

**CHALLENGING THE BALANCE OF POWER THEORY WITHIN THE
POST-COLD WAR PERIOD: ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

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JANUARY 2010

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
IZMIR UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS

BY
AHMET TOPRAK

IN PARTIAL FULLFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ART
IN
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

JANUARY 2010

ABSTRACT

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This thesis analysis the ill-functioning character of the balance of power theory within the post-Cold War period. While trying to falsify the balance of power theory, the thesis aims at underlying the alliance behaviors of the European Union (EU) member states and role of the United States in the post-Cold War period. Instead of balancing, the thesis points out the bandwagoning alliance behavior as the guiding motive of the EU member states. According to the balance of power theory simply, if one state appears to grow too strong, others will ally against it so as to avoid threats to their own independence. So according to the balance of power theory states choose their alliance behavior in terms of power. But during the post-Cold period alliance decisions of the EU member states are taken in terms of threat rather than power. Although power is an important factor for all actors within the system, states choose to ally mainly in response to threat.

Key Words: Balance of power, balance of threat, bandwagon, unipolar international order, European Union, post-Cold War international order.

ÖZET

GÜÇ DENGESİ TEORİSİNİN SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI DÖNEMDE SORGULANMASI: AMERİKA BİRLEŞİK DEVLETLERİ VE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN RÖLÜ

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Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Yücel Bozdağlıođlu

Bu tez, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde güç dengesi teorisinin geçerliliğini sorgulamaktadır. Güç dengesi teorisinin geçerliliđi sorgulanırken, Avrupa Birliđi'nin Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde yükselen Amerikan hegemonyası karşısındaki duruşu ve ittifak tercihleri de incelenmektedir. Teori, uluslararası sistem içerisinde, gücün dağılımını bozan devlet(ler) karşısında oluşturulacak bir güç dengesini öngörmektedir. Yalnız Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Avrupa Birliđi üyesi ülkeler oluşturdukları ittifaklarda güç yerine tehdit unsurunu ön plana çıkarmışlardır. İttifak tercihlerinde güç her ne kadar önemli bir yere sahip olsa da devletler söz konusu durumlarda tehdit unsurunu ön planda tutmayı tercih etmektedirler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güç dengesi, tek kutuplu dünya sistemi, Avrupa Birliđi, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönem.

To my family...

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I would like to thank my thesis advisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yücel Bozdağlıođlu for his guidance and suggestions throughout this study. I am very grateful for his valuable comments, support and suggestions.

I also would like to thank Ceyda Basmacı for her endless support.

I am very thankful to my parents for giving me all their support and making me the person that I am.

And finally to Yasemin Erdiñç for being there with me...

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LIST OF ABBREVIATION

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

ECB European Central Bank

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSS National Security Strategy

DPG Defense Planning Guidance

EEC European Economic Community

EU European Union

GNP Gross National Product

PRC Peoples Republic of China

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

UN United Nations

UNC United Nations Command

UNSC United Nations Security Council

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union also put an end to the Cold War period that lasted for more than 40 years. Not only a great power has been dissolved but also the international system of post-1945 era has been transformed from bipolarity to unipolarity. Dissolution of the Soviet Union leaves the United States as the only superpower and breaks down the stability of the international order. According to Layne, the United States manages to impose strength in all categories of great power capability: not only in military both also in economy, politics and culture. So, this makes the United States gain a preeminent role in the international politics against militarily powerful Russia or economically strong Japan and Germany.¹ So with the end of the Cold War period, keeping its preponderance and preserving the unipolar international system becomes an important policy behavior for the United States.

This policy behavior also officially takes place in Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for Fiscal Years 1994 – 1999. The document states that:

We (the United States) must account sufficiently for the interest of the large industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political or economic order and that we must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.²

Yet, for most of the scholars the United States' efforts to preserve the unipolar international order stands to be futile. The reason is that; according to what the balance of power theory predicts, the rising power of the United States will be

¹ Layne, Christopher, *The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise*, *International Security*, Vol.17, No.4. (Spring, 1993), pp. 5.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

balance by the other actors within the international order. So, together with the end of the Cold War the balance of power theory predicts the states to balance the rising power of the United States so as to provide the necessary equilibrium within the system. But all through the post-Cold War period instead of balancing, states choose to bandwagon with the United States.

The aim of this thesis is to accentuate the ill-functioning structure of the balance of power theory not only in the post-Cold War period but also in the Cold War period. While doing so, the alliance behaviors of the EU member states will be examined. Their alliance behavior to bandwagon with the United States will be given by the examples relating to the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.

The first chapter of the thesis underlines the balance of power theory. Various usages of the theory will be emphasized in order to dissolve the intricacies in understanding the balance of power theory. Also bandwagoning will be indicated as the critique of the theory.

The Second Chapter focuses on the Cold War period. Declining supremacy of the European continent in conjunction with the two world war are going to be discussed. Also Stephens Waltz balance of threat theory will be given in order to illuminate the alliance behaviors of the Western European states. Much emphasis will be laid on Korean War as a case study to see the Western European states to choose bandwagoning alliance behavior.

In the third Chapter, the September 11 attacks will be given along with the Afghanistan and the Iraq War of the United States. The attention will be drawn to the bandwagoning alliance decisions of the EU member states.

CHAPTER I

DEFINING THE TERM: BALANCE OF POWER

(1.1.) Balance of Power Theory

Balance of power theory stands at the center of most of the debate made by the scholars on international politics. It is not only because the balance of power theory turns out to be the oldest and the most venerable concept but also locates itself at the core of the most international relations theories. When deeply examined, it is true to underline the balance of power theory to have a great influence on scholars and also on statesmen and contested by nearly all the international relations theories.⁵

According to Wohlforth and his colleagues, the role of the balance of power theory in today's world is as central as it has been all through the period since the Enlightenment.⁶ But what is the reason that has kept the balance of power theory alive at the heart of world politics since the eighteen century? What makes the balance of power theory “either the approach of choice or the focus of criticism”⁷ between the scholars? Norris gives a brief answer to that question. He underlines that, despite the opposite stand the balance of power theory displays, influence of the theory on other paradigms and international relations theories and the aim of the

⁵ Sangiovanni, Mette Eilstrup, The End of Balance of Power Theory? A Comment on Wohlforth et al.'s 'Testing Balance of Power Theory in World History', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.15, No.2, 2009, pp.347.

⁶ Wohlforth, William C., Little, Richard, Kaufman, Stuart J., Kang, David, Charles, Jones A., Tin-Bor Hui, Victoria, Eckstein, Arthur, Deudney, Daniel, Brenner, William L., Testing Balance of Power Theory in World History, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.13, No.3, 2007, pp.155

⁷ Norris, David A., Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era, Master of Art Thesis submitted to the College of Arts and Science of Ohio University, pp. 15, <http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/send-pdf.cgi/Norris%20David.pdf?acc_num=ohiou1015857663>, visited on January 15, 2008.

scholars to make the critique of the balance of power theory and take it as their starting point to keep the validity of the theory to stay alive for centuries.⁸

Although, scholars try to prove the validity of the balance of power theory by either making it their starting point or simply by criticizing the theory within their studies; is it possible to name balance of power still applicable in today's world; especially for the post-Cold War period? As Waltz puts in words, is the balance of power theory still the most distinctive political theory of international politics?⁹ Can the theory still be named as the only guide for statesmen that keeps its relevance also in the atomic ages as George Kennan underlines?¹⁰ The year 1991 proved us the opposite about all those assumptions made by the scholars. During the Cold War period, with the United States and the Soviet Union forming the two poles; balance of power theory guided the political system of international relations. In 1991 together with the end of the Cold War, political system of the three centuries also came to an end. End of the Cold War also ends the balance of power.¹¹

Balance of power theory has an undeniable impact on international politics, but the theory has deficiencies in defining the allegedly international order of post-Cold War period. Before underlining those deficiencies, sketching the meanings of the balance of power theory is important in order to give the answer we seek within this thesis.

⁸ Ibid., pp.15.

⁹ Waltz, Kenneth N., *Theory of International Politics*, McGraw-Hill, 1979, pp. 117.

¹⁰ Haas, Ernst, B, *The Balance of Power as a Guide to Policy-Making*, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol.15, No.3, (August 1953), pp.372-373.

¹¹ Krastev, Ivan, *The Crisis of the Post-Cold War European Order*, Brussels Forum Paper Series, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, (March 2008), pp.5, <http://www.gmfus.org/brusselsform/2008/doc/krastev_web.pdf>, visited on October 10, 2009.

(1.2.) Complexity of the term

Trying to define the term balance of power by making a single definition seems quite impossible; mostly because of the ambiguity of this concept. Instead, besides its abundance, underlining the multiple meanings of the term helps dissolving the complexity in understanding the term balance of power.

Inis L. Claude, in his work *Power and International Relations* tries to show all of the different usages of the term aiming to reach a single definition of the balance of power theory. He gives A. F. Pollard's work *The Balance of Power* as an example in which Pollard tries to define the possible meanings that can be attached to the balance of power. Pollard starts by using dictionary definitions of the component words of the balance of power in order to reach a conclusion. But at the end of his work, he concludes that: "the balance of power may mean almost anything; and it is used not only in different senses by different people or in different senses by the same people at different times, but in different senses by the same person at the same time."¹²

Robert Gilpin's book, *War and Change in World Politics*, can be pointed out as one of the examples where balance of power is used in different meanings by the same person. In the first part of his book, Gilpin materializes balance of power as a structure that shapes the international system.

Throughout history, three forms of control or types of structure have characterized international systems. The first structure is imperial or hegemonic: A single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in the system...The second structure is a bipolar structure in

¹² Claude, Inis L. Jr, *Power and International Relations*, A Random House Books, Fourth Printing, February 1965, pp. 12.

which two powerful states control and regulates interactions within and between their respective spheres of influence...The third type of structure is a balance of power in which three or more states control one another's actions through diplomatic maneuver, shifting alliances, and open conflict.¹³

In the first part of his book, Gilpin underlines balance of power as a structure where more than two states' interaction takes place within the international system. So he presented balance of power as a structure that shapes a multipolar international order. But in the epilogue, Gilpin discusses five types of destabilizing factors of bipolar system:

The first potentially destabilizing factor is the danger that one of the pair (like Sparta prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War) will fail to play its balancing. Through neglect, it permits a dangerous shift in the balance of power to take place. As long as the United States and the Soviet Union maintain a system of mutual deterrence, this is unlikely to happen.¹⁴

Within the epilogue, Gilpin defines the balance of power structure to take place between two states. According to Gilpin, the existing balance between the two poles must be preserved in order to keep the bipolar international order stable.

Like Gilpin, many other scholars stress different meanings of the balance of power concept even within the same work of their own. However it is not the scholars but the term balance of power itself is the source of the existing complexity which makes it difficult to point out a single definite meaning. So, this complexity leaves us no choice but to exhibit the various usages of the term in the way of defining the balance of power concept. Highlighting the different meanings will give

¹³ Gilpin, Robert, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press 2002, pp. 29.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 235.

us the chance to sketch the limits of the term and put us a step forward in understanding and clearly defining the concept and how it is used within this paper.

Balance of power concept can be traced back to early works of the scholars in the fields of international relations. Scholars try materializing the concept according to the need of their era. Depending on the needs, balance of power is sometimes defined as; an equal distribution of power, representing the pairs of a scale, among the European Princes or a pure action taken by a state to prevent its neighbor to become strong enough to threaten its existence. Fenelon, for example, in 1835 defines the balance of power as the system where no states have absolute mastery and dominance over the others. Then nearly a century after his definition Pollard in 1923 defines the term as the power of two states or aggressors that are equally balanced. So balance of power is sometimes defined as the tool that supplies the exact equilibrium or presents the stability of the existing power relations within the system.¹⁵

Like his premises Ernst Haas, Hans J. Morgenthau, Inis L. Claude and Kenneth Waltz are some of the scholars who also loaded several meanings on balance of power. According to their ideas, balance of power may mean almost everything; the term sometimes represents stability and instability, sometimes peace and war and even the universal law of history.¹⁶ Kenneth Waltz tries to underline the multiple meanings of the term in order to highlight the confusion that the term contains. He finds out that: "...the balance of power" is sometimes a frightening, sometimes a bewildering phrase. People differ on whether it is good or bad, on who

¹⁵ Zinnes, Dina A, An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 4, No. 3. (1967), pp. 271-272.

¹⁶ Haas, "The Balance of Power Prescription, Concept of Propaganda," pp. 442-477.

has approved it and who has not, and even on whether or not it exists.”¹⁷ And what is more important, he named all the efforts which aim dissolving the confusion the term carries as “quixotic”.¹⁸

Different examples about the definition of the term prove us that the scholars use the balance of power in various different meanings where on the one hand it is used as a guide for the statesmen; as the best way to guarantee the security of the states and the peace all around the world. On the other hand, some of the scholars see balance of power as a tool for statesmen to disguise their imperialist policies and point it as the main source of the wars all around the globe.¹⁹ Besides all those different meanings the scholars loaded on balance of power, most of them used the term for a common purpose. Between the scholars balance of power was used as a guide in explaining the international politics.

