RE-POSITIONING DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION BEYOND BINARY DICHOTOMIES
A CO-OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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ETHICAL DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have conducted my work in accordance with academic rules and ethical behaviour at every stage from the planning of the thesis to its defence. I confirm that I have cited all ideas, information and findings that are not specific to my study, as required by the code of ethical behaviour, and that all statements not cited are my own.

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Date: 22.1.2024

ABSTRACT

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Master’s Program in Political Science and International Relations

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By exploring the concepts of political theory, this thesis aims to construct an analytical framework by synthesizing Hannah Arendt's concept of enlarged mentality with Margaret Canovan's account of redemptive and pragmatic faces of democracy. The purpose of the synthesis is to illustrate the co-operational capacities of political participation and representation and provide a basis for an argument for their symbiotic origins. Furthermore, the discussion of works that hold broad range perspectives from the field of democratic theory, aims to reveal and elaborate complementary evidence for their symbiosis. Moreover, it aims to understand historical context of the complex relationship between political participation and representation by drawing insights from the works of Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville. Finally, it engages with contemporary discourse by utilizing the perspectives of Benjamin Barber and Nadia Urbinati to assess the possibilities of a co-operative approach.

Keywords: Participation, Representation, Enlarged Mentality, Hannah Arendt, Margaret Canovan

ÖZET

DEMOKRATİK KATILIMIN VE TEMSİLİN İKİLİ ANLAYIŞIN ÖTESİNDE YENİDEN KONUMLANDIRILMASI
KOOPERATIF PERSPEKTİFİ

Viherä, Anni Marja

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Bu tez, siyaset teorisi konseptlerini inceleyerek, Hannah Arendt'in "genişletilmiş zihniyet" kavramını, Margaret Canovan'ın demokrasinin "pragmatik" ve "kurtarıcı" yüzleri üzerine yaptığı çalışmalarla entegre ederek analitik bir çerçeve oluşturmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu sentezin amacı, politik katılım ve temsiliyetin işbirlikçi kapasitelerini ortaya koymak ve bunların simbiyotik kökenleri üzerine bir argüman zemini sunmaktır. Ek olarak, demokratik teori alanındaki geniş perspektif yelpazesinden farklı eserlerin tartışılması, bu simbiyoz için tamamlayıcı kanıtların açığa çıkarılmasını ve detaylandırılmasını amaçlamaktadır. Dahası, Benjamin Constant ve Alexis de Tocqueville'in eserlerinden çıkarılan içgörüler ile politik katılım ve temsiliyet arasındaki karmaşık ilişkinin tarihsel bağlamının anlaşılması amaçlanmaktadır. Son olarak bu çalışma, Benjamin Barber ve Nadia Urbinati'nin perspektiflerini kullanarak, işbirlikçi yaklaşımdan doğan olasılıkları güncel literatür ile etkileşimli olarak değerlendirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Katılım, Temsiliyet, Genişletilmiş Zihin, Hannah Arendt, Margaret Canovan

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The democratic paradox of reconciling political participation with representation has long intrigued scholars, oscillating between the possibilities of direct democracy and representative government. This thesis will navigate this landscape by re-examining participation and representation as complementary forces that shape the democratic process rather than viewing them as a paradoxical pair or a binary opposition. More specifically, it is informed or a binary opposition. More specifically, it is informed by an analytical framework which in turn is guided by a democratic interpretation of Hannah Arendt´s concept of enlarged mentality.

This thesis is a reflection of my studies in political science at Izmir University of Economics with the valuable guidance of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Devrim Sezer. My introduction into political theory occurred during my second semester of MA studies in political science, with a background of a bachelor´s degree in social services in Finland. This transition from one field of study to another surprisingly proved to be highly complementary and broadening my perspectives significantly, also what it comes to my understanding of social work and social services.

As a result, I experienced a shift in my previously held views on civic participation, views that were largely shaped by my undergraduate background in social services. Gaining more perspective with open mind in a completely new field of political theory has shaped and clarified my opinions and views. I believe that the theoretical arguments which can be heard in my thesis might resonate also with this personal development. This transition has seen me move from a stance of stricter skepticism to a more balanced outlook. While I remain open to further evolution in my views as I continue to learn, this thesis marks a significant milestone in my professional development, encapsulating the new knowledge and perspectives gained through my MA studies focused on political theory.

1.1 *Research Topic – Identifying the problem*

The exploration of democratic participation and representation has been quite bound to a binary dialogue – paradoxical or co-original. Co-originality refers to the concept of representation and participation originating from the same source, which is essential for making systems of representation democratic. On the other hand, the idea that a representative system and democracy can be seen as contradictory is also presented. This argument suggests that a liberal representative system fails to meet the standards necessary to be considered genuinely democratic.

Through one lens, the relationship between democratic participation and representation is often construed as a paradoxical tug-of-war. Proponents of direct democracy defend the unmediated voice of the people, whereas representative democracy leans on institutional intermediaries to echo the will of its citizens. I argue that this framing has a risk of fostering a divisive "us versus them" dynamic. This dynamic portrays the two systems as competitors contesting for supremacy in an all-or-nothing contest. Yet, this narrative calls for scrutiny - it may oversimplify the complexities of democratic governance potentially casting it as a simplistic conflict where one side's gain is automatically the other's loss.

The paradoxical perspective of democratic participation and representation frames these two components as competing entities. This is a historically grounded viewpoint that does capture some aspects of democratic dynamics. It underlines the tension between the immediate voice of the people and the mediated voice of representation while emphasizing the potential for conflict and competition. However, this perspective, too, has its limitations and potential drawbacks when used as the primary lens to interpret democratic processes.

Firstly, framing participation and representation as antagonistic risks creating a divisive narrative in democratic discourse. The "us versus them" framework can perpetuate a sense of division and conflict between constituents and their representatives, possibly hindering the trust and mutual respect or the validity of pluralism. In other words, factors necessary of a healthy democracy (Müller, 2016). Additionally this "us vs. them" positioning brings out the question on favoring direct

participation over representation due to representative model´s possible alienating factors. If representative model alienates the public from participating, would the inevitable positioning as antagonistic oppositions without common understanding and a possible solution result in similar alienation? Alienation, that stems from this inherently pessimistic nature implying common solutions would be impossible.

Secondly, the paradoxical perspective could be seen as overly reductionist. It simplifies the complexity of democratic processes into a binary opposition, potentially ignoring the multi-dimensional interactions. These interactions exist between the two elements. Participation and representation are not just competing forces - they also interact, influence, and shape each other in a myriad of ways that a simplistic paradoxical model may overlook. Thirdly, the depiction of democratic processes as a zero-sum game, where the gain of one component necessitates the loss of the other may limit our understanding and imagination of democratic possibilities. This view negates the potential for democratic innovation. Only novel approaches and mechanisms could create a synergy between participation and representation rather than a competition.

By re-thinking the origins of the co-originality and the co-operational perspective I provide in this thesis, could possibly mitigate these issues. By viewing participation and representation as complementary and interrelated parts of a whole, it promotes a more holistic understanding of democratic processes. Simultaneously, it would foster space for a holistic understanding of the human political capacity. This view acknowledges the potential for conflict, but also underscores the possibilities for collaboration and co-development. It encourages considering how we might design democratic institutions and processes to leverage the strengths of both participation and representation, cultivating a more dynamic, resilient, and inclusive democratic system.

The co-originality concept links democratic participation and representation as intrinsic, interdependent components of the same process – one coin with two similar sides (Habermas, 2001). This school of thought has the merit of recognizing their mutual co-dependency, but it could be critiqued for downplaying the nuances and complexities within each aspect. Portraying them as co-original may inadvertently

imply a homogenous mix while neglecting the inevitable tensions and negotiations intrinsic to the democratic process. Although, the co-originality concept has significantly contributed to the understanding of the democratic process, offering a fresh perspective that refutes the notion of these elements being in opposition. Despite, it entails its own weaknesses: For example, the cornerstone of democracy, democratic participation, is frequently hindered by factors including voter indifference, lack of accessible information, or systemic hurdles (Bobbio, 1987, Pateman, 1970). These finer points may be glossed over by the overarching viewpoint presented in the co-originality concept. In addition, the significant aspect of representation often finds itself embroiled in controversy due to issues such as the accurate representation of minority groups or gerrymandering (Issacharoff, 2002). Additionally the implications of the first-past-the-post electoral system can be a serious source of controversy. By framing representation as only a counterpart to participation, there's a risk that individual complexities are left without addressing:

Firstly, the theory of co-originality tends to place representation and participation on an equivalent plane while presuming a balanced and seamless interaction between the two.

While this view acknowledges their interconnectedness, it might simultaneously oversimplify the inherently complicated relationship they share. By treating them as equally weighted co-origins, we risk neglecting the dynamic fluidity between participation and representation. This neglect would also be an argument against the continuous change of the socio-political environment. Secondly, co-originality can arguably engender a static perception of the democratic process, constraining our understanding within a binary framework. This perspective might not fully acknowledge the reality of democracy as a living and evolving entity, which is characterized by continuous transformations. Thirdly, the co-original model might inadequately address the potential for conflict and tension between participation and representation. The very nature of democracy ensures a degree of friction between pluralist interests, beliefs, and values (Mouffe, 2000, pp. 80). These conflicts, far from being aberrations are essential to the democratic process. Essential in the sense, that they drive debate, compromise, and progress. By implicitly suggesting a harmonious and consistent relationship between participation and representation, the co-originality concept could risk overlooking these essential democratic tensions.

Transitioning to a stance that views participation and representation as co-operative and non-binary seems quite a logical step forward. It may allow us to better appreciate the fluidity, dynamism, and depth of their interactions. Looking beyond binaries can encourage reading deeper into their co-dependent evolution while not overlooking their contrasts. This view would provide a chance to celebrate the complementary nature of their roles. Viewing these two components in a cooperative framework can foster a willingness to embrace the fluidity inherent in democratic practices.

1.2 *The Scope of Thesis and the Relevant Literature*

The scope of this thesis is sharply focused on re-examining the relationship between democratic participation and representation. Moving on beyond the traditional binary debates, that perceive these concepts as either paradoxical or co-original this thesis introduces a novel perspective - viewing them as co-operative constituents of democracy stemming from the same human cognitive capacity. This research critically analyzes selection of democratic theorists to support this argument. On one end, I revisit the historical insights provided by Benjamin Constant (1988) and Alexis de Tocqueville (2000), thereby aiming to offer a foundational understanding of democracy's development. On the other end, this thesis reflects the contemporary perspectives of Benjamin Barber (2003) and Nadia Urbinati (2006) whose accounts provide a continuum to the historical debates and discussions.

Central to this thesis is a reinterpretation of Hannah Arendt's enlarged mentality and Margaret Canovan's (1999) two faces of democracy supported by selected notes by Jürgen Habermas (2001). This reinterpretation re-positions Arendt's concept from being exclusively tied to a theory of political judgment and reframes it as concept with foundational democratic capacities. This positioning provides groundwork for understanding the co-operational and symbiotic nature of democratic participation and representation. Moreover, the analytical frame of this thesis aims to offer a small illustration in the form of a proposal to integrate expertise-based elements within participatory processes. In essence, this thesis is firmly rooted in its purpose:

to revisit the relationship between democratic participation and representation, substantiate the co-operative interpretation through an effort of a novel interpretation of a synthesis of enlarged mentality and Canovan´s (1999) two faces of democracy.

To better contextualize this analysis, a historical perspective is provided, tracing the path from Benjamin Constant's "The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns" (1988) to Alexis de Tocqueville's (2000) observations of the democratic structures of the 1800s America. This historical lens not only enriches our understanding but also guides us towards our contemporary analysis, setting the stage for a critical juxtaposition of Urbinati´s and Barber's democratic theories. The connection to the contemporary discussions, this thesis aims to analyze Benjamin Barber's participatory-focused “Strong Democracy” (2003) and Nadia Urbinati's pragmatic and innovative view of representation in “Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy” (2006). In this attempt, the invaluable insights of Hannah Arendt and Margaret Canovan are leveraged, enabling us to re-conceptualize the synthesis between enlarged mentality and the two faces of democracy, further substantiating our stance on the non-binary position of democratic participation and representation.

In this thesis I aim to navigate this tension by viewing these liberties not as contradictory, but as foundational elements in a democratic society, where participation and representation inform and shape each other. Nadia Urbinati´s practical approach to representation and Barber's optimistic vision of participation provide an exploration to the theoretical tensions in the contemporary literature. Throughout this thesis, the perspectives of Margaret Canovan (1999) and Hannah Arendt (1998) will offer perspectives for reflection. Canovan's distinction between the redemptive and pragmatic faces of democracy will help temper the expectations, while Arendt's concept of enlarged mentality provides a guiding principle of intesubjective judgment. These perspectives have been chosen to enrich understanding of the human democratic capacity and to navigate the complexities of democratic participation and representation.

By examining these theorists in tandem, this thesis will chart a course through the terrain of political participation and representation, elucidating their complementarity. By reframing these two elements as intertwined aspects of democratic society, rather than opposing forces, we may gain new insights into the fluid dynamics of democratic theory and practice through a democratic interpretation of Arendt´s concept of enlarged mentality (2018)

Jumping on an analysis of Barber´s (2003) and Urbinati's (2006) respective works, this thesis seeks to carry out a purpose. This thesis seeks to harmonize two seemingly divergent concepts – political participation and representation. Accompanied with sensible skepticism, I seek to remain mindful of the potential extremes of participatory democracy - all the while keeping an open mind to innovate within existing institutional constructs. Drawing inspiration from education-based oversight, this thesis introduces the concept of co-creative democratic institutions. However, this thesis binds the take on educated oversight with the frequently stressed importance of public education by the well-known authors (Barber, 2003, Habermas, 2001). These institutions comprise expert panels that, guide public discourse in its quest to engage with and facilitate deliberation on complex political issues. Yet, they should respect and preserve the diversity and spontaneity of public opinion.

The aspiration here is not to radically overturn existing paradigms. Instead, it is to gently suggest additions to the democratic machinery, elements that could lend participatory democracy a more educational and enriching character. Taking cues from the perspectives of Alexis de Tocqueville, Benjamin Constant, and Hannah Arendt, this thesis attempts to create a nuanced narrative. I aim to thread the fine line between Urbinati's grounded understanding of representation and Barber's exited vision of participation. What I hope to emerge from this is a balance, recognition of the co-originality of political participation and representation.

The arguments in the analytical framework hopefully showcase the interest and new ideas proposed. It is effort for democratic discourse, an aspiration for a more inclusive, informed participatory and effectively representative polity. The analytical framework is an effort to rethink the dynamics between participation and representation and to acknowledge their co-originality. This co-originality I argue, is

directly linked to the democratic capacities of Hannah Arendt´s concept of enlarged mentality (1998) allowing the co-operational functions of participation and representation.

The academic contributions of de Tocqueville, Constant, Barber, and Urbinati are undeniably central to the field of political theory. In the case of Tocqueville, his pioneering observations of the American township system in his seminal work Democracy in America (2000) established the understanding of the importance of grassroots citizen engagement in democracy. His work offered a glimpse into how local governance could reflect broader democratic norms and values. Thereby, demonstrating that citizen participation was not simply a luxury of its time, but a continuous necessity for democratic governance.

Constant, meanwhile, provided a complex historical understanding of democratic liberties. His demarcation of the 'liberties of the ancients' and the 'liberties of the moderns' (1988) revealed a novel continuum of democratic practice and representation. He introduced us to the understanding that active civic participation and representative governance are not at odds but can coexist within the same democratic framework, while acknowledging the risks of both of the liberties and their unfit combination attempts.

Venturing further into this topic of participation and representation, we encounter Nadia Urbinati's innovative take on representation. Urbinati's theoretical model advances the concept of representatives as advocates, intertwining the representation with active participation. Her seminal work “Representative Democracy:- Principles & Genealogy*”* (2006) is innovative account that illuminates the possibilities of how representation can and should be more than passive proxy politics. According to Urbinati (2006) representation could be dynamic, responsive, and be construed as an active form of participation itself. Her reframing of representation offers fresh perspectives, on how elected representatives can and should interact with their constituents. This view emphasizes moving on beyond the casting of votes to ongoing engagement and dialogue. Urbinati's emphasis on the dialectic process, an ongoing dialogue between the representative and the represented forms a critical piece in the larger puzzle of democratic theory. She stresses that representatives need

to continually interpret and reinterpret, engage and deliberate, the will of the people in an ever-changing socio-political environment. Therefore, it is in this dialectic process that we see the embodiment of participatory democracy within the structures of representative government.

Moving on to Benjamin Barber, a democratic theorist of an entirely different perspective argues for a vision of “strong democracy”. Barber's advocacy for a participatory form of governance is a call for a democracy that is not only representational but participatory in its core. His book “Strong Democracy:- Participatory Politics for a New Age" (2003), first published in 1984, serves as a blueprint for a democratic structure that highly encourages the active participation of its citizenry. Barber’s model of strong democracy is not just an invitation for citizens to participate more in their government; but it is additionally proposal for institutional democratic reforms and additions. He lays out a vision where citizen participation is not episodic but a sustained, deliberative process that fosters civic virtue and fortifies democratic legitimacy. It is Barber's assertion that such robust and continuous participation can transform the democratic fabric. This transformed democratic environment can create a political culture rooted in active citizenry. In this way, Barber´s strict skepticism towards representation and Urbinati´s creative aim to reformulate political representation into a more engaging and participatory shape provide a diverse basis of voices to the analysis of this thesis.

By drawing on Hannah Arendt's concept of representative thinking and enlarged mentality (1998, 1963, 1971) accompanied with Margaret Canovan's exploration of the two faces of democracy (1999), Canovan's distinction between the redemptive and pragmatic faces of democracy can shed light for understanding of the complexities and limitations of political participation. She highlights the contrasting ideals of transformative change and practical compromises, an idea of through which I seek to connect to the democratic take on enlarged mentality. I aim to build this connection by showcasing the connection of Canovan´s two faces of democracy to the symbiotic human capacity of representation and participation stemming from the faculty of imagination and intersubjective judgment. By incorporating these perspectives, this thesis aims for a reflective analysis, recognizing the significance of political participation while maintaining a critical stance towards its potential

challenges and limitations. This approach aims for a creative examination of the complementary nature of participation and representation in democratic processes.

Within the scope of this thesis, the aim of a nuanced perspective on political participation and representation as complementary components of democracy is accompanied by a hint of skepticism towards participatory democracy. This careful critical stance informs the proposed co-creative implementations, which draw upon careful education-based principles and prioritize expertise in decision-making processes. By leaning towards educational co-creation, the thesis suggests that a well-informed citizenry can contribute to effective democratic governance. Drawing from the insights from Barber's (2003) and Urbinati's (2006) works is it possible to argue for a model where representation and participation co-exist in a cooperative relationship, challenging the notion of binary paradoxical or co-original perspectives? Is it possible to simultaneously acknowledging the inherent limitations of public participation in a democratic context?

In this thesis, I adopt a cautiously skeptical stance, even while advocating for the concept of democratic enlarged mentality as a vital democratic capacity. This skepticism stems mainly from the distinction of the separation of human democratic capacity and the character based decision to act (see chapter 2). I will aim delve into the complicated challenges of differentiating democratic rhetoric from poetry, specifically in the context of creating and basing politics on non-existent ideals facilitated by the human faculty of imagination. A critical view will be applied to my analytical framework and thesis statement, reflecting my position as a master's student. This thesis is not about providing definitive solutions; rather, it is an effort to step into the realm of ideation and inquiry, aiming to stimulate discussion and raise questions in the field of political theory.

Through this thesis I seek to navigate the complicated tensions between participation and representation. The varying perspectives and critical reflections woven throughout the thesis seeks to offer some understanding or novel perspectives of the potential trade-offs and complexities inherent in the pursuit of effective democratic governance. This thesis consciously avoids giving in to the allurel of a romanticized vision of participatory democracy, while recognizing the inherent complementary

nature of political participation and representation. I aim to navigate a path of critical inquiry while acknowledging the potential pitfalls and challenges associated with participatory approaches. This, while also looking to acknowledge that the symbiotic understanding of participation and representation is not just a democratic vision but also a securing a setting of self-development (Constant, 1988). This thesis aims to engage with the works of a broad range of political theorists and scholars from the vast timeline of political theory. The intention is not only to cite these thinkers, but to analyze their ideas, considering their implications on our understanding of political participation and representation and their interconnections in the democratic process.

While this thesis engages in the realm of political participation and representation, I acknowledge the monumental contribution of Jürgen Habermas (2001) to the field of democratic theory. Habermas, with his careful exploration of the co-originality of these concepts has significantly influenced contemporary thought on the topic. His academic accomplishments and incisive analysis have indeed set a benchmark in the study of democratic theory. Despite the importance and depth of Habermas's work, this thesis does not delve into his co-originality thesis in detail. Instead I briefly explore it in the formation of the theoretical frame in the second chapter. The primary reason for this decision lies in the scope of his investigations. Habermas does not extensively cover the specific aspect of public participation that this dissertation seeks to emphasize. Thus, while Habermas´s valuable insights set a base for this study, his arguments are not the focal point of our analysis. Nevertheless, we owe a debt of gratitude to Habermas. His work provides a key reference, offering clear direction for those who are engaged in the study of democratic theory. As such, even though his work is not a central component of this thesis, his influence and the respect he commands in the academic community' remain unquestioned. His intellectual achievement serves as an inspiration, and his profound insights into the nature of democracy continue to resonate within this thesis.

1.3 *Structure of the Thesis*

This thesis seeks to build an analytical framework re-thinking the possible origins of the human co-operational capacities of representation and participation. The following chapters elaborate on the dichotomy of democratic participation and representation first from a historical perspective moving on to contemporary visions. The heart of this thesis aims to be found from the analytical frame aimed at examining and substantiating the argument that the traditional binary debate of whether democratic participation and representation are co-original or paradoxical should be transcended. Instead, the focus will be directed towards the understanding of these elements as co-operative aspects outside of this binary dichotomy.

Central to the analytical framework of this thesis is a critical reinterpretation of Hannah Arendt's notion of enlarged mentality (1963,1971), traditionally associated with political judgment. The intent here is to reveal its democratic significance and illuminate its relevance to my argument. Bind to this effort, I then draw connections to other key theoretical constructs - Margaret Canovan's Two faces of democracy (1999), Habermas's Co-originality thesis (2001). This theoretical layering aims to create a coherent and well-articulated roadmap for the reader, smoothing the transition to the thesis's reflective approach in the third and fourth chapters. Beginning with the historical viewpoints of Tocqueville (2000) and Constant (1988) this roadmap aims to provide a contextual understanding against which my non-binary, symbiotic vision will be juxtaposed. By juxtaposing our non-binary perspective against contemporary views by Urbinati (2006) and Barber (2003), the thesis aims to bring fresh insight to the debate about the nature of democratic participation and representation. This effort is rooted in the democratic take on enlarged mentality and its origins in the faculty of imagination.

The dive in to the historical perspective of this thesis will revisit Alexis de Tocqueville's observations on the American township system, an observation that was novel to his contemporaries. This township system is a microcosm where local political participation thrives. Tocqueville's observations on American townships in Democracy in America (2000) underline the crucial role of local government in fostering democratic habits and culture. He views townships as the foundation of

American democracy, where citizens learn the practice of self-government. Through townships citizens can develop a sense of community, and engage directly in public affairs. This grassroots democratic participation and according to Tocqueville, both strengthens local autonomy and fortifies the broader democratic system. Therefore reflecting the interconnectedness of the local and national spheres. Through Tocqueville´s account and practical examples, I aim to examine how Constant's notion of ancient liberty (1988) - active civic participation - finds expression in the fabric of local democracy. However, scaling up to the complexities of national governance reveals the importance of Constant's modern liberty or a representative government.

In his essay, The Liberty of Ancients Compared with that of Moderns (1988), Constant articulates a clear distinction between two models of liberty. He portrays ancient liberty as participatory in its essence and rooted in political engagement. The downsides of this liberty are that it may potentially limit personal freedoms due to communal control and subject people to arbitrary powers. Modern liberty, conversely, emphasizes individual rights such as freedom of speech and assembly. Thus, modern liberty prioritizes personal freedoms over political participation. This dichotomy continues to shape the contours of political theory and provoking thought about the potential friction or co-dependencies between democratic participation and individual freedom. It highlights that the interpretation of liberty is not static but adaptable and evolving. This understanding encourages ongoing reassessment in light of personal and therefore societal development. In the second section of this thesis in the chapter 4, the main focus shifts to the complementary dynamics of political participation and representation within modern representative democracies. Here, Urbinati's model of representatives as advocates reframes the concept of representation as a form of active participation. It provides a novel and idea provoking understanding of how representation in the form of advocacy can embody participation in the complex dynamics of large-scale governance.

Meanwhile, Barber's model of strong democracy presents a vibrant ideal where civic participation is actively cultivated within representative systems. His work while ambitious - does raise valid questions about the role of direct participation in a representative democracy. Just like with the general topic of the thesis, I seek to find

a balance between Urbinati's practical approach to representation and Barber's optimistic vision of participation. Throughout the reflections, the perspectives of Canovan (1999) and Arendt (1998,1963,1971,1972) will offer guidance. Canovan's distinction between the redemptive and pragmatic faces of democracy will help temper our expectations. By reframing these two elements as intertwined aspects of democratic society, rather than opposing forces, we may gain new insights into the fluid dynamics of democratic theory and practice.

This master's thesis strives to lead the reader on a thoughtful reflective discussion, re-examining the already widely-debated question of whether democratic participation and representation are co-original or paradoxical. We are now set to read into the chapters that lay out the analytical framework of this thesis. From there the historical dimensions of this thesis will challenge the framework to find its support. From there I will transition to the contemporary section the thesis, where the academic contributions of Urbinati (2006) and Benjamin Barber (2003) will reveal the current state of the centuries-old discussion.

CHAPTER 2: POSITIONING PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION AS NON-DICHOTOMOUS, INTERACTING CONCEPTS

By dispelling the binary facilitates a richer understanding of democratic processes it is possible to explore a more vivid picture of how participation and representation can work harmoniously in order to foster a democratic culture that is more than the sum of its parts. I see this nuanced perspective as crucial for unlocking the potential of modern democratic practices and envisaging more inclusive, adaptive and effective democratic models for the future. In essence, it is a perspective that encourages curiosity of thought while inviting us to question and to explore the democratic culture and system of government. Recognizing participation and representation as co-operational does not negate their interconnectedness, but seeks to emphasize the complexities within their interaction. This model, I argue, is more reflective of the democratic process, acknowledging the potential for conflict and negotiation, and allowing for fluidity and change. It encourages us to envision democracy not merely as a fixed structure, but as an ongoing negotiation of competing interests, an evolving ecosystem of discourse and decision-making.

This upcoming sequence of subchapters seeks to construct a creative theoretical framework, designed to support the proposition for a non-binary perspective on democratic participation and representation. My aim here is to move past the traditional dichotomies and try to dig out something new from the multifaceted layers of democratic discourse. By doing so, I hope to showcase a fairly novel view of these core democratic concepts.

2.1 *An Overview of Hannah Arendt´s Concept of Enlarged Mentality*

In the vast field of political theory, Hannah Arendt's concept of "enlarged mentality" (1998) offers a profound reconsideration of the nature of judgment and its role within democratic societies. This notion draws heavily from Kant's philosophy, and particularly from his emphasis on enlarged thought in his work Critique of Judgment (Kant, 1987). For Kant, the capability to step beyond one's personal standpoint and

imagine various perspectives is central to aesthetic judgment's claim to universality. Although both Kant and Arendt value the notion of enlarged mentality, their contexts and emphases bring unique colors to the concept. Kant's perspective is primarily situated within aesthetic philosophy invites us to step beyond our personal viewpoints while enhancing understanding by striving for an enlarged and impartial judgment. Kant's focus is mainly on the intersubjective status of aesthetic judgments.

On the other hand, Arendt takes this concept into the political arena. In her view, the enlarged mentality is not only an aesthetic matter; it is a key tool for political judgment. Arendt does recognize that political decisions affect a plurality of individuals. Thus, while making a judgment about a particular political problem or phenomenon, this diverse array of viewpoints must be considered. Furthermore, she adds a layer to the discussion by proposing that such an enlarged mentality is not innate, but cultivated - hinting at an educational component to democracy. Thus, while both Kant and Arendt encourage the adoption of others' perspectives, Arendt specifically connects this notion to political judgment. This connection will set a basis for enriching this thesis exploration of the democratic processes.

Building on this idea, Arendt transforms Kant's concept of enlarged thought into her distinct conception of enlarged mentality (Benhabib,1988, Beiner, 1983, Zerilli, 2016) However, it is important to note that while Arendt's theoretical groundwork has a Kantian root, her attention is predominantly focused on the political rather than the aesthetic domain. The core essence of enlarged mentality, according to Arendt can be found in the ability to think from the standpoint of others, thus making it a critical mechanism for political judgment. This mechanism though, is not a call for empathy. Instead, it encourages an appreciation and understanding of the different viewpoints that arise in a pluralistic society. While Arendt does not seem to have in mind the nature of a democratic political culture in her theory of judgment, it is vital to realize that the ability to understand and navigate such plurality nurtures the dynamics of a vibrant democratic community. In Arendt´s account enlarged thought emerges when we set aside our personal biases and self-interest, which Kant views as inherently restrictive. This process of thought involves moving beyond personal, individual perspective to consider a broader range of viewpoints. This kind of thinking is not about generalizing concepts in an abstract way, like categorizing all

buildings under the concept of a house. Instead, it is closely knitted with the specific circumstances of different perspectives that we explore to develop a more comprehensive understanding. This approach leads to what we refer to as impartiality. It is a way of observing, judging, and reflecting on human affairs from a broader and from a more inclusive standpoint. However, this standpoint doesn't directly dictate our actions. (Arendt, 1971. pp. 258)

The enlarged mentality is Kant's term for the faculty of judgment that enables us to judge in the absence of universally valid rules. It is the faculty that enables us to see things from the perspective of others and to think in the place of everybody else - intersubjective judgment. In Arendt´s view that is exactly what is required for political judgment, as for in politics we always have to deal with people who are different from us and who have different opinions and interests. If we are to reach an impartial decision, we must be able to take their perspectives into account. (Sezer, 2015).

"*The "enlargement of the mind" plays an important role in the Critique of Judgment. It is accomplished by "comparing our judgment with the possible rather than the actual judgment of others. By putting ourselves in the place of any other man " The faculty which makes this possible is called imagination. . . Critical thinking is possible only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection. Hence, critical thinking while still a solitary business has not cut itself off from "all others." . . . [By] force of imagination it makes the others present and thus moves potentially in a space which is public, open to all sides; in other words, it adopts the position of Kant's world citizen. To think with the enlarged mentality— that means you train your imagination to go visiting. . . .*" (Arendt, 1971. p. 257)

If we pay attention to this note "*To think with the enlarged mentality - that means you train your imagination to go visiting*" (Arendt, 1971. p. 257), we can understand that enlarged mentality is not something that we are born with. It is something that we have to learn. It is a kind of education of the imagination, an education in which we learn to see the world from the perspectives of others. This is not an easy task, but it is essential for political judgment. Without enlarged mentality, we cannot hope to make good political decisions.

It is possible to detect the connection between enlarged mentality and human contemporary imaginary. It signifies an ongoing process of self-examination and questioning that aligns well with democracy's inherent commitment to dialogue and critical debate. In this sense, Arendt's notion of enlarged mentality is not solely about judgment but about cultivating a cognitive space where the complexities of human plurality can thrive. In other words, it signifies an inherent human democratic capacity. This capacity has a possibility to operate as a unifying power. In an increasingly polarized political landscape, Arendt's conceptual framework highlights the democratic potential of our differences. Instead of perceiving these differences as divisive forces, enlarged mentality proposes that they can be constructive elements of dialogue and mutual understanding. However, there are complexities and challenges inherent to the practice of enlarged mentality. The effort to truly understand another's perspective demands not only intellectual effort but also emotional maturity. These are the requirements in order to perceive others without being blinded with the very humane emotion of empathy. Empathy strives simultaneously to alleviate our own anxieties through adopting the struggles of another, thus blurring the lines of self-interest and objective problem solving and deliberation. It invokes questions about the limits of understanding - can we genuinely step into another's shoes? If we manage to do so, can we be confident in the accuracy of our understanding?

Notwithstanding these cognitive obstacles, the essence of Arendt's enlarged mentality provides an extraordinary vision. Her account encourages us to perceive differences as opportunities for dialogue, enhancing our democratic fabric through understanding and growth. Thus, it bears witness to the timeless ideals of democracy and reinvigorates our vision of democratic theory and practice.

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2.2 *Re-Thinking Enlarged Mentality as a Democratic Capacity*

The concept of enlarged mentality (Arendt, 2018) might at first take seem confined to the realm of individual judgment, a cognitive process confined within the boundaries of one's mind. Yet as we delve deeper into its details, we can uncover its substantial democratic implications. We are invited, then, not just to perceive this as a solitary cognitive act but as a participatory one. As an exercise that lies at the heart of the democratic ethos. Enlarged mentality developed by Hannah Arendt, and reflected in her assertion that this faculty allows us to see things from the perspective of others. Enlarged mentality lets us to think in the place of everybody else (Arendt, 2008). Her concept of enlarged mentality offers a fresh lens through which we may understand the relationship between democratic participation and representation. The inherent emphasis in Arendt's concept on embracing multiple perspectives naturally aligns with a vision of these democratic elements as co-operative. Thereby, breaking free from the limitations of binary interpretations.

According to Arendt, political thought itself is representative, as she discusses in her essay Truth and Politics (1967). "*Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion*." (Arendt, 1967, p. 303)

Participation, according to Arendt's framework is more than just having one's say. For her participation is about contributing a unique perspective to a dialogue that is diverse with through the unique individuals participating in it. Similarly,

representation is not just a process of passively communicating these diverse voices. Instead, it is a dynamic process that involves integrating the varied viewpoints in a fair and inclusive manner. The concept of enlarged mentality is a thought provoking theoretical idea that finds its roots in the work of Kant. Later it has been re-contextualized, or according to critical analyses, perhaps appropriated (Wester, 2018) by Arendt. This accuse of appropriation could possibly be said about the democratic interpretation of enlarged mentality used in this thesis as well. The core idea revolves around the capacity to "visit" other minds, enabling a broader and deeper understanding of diverse perspectives. Therefore, this usage of imagination effectively acting as a cognitive tool of detection rather than just a channel for empathy. Arendt applied this concept to a real-world phenomenon, most famously in her analysis of the Eichmann trials (Arendt 1963). Eichmann, a major organizer of the Holocaust was in Arendt's view, not driven by inherent evil, but rather by his belief that he was carrying out his duties as a proper member of his in-group should. This is an understanding that Arendt attributed to *her* (Arendt´s) *own* use of an enlarged mentality . The capacity that she argued she herself possessed, and through that capacity she was able to see that Eichmann did not have developed enough his own enlarged mentality (Arendt, 1963). This conceptualization regarding Eichmann inspired extensive research, notably the Milgram Experiment of 1963 (Milgram, 1963). This particular study revealed the propensity of individuals to comply with directives from those in positions of authority. The vast majority would comply even when the orders given could result in harming others. Research of a similar nature proliferated around and subsequent to the Second World War era, providing empirical resonance to Arendt's observations of Eichmann's apparent lack of remorse or personal accountability for his actions. These studies explained Eichmann´s compliance with the Nazi system over any genuine allegiance to its doctrines.

While such experiments offer limited psychological evidence on today´s standards, they do serve as a base for deeper contemplation about the underpinnings of human behavior and attributes. This understanding provides an echo to Arendt's aim in her work in political philosophy (Brooks, 2022). I argue, that the fact that Eichmann really thought he was doing the right thing, complying and following the orders, thus not able to feel or express remorse, suggests that he used the inherent capacity of

putting oneself in other´s shoes to evaluate the personal consequences and sanctions of non-compliance. As I am separating the ability to judge and to act, it may be possible that Eichmann was able of intersubjective judgment. Why, Eichmann opted for not showing any remorse in the court is a case of speculation.

I believe non-conforming and bravery as taken action are not necessarily aligned with the capacity of putting one in another´s shoes in an non-emotion based analytical manner.

When we analyze enlarged mentality as a democratic capacity, enabling us the skill to put you in others´ shoes and therefore inherently making it also a capacity aiming to predict the reasoning and behavior of the other, it is plausible to see the connection to both – active political participation and political representation through the imaginary nature of the representative through. This view is a realistic one however; the cognitive capacity of enlarged mentality does not ensure a democratic environment which is just and equals. As while I am arguing that representation and participation stems from the same source of imaginary, I also want to stress that neither one of them is necessary democratic in action. In this thesis I find crucial to differentiate the ability of thinking and judging and the ability of act, a difference I see a need to emphasize.

This capacity for an enlarged mentality facilitates not just the understanding of differing viewpoints or visiting minds as Arendt brilliantly points out, but actually also the prediction of future actions based on those viewpoints. This perspective underscores enlarged mentality´s utility as a pre-emptive tool. Thus, it has an episodic nature, whereby visiting other's minds becomes an active, investigative process rather than a static state of comprehension requiring a constant flow of updated information from a larger scale of events around the individuals “visited”. This interpretation does align with the understanding of logical atomism, introduced by analytical philosopher Bertrand Russell (Klement, 2019) and through gestalt principles where the whole is more than the parts aggregating it in which every piece of truth can be analyzed to the smallest particle that is unable to be broken down further and these facts independent from each other make the whole. In the context of this thesis, I argue that it is impossible to continuously know and analyze the perspective of others with the environmental and inner variables in the “other”

constantly changing. This, I argue, is a major flaw in the human democratic capacity, of which prowess stems from the same source - the faculty of imagination. Representation can indeed transform into an art of substitution, as Rousseau anticipated – "*an imaginary presence for existential presence*" (Urbinati, 2006, p. 80).

If the capacity of enlarged mentality can be altered for example with education, then it is in itself transformative in nature through one´s lifespan. It is a guiding cognitive capacity, but not a foolproof tool. We can only temporarily analyze others not possessing this capacity of enlarged mentality. However, the trust in this knowledge of ours should not be drenched in over-confidence and rationality bias. It is possible for humans to understand and rationalize the whole, yet not necessarily grasp how and why it came to be. This and this is where education becomes crucial. I am not arguing this would be an issue possible of overcoming, but through education its is possible to learn how to acknowledge it.

In the context of democracy and in particular representative democracy, the concept of enlarged mentality holds significant implications. On one hand, it allows citizens to better comprehend the perspectives of potential leaders while fostering more informed decision-making during elections. On the other hand, it equips leaders or those aspiring to leadership, with an ability to effectively understand, predict, and counter the opinions of their adversaries through the faculty of imagination. Thereby, adding a representational dimension that aids in political persuasion and negotiation and serves as a cornerstone for the ability to the art of rhetoric:

"*Rhetoric, in the general sense of the use of language in such a manner as to impress the hearers and influence them for or against a certain course of action, is as old as language itself and the beginnings of social and political life. It was practiced and highly esteemed among the Greeks from the earliest times*" (Aristotle, 1994, p. xi).

From this it can be concluded that the art of rhetoric is essential human democratic capacity that is highly relevant to democratic theory and practice. Rousseau, by integrating Aristotelian concepts approached politics with an emphasis on immediacy. He emphasized the unity of space, time, and subject. He merged two

realms that Aristotle kept distinct: the realm of rhetoric, which involves the skillful use of language and reason for persuasion, and the realm of poetics. The realm of poetics centered on the power of imagination to create new realities. In Rousseau's view, the art of persuasion is about crafting justifications, using language not to create new realities but to provide reasons for existing ones. In contrast, the poetic or mimetic art is about constructing entirely fictional worlds, using narrative tools like fables and tragic myths to convey truths through the vehicle of fiction (Urbinati, 2006, p. 79-78).

To elaborate on the relevance of rhetoric related to the discussions in this thesis, I argue that cultivation of a rhetorical practice rooted in empathy, imagination, and intersubjective judgment becomes beneficial and essential for the health of democratic societies. I back up this argument by incorporating notions from Arendtian view of public space as well as from Habermas´s communicative action.

Arendt's notion of the public sphere as a space for appearance and action, where individuals come together to discuss and deliberate matters of common concern highlights the importance of a shared world where diverse perspectives can be openly exchanged (Arendt, 1998). In this context, rhetoric serves as the medium through which individuals articulate their viewpoints, listen to others, and engage in a collective process of understanding. However, for rhetoric to fulfill this role, it must transcend persuasion or the pursuit of individual or partisan advantage. Instead, it should aim to foster a genuine dialogue that respects the plurality and dignity of all participants.

Similarities can be found from Habermas's theory of communicative action, we can further articulate a vision of rhetoric that emphasizes the co-creation of meaning through dialogue (Habermas, 1984). Communicative action relies on the capacity of individuals to reason together, grounded in the mutual recognition of each other's claims to validity. This Habermasian form of rhetoric encourages participants and speakers to engage with others not as adversaries to be defeated but as co-participants in a shared quest for understanding and possibly a consensus. Through this process the public sphere can become a site and a practice field for the enactment

of an enlarged mentality, where the focus shifts from winning arguments to deepening mutual comprehension.

The prediction of the other´s actions I propose as an inevitable part of enlarged mentality shall not be confused with Arendt´s critique on human desire and confidence to predict the future phenomena, as we would be entering the realm of art of poetry, enabling an envisaged world constructed of lies powered by private interests;

"*Events, by definition, are occurrences that interrupt routine processes and routine procedures; only in a world in which nothing of importance ever happens could the futurologists' dream come true. Predictions of the future are never anything but projections of present automatic processes and procedures, that is, of occurrences that are likely to come to pass if men do not act and if nothing unexpected happens; every action, for better or worse, and every accident necessarily destroys the whole pattern in whose frame the prediction moves and where it finds its evidence*." (Arendt,1969, pp. 7)

By referencing the prediction of the other via enlarged mentality, I am not alluding to forecasting future events or collective endeavors, a contemporary tendency of which Arendt is extremely critical. Rather, just as enlarged mentality helps us take a step forward to another's perspective through imagination, thereby discerning their stance vis-à-vis their surroundings and community, this predictive capacity emerges from that acute comprehension of objectively gauging another's circumstances and viewpoints. Armed with such insights, one can then logically assess probable responses to specific initiatives and persuasive endeavors.

Re-thinking the concept of enlarged mentality in a democratic light accentuates its potential role as a unifying force in democratic societies – its importance in rhetoric, and intersubjective judgment. It underscores the fact that this cognitive capacity, is not merely for understanding and predicting others' viewpoints but also for facilitating cooperation and fostering unity among diverse groups.

However, as Arendt points out, the capability to view things from the standpoint of others is not innate even though enlarged mentality as a predictive tool would be; it is an acquired skill, akin to an education, in other words the amount of information about the “other” (1963). This insight becomes the driving force behind the proposal to introduce expertise-based educational applications to existing democratic structures. These educational initiatives aim to cultivate Arendt's notion of an enlarged mentality, preparing citizens to participate more effectively in the democratic process by equipping them with the ability to understand and appreciate diverse perspectives. Therefore, this expanded and enriched array of viewpoints can better inform decision-making processes and can strengthen the complementary relationship between participation and representation. By re-contextualizing Arendt's enlarged mentality, we move beyond the binary constraints of co-originality and paradox positioning, infusing our democratic discourse and institutions with a richer, more nuanced understanding of participation and representation. I argue, that enlarged mentality when seen through a democratic lens, is an inherent ability due to the various forms how placing one in other´s shoes can be actualized, and the various possible outcomes of objective of analysis of another, whilst not dismissing that this capacity would necessarily just result in the understanding of the common good.

In many respects, the democratic process is inherently dialogical. It thrives on the exchange of diverse perspectives, the weighing and balancing of differing views. It is not simply about casting a vote in a ballot box - rather, it is about engaging in a shared endeavor of negotiating meanings, making sense of shared experiences, and finding common ground amidst diversity. Herein lays the resonance with Arendt's enlarged mentality; the capacity to embrace diversity of thought, to entertain varying perspectives, and incorporate them into our worldview, is akin to the essence of democratic participation and the representative capacity. By using enlarged mentality, common people and leaders can "visit" a multitude of perspectives, deeply attempting to understand the motivations, fears, hopes, and beliefs that shape these viewpoints. In turn, this understanding can be leveraged to craft narratives and symbols that resonate with a broad spectrum of individuals, thereby fostering a sense of shared identity and purpose. Moreover, this process facilitates the establishment of common ground even among divergent opinions. Through the attempt of understanding the 'why' behind differing perspectives, it becomes possible to identify

shared values and goals, enabling the development of compromises and co-operative democratic action.

Arendt's conception of judgment was never solely about the application of predefined rules or the execution of logical processes. It was a communicative, reflexive act, akin to the practice of democratic deliberation (Benhabib, 1988; Zerelli, 2016). Through this lens, we can observe the democratic elements inherent in the act of judgment. It is about coming together, sharing perspectives, and collectively deciding on a course of action. The democratic ethos values the plurality of views and voices. It is an ongoing dialogue, a conversation that is enriched by the multiplicity of its participants. Arendt's concept of enlarged mentality nurtures this pluralism. It fosters a space where individuals cannot just recognize, but engage with differences in perspective, thereby forging a more robust and healthier democratic culture. To see Arendt's concept of enlarged mentality merely as a cognitive tool would be to underestimate its potential. Rather, it should be viewed as an invaluable resource for any democratic society. It encourages a culture of conversation, mutual understanding, and respect - essential components of a thriving democratic community (Barber, 1987, Habermas, 2001, Tocqueville, 2000).

To elaborate on the origins of Arendt´s account, in her essay "Judgment and the Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt's Thought" (1988), Seyla Benhabib delves into Hannah Arendt's revolutionary concept of "the banality of evil". Arendt´s concept challenges traditional Western notions of evil as inherently monstrous or sinful. Arendt's analysis of Adolf Eichmann's actions during the Holocaust led her to identify not wickedness or depravity but thoughtlessness as his defining trait. This insight prompted her to explore the connection between moral judgment, our ability to differentiate right from wrong and the activity of thinking itself. Arendt speculated that the habit of consistently engaging in critical examination, without attachment to specific outcomes or content, might play a crucial role in preventing individuals from committing immoral acts. This hypothesis implies that the act of thoughtful contemplation could be instrumental in conditioning individuals to avoid harmful behaviors (Benhabib, pp. 30).

Our exploration of Arendt's concept of enlarged mentality invites to reconsider traditional interpretations and widen our understanding of its democratic implications. The rethinking process should not be considered as a radical departure from the original idea, but rather as an exploration that strives to uncover its hidden depths and possible dimensions. In the context of a democratic society the process of judgment is a social act unfolding within a community of discourse. This shift from an individualistic perspective to a collective one enables to view enlarged mentality as a mechanism for promoting democratic dialogue and deliberation, instead of merely as means of enhancing individual judgment. Rethinking enlarged mentality in this way allows us to realize its transformative potential in a democracy. It challenges us to see beyond the concept as an intellectual skill and instead perceive it as a democratic virtue. By doing so, it deepens the understanding of what it means to be a participant in a democratic society. It places the emphasis on the value of understanding and appreciating different perspectives, prompting individuals to step outside their comfort zones and engage with ideas and viewpoints they may not have been previously considered.

In conclusion, rethinking Arendt's concept of enlarged mentality affords a valuable tool for exploring democratic participation and representation beyond the question of their original positioning. I argue that the process invites to reflect on our values, structures, and practices. This, while pushing us to strive for a more inclusive, understanding, and robust democratic culture. By harnessing the re-conceptualized understanding of Arendt's enlarged mentality, this thesis introduces a theoretical effort bridging the divide between democratic participation and representation. This perspective allows us to shift the main focus away from their origins towards emphasizing their mutually supportive characteristics. In this light, the importance lies not in whether these concepts are co-original or paradoxical, but in how they co-operate and complement each other in the actual practice of democracy. This chapter will continue to strengthen this established analytical framework bridging the cognitive tool of enlarged mentality with Margaret Canovan´s perspective of democracy.

This thesis refrains from engaging in the debate about the inherent justice of democracy or its status as the normative pinnacle of governance systems. Instead, it

attempts on an abstract exploration of the human condition, scrutinizing the potential it commits upon us for both democratic representation and direct engagement, whilst acknowledging the inevitable shadow of human fallibility.

Arendt's reinterpretation of sensus communis or common sense in the context of historical ideas provocative, positioning it as a revival of Aristotle's concept of *phronēsis*, or practical wisdom, thereby setting it against *sophia*, or philosophical wisdom. Unlike philosophical wisdom, which operates independently of others' situated perspectives, Arendt redefines *phronēsis* to signify the broadest possible consideration of various standpoints and viewpoints for observing and evaluating a matter. This repositioning of common sense enables Arendt to elevate the Kantian judgment into the political arena. (Ackerman, 2018).

Even though we can see enlarged mentality as a political action or *phronesis*; (Benhabib, 1988, pp .41, Arendt, 2005, pp. 168), in practice this capacity does not ensure the substantial step of acting accordingly to the reflective judgment resulted in the thinking process of enlarged mentality. Instead, public acquiring the elevated skill and habit of enlarged mentality could actually prevent the future wrongdoings rather than equip individual with the courage to change and challenge the already happening bad actions on a collective level.

2.3 *Supporting Enlarged Mentality as a Democratic Capacity with Canovan´s Two Faces of Democracy*

Margaret Canovan's interpretation of the dual aspects of democracy, specifically the redemptive and the skeptical sheds a light on the evolving analytical framework of this thesis. Her vision is in harmony with the interpretation of enlarged mentality - a theory that deliberately avoids empathy in favor of an unbiased and reflective capacity to understand differing viewpoints. Together these two concepts help to illustrate an argument for approaching participation and representation as non-binary, complementary elements within a democratic system.

Canovan's conceptualization outlines a dual perspective on democracy and it offers a balance between idealism and realism. Drawing inspiration from Michael Oakeshott´s politics of faith and politics of skepticism, (1996) Canovan divides democracy into two contrasting faces: the redemptive and the pragmatic (Canovan, 1999). In this thesis I will use the term skeptical also when elaborating on Canovan´s pragmatic face of democracy.

The redemptive face looks at democracy with hope and aspiration seeing it as a path towards moral and societal betterment. This view is characterized by a confident belief in the potential of democratic principles to elevate human nature and society. In this redemptive realm, democracy is viewed as a transformative force capable of leading individuals and communities toward a higher ethical plane. In the redemptive outlook people are seen as inherently capable of good. Therefore, through democratic processes individuals can realize a collective dream of justice, equality, and human dignity.

The redemptive face focuses on the inherent potential for progress and positive change. On the other hand, the skeptical face recognizes the limitations, complexities, and compromises of democracy. Through this recognition the skeptical face keeps a more grounded and practical view. This perspective is more pragmatic, grounded in the realities of human nature and societal dynamics. It understands that while democracy aims for equality and justice, it operates within a framework of multiple limitations. The realm of skepticism includes self-interest, power imbalances, and imperfect information. Skeptical democracy is aware of the fact that democratic processes can be flawed and manipulated, or in some cases even exploited. Skeptical face of democracy does not shy away from acknowledging these imperfections, as I argue it is the face breathing air to these calculative manipulative actions. This face keeps a more guarded and practical view, tempering the idealism of redemptive democracy with a sharp awareness of potential pitfalls and inherent limitations.

However, it is important to keep in mind that Margaret Canovan's conceptualization of these two faces is not meant to place one against the other but to present them as complementary aspects of a complex whole. *"[I] shall argue, that the two faces of*

democracy are a pair of squabbling Siamese twins, inescapably linked, so that it is an illusion to suppose that we can have one without the other" (Canovan, 1999. p. 10).

By understanding both the redemptive and skeptical dimensions it is possible to gain a nuanced picture of what democracy can and cannot achieve. This picture can evoke a rather radical question, whether the co-original - paradoxical dichotomy is an illusory dichotomy in our democratic life-system.

The redemptive face inspires and motivates providing a vision of what democracy could be. On the other had the skeptical face offers a reality check, reminding us of the potential challenges and imperfections in democratic governance. Together, these two faces provide a balanced and a complex perspective that neither blindly idealizes nor cynically dismisses democratic principles and practices. The bridging of these concepts with the idea of the democratic interpretation of enlarged mentality aims to further enhance the understanding of democratic participation and representation. It allows us to see them as complimentary, non-binary concepts. A synthesis of these two faces of democracy reflects both the aspirations and the realities of democratic life opening the opportunity to understand enlarged mentality as a unifying force beyond just a cognitive tool. Through this synthesis I aim to recognize the complexity and richness of democracy, appreciating both its potential for transformation and its susceptibility to human frailty and error.

When Canovan's two faces of democracy are brought together with the concept Arendt´s enlarged mentality in its nuances discussed above, it is possible to achieve a layered way of looking at democratic participation and representation. Instead of seeing these ideas as co-original or paradoxical, it is possible to approach them as non-binary and complimentary. This possibility stems from the human faculty of imagination providing the capability to imagine the ideal as well as imagine the unwanted. This alignment creates a more diverse understanding of democracy that avoids oversimplification. I argue that this approach supports the multi-dimensional view of participation and representation that is rooted in real-world complexities, yet hopeful in its outlook.

Redemptive democracy is according to Canovan (1999), a concept that emphasizes collective values and societal cohesion. She argues the redemptive face is an endorsement of political participation with the direct expression of the citizens´ passions and beliefs. The application of democratic view of enlarged mentality can guide to understand the value of redemptive democracy in the context of representation. The redemptive face brings vibrancy to democratic governance through infusing it with diverse voices. In this setting also the minorities can be empowered to voice their passionate interests, while representation facilitated by the skeptical face, acts as the practical means through which these voices are adapted into collective action. This union could offer a reflective lens through which different perspectives can be understood, appreciated, and reconciled. The capacity to visit various viewpoints while realistically aware of the presence of emotional biases helps in maintaining focus on the shared values that bind a democratic society together. The discourse thus remains rooted in mutual understanding and respect rather than divisive conflicts. This view strengthens the seamless harmony that exists between participation and representation aligning them to realize a vision of democratic redemption.

On the other hand, skeptical democracy acknowledges the complex and often messy reality of democratic governance demands a more pragmatic approach. Conflicts, disagreements, and contradictions are not anomalies but integral to the democratic process. Enlarged mentality, with its emphasis on objective analysis becomes an essential tool for navigating these intricate dynamics. Through a clear-eyed assessment of conflicting views, it facilitates a balanced and fair negotiation that leads to sustainable solutions without losing sight of fundamental democratic principles. Participation and representation do not emerge as antagonistic forces but as critical elements. When these critical elements are in equilibrium, it is possible navigate the maze-like world of modern democracy. Enlarged mentality transcends its role as a mere tool; it can become a unifying philosophy. Its power to mediate diverse perspectives without reducing them to binary opposites indeed resonates with the fluid and multifaceted nature of democratic governance that Canovan's two faces of democracy captures. The democratic process is neither static nor rigid - participation and representation are not written in stone but instead they are in a

dynamic evolution that constantly realigns and intersects. They demand continuous reflection, assessment, and rebalancing. Enlarged mentality has this inherent flexibility to enable this. Margaret Canovan's notion of the two faces of democracy combines seamlessly with this expanded perspective on the enlarged mentality brought to the democratic arena. Canovan's analytical dichotomy emphasizes the dual nature of democracy: the redemptive, which captures the idealistic and transformative aspirations and the pragmatic, which represents the day-to-day operations and practicalities of governance. These two faces must be in constant conversation with each other to achieve the true spirit of democracy. I call this constant conversation, as the both faces have their unique distinctiveness – it is a dynamic relationship between two not a monologue with oneself.

Enlarged mentality facilitates a continuous negotiation between the two faces. By "visiting" diverse perspectives, one can appreciate the transformative promises of democracy while also grappling with the challenges of practical governance. It serves as a bridge, allowing the aspirational and the operational to inform each other. I argue, that bridging these results in a more responsive and reflective democratic process, linking representative democracy as a part of a human communicative capacity. As an example, understanding a citizen's aspiration for equality (redemptive), can lead to better policy-making in areas of wealth redistribution or access to education (skeptical). Additionally the recognition of the operational challenges of implementing a certain policy (skeptical), can clarify on why certain idealistic goals (redemptive) might not be immediately achievable. This constant interplay and discussion, enhanced by the enlarged mentality brought into a democratic lens describes a democracy that is not binary but fluid. This fluid democracy is by a dance between ideals and realities. Such a democracy supported by citizens and leaders equipped with this cognitive flexibility is better positioned also to address the multifaceted challenges of modern governance. Enlarged mentality brought in to the democratic light has a place in both of in pragmatic and redemptive faces of democracy. This position is secured by understanding enlarged mentality as human capacity to predict possible outcomes, and therefore cast a shadow of political skepticism. Additionally, through this positioning enlarged

mentality enables one to make unifying political decisions through its uniting possibilities.

One must be cautious, however, of conflating enlarged mentality with empathy. While empathy's emotional resonance can be strong, it may inadvertently create barriers to understanding and compromise. Emotionally charged judgments could hinder the discourse between participation and representation. Enlarged mentality's effort to de-attach from emotional entanglements fosters a more rational and reflective democratic environment. This reflectiveness and rationality has a connection with Canovan's analytical framework. The union of the two faces of democracy with the concept of re-thought enlarged mentality provides support that helps unravel the complexities of democratic dynamics leaning towards the non-binary and symbiotic position of democratic participation and representation. Together, they encourage moving beyond binary thinking and embracing a more thoughtful and fluid understanding of democracy through the human political capacity of judgment. Under this lens participation and representation emerge as synergistic elements that enrich and fortify the democratic process. By recognizing and harnessing their complementary nature and leveraging the analytical capabilities of enlarged mentality citizens are invited to engage with democracy as a dynamic that thrives on diversity and not as a monolithic entity. What I mean by this diversity is plurality of opinions, reflection, and constant evolution and a unified understanding of the diverse yet shared experience of a human life.

2.4 *The Co-Originality Thesis and Enlarged Mentality*

Delving further into the nuances of democratic principles when it comes to the non-binary view of democratic participation and representation, the attention turns to Jürgen Habermas´s co-originality thesis (2001). His co-original thesis was introduced in his essay “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?” (2001). In the context of this discussion of democratic participation and representation, engaging with the idea of re-thought democratic interpretation of enlarged mentality. It is quite clear to see how it resonates with Canovan's notion of

democracy's two-sided nature as well as with Habermasian co-original view of democratic participation and representation. By examining these perspectives side by side I aim to argue for the collaborative nature of democratic participation and representation and to reveal their supporting elements.

The conceptual landscape of democratic theory is vast and complex. It presents an arena of discourses that intersect, diverge, and quite often even clash. Central to these deliberations is Jürgen Habermas´s co-originality thesis, a thought-provoking proposition that underscores the foundational interrelation of democratic elements. Habermas´s hypothesis (Habermas, 2001) is based in the belief that the twin pillars of constitutional democracy - individual rights (private autonomy) and political rights (public autonomy) do not emerge in isolation. He argues that these two autonomies share a common genesis. This intrinsic relationship signifies that they are not just foundational but also mutually constitutive. In dissecting Habermas's co-originality framework it is possible to recognize an embedded nuance: the relationship between democratic participation and representation. These are not only components of democracy but they are its lifeblood. Participation, in its purest sense captures the direct engagement of the citizenry in the democratic process. For Habermas, participation offers legitimacy and ensures accountability. On the other hand, representation is the conduit through which these diverse voices are channeled. Participation thus offers a practical modality for governance in complex, large-scale societies. The Habermasian co-originality thesis suggests that these two elements are not just parallel tracks but are intertwined, each shaping and being shaped by the other in an ongoing dynamic.

Yet, while the co-originality thesis eloquently binds these concepts there is room to explore a bit further. One might question if participation and representation are indeed so seamlessly integrated. Is it possible that there would exist moments of friction, divergence, or even contradiction between the two? Such reflections do not take away from the merits of Habermas´s thesis, but rather add layers to its interpretative value. In addition, by asserting the intertwined nature of participation and representation Habermas´s engages with the broader debate on the nature of

democracy. Is democracy a mirror reflecting the will of the people, can it be a is it a prism refracting and synthesizing diverse voices into reasonable policy directions? The co-originality thesis leans towards the latter interpretation, but it does not entirely forsake the former. This balance calls for further exploration, especially in the context of the increasing tensions and demands of contemporary democratic societies. In essence, the co-originality thesis of Habermas and Canovan's dual perspective on democracy provide the stage which the enlarged mentality operates. It is a cognitive capacity, sometimes a tool for understanding and foresight which enables enriched democratic processes. It serves as the bridge melding participation with representation and the tangible with the aspirational. This bridge can reveal a more holistic, unified, and enriching democratic experience

2.5 *A Brief Illustration: Applying our Analytical Frame to Existing Democratic System*

In the contemporary democratic imaginary the riddle has been the proper balance between participation and representation. These are two pillars which are traditionally seen in binary opposition or as co-original. As stressed in this thesis, this view requires revisiting through the lens of enlarged mentality, a concept that has expansively elaborated in the earlier sections. While this thesis does not venture into a redesign of the existing representative democratic system, the vitality of concrete examples should be acknowledged. A brief practical proposal helps to elaborate on this fairly abstract though experiment of the thesis. Such examples provide tangible bases to abstract theoretical concepts, breathing some life into sometimes difficult to gasp theories. The illustrations which I am showcasing here are not just add-ons but what I imagine as “co-creative additions”. Conversely, they are instrumental in strengthening the understanding of how democratic participation and representation can be visualized through the kaleidoscope of the enlarged mentality. The idea of co-creative additions highlights a collaborative and evolving dynamic of democratic processes. It suggests a democratic system that is not rigid but is flexible and open to organic evolution. Through revisiting the democratic ethos via the analytical frame of the enlarged mentality, the vast potential of citizens apart of being mere voters can

be realized. Citizens should be rightfully acknowledged as thinkers, negotiators, and participants in a multi-dimensional democratic space. I argue that even the most skeptical views should recognize the political developmental capacity of the citizenry. Drawing upon the analytical framework in previous subchapters, these co-creative additions provide insights into the intersectionality of Habermas´s co-originality thesis and Canovan's two faces of democracy. The pivotal thread that runs through these intersections is the re-thought enlarged mentality. I aim to argue its democratic capacity as a cognitive tool that fosters objective thinking and analytical engagement.

I propose that citizens, equipped with the democratic capacity of an enlarged mentality, can engage more profoundly with the complexities of democratic representation. They can move beyond the immediate and the evident struggle with the undertones that shape democratic processes. By introducing co-creative additions into the existing democratic framework, I am not even attempting to present an overhaul the existing system. Instead, my aim is to try to elaborate the though experiment of the analytical framework, and to briefly illustrate what do I mean by the development of democratic enlarged mentality. The alignment is here aiming towards the idea that systems can evolve and adapt by drawing from theoretical insights. This alignment leads to a more engaged, thoughtful, and effective results.

The liberal representative democracy operates under a set of principles that involve the electorate choosing their leaders and then entrusting them with decision-making until the next electoral cycle (Schumpeter, 1962). While this system offers stability and structure there is growing sentiment that it may not be dynamic enough to address the complexities of today's quickly evolving societies. The fusion of Canovan's dual faces of democracy to the democratic enlarged mentality presents a possible avenue for transforming representative democracy. Here I am proposing the co-operational citizen model. The co-operational citizen model proposes a shift in how we perceive the role of the individual in representative democracy. Citizens can have a more informed choice to become active contributors to the decision-making process through developing their capacity of enlarged mentality rather than being just passive participants who engage primarily during electoral cycles. I would like to

stress once more that I do not suggest a complete overhaul or a major change thereof to the representative system, but rather an augmentation. Elected officials remain central to governance, but the co-operational model incorporates regular avenues for citizens to actively contribute and/or engage politically using their capacity for enlarged mentality.

The core tenet of the enlarged mentality is the ability to actively understand diverse perspectives and anticipate actions. To cultivate this ability in the political arena I propose implementation structured community dialogues. Here participants are supported to approach discussions with the intent of understanding without forgetting the key skill of democratic politics, persuasion and the art of rhetoric in the sense I have discussed in the previous sections. It is vital to remember with ancient thinkers such as Socrates and Plato who hold radically different views on certain aspects of political existence that human political capacities indeed evolve. This evolvement can happen directly through education or through emotion evoking stories. Or in a less preferred method - by force. Neither one of them is hopeless of regarding the possibility of the evolution of the political *techne*. (Ferrari, 2007.) Educational programs, both in formal settings like schools and informal ones like community workshops can prioritize the teaching of active listening, critical thinking and verbal and/or written self-expression. Real-world scenarios can be simulated by offering participants the opportunity to "visit" various perspectives on hot-button issues. Citizens may engage in understanding the underlying motivations and beliefs, and then formulate cohesive arguments that incorporate these multiple viewpoints. In a sense what I argue for is a form of a deliberation clubs, in which inevitably socialization is in a big role. The reason why I refer to the term “club” is that I argue that directly facing and communicating with people with different views is highly more efficient than distant communication. While some have the capacity to understand written text and stories in a way, that the feels they get to know the author through the texts personally, I am skeptical of appointing too much confidence on the distant proximity to others where enlarged mentality can be developed. An amount of people that an individual can truly recognize as persons with their own human experience has been discovered in psychological studies resulting in understanding called the Dunbar´s number. People begin to identify others distantly only trough

shared or separate symbols in groups exceeding maximum 300 people depending on the individual (Dunbar, 1993, Lindefors et. al., 2021). When an individual is not in the proximity of others´ Dunbar number, they began to be labeled and viewed only through stereotypes, that in most of the cases are misleading and false. Perhaps , this understanding can also shed light to the previous discussions on Eichmann´s reasoning to his devastating actions against humanity during the Nazi regime (Arendt, 1963). In the aims for deliberative settings the identification of similar or separate symbols already determines the willingness to actually communicate and deliberate with one another.

While an increase in democratic participation often garners enthusiasm it is necessary to ask: is more always better? Enlarged mentality can offer a lens to assess this question. More participation without the accompanying depth of understanding can lead to cacophony rather than constructive dialogue, while risking the tyranny of the majority (Tocqueville, 2000, pp. 268-270). The point here is not only to increase participation, but to seek to elevate its quality. Encouraging citizens to employ enlarged mentality can help to ensure that their involvement is informed in their own unique manner as well as constructive in order to find ground in the pool of diverse views.

Arendt's notion of "*lost treasure*" in American democracy (1973), the disregarded potential of townships offers a historical context to validate the co-operational model. Townships were more than just administrative divisions; they were political units open to the citizens where deliberative democracy could thrive. Importantly, townships were spaces where people met, discussed, and collaborated across the various stages of their lives. They provided a setting productive for the exercise of enlarged mentality. In townships people could consider political issues from multiple viewpoints while fulfilling Arendt's criteria of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not (2008).

The co-creative model advocates for the creation of such intellectual and deliberative spaces within our current system. The aim would be to turn citizens from passive receivers of policy into active co-creators. However, the exercise of enlarged mentality requires more than just exposure to different opinions. It calls for an immersion in different life experiences to understand multiple standpoints truly. This could be facilitated through diverse ways, such as community service initiatives, working life and education exchange programs made more accessible, or maybe trials on the effectiveness of virtual environments with a possibility for a more person to person communication than merely a distant online discussion with people reduced to stereotypes.

By fusing the Co-operational Citizen Model with Arendt's insights, a transformative path can be realized. A path that goes beyond just improving mechanisms of representation or increasing participation rates. It aims for a democracy rich in epistemic virtues and emotional intelligence. A co-operational model does not necessarily imply more political interest, but a way where citizens participate for the development of their enlarged mentality. This development itself can encourage the individual with a better informed judgment at the ballots. Of course, in this hypothetical proposal, there could be challenges as well. The sheer diversity of opinion might risk decisional paralysis, and there is always the risk that the tools designed for broadening perspectives could be misused to deepen existing divides.

In sum, the idea of co-creative citizen model serves as an illustrative embodiment of the analytical framework.. While this proposal of the co-creative model itself may not be the focus of this thesis, it provides an idea of a real-world actualization that helps the reader grasp the potential implications of the theoretical discourse of this thesis.

2.6 *Conclusion*

In rethinking democratic participation and representation, it is evident that Habermas's co-originality thesis, Canovan's perspective (Canovan, 1999) and Arendt's concept of "*enlarged mentality*" (1967, 1971) form a trinity that can lead

past the stalemate of seeing these elements as either co-original or paradoxical. Instead, they serve as complementary components of democratic governance, working in synergy to create a balanced and resilient democratic culture.

Arendt's notion of enlarged mentality acts as a cognitive bridge between Habermas's and Canovan's frameworks. Additionally, Habermas sets his account for the co-originality of constitutional and democratic aspects of human rights and people´s sovereignty respectively. Habermas´s account suggests that democratic participation in public debate participation in public debate is as foundational as the protection of individual rights. Canovan illustrates how democracy oscillates between its pragmatic and redemptive faces, thereby making it more than a struggle of two dichotomies. Both perspectives are can be made more robust and unified through the lens of enlarged mentality. I see essential to underline once again that enlarged mentality does not require empathy. It involves an objective, disinterested exploration of multiple viewpoints. As Arendt clearly pointed out, bringing love or an emotional bond to the discussion table is politically sterile, thus apolitical (Arendt and Gaus, 1964). Reactionary responses are utterly humane and welcomed in some instances, but in order to fruitfully deliberate clashing political viewpoints, they only pose harm. When we apply Arendt's enlarged mentality to these theories, the alleged paradox between democratic participation and representation can be seen dissolving. For instance, the enlarged mentality equips citizens and leaders with a tool for better decision-making by creating a space for the standpoints of the people not present (Arendt, 2008). This allows for a diverse form of representation that is dynamically responsive to the electorate, a view that fits well within Habermas's co-originality framework (2001). It also complements Canovan's two faces by serving as a cognitive mechanism that reinforces both the skeptical and redemptive aspects of democracy. Thus, I argue, enlarged mentality is a tool and a capacity for representative thinking transcends the limitations of viewing democratic participation and representation as either paradoxical or co-original. The cultivation of enlarged mentality adds a layer of cognitive sophistication, making the two not just co-existing or mutually reinforcing but rather aspects of a democratic prism each reflecting and amplifying the other. I root this argument in Arendt's belief that the strength of one's capacity for representative thinking is directly proportional to the number of standpoints considered, while reminding mindful of the realistic

limitations of the human capacity to consider large masses of people and respect their individuality.

In concluding the analytical thought experiment of the democratic paradox supplied with theoretical accounts from Arendt, Canovan, and inspiration from Habermas. I have aimed to crystallize my arguments made thus far, while paving the way for a historical chapter. The discussion of enlarged mentality lifted from Arendt's contemplation on Kant´s "*representative thinking*" (Kant, 1987) serves as a base in tying together Canovan's dual faces of democracy (1999) with inspirations from Habermasian co-originality thesis (2001).

As this thesis proceeds forward to the historical analysis, it is worth echoing Arendt's account on the lost treasure of American democracy: the townships "*The failure of the founders to incorporate the township and the town-hall meeting into the Constitution*" (Arendt, 1963, pp. 236). It might have been a point of transference from the time where enlarged mentality had been practiced on a daily basis. These communal settings where representative thinking would have shined do reflect what Arendt, Barber Constant and Tocqueville argue: The form and substance of democracy are shaped not just in the halls of government but in the daily interactions of its citizens.

Moving forward from this analytical framework to historical perspectives of democratic participation and representation, Arendt's townships loom large as missed opportunities. Townships were potential forums for citizens to go beyond stamping at the ballot boxes in to actively employing enlarged mentality. In township system it was possible to enrich their individual perspectives and contributing to collective wisdom. Townships are in a way a representation or a simulation of what a democratic society equipped with the analytical tools we have discussed would look like.

The next chapter will unpack the historical evolution of democratic participation and representation framed through the accounts of Constant and Tocqueville. The aim is to illustrate that the disputes, contradictions, and nuances they observed in their respective eras continue to resonate still in today´s debates. I will first introduce the

theoretical accounts if Constant, followed by a more practical illustration of the American township system and jury from the observations of Tocqueville.

CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION

This chapter looks into the historical foundations of democratic theory, specifically addressing the longstanding debate on whether participation and representation are paradoxical or co-original bases on. Reflected through the analytical framework, this section offers a historical view of this particular topic drawing insights from thinkers such as Constant and Tocqueville. This chapter serves as an essential precursor to the contemporary discussion of this thesis in the upcoming chapters.

3.1 *Introduction*

The historical roots of democratic thought often provide profound insights into the contemporary challenges and achievements of political practice. The reason of choosing the works by Constant and Tocqueville to this historical section of my thesis is as follows. Firstly both, Constant and Tocqueville clearly understand the importance of political participation in an environment without forgetting the importance of political participation. Secondly, both Constant and Tocqueville offer complex views of the dynamics of participation and representation - in other words, they both say so much more than might be obvious from the first read. In this chapter, I will first discuss the theoretical foundations set by Constant, carrying on to a practical illustration of American townships and jury system illustrated in Tocqueville´s observations.

Constant, in his speech on two different concepts of liberty (1988), offers an account of individual freedoms versus collective participation, setting a stage to debate the evolving nature of liberty in democratic societies. Tocqueville´s observations offer a practical illustration to an attempt to combine the liberties Constant elaborated on. By reading into the contributions of these two foundational figures of democratic theory, I aim to argue for the co-operational nature of participation and representation.

3.2 *Benjamin Constant and the Two Faces of Liberty*

Benjamin Constant was a Swiss-French thinker active during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, a period marked by revolutionary change. He is known for distinguishing between two kinds of liberty: the "*liberty of the ancients*", emphasizing collective political participation, and the "*liberty of the moderns*", focusing on individual rights and private life (1988). Constant's work is a cornerstone in understanding simultaneously the dichotomy and codependency between public and private liberties, themes as relevant today as they were during the events of his era. His analysis of liberty and his conception of it as non-subjectification to arbitrary power (Jennings, 2019, Simhony, 2022) remain central in the debates over the role of the institutions against the rights of individuals in democratic societies.

In his lecture "Two Concepts of Liberty," Isaiah Berlin (2002, p.170) recognized Constant as a thinker who was able to really recognize the pivotal differences of the two liberties whilst persuading an account for remembering the meaning of individual liberty in a modern political environment. In his work Constant (1988) does not provide the reader a solution to the dichotomies positioning of the liberties, but instead he illustrates the complex dynamic between the two forms of liberties and their co-dependence and the risks if applied together inadequately. Constant's account for integrating both individual freedoms (modern liberty) and active political participation (ancient liberty) resonates with the idea of democratic participation and representation being interdependent and motivated by needs stemming from the same source, a connection that I will elaborate on in this chapter. Constant´s account complements this perspective by suggesting that a healthy democracy does not only require the safeguarding of individual rights (akin to the representative aspect) but active civic engagement as well (akin to direct participation).

I will start the elaboration on Constant´s arguments from his observations on the liberty of the ancients. In his differentiation of the two types of liberties, Constant defines the liberty off the ancients as "*to share social power among the citizens of the homeland*" (Constant, 1988, p. 317). This liberty culminates in liberty for constant and active citizen participation. The people of the ancients were the ones to decide on the existential issues of the nation, such as war and peace. This participatory effort

was in its essence collective and future-oriented decision making where the citizens would all have a voice in the decision making. However, this liberty did not come for free; since the public would decide on every private matter, the ancients had no freedom for the private man. Every private action was under surveillance and under arbitrary power of the public. Every action from career paths to the most intimate relations and issues of life would be under the community scrutiny (Ibid. 311). If the particular actions were displeasing for a reason or another, ancient individual would face the tyranny of the arbitrary legal power of social exclusion and ostracism. The individual was free in all of his public accounts, but a slave of the arbitrary powers and surveillance in his private realm.

As for the moderns, who are free from the surveillance of their private lives and in their aspirations, Constant defines their liberty as "*enjoyment of the security in private pleasures: and they call liberty the guarantees accorded by institutions to these pleasures*" (Constant, 1988, p. 317). Even though the modern liberty is partially the result of the larger size of the nation, where direct participation is difficult, every individual has a possibility for influence. This influence though, according to Constant (Ibid, p. 312) and later echoed by Wolin (1994) is episodic, without constant engagement with the public issues.

In Constant´s recognition of risks favoring one type of liberty, he argues that both of the liberties have their own particular downfalls, and when not applied together with caution, unnecessary hardships like the aftermath of French revolution may arise. Constant´s arguments suggest that a well-rounded democratic citizen is not only focused on personal or group interests but also actively considers and engages with broader societal issues. This ties back to the integration of Canovan's two faces of democracy (redemptive and skeptical), where the balance between idealism and realism are central. In Canovan´s account this balance strikes as a democratic concept, but in my interpretation this is the dichotomy dictating the human experience (chapter 2).

Constant´s arguments highlight that effective democratic governance is about harmonizing these elements in a correct manner, enabling for a complementary application of ancient and modern liberties, participation and representation.

Constant sees these liberties not seen as opposing forces but as complementary aspects of a robust democratic system. Constant's account on ancient liberty, characterized by direct political participation and collective decision-making, can be seen in Canovan's "*redemptive face of democracy*" (Canovan, 1999, pp. 8-9). This aspect of democracy cherishes idealistic and transformative aspirations, passions and beliefs. In ancient times, this translated into active, direct involvement in public affairs, reflecting a collective dream of communal governance and societal involvement. However, Constant's analysis reveals the limitations of applying this model in a modern context, where societal structures and needs have evolved. This insight finds links with the enlarged mentality's capacity for understanding and adapting to different temporal and social contexts, highlighting the need and tendency for democratic systems to evolve and accommodate changing societal dynamics. Additionally the notes of Canovan´s two faces can be observed in Constant´s account of war and commerce.

According to Constant as the moderns share a common tendency to peace, war has been replaced by commerce. For Constant it is natural for people to build communities wherever they go and for him civic interactions have always an antagonistic nature. Therefore the ancients faced war in every civic interaction due to the antagonism of their relations. The ones without motivation to attack their neighbors or strangers, had to concentrate on defending their own (Constant,1998, pp. 312). The moderns, who managed to build the institutions securing the private realm of life as well as their property, according to Constant, have replaced war with commerce. Constant described commerce as a "*milder and surer means of engaging the interest of others to agree what suits his own*" (Ibid, pp. 313). For him war is an impulse and commerce rationality as it depends on habits of frugality, moderation, work, wisdom, and orderliness (Forde, 2010, pp.4). I argue that these are the exact illustrations of the inherent psychological nature of Canovan´s two faces of democracy (1999) the underlying motivations and faculties of rationality and emotion are present in a way that can be seen in political structures throughout history.

The calculative nature of commerce follows the principles of skeptical democracy. Furthermore, we can see this calculative capacity in the predictive side of democratic

enlarged mentality as discussed in the chapter two. I am not arguing the slightest for a symbiosis of war and commerce with democratic faces, but the inherent human capacities can be detected in Constant´s description of impulsive war and calculative commerce (Constant, 1988, pp. 313). Even though Constant saw war as a result of political action, I am aligning my view with Arendt, who saw that violence can never be a political; therefore war is paradoxical with political action (Arendt, 1972, pp. 51-102). However, the discussion of war and commerce linking to the skeptical and redemptive face of democracy can be entertained through understanding the underlining roots of these faces can be detected from the very essence of human experience, not only from political actions or institutions. These are human needs and inherent qualities to be fulfilled equally, and when not, they result in unwanted outbursts of another. Constant realizes that the emergence of commerce has further alienated the citizens from their interest of political participation through the continuous engagement that it requires. Without the modern commerce, ancients could enjoy time off from their duties to indulge to civic activities and political participation.

In addition, the liberal democratic model which the liberty of the moderns represents strips the citizen of his continuous political agency, reducing the decision making process to the times of elections. The modern citizen is consumed by his self-determined way of life and commerce to the extent that the political alienation and dis-interest are the inevitable results. However, like Barber (in chapter 4.2), Constant argues that the alienation and lack of interest are also inherent to the lack of continuous political agency, restricted by the institutions designed to protect the individual freedom. People are not powerless because they are apathetic, but instead they are apathetic because they are powerless (Barber, 2003,pp. 272, Constant, 1988, pp. 316).

Constant emphasizes that political liberty (ancient liberty) is not only a safeguard of modern liberty but also a means of self-development and moral elevation of citizens. However, Constant argues that each form of liberty faces its distinct dangers. Ancient liberty risked undervaluing individual rights in favor of collective power, while modern liberty's peril lies in individuals becoming too absorbed in personal independence and neglecting their share in political power.(Constant, 1988)

Constant understood that neither forms of liberty can be fully actualized and enjoyed without another. According to Constant, people had increasingly prioritized self-interest leading them to abandon their higher, nobler sentiments. This shift towards self-centeredness, he argued, resulted in a society where individuals became increasingly isolated from one another. Constant metaphorically described this state of isolation as a collection of dust, implying a lack of cohesion and unity among people (Jennings, 2009, pp. 71). He warned that in such a fragmented society, where individuals are disconnected and self-absorbed, true liberty is neither attainable nor sustainable. Reflecting Constant´s positioning of the two liberties to the analytical frame of this thesis, we can see similar symbiotic positioning of the redemptive and skeptical sides of democracy: "*Therefore sirs, far from renouncing either of the two sorts of freedom which I have described to you, it is necessary, as I have shown, to learn to combine the two together*" Constant, 1988, pp. 327).

By cutting out the ancient (redemptive) liberties from the political life, the political itself dies due to the lack of motivation to participate. This motivation would have otherwise by ensured by the facilitated venting of passions and beliefs of diverse groups of people. The motivation to participate itself fosters the democratic education by igniting deliberative processes ideally secured by our modern liberty to indirect and discreet, