention to Afghanistan were not formulated as a response to September 11 and such plans already existed prior to the terrorist attacks in the USA.<sup>106</sup> They questioned the linkage between the events of September 11 and the US operations in Afghanistan and claimed that the tragic terrorist attacks provided the US an opportunity to enter Afghanistan and to extend its project on the region that had already started months ago. According to this point of view, Afghanistan has a special geostrategic significance and the USA has significant political, military and economic reasons to try to turn Afghanistan into a base for American military operations in the region. The strategic importance of Afghanistan comes from its location spanning from South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East in which significant oil and natural gas reserves are located.<sup>107</sup>

The U.S. attack on Afghanistan would allow the U.S. to advance several long-standing geopolitical aims that were on the agenda since the end of the Cold War, one of which was strengthening the U.S. hegemony in the Middle East.<sup>108</sup> As discussed in the previous chapter, with the collapse of the socialist system, geopolitical and geoeconomic contexts of the world politics were radically transformed and in the absence of any other super power, the USA found itself the sole hegemonic power of the new world. In the new world in which the US enjoys a global dominance, the US was using its military might to shape the political and economic contexts of the world politics. It is argued that “the way the US exercised its hegemonic power in the world politics in relation to its military operations in

---

<sup>106</sup> See Gökay B. , “The Most Dangerous Game in The World: Oil,War, and US Global Hegemony”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol.1, No:2, Summer 2002 and also Çakmak C., “American Foreign Policy and September 11”, March-May 2003, *Perceptions*, Vol.8, No.1

<sup>107</sup> Gökay, p.48-49

<sup>108</sup> Selfa, “Behind the Fog of Deception / Washington's real war aims”.



Afghanistan was very much a continuation of a policy started at the end of the Cold War”<sup>109</sup> and “if history had not witnessed those terrible events, it was still likely that the US would have intervened in Afghanistan<sup>110</sup>. This argument based on the idea that the starting point of the American military response to Afghanistan is rooted in the new international environment created by the end of the Cold War. In the post Cold War era, the change in the world order in favor of the U.S.A led to a change in the U.S foreign policy. With the removal of the check of the Soviet power, U.S. made several overseas military and humanitarian interventions. (in Panama, Gulf Region, Somalia...)

The U.S military interventions after the end of the Cold War, and attacking on Afghanistan after the September 11 terrorist attacks were all signalling a change in the nature of the U.S foreign policy. However, the changing nature of the U.S foreign policy became more apparent and unquestionable, particularly after the release of the U.S.A’s new security doctrine which was prepared by the Bush Administration. The new national security strategy was a product of the new environment shaped by the fears of terrorism and the desires to maintain the U.S’s global power status.

---

<sup>109</sup> Gökay, p.50

<sup>110</sup> Ibid. p.48

## 2. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the Bush Administration

President Bush's speech at West Point, in June 2002, was the first indicator of a new period for the U.S. foreign policy. In his speech at West Point, Bush cited the realities of a new post-Cold War era and outlined a major shift in the USA's national security strategy -- from containment which was the U.S. strategic policy toward the Communist bloc for the duration of the Cold War to *preemption*. Bush's West Point speech also outlined a vision for a strong American leadership in the world, a leadership that would project America's power and influence. He said:

*" [O]ur security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives. For much of the last century, America's defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking. "Deterrence" -- the promise of massive retaliation against nations -- means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. "Containment" is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long."*<sup>111</sup>

On September 17, 2002, The National Security Strategy(NSS) of the United States of America was published by the Bush administration. This thirty eight page document,

---

<sup>111</sup> George W.Bush, West Point speech, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>

was the first document produced by the Bush administration outlining its comprehensive approach to national security and foreign affairs.

Many elements in the 2002 NSS document have a strong resemblance with recommendations presented in controversial *Defense Planning Guidance draft* which was written in 1992 under the first Bush administration. The draft which included an internal set of military guidelines, was prepared by Paul Wolfowitz who was the under secretary of defense. Wolfowitz's draft argued for a new military and political strategy in a post-Cold War world. It was said in the draft that containment was a relic of the Cold War. America should talk loudly, and use its military power to preempt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The document linked preemption to the problem of nuclear proliferation, asserted that the United States must be prepared to use force to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>112</sup> The document also stated that America should take “military steps to prevent the development or use of weapons of mass destruction, and those steps could include pre-empting an impending attack with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons”.<sup>113</sup> It was asserted in the document that the United States should be “postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated.”<sup>114</sup>

Apart from the resemblance in unilateral approaches or references to preemption, there was another resemblance between these two documents. It was the notion of American hegemony. In the draft of 1992, it was asserted that America’s political

---

<sup>112</sup> Kegley, C. W. and Raymond G. A. “Global Terrorism and Military Preemption: Policy Problems and Normative Perils”, *International Politics*, Vol.41, Issue.1, 2004, p.39

<sup>113</sup> Tyler, P. E., “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop A One-Superpower World”, *The New York Times*, March 8, 1992.

<sup>114</sup> Weisman, S.R., ‘Iraq War Entrenches Policy of Pre-Emption,’ *The New York Times*, March 23, 2003.

and military mission in the post-cold-war era would be to ensure that no rival superpower is allowed to emerge in Western Europe, Asia or the territories of the former Soviet Union. Wolfowitz wrote in the draft that “with the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States must act to prevent the rise of peer competitors in Europe and Asia”.<sup>115</sup> The document focused on a world dominated by one superpower and concept of benevolent domination by one power.<sup>116</sup> As a significant similarity, establishment of American hegemony or primacy was one of the most important pillars that constituted the Bush Doctrine.

After the leakage of the draft to the press, controversies increased in the public and Defense Planning Guidance draft disavowed by the first Bush administration.<sup>117</sup> The White House ordered Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to rewrite it. In the new draft there was no mention of preemption or U.S. willingness to act alone.

The strategy of Bush Administration represents both a degree of continuity in relation to earlier American strategies as well as some departures. In order to make a logical comparison of the security strategies, the previous example should be noted. When we analyse the President Bill Clinton’s 1999 National Security Strategy (NSS), as the predecessor of that of Bush administration, we see that it was composed more of a combination of non-proliferation efforts. The document focused on strengthening international nonproliferation regimes, as well as maintaining a strategic nuclear deterrent to dissuade enemy attacks on the United States or its

---

<sup>115</sup> Ikenberry, p.50

<sup>116</sup> Tyler, P. E., ‘U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop A One-Superpower World’, *The New York Times*, March 8, 1992

<sup>117</sup> Gaddis, J.L., “A Grand Strategy of Transformation”, *Foreign Policy*, 133, Nov./ Dec 2002, pp. 50–57, p.52.

allies. In addition to these nonproliferation efforts, President Clinton also focused heavily on *deterrence* as a means of providing security for the United States. The Clinton administration, like so many before it, believed that the best means of ensuring the security of the United States against WMD was through continuing *deterrence* and strengthening *multilateral nonproliferation regimes*.

According to Clinton, the strategic nuclear arsenal is a crucial element of U.S. *nonproliferation* and *deterrence* strategy:

*“[N]uclear weapons serve as a guarantee of our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons. The United States will continue to maintain a robust triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any potential adversaries who may have or seek access to nuclear forces –.”*<sup>118</sup>

On the other hand, George W. Bush’s approach was different from the deterrent strategies of Clinton and his predecessors. His doctrine had four basic elements. First of all, the doctrine based on a strong belief in the importance of a state’s domestic regime in determining its foreign policy and a related judgement that this is an opportune time to transform international politics. Secondly, it was believed that the great threats can be defeated only by drastically different and vigorous policies, most notably *preventive war*. Thirdly, there was a willingness to act *unilaterally* when necessary. Lastly, as both a cause and a summary of these beliefs, an overriding

---

<sup>118</sup> President Bill Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, the White House, December, 1999 at <http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/010400-press-release-on-national-security-strategy.htm>

sense that peace and stability require the United States to assert its primacy in world politics.<sup>119</sup> The new national security strategy of the United States has been described as bold, perhaps the most sweeping reformulation of US strategic thinking in over half a century, when the containment doctrine became the cornerstone of America's Cold War foreign policy.<sup>120</sup>

Spreading democracy constituted the first pillar of the Bush's security strategy. In order to spread democracy, the administration thought that they needed strong measures. According to the Bush administration's point of view, more democracies mean greater stability, peaceful relations with neighbours, and less terrorism. They believed the necessity of regime change, because, in their view, tyrannical governments will always be prone to disregard agreements and coerce their neighbours just as they mistreat their own citizens. Bush and his team were optimistic in seeing the possibility of progress. So, they believed that liberating Iraq would not only produce democracy there, but it will also encourage democracy in the rest of the Middle East. They thought that free Iraq can be an example of reform and progress to all the Middle East. Bush said in a November 2003 speech to the National Endowment for Democracy that "the establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution".<sup>121</sup> Iraq was expected to be "the catalyst of change".<sup>122</sup>

---

<sup>119</sup> Jervis, R., "Understanding the Bush Doctrine", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.118, No.3, 2003, p.365

<sup>120</sup> Gaddis, J.L. (2002, Nov./ Dec.), p.57

<sup>121</sup> Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html>

<sup>122</sup> Wright, R., "Iraq Occupation Erodes Bush Doctrine", *Washington Post*, June 28, 2004, page A01

In accordance with such ideas, Bush declared in a formal speech that: “I see a peaceful world beyond the war on terror, and with courage and unity, we are building world together.”<sup>123</sup> Bush also declared in March 2002 that: “we understand history has called us into action, and we are not going to miss that opportunity to make the world more peaceful and more free.”<sup>124</sup>

Second pillar of Bush doctrine was based on the idea that this was a time of great threat posed primarily by terrorists and rogue states and these threats can not be contained by deterrence. It is believed that *defense* may not be possible against terrorists or *rogues* because terrorists are fanatics and there is nothing that they value, so the United States must be ready to wage *preventive wars* and act against emerging threats before they are fully formed. President Bush cited the need for such a strategy due to the nature of the threats facing the United States in a strategic environment shaped by terrorism. The concept of preemption is a critical element of Bush’s strategy and it refers to “the use of military force in advance of a first use of force by the enemy”.<sup>125</sup> President Bush focuses on the broader concept of striking first to prevent the possibility of an imminent attack by the enemy which may occur over the long-term. The goal of this preventive/preemptive strategy was said to protect the United States and its allies from WMD attack by *rogue states* and terrorist organizations.

---

<sup>123</sup> “President Thanks World Coalition for Anti terrorism efforts” White House Press Release, 11 March 2002, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020311-1.html>

<sup>124</sup> “President, vice president Discuss the Middle East”, White House Press Release, 21 March 2002, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020321-6.html#>

<sup>125</sup> Arend A.C. , “ International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force”, *THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY*, Spring 2003, p. 89

Bush stated in the National Security Strategy: “*as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed..... History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.*” <sup>126</sup>

The adoption of the dangerous venture of preemption by the Bush administration as a security strategy was an unprecedented move by the United States, distancing the Bush administration’s national security policy from all before it. Rather than aiming to block enemy access to WMD and dissuading attacks through the threat of a retaliation, Bush would prefer seeking out and destroying suspected stores of enemy WMD before they can be used against the USA. Preventive war policy requires the ability to act alone militarily—a unilateral global offensive capability.<sup>127</sup>

It’s virtually self evident that the preventive war component of the Bush Doctrine and its application to Iraq, is a policy choice that entails great risks for the entire world as well as for the United States. There is neither an inherent limit nor an inherent rationale in its potential range of application. <sup>128</sup>

First of all, the sufficient information to launch a preventive war is hard to obtain because it involves predictions about threats that reside sometime in the future. Also, it is hard to understand the real intention of the possessor of WMD whether it will

---

<sup>126</sup> George W. Bush, West Point speech, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>

<sup>127</sup> Posen, B. R., “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony”, *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 5–46, p.44

<sup>128</sup> Leiss, W., “The risks of Policy Choices: The war in Iraq and the policy of preemption”, *Policy Options*, May 2003, p.44



use it against the United States or not. Just as the United States relied on its strategic nuclear arsenal to *deter* its potential enemies for so many years, so any other state may possess WMD to enhance its own security with a credible deterrent. Striking at such a state preemptively will only cause unnecessary conflict. So, any preemptive strategy carries the danger of damaging U.S. credibility.

Besides, the information on capabilities of the states is difficult to obtain. As the case of Iraq showed, the United States and Britain overestimated the extent of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. Saddam's links to terrorists are still not clear and remain subject to debate. So; this policy may be risky for international relations because some states may abuse the policy of preemption in order to reach their own foreign policy goals and gain economic, political benefits.

In the new security strategy, the US reserves the right to label unilaterally any nation in the world as rogue state. Any nation considered by the US to be a rogue state is at risk of having preemptive action taken against it.<sup>129</sup>

Thirdly, it seems that if all challengers are not deterred by the exercise of the doctrine in Iraq, preventive wars will have to be repeated by the other powerful actors in the system as other threats emerge.<sup>130</sup>

Finally, there is a risk that a unilateral preemptive action by the United States will set a precedent for other states to follow. This is perhaps the most dangerous consequence of preemptive U.S. action, because it opens the door for any powerful

---

<sup>129</sup> Leiss, p.44

<sup>130</sup> Jervis, p.371

state to unilaterally and preemptively target its enemies, possibly even with nuclear weapons. If other states act on the same rationale that the United States has proposed, and accept preventive military action as a legitimate response to potential threats, “a messy world would become a lot messier”.<sup>131</sup> As Ikenberry stated; “once the United States feels it can take such a course, nothing will stop other countries from doing the same.”<sup>132</sup>

Due to the difficulties and the ambiguity of the evidence for waging a preventive war, “national leaders generally hesitate to take strong actions in the face of such uncertainty”.<sup>133</sup> However, Bush and his team attempted to behave unusually in the war against terrorism because of their feeling of vulnerability and their belief that the risks and costs of inaction are unacceptably high. But, the lack of international support for the new US security strategy have made the practical application of Bush’s National Security Strategy difficult.

The perceived need for “preventive wars” is related with *unilateralism* which constitutes the third pillar of of the Bush doctrine. The new administration thought that the US should adopt more unilateral approaches, because the nature of the threats facing the United States in a world shaped by terrorism was thought to be quite different. President Bush stated in the graduation speech at West Point on June 1, 2002, that the USA “face a threat with no precedent”.<sup>134</sup>

---

<sup>131</sup> Keller, B., ‘Pre-emption’, *The NewYork Times Magazine*, December 15, 2002, p.115

<sup>132</sup> Ikenberry, G.J., “America’s Imperial Ambition”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.80, No.5, September/October 2002, pp.44–60, p.57

<sup>133</sup> Jervis, p.369

<sup>134</sup> George W.Bush, West Point speech available at [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3)

Unilateralism often requires an effective leadership. The American leadership of the Atlantic Alliance and the free world was proved after the disappearance of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.<sup>135</sup> In the first years of the new century, the United States began to have an increasingly unilateralist behaviour. Although there were many indicators that were signaling the start of a new political period shaped by more unilateral thoughts<sup>136</sup>, this kind of thoughts were not so effective until the terrorist attacks. With the tragedy of the attacks, the US started to behave in a highly unilateral fashion and assert its primacy. It can be asserted that Bush administration brought “a more unilateral outlook to the office than his predecessor, Clinton administration”.<sup>137</sup> The neo-conservative tendencies inherent in the new security strategy represented a marked change from previous foreign policy doctrines, and have given rise to serious questions about the role of America as the dominant power in a modern, globalized world.

Although President Bush explicitly stated that his strategy is a multilateral one focused on building new alliances and strengthening old ones, he also added: “*While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists*”<sup>138</sup> This unilateralist view

---

<sup>135</sup>Wallace W., ‘Living with the Hegemon: European Dilemmas’, at [http://www.sscr.org/sept11/essays/wallace\\_text\\_only.htm](http://www.sscr.org/sept11/essays/wallace_text_only.htm)

<sup>136</sup> For example; in January 2001, the US announced that it wouldn’t be sending the treaty establishing an International Criminal Court (ICC) to the Senate for ratification; in March, it abandoned the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; in July, it threatened to withdraw from a UN conference to impose limits on illegal trafficking of small arms and also, it rejected proposed enforcement measures for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

<sup>137</sup> Jervis, p.379

<sup>138</sup> President Bush speech in The National Cathedral, Washington, D.C., September 14, 2001, available at US Department of State web site: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/15423.htm>

completely undermined the President's assurances within the document that his strategy is a multilateral one.

The new security strategy clearly demonstrated that the Bush administration was determined to use unilateral force if it could not reach a consensus with its allies or obtain enough international support for a particular course of action. As Jervis put , “during the history; the degree to which the United States sought consensus and respected allied desires varied from issue to issue and president to president. Cooperation with allies had always been a matter of choice, not necessity.”<sup>139</sup>

Under the framework of the new security doctrine, the United States reserved the right to “discard the consent of international community as a prerequisite to its actions”<sup>140</sup> and to launch unilateral preemptive attacks against terrorist groups and so-called rogue states, either already in possession of weapons of mass destruction or potentially on the way to acquiring them.

Washington, especially after the victory in Afghanistan, advanced its vision of American unilateralism. Although assistance from others was needed in Iraq, the United States did not regulate its policy according to the preferences of others. In the US-led war against Iraq; the strong opposition of allies to a regime change in Iraq was perceived as an advantage as well as a disadvantage by Bush administration. Although it increased domestic costs and complicated the effort to rebuild Iraq, it also gave the United States an opportunity to demonstrate that it would override strong objections from allies, if this was necessary to reach its strategic aims. Also,

---

<sup>139</sup> Jervis, p.378

<sup>140</sup> Çakmak, p.202

although UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declared an American attack without Security Council endorsement would not be in conformity with the UN Charter; the administration did not give up in order to show how much serious Bush was about his doctrine and the degree of US decisiveness if its national interests are at stake.

The unilateral policies of the Bush Administration were considered as U.S efforts to increase its hegemonic position and as a result, caused serious reactions from the rest of the world. It can be argued that using *unilateral force*, or *preemption* requires “hegemony”.<sup>141</sup>

Establishment of American hegemony or primacy was the final element of the doctrine. The evolving hegemonic role of the US was not new. But, although the US has already been considered as a hegemonic power in the new world order, its hegemonic character was said to be confirmed by its reactions to the September 11. The political, diplomatic and decision making processes in the international arena after 9/11 can be accepted as the practical application of US’s hegemonic power.<sup>142</sup>

### **3. U.S-led War Against Iraq**

The United States began to emerge as the sole super power after the decline of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and by the time of the Bush Presidency, the U.S. had become the strongest power the world had ever known with a great ability to affect the developments around the world. What the terrorist events of September 11 provided was an additional rationale to the US administration for the unilateral action

---

<sup>141</sup> Gaddis, p.52

<sup>142</sup> Çakmak, p.193

and preemption to achieve its strategic aims in the Middle East and increase its political and military dominance over the globe. In this regard, the US-led war in Iraq was not seen by many people a war against terrorism or a war to liberate oppressed people, but a war which served the hegemonic desires of the US and also a part of a grand US strategy.

In this part of the chapter, the reasons of U.S decisiveness about launching a war against Iraq and the process toward the war will be discussed briefly. Different reactions of European states to the American *use of force against Iraq*, and the incapability of EU member states of adopting a common policy for the US-led preventive war against Iraq, will be discussed in the next chapter, in details.

### **3.1. Towards the War**

The Bush administration had offered three main reasons for launching a war against Iraq. Firstly , Iraq had developed and may possess weapons of mass destruction. It has a history of aggression against its neighbors, and has sponsored international terrorism. The administration argued that since Iraq might share such weapons with terrorists, only war could eliminate this threat to the United States.

Secondly, the U.S administration claimed that the Iraqi regime was a brutal dictatorship that had used its weapons against its own citizens. According to Washington, only war could ensure its removal and the installation of a new democratic state. Bringing democracy, they thought, would open a new era of democracy throughout the Middle East.

Third reason of the Bush team was the constant violation of the U.N. Security Council resolutions by Iraq. The administration said that since Iraq is now in violation of U.N Security Council Resolution 1441, recently passed, the United States would simply be enforcing international law by going to war to remove its regime.<sup>143</sup>

But, on the other hand, most credible observers were believing that Iraq has no prospect of developing nuclear weapons or delivery systems in the foreseeable future. Prior to the U.S. attack on Iraq, there had not been any proof that Iraq had offered non-conventional weapons to terrorists, nor was it likely to do so. In fact, Iraq was posing no credible threat to the United States, its vital interests or its allies.

Therefore, the motives for such a preemptive war must be evaluated carefully. In the first place, it can be said that the neo-conservative approaches that dominates most of the American bureaucracy were effective in the process towards the Iraq war. The neo-conservatives (neo-cons) have an aggressive, ideological vision of America's place in the world and their vision proposes a world hegemony for the United States. Neo-conservative discourse on American foreign policy, which outlines a world order, "based on unrivalled American military might and a cultivated belief in American exceptionalism."<sup>144</sup> Neo-cons thought that a preemptive strike on Iraq was necessary for preservation of US interests, implementation of the U.S. policies and it would demonstrate the USA's unchallengeable power.

---

<sup>143</sup> Klare, M.T., "The Coming War With Iraq: Deciphering the Bush Administration's Motives," *Foreign Policy In Focus*, January 16, 2003, p. 2.

<sup>144</sup> See, Ikenberry, G. J., "The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment", *Survival*, Vol.46, No.1, 2004, pp.7-22

Also, the ambition of gaining the control of the Middle East region and its strategic resources (oil) was believed to be an important underlying reason behind the US decisiveness about launching the war against Iraq. Because, overseeing the oil reserves in Iraq, and maybe soon, in other Gulf countries would enable the US to use oil as power.

Prior to the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, Saddam were controlling a country at the centre of the Gulf, a region with a quarter of world oil production in 2003, and containing more than 60% of the world's known reserves. With 115bn barrels of oil reserves, and perhaps as much again in the 90% of the country not yet explored, Iraq has capacity second only to Saudi Arabia. The US, in contrast, is the world's largest net importer of oil. In 2003, the US Department of Energy forecast that imports will cover 70% of domestic demand by 2025. By invading Iraq, Bush has taken over the Iraqi oil fields, and persuaded the UN to lift production limits imposed after the Kuwait war which led to an increase in the oil production.<sup>145</sup> The desire to control a large supply of oil was, of course, a significant motivation for the Iraqi war. But more importantly, “it would give the US an additional instrument of influence”.<sup>146</sup>

Finding WMD in Iraq, bringing democracy and stability to the Middle East by changing the Iraqi regime, were the seeming rationales for the US invasion of Iraq without the approval of the UN and despite the reactions of world public. What really driving the US to this war was to protect the American national interests, to increase its influence in the strategic regions of the Middle East, to show the world that a

---

<sup>145</sup> Chapman, J., “The real reasons Bush went to war”, *The Guardian*, July 28, 2004, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1270414,00.html>

<sup>146</sup> Jervis, p.381



global power can act unilaterally and preemptively if its security and prestige is at risk. So, as a part of a larger project, this war had a great importance for the USA.

In September 2002, some US and UK officials prepared a draft resolution including some tough and vigorous demands from Iraq. According to this draft resolution; Iraq had been in *material breach* of the obligations for years and it had failed to cooperate with UN weapons inspectors. With this draft, Iraq had to provide UN weapons inspectors with immediate and unrestricted access to any sites in Iraq and if Iraq failed to comply with the resolution, it would mean further *material breach* which would authorize members of the Security Council to use *all necessary means* to provide security.<sup>147</sup> France opposed the draft proposed by the US, arguing that the phrase *all necessary means* was too much ambiguous.

In order to reach a consensus, the US accepted to eliminate the sensitive phrase of *all necessary means* and France agreed to state in the resolution that the failure to comply with the resolution would have *serious consequences*. Also, it was agreed that in case of violations of the resolution, the Security Council would convene immediately in order to consider the situation. This formulation satisfied both sides because the French was thinking that Washington had agreed to ask for approval from Security Council before acting, while the US was thinking that no further vote would be required to enforce the resolution. The Americans found the reference to *serious consequences* in the event of Iraqi non compliance sufficient and argued that it gave them the right to act without further Council approval.

---

<sup>147</sup> Gordon P.H and Shapiro J. *Allies at War: America, Europe, and the crisis over Iraq*, McGraw-Hill, 2004, p.110

On November 8, *Resolution 1441* passed by a unanimous vote of 15-0. The final version of Resolution 1441 stated that Iraq “has been and remains in material breach” of previous resolutions and it required Iraq to submit a “currently accurate, full, and complete” declaration of all its chemical, biological, and nuclear programs and obliged Iraq to provide unconditional access to UN weapons inspectors. Resolution 1441 decided that: “[I]raq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations, in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA( *International Atomic Agency*)”. The resolution gave “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process.”<sup>148</sup>

But, in fact, the Resolution 1441, was not successful at reconciling different views about what to do about Iraq. In the French view, if members of the Security Council disagreed on the interpretation of the resolution, it would be up to the weapons inspectors, and the Security Council as a whole, to decide what to do. However, in the US view, Washington had all the authority it needed to take action.

On December 7, 2002, Iraq submitted its weapons declaration and denied the possession of any WMD programs or chemical and biological warfare materials. Americans considered this denial as a clear sign of noncompliance with the resolution and intended to use it as a justification for the war. Throughout December and January 2003, many French, German, and even British officials and many

---

<sup>148</sup>The UN official web site: <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm>

Europeans were still hoping that war could be avoided with sufficient cooperation by Iraq. But, the U.S. had already taken a step forward and started the U.S. military deployments to the region. In January 2003, President Bush announced that the United States was *ready* for a war.<sup>149</sup> “The accelerating American military deployment was interpreted across Europe as a sign of the growing inevitability of the war.”<sup>150</sup>

On the other hand; president Chirac was still insisting to support the use of force after an explicit decision by the Security Council based on a report prepared by weapons inspectors, not based on a U.S decision alone.

Since the resolution authorizing inspections was passed in October 2002, inspectors reported slow progress. Both Hans Blix, head of the UNMOVIC inspection team and Mohamed El-Baradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency insisted that they needed more time to continue inspections. Mohamed El-Baradei, head of the IAEA, claimed there was no evidence that Iraq possessed any nuclear capability. El Baradei informed on January 30, 2003, that, IAEA has “found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the program in the 1990s.”<sup>151</sup> Although Americans had long claimed that no second resolution was necessary to authorize war, a process with two resolutions was seen necessary, especially by France.<sup>152</sup> In the end, the US and the UK were not able to get agreement on a second UN resolution that would authorize the use of force. France and Russia threatened to veto any such resolution, while Germany also opposed it.

---

<sup>149</sup> Allen, M., “Bush Tells Troops: Prepare for War; ‘We are ready’, January 5, 2003, *Washington Post*

<sup>150</sup> Gordon-Shapiro, p.119

<sup>151</sup> Statement of John D. Negroponte, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, available at: <http://www.un.int/usa/03jdn0130.htm>

<sup>152</sup> Gordon-Shapiro, p.146

Nonetheless, US President Bush made a speech giving Iraq 48 hours to prove that it was disarming, and when they failed to comply. He announced on March 17, that “Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of USA’s choosing”.<sup>153</sup>

### **3.2. The Attack on Iraq**

After months of threats and a long military buildup, the United States attacked Iraq on Thursday, March 20, 2003. The war faced strong opposition from France, Germany, Russia, China and the great majority of UN member states as well as the world public opinion. Also; the US and the UK, with a military ground force of about 300,000, faced hard Iraqi resistance.

Before and during the war with Iraq, the American public expressed substantial doubts about going to war with Iraq. While many people assumed that Iraq probably had or was developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), most of them did not think the threat was imminent and wanted to give the UN inspectors more time to look for the weapons. Many Americans also had doubts about whether the US had the right to take action against Iraq without UN approval and wanted to take more time to build international support.

When US troops arrived in Iraq, American public clearly expected that they would find evidence that Iraq had been providing support to al-Qaeda, as well as weapons

---

<sup>153</sup> Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation, at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html>

of mass destruction or at least evidence of such programmes. But when the US failed to find such evidence, this created a serious tension in the *coalition of the willing* as well as in the world public. If the US had found any evidence of the production of WMD in Iraq, the USA's decision to go to war and overthrow the Iraqi government on the US initiative would have been vindicated as, to a certain extent, an act of selfdefense in the eyes of the world.

Initially, it was suggested by some scholars that terrorism would be the new unifying threat, serving as a foundation for great power harmony. For example, according to John Ikenberry, the impact of September 11 would push the United States "back toward a more centrist foreign policy that stresses alliances and multilateral cooperation and would lead to a cohesion among the great powers."<sup>154</sup> But such assessments was wrong. "The events of September 11 and their aftermath have done more to divide than to unite the international community."<sup>155</sup> Great powers could not reach a consensus about launching a war against Iraq.

A war with Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein would be the first test case in the Bush administration's larger strategy for projecting U.S. power and influence but the war created a deep humanitarian crisis in Iraq and a deep political crisis in the international system.

As the costs of the occupation and reconstruction mounted in terms of dollars and lives, and the prospects became clearer that the operation would likely to continue, questions about the decision to attack Iraq increased. Although "the clear link

---

<sup>154</sup> Ikenberry, G.J. "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror", *Survival*, 43:4, 2001/2002, pp.19-34

<sup>155</sup> Kupchan, C.A., "New Research Agenda? Yes. New Paradigm? No.", *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen*, 2004, p.105

between Taliban and Al-Qaeda won the United States widespread international support for the war in Afghanistan, the absence of a convincing link between Saddam Hussein and the events of September 11” deprived Washington of such support for the war in Iraq.<sup>156</sup> American practice of preventive war under the cloak of preemption undermined the institutional structures on which global governance is based. Before attacking Iraq, the USA ignored the fact that “disregarding the UN Charter restraints on the use of force would erode America’s reputation and squander its ability to exercise leadership on pressing global issues.”<sup>157</sup>

## **B. Evaluation**

There has been an underlying reality in the American responses to many political and economic crisis in the post- Soviet space and also in the “war on terrorism”, so far. Although these various wars and conflicts had regional dimensions, they were primarily the US responses to the challenges and opportunities opened by the collapse of Soviet system. All U.S. responses / interventions, were aiming to give the US an opportunity to “turn the strategic regions of the world into an American sphere of influence”<sup>158</sup>. It was again the case both in the U.S military intervention in Afghanistan and the US-led war against Iraq.

The real motive for America’s determination to intervene into Afghanistan was related to the U.S.’s geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in the region. U.S operation in Afghanistan was a part of an ongoing approach of the USA to global

---

<sup>156</sup> Kupchan, p.106

<sup>157</sup> Kegley and Raymond, p.47

<sup>158</sup> Gökay, p.63

order since the end of the bipolar world order and Bush administration was seeking a war in Afghanistan in order to achieve some global strategic goals. In other words; “American plans for military intervention to Afghanistan were not developed as a response to September 11. These plans existed before the terrorist attacks but what the attacks did was to give the US the opportunity to enlarge the scope of its plans and accelerate the implementation of them.”<sup>159</sup>

The attack on America on September 11 provided an additional incentive to the US administration to increase its dominance over the Middle East as well as to remind the world of America’s capacity for political-military control. In this regard, Bush doctrine can be accepted as *a doctrine of military dominance* through preemptive attacks. In the Bush Doctrine, there are no universal norms or rules governing all states, on the contrary, order can be maintained only if the dominant power behaves quite differently from the others. According to the Bush and his colleagues, “American security, world stability and the spread of liberalism require the United States to act in ways others can not and must not. This is not a double standard, but is what world order requires”.<sup>160</sup>

It is argued that the doctrine of dominance and preventive war inherent in the Bush administration’s *National Security Strategy* is reminiscent of the imperial mentality of the 19th century Europe, which contradicts with the principles of *freedom and liberty* upon which US nation was founded. “Beneath the discourses on liberation of the oppressed people and disarmament of the Iraqi regime, Anglo-American invasion

---

<sup>159</sup> Çakmak, p.193.

<sup>160</sup> Jervis, p.376

of Iraq included something akin to an imperial urge.”<sup>161</sup> According to John Ikenberry, the notions in the new strategy “form a neo-imperial vision in which the United States arrogates to itself the global role of setting standards, determining threats, using force.”<sup>162</sup>

The new doctrine included a fundamental commitment to maintaining a unipolar world in which the United States has no peer competitor. No coalition of great powers without the United States will be allowed to achieve hegemony.<sup>163</sup> The president called for an American hegemony in his speech in West Point in June 2002, he said "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge." <sup>164</sup>

As explained in the previous chapter, *hegemony* is a concept, meaning primacy or leadership and *hegemonic state* refers to the leading state in the international system or regional sub-system. While some of the realists are thinking that the US should rediscover the advantages of *classical balance of power system*, in which constantly shifting coalitions contained the ambitions of any aggressive power, most of them are skeptical about the advantages of such a multipolarity and believe in a stability constructed under US hegemony. The latter group thinks that “*war* was the crucial instrument of the *multipolar balance of power* and many regions of the world in history have seen stability under *hegemony*.”<sup>165</sup> According to this group, inequality of power in the international system can be a source of peace and stability while the efforts to maintain a balance have often led to war. But, if a powerful state takes the

---

<sup>161</sup> Adem, S. , “ Constructing a new imperial order?The War in Iraq and the Ideology of Clashism”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Realitions*, Vol.2, No.2, Summer 2003, p.9

<sup>162</sup> Ikenberry(2002,Sep./Oct.), p.44

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., p.47

<sup>164</sup> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>

<sup>165</sup> Nye.J.S., *The Paradox of American Power*, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.13-14



lead in the system, it will be meaningless for others to declare war against a dominant state.<sup>166</sup> For example, a realist political scientist Robert Gilpin claims that “Pax Americana, like the Pax Romana, ensured an international system of relative peace and security.”<sup>167</sup> Also, the economist Charles Kindleberger, argues that “for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer”.<sup>168</sup>

But, the inequality of power can be tolerable as long as the dominant state possesses soft power, respects the benefits of the other actors in the system. By doing so, it can prevent the emergence of counter-coalitions or new challengers. On the other hand, if the leading country fails to achieve such a policy, defines its national interests narrowly and uses its economic power and military might arrogantly and illegally, this will lead to the loss of its legitimacy and encourage the other actors to escape from its hegemonic umbrella. It can be asserted that, after the adoption of the Bush Doctrine shaped with the effects of the vulnerabilities of the terrorist attacks, the USA began to use all its military might and capabilities to protect its own national interests, to repair its prestige damaged by the attacks and to achieve its grand strategies designed to increase the U.S power and expand its sphere of influence.

Bush Doctrine, presented a bold and comprehensive reformulation of U.S. foreign policy. Under the pillars of the doctrine, the USA began to implement a more unilateralist foreign policy and ignore the opinions of other actors in the system. The tendency of the U.S foreign policy towards *unilateral force* was considered by many as a new tendency to become *a hegemonic power*. But, these people were ignoring

---

<sup>166</sup> Ibid. p.15

<sup>167</sup> Gilpin R.(1981) , p. 144

<sup>168</sup> Kindleberger C., *The World in Depression,1929-39*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973, p.305

one point. This tendency was not a completely new phenomenon in American foreign policy. Actually, international community has already been confirming the evolving hegemonic character of American foreign policy since the collapse of the communist system. Because, in the absence of the other superpower, the US had found itself the master of a new world and none of the regional powers of the world were likely to match the US military, economic and technologic power.<sup>169</sup> Although evolution of the US to a hegemonic power through more unilateralist policies was not a new phenomenon, it became much more disturbing for the world especially in the post-September era. According to Nye, the unilateralist policies of Bush administration caused a “decline in *the* USA’s soft power which is the ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S.policies and the values that underlie them”.<sup>170</sup> By attacking Iraq, the US acted against the court of world opinion and the attacks damaged its international legitimacy. In the eyes of the world public, “America’s benign hegemony is no longer so benign”.<sup>171</sup> When U.S policies lose their legitimacy in the eyes of others, distrust grows and this will reduce U.S leverage in international affairs.<sup>172</sup>

Under the light of the above arguments, preventive war component and the unilateralist perspectives of the Bush doctrine which are based on strength and the desire to ensure the maintenance of American dominance is strongly related with the concept of hegemony. The links between preventive war and the concept of hegemony has been mostly illuminated by the war against Saddam. The most

---

<sup>169</sup> Çakmak, p.203

<sup>170</sup> Nye, J.S.Jr., “The Decline of America’s Soft Power”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 83, No.3, May-June 2004, p.16

<sup>171</sup> Kupchan, C.A. ‘New World Order: Not Only One Will Win’, *Die Zeit*, May 22, 2003, available at [http://www.cfr.org/pub6005/charles\\_a\\_kupchan/new\\_world\\_order\\_not\\_only\\_one\\_will\\_win.php](http://www.cfr.org/pub6005/charles_a_kupchan/new_world_order_not_only_one_will_win.php)

<sup>172</sup> Nye(2004), p. 16

apparent feature of an hegemonic power is accepted to be the ability to act against an emerging power anywhere in the world which is believed to pose a threat to its national interests or its security. Since the U.S administration believed that Iraqi regime was threatening international security by its WMDs, despite the oppositions of the majority, acted preemptively to overthrow the Iraqi regime. The policy of preemption was at the heart of the Bush administrations rationale for waging war in Iraq<sup>173</sup>

The goal of this preventive/preemptive strategy was said to protect the United States and its allies from any attack with WMD by rogue states and terrorist organizations. However, this strategy asserts that preemption, along with the build-up of the U.S. military, will serve to dissuade future military competition, or maintain U.S. military dominance in the world. In other words, with the help of such a security strategy, the Bush administration would not only protect the United States from potential WMD attack, but also it would eliminate any future competitors seeking to challenge *U.S. dominance* on the world scene.

It can be said that, “under the Bush doctrine, the USA was no longer a *status quo power*. Its motives may be selfish, but the combination of power, fear and perceived opportunity is leading it to seek to reshape world politics and the societies of many of its members”.<sup>174</sup> What the Bush administration thought was that without strong American intervention, the international environment would become more dangerous for America, its values and interests. With strong action, the US could increase its security and produce a better world. In order to establish a safer and better world,

---

<sup>173</sup> Leiss, p.43

<sup>174</sup> Jervis, p.383

Bush administration argued, dictatorial regimes must be abolished or kept away from WMDs.<sup>175</sup> The war against Iraq was declared to be a continuation of such a strategy.

The message intended to be given to the international community with the Bush Doctrine was that the United States is the world's sole superpower and intends to maintain this status indefinitely. The US was aware of the fact that if any of its adversaries attempted to challenge US military supremacy, it would call into question the *US hegemony* in the world affairs. For the US, "the most effective way to enforce world domination is to use its military might. This has been the key understanding of the development of the global politics in the post Cold war order".<sup>176</sup> In the new order, America has always intended to increase its military strength, in order to prevent other countries from challenging its supremacy. By using force on behalf of others, America has desired to abolish their need to develop potent military establishments of their own.<sup>177</sup> Since the US has a wide range of political, military and economic instruments for controlling the global inter-state system; it always wanted to use its "military power in order to prevail over its rivals in the struggle for *resources and political hegemony*."<sup>178</sup> But, of course, strengthening the *global control* or being a *hegemon* is not just related to the scale and power of a state's military might. "Hegemony rests upon a range of resources like economic weight, financial commitments and the soft currency of hegemonic values, cultural influence and prestige."<sup>179</sup>

---

<sup>175</sup> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>

<sup>176</sup> Gökay, p.64

<sup>177</sup> Jervis, p.377

<sup>178</sup> Gökay, p. 60

<sup>179</sup> Wallace W., 'Living with the Hegemon: European Dilemmas', available at [http://www.sscr.org/sept11/essays/wallace\\_text\\_only.htm](http://www.sscr.org/sept11/essays/wallace_text_only.htm)

#### **IV. The Disunity Among the EU Member States in the Iraqi crisis and the Failure in Adopting a Common European Foreign Policy**

Due to the different global positions, different levels of vulnerabilities and threat perceptions, the USA and the EU showed different policy inclinations during the process toward the 2003 Iraq War. However, this critical process was not only a turning point for the US-European relations, but it had also a vital importance for the unity of the EU.

The main actors in Europe that had direct impact in the Iraqi crisis, and also in the process concerning the adoption of a common foreign policy toward Iraq were France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Conflicting national preferences of these actors prevented the implementation of a collective foreign policy.

Iraqi crisis revealed significant differences between the national interests of European countries. It showed that the attitudes of the EU states towards global problems vary across Europe and demonstrated the difficulty of adopting a common foreign policy in the Union as long as different national interests in foreign policies exist. So, after examining the differences in the threat perceptions between the USA and the EU, this chapter will, then, examine the history of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy briefly and evaluate the different responses from major European states to American foreign policy toward Iraq during the 2003 Iraqi crisis with

emphasizing the domestic contexts and international relationships that influenced them. It also examines whether the disunity among EU members' foreign policies revealed by the crisis affected the functioning of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

### **A. Different Threat Perceptions Between the EU and the U.S.A**

In order to examine the EU's approach to US policy implementations prior to the Iraq war and its stance on the US-led military intervention against Iraq, it is necessary to evaluate primarily the difference between the threat perceptions of both sides of the Atlantic.

It is clear that, after the terrorist attacks, a quite different conception of international relations has developed in Europe from the one in the United States. This is based fundamentally on a different perception of threats and, obviously, a different idea of how to deal with them<sup>180</sup> On the one hand, Americans felt vulnerable and insecure about the terrorist threat and believed that they were involved in a new kind of war. Europeans, on the other hand, did not see things that way; they did not regard it as a war and therefore did not believe in the necessity of a serious military response.

In the case of Iraq, the most apparent cause of divergence in viewpoints might be that the September 11 terrorist attacks took place not in Europe but in the United States. Also, Europeans never really believed that they could be the next target. They

---

<sup>180</sup> "Democracies facing terrorism", Document 9225, Report of the Political Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe, Rapporteur: Mr Terry Davis. Recommendation 1534 adopted by the Assembly of the Council of Europe on 26 September 2001, <http://www.assembly.coe.int>

believed that “they could be secondary targets, not the primary, because they no longer play the imperial role in the Middle East that might be engendered the same antagonism against them as is aimed at the U.S.”<sup>181</sup>

The attacks had a huge psychological impact on a population that had long held a notion of territorial invulnerability. “Due to their long history of relative invulnerability- a product of friendly neighbours and protective oceans- and unprecedented relative power in the world, Americans have developed a much lower tolerance for vulnerability than their European counterparts.”<sup>182</sup>

Since 11 September 2001, Americans perceive the threats related to international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and WMD proliferation far more dramatically than Europeans. An opinion poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and German Marshall Fund of the United States (See Table 1) points out that Americans perceive that a whole range of international issues are serious threats for them, with the exception of global warming. On the other hand, Europeans do not manifest the same anxiety.

---

<sup>181</sup> Kagan(2003), *Paradise & Power*, p.36

<sup>182</sup> Gordon, P.H., “ Iraq: the Transatlantic Debate”, Occasional Papers No.39, the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, p.15

**Table 1: Comparative Threat Perceptions of the American and European Publics**

<b><u>Types of threat</u></b>	US %	Europe %	Difference in public opinion
International terrorism	91	64	27
Iraq developing WMD	86	57	29
Ar ab- Israil Conflict	67	42	25
Islamic Fundamentalism	61	47	14
Immigration	60	37	23
China as a world power	56	18	38
Gloabal Warming	46	49	-3
Political Turmoil in Russia	27	14	13

*Sources: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations/German Marshal Fund of the US (2002), "Comparing American & European Public Opinion on Foreign Policy", Worldviews Survey 2002, p. 9, September, CCFR/GMF, Chicago.*

After the terrorist attacks, Americans feared that terrorists might plan further massive attacks, that may include the use of WMDs. The U.S government thought that terrorism is "existential threat that must be prevented at any cost".<sup>183</sup>

Also, it is argued that Americans and Europeans had different political approaches. It means, while the United States regards terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and rogue states as a danger to homeland security and an overriding priority of international policy, Europeans believe that terrorism is undoubtedly a threat, but no less is poverty, pandemics, a rising birth rate, problems of sustained development,

---

<sup>183</sup> Ortega, M., "Iraq: A European Point of View", Occasional Paper, No.40, EU Institute of Security Studies, Paris, 2002, p.10



climatic change, all of which can give rise to instability or cause regional problems, to the same extent at least as terrorism.<sup>184</sup>

According to Robert Kagan, differing perceptions of threats and how to address them are only the surface manifestation of more fundamental differences in the worldviews of a strong United States and a relatively weaker Europe. He argues that the main problem between these two actors is not just the disunity about a specific issue, like Iraq but, they do not share a same view of how the world should be governed, about the role of international institutions and international law, about the balance between the use of force and the use of diplomacy in international affairs.<sup>185</sup> He also asserts that strong powers naturally view the world differently, they define security differently, and they have different levels of tolerance for insecurity. Those with great military power are more likely to consider force a useful tool of international relations than those who have less military power.<sup>186</sup>

Consistent with the above arguments; following the 11 September 2001 attacks, Europe gave priority to diplomacy and dialogue, while the United States chose force as its first preference. For Europeans, a military solution is not always the most effective against every kind of threat. Furthermore “the US tendency to see everything in terms of black and white, of *Good* and *Evil* and insisting everyone take sides *for* or *against* the United States has dismayed most of its Allies . The effect of

---

<sup>184</sup> “Europe and the new United States national security strategy”, Document A/1819, Report: Political Committee, Rapporteur: Mr de Puig, adopted by the Assembly Of Western European Union, Forty-Ninth Session, 4 June 2003, p.13

<sup>185</sup> Kagan (2003), p.37

<sup>186</sup> Ibid. p.27

this type of attitude is to deny the latter any independent room for manoeuvre in keeping with their own views and national and European interests.”<sup>187</sup>

It can be said that, long standing differences in American and European perceptions and strategic culture split the two sides of the Atlantic on the Iraq issue.<sup>188</sup>

Overwhelming majorities within many European countries felt that American policy toward Iraq and the Middle East in general was based “mainly on its own interests”.<sup>189</sup> European public opinion across the continent wondered why the United States was planning to go to war against Iraq just as it was finally welcoming weapons inspectors, but doing little about North Korea. Many countries in Europe feared that a world dominated by the United States would be the one in which their values and interests would be served only at American sufference.<sup>190</sup> Therefore, they rejected the American way for resolution of the Iraqi conflict. Although many Europeans believed that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant, the majority thought that the war against Saddam was not justified. The reasons for it were not clear, the death and destruction it caused was not proportionate, and moreover it did not have UN backing. In the eyes of some governments and many ordinary citizens it is clear that the war was illegal, unlawful and unjust.<sup>191</sup>

---

<sup>187</sup> “Europe and the new United States national security strategy”, p.15

<sup>188</sup> For the differences in American and European strategic culture, see Robert Kagan’s “Power and Weakness” at <http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html>; Philip Gordon’s “Bridging the Atlantic Divide”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.82, No.1, Jan/Feb 2003.

<sup>189</sup> Clyner, A. “European Poll Faults U.S. for its Policy in the Mid East”, *New York Times*, 19 April, 2002

<sup>190</sup> Jervis, p.384

<sup>191</sup> “Europe and the war in Iraq” Document 9768, Report: Political Affairs Committee, Rapporteur: Mr Andreas Gross. Recommendation 1603 adopted by the Assembly of the Council of Europe, 3 April, 2003, available at <http://www.assembly.coe.int>

As discussed in the previous chapter, U.S policy makers found it more advantageous for the U.S. to link September 11 and rogue states, particularly Iraq. But many Europeans did not agree with the logic of linking both.

In conclusion, the United States made an assessment of the Iraqi threat that was not shared by many Europeans. While the US government believed, preferred to believe, that the Iraqi regime, and its WMD, represented a direct and imminent threat to the US national security and was one linked with terrorism, many European states think that Iraqi WMD, however dangerous, can be contained. So, in order not to lose the control over the issue, Europeans (with some exceptions) declared that a UNSC resolution authorising the use of force against Iraq was necessary. For the United States, conversely, the Security Council's blessing was not indispensable because they contended that they are acting in self-defence.<sup>192</sup>

## **B. Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) for the EU vis-a-vis the Iraqi Crisis.**

### **1. Brief History of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)**

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) became a reality only when the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (Treaty on European Union) came into force at the end of 1993. What became the CFSP at Maastricht had up to then been European Political Cooperation (EPC) which was the precursor to the CFSP.

---

<sup>192</sup> “CFSP Confronting Iraq”, Institute Note, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 3 March 2003

At the beginning of the 1960s, though negotiations were conducted on the basis of two Fouchet plans which envisaged closer political cooperation, a union of states and common foreign and defence policies. But the member states could not reach an agreement on the proposals of the Fouchet Committee. Then, in order to find ways of moving forward on the political level, a report known as the “Davignon report” was presented in 1970 at Luxembourg Summit. The process of EPC launched by the Luxembourg Report of the foreign ministers of the six European states who decided on the need for intensified political cooperation and the mechanisms for harmonising their views on international affairs.<sup>193</sup> This was a turning point for EPC which gradually developed in time.

In 1986, the Single European Act not only created the Single Market, but also it also gave the EPC a treaty base. The provisions introduced by the Single European Act established an institutional basis for EPC. However, EPC remained a loose form of cooperation between Member States in the field of foreign policy. It provided a consultation mechanism for foreign policy matters.<sup>194</sup>

Despite their apparent enthusiasm for the notion of a truly common foreign and security policy, for long years, EU member states have not been ready to subsume their statehood into a European state.<sup>195</sup>

The major catalysts in launching the foreign and security policy debate among the Member States were the world events taking place prior to and during the Maastricht

---

<sup>193</sup> Crowe, p.533

<sup>194</sup> Açıkmеше, p.122

<sup>195</sup> Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H., *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe*, London and New York: Routledge Press, 1998, p. 42

Treaty negotiations. One of them was the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the United States guaranteed the collective security of Europe through NATO. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, it was feared that the US might reduce its commitment to European defence. Other important factors were the resulting security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany. The Gulf crisis and the war in Yugoslavia added urgency to the whole process. Therefore, the need for a coherent, common foreign policy among the EU countries to the outside world emerged.

Because foreign, security and defence policies are very sensitive sectors, political integration has been slower and harder to achieve. Member States are generally reluctant to surrender their sovereign rights to the European level. It was not until the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 that the Common Foreign and Security Policy was created within the treaty structure. The Title V of Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty on European Union) made the CFSP second pillar of the Community, which includes cooperation, peacekeeping, democracy as a foreign policy; and disarmament and financial aspects of defense as a security policy. Article 1 of Title V, stated that “the Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations”.<sup>196</sup> Moreover, Maastricht Treaty provides the CFSP with the following key instruments:

---

<sup>196</sup> Title V of the Treaty on European Union, available at <http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entr2f.htm#16>

- common positions, which require the Member States to implement national policies that comply with the position defined by the Union on a particular issue. One example of coordination can be found in the fight against the illicit traffic in diamonds, as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts which are centred on countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola;
- joint actions, which are operational actions by the Member States under the auspices of the CFSP. One example is the support for the Palestinian Authority in its efforts to counter terrorist activities emanating from its territories.<sup>197</sup>

Another important step to strengthen the Union's CFSP was the Amsterdam Treaty which entered into force in May 1999. Amsterdam Treaty strengthened the CFSP in several ways. First of all, it introduced a new policy instrument called "common strategy", aimed at creating long term perspective on CFSP.<sup>198</sup> Then, qualified majority vote (QMV) would also be used to implement CFSP decisions but unanimity was still the considered as the general principle. The treaty, also, established the "High Representative (HR) of the CFSP" and created the "Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit" to help the HR-CFSP. This unit established in the General Secretariat of the Council under the responsibility of its Secretary-General.<sup>199</sup> The appointment of a High Representative for the CFSP was an

---

<sup>197</sup> See, <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00001.htm>

<sup>198</sup> An early and notable common strategy was the "Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia of June 1999".

<sup>199</sup> For detailed information about Amsterdam Treaty, see Sir William Nicoll, Trevor C. Salmon, *Understanding the European Union*, Longman press, 2001, p.366, for full text of the Amsterdam Treaty see, EU Official Journal C 340, 10 November, 1997, available at <http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/lex/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html>

important decision in terms of improving the effectiveness and profile of the Union's foreign policy.<sup>200</sup>

Since the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty and as a result of the Kosova crisis in 1999, which the Union could not implement an active policy, European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) developed rapidly. Because, Kosova crisis revealed the shortcomings of Europe's existing national and collective military capabilities and underlined the need for a European strategic defence policy.<sup>201</sup>

Successive European Council summits, like Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, Nice, Laeken and Copenhagen led to significant progress toward a European defense policy. The aim was to create capacity for autonomous action and the readiness to respond international crisis.

With the Cologne Summit in 1999, Europeans committed themselves to a common defence policy for the first time, with the declaration of a capability for autonomous military action and formal launching of the ESDP project.<sup>202</sup> In December 1999, at the Helsinki European Council, the Union decided to establish a *Headline Goal* which created a multi-national Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of 50.000-60.000 men who should be deployed within sixty days and sustained for at least a year by the member states. The aim of the RRF was to demonstrate the Petersberg Tasks which were the tasks declared by the WEU countries' foreign and defense ministers and included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat

---

<sup>200</sup> The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) site of the Council of the European Union [http://ue.eu.int/cms3\\_fo/showPage.asp?id=248&lang=en&mode=g](http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=248&lang=en&mode=g)

<sup>201</sup> *The European Union and the World*, European Commission official publication, 2001, Brussels, p.34

<sup>202</sup> Açıkmеше, p.128

forces in crisis management, including peacemaking<sup>203</sup> After Helsinki Summit, Feira Summit of June 2000 established a European Security and Intelligence Force (ESIF) which consists of 5.000 police officers deployable in two months in the crisis regions.<sup>204</sup>

The Treaty of Nice, agreed by the Heads of State or Government at the Nice European Council on 11 December 2000 and signed on 26 February 2001, entered into force on 1 February 2003 contained new CFSP provisions. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) and its role in crisis management were established. It notably increased the areas which fall under qualified majority voting.<sup>205</sup>

One of the objectives of CFSP was declared to be “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union”<sup>206</sup> but the developments in the world politics prior to the US-led Iraq war of 2003, seriously damaged the EU’s CFSP project.

## **2. Different Foreign Policy Approaches of the EU Members to the Iraqi Crisis Due to the Different National Interests.**

After the United States was attacked by terrorists on September 11, its European allies were among the first nations to express sympathy. On 14 September 2001, a joint declaration about the terrorist attacks in which European leaders demonstrated

---

<sup>203</sup> Yorkan, A., “European Union Security and Defense Policy after September 11”, *Journal of International Studies*, Vol.3, No. 2, Winter 2004, p.15

<sup>204</sup> [http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/6\\_1\\_3\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/6_1_3_en.htm)

<sup>205</sup> The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) site of the Council of the European Union [http://ue.eu.int/cms3\\_fo/showPage.asp?id=248&lang=en&mode=g](http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=248&lang=en&mode=g)

<sup>206</sup> European Parliament Fact Sheets, “Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the WEU”, available at [http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/6\\_1\\_3\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/6_1_3_en.htm)



strong signs of transatlantic solidarity was adopted by the EU.<sup>207</sup> The EU stated its solidarity with and willingness to support the US and Europeans largely agreed with the initial response of the US towards the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Al Qaeda. But, as time passed and as the scope of the new U.S foreign policy revealed and as the US appears to be degrading the rules and institutions of international community, the “sympathy and goodwill generated around the world for the United States after September 11 quickly disappeared”<sup>208</sup> and distrust toward America increased. When the American plans for a war against Saddam Hussein began to take shape, it caused immense damage to transatlantic relations and to the image of America in Europe.

Confronted with a United States determined to act against Iraq anyway, the Europeans took two different stances. Some, like the UK, Italy, Denmark, Spain (until the change of government in 2004), and also many central and eastern European countries opted for following the US political leadership. On the other hand; others, like France, Germany, Belgium, preferred to oppose the United States. Upholding either their interests or international principles and values, or both, were possible explanations of those countries’ attitudes.

It is notable, that the leaders of the UK, Italy and Spain took their stance against the direction of much public opinion in their countries. Then, the Spanish leader lost the election in 2004, and the premierships of Blair and Berlusconi were significantly

---

<sup>207</sup> For the full text of the declaration see, ‘Joint Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the European Union, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission and High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, 14 September 2001, [www.eurunion.org/partner/EUUSTerror/JtEUDeclaration.htm](http://www.eurunion.org/partner/EUUSTerror/JtEUDeclaration.htm)

<sup>208</sup> Ikenberry, J. (2002, Sep. /Oct.), p.60

damaged by their support for the United States.<sup>209</sup> In order to clarify the political preferences in the EU-15 during the Iraq crisis, the table below will be useful.

**Table 2: Public opinions and government positions in the Iraq crisis**

EU member states	Public Opinion (in%)	Government positions
Austria	strongly against war	opposed
Belgium	against war	mildly opposed
Denmark	79 against war	support for US
Finland	-	opposed to war
France	Against war	strongly opposed to war
Germany	Against war	strongly opposed to war
Greece	-	EU Presidency holder
Ireland	-	rather opposed
Italy	60-70 against war	Support for US
Luxemburg	-	strongly opposed to war
Netherlands	-	Mild support
Portugal	72 against war	Support for US
Spain	80-85 against war	Strong US support
Sweden	75-80 against war	not participate
United Kingdom	55-70 against war	Support for US

Source: Maciej Wilga, “Common Foreign and Security Policy and its member states vis-à-vis the Iraq crisis”, prepared for the ongoing PhD seminar series of the Political Science Department, University of Southern Denmark, 15th December, 2004, p.15

<sup>209</sup> Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, “ ‘International community’ after Iraq”, *International Affairs*, Vol.81, pp.31-52, 2005, p.45

Europe divided publicly over the war against Iraq and the Bush Administration was accused of dividing Europe during this critical process.<sup>210</sup> Some Europeans blamed the US for the sharp lines of divergences that emerged between the Europeans during the crisis. As De Puig mentioned in his article:

“The United States, in its dual role as sole superpower and as a friend/ ally, often puts pressure on European governments individually to obtain their support, which tends to encourage division between Europeans.”<sup>211</sup>

The Iraqi crisis was a case in point. The U.S preferred the disunity among the EU members rather than a collective opposition of the EU. It was perfectly rational for the United States to treat the member states of the EU as separate actors.<sup>212</sup>

The reality was that Europeans could not come up with a single policy for the Iraqi problem so the vision of a divided EU in terms of common foreign policy became more apparent with the Iraqi crisis. On the one side *new Europe*- Britain, Italy, Spain, several smaller EU countries and most of the Eastern Europeans- opted for following the US leadership whereas *old Europe*- France and Germany, supported by several smaller EU members- rejected the American policies.<sup>213</sup> It means that, with this crisis, in addition to transatlantic differences, a boundary line between European

---

<sup>210</sup> See the note of the Institute for Security Studies of the EU on the seminar ‘CFSP Confronting Iraq’, Paris, 3 March 2003, available at [www.iss-eu.org/activ/content/rep03-le.pdf](http://www.iss-eu.org/activ/content/rep03-le.pdf)

<sup>211</sup> Puig, L.M., “Europa contra la Guerra – Europa como instrumento de paz en un mundo multipolar”, Fundación Compalans, Barcelona, 2002, pp.20-22

<sup>212</sup> Raab, C., “The consequences of the Iraq crisis on the European Security and Defence Policy”, EU Policy Network, available at <http://www.europeananalysis.org.uk/research/raab1.pdf>

<sup>213</sup> Açıkmeşe, S.A., “The Underlying Dynamics of the European Security and Defence Policy”, *Perceptions*, Vol.9, No.1, March-May 2004, p.133

states has emerged with respect to basic strategic issues. The latter split has been called a division between *old* and *new* Europe.<sup>214</sup>

US intervention against Iraq drove a “temporary wedge in the EU between UK-Spain-Italy and most eastern European states versus the Franco-German-Belgium core.”<sup>215</sup> Iraq was an issue which involved taking positions on the choice between war and peace, the legitimacy of military action, democratic control, the nature of the transatlantic relationship, the viability and future of the UN, stability in the whole Middle East region.<sup>216</sup>

Different foreign policy priorities and different national interests of the EU member states completely surfaced on the way toward the war. Due to the differences in national interests, European states adopted different approaches toward the U.S. policies and Iraq problem. The Iraq war and the very controversial positions, in London, Rome and Madrid on one side, and on the other in Paris and Berlin, have “unmasked ten years of talking about an alleged communal foreign and security policy as a years-long babble without real content”<sup>217</sup> According to Johannes Varwick;

---

<sup>214</sup> Fedorov, Y. E., “ ‘Old’ And ‘New’ Europe: A View From Russia”, European Security Forum Working Paper, No.14, October 2003, p.4

<sup>215</sup> Hall Gardner, ‘The Iraq crisis and its impact on the future of EU-US relations: an American view’, 2003, [http://www.cicerofoundation.org/pdf/gardner\\_iraq.pdf](http://www.cicerofoundation.org/pdf/gardner_iraq.pdf)

<sup>216</sup> Crowe, B., “A Common Foreign Policy After Iraq?”, *International Affairs*, 79:3, 2003, p.535

<sup>217</sup> Wood, S. “The Iraq War: Five European Roles”, National Europe Centre, Paper No. 112, presented at the National Europe Centre, 13 June 2003, p.15

“...even for traditionally integration-ready states like Germany, national autonomy obviously comes before European unity. States like Great Britain, Germany or France are only European if the situation is in accord with their national interests.”<sup>218</sup>

The crisis proved that national preferences continue to predominate in external policies and defence matters. It demonstrated that some attributes of the *realist IR model* are not, in practice, yet obsolete: states are predominant; perceptions of national interests are still primary; power politics and tenuous alliances (like Russian proposals for a Eurasian Union to counter the USA) and international anarchy are present.<sup>219</sup> The divisions among Europeans produced by the war occurred for a variety of reasons. These internal divisions over Iraq, were much more related with the attitudes of different EU states toward the United States than the views of what to do about Iraq.

## **2.1. French and German Axis**

France and Germany both presented a common front in the Iraq crisis. French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder expressed strong reluctance to take part in a war against Iraq.<sup>220</sup>

In the wake of the Iraqi crisis in 2003, France and Germany reclaimed their European leadership position in the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty of 1963. Elysée treaty was an agreement between Charles de Gaullle and Kondrad

---

<sup>218</sup> Varwick, J. “Warum Spricht Europa außenpolitisch nicht mit einer Stimme?” *Gesellschaft-Wirtschaft-Politik* 51:4 2002, pp. 401-407

<sup>219</sup> Wood, “The Iraq War: Five European Roles”, p.2

<sup>220</sup> Ortega, p.8

Adenauer to promote Franco- German friendship and foreign policy unity. France and Germany had built a solid partnership inside the European Union. In the post-World War II period, both countries decided to balance their opposing economic and political interests by pushing for European integration. The post-war deal between both countries was renewed and deepened with the Maastricht Treaty and the foundation of a Political Union and the Economic and Monetary Union.

The “friendship between Germany and France is not based on similar interests, but on a voluntaristic decision to push ahead with European integration”.<sup>221</sup> It can be said that this friendship has served both countries’ domestic as well as foreign policy interests. In the 40th anniversary of Elysée treaty, the leaders of France and Germany reemphasized on the special role of France and Germany as the motor of European integration. The political declaration adopted at the Paris summit signaled the overhaul and deepening of the Franco-German relationship. Accompanied by concrete measures of cooperation, it would demonstrate the role of the two countries as the engine of Europe.<sup>222</sup> Also, France and Germany said they would work together in the Security Council to try to prevent a war on Iraq.

After the terrorist attacks in September 11, France was among the other European countries that expressed genuine sympathy to America. France pressed for a UN resolution in support of the US; and agreed to invoke Article V of the NATO treaty. Like other European states France expected that the US would return to the

---

<sup>221</sup> Ebertowski, M., “The European Common Foreign And Security Policy in the Wake Of The Iraq Crisis”, Heinrich Böll Foundation EU Regional Office report, Brussels, May 2004, p.2, available at [http://www.fluesse-verbinden.net/download/beyond\\_the\\_great\\_divideEN.pdf](http://www.fluesse-verbinden.net/download/beyond_the_great_divideEN.pdf)

<sup>222</sup> France Ministry of Foreign Affairs:  
<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.GB.asp?ART=31173>

multilateralist fold after 9/11 and became increasingly worried at Washington's determination to opt for a unilateral approach. From the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States through the Iraq war of 2003 until today, "France has pressed the United States to confront emerging crises within a multilateral framework. France normally wishes to legitimize actions ranging from economic sanctions to political censure to military action in the UN."<sup>223</sup> It believed the necessity of the UN approval for the military intervention and opposed the idea of a military intervention against Iraq, especially when decided unilaterally by the U.S.

Its "operational pattern is to resist anything that impinges on its understanding of its own national interest". It is argued that, France has direct national interests in Iraq -- oil, defense and other markets. "France and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have already signed multi-billion oil contracts with the Iraqi government". These contracts might not be honoured if the US invades Iraq and takes control of the Iraqi oil fields. It is therefore in the French national interest to resist.<sup>224</sup> However, from an other point of view, the explanation for French policy which suggest that it was driven primarily by commercial interests is a false premise. According to this idea, while France once had significant trading relationships with Iraq, by the early 2000s the 12 years of sanctions on that country had reduced business interests to a minimum. From 1997 through 2002, French exports to Iraq averaged \$388 million per year, which is less than 0.3 percent of overall exports. French imports from Iraq during

---

<sup>223</sup> Gallis, P., "France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations", Congressional Research Service RL32464, Report for Congress, January 10, 2005.

<sup>224</sup> See, Alan Bell, "British and European Perspectives on the War on Terrorism", March 13, 2003, available at [http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/British\\_EU\\_perspectives.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/British_EU_perspectives.htm))

that period averaged around \$850 million, or 0.2 percent of overall imports.<sup>225</sup> These were not levels likely to have a major impact on French foreign policy.

The role of Jacques Chirac in the French policy making during the Iraq crisis can not be ignored but it must be kept in mind that “ French policy was motivated not only by preferences on Iraq directly but by a reservoir of resentment at the American hyperpower, present to some degree in all parties.”<sup>226</sup> France has traditionally adopted a sceptical approach towards America and it has always “rejected the hegemonic tendencies of Washington, arguing for a multipolar world in which Europe would be a counterweight to the US.”<sup>227</sup>

Jacques Chirac considers himself to be the contemporary *heir of the Gaullist legacy*. The most important feature of Gaullism is the deep belief in a specific historical role of France. In Gaullist view, France is not just a country, but it stands out among the other sovereign nations. France is *a country with a mission*. For De Gaulle, the nation-states which are led by self interest and act on the basis of geopolitical interests must have an independent foreign policy.<sup>228</sup> French Gaullists, like the United States, believe that France has a special role in the world. They have been highly assertive in seeking to spread French values throughout the world. As a contemporary version of a Gaullist politician, President Chirac has altered the

---

<sup>225</sup> Gordon-Shapiro, p.77

<sup>226</sup> Wood, “The Iraq War: Five European Roles”, p.6

<sup>227</sup> Cameron, F., “How Europe views America”, *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations*, Vol.51, Issue 2, 2005, pp.83-95, p.91

<sup>228</sup> The term “Gaullist” originated during Charles de Gaulle’s presidency (1958-1969). President Chirac was a founder of the Gaullist Party, once known as the Rally for the Republic. Gaullists have traditionally believed in a strong national voice and an independent foreign policy for France, and that France must play a central role in shaping Europe and in influencing world affairs. For more information about Gaullism, see Marcel H. Van Herpen, “Chirac’s Gaullism- Why France Has Become The Driving Force Behind an Autonomous European Defence Policy”, *The Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 1, May 2004, pp. 67-81



traditional Gaullist view that France could act alone as a global power and be the Union's most important member. Rather, today, the Gaullists believe that France can best exert its power through the EU, acting in tandem with Germany.<sup>229</sup>

France administrated by Chirac, whose political elites and public are still affected by Gaullist views, was anxious about "the possibility that a successful war in Iraq would strengthen the American position in global geopolitics to the prejudice of French international interests."<sup>230</sup>

France used the UN quite effectively as a political and public relations instrument. In any case, France insisted, only the UN Security Council could authorize the use of force, and according to the Resolution 1441, only a report by the inspectors could serve as a trigger for action by the Council.

France decided an anti-war/ anti-USA course, in order to both follow and appeal to public opinion in France and to present France as leader of the "peace camp".<sup>231</sup> Behaving in such a fashion, was completely consistent with its own national interests. France wanted to build a concert of nations in which its national sovereignty is guaranteed and its right to pursue its national interests is recognized. It resisted US policies vigorously, sought to build coalitions with other nations in order to limit USA's global power. More important, France understood that the U.S. occupation of Iraq would shift the global balance of power even more in favor of the US.

---

<sup>229</sup> "France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations", p.15

<sup>230</sup> Federov, p.6-7

<sup>231</sup> Wood, p.6

By the beginning of 2003, Paris still argued that the conditions for using force in Iraq had not yet been met. France was seen in the United States and the United Kingdom as the main barrier to UN Security Council support for a second UN resolution that would have explicitly permitted the use of force.

In an interview with Jacques Chirac on March 10, he explained ‘France’s opposition to war in Iraq in terms of its desire to live in a multipolar world’. It was an answer that irritated many Americans, because they saw in it the confirmation that ‘challenging American hegemony was the true driver behind French policy’.<sup>232</sup>

It can be asserted that the most fundamental shift in European attitudes towards America has occurred in Germany. During the Cold War, it was unthinkable for a German Chancellor to criticize Washington. Germany's role was often to try and mediate between Paris and Washington. But with the end of the Cold War and especially with the election of Gerhard Schroeder in 1998, Germany started not to look automatically to Washington for guidance and approval for its policies.<sup>233</sup>

German views about the necessity and the legality of a war against Iraq was similar with that of French. In July-September 2002 the international debate on what to do about Saddam coincided with a national election campaign in Germany. “In the midst of an electoral campaign which finds him in an uncomfortable position, Schroeder decided to bring Iraq into the election debate, moving away from the US

---

<sup>232</sup> Gordon-Shapiro, p.152

<sup>233</sup> Cameron, p. 92

stance”.<sup>234</sup> German-American relations started to deteriorate when the leader of Germany saw an advantage in running an election campaign against the United States. Schroeder won the 2002 election partly on an anti-US platform, pledging that Germany would never participate in any invasion of Iraq. “The negative attitude in Germany towards the British and American intervention in Iraq was mostly the result of Germany’s domestic political situation, and the dependence of the German social-democratic government upon an anti-American and antiwar sentiment typical of a left-wing European political mindset.”<sup>235</sup> It is claimed that if the war against Saddam had occurred a year earlier or later and not coincided with a national election, the Iraq scenario may well have been different for Germany.<sup>236</sup>

In the speech launching the Social Democratic Party’s electoral campaign in Hanover (August 5, 2002), the German Chancellor declared: “Pressure on Saddam Hussein: yes. But I can only warn against playing games with war and military intervention. That won't be done with us”.<sup>237</sup> He also said in a speech: “German troops will not take part in military action in or against Iraq”<sup>238</sup>.

In February 2003 Germany took over the presidency of the UN Security Council<sup>239</sup>, which could be “the main forum for it to stress its preferences: the primacy of

---

<sup>234</sup> Dassù, M., “ Iraq – If Or When?” – “How To Deal With Iraq: European Perceptions”, European Security Forum Working Paper No. 9, November 2002, p.2

<sup>235</sup> Federov, p. 6-7

<sup>236</sup> Wood, p.10

<sup>237</sup> Dassù, p.2

<sup>238</sup> Policy statement by Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in the German Bundestag on the international situation, Berlin, April 3, 2003, available at <http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/speeches/040303.htm>

<sup>239</sup> See [http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol\\_UN\\_02\\_03\\_review.html](http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_UN_02_03_review.html), for history of UN and Germany relations see [http://www.german-embassy.org.uk/germany\\_at\\_the\\_un.html](http://www.german-embassy.org.uk/germany_at_the_un.html)

international law and that the UN must have a central role in any action against or in Iraq.”<sup>240</sup>

It was thought in Germany and in many other European countries that any unilateral and preclusive intervention would set a dangerous precedent; it would undermine international law and concepts of national sovereignty dating back to Westphalia, with profound consequences for the behaviour of states in the future.

Berlin, like France, did not share the same threat perceptions of Iraq as did Washington; rather, Berlin regarded Iraq as a state that was near collapse. Moreover, Germany along with France, saw “more negative than positive circumstances coming out of military intervention and consequent perceptions of occupation, in that there would be greater regional instability and anti-Western backlash; more terrorism, not less.”<sup>241</sup>

It is also claimed, like in the French case, that commercial interests were effective while shaping German foreign policy. But, this idea was found incomplete due to some commercial data. For example, for the year 2002, German exports to Iraq were 0.001 percent of overall exports and German imports from Iraq were 0.062 percent of overall imports.<sup>242</sup> These percentages were hardly sufficient to affect a foreign policy of a powerful state.

---

<sup>240</sup> Wood, p. 9

<sup>241</sup> Gardner, H., “The Iraq Crisis and Its Impact on the Future of EU-US Relations: An American View”, May 2003, available at [http://www.cicerofoundation.org/pdf/gardner\\_iraq.pdf](http://www.cicerofoundation.org/pdf/gardner_iraq.pdf)

<sup>242</sup> Gordon-Shapiro, p.78

Chirac and Schröder presented a common front in the Iraqi crisis. They genuinely opposed to the war and this stance gave them widespread political support, helped transform their political fortunes. For France and Germany, the debate about Iraq was also a *question of world order* and Franco-German response was a *refusal to accept U.S leadership* and the truth that America is the sole super power.<sup>243</sup> So, the logical explanation for French and German policy inclinations during the Iraq crisis includes domestic conditions in both of the countries and their desire to reestablish Franco-German leadership in the European Union and make Europe a key player in world affaires.

## **2.2. Pro-US European States in the Iraq crisis**

### **2.2.1. British Stance**

For reasons of history, shared experience, language and culture, Britain always has a special relationship with the USA. This has always been a central component in British foreign affairs. UK governments have generally favoured a prominent American role in the world and in Europe. The current government conceives of the UK as a bridge between the USA and continental Europe. Therefore, Blair's interest in maintaining UK's status certainly influenced Britain's Iraq policy.

In the two phases of the conflict, first diplomatic/political and then military, the UK was confirmed as the USA's most longstanding and important ally.<sup>244</sup> While France

---

<sup>243</sup> Ibid. p.80

<sup>244</sup> Wood, p.4

and Germany rejected the use of force against Iraq, arguing Iraqi disarmament must be pursued through patient negotiation and the inspections regime, the UK , alongside with the US, constantly argued that the UN had to support the use of force. When the UK had to choose between joining with the US in its unilateral quest to dismantle the Saddam regime by force or siding with the Franco-German European view of disarming Saddam through multilateral negotiations, Blair chose to side with the US, while risking to face many domestic obstacles in the process.<sup>245</sup> “The British Government consistently maintained that the Iraqi threat must be tackled vigorously and in cooperation with the Bush Administration.”<sup>246</sup>

Tony Blair completely believed the necessity of a military intervention while the British public and most of the Labor Party were strongly opposed to war. In a speech in the House of Commons, Tony Blair said:

“We took the decision that to leave Iraq in its brutalised state under Saddam was wrong. Now there is upon us a heavy responsibility to make the peace worth the war”.<sup>247</sup>

Although there was strong conservative support for military intervention in the government, public opposition was high. Prime Minister Blair decided to go to war against Saddam when the British public was largely against it. The UK government preferred to support the U.S’s Iraq policies and act with it rather than to be a part of the Franco-German opposition. National preferences and interests stood beyond the union’s collectiveness.

---

<sup>245</sup> Chadwick, A and Heffernan, R. “New Labour in the International Arena: Britain and the Iraq War”, available at [www.polity.co.uk/newlabour/pdf/newlabour.pdf](http://www.polity.co.uk/newlabour/pdf/newlabour.pdf)

<sup>246</sup> Ortega, p.8

<sup>247</sup> Tony Blair, speech in the House of Commons, 14 April 2003, available at <http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page3494.asp>

UK Foreign Minister Jack Straw, pointed the primacy of national interests in one of his speeches:

*“The Iraq crisis has shown that the foreign policies of nation states are ultimately determined by national interests. That will always be the case in a Union whether of 15 or 25 sovereign countries. For Britain, and other member states, there will also always be issues where our own pressing national interests are not shared by a critical mass of EU partners. We therefore need to be able to act on our own initiative. We may look for support and help from other EU partners, but there isn’t a sufficient mass of shared interests for a truly common policy.”*<sup>248</sup>

### **2.2.2. Letter of Eight**

The attitudes of Britain, Spain, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Denmark, Portugal, and the Czech Republic toward the United States became clearer in the late January of 2003. The disputes within Europe over Iraqi problem intensified after a joint letter of support for the United States from eight European governments appeared in the Wall Street Journal and also several other newspapers across Europe. In this letter, the leaders from Britain, Spain, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Denmark, Portugal, and the Czech Republic expressed solidarity with the United States.

The signatories of the Letter of Eight, and particularly Blair, Aznar, and Berlusconi, saw it as a good opportunity to express support for the United States on Iraq at a sensitive time.

---

<sup>248</sup> Jack Straw “Europe in the world” speech at CEPS, Brussels, 19 May 2003, available at [http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/documents/speech/sp190503\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/documents/speech/sp190503_en.pdf)

But the idea of a public statement by eight European governments without consulting their EU partners was a ‘distinct slap at the very notion of the common foreign policy’ that the EU was trying to develop.<sup>249</sup> The leaders of France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg, were not only not asked to sign, but not even informed that the letter was being prepared. Greece was holding the rotating presidency of the EU at that time, but neither Greek government, nor European Commission President Romano Prodi or the EU foreign policy high representative Javier Solana were informed about the letter.<sup>250</sup> The letter caused great debates in Europe, Germans denounced the signatories of the letter for blatantly undermining the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

### **2.2.3. The Choice of Central and East Europeans –The Vilnius 10**

In Central and Eastern Europe, the US enjoys a rather more favourable image. This is partly because the US is perceived as being the strongest supporter of these countries when they suffered under communism. Furthermore they are grateful to the US for hastening their membership of NATO. They also recognize the generous American support to civil society before and during the transformation years.<sup>251</sup>

Therefore, most of the Eastern European states, preferred to support US policies during the Iraq crisis. So, the intra European tensions over Iraq and over how to deal with the United States spilled over into relations between Western and Eastern Europe.

---

<sup>249</sup> Gordon- Shapiro, p.131

<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

<sup>251</sup> Cameron, p. 93



A group of ten new democracies- Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania-resented not having been asked to sign the Letter of Eight although they agreed with the letter's message. These ten countries, called "Vilinius 10".<sup>252</sup> "The Vilinius 10" issued a statement on transatlantic solidarity and Iraq which had a similar tone with the Letter of Eight. They considered the issue as an opportunity to demonstrate, especially to the United States, their credentials as strong Atlantic allies. The Vilinius 10 text which was issued on February 5, 2003 stressed the signatories' solidarity with the United States. Both the Letter of Eight and the Vilinius 10 text seriously irritated France and Germany. Especially France feared that these countries were 'reflexively Atlanticist countries waiting to become Trojan horses for the Americans within the EU and challenge Franco-German leadership of Europe'.<sup>253</sup>

Neither France nor Germany is trusted to put European interests ahead of their own; nor is it clear, in a practical sense, that there is such a thing as a "European interest". It is claimed that new members stood with the US not because the US was right, but because they did not want the French and Germans to become too powerful.<sup>254</sup>

Since the celebration of the 40th anniversary of Elysée treaty in 2003, the view that France and Germany have a special role as the motor of European integration reappeared. The assumption that France and Germany were the motors and the natural leaders of European integration had caused resentment in Europe. The problem appeared within European states was that the Franco-German core tried to

---

<sup>252</sup> Vilinius was the name of a Lithuanian city in which they declared their common will to join NATO in May 2000.

<sup>253</sup> Gordon and Shapiro, p. 133

<sup>254</sup> Alan Bell, "British and European Perspectives on the War on Terrorism".

use the concept of Europe to limit US power while the rest of Europe sought to limit French and German power by standing with the US.

In conclusion, both the anti-US positions of the Franco-German axis and the statements like “Letter of Eight” of 29 January 2003 and “Vilnius 10” demonstrated a fundamental split in common European foreign policy toward Iraq. They made the EU look more like a ‘congeries of distinctive states without collective will’ than a cohesive Union.<sup>255</sup>

### **3. Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP) and the Iraq Crisis**

Iraq crisis, posed a fundamental challenge for the CFSP. It has demonstrated the internal divisions between the EU member states, the existence of different national interests and the continuing primacy of national foreign policies. The Iraqi crisis was perhaps the most severe test for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). “It gave some indication of how much unity Europe possesses and how ‘common’ the CFSP is.”<sup>256</sup>

It became clearer in the wake of the Iraq crisis that, for the larger Member States in particular, the merits of coordination in foreign and security policy issues through CFSP are recognised when they amplify existing national preferences. EU Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten explained the situation like that:

---

<sup>255</sup> Barnaby Mason, “Analysis: Europe’s Divisions laid bare”, BBC News, 30 January 2003, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2709435.stm>

<sup>256</sup> Wood, p. 13

*“The war in Iraq has undeniably been a setback in our attempts to create a common European foreign policy. The immature and vulnerable side of European togetherness has been starkly revealed.”*<sup>257</sup> Also he added , in a speech to the European Parliament, said: *“there can be no denying that this has been a very bad passage for the Common Foreign and Security Policy; a very bad passage for the European Union as a whole; a very bad passage for the authority of the UN; for NATO; and a very bad passage for transatlantic relations.”*<sup>258</sup>

On the economic front, the EU set out in the EC Treaty four *convergence criterias* – price stability, government finances, exchange rates and long term exchange rates – that reflect the degree of economic convergence that Member States had to achieve. Although, each Member State was called upon to satisfy all four criteria in order to be become part of the euro area, in the intergovernmental framework within which the EU’s CFSP is elaborated, Member States have hitherto displayed no desire to set out binding foreign policy convergence criteria that might limit their freedom of action.<sup>259</sup>

Difficult circumstances for the European states and therefore, also for the CFSP appeared more clearly after the US declared its determination about going to a war against Iraq. During the intense discussions about the necessity of a second UN resolution that authorizes a military intervention in the UN Security Council, the French representatives threatened to use their veto right. The French preference to

---

<sup>257</sup> EU Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten , “Keynote Address on European Union Foreign Policy”, National Europe Centre Paper No. 92 , 17 April 2003, p2.

<sup>258</sup> Speech by The Rt Hon Chris Patten, European Parliament Iraq Debate, Brussels, 20 March 2003, available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/news/patten/sp03\\_148.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp03_148.htm)

<sup>259</sup> Musu, M., “European Foreign Policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of ‘Converging Parallels’?”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol.8, 2003, p. 38

give more time to the UN weapon inspectors differed noticeably from the US position. Already at the end of 2002, but more at the beginning of 2003, the American preparations for Iraq invasion started. As discussed above, this was a turning point for the European leaders. European leaders could not have a unified position and the divisions among them became apparent, especially after eight European leaders, all of which NATO being members and some EU member states, signed the famous Letter of Eight supporting president Bush's hawkish policy towards Iraq on 30 January 2003. With this letter and also the declarations of the other Eastern European states, the "CFSP was politically damaged."<sup>260</sup> Different foreign policy approaches underlined "the EU's incoherence on foreign policy"<sup>261</sup>, "the persistence of the primacy of national foreign policies and the difficulty for Member States to overcome differences and harmonize interests".<sup>262</sup>

The EU member states were pushed more to think about the utility of their common foreign policy, in general, CFSP, in the time of Iraq crisis. This policy field seemed to be in a deep crisis. The events in 2003, as Shepherd noticed, "appeared to make a mockery of the idea for a Common Foreign and Security Policy in a Union of 25 states. The failure of the EU to produce a coherent and united position on the action to be taken with regard to Iraq was a severe, although predictable, blow for the

---

<sup>260</sup> Wilga, M. "Common Foreign and Security Policy and its member states vis-à-vis the Iraq crisis", prepared for presentation at a joint meeting of the permanent research group 'Europa' and the ongoing PhD seminar series of the Political Science Department, University of Southern Denmark, 15th December, 2004., p.5, available at [www.sam.sdu.dk/~mwi/Wilga,%20CFSP%20and%20Iraq%20crisis-15.12.04.pdf](http://www.sam.sdu.dk/~mwi/Wilga,%20CFSP%20and%20Iraq%20crisis-15.12.04.pdf)

<sup>261</sup> Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez, p.44

<sup>262</sup> Musu, p.35

CFSP...”<sup>263</sup> This situation made some of the EU member states think harder how to improve the CFSP institutions in order to avoid similar situations in the future.

Next chapter will compare different global positions of the USA and the EU, evaluate the importance of having a common foreign policy for Europe in order to be accepted as a unified power that has a single voice in the world politics and discuss the possibility for the EU to become a counter-weight against the US in the future.

---

<sup>263</sup> Shepherd, Alistair J. K. (2004) “ EU Security and Defence Policy:After Enlargement”, *Aberystwyth Journal of World Affairs* 1, pp.19-23, p.19

## **V. Can EU become a potential candidate that might challenge the hegemonic position of the USA before having a common foreign policy?**

Undoubtedly, the formation of the European Union was one of the defining events of the twentieth century. It has changed the political, economic, and social landscapes of Western Europe, changed the balance of power in the world by helping Europeans reassert themselves on the world stage.<sup>264</sup> Also, the formation of the European Union and the creation of a common European currency in the 1990s can be considered as “the single most important move”<sup>265</sup> in a worldwide reaction against American hegemony.

Many people expected with the end of the Cold War that the world would have multiple centers of power, and Europe would be one of them. It was also hoped that Europe would become a global superpower in the near future. As explained in the first chapter, despite the expectations that Europe would produce a truly multipolar twenty-first century; it could not acquire the capabilities of a real super power. It can be argued that, if it had achieved to overcome crises on the European continent in the 90s, such as the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, or tried to increase its military capabilities; perhaps it could have re-emerged as a global player and acted as a counter weight to the US in the end of the 20th century. But during the 1990s; the

---

<sup>264</sup> McCormick, J., *The European Union: Politics and Policies*, Oxford, 1999, p.1

<sup>265</sup> Huntington (March 1999), p.4

European role was limited to filling out peacekeeping forces after the United States had carried out the decisive phases of a military mission and stabilized the situation. As some Europeans put it, the real division of labor consisted of the United States “making the dinner” and the Europeans “doing the dishes.”<sup>266</sup> There are conflicting views about the possibility of Europe’s becoming a counterweight to the US in the future. Hubert Vedrine, French Foreign Minister, had said that “Europe must come together on its own and create a counter weight to stop the United States from dominating the world.”<sup>267</sup> Also, Charles Kupchan found the EU, as an entity of sufficient political will and sufficient sense of collective identity, potentially powerful to act as a counterweight to the U.S.<sup>268</sup>

On the other hand, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO General-Secretary and former foreign minister of the Netherlands asserts that “as a counterweight to the U.S., the EU will not work because the result will be a split in Europe.”<sup>269</sup> The view that “trying to build a strong Europe against the USA will divide Europe and has no future in present-day society”<sup>270</sup> is widely accepted today.

Today, the European Union (EU), with 25 member countries, covers a large part of the continent of Europe and it has become a major economic power. While the surface area of the US is 9.6 million square kilometres, the EU covers nearly 4 million square kilometres. Its population (for the year 2004) is 456.8 millions while

---

<sup>266</sup> Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness”.

<sup>267</sup> Huntington (March 1999), 4-5

<sup>268</sup> Foreign Policy Association Lecture by Charles Kupchan, 20 February, 2003, available at: [http://www.fpa.org/topics\\_info2414/topics\\_info\\_show.htm?doc\\_id=150659](http://www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topics_info_show.htm?doc_id=150659)

<sup>269</sup> Dempsey, J. “U.S. supports Europe, NATO chief asserts”, *International Herald Tribune*, 07 Jun, 2005

<sup>270</sup> Neuwahl, N., “The Atlantic Alliance: For Better or for Wars”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* 8, 2003, pp.427–434, p.431

the population of the US is 291 millions. It can be said that the European Union is only about two fifths the size of the United States, but its population is 57% larger. In fact, the EU population is the world's third largest after China and India.<sup>271</sup> (See Table 3)

Table 3: populations of some major countries

Country	Population (millions)
China	1 288.4
India	1 064.4
EU-25	456.8
US	291.0
Russia	143.4

Sources: Eurostat, World Bank. (Figures for the EU-25 are for 2004, figures for the other countries are for mid-year 2003.)

The EU's gross domestic product (GDP) , which is the economy's output of goods and services, is steadily growing. With its enlargement from 15 to 25 countries, the EU's GDP is about the same as that of the United States.<sup>272</sup> (See table4)

Table 4: GDP of the EU-25 and the USA, in billions of euro, 2003

Country	GDP (billion €)
EU-25	9 755.4
US	9 727.7

Sources: World Bank, Eurostat.

<sup>271</sup> European Commission Booklet, *Key facts and figures about Europe and the Europeans*, May 2005, p.9, [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/eu\\_glance/51/en.doc](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/eu_glance/51/en.doc)

<sup>272</sup> Ibid., p.37



Also, the EU-15 merchandise exports was 2901 billion dollars in 2003, while that of the US was 724 billion dollars for the same year. The EU-15 merchandise imports was 2920 billion dollars, while that of the US was 1303 billion dollars.<sup>273</sup> The EU accounts for approximately a fifth of global imports and exports. It is therefore a major trading power with an important role to play on the world stage.<sup>274</sup> Also, the euro poses an important challenge to the hegemony of the dollar in global finance.<sup>275</sup>

Andrew Moravcsik identified Europe as the "quiet superpower".<sup>276</sup> He asserts that there are many ways in which Europe can wield influence over peace and war as great as that of the US. One of them is the EU accession. He found it the single most powerful policy instrument for peace and security in the world today. Because, in potential member states, authoritarian and intolerant governments have lost elections to democratic, market-oriented coalitions held together by the promise of eventual EU membership. Also, Europeans provide more than 70 per cent of all civilian development assistance. This is four times more than the US. When the shooting stopped in Kosovo and Afghanistan, it was the Europeans who were called on to rebuild, reconstruct and reform. Lastly, European troops, generally under multilateral auspices, help keep the peace in trouble spots. EU members and applicants contribute 10 times as many peacekeeping troops as the US.<sup>277</sup>

---

<sup>273</sup> [http://www.wto.org/english/res\\_e/statis\\_e/its2004\\_e/its04\\_byregion\\_e.pdf](http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2004_e/its04_byregion_e.pdf)

<sup>274</sup> European Commission Booklet, *Key facts and figures about Europe and the Europeans*, p.39

<sup>275</sup> Huntington (March 1999). "The Lonely Superpower", p.4-5

<sup>276</sup> Moravcsik, A., "How Europe can win without an army", *Financial Times*, April 2, 2003

<sup>277</sup> Ibid.

If just the size of population, its GDP, trade statistics or the ability in peacekeeping are considered, the EU can be defined as a potential superpower that may challenge the position of the US. But these are not enough for being a real superpower like the US. The U.S has been the only state that enjoys a preeminence in nearly all the component elements of power that is unprecedented in modern international history. It excels in all the relevant power capabilities: military, economic, technological, and geopolitical.<sup>278</sup> It can take unilateral decisions if necessary and wield military power across the globe. The EU has a long way to go until it catches up with the U.S. in technology and military power.

In today's world, the widespread perception is that the possession of military capabilities is the main requirement for having credibility and effectiveness in international relations.<sup>279</sup> And therefore, "military power has always given the United States an immediate structural advantage over *civilian power Europe* when the issues are those of hard security."<sup>280</sup> One pillar of U.S. hegemony is "the vast military power of the United States."<sup>281</sup> It spends more than virtually all of the world's other major military powers combined, most of which are U.S. allies. According to the Center for Defense Information, the fiscal year 2003 budget request of \$399.1 billion "is more than the combined spending of the next 25 nations."<sup>282</sup> US military expenditure has increased rapidly during the period 2002–2004 as a result of massive budgetary allocations for the *global war on terrorism*, primarily for military

---

<sup>278</sup> Wohlforth, W.C., "Transatlantic Relations in a Unipolar World", Occasional Paper No. 41, Dartmouth College, p.4

<sup>279</sup> Açıkmışe(2004), p.135

<sup>280</sup> Smith, M., "Between Two Worlds?The European Union, the United States and World Order", *International Politics*, Vol.41, 2004, p.105

<sup>281</sup> Posen (Summer 2003), p.7

<sup>282</sup> For military budgets of selected countries , see <http://www.cdi.org/issues/wme/spendersfy04.html>

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>283</sup> The fact is that the nature and scope of U.S. military power affect U.S. grand strategy choices and make its hegemonic policies practical.<sup>284</sup>

On the other hand; the EU is generally accepted militarily inferior to the US and it is frequently criticized for possessing nothing but soft power and not being able to operate in the areas where the US is most dominant. Eventhough it has become the preeminent economic power and America's economic peer in the new century, "it is not yet a global military power."<sup>285</sup>

Europeans generally object to American unilateralism. According to Robert Kagan, "their hostility to unilateralism is actually self-interested. Since Europeans lack the capacity to undertake unilateral military actions, either individually or collectively as 'Europe', it is natural that they oppose allowing others."<sup>286</sup> The EU policy on world order and its stance on unilateralism are thus to be seen as the products of the weakness of the Europeans in essential parts of the power inventory.

What European Union definitely lacks is the capability to project force globally. It lacks "power in the hard sense of military which it may deploy in pursuit of European interests"<sup>287</sup> However, actually, the most important defect of the EU as a potential superpower is the disunity in the member states' interests. The issue of European interest has always been a controversial issue because it causes questions

---

<sup>283</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2005, Chapter 8: Military expenditure, available at <http://yearbook2005.sipri.org/ch8/ch8>

<sup>284</sup> Posen, p.44

<sup>285</sup> McCormick (1999), p.280

<sup>286</sup> Kagan (2003), p.38

<sup>287</sup> Peterson, J. , "The European Union as a Global Actor", in John Peterson and Helena Sjursen, *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe*, Routledge, 1998, p.3

about the unity and collectivity of the EU. Defining a European interest in the issues of high politics, has always been difficult because a European interest is generally accepted subordinate to national interests by the member states. When their national interests are at stake, member states prefer to pursue strategies that are consistent with their own national interests. The reason is that national interests are still the determinants of the national policies and national preferences still dominates the state behaviour in world politics.

A real superpower must be a cohesive and unified entity that has a single and effective voice in world politics. The idea that the European Union should speak with one voice in world affairs is as old as the European integration process itself. But; because of the fact that the Union consists of several sovereign countries with different foreign policy inclinations, it has made less progress in forging a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) over the years than in creating a single market and a single currency.<sup>288</sup> The collapse of communism, and the outbreak of regional crises in the Balkans and beyond have led EU members to increase their efforts to speak and act as one unit.

Member states committed themselves to making a success of the CFSP, but they sometimes find it hard to change their own national policy regarding a particular country or region in the name of EU solidarity. The difficulty of this was clearly illustrated by “the deep divisions among EU member states in 2003 over whether the UN Security Council should authorise the American-led war on Iraq”.<sup>289</sup>

---

<sup>288</sup> [http://www.europa.eu.int/pol/cfsp/overview\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/pol/cfsp/overview_en.htm)

<sup>289</sup> Ibid.

In the pre-war period; European public opinion has shown its desire to avoid war, while European governments showed different foreign policy inclinations toward the U.S. Iraq policies and were profoundly divided on this matter. Member states of the EU split into two seemingly irreconcilable camps, one siding with the United States, the other with France and Germany.<sup>290</sup> And, it was proved that the EU is still a "union" of nations with diverging interests and there are significant limits on the degree of unity in the EU. Despite fifty years of integration process, national identities remain stronger than a common European identity, and national interests are still important.<sup>291</sup>

With the effect of the internal splits, Europe failed to stop the war. For Laurent Fabius, a former French prime minister, during the process toward the war, Europe "was unable to make its voice heard in the US because it was divided."<sup>292</sup> It must be noted that the EU's incapability of agreeing a common position on such a crucial issue greatly damaged its credibility.<sup>293</sup>

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Iraq crisis has been a failure for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Member countries were very visibly split in their position towards the war against the regime in Baghdad. For European unity, this split experienced over Iraq can be defined as a disaster. "No serious attempts were made by major members to reach a consensus

---

<sup>290</sup> "One Year on: lessons from Iraq", Chaillot Paper no.68, EU Institute for Security Studies, March 2004, p.16

<sup>291</sup> Nye (2002), p.31

<sup>292</sup> Fabius, L., "A Stronger Europe for a Better World", *The Financial Times*, 26 March 2003

<sup>293</sup> "One Year on : lessons from Iraq", p. 6

well before the war when a common European position might still have had some impact on the events.”<sup>294</sup>

The Iraqi crisis has proven that there is no common vision, no shared approach to many international problems and threats among the EU member countries, which is the indispensable base for any coherent foreign policy. And, with the challenge of this crisis, it revealed that the CFSP adopted at the European Council of Maastricht (1991) requires a fresh approach. The EU has yet to fine tune its institutions and capabilities<sup>295</sup> in order to develop a common ethos and a cohesive European Foreign Policy.

With this crisis, it was understood in the EU that without a major step forward in the integration of concepts, procedures and means for a common foreign and security policy, Europe will have little or no influence on US strategic decisions and unilateral instincts.<sup>296</sup>

According to Laurent Fabius, the war in Iraq showed the need to construct a united Europe. It demonstrated “the urgent need for Europe to advance political union, to become a federal Europe.”<sup>297</sup> In order to further EU political integration and institute internal reforms, during 2004, the EU countries continued to work on a new constitutional treaty. The constitution contains changes for the EU’s governing

---

<sup>294</sup> Ibid., p.16

<sup>295</sup> Neugar, F. and Luciani , G., “Toward a European Strategy for Iraq”, CAP Policy Paper, March 2003, p. 2

<sup>296</sup> “One year on.: Lessons from Iraq”, p.16

<sup>297</sup> Fabius, “A Stronger Europe for a Better World”.

institutions and decision-making processes and aims to enable a larger EU to operate effectively boost the EU's visibility on the world stage.

The Constitution grew out of the 2002-2003 "Convention on the Future of Europe" which was held in the middle of the Iraqi crisis. The convention was charged several key tasks including examining and better defining the distribution of power between the EU's institutions and the member states; encouraging the development of the EU as a coherent foreign policy actor.<sup>298</sup> In July 2003, the Convention finalized the "Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe" and concluded its work. The discussions about the reformation of the CFSP included institutional questions. The European Convention completed its work in July 2003 and in October 2003, EU leaders convened an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to work out the definitive text of the new constitutional treaty.<sup>299</sup> The work of the IGC was finally completed when the Constitution was signed in Rome on 29 October 2004.<sup>300</sup>

In the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Constitution created a new EU foreign minister position that would combine the roles of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the External Relations Commissioner. The purpose of introducing such a role was to make the European Union's external action more effective and coherent, the Minister for Foreign Affairs would become in effect the voice of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Foreign Affairs Minister would be charged to

---

<sup>298</sup> Archick, K., "The European Union's Constitution", Congressional Research Service Report RS21618, June 10, 2005, p.3

<sup>299</sup> For detailed information of the history of the EU Constitution,

[http://europa.eu.int/roadtoconstitution/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/roadtoconstitution/index_en.htm)

<sup>300</sup> Kristin Archick, "The European Union's Constitution", p.3

represent the EU in matters concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy, conduct political dialogue on the Union's behalf and express the Union's position in international organisations and at international conferences. He or she would also be responsible for coordinating Member States' actions in international fora (Article III-305).<sup>301</sup>

According to the provisions of the Constitution, the European Foreign Policy should always be based on a commonly defined position and once a common position has been agreed upon, Member States should actively and unreservedly support the Union's CFSP in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and should comply with the Union's action in this area.<sup>302</sup>

As an other innovation, the constitution abolishes the rotating six-month presidency in favor of an individual. This New President of the European Council would be elected by member states for a term of two and one-half years, to ensure policy continuity and raise the EU's profile on the world stage.<sup>303</sup>

The provisions such as the new president and foreign minister positions were all designed to promote an EU able to speak with one voice on foreign policy issues. However, in order to come into effect, the EU's constitutional treaty had to be ratified by all 25 member states through either parliamentary approval or public referenda. The EU set November 2006 as the target date for the treaty's entrance into force. Some members, including the U.K., France, Denmark, Ireland, Poland, and the

---

<sup>301</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/constitution/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/constitution/index_en.htm)

<sup>302</sup> Ibid.

<sup>303</sup> Archick (June, 2005), "The European Union's Constitution", p.3



Netherlands decided to hold public referenda on the treaty's ratification. But the ratification process turned the Constitution project into a failure.

Many member states such as Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy Lithuania Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, ratified the treaty but in several EU countries, ratification process caused controversy for a variety of reasons. Traditional Euro-skeptic voters in the U.K., for example, worried that the "constitution" will infringe too much on national sovereignty.<sup>304</sup> Many French and Dutch voters viewed a *no vote* as a way to express dissatisfaction with their unpopular national governments, the EU bureaucracy, and Turkey's prospective EU membership. In France, some feared that the constitution, by paving the way for further EU enlargement, would erode French influence in the EU, while Dutch voters complained that the EU's big countries were already too strong and that certain provisions of the constitution would increase their power even more. Consequently, the future of the EU's constitution, was thrown in doubt by the rejection of French and Dutch voters in separate referenda in May and June 2005.<sup>305</sup>

Each member state of the EU made individual calculations and reflected their national preferences either in their public referenda or parliaments. They did not hesitate to impede or stop the Constitution process which was the product of long-lasting tough negotiations. They again ran the risk of damaging the EU unity.

---

<sup>304</sup> Archick, K. "The European Union in 2005 and Beyond", Congressional Research Service(CRS) Report RS21757, 2 May, 2005, p.2

<sup>305</sup> French voters rejected the constitution by 55% to 45%; Dutch voters rejected it by 62% to 38%

UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said after the french referandum, "The result raises profound questions for all of us about the future direction of Europe".<sup>306</sup> Also, on June 6, 2005, he announced that there was "no point" in continuing to plan for a UK poll and effectively postponed the UK's referendum indefinitely.<sup>307</sup>

These referandums have once again demonstrated that national identities and interests have absolute priority over European integration.<sup>308</sup> So, it revealed that establishing a common foreign policy among states that have different foreign policy preferences is not so easy. According to John Peterson, "a common foreign policy can not exist as long as there is no European Public."<sup>309</sup> The lack of a common identity and the existence of the diversity in the national interests represent fundamental defects of a common foreign policy and affect the formation process of a well functioning common foreign policy among the EU members. These defects inevitably affect the EU's ability to wield its influence as an international actor.

In the meantime, Europe will have to decide whether it wants to be a regional power or a global player. It has to decide what it wants to be, what role in the world it wants to play. If Europe wants to have an important role for itself in the world, it must overcome its divisions, act in unison to defend its values and interests.<sup>310</sup> It is clear that, " a collective EU, sharing the responsibility as well as the burden, will be much

---

<sup>306</sup> <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/05/29/france.eu/>

<sup>307</sup> Archick (June 2005), p.3

<sup>308</sup> Kohen, S., "Yorum: 'Non'.. 'Nee'.. sonrası ne?", Milliyet, 2 June, 2005, p.20

<sup>309</sup> Peterson, J., "The European Union as a Global Actor", in John Peterson and Helena Sjursen, A Common Foreign Policy for Europe, Routledge, 1998, p.3

<sup>310</sup> "One year on: Lessons from Iraq", p.17

more effective in the international system than any single European actor.”<sup>311</sup> In order to achieve this collectivity, the EU will need a functioning CFSP and ESDP, because without them its voice and its influence will be weak and ineffective.

Similarly, Waltz states that the EU, “will not be able to claim a louder voice in alliance affairs unless it develops the unity in foreign and military affairs that it is achieving in economic matters. European leaders have not been able to find an incremental route to a European foreign and military policy or even have tried very hard to do so. In the absence of radical change, Europe will count for little in international politics.”<sup>312</sup> It must be noted that “the European architecture of division creates a poor image of the EU as an actor in international relations and has wider implications for the future of the EU”.<sup>313</sup>

While evaluating the challenge presented by the EU, the key question must be “whether the EU will develop enough political and social cohesion to act as one unit on a wide range of international issues, or whether it will remain a limited grouping of countries with strongly different nationalism and foreign policies.”<sup>314</sup> According to John McCormick, a real political union among the EU members will inevitably be established and the EU will act as one unit because the EU experiment has brought peace and prosperity to the continent and Europeans have too much in common.<sup>315</sup> But; establishing a political union requires overcoming the diversities in national

---

<sup>311</sup> Crowe, p.37

<sup>312</sup> Waltz, (Summer 2000), p.30, 31

<sup>313</sup> Açıkmеше (March- May 2004), p. 135

<sup>314</sup> Nye (2002), p.30

<sup>315</sup> McCormick (1999), p.285

interests and attitudes. Due to these diversities, it is very difficult to make common policies that satisfy each member state.<sup>316</sup>

Another key question must be “whether the EU wants to be a global actor on the world stage, or it will let the US play this role lonely.”<sup>317</sup> If Europe wants to have an effective position in the world politics and become a global actor in international relations, it must show a desire to direct its own destiny. It is necessary “for the EU members to suppress their own views to arrive at a common view: in other words they have to accept that having a common policy is the highest priority.”<sup>318</sup> Because, “only a united Europe is an effective global player.”<sup>319</sup> As long as the member states retain their national foreign policy capabilities and the various national interests of each member state exist, a coherent and effective European voice can not emerge<sup>320</sup> and, it is difficult for the EU to establish a common foreign policy and act as a unified superpower that may challenge the hegemonic position of the US in the near future.

---

<sup>316</sup> Kohen, “Yorum: ‘Non’.. ‘Nee’.. sonrası ne?”

<sup>317</sup> Demirtaş, S., “AB, ikinci bir küresel güç olamadı”, *Radikal*, 22, June, 2005

<sup>318</sup> Crowe (2003), p.536

<sup>319</sup> Ebertowski, M., “The European Common Foreign And Security Policy in the Wake Of The Iraq Crisis”, p.34

<sup>320</sup> Allen, D., “Who Speaks for Europe?”, in *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe*, John Peterson-Helena Sjursen(eds), 1998, Routledge, p.58

## **VI. CONCLUSION**

In neo-realism, the patterns of international events are explained in terms of the system “structure” and the “international distribution of power” across the primary units of the international system, which are the “states”. In neo-realism, which is also called “structural realism”, structure is defined by “anarchy”. It is the ordering principle of the international system. An anarchical system is one where no formal relations are present and where there is no central authority to enforce rules and norms. For neo-realists, all states experience the same constraints presented by the condition of anarchy, for example all of them need security to protect their national interests. But, they reacted to anarchy proportional to their power and capabilities.

Structural realism is the product of Kenneth Waltz who believes that the structure of the international system is a major determinant of actor behaviour and shapes all foreign policy choices. With the end of the Cold War, the structure of the international system radically changed and the “bipolar” world order evolved into a “unipolar” one, where the United States remained alone in the world as the sole global power without a major threat to its security. It had become the most powerful state in the system. In neo-realist view, power gives a state a place or position in the international system and shapes the behaviour of the state. It can be said that the rise in the US power and the absence of serious threats to American security in the post Cold War era gave the US wide latitude in making foreign policy choices. Since states are self-interest oriented in an anarchic order, the United States started to wield

its relatively great power in confirmity with its national interests in order to reach its foreign policy goals and maintain its superiority. Its hegemonic charecter started to be more apparent.

For neo-realists, like classical realists, the central mechanism for order in the system is “balance of power”. According to Balance of Power theory , in the case of unipolarity, states seek to balance power, thus the preponderence of power in the hands of a single state will stimulate the rise of new great powers, and possibly coalitions of powers, determined to balance the dominant state. In unipolar systems, states do indeed balance against the hegemon’s unchecked power. Because; left unbalanced, hegemonic power threatens the security of the other major states in the international system. The formation of the European Union and the creation of a common European currency after the end of the Cold War can undoubtedly be accepted as the most important move toward an anti-hegemonic coalition against the dominant state, which was the US. These developments were the defining events of the twentieth century. They changed the political, economic, and social landscapes of Western Europe and the balance of power in the world by helping Europeans reassert themselves on the world stage.

Many people expected with the end of the Cold War that the world would then have multiple centers of power. It was also hoped that a unified Europe would become a global superpower which can be a counterweight to the US in the near future. But, although Europe produced miracles in the economic and political realms, it could not fulfil the promise of restoring a truly multipolar world. Unipolar world order organized under US leadership prevailed during the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet

system elevated the United States to a historically unprecedented position of primacy in international politics. It was one of the turning points of the evolution of the US hegemony.

Realist theories of hegemony argue that “order is a result of the concentration of material power capabilities in a single state, which uses its commanding position to create and maintain order. When a world system is dominated by one state, that state can be referred as a hegemon. Hegemony denotes the overwhelming military, economic, and diplomatic preponderance of a single great power in international politics. Hegemonic Stability theory, which was developed by some scholars who believe in the necessity of a hegemonic state for the well functioning of the order, says that regimes are most effective when power in the international system is most concentrated. Hegemonic powers are believed to provide order and stability for the system. Hegemonic stability theorists are in favor of a world that is constructed under US hegemony.

The most significant turning point for the US hegemony was the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the U.S. soil. Because, with the tragic events of September 11, significant changes that included many apparent hegemonic inclinations occurred in the US foreign policy. Bush administration forcefully attempted to reassert American leadership internationally. It launched a “war against terrorism”. The defence of American economic and geopolitical interests worldwide was the main underlying reason of the American war against terrorism. American foreign policy pretended to formulate a war against terrorism so as to maximise its benefits because,

in international politics, all political decisions are set in order to obtain the maximum benefit and satisfaction.

The United States, with support from the United Kingdom, Australia and the Northern Alliance, invaded Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 as a part of its “war against terrorism” campaign. It is argued that the tragic terrorist attacks provided the US an opportunity to enter Afghanistan which has a special geostrategic significance for the USA. The USA has significant political, military and economic reasons to try to turn Afghanistan into a base for American military operations in the region. The U.S. attack on Afghanistan would allow the U.S. to advance several long-standing geopolitical aims that were on the agenda since the end of the Cold War, one of which was strengthening U.S. hegemony in the Middle East. This argument based on the idea that the starting point of the American military response to Afghanistan is rooted in the new international environment created by the end of the Cold War.

The U.S military interventions after the end of the Cold War, and attacking on Afghanistan after 9/11 were all signalling a change in the nature of the U.S foreign policy. However, the changing nature of the U.S foreign policy became more apparent and unquestionable, particularly after the release of the U.S.A’s new security doctrine which was prepared by the Bush Administration. The new national security strategy (NSS) of the U.S.A was a product of the new environment shaped by the fears of terrorism and the desires to maintain the U.S’s global power status.



This doctrine had four basic elements. Spreading democracy constituted the first pillar of the Bush's security strategy. President Bush and his team believed the necessity of regime change in tyrannical governments because, for them, more democracies mean greater stability. Second pillar of Bush doctrine was based on the idea that this was a time of great threat posed by terrorists and rogue states and the United States must be ready to wage "preventive wars". Preemption refers to the use of military force in advance of a first use of force by the enemy. The perceived need for preventive wars is related with "unilateralism" which constitutes the third pillar of the Bush doctrine. This new security strategy clearly demonstrated that the Bush administration was determined to use unilateral force if it could not obtain enough international support for a particular course of action. Preventive war component and the unilateralist perspectives of the Bush doctrine which are based on strength and the desire to ensure the maintenance of American dominance is strongly related with the concept of hegemony. Establishment of American hegemony or primacy was the final element of the doctrine. The evolving hegemonic role of the US was not new. But, although the US has already been considered as a hegemonic power in the new world order, its hegemonic character was said to be confirmed by its reactions to the September 11, especially by its unilateral decision to attack Iraq preemptively without the approval of the UN Security Council and despite the reactions of world public.

Finding WMD in Iraq, bringing democracy and stability to the Middle East by changing the Iraqi regime, were the seeming rationales for the US invasion of Iraq. What really driving the US to this war was to protect the American national interests, to increase its influence in the strategic regions of the Middle East, to show the

extent of its military power as a “hegemon” and prove that a “global power” can act unilaterally and preemptively if its security and prestige is at risk. However, by attacking Iraq and ignoring the UN, the United States ran the risk of losing its legitimacy in the eyes of world public and damaging the reliability of the UN. A war with Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein would be the first test case in the Bush administration's larger strategy for projecting U.S. power and influence but the war created a deep humanitarian crisis in Iraq and a deep political crisis in the international system.

The reality was that Europeans could not come up with a single policy for the Iraqi problem. The vision of a divided EU in terms of common foreign policy became more apparent with the Iraqi crisis. On the one side *new Europe* - Britain, Italy, Spain, most of the Eastern Europeans- opted for following the US leadership whereas *old Europe* - France and Germany, supported by several smaller EU members- rejected the American policies. Member states preferred to pursue strategies that are consistent with their own national interests. The reason is that national interests are still the determinants of the national policies and national preferences still dominates the state behaviour in world politics. Different foreign policy approaches underlined the EU's incoherence on foreign policy, the primacy of national foreign policies and the difficulty for Member States to overcome differences and harmonize interests.

The Iraqi crisis was perhaps the most severe test for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The lack of a common identity and the diversity in the national interests represent fundamental defects of a common foreign policy. These defects inevitably affect the EU's ability to wield its influence as an international

actor. Iraqi crisis showed that the EU is politically divided and little able to assert itself against the American hegemony.

If Europe wants to have an effective position in world politics and become a global actor in international relations, it must show a desire to direct its own destiny. It is necessary for the EU members to suppress their own views to arrive at a common view. Because, only a “united Europe” can be an effective global player. As long as the differences in national interests and the incoherence in the foreign policies persist among the EU states, it would be neither realistic nor desirable for the EU to speak with one voice on foreign policy issues or develop into a politically unified superpower that may challenge the US hegemony.

## ***Bibliography***

### ***Books and Articles***

- Açıkmeye, Sinem.A. 2004, March/May. “The Underlying Dynamics of the European Security and Defence Policy”, *Perceptions*, Vol.9, No.1.
- Adem, Seifudein. 2003, Summer. “Constructing a new imperial order?The War in Iraq and the Ideology of Clashism”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Realties*, Vol.2, No.2.
- Agnew, John. 2003. “American Hegemony Into American Empire? Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq”, *Antipode*, November, Vol. 35, Issue 5.
- Anderson, Perry. 2002, Sep./Oct. “Force and Consent”, *New Left Review* 17
- Allen, Mike. 2003 January 5. “Bush Tells Troops: Prepare for War; ‘We are ready’ ”, *Washington Post*.
- Arend, Anthony, C. 2003, Spring. “ International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force”, *The Washington Quarterly*.
- Smith, Steve and Baylis, John (eds.). 1997. *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford University Press.
- Bell, Alan. 2003, March 13. “British and European Perspectives on the War on Terrorism”, available at [http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/British\\_EU\\_perspectives.htm](http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2003/British_EU_perspectives.htm)
- Buzan, Barry and Gonzalez-Pelaez, Ana. 2005. “ ‘International community’ after Iraq”, *International Affairs*, Vol.81, pp.31-52.
- Cameron, Fraser. 2005. “How Europe views America”, *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics*, Vol.51, Issue 2, pp.83-95.
- Chadwick, Andrew and Richard Heffernan. “New Labour in the International Arena: Britain and the Iraq War” available at [www.polity.co.uk/newlabour/pdf/newlabour.pdf](http://www.polity.co.uk/newlabour/pdf/newlabour.pdf)
- Chapman John. 2004, July 28. “ The real reasons Bush went to war”, *The*

*Guardian*, available at  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1270414,00.html>

- Clyner, A. 2002, April 19. “European Poll Faults U.S. for its Policy in the Mid East”, *New York Times*.
- Cox, Michael. 2002. “American power before and after 11 September: dizzy with success?”, *International Affairs* 78
- Cronin, Bruce. 2001. “The Paradox of Hegemony”, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.7(1)
- Crowe, Brian. 2003. “A Common Foreign Policy After Iraq?”, *International Affairs*, Vol.79, No.3.
- Çakmak, Cenap. 2003, March/May. “American Foreign Policy and September 11”, *Perceptions*, Vol. 8, No. 1.
- Demirtaş, Serkan. 2005, June 22. “AB, ikinci bir küresel güç olmadı”, *Radikal*.
- Dempsey, Judy. 2005, June 07. “U.S. supports Europe, NATO chief asserts”, *International Herald Tribune*.
- Dombrowski, Peter. and Rodger A. Payne. 2003, November. “Global Debate and the Limits of the Bush Doctrine”, *International Studies Perspectives*, Issue 4.
- Duncan, Snidal. 1985. “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory”, *International Organization* 39(4).
- Fabius, Laurent. 2003, March 26. “A Stronger Europe for a Better World”, *The Financial Times*.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. 2002, Nov./ Dec. “A Grand Strategy of Transformation.” *Foreign Policy* 133.
- Gardner, Hall. “The Iraq crisis and its impact on the future of EU-US relations: an American view”, 2003,  
[http://www.cicerofoundation.org/pdf/gardner\\_iraq.pdf](http://www.cicerofoundation.org/pdf/gardner_iraq.pdf)
- Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in the World Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Goh, Evelyne. 2003. “Hegemonic Constraints” , *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.57, No.1.
- Goldstein, Joshua S. 2003. *International Relations*, Longman.

- Gordon, Phillip. 2003, Jan/Feb. “Bridging the Atlantic Divide”, *Foreign Affairs* , Vol.82, No.1, pp. 70-83.
- Gordon, Phillip.H and Jeremy Shapiro. 2004. *Allies at War: America, Europe, and the crisis over Iraq*, McGraw-Hill.
- Grunberg, Isabelle. 1990, Autumn. “Exploring the Myth of Hegemonic Stability”, *International Organization* 44.
- Gökay, Bülent. 2002, Summer. “The Most Dangerous Game in The World: Oil, War, and US Global Hegemony” , *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol.1, No.2.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1999, March. “The Lonely Superpower: US military and cultural hegemony resented by other powers”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.78, Issue.2
- Ikenberry, John, G. 2001/2002. “American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror”, *Survival*, Vol.43, No.4
- Ikenberry, John. 2002, Sep./Oct. “America’s Imperial Ambition”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No.5, pp.44-60
- Ikenberry, John, G. 2004. ‘The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment’, *Survival*, Vol.46, No.1
- Jervis, R. 2003. “ Understanding the Bush Doctrine”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 118, No.3
- Kagan, Robert and William Kristol. 2000, Spring. “The Present Danger”, *The National Interest*, No.59
- Kagan, Robert. 2003. *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, Atlantic Books, London
- Kegley, Charles W. and Gregory A. Raymond. 2003, November. “Preventive War and Permissive Normative Order”, *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 4, Issue 4
- Kegley, Charles W. and Gregory A. Raymond. 2004. “Global Terrorism and Military Preemption: Policy Problems and Normative Perils”, *International Politics*, Vol.41, Issue.1.
- Keller, Bill. 2002, December 15. “Pre-emption”, *The New York Times Magazine*.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1986. *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press

- Keohane, Robert.O. 1991. “The United States and Postwar Order: Empire or Hegemony?”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol 28, No.4.
- Klare, Michael T. 2003, January 16. “The Coming War With Iraq: Deciphering the Bush Administration’s Motives,” *Foreign Policy In Focus*, available at [www.fpif.org/pdf/gac/0301warreasons.pdf](http://www.fpif.org/pdf/gac/0301warreasons.pdf)
- Kohen, Sami. 2005, June 2. “Yorum: ‘Non’.. ‘Nee’.. sonrası ne?”, *Milliyet*.
- Krasner, Stephan D. 1976. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade”, *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No.3.
- Krauthammer, Charles. 1991, Spring. “The Unipolar Moment”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.70, No.1.
- Krauthammer, Charles. 2002/2003, Winter. “The Unipolar Moment Revisited”, *The National Interest* 70.
- Kupchan, Charles.A. 2004. “New Research Agenda? Yes. New Paradigm? No.”, *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen*, pp.101-109.
- Layne, Cristopher. 1993, Spring. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise”, *International Security*, Vol.17, No.14, pp.5-51.
- Layne, Christopher. 2002, Spring. “Offshore Balancing Revisited”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.25, No.2.
- Leffler, Melvyn P. 2005, March. “Cold War and Global Hegemony,1945-1991”, *OAH Magazine of History*.
- Leiss, William. (2003, May). “The risks of Policy Choices: The war in Iraq and the policy of preemption”, *Policy Options*, pp.41-44.
- Maria de Puig, Lluís. 2002. “Europa contra la Guerra – Europa como instrumento de paz en un mundo multipolar”, *Fundación Compalans*, Barcelona.
- Mastanduno, Michael. 1997, Spring, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War” , *International Security*, Vol.21, No.4.
- McCormick, John. 1999. *The European Union: Politics and Policies*, Oxford Press.
- Morgenthau, Hans, J. 1965. *Politics Among Nations: The struggle for power and Peace*, Alfred A. Knopf: New York.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 2003, April 2. “How Europe can win without an army”, *Financial Times*.

- Musu, Costanza. 2003, Spring. “European Foreign Policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of ‘Converging Parallels’?” *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Kluwer Law International: Vol. 8, Issue 1.
- Neuwahl, Nanette. 2003. “The Atlantic Alliance: For Better or for Wars”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* 8:4, pp.427–434.
- Nicoll, Sir William and Salmon, Trevor.C. 2001. *Understanding the European Union*, Longman press.
- Nye, Joseph S.Jr. 2000. “The US and Europe: continental drift?”, *International Affairs*, 76:1.
- Nye, Joseph. S.Jr. 2002. *The Praradox of American Power: Why the world’s only superpower can’t go it alone?*, New York : Oxford University Press.
- Nye, Joseph, S. Jr. 2002-2003. “Limits of American Power”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.117, No.4.
- Nye, Joseph.S., Jr. 2004, May/ June. “The Decline of America’s Soft Power ”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 83, No.3.
- Paul, TV. and Hall, John, A. (eds.). 1999. *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, Cambridge University Press.
- Peterson, John and Sjursen, Helene (eds). 1998. *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe*, London and New York: Routledge Press.
- Posen, Barry, R. 2003, Summer. “Command of the Coomons:The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony”, *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 5–46.
- Raab, Cristophe, “ The consequences of the Iraq crisis on the European Security and Defence Policy”, EU Policy Network, available at <http://www.europeananalysis.org.uk/research/raab1.pdf>
- Rahman, Sabeel. 2002, Summer. “Another New World Order? Multilateralism in the Aftermath of September 11”, *Harvard International Review*, available at <http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/953/>
- Rengger, Nicholas, J. 2000. *International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order*, Routledge, London–New York.
- Selfa, Lance. 2001, Nov./ Dec. “ Behind the Fog of Deception / Washington's real war aims” *International Socialist Review*, available at [http://www.isreview.org/issues/20/washingtons\\_aims.shtml](http://www.isreview.org/issues/20/washingtons_aims.shtml)



- Shepherd, Alistair J. K. .2004. “EU Security and Defence Policy:After Enlargement”, *Aberystwyth Journal of World Affairs* 1, pp.19-23.
- Smith, Michael, J., 2004, “Between Two Worlds?The European Union, the United States and World Order”, *International Politics*, Vol. 41, Issue 1.
- Smith, Steve. “ The End of the Unipolar Moment: September 11 and the Future of World Order” , available at [http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/smith\\_text\\_only.htm](http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/smith_text_only.htm)
- Tyler, Patrick, E., 1992, March 8. “ U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop A One-Superpower World”, *The New York Times*.
- Keller, Bill. (2002, Dec. 15) “Pre-emption”, *The NewYork Times Magazine*.
- Kindleberger, Charles. 1973. *The World in Depression,1929-39*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Klare, Michael T. 2003, January 16. “The Coming War With Iraq: Deciphering the Bush Administration’s Motives,” *Foreign Policy In Focus*.
- Kupchan, Charles.A. 2003, May 22. “New World Order: Not Only OneWill Win”, *Die Zeit*.
- Osborne, David. 2003, April 7. “The future ain’t what it used to be”, *Independent Review*.
- Wallace, William. “Living with the Hegemon: European Dilemmas”, Social Science Research Council, available at [http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/wallace\\_text\\_only.htm](http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/wallace_text_only.htm)
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics* , Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Waltz, Kenneth, N. 2000, Summer. “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, *International Security*, Vol.25, No.1.
- Weisman, Steven R. 2003, March 23. “ Iraq War Entrenches Policy of Pre-Emption”, *The NewYork Times*, B1.
- Varwick, Johannes . 2002. “Warum Spricht Europa außenpolitisch nicht mit einer Stimme?”, *Gesellschaft-Wirtschaft-Politik* 51:4, pp. 401-407
- Yorkan, Arzu. 2004, Winter. “European Union Security and Defense Policy after September 11”, *Journal of International Studies*, Vol.3, No. 2.

### ***Web Sources***

The Center for Defense Information: <http://www.cdi.org>

Clinton Foundation: <http://www.clintonfoundation.org>

CNN International: <http://www.cnn.com>

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France: <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr>

The EU official web site: <http://www.europa.eu.int>

The European Parliament: <http://www.europarl.eu.int>

Delegation of the European Commission-USA: <http://www.eurunion.org>

German Information Source: <http://www.germany-info.org>

German Embassy-London: <http://www.german-embassy.org.uk>

NATO official web site: <http://www.nato.int>

The UK Government: <http://www.number10.gov.uk>

The U.S. Department of State: <http://www.state.gov>

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: <http://www.sipri.org>

The UN official web site: <http://www.un.org>

The Institute for Security Studies: <http://www.iss-eu.org>

The US government: <http://www.whitehouse.gov>

The World Trade Organization: <http://www.wto.org>

### ***Other Sources***

- Archick, Kristin. 2005, May 2. "The European Union in 2005 and Beyond", Congressional Research Service(CRS) Report RS21757.
- Archick, Kristin. 2005, June 10. "The European Union's Constitution", Congressional Research Service(CRS) Report RS21618.
- Beason, Mark. 2004, August. "The Rise of the 'Neocons' and the Evolution of American Foreign Policy", University of Queensland, Asia Research Centre Working Paper No.107.
- "CFSP Confronting Iraq", Institute Note, Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 3 March 2003.

- Dassù, Marta. 2002, November. “ Iraq – If Or When?” – “How To Deal With Iraq: European Perceptions”, European Security Forum Working Paper No. 9.
- “Democracies facing terrorism”, Document 9225, Report of the Political Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe, Rapporteur: Terry Davis. Recommendation 1534 adopted by the Assembly of the Council of Europe on 26 September 2001, available at <http://www.assembly.coe.int>
- Ebertowski, Marieanne. 2004, May. , “The European Common Foreign And Security Policy in the Wake Of The Iraq Crisis”, Heinrich Böll Foundation EU Regional Office, Brussels, this brochure is available at [http://www.fluesseverbinden.net/download/beyond\\_the\\_great\\_divideEN.pdf](http://www.fluesseverbinden.net/download/beyond_the_great_divideEN.pdf)
- “Europe and the war in Iraq” Document 9768, Report: Political Affairs Committee, Rapporteur: Mr Andreas Gross. Recommendation 1603 adopted by the Assembly of the Council of Europe, 3 April 2003, available at <http://www.assembly.coe.int>
- “Europe and the new United States national security strategy” , Document A/1819, Report: Political Committee, Rapporteur: Mr de Puig, adopted by the Assembly Of Western European Union, Forty-Ninth Session, 4 June 2003, available at [http://assemblyweu.itnetwork.fr/en/documents/sessions\\_ordinaires/rpt/2003/1819.html](http://assemblyweu.itnetwork.fr/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2003/1819.html)
- European Commission Booklet, *Key facts and figures about Europe and the Europeans*, May 2005, available at [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/eu\\_glance/51/en.doc](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/eu_glance/51/en.doc)
- *The European Union and the World*, European Commission official publication, 2001, Brussels.
- European Parliament Fact Sheets, “Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the WEU”, available at [http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/6\\_1\\_3\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/6_1_3_en.htm)
- European Parliament Iraq Debate, speech by Chris Patten, Brussels, 20 March 2003, available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/news/patten/sp03\\_148.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp03_148.htm)
- Fedorov, Yuri E. 2003, October “ ‘Old’ And ‘New’ Europe: A View From Russia”, European Security Forum Working Paper, No. 14.
- Foreign Policy Association Lecture by Charles Kupchan, 2003, February 20, available at: [http://www.fpa.org/topics\\_info2414/topics\\_info\\_show.htm?doc\\_id=150659](http://www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topics_info_show.htm?doc_id=150659)

- Gallis, Paul. 2005, January 10. “France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations”, Congressional Research Service RL32464, Report for Congress.
- Gordon, Philip, H. “ Iraq: the Transatlantic Debate”, Occasional Papers No.39, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris.
- Griffiths, Martin. 2003, Sep./Oct. “Self-Inflicted Wounds – US Grand Strategy and the War on Terror”, refereed paper presented to the Australian Political Studies Association Conference, , available at <http://www.utas.edu.au/government/APSA/MGriffithsfinal.pdf>
- Mason, Barnaby. 2003, January 30, “Analysis: Europe’s Divisions laid bare”, BBC News, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2709435.stm>
- Neugart, Felix and Luciani, Giacomo. 2003, March. “Toward a European Strategy for Iraq”, CAP Policy Paper.
- Ortega, Martin. 2002, December. “Iraq: A European Point of View”, Occasional Paper, No.40, EU Institute of Security Studies, Paris.
- “One Year on: lessons from Iraq”, Chaillot Paper no.68, EU Institute for Security Studies, March 2004.
- Patten, Chris. 2003, April 17. “Keynote Address on European Union Foreign Policy”, National Europe Centre Paper No. 92.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2005, Chapter 8: Military expenditure, available at <http://yearbook2005.sipri.org/ch8/ch8>
- Wilga , Maciej. 2004, December. “Common Foreign and Security Policy and its member states vis-à-vis the Iraq crisis” , prepared for presentation at a joint meeting of the permanent research group ‘Europa’ and the ongoing PhD seminar series of the Political Science Department, University of Southern Denmark, available at [www.sam.sdu.dk/~mwi/Wilga,%20CFSP%20and%20Iraq%20crisis-15.12.04.pdf](http://www.sam.sdu.dk/~mwi/Wilga,%20CFSP%20and%20Iraq%20crisis-15.12.04.pdf)
- Wood, Stephan. 2003, June 13. “The Iraq War: Five European Roles”, National Europe Centre Paper No. 112 .
- Wohlforth, William C, “Transatlantic Relations in a Unipolar World”, Dartmouth College Occasional Paper No. 41.