(1.3.) Defining the Balance of Power

Underlining the various meanings of the term not only gives us a chance to see the different meanings attached to the balance of power concept but also makes us to realize the limits of it. Now we can frame all those different approaches in order to point out a single definition of the balance of power theory and how it is used. Despite the many different ways the scholars defined the balance of power over the centuries, one of the main assumptions the realist theory underlines about the balance of power is the role of the states within the anarchic international order. According to

¹⁷ Waltz, Kenneth N., *Man the State and War, A Theoretical Analysis*, Columbia University Press, 2001, pp. 199.

¹⁸ Waltz, “Theory of International Politics,” pp. 115.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*,” pp. 117.

the theory, states stand to be the most important actors and the military power they have is the primary dynamic that holds the balance of power theory on foot.²⁰

According to Waltz, a balance of power theory must begin with the assumption about states. Within this context, states are the primary actors who at least try to preserve their own security or at most have the intention for a universal domination:²¹

States have many objectives. Some states may aim at the conquest of the world; other states may aim at a local hegemony, and while others may aim at no hegemony at all but the desire of all states is to survive. Even a state that wants to conquer the world wants also, as a minimum, to continue its present existence. If all states wanted simply to survive, then none would need to maintain military forces for use in either defensive or offensive action. But whenever some states give the impression that survival does not exhaust their political ambitions, others are forced, logically, to look to their defenses.²²

With the states standing at the center of the balance of power theory, the core meaning of the theory arises. According to the theory, hegemonies within a multistate system do not form as their relatively high power constitute a direct threat for the other leading states and force them to apply a balancing behavior within the anarchic international order.²³ Joseph M. Grieco interprets that “international anarchy is the principle force shaping the motives and actions of states.”²⁴ So anarchic structure of the world not only shapes the actions of the states but also takes its place at the core of the balance of power theory. For that reason, before understanding

²⁰ Işıksal, Hüseyin, To What Extend, Complex Interdependence Theorists Challenge to Structural Realist School of International Relations, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.3, No.2&3, Summer&Fall 2004, pp. 134.

²¹ Waltz, “Theory of International Politics,” pp. 108.

²² Waltz, “Man the State and War,” pp. 203-204.

²³ Wohlforth, Little, Kaufman, Kang, David, Jones, Tin-Bor Hui, Eckstein, Deudney, Brenner, “Testing Balance of Power Theory in World History”, pp.156.

²⁴ Grieco, M., Joseph, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, International Organization, Vol. 42, No.3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 487.

what the balance of power is, leaving no doubts about the definition of international anarchy stands to be a must. One must understand the anarchic structure of the world in order to fully understand the term balance of power in international politics.

According to Kenneth Waltz, international structure is composed of two different ordering principles. He underlines those principles as hierarchy and anarchy. In a hierarchical system relations between the actors are legally organized with the laws and the integrity of the system is protected constitutionally. Unlike hierarchy, in an anarchic international system, there are no laws organizing the relations of the actors. Waltz's definition of international anarchy with the example he gives can be named as the simplest way to define the term. According to Waltz states should guarantee their own security in order to survive within the international order.

A man attacked by would-be thieves on Main Street may fairly hope that the police will either thwart the attackers or recover the loot. The chances of getting away with the crime are sufficiently small to reduce such incidents well below the point at which the ordinary citizen begins to carry arms. States, however, do not enjoy even an imperfect guarantee of their security unless they set out to provide it for themselves.²⁵

Besides its simplicity, Waltz's example underlines the absence of an "authority" that has to be situated above all the states within the international structure. Contrary to a citizen, states are forced "to carry arms" in order to preserve their security and most importantly survive within this anarchic order. There exists no such "authority" that has the power to ensure the security and integrity of the existing states within the international system. As a result, self-help becomes the ordering

²⁵ Waltz, "Man the State and War," pp. 200-201.

principle of state actions in an anarchic international order. Then the major problem arises at this point. Intentionally or not, states do not carry the identical objective which is only to guarantee their security and existence within the international order.

According to Waltz, the actions of the states are determined by their capabilities. All states are forced to preserve their own safety and interests due to the lack of a higher authority. So the most capable states compared to their rivals prevail while the others become vulnerable. Besides the identical functions all states have, it is not possible for them to perform it in equal standards. It is because, while trying to provide their security states act unequally as they have distinct resources to channel in.²⁶

Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so-or live at the mercy of their military more vigorous neighbors. Among states, the state of nature is a state of war...Like among men, among states anarchy, or the absence of government, is associated with the occurrence of violence.²⁷

In other words, Waltz contends that anarchy represents an ordering principle of the international system that he defines it as: “the enduring anarchic character of international millennia.”²⁸ Therefore, Waltz, sees anarchy as an unchangeable, ‘enduring’ force. So the character of the states, under anarchy, is identical but the ways they perform it vary due to differences in their capabilities. So the primary function of all states turns out to be the preservation of their survival within the anarchic international order.

²⁶ Norris, “Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era”, pp. 18.

²⁷ Waltz, “Theory of International Politics,” pp. 102.

²⁸ Ibid., pp.102.

But the critiques of the balance of power theory argue that anarchy is not necessarily the ordering principle of the international system as Waltz underlines. According to Randall Schweller, it is not the anarchic structure but the intentions of states that become the source of threat within the system.

...if all states seek the minimum of power needed for security, threats sufficient to provoke balancing behavior will not arise in the first place...anarchy among units wishing to survive does not mean that war is always possible, and states that do not pursue security will not be punished by the system.²⁹

Starting from the point that states are the rational actors within the international system, Schweller points that if preserving their security is the only purpose of the states then there will not be any reasons for wars. Instead of anarchic order controlling the behaviors of the states, they decide whether to struggle or cooperate in terms of their interests. So, he underlines the reasons for wars arise not because of the anarchic structure of the international order but the aggressive intentions of the states. Like Schweller, critiques of the balance of power theory share the idea that, "...anarchy does not fashion an automatic propensity for states to conflict, at least not if we assume that their motivation is merely their own security."³⁰

(1.4.) The Balance of Power: A System of International Relations

As we underlined, according to the balance of power theory, anarchic international system forces states to provide their own security above all other objectives they may have. While providing their security states are forced to avoid

²⁹ Schweller, Randall L., Neo-Realism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?, Security Studies, Vol.5 Issue.3, Spring 1996, pp.116-119

³⁰ Norris, "Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era", pp. 26.

forming hegemonic coalitions because the balancing behavior prevents states to do so. As Sweeney and Fritz underlines, balancing turns out to be the behavior of great power alliances.³¹ So the anarchic structure of the international system forces states to create a balance in which no state can exhibit hegemonic intentions. The main aim of the created balance is to preserve the existing power relations of the international structure. Joseph Nye formulates this idea as: "...the balance of power predicts that if one state appears to grow too strong, others will ally against it so as to avoid threats to their own independence."³² What Nye underlines is the behavior of the balance of power that forms the structure of the system of states. In the light of all we underlined below, the true function of the balance of power turns out to be the distribution of the political power within the international order. With the function the balance of power has, scholars define the term as a system of international relations that organizes the existing power relations of the states within the international order.

The balance of power system is aptly characterized as an alliance system. States struggling for what they regard as appropriate places in the distribution of power discover readily enough that they can enhance their power not only by the "natural" method of building up their own resources, but also by an "artificial" method of linking themselves to the strength of other states.³³

For the balance of power system, security simply refers to the survival of the state itself. According to what we have discussed above, the survival, so the security, of the state is connected with how much power the state has in relation to others. But then the question of states which has little power, compared to others, arouses.

³¹ Sweeney, Kevin, Fritz, Paul, Jumping on the Bandwagon: An Interest-Based Explanation for Great Power Alliances, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol.66, No.2, May 2004, pp. 429.

³² Nye, Joseph S. Jr., The Changing Nature of World Power, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 105, No. 2. (Summer, 1990), pp. 184.

³³ Claude, "Power and International Relations," pp. 89.

According to scholars, balance of power stands as a strong tool, even for the states which have relatively less power, to make all states feel secure within the international structure. States, whether they are weak or strong, survive "...either by expanding their own capabilities (internal balancing) or by forming alliances (external balancing)"³⁴ within the international system.

Besides the different ideas underlined by the scholars, it is clear that preserving and protecting the security of states within the balance of power system, with no doubt, stands as the common idea the scholars agree on. So, according to most of the scholars security simply stands as the fundamental objective of the balance of power system.³⁵ Although scholars have consensus on the idea that security stands as the guiding motive of the system; they differentiate about "what kind of a system?" balance of power will be.

Some scholars saw in the balance of power system a roughly equal distribution of power between two "scales," while others insisted that one or several states must remain outside the match in order to act as "balancers," i.e., "throw their weight" into whichever scale proved to be the weaker in the actual or potential conflict.³⁶

Claude divides the balance of power system into three categories. He differentiates those categories according to the different equilibrating functions the system poses. According to his idea, equilibrium within the balance of power system can be obtained automatically, semi-automatically and manually.³⁷ At the automatic version of the balance of power system, equilibrium is maintained by the system

³⁴ Sangiovanni, "The End of Balance of Power Theory? A Comment on Wohlforth et al.'s 'Testing Balance of Power Theory in World History'", pp.347.

³⁵ Chatterjee, "The Classical Balance of Power Theory", pp. 51.

³⁶ Haas, "The Balance of Power as a Guide to Policy-Making," pp. 371.

³⁷ Claude, "Power and International Relations," pp. 45

where no single actor has the power to interfere. According to this assumption equilibrium in the system is produced by without actually the will of the states. States act as the system forces them. So equilibrium forms like a law and becomes the ultimate result of the balance of power system.³⁸ Morton Kaplan also gives the example of Adam Smith's 'unseen hand' of the laissez-faire economic system, while defining the automatic function of the balance of power which he named it as the 'ideal form'.

...the system tends to be maintained by the fact that even should any nation desire to become predominant itself, it must, to protect its own interest, act to prevent any other nations from accomplishing such an objective. Like Adam Smith's "unseen hand" of competition, the international system is policed informally by self-interest, without the necessity of a political subsystem.³⁹

Scholars who defend the semi-automatic version of balance of power system believe that it is not possible for states to rely on the competitive structure of the international system to maintain balance without any intervention by them. Instead of waiting for the system to act automatically, some states feel obliged to take action in order to create the needed balance within the system.⁴⁰ As Waltz underlines "a balance of power may exist because some countries consciously make it the end of their policies..."⁴¹ According to his idea, besides –what he named– the ordinary members within the system, there must be a powerful state within the balance of power system that has capability to arrange the relations in order to hold the system at balance. At the semi-automatic version, ordinary member act automatically as the system forces them to do so. But the automatic character of the system is obtained

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 46.

³⁹ Kaplan, "Balance of Power, Bipolarity and Other Models of International Systems," pp. 690.

⁴⁰ Rosecrane, "Has Realism Become a Cost-Benefit Analysis," pp. 134.

⁴¹ Waltz, "Man the State and War," pp. 208.

according to the decision of a powerful state that “committed itself to the process of equilibration.”⁴² Besides both automatic and semi-automatic function of the balance of power system, Claude underlines the manually operating function of the balance of power system. At this version of the system, the process of equilibration is left to decisions of states within the system. All actors in the system operate on behalf of the balance of power system aiming to form the equilibrium. So, the system is actually controlled by the decisions of the statesmen.⁴³

Between all three versions, Waltz believes that the balance of power system functions automatically. He underlines that states may choose to act against a rising power (hegemon) or decides to do nothing; but the system in both cases works for the survival of the system. So it is not necessary for states to make balance of power as their “conscious goal”; because in those cases the balance of power system works on behalf of the states.⁴⁴ The rationale behind this is the production of a stable equilibrium within independent states where no central authority do exists.

Although Waltz stresses the automatic and semi-automatic character of the balance of power as the system of international relations and most scholars have traditionally accepted the view that balance of power is the ordering principle through which states balance against a threatening rising power; the critiques of the theory contend that the validity of the balance of power theory has diminished over the centuries. According to their idea, “paradoxically, besides balancing, practitioners through the ages have held a bandwagoning image of international

⁴² Claude, “Power and International Relations,” pp. 48.

⁴³ Ibid., pp.48-49.

⁴⁴ Waltz, “Man the State and War,” pp. 208.

politics.”⁴⁵ So, contrary to what Waltz, Haas, Kaplan and many other scholars highlighted, critiques believe that balance of power is not the ordering principle of the system.

(1.5.) Bandwagoning as the Dominant Alliance Behavior

As an international alliance behavior the term bandwagoning was firstly used by Kenneth Waltz.⁴⁶ In his view, bandwagoning stands to be on the opposite side of balancing where bandwagoning means joining the stronger side and balancing means allying with the weaker side.

In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit and power. Because power is a means and not an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions...if states wishes to maximize power, they would join the stronger side...this does not happen because balancing, not bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system.⁴⁷

Waltz underlines that anarchic structure of the system forces states to choose balancing behavior. This is because security stands to be the primary concern of states within the structure. He coincides bandwagoning behavior with the states aim to increase power and gain profit and balancing behavior simply to obtain their security. What is more, by giving the example of secondary states he tries empowering the balancing behavior against bandwagoning.⁴⁸ He defines secondary states, “if they are free to choose, they flock to the weaker side because it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side he believes they are more

⁴⁵ Schweller, Randall L., Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No.1, (Summer 1994), pp. 72.

⁴⁶ Bandwagoning was for the first time used as an international alliance behavior at Kenneth Waltz’s book “Theory of International Politics”.

⁴⁷ Waltz, “Theory of International Politics,” pp. 126.

⁴⁸ Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In”, pp. 86-88.

appreciated and safer.”⁴⁹ So, he points secondary states that are the ones serving for great powers, to be more secure and appreciated on the weaker side. That is why weaker side (balancing behavior applies) but not the stronger side (bandwagoning behavior applies) is where he highlights for the states wishing to take their parts.

With the definition of Waltz standing at the core of the behavior, Stephen Walt redefines and develops the bandwagoning behavior of states. Like Waltz, Stephen Walt also stresses bandwagoning to stand on the opposite side of balancing.

When entering an alliance, states may either balance (ally in opposition to the principle source of danger) or bandwagon (all with the state that poses the major threat). These contrasting hypotheses depict very different worlds, and the policies that follow from each are equally distinct...Regardless of the specific motives, however, bandwagoning behavior stands in sharp contrast to the predictions of balance of power theory. The two hypotheses thus offer mutually exclusive explanations for how states will make their alliance choice.⁵⁰

According to Walt, two primary motives can be highlighted in order to explain the logic behind the bandwagoning behavior of states. The first one is states choose bandwagoning for defensive purposes. So bandwagoning is adopted as a form of appeasement policy where states choose to avoid a threat coming from the aggressor. The second reason why states choose to bandwagon concentrates on offensive purposes. Within this context states wishing to increase their strength and gain awards such as the new territories, choose to take its side with the aggressor.

In general, however, these two motives for bandwagoning are quite different. In the first, bandwagoning is chosen for defensive reasons,

⁴⁹ Ibid, pp. 87.

⁵⁰ Walt, Stephen M., Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, International Security, Vol.9, No.4, (Spring 1985), pp. 4-7.

as a means of maintaining independence in the face of a potential threat. In the second, a bandwagoning state chooses the leading side for offensive reasons, in order to acquire territory.⁵¹

Walt underlines that if balancing behavior is much more common between the states compared to bandwagoning; it means that states are more secure within the system. This is because the threatening power that upsets the existing power relations faces the joint opposition of the states. But if the behavior is the opposite and states choose to bandwagon then the security within the system is in danger because the threatening power, so aggression, is rewarded.⁵² So both Waltz and Stephen Walt underlines balancing as the dominant behavior of the states when compared with bandwagoning. But according to Walt, states choose to balance against a common threat instead of power. He underlines the alliance behaviors of the states made in terms of power as an ill-functioning one and points out the balance of threat theory in defining the alliance behaviors of the states. So according to his idea, threat but not the power stands as the guiding motive for the balancing behaviors of the states within the international system.⁵³ Although Waltz and Stephen Walt have different approaches, they agree that the primary concern of all states is simply their security and survival as the international system is anarchic. This is why the balancing behavior becomes the ultimate consequence the states reach.

Besides what both scholars highlight, Randall Schweller develops a new perspective for bandwagoning behavior by making the distinction between the states within the system as ‘satisfied’ and ‘revisionists’. According to his idea, Waltz’s argument that the primary concern of all the states is security stands to be an

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 8.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 4.

⁵³ Walt, Stephen M., *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, 1990, pp. 17 – 26.

incomplete assumption. He underlines that this assumption is only true when the satisfied states are in question. For those countries Waltz's assumption applies and their primary concern becomes their security within the system. On the other hand the classical realists explain the primary concern of the states, "...as a continuous striving for great power and expansion...to evaluate correctly the interplay of opposing forces and interests and to create a constellation favorable to conquest and expansion."⁵⁴

As he names the satisfied states are the ones that have power and prestige when compared with the revisionist ones; their primary concern becomes their security in order to protect their existing power and prestige within the system. But for revisionist states not only increasing their power but also improving their existing position in the system predominate.⁵⁵

...the most important determinant of alignment decision is the compatibility of political goals...dissatisfied powers (revisionist states), motivated by profit more than security, will bandwagon with an ascending revisionist state.⁵⁶

So, because the intentions of states vary according to their positions and expectations within the system; balancing behavior turns out to be a choice instead of being an order of the international system. Revisionist states choose bandwagoning instead of balancing with the weaker side. Or satisfied states choose balancing in order to protect their power and prestige. Both behaviors do apply and none of them can be underlined as the law of the international system as Waltz and his successors do advocate.

⁵⁴ Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In", pp. 86-87.

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 87.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 88.

Schweller points out the key assumption that "...it is not whether states balance or bandwagon – history clearly shows that they do both – but rather under what conditions states choose one strategy or the other"⁵⁷ really matters.

(1.6.) A Preliminary Conclusion: Is Balance of Power System Inevitable?

Waltz asks the question whether the balance of power is something inevitable or not? According to Waltz, the answer that must be given to this question is: "obviously not"⁵⁸. He continues as, "...if it depends on a wish for state survival in a condition of anarchy among states, then it will disappear in its present form only when the wish or the condition disappears."⁵⁹ So he believes as long as survival stands to be the primary concern of the states within the international structure and no states and statesmen consciously wish to vanish, balance of power system stands to be the only solution that must be followed. Whereas, Waltz ironically highlights that states are free to decide between balance of power theory and its alternatives. But with no hesitation, he defines the alternatives of balance of power theory equal to committing a suicide:

...pursuing a balance of power policy is still a matter of choice, but the alternatives are those of probable suicide on the one hand and the active playing of the power politics game on the other.⁶⁰

But what Schweller and other scholars point out that history proves that the opposite is true; especially for the post-Cold War period. During the post-Cold War, especially after the September 11 attacks and at the Iraq War, states chose bandwagoning rather than balance of power policy. This is especially true for the

⁵⁷ Norris, "Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era", pp. 35.

⁵⁸ Waltz, "Man the State and War," pp. 208.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 208.

⁶⁰ Waltz, "A Theoretical Analysis," pp. 205.

European Union (EU) states that bandwagoning but not balancing become the principle policy in the post-Cold War period. Norris interprets John Vasquez's idea by highlighting his words about the post-Cold War alliance behavior of the states.

Vasquez argues that:

...the balance of power was never the law Waltz thought it was. In effect, he offered an explanation of a behavioral regularity that never existed, except within the logic of the theory.⁶¹

End of the Cold War gave rise to the increasing power of the United States. The collapse of the Soviet Union gave the United States unexpected unipolarity⁶² and United States turned out to be the only superpower. So, as Layne contends, together with the end of the Cold War, "United States started imposing strength in all the categories of great power capability and started enjoying a preeminent role in international politics."⁶³

While the United States turned out to be the only superpower, the stability of international system also broke down. According to the balance of power theory, increasing power of the United States started constituting a direct threat for the EU states; like it does for all the other actors within the international structure. So, the balance of power theory anticipates the balancing decision against the rising power of the United States. But instead of balancing, EU states choose to bandwagon with the United States. It is because, instead of power, threat guides the alliance behaviors of the EU states as Stephen Walt underlines.

⁶¹ Norris, "Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era", pp. 34.

⁶² Ambrosio, Thomas, *Challenging America's Global Preeminence: Russia's Quest for Multipolarity*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005, pp. 15.

⁶³ Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," pp. 5.

During the Cold War period source of threat for both of the sides was clear. For the United States and also for the Western European states, Soviet Union was standing as a common threat against their security. Comparing two superpowers the United States was more powerful than the Soviet Union within all the fields.

More than the Soviet Union, the United States acted all over the globe in the name of its own security and the world's well-being. According to Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, in the roughly thirty years following the 1946, the United States used military means in one way or another to intervene in the affairs of other countries about twice as often as did the Soviet Union.⁶⁴

Unlike the Soviet Union, United States had the chance to decide within a diverse arsenal of instruments: military, economy, politics and culture. But the Soviet Union could only depend on its military and partly its ideological strength.⁶⁵ Although United States was more powerful than its opponent, it was the Soviet Union that triggered the Western European states' perception of threat. So they chose to bandwagon with the United States aiming to balance the Soviet threat. Rather than allying in response to power as the balance of power theory anticipates, Western European states choose to ally against the most threatening power by simply bandwagoning with the United States. Together with the end of the Cold War period, the Soviet threat dissolved and the United States turned out to be the only superpower. But EU states continued bandwagoning with the United States contrary to the balance of power theory anticipated. It was because, according to their perception of threat, hegemony of the United States did not constitute a threat for the security of the EU states within the international system.

⁶⁴ Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," pp. 48.

⁶⁵ Lundestad, Geir, East, West, North, South, Major Developments in International Relations Since 1945, Sage Publications, 5th Edition, 2005, pp. 2.

Balance of power theory remains insufficient in explaining both Cold War and post-Cold War periods, and bandwagoning turns out to be the guiding motive of the EU member states. Not only EU member states but also the other actors in the system choose balancing behavior in response to threat rather than power. With the dissolution of threat, balancing behavior becomes rare and bandwagoning becomes the guiding motive. So, bandwagoning turns out to become the chosen principle of states within the international politics and Kennan's thought to define the validity of the balance of power theory "to survive even within the atomic ages"⁶⁶ seems to have lost its relevance.

⁶⁶ Haas, "The Balance of Power as a Guide to Policy-Making," pp. 372-373.

CHAPTER II

COLD WAR PERIOD

At the theory chapter, to the contrary that the balance of power theory predicts, bandwagoning is defined as the dominant behavior of the states acting within the international system. The weakness of the balance of power theory in explaining the alliance behaviors of the states theoretically is highlighted with the given examples of the scholars. This chapter and the following one aim to empower the theoretical explanation of the scholars by the historical examples of the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods. Alliance behaviors of the EU member states will try to be underlined in order to understand whether they balance or simply bandwagon with the rising power of the United States. Within this context, at the end, we will have the chance to examine the role of the EU member states and the insufficiency of the balance of power theory in explaining the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.

Together with the end of the Cold War, bipolar international order that lasted more than 40 years has collapsed. Dissolution of the Soviet Union left the United States as the only superpower and broke down the stability of the bipolar international system. According to the balance of power theory, increased power of the United States started constituting a direct threat for all the states within the international system. At this point the balance of power theory predicts that EU member states balance against the rising power of the United States and consequently create equilibrium within the system. But instead of balancing, EU member states chose to bandwagon with the United States. Actually bandwagoning

behavior of the EU member states was nothing new for the post-Cold War period. During the Cold War period Western European states also chose bandwagoning as the dominant alliance behavior. Throughout the Cold War, the United States acted to obtain its self-interest and threatened the interests of all states in the system. Inarguably, without underestimating the partial role played by the structural constraints of the Cold War period on state behaviors; it can be said that Western European states chose to bandwagon with the United States.

This chapter starts with the declining supremacy of the European states and the collapse of the multipolar international order. Then Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory will be highlighted as the alternative against the so-called dominance of the balance of power theory. While defining the Cold War period, also bandwagoning behavior of Western European states against the United States will be underlined. At the end of the chapter it will be clear that, even within the Cold War period, Western European states chose bandwagoning behavior in order to survive within the international system.

(2.1.) Declining Supremacy of Europe

History proved that every legacy is incapable of bringing happiness, wealth and peace for the people all around the globe. Especially the legacy of the First World War is one of them. Despite the casualties⁷¹, which 10 million people were killed and 20 million were wounded, the world was dragged into a huge chaos that signals the changing structure of the international order. Scholars define the First

⁷¹ It is impossible to compute precisely the total casualties caused by the Great War. However, as a direct consequence of combat, it is likely that about 10 million men died. This total is roughly made up as follows: Russia 3 million; Germany 3 million; France 1.4 million; British Empire (just under) 1 million; Austria-Hungary 1 million; Italy 0.5 million. Roberts J. M., *Europe 1880-1945*, Pearson Education Limited-Longman, Third Edition, 2001, pp.253.

World War period as the most distinct example that highlights the declining supremacy of Europe.

According to James Joll, before 1914, European domination and supremacy over the entire world was accepted by all states; even for Europeans themselves. Not only European technology and ideas but also the governmental system of Europe was believed to be the best in the world.⁷² The entire world was seen as the playground for the European powers; “the problems of the Middle East were considered in terms of Anglo-French rivalry rather than in terms of interest of Arabs or Kurds or Turks or Greeks or Jews.”⁷³ What is more, non-European states were ironically searching their own survival by looking at the European methods and systems; hoping to end the worldwide domination of the European powers. In the 1900s most scholars undoubtedly described the twentieth century as the European-dominated one. According to their ideas, twentieth century would be defined as continuing imperial rivalries of the European powers with growing prosperity of the continent.⁷⁴ However, the First World War and especially the Second World War marked the declining supremacy of Europe. Destruction of wars within the European continent and rise of the United States as an economic and military power made European states face the declining supremacy of their continent. Both world wars with rising ideologies of totalitarian fascism and communism brought “the end of European empires, and the end of Europe as the arbiter of world power”.⁷⁵ European supremacy stumbled with the First World War; but it is the Second World War

⁷² Joll, James, *Europe Since 1870-An International History*, Penguin Books, Fourth Edition, 1990, pp. 272.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 272.

⁷⁴ Nye Jr., Joseph S., *Limits of American Power*, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.117, No:4 (Winter, 2002-2003), pp.547.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.547.

which marked the destruction of the continent. European states not only lost their economic but also their military powers.

During the Second World War, Europe's GNP fell nearly by 25 percent while GNP of the United States increased by more than 50 percent. According to 1950 figures Europe's per capita GNP was only half of the United States' per capita GNP with 2,536 dollars. Also Europe's share within the world manufacturing output receded. According to 1953 figures Europe was producing only 26 percent of world's manufacturing output while the United States was producing the 44.7 percent. Besides its effect on economy, the Second World War also had a negative effect on the population of the European States. Their population was no more than 15 – 16 percent of the world's total population.⁷⁶

Table 1. Total GNP and per Capita GNP of the Powers in 1950⁷⁷
(in 1964 dollars)

	Total GNP	Per Capita GNP
United States	381 billion	2,536
USSR	126 billion	699
U.K.	71 billion	1,393 (1953 Figures)
France	50 billion	1,172
West Germany	48 billion	1,001
Japan	32 billion	382
Italy	29 billion	626 (1951 Figures)

Besides its bad economy, also the military power of the European states diminished. According to 1950 figures, Britain spent 2.3 billion dollars on defense and had 680,000 personnel while France with 1.4 billion dollars

⁷⁶ Kennedy, Paul, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, First Vintage Books Edition, January 1989, pp.368-369

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.369.

and 590,000 personnel, Italy with 0.5 billion dollars and 230,000 personnel where Germany was still demilitarized. The defense expenditures of Britain, France and Italy with a total of 4.2 billion dollars were less than the United States with 14.5 billion dollars spending on defense expenditures and had 1.38 million military personnel.⁷⁸ It was the United States that came out of the War; holding the superiority in a wide range of technologies essential to modern warfare; with its navy, air and land forces and especially its monopoly over the atomic bomb.⁷⁹

Now it turned out to be the European continent that became the arena of struggle between the two rising superpowers of the 1945 period: the United States and the Soviet Union. It was for the first time since the beginning of the state system of international relations in the seventeenth century, the political center of gravity moved outside of Europe.⁸⁰

It was no longer European powers that had the capability to decide on behalf of the world. Especially after the end of the Second World War, aside from imposing their strength on world affairs, European powers were hardly capable of determining their own future. They were given two alternatives to decide; whether to take their side with the United States or the Soviet Union. According to Paul Kennedy, with the end of the Second World War, France and Italy already lost their powers. Germany's aim for seizing the mastery in Europe was collapsing. What is more, despite the

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp.369.

⁷⁹ Painter David S., Leffler Melvyn P., *The International System and the Origins of the Cold War*, in Painter David S., Leffler Melvyn P. eds., "Origins of the Cold War – An International History", Routledge Publication, Second Edition, 2005, pp. 1.

⁸⁰ Norris, "Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 20.

efforts of Churchill, Britain had already lost its fame to be named as the empire on which the sun never sets.⁸¹

Only in one respect did the European hegemony survive, yet it was crucial. As the men of 1945 looked around for guidance and landmarks in a world of new possibilities, they discern two sources of hope and enlightenment. One was the tradition of liberal nationalism, the other, Marxist communism; both were European. Inspired by them, and armed with inventions and practical knowledge from the same source, the people of the post-European age faced an alarming future in 1945.⁸²

Joll even defined the end of the Second World War as the end of the European history. According to him, although European problems and especially the problem of Germany stood at the center of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union for more than forty years; events outside European continent became increasingly important for the development of international relations.⁸³ Together with the Second World War, the power system dominated by the European powers was in ruins. Most of the people were even skeptical about the survival of the European states.⁸⁴ World War II was resulted by the death of 50-60 million people. At the end of the war, people were tired of fighting, giving casualties, and most horribly they witnessed the explosion of atomic bombs over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and over Nagasaki on 9 August 1945, the first killing 68,000 and the second 38,000; although by the end of the year the total fatalities were at least double these figures.⁸⁵

⁸¹ Kennedy, Paul, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, First Vintage Books Edition, January 1989, pp.357.

⁸² Roberts, "Europe 1880-1945," pp. 465.

⁸³ Joll, "Europe Since 1870," pp. 470.

⁸⁴ Roberts, "Europe 1880-1945," pp. 457.

⁸⁵ Nicoll, William, *Salmon Trevor, Understanding the European Union*, Pearson Education Limited, 2001, pp. 7.

During the war, decisions had been made by the three powers; the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. To a large extent, they determined the course of the war. But as the war continued, the balance between three major powers was destroyed. United Kingdom became the weakest power when compared to the United States and the Soviet Union. Huge economic resources of the United States and the massive military power of the Soviet Union prevented United Kingdom to keep its status within the alliance system of three powers.⁸⁶ When British Prime Minister Churchill was replaced by Clement Attlee, the role of the United Kingdom was further weakened without leaving a question. New foreign policy approach and the heavy burden of the war weakened the United Kingdom's power.⁸⁷ Together with the declining influence of the United Kingdom within the international order, world politics started to be characterized by the conflict between the two new superpowers: United States and the Soviet Union.

Although both the United States and the Soviet Union had been allies during the war; their competition and mutual fears polarized them only a few years right after the end of the Second World War.⁸⁸ According to Norris unfriendly relations of two superpowers were nothing new. Since 1917 relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had not been improved. They could manage to establish their diplomatic relations until 1933. However, during that period of time, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had little impact on international relations as both countries were "outsiders in international politics".⁸⁹ But the end of the Second World War marked the changing structure of the world system and the

⁸⁶ Joll, "Europe Since 1870" pp. 422.

⁸⁷ Lundestad, "East, West, North, South, Major Developments in International Relations Since 1945", pp. 4.

⁸⁸ Norris, "Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 20.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3.

role of the United States and the Soviet Union. Both powers turned out to be the main actors of the post-war period. With the end of the war, the ongoing disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union not only started to affect the international politics but also created the post-war system as well.

The traditional multipolar world of post-1880 period had collapsed. United States and the Soviet Union came out to be two superpowers. Almost as soon as their wartime alliance ended, the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves locked in a Cold War. In a world of two great powers, each is bound to focus its fears on the other, to distrust its intentions, and to impute offensive intentions even to defensive measures.⁹⁰

The Second World War not only diminished the supremacy of the European states but also ended the multipolar international system constructed in the 1800s. International politics was deeply affected by this change. It was for the first time in a world of sovereign states that bipolarity prevailed. European powers, for the first time in their history, had nothing to do; except to wait and see. Being subjects, more than actors, was something new for all of the European states. The rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as the new superpowers left the European states with no other choice but to give up their imperial ambitions. Besides creating national rivalries within the continent and seeking for colonies outside; they were forced to follow a more passive policy within the international order.⁹¹

(2.2.) The Cold War

The Cold War period can simply be defined by disagreement and dispute between two blocks formed by the United States and the Soviet Union. Besides

⁹⁰ Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," pp. 45.

⁹¹ Charillon, Frédéric, The EU as a Security Regime, *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10, 2005, pp. 519.

constituting two different blocks, competition between the superpowers had a deep ideological base. The United States and its allies, known as the West, were defending the democracy and capitalist market economy, where on the other side, the Soviet Union and its allies, known as the East, were defending communism. Within this context, for more than forty years, the Cold War dominated the foreign policy behaviors of these two superpowers and deeply affected their political, economic and military institutions. What is more, the Cold War also shaped the domestic and foreign policies of their allies and the other states within the international system.⁹²

During the Cold War period most of the scholars relied on the balance of power theory in defining the international structure. According to their ideas, the Cold War system forced the United States and the Soviet Union to form two opposing blocks aiming to balance the threatening power of each other. But the critiques of the balance of power theory underlined that the balance of power had deficiencies in defining the Cold War period. Stephen Walt was one of those scholars who introduced the balance of threat theory in explaining the alliance behaviors of the states within the international system. According to his idea, alliance decision of the states made in terms of power is an ill-functioning one as it ignores the other factors that states take into account. Although power is an important factor for all actors within the system, states choose to ally mainly in response to threat. Walt underlines that whenever the potential allies of a state are roughly equal in power, the alliance decision is made according to the threat posed by those allies. Within this context, the state chooses to ally with the side which is least dangerous for itself. Also for Walt the source of threat does not necessarily coincide with the capabilities

⁹² Painter, Leffler, "Origins of the Cold War – An International History", pp. 1.

of states. Even the weaker states have a potential to become the source of threat within the system.⁹³

...states may balance by allying with other strong states, if a weaker power is more dangerous for other reasons. Thus the coalition that defeated Germany in World War I and II were vastly superior in total resources, but united by their common recognition that German expansionism posed a greater danger.⁹⁴

Norris also empowers Walt's idea by presenting the United States and Iraq as the two examples where balance of threat theory applies. According to Norris, a very powerful state, like the United States, consciously or not, has the possibility to pose a direct threat for other actors in the system. Conversely, a less powerful state, like Iraq, might have revisionist intentions which threaten the stability of the system.⁹⁵ Arguing that power does not always stand as the source of the threat within the international system; Walt defines threat as the product of the state's aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive capability and finally the perceived aggressiveness of its intentions.⁹⁶ So, according to his idea the balance of power theory remains insufficient in explaining the alliance behaviors of states and the structure of the international system itself. Instead, he highlights the balance of threat theory in which states balance against a threatening power.

As Walt puts in word, during the Cold War period states chose to balance against a common threat. The source of the threat was clear for all actors within the international system. For the Western block, the Soviet Union was the source of

⁹³ Walt, "The Origins of Alliances", pp. 17 – 26; Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power", pp. 8 – 9; Norris, "Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 29; Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In", pp. 75 – 76.

⁹⁴ Walt, "The Origins of the Alliances", pp. 22.

⁹⁵ Norris, "Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 29.

⁹⁶ Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In", pp. 75.

threat and for the Eastern Block it was the United States constituting a direct threat to their survival. Together with the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union, other states were obliged to take their sides within one of the blocks formed by two superpowers. War time alliance of the United States and the Soviet Union dissolved and the longstanding multipolar international order was replaced by bipolarity. The distinction between the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union came into light right after the end of the Second World War. The huge policy gap between two superpowers, especially in the question of the Polish and most importantly the German problem, was obvious. Clearly, only aspect on which both superpowers agreed was to prevent the revival of the German militarism within the European continent.⁹⁷ Besides that, most of their policies were far away to come to an agreement. In February 1946 George Kennan who served as the chief adviser for US Ambassador to Moscow, later to become the Ambassador during the peak of the Cold War, warned his government about the policy gap between the United States and the Soviet Union with his famous, 5540 word, *Long Telegram*. At his telegram, he was anticipating a total chaos and the collapse of the international system because of the policies of the Soviet Union.⁹⁸

Everything possible will be done to set major Western powers against each other...In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control...we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers", pp.374.

⁹⁸ Walker Martin, *The Cold War*, Vintage Books, First Edition, 1993, pp. 31 - 40.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 40.

It was not for the first time that Kennan was warning his government about Stalin and his ideas designed to destroy the capitalist Western world. Kennan's eighteen months of warning was at last heard by the US government with his telegram and strongly influenced the containment policy underlined by the Truman Doctrine. In March 1947 President Truman made a speech pointing out a world, deciding between two different sets of ideological principles. In his speech he underlined the policy of the United States as: "to help free people to maintain their institutions and their integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon the totalitarian regimes."¹⁰⁰ With his speech, Truman was making a promise that the United States would support all states challenged by the communist threat. In the European context, supporting the states against the communist threat and helping them to maintain their institutions were mostly linked with the economic problems that the continent was facing; like food shortages and scarcity of coal. The US solution for the underlined economic problems was the Marshall Plan; which was aiming to give a huge economic aid to make the European states to stand on their feet again. With the Marshall Plan declared in 5 June 1947, the United States primarily wished the European States to empower their military security in order to fight against a common enemy: communism.

For the United States, communist threat was a dangerous challenge for the existence of the present international system. According to their ideas, European states should take a common stance against it together with the United States.¹⁰¹ With the Berlin Crisis of 1948 – 1949 communist treat and the need for a collective action became apparent. The United States increased its efforts to maintain the

¹⁰⁰ Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers", pp.372.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 376.

security of European states by fostering the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. According to Norris, creation of the NATO institutionalized the security commitment of the United States to Europe with the strategic purpose of providing the North American aid to European states against the rising Soviet threat.¹⁰² With the formation of NATO, the United States was not only providing the needed security for the European States but also forcing them to take an active role against the defined threat.

Besides forcing states to act simultaneously, Kennedy also underlined that the formation of the NATO alliance “did militarily what the Marshall Plan had done economically”; he believed the NATO alliance simply deepened the 1945 division of Europe into two camps: West and East. The Soviet answer to NATO came in 1955, when the West Germany was formally granted full sovereignty, NATO membership and the right to rearm. The Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact as a military counterweight to NATO.¹⁰³

The high tension between two superpowers and their efforts to counterbalance each other within economic, military and social fields continued all through the Cold War period. Throughout that period European states remained dependent on the military power of the United States to maintain their security. Economically, although the European states took the first step of their integration by forming the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957; they still remained incapable to reach the superpower status individually. During the Cold War period

¹⁰² Norris, “Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era,” pp. 21.

¹⁰³ Kennedy, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers”, pp.379.

European states got stuck within the bipolar international order and Europe could only become an arena of struggle for two superpowers.

Bipolar international order started to dissolve in 1985. In 1984 Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union. His leadership was signaling the upcoming change within the Cold War international order. His policies such as withdrawing the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and practicing relatively soft policies in Eastern Europe convinced Western world that the Soviet Union was changing.¹⁰⁴ After taking the Secretary General office Gorbachev started a powerful programme of 'restructuring' (perestroika) to increase economic efficiency in order to eliminate corruption and catch up with the technological development of Western countries. In strictly following these goals he allowed a limited degree of free discussion in the name of 'openness' (glasnost).¹⁰⁵ Those underlined policies of the Soviet Union were implying that communist regime did no longer constitute a threat to Western world and concluded with the independence of the Soviet republics. In 1987 Gorbachev declared that "we need democracy as fresh air."¹⁰⁶ In his speech, Gorbachev was announcing the early collapse of the Soviet Union which would be finalized by 1991.¹⁰⁷

The end of the Cold War period significantly changed the structure of the world system. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the sole superpower and transformed the bipolar international order into a unipolar one. So, basically the United States, willingly or not, became a hegemon that destroyed the

¹⁰⁴ Norris, "Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 22.

¹⁰⁵ Joll, "Europe Since 1870," pp. 490.

¹⁰⁶ Lundestad, "East, West, North, South," pp. 218.

¹⁰⁷ Norris, "Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 22.

existing power relations of the international system. Other actors within the system did not behave as the balance of power theory anticipated; instead of balancing the rising power of the United States, they continued to bandwagon. This is true not only for the post-Cold War period but also for the Cold War period as well. During the Cold War, Western European states did not balance the United States although some of its policies posed a direct threat to them and the system itself. Korean War stands to be one of the most important examples in which Western European states chose bandwagoning; although policies of the United States had direct effects on the Western European states and on the equilibrium of the international system as well.

(2.3.) The Korean War

The Korean War had a great impact on the course of the Cold War by not only resolving the incoherence which shaped the foreign and defense policies of the United States between the periods 1946 – 1950 but also affecting the policies of all other actors within the international system. According to Robert Jervis, “if the Korean War had not taken place, no other events that were likely to have occurred would have produced the effects that the Korean War did.”¹⁰⁸ In the late 1940’s the Soviet Union was perceived as a threatening but a weak and cautious power. But the Korean War changed this perception of Western powers. It was for the first time that the Soviet threat became something real for the Western block instead of being just a warning within a telegram sent by George Kennan. As the United States Secretary of Defense Louise Arthur Johnson underlined at a Congress meeting:

The very fact of this aggression...constitute(s) undeniable proof that the forces of international communism possess not only the

¹⁰⁸ Jervis, Robert, The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 4, (December 1980), pp. 563.

willingness, but also the intention, of attacking and invading any free nation within their reach at any time that they think they can get away with it. The real significance of the North Korean aggression lies in this evidence that, even at the resultant risk of starting a third world war, communism is willing to resort to armed aggression, whenever it believes it can win.¹⁰⁹

During the twentieth century Korea was seen as a pawn for the major powers in implementing their policies in the Far East. From the period 1905 to 1945, Korea was under Japanese control. During that period there had been a competition between the communists and rightists about gaining control over the country. While the Korean Communists were trying to seize the country by conducting a low-level guerrilla war against the Japanese; exiled non-Communist Koreans formed a Nationalist provisional government in Shanghai. Besides the attempts of the communists and rightists, President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt was thinking of placing Korea under international trusteeship, which would include the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and China, for forty years, as soon as Japan was defeated. In 1943, during the Tehran Conference, three major powers, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, agreed on the idea that Korea must be placed under international trusteeship before gaining its independence.¹¹⁰ But the plans for placing Korea under international trusteeship broke up in August 1945 by the Soviet Union's declaration of war against Japan. Nearly one month before the Soviet Union, in July 1945, US War Department charged General Douglas MacArthur to prepare a plan to occupy Korea. Both superpowers were holding identical intension about the future of Japan and the role of the Korea within this perspective. Two days after the Soviet declaration of war on Japan, a fix line was drawn to divide Korea into two equal parts: North for the Soviet

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 579.

¹¹⁰ Malkasian, Carter, *The Korean War 1950 – 1953*, Osprey Publishing, First Publication, 2001, pp.11.

Union to place its forces and South for the United States. The aim of the line was to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese forces and the invasion of the country. During that period, none of the states, even the Americans and the Soviets, was thinking that this quickly drawn line would become a permanent international border.¹¹¹

In 1945, when Harry S. Truman became the President of the United States, he followed the policies of the former President Roosevelt for Korea. In December 1945, during the foreign ministers meeting of the United States and the Soviet Union in Moscow, both superpowers agreed on a US proposal planning to hold elections for a provisional government and establish an international trusteeship in Korea for a five – year period. At the same meeting, the construction of a joint commission was decided between two superpowers. Although the commission managed to meet for several times, the elections for the establishment of a provisional government could not be done.¹¹²

According to Cartel Malkasian, until 1950, the threat posed by the Soviet Union was not clear for the United States and its allies. Until that time the United States had no significant military preparation aiming to stop the Soviet Union's expansionist policies that threatened the Western world. Even the formation of NATO was an insufficient act and lacked both conventional and nuclear strength. US armed forces were not ready to take a military action due to their demobilization and reduced defense budget with the end of the Second World War.¹¹³ This is mostly because, until the Korean War, nearly all US leaders believed that the greatest danger

¹¹¹ Sandler, Stanley, *The Korean War - No Victors No Vanquished*, The University Press of Kentucky, 1999, pp. 22.

¹¹² Kaufman, Burton I., *The Korean Conflict*, Greenwood Press, First Publication, 1999, pp. 6.

¹¹³ Malkasian, "The Korean War 1950 – 1953", pp. 10.

from the Soviet Union could only be materialized as a communist takeover within the Eastern European countries.¹¹⁴ But the attack of 90,000¹¹⁵ highly trained North Korean forces supported with Soviet-built T-34 tanks and the heavy bombardment of the North Korean pilots in Soviet YAK fighter planes made the United States realize the danger posed by the Soviet Union.

On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea by crossing the 38th Parallel which had been dividing the country since the end of the Second World War. Both South Korea and the United States were surprised by the attack. According to President Truman, it was the Soviet Union supporting North Korea and this attack was the first challenge against Western states. President Truman was right about the Soviet Union's support. The correlation of forces between the South and North Korea in the eve of the War was supporting his thought: South – North correlation of the forces was "...in number of troops 1:2; number of guns, 1:2; machine guns 1:7; submachine guns 1:13; tanks 1:6,5 [actually the South Koreans had no tanks but they had armored car] and planes 1:6".¹¹⁶ Besides supporting North Korean forces especially with the arms pact signed in March 1949; it was the Soviet Union who gave the permission to North Korean leader Kim II-sung to launch the attack against South Korea.¹¹⁷ The United States immediately brought the issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). During that period Soviet Union was boycotting the UNSC because it was protesting the Chinese Nationalist government's occupation of the seat within the UNSC instead of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Nine member of UNSC supported the Resolution 82 (with

¹¹⁴ Kaufman, "The Korean Conflict", pp. 6.

¹¹⁵ According to Kaufman, the number of North Korean soldiers was given as 110.000. For more information: Kaufman, "The Korean Conflict", pp. 7.

¹¹⁶ Sandler, "The Korean War - No Victors No Vanquished", pp. 30.

¹¹⁷ Malkasian, "The Korean War 1950 – 1953", pp. 15 – 16.

no vetoes). The resolution was adopted. It was calling support of the United Nations (UN) member states to South Korea against the North Korean invasion. Two days later, by adopting the UNSC Resolution 83, the immediate military support for South Korea was underlined by recommending UN member states to give their assistance to South Korea in order to dissolve the attack. With the adoption of this Resolution, United States in 29 June 1950 ordered its forces to protect the territorial integrity of the South Korea and restore the peace.¹¹⁸ In 7 July 1950, UNSC Resolution 83 was adopted. It was recommending the establishment of a United Nations Command (UNC) to defend South Korea, under the authority of the United States where General MacArthur was appointed as its commander. Although, on a large scale, the military power of UNC was provided by the United States¹¹⁹ and the South Korea; fifteen states, including the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, New Zealand, Netherlands, Canada, and Australia, also offered military assistance and contributed to the UNC forces.¹²⁰

Within the few days after the North Korean invasion, two opposing parties started challenging each other in order to control the country. The primary concern of the UNC forces was to recapture all of the South Korean territory and to take a decisive victory against the North Korean forces. But soon it was understood that a decisive victory did not seem possible as it would entail huge amounts of human and material losses. Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Ernest Bevin acknowledged this truth especially with the Chinese intervention in the Korean War.

¹¹⁸ Bozkurt, Enver, *Birleşmiş Milletler Sisteminde Kuvvet Kullanımı*, Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, First Edition, 2003, pp. 43 – 44.

¹¹⁹ “During the Korean War, United States provided % 50 of the land forces, % 86 of the naval forces and % 93 of the air forces to be deployed within the UNC forces.”, Sander, Oral, *Siyasi Tarih 1918 – 1994*, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, Seventh Edition, 1998, pp. 250.

¹²⁰ Malkasian, “The Korean War 1950 – 1953”, pp. 16 – 17.

On 13 November 1950, Bevin informed the British ambassador in Washington about a new solution to end the Korean problem. According to the plan, a demilitarized zone would be established along the Sino – Soviet border with North Korea which would be administered by UN together with China until the reunification of Korea. But the British plan was immediately refused by the General MacArthur and regarded as an appeasement. Also for the United States government the British plan could not be put in practice and went much too far. On 24 November 1950 the United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson explained in a message to Bevin that: “The effect of such a proposal on the conduct of military operations, upon the morale of the troops, upon the morale of the Koreans, upon the public opinion in the US...be disastrous.”¹²¹ For Bevin, Chinese intervention to the Korean War was standing as a threat for the United Kingdom. It was because of the possibility that the United State could extend the war into China. But he was also aware that the United Kingdom had nothing to do but to cooperate with the United States.

Like the Foreign Secretary Bevin, also the President Truman was aware of the danger posed by the Korean War. But according to his idea, before the war ended, at least all occupied territory of the South Korea must be recaptured. In March 1951, when UNC forces recaptured most of the South Korean territory, President Truman planned to organize armistice talks with the North Korean forces. But again, the opposition of the General MacArthur postponed the President Truman’s plan for the armistice talks which could only be started in 10 July 1951.¹²² It took two years for both of the parties to negotiate and put their signatures on the armistice. By the time it was finally signed on June 1953, both sides had decided to keep the Korean border

¹²¹ Warner, Geoffrey, *The Korean War, International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944 –), Vol. 56, No.1, (January 1980), pp. 107.

¹²² Kaufman, Burton I., *The Korean Conflict*, Greenwood Press, First Publication, 1999, pp. 17.

remain on the 38th parallel. End of the Korean War resulted with the dead of 600,000 Koreans and nearly one million Chinese. United State lost more than 54,000 soldiers. Western European States, those participating UNC forces, including the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, also gave casualties.¹²³

Table 2. Casualties of the Korean War¹²⁴
(U.S. and European States)

	Dead	Wounded
United States	54,229	103,248
U.K.	710	2,278
Turkey	717	2,246
France	288	818
Greece	169	543
Netherlands	111	589
Belgium	97	350

Besides the huge number of casualties, states also increased their military spending during the Korean War. During the war, total military expenditure of the United States reached up to 50 billion dollars. Also Western European states increased their defense expenditures in order to take an active role within UNC force. Especially the United Kingdom and France doubled their defense budgets to stand beside the United States.¹²⁵

¹²³ Walker, "The Cold War", pp. 82.

¹²⁴ Korean War Casualty Statistics, <<http://www.centurychina.com/history/krwarcost.html>>, visited on February 20, 2009.

¹²⁵ Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers", pp. 383-384.

Table 3. Defense Expenditures of the Powers, 1948 – 1953¹²⁶
(Billions of dollars)

	United States	USSR	France	U.K.	Italy
1948	10,9	13,1	0,9	3,4	0,4
1949	13,5	13,4	1,2	3,1	0,5
1950	14,5	15,5	1,4	2,3	0,5
1951	33,3	20,1	2,1	3,2	0,7
1952	47,8	21,9	3,0	4,3	0,8
1953	49,6	25,5	3,4	4,5	0,7

Western European states not only displayed an active role within the UNC forces but also some of them served as the arsenals for the United States' nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. With the outbreak of the Korean War in July 1950, President Truman authorized the storage of eighty nine sets of non-nuclear components in the United Kingdom's bases. Besides the non-nuclear components, also the nuclear cores and the plutonium capsules of the bombs were located in the United Kingdom. Those nuclear components were kept under the control of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and ordered not to be mated together, ready for use, without the authorization of the United States. The Defense Department of the United States for the first time gave the authorization to hold both of the nuclear and non-nuclear components together during the Korean War, in April 1951. Besides the United Kingdom, France was also holding some of those non-nuclear components within its bases. It was the January 1952 when President Truman authorized the storage of non-nuclear components at the bases in French Morocco even without consulting the French government.¹²⁷ It was not for the first time that the United States was acting without consulting to its Western European allies. At the beginning of the Korean War in

¹²⁶ Ibid., pp.384.

¹²⁷ Walker, "The Cold War", pp. 57 – 58.

June 1950, before the UNSC Resolution 83 was adopted, United States started deploying its military forces to South Korea also without consulting to its allies.¹²⁸ Those unilateral actions of the United States were lack of confidence and could not be welcomed among the Western European states. But instead of taking a stance against those unilateral actions, Western European states chose to ally with the United States.

The Korean War had a huge impact on the policies of the Western European states. Western European states tried hard to gather the public support needed for higher military budgets in order to strengthen their military powers and defeat the Soviet threat in Korea and all over the world. They actively joined the militarization of NATO. With Jervis's words, a paper organization built on a symbolic American commitment which later transformed into a military force again with the initiative of the United States in order to resist to the Soviet threat. Within the course of strengthening NATO, Western European states acted together with the United States and gave the permission for deployment of more American troops in Europe. Additionally, they agreed on German rearmament where the United States and French Troops were placed in under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. According to Jervis, all those underlined efforts could not have succeeded without the contribution of the Western European states.¹²⁹

During the Cold War, Western European States chose to bandwagon with the United States. Although some of the policies of the United States constituted a direct threat for the Western European states, as Ernest Bevin underlined, weakness of the

¹²⁸ Sander, "Siyasi Tarih 1918 – 1994", pp. 250.

¹²⁹ Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War", pp. 580 – 581.

Western Europe left no choice but to cooperate with the United States. With the end of the Second World War, US military involvement in most parts of the world increased in order to balance the rising Soviet threat. However, especially after the Korean War, the number of American troops multiplied within Asia. Also, with the Korean War, the United States made several defense agreements in the region. In 1951, the United States government was planned to make a defense agreement between the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Indonesia. But, owing to the oppositions against Japan presence, underlined agreement could not be completed. The United States made separate agreements with Japan and the Philippines, instead. Then together with Australia and New Zealand, the United States entered into ANZUS pact. But the United Kingdom was not included in the pact. It was because of the United States' policy which aimed to weaken the role of the United Kingdom in strategically important regions. In Lundestad's words: "This emphasized the power shift to the advantage of the United States that had taken place in this part of the world as well as elsewhere."¹³⁰ According to Lundestad, besides in Asia, US policy to weaken the role of the United Kingdom was also visible in the Middle East in 1950s:

To some extent, the United States perceived the British presence as a factor that contributed to making the countries there (in Middle East) more radical, thus making the establishment of a front against communism more difficult. A weakening of the British role could also lead to a strengthening of the US position.¹³¹

During the Korean War, in January 1951, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom Ernest Bevin wrote to Prime Minister Clement Attlee about the present

¹³⁰ Lundestad, "East, West, North, South, Major Developments in International Relations Since 1945", pp. 48 – 49.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 52.

fears that the United States' potential to use the atomic bomb in Korea. He continued by underlining the dangers of the US policy and pointed out the weakness of the Western European States. According to his idea, besides the great threat posed by the United States, the best thing that could be done for the Western European states was to ally with the United States in order to help her to preserve its strength.¹³²

The full participation of the United States is essential to sustain the free world which Soviet Russia is trying to undermine. It must therefore be the least of all risks that America should be strong, resolute and actively co-operating with the other free nations. This must offer the best chance of avoiding war.¹³³

Bevin was pointed out the bandwagoning behavior as the dominant solution for preventing wars and for the survival of the Western European States. According to his idea, a free world could only be achieved by bandwagoning with the United States not only militarily but also economically and morally. What is more important, the safety of the Western European States could only be achieved by influencing the United States Government and people, not by opposing or discouraging them.¹³⁴

Just like during the Korean War, throughout the Cold War period, Western European states choose to bandwagon with the United States. Balance of power theory remains insufficient in explaining not only the role of Western European states but also the whole structure of the international system. Power itself stands insufficient in shaping the alliance behavior of the Western European states. Instead, Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory better explains the alliance behaviors of all the states and becomes the dominant strategy of the Cold War period. Cold War

¹³² Reynolds, David, Rethinking Anglo – American Relations, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944 –), Vol. 65, No.1, (Winter, 1988 – 1989), pp. 97.

¹³³ Ibid., pp. 97.

¹³⁴ Ibid., pp. 97.

alliance decision of Western Europe resulted mainly from their perception of threat. They choose to bandwagon with the United States because it is the United States that threatens them less. As Walt underlines, not only the Soviet Union's aggregate power but also its geographical proximity, offensive capability and perceived aggressiveness of its intentions make the Western European states' threat perceptions increase and to bandwagon with the United States. Western European states chose bandwagoning behavior in order to balance the Soviet threat. In fact the United States also constitutes a threat for the Western European states. But bipolar international system of the Cold War forces them to take part within one of the sides. So, Western European states choose to ally with the side that threatens them less.

CHAPTER III

POST – COLD WAR PERIOD

In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, not only the Cold War period ended but also the long lasting bipolar international order transformed into a unipolar one with the hegemony of the United States all over the globe. With the end of the Cold War, most scholars underlined that American power unquestionably was left unchallenged within the system. French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine also underlined that after the collapsed of the Soviet Union, the United States took a step further and went beyond its superpower status of the twentieth century: “US supremacy today extends to the economy, currency, military areas, lifestyle, language and the products of mass culture that inundate the world, forming thought and fascinating even the enemies of the United States.”¹³⁵

End of the bipolar international order also brought an end to the common diplomatic code shared within the two blocks formed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The security policies of both sides based on the block theory¹³⁶ was no longer alive within the new unipolar international order.¹³⁷ For the states within the Western Block, the Soviet threat that forced them to share a common code dissolved. So, for Western European states bandwagoning with the United States in order to

¹³⁵ Nye, “Limits of American Power”, pp. 545.

¹³⁶ According to the block theory states within blocks do not have the power to set autonomous security policies and force to act identical with the block they become the part of. Charillon, “The EU as a Security Regime,” pp. 520.

¹³⁷ Ibid., pp. 520.

balance the Soviet threat became pointless. According to the balance of power theory, now it turned out that the United States must be balanced with its unchallenging power in the system. But instead of balancing, EU member states chose once again to continue bandwagoning with the United States in the post-Cold War period. This was primarily because the alliance decisions of the EU member states were made in response to threat rather than power as it was the case during the Cold War period. And the second reason why the EU member states chose bandwagoning with the United States was their perception of threat. For the EU member states, the United States did not constitute as a threat against their security within the system.

This chapter starts with the September 11 attacks and their deep impact on the international system. EU policies to support the United States during and after the war in Afghanistan will be highlighted. Then the Iraq War and its negative effects on transatlantic relations will be presented. While discussing the war in Iraq, EU member states' inability to display a common stance against US preponderance will also be clarified. At the end of the chapter, it will be clear that the balance of power theory remains insufficient in explaining the post-Cold War period.

(3.1.) September 11 Attacks and the War in Afghanistan

September 11 attacks stand to be one of the most important landmarks that changed the course of the modern world's history. Besides the Japanese attack against the United States' Pacific fleet lying at anchor in Pearl Harbor, it was for the

first time that the American soil was hit.¹³⁸ Planes which were hijacked by the Al Qaeda terrorists aiming to commit a suicide attack on September 11, 2001 was also a surprise attack not only for the American people but for the people all around the world. Out of four commercial passenger airplanes, two of them hit the New York's World Trade Center Towers where more than 2500 people were killed. Also the Pentagon, the headquarters of the United States Department of Defense, was hit by another plane and the last one crashed on a rural area in Pennsylvania before managing to reach its final destination to Washington D.C. According to Michael Hirsh, in its emotional impact, September 11 attacks stands to be the most horrifying single day in American history:

It was as bloody as some of great battles and disasters of the past have been, the news about them tended to trickle out: most Americans read detailed accounts of Vietnam and Pearl Harbor well after the event. On September 11, Americans watched on television, in the real time, as the twin towers of the World Trade Center burned...all of them watched as the towers imploded, and they all knew that they were witnessing, in seconds, the deaths of thousands of their compatriots in the nation's front yard.¹³⁹

When George W. Bush was elected as the president of the United States in November 2000, he was precise about the foreign policy behavior of the United States. According to his idea, the United States should implement a more nationally-oriented foreign policy behavior. His foreign policy approach stood as a direct criticism against the multilateral foreign policy approach of the Clinton Administration. President Bush was keen that the Clinton Administration sacrificed

¹³⁸ Cox, "American Power Before and After 11 September," pp. 261.

¹³⁹ Hirsh, Michael, Bush and the World, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2002, Vol.81, No.5, pp. 18.

vital interests of the United States in order to implement a multilateral foreign policy approach.¹⁴⁰ As soon as Bush became the President, he described the new foreign policy approach of the United States as “new realism”. According to this idea, “the focus of American efforts should shift away from Clinton-era with nation building, international social work, and the promiscuous use of force, and towards cultivating great power relations and rebuilding the nation’s military.”¹⁴¹ However, just like President Clinton realized, Bush administration would soon discover how vulnerable the United States was, especially in the post-Cold War period. Being the world’s superpower did not mean that the United States was immune to dangers. Even a relatively small terrorist group named Al Qaeda proved this idea to come true¹⁴² and made Bush administration realize that nationally oriented foreign policy must be kept within the election speeches. Isolation would no longer stand as an option for the United States’ foreign policy.

Approximately four years earlier than the September 11 attacks, a public opinion survey was made in order to figure out the way the American people regarded the role of the United States within the international order. The outcome of the survey was that only 13 percent of people wished the United States to undertake a leading role within international problems and 74 percent of people did not want the United States to cooperate with other states. Moreover, in another survey, 66 percent of American people believed that events taking place in Asia, Mexico, Canada and

¹⁴⁰ Lundestad, “East, West, North, South,” pp. 117.

¹⁴¹ Ikenberry, John G., *America’s Imperial Ambition*, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2002, Vol.81, No.5, pp. 46.

¹⁴² Lundestad, “East, West, North, South,” pp. 117.

the European states had little or no impacts on their lives.¹⁴³ But September 11 attacks changed the ideas of the most American people and for the first time they totally felt insecure as their geographical advantage no longer existed. Washington was open to all sorts of threats as much as London, Paris and Berlin.

September 11 attacks not only changed the ideas of the American people but also changed the course of the transatlantic relations and deepened the United States' demand for international cooperation. Actually it was for the first time since the end of the Cold War period that transatlantic relations have started to be defined by genuine sympathy and solidarity; where more than 800 million people in 43 European countries expressed their solidarity by several minutes of silence.¹⁴⁴ On 13 September 2001, French newspaper *Le Monde* wrote: "We are all Americans now".¹⁴⁵ In Germany, more than 200,000 people came together spontaneously at the Brandenburg Gate in order to organize a pro-American meeting. Chancellor Gerhard Schroder promised to give unlimited support to the United States in the Bundestag and also risked his political career on a vote of confidence to convince the Germans in order to support the US military operation in Afghanistan and to send German Special Forces to the region. Furthermore, the German Embassy in Washington established a fund in order to give aid to the victims of September 11 attacks and managed to gather 42 million dollars. Germany's central intelligence institution,

¹⁴³ Han, Ahmet Kasım, *Tarafsız Olmayan Savaş Yeni Muhafazakâr Komplotu(?) ve Bush Doktrini*, in Toktamış, Ateş, eds., *Kartal'ın Ayak Sesleri: ABD Dış Politikasında Yeni Yönelimler ve Dünya*, Ümit Yayıncılık, Ocak 2004, pp. 127.

¹⁴⁴ Sanderson, Thomas, Nikitin, Mary B., *International Cooperation*, in Smith, Julianne, Sanderson, Thomas, eds., *Five Years After 9/11*, the CSIS Press, 2006, pp. 33.

¹⁴⁵ Norris, "Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 164.

Bundesnachrichtendienst also provided information to its counterpart Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) about the hijackers.¹⁴⁶ Norris interprets that:

September 11 attacks served as a sharp reminder of the values and interests Americans and Europeans still have in common. The American ambassador to the EU spoke of a renewed solidarity and a reinvigorated sense of partnership, a sentiment shared by the European Commission President Romano Prodi, who declared it was time for real solidarity.¹⁴⁷

Less than two days after the September 11 attacks, EU authorities made formal statements in order to display the commitment of the EU to the United States' cause. Their common stance against the terrorist attacks was highly welcomed by the US government and reminded them of the Cold War transatlantic relations. Formal statements were made by the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, by the High Representative, Javier Solana, the President of the European Parliament, the two external relations Commissioners and the General Affairs Council, after holding an extraordinary meeting attended by all. According to Christopher Hill, the most significant and straightforward statement was made by the High Representative Solana. He underlined that: "the European Union stands firmly and fully behind the United States".¹⁴⁸ Also on 12 September, President of the European Central Bank, Willem Duisenberg made his much criticized statement and pointed out that:

¹⁴⁶ Pond, Elizabeth, *The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy over Iraq*, European University Institute Working Papers, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, No. 2004/26, pp. 3.

¹⁴⁷ Norris, "Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 163.

¹⁴⁸ Hill, Christopher, *Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001*, *JCMS*, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 146.

The European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks are standing ready to support the normal functioning of markets and relevant operational systems, if the need is arises. Indeed, the ECB has been in close contact with the other major central banks in the world since the events have unfolded.¹⁴⁹

Underlined statements of the EU authorities were standing as a blank check for the United States. It was obvious that the United States had the support of the EU member states by all means. Additionally, besides the EU member states, most of the other states also supported the United States and its war on terrorism.

With the immediate worldwide support, operation officers of the Central Intelligent Agency (CIA), military planners at US Central Command headquarters and the headquarters of the Defense Department, Pentagon had already started working on how the United States could strike back against the terrorist attacks. Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda terrorist organization was held responsible for the terrorist attacks. So all the attention was focused on Afghanistan where Osama bin Laden and other high – ranking Al Qaeda members were believed to be hiding. On 18 September 2001, UNSC adopted a resolution demanding the Taliban regime to hand over Osama bin Laden and close all terrorist camps in Afghanistan. Following the UNSC resolution, President Bush, in a joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001, repeated the UNSC's demands with a higher tone. But the Taliban regime refused to deliver the Al Qaeda leader. Less than two days after the terrorist attacks, United States' Air Force was ready on the island of Diego Garcia at Indian Ocean and also United States' Navy carrier battle groups were on the way to the Persian

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 146.

Gulf. The outline of war was already prepared in the following week of the September 11 attacks.¹⁵⁰

The Afghanistan War had two highlighted strategic aims, both of which were shared by the European states: “First one was to force Al Qaeda out of their base in a sovereign state in order to put them on trial (or, if not possible, to destroy them); and the second one was to remove the Taliban regime, which had harboured Al Qaeda and was therefore complicit in acts of aggressive war.”¹⁵¹ With the underlined aims, on 7 October 2001, Bush government launched a military operation in Afghanistan. On 13 November the Kabul fell and within a month, supported by a heavy bombing campaign, the United States and its allies managed to defeat the Afghan forces and helped the establishment of the Afghan Transitional Administration headed by Hamid Karzai. After gathering the needed support for its military mission in Afghanistan, the United States successfully formed new alliances with the states which it had poor or strained relations. The United States started to develop friendlier bonds with Russia, Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, China and even Iran in the course of the war in Afghanistan.¹⁵²

Before the war had started, EU member states were also willing to provide military support for the United States’ war in Afghanistan, in order to prove that holding an alliance was something mutual and now it was their turn to stand behind

¹⁵⁰ North, Oliver L., *American Heroes In the Fight Against Radical Islam*, in Holton, Chuck, eds., B&H Publishing Group, 2008, pp. 31 – 33.

¹⁵¹ Hill, “Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001”, pp. 148.

¹⁵² Norris, “Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era,” pp. 166.

the United States. As William Wallace puts it like the United Kingdom, “both France and Germany chose explicitly to bandwagon rather than to balance (with the United State): to declare their active support for the American response, and to offer military contribution towards it.”¹⁵³ But Bush government did not want EU member states and NATO to involve in the war. It was because the Bush government wanted to have a complete monopoly over the war in Afghanistan. Except for the United Kingdom and Australia, the United States mostly allied with the local partners in the region to hold its control over the war.¹⁵⁴ According to Norris:

The military effort in Afghanistan was an almost wholly American affair, rather than a genuine coalition. Apart from a minor British contingent, whose most active role came on the first day, this campaign was an American, not an international or even Western one. Although the United States received immediate support from NATO, which invoked its Article Five clause for the first time (apparently acting on a British suggestion), the United States largely declined to draw on this resource.¹⁵⁵

EU member states’ offer to provide military support for the war was perceived as a political support and indirectly rejected by the United States. During the war, militarily, European powers could only substitute for the United States’ military forces (planes and troops), located in Europe, which were mobilized to join the war in Afghanistan. European states were only asked to provide back – up assistance in intelligence, transportation, policing and in other issues determined by

¹⁵³ Hill, “Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001”, pp. 147 – 148.

¹⁵⁴ Lundestad, “East, West, North, South,” pp. 117.

¹⁵⁵ Norris, “Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era,” pp. 166.

the United States.¹⁵⁶ But with the end of the war, the United States called for the EU member states and NATO to join in peace – keeping tasks in order to reduce chaos in the post – war Afghanistan. On 5 December 2001, after the Bonn accord was signed, a new legitimate government was established in Kabul. Then, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established by the UNSC Resolution 1386 on 20 December 2001 in order to secure Kabul and the surrounding areas.

With its establishment, 19 states contributed to the ISAF, 12 of which were member states of the EU. Before NATO took the leadership of ISAF in August 2003¹⁵⁷, it was commanded in turn by the United Kingdom, Turkey and Germany together with the Netherlands. The EU provided a huge support for the peace – keeping task in Afghanistan. Besides its active contribution in ISAF, it also gave commitment to long – term aids with reconstruction of Afghanistan. For the three years period, from January 2002 to 2005, the EU had spent over 2 billion Euros in order to provide assistance in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁸ During the same period, EU member states also suffered huge number of casualties in Afghanistan War. The total deaths of the coalition forces were 1547, 473 of which were from the EU member states.

¹⁵⁶ Hill, “Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001”, pp. 148.

¹⁵⁷ Within the NATO summit in Prague on November 2002, it was agreed on two primary shifts in order to keep NATO immune against the new security threats. First of all, NATO was approved to have the power to function outside its territory (to join out-of-area operations). And then a NATO Reaction Force was created in order to carry out missions to intervene worldwide crises. See: Pond, “The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy over Iraq”, pp. 7.

¹⁵⁸ Hill, “Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001”, pp. 149.

Table 4. Casualties of the Afghanistan War.¹⁵⁹
(US – EU Casualty Statistics 2001 - 2004)

	Deaths		Deaths
United States	939	Hungry	2
United Kingdom	245	Italy	22
Belgium	1	Netherlands	21
Denmark	30	Norway	4
Finland	1	Poland	16
France	36	Spain	26
Germany	31	Turkey	2

The costs of September 11 attacks to the United States were undoubtedly enormous...Few doubted that the United States would take military action. But hardly anybody could have anticipated the speed with which the regime in Afghanistan collapsed, and the extent to which the United States found itself playing the role of regional arbiter in Central Asia within only a few weeks of having launched a war that many originally predicted would lead to disaster.¹⁶⁰

During the events following the September 11 attacks and especially in Afghanistan War, EU member states chose to bandwagon with the United States. According to their perceptions, terrorism was standing as the source of threat in the system. So, as they did during the Cold War period, they chose to bandwagon with the United States in order to balance the new threat: international terrorism. In

¹⁵⁹ Casualty Statistics of the Afghanistan War, CNN, <<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2004/oef.casualties/>>, visited on March 25, 2009.

¹⁶⁰ Cox, "American Power Before and After 11 September," pp. 271

addition to simply supporting the United States' war on terrorism, they also took active role in the Afghan War. But for some of the EU member states, the perception of threat was about to change. The main reason behind this change was the Bush Administration's relentless unilateralism moving in a very dangerous direction that could disturb order and stability in the system. President Bush's famous statement on war on terrorism, which came to be known as the Bush Doctrine, included signs of the dangers of American unilateralism. In that doctrine Bush drew a picture of the world consisting of states which were divided into two groups: states that support the US unconditionally are the states that are against terrorism and those who are against US military operations are the states that support terrorism. In President Bush's word: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."¹⁶¹ This simplification indeed showed that unchecked US power that pictures the world only white and black could turn into a lethal weapon in the wrong hands. Later, the president used the Bush Doctrine to define Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the "axis of evil" and declared the United States' right to make preemptive attacks anywhere in the world. According to Garden, Bush Doctrine, his "axis of evil" speech and the new US national security strategy declared in 2002 left many Europeans worried by the new direction President Bush was guiding the world.¹⁶²

(3.2.) War in Iraq

After the military success in Afghanistan, the United States soon focused its attention on Iraq. After September 11 attacks, the United States took the risks of

¹⁶¹ Hirsh, "Bush and the World", pp. 19.

¹⁶² Garden, Tim, *The Future of European-American Relations: A Historical Bond*, EU Policy Network, <<http://ecpr-sgeu.lboro.ac.uk/research/garden1.pdf>>, visited on March 25, 2009.

leaving Saddam Hussein in power. This was mostly because the Bush government was trying to avoid the risk of fighting a war both in Afghanistan and Iraq. But Iraq was already on the official agenda of the United States long before the war in Afghanistan. In October 1998 it was the President Clinton had ratified the Iraq Liberation Act stating that: “It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime”.¹⁶³

In January 2002, President Bush made one of his famous statements and named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an “axis of evil” in which he was officially pointing out the next target of the United States. According to Lundestad:

For the most conservative members of the Bush administration, Saddam Hussein had been a thorn in the flesh ever since the end of the 1991 Gulf War. Saddam’s attempt to assassinate George W. Bush Sr. during a visit to Kuwait had made the climate even worse. George W. Bush and his administration, eager to find a link between Saddam and Al Qaeda, assumed that Iraq had resumed its program to develop weapons of mass destruction after the Gulf War and after the United Nations weapon inspectors were expelled in 1998.¹⁶⁴

Like during the war in Afghanistan, the United States again looked for the support of its allies and especially the support of NATO and the UN for the war in Iraq. But US expectations to get support for a war in Iraq seemed impossible as most

¹⁶³ Gardner, Hall, *The Iraq Crisis and Its Impact on the Future of EU-US Relations: An American View*, 2003, pp. 1, <http://www.cicerofoundation.org/pdf/gardner_iraq.pdf>, visited March 22, 2009.

¹⁶⁴ Lundestad, “East, West, North, South,” pp. 118.

of the states, but especially Europeans, were stressing on soft-power¹⁶⁵ option rather than a military campaign to Iraq.

For both Americans and Europeans, Saddam Hussein formed a threat to his regional neighbors and partly to all world powers. But according to Europeans, Saddam Hussein was successfully suppressed by UN embargos, enforcement of Iraqi no-fly-zones and prevented from building up nuclear weapons since he had been pushed out of Kuwait. So, Europeans believed that there was no urgency to invade Iraq as their nuclear weapons programme or link with the Al Qaeda terrorists could not be proved. Some EU member states for example France and Germany believed that: "...an attack on Iraq could break up this crucial country, with Iran taking over parts of the south, Turkey the Kurdish territory to the north...with the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation still at boil...consequences could destabilize the entire Middle East".¹⁶⁶

Most of the EU member states were not supporting the US military campaign against Iraq; although it was accepted as a terror-sponsoring state which also threatened the security of EU member states. They believed that Iraq was far away to become a nuclear danger seeking to seize the world. Instead, they regarded Iraq as a state on the edge of collapse. According to Norris, opposition of EU states to an attack on Iraq was mostly because of their lack of power and high vulnerability.

¹⁶⁵ Joseph Nye makes the distinction between "hard power" and "soft power". According to his definition "hard power" denotes military and economic power, whereas "soft power" means the ability to have impact on others by intangible factors like culture and values or to affect others by its attractive features., in Çoşkun, "EU's New Position in the International Order," pp.74.

¹⁶⁶ Pond, "The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy over Iraq", pp. 4.

Additionally, EU member states did not share the identical threat perceptions on Iraq with the United States.¹⁶⁷ According to Larsen:

...the basic difference between the EU and the US on this issue has been the EU's tendency to frame the problem of terrorism as an economic, political and social problem, while the US has (in comparison) focused on terrorism as a military threat that should be addressed by military means.¹⁶⁸

Throughout the Iraq crisis, EU member states did not have the collective capability neither to support (bandwagon) nor to stand up (balance) to the United States. Furthermore, majority of the public opinion in EU member states were highly against to an attack on Iraq. The reason for the EU's inability to form a common stance was the diverse policies of the three big member states of the European Union: the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Apart from France and Germany, it was the United Kingdom that supported the United States all throughout the Iraq crisis. With the help of the United Kingdom, the United States managed to conduct a successful campaign to direct the international pressure on Saddam Hussein and Iraq's so-called nuclear weapons program.

Although the United Kingdom supported the US intervention in Iraq, France and Germany did not offer their support for a military campaign outside Afghanistan. Germany was holding a firm stance against the US military intervention to Iraq. Its

¹⁶⁷ Norris, "Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 178.

¹⁶⁸ Larsen, "The EU: A Global Military Actor?," pp. 297-298.

firm stance was also making it difficult for three biggest EU member states to come together at private trilateral meetings or mini – summits which they used to organize during the war in Afghanistan. For Germany, its stance was not because of a pacifism driven by the government but simply because of German public opinion against the war. This was indeed the hidden part of the iceberg. The other important reason for Germany to hold an opposite stance against the war in Iraq was the unilateral policies of the United States. US actions undermining the role of international law in fact were forming a threat for Germany and for all other states in the system. Other than Germany, some other EU member states were also sharing the idea that unilateral policies of the United States constituted a threat to the existing balance in the system.¹⁶⁹

Contrary to Germany, France tried to hold a more soften policy during the first months of the Iraq crisis. Its long held interests in the Middle East politics and permanent seat within the UNSC prevented France to hold a firm opposition just like Germany did. French signature on the UNSC Resolution 1441, calling for Saddam Hussein to allow international inspectors in Iraq made the United States believe that France was ready to sign a second resolution that would authorize the use force in Iraq. According to Pond, all the diplomatic signals were also pointing out that France was ready to support the US war in Iraq if it could take a high political price from the United States. Even in December 2002, “a senior French general informed the Pentagon that France would send 15,000 troops, 100 planes, and an aircraft carrier”

¹⁶⁹ Gardner, “The Iraq Crisis and Its Impact on the Future of EU-US Relations: An American View”, pp. 3.

¹⁷⁰ to take a part in the Iraq War. But soon, both President Chirac and Foreign Minister de Villepin were forced to oppose the US intervention in Iraq due to the strong anti-war public opinion in France.¹⁷¹ Wood interprets that “a poll published in the beginning of April 2003 showed % 78 of the French public disapproved of the American War and % 74 approved of Chirac’s opposition to Bush. Also % 65 thought that the conflict was entirely or primarily caused by the USA”.¹⁷² France was keen on not supporting the use of force in Iraq unless the UN was given sufficient time to investigate whether Iraq actually had weapons of mass destruction.¹⁷³ Like Germany, France was also not happy with unilateral policies of the United States. US unilateralism was also standing as a threat for France and clearly damaging its own policies.

Basically, European powers took two different stances against the United States’ war in Iraq. Countries, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Poland, Hungary, Netherlands, Czech Republic and Portugal and also other central and eastern European countries chose to support United States’ military campaign in Iraq. But on the other hand, countries like Germany, France, Belgium, Austria, Ireland and Luxembourg chose to stand against the policies of the United States.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰ Pond, “The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy over Iraq”, pp. 6.

¹⁷¹ Hill, “Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001”, pp. 152 – 153; Pond, “The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy over Iraq”, pp. 7.

¹⁷² Wood, Stephen, The Iraq War: Five European Roles, National Europe Centre Paper, No. 112, pp. 6 – 7, <<http://dspace.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/41693/2/EuropeandIraq-paper.pdf>>, visited on March 17, 2009.

¹⁷³ Lundestad, “East, West, North, South,” pp. 118.

¹⁷⁴ Şener, Aysin, EU Disunity vs, the US Hegemony: Different Foreign Policy Approaches of the EU Members on the eve of the Iraq War, Master of Art Thesis submitted to the Izmir University of Economics, Department of European Studies, 2005, pp. 77.

Table 5: Public Opinions and the Positions of the Governments in the Iraqi Crisis¹⁷⁵
(EU-15)

EU Member states	Public Opinion (in %)	Government Positions
Austria	Strongly Against War	Opposed
Belgium	Against War	Mildly Opposed
Denmark	79 Against War	Support for US
Finland	-	Opposed to War
France	Against War	Strongly Opposed to War
Germany	Against War	Strongly Opposed to War
Greece	-	EU Presidency Holder
Ireland	-	Rather Opposed
Italy	60-70 Against War	Support for US
Luxemburg	-	Strongly Opposed to War
Netherlands	-	Mild Support
Portugal	72 Against War	Support for US
Spain	80-85 Against War	Strong US Support
Sweden	75-80 Against War	Not Participated
United Kingdom	55-70 Against War	Support For US

Not all the European states acted in accordance with public opinion in their countries. Instead, some of them chose to support the United States during the Iraq War. European powers could not manage to come up with a unified foreign policy behavior during the war in Iraq. Consequently the European Union failed to form a

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 78.

unified bloc against the War. “On the one side *new Europe*-United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, most of the Eastern Europeans-opted for following the US leadership whereas *old Europe*-France and Germany, supported by several small EU members-rejected the American policies.”¹⁷⁶

Instead of trying to unite on a common foreign policy behavior for the Iraqi War, EU member states were acting in accordance with their national interests. So, in every single crisis, policy gap between the member states deepened further. One of the most significant disputes among EU member states occurred after a joint letter prepared by eight of the European powers: the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Denmark, along with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Their joint letter was simply supporting the United States’ war in Iraq and the letter later was published in the Wall Street Journal. The letter was prepared without consulting to other European powers. More importantly France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, four of the founding six, were even not informed about the letter. By signing this letter, signatory states empowered their solidarity with the United States in the course of the war in Iraq. Following the joint letter, ten member countries of NATO and EU candidates also wrote an American drafted declaration which was explicitly supporting the United States and its policies in Iraq. Pond underlined that the joint letter of eight European states made President Chirac so angry. She quoted that “memorably, the angry Chirac told reporters that the Central European candidates for EU membership had missed a good opportunity to shut up and

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 79.

threatened them to veto their entry into the Union”.¹⁷⁷ Not only the underlined countries but also most of Eastern European powers offered their support for the policies of the United States during the Iraqi war.

The United States’ war in Iraq divided the European powers in the course of their foreign policy approaches. Unlike the balance of power theory foresees, European powers chose to adopt different policies towards the Iraqi War. Some of those powers chose to balance against the United States, while the others preferred to bandwagon in accordance with their different national interests. The Iraqi crisis showed once more that EU member states failed to speak with a single voice. Even the candidate states did not choose to support the de facto leaders of the EU, France and Germany, as it was the American policy which attracted them more.

A pro-American behavior of some of the member states and the candidates was underlying the weakness of the EU to stand up as a unitary actor in the system. EU member states were aware of that truth. Besides their weakness, they also knew that the only way to balance the preponderance power of the United States lied within their unity. Only a united EU, with a single voice, could have the power to balance the United States in the post-Cold War period. But individually they had no chance to balance the threat of the United States. Prime Minister Blair was also aware of the need for a united Europe. Just before the Iraq War, he naively

¹⁷⁷ Şener, “EU Disunity vs, the US Hegemony: Different Foreign Policy Approaches of the EU Members on the eve of the Iraq War”, pp. 91 – 92; Pond, “The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy over Iraq”, pp. 7.

underlined the belief that the transatlantic community would put their differences aside and reunite in order to rebuild the Iraq. Besides the other factors, the most important one that made Blair call for a united transatlantic community was the threat posed by the preponderant power of the United States. According to his idea, existence of a united transatlantic community stands to be extremely important in order to end the unilateral policies of the United States.¹⁷⁸

(3.3) US Power: Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism

In 2000, Robert Kagan and William Kristol wrote that: “Today’s international system is built not around a balance of power but around American hegemony”¹⁷⁹. Both scholars underlined an important fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States with an unprecedented power in the system. The break-up of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War period and the bipolar international order was replaced by a unipolar one. Charles Krauthammer writes that: “The breakdown of the bipolar Cold War system meant that there are no longer any checks and balances on US actions.”¹⁸⁰ According to his idea, during the Cold War period both the United States and the Soviet Union were stuck within their spheres of influence and could hardly impose their powers on other areas without challenging their opponents.

¹⁷⁸ Pond, “The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy over Iraq”, pp. 11.

¹⁷⁹ Nye, “Limits of American Power”, pp.545.

¹⁸⁰ Gardner, “The Iraq Crisis and Its Impact on the Future of EU-US Relations: An American View”, pp. 2.

Throughout the post-Cold War period, the United States chose to set its own agenda instead of absorbing European ideas and its needs in order to meet them on a common policy. Many American officials were holding the same idea that existence of allies was not something compulsory for the United States. Pond quoted that “the United States viewed itself as uniquely righteous and wise in its policies because of having invented modern democracy, which clearly stands as the best democracy in the world...”¹⁸¹ Americans believe that their administrative system stands to be the best in the international order. So, they also think that their policy instruments: military, economy, politics and culture stand as the best choice not only for the United States but for all the other states within the system. Evolved with those arrogant ideas, American elites and also the man in the street believe that the United States saves the world; and lack of US power coincides with a total disaster for the world. *The Economist* wrote that “the United states bestrides the globe like a colossus. It dominates business, commerce and communication; its economy is the world’s most successful, its military might second to none.”¹⁸² According to Pond:

Above all, Americans knew that they were the world’s only remaining superpower. Their revolution in military affairs, with its dazzling C4 (command, control, communications and computing), precision weapons, and net-centric battlefield intelligence and management, so far surpassed both foes and allies that few Europeans could still fight at the side of US forces. Washington’s annual dollar outlay for defense was double that of the combined defense expenditures of all EU member states.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Pond, “The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy over Iraq”, pp. 1.

¹⁸² Nye, “Limits of American Power”, pp.545.

¹⁸³ Pond, “The Dynamics of Alliance Diplomacy over Iraq”, pp. 1.

Table 6: Comparing Defense Expenditures of World Powers¹⁸⁴

	2004 Expenditures in Current US Dollars (billion \$)	Expressed as a percentage of GDP	Percent of the world total	Number of Armed Forces (thousands)
United States	455.91	3.9 %	41%	1,546
NATO Europe	240.11	1.9 %	21%	2,352
China	84.30	1.5 %	7%	2,255
Russia	61.50	4.4 %	5%	1,027
Japan	45.15	1.0 %	4%	260
World Total	1.119.27	2.5 %	100%	19,97

With the September 11 attacks, close cooperation between the United States and the EU raised the expectations that a new level of multilateralism would be formed in the transatlantic relations. But the United States continued to follow its own agenda. President Bush's message to the world was clear: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."¹⁸⁵ He was pointing out that either all the states stand on their side and follow what they would do or simply stand with evil and face the consequences. The United States was never precise about the meaning of being "with" the United States. Instead, they preferred to use it according to their needs. For example during the war in Afghanistan, they did not want to take military support from EU member states in order to have a monopoly over the course of the war. But with the end of the war, during the peace – keeping tasks, they asked the

¹⁸⁴ Connen, Stephen J., *The Widening Military Capabilities Gap between the United States and Europe: Does it Matter?*, Parameters, Autumn 2006, pp. 76.

¹⁸⁵ Hirsh, "Bush and the World", pp. 19.

assistance of the EU member states. According to Norris, the United States commitments for multilateralism were simply tactical rather than something strategic. Although analyses were correct in underlying increased cooperation between the EU and the United States, it was not pointing out a radical shift of US policies towards multilateralism. Instead, US policies could be named as: "...a temporary, self-interested internationalism, or neoisolationism."¹⁸⁶

End of the Cold War raised the expectations that EU would dissolve the unchallenging preponderance of the United States within the unipolar international order. Coinciding with the underlined belief, September 11 attacks were seen as a great chance for EU to balance the rising power of the United States. Reminding the words of Jacques Pools, it was believed that "the hour of Europe"¹⁸⁷ has come. But September 11 attacks and both of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq proved that the balance of power theory remains insufficient in explaining the role of the EU. With the end of the Cold War period, Soviet threat disappears for the states within the Western Block. So, for the Western European states, bandwagoning with the United States becomes pointless. According to the balance of power theory, it becomes the United States which must be balanced because of its preponderance in the system. But, instead of balancing, EU member states chose to bandwagon with the United States which turned out be the dominant alliance behavior of the EU member states and also for most of the other states within the system. The reason that prevented the EU member states to balance the preponderance power of the United States was

¹⁸⁶ Norris, "Neorealism and the European Union-Balance of Power in the Post-Cold War Era," pp. 171.

¹⁸⁷ Charillon, Frédéric, The EU as a Security Regime, *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10, 2005, pp. 521.

because of their incapability to raise a single voice and stand up as a unitary actor within the system.

CONCLUSION

The thesis begins with the assumption that the balance of power theory stands as the ordering principle within the international system. According to the balance of power theory, states choose to balance against a threatening rising power in order to obtain the equilibrium within the international system. But both the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods prove that the balance of power theory remains insufficient in explaining the alliance behavior of the states within the system. The thesis examines the alliance behaviors of the EU member states in order to underline the ill-functioning structure of the balance of power theory.

During the Cold War period, Western European states choose to bandwagon with the United States, contrary the balance of power theory anticipates. Stephen Walt who underlines the balance of threat theory introduces that states make their alliance decisions in response to threat rather than power. Then he points out that states choose to ally with the side which is least dangerous for themselves. During the Cold War period source of the threat for all actors within the international system is clear with no doubts. For the Western block, the Soviet Union is standing as the source of threat. So, all through the Cold War period, Western European states choose to bandwagon with the side threatens them less. They choose to bandwagon with the United States in order to balance the Soviet threat. As the British Foreign Secretary Bevin underlines: “It must therefore be the least of all risks that America should be strong, resolute and actively co-operating with the other free nations. This must offer the best chance of avoiding war.”¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 97.

End of the Cold War period also changes the structure of the world system. The collapse of the Soviet Union leaves the United States as the only superpower within the system. Also the bipolar international order of the Cold War period is transferred into a unipolar one. So, basically the United States became a hegemon that destroys the existing power relations of the international system. But other actors within the system do not balance the rising power of the United States contrary the balance of power predicts. Instead of balancing, Western European states choose to bandwagon with the United States also during the post-Cold War period.

One of the most important reasons that prevent the EU member states to balance the United States threatening rising power is the weakness of the EU to stand up as a unitary actor in the system. Only a united EU, with a single voice, can gather the power to balance the United States in the post-Cold War period. But individually EU member states can only bandwagon with the United States in order to survive within the post-Cold War international system.

Balance of power theory remains insufficient in explaining the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Instead of balancing, bandwagoning turns out to be the guiding motive of the EU member states.

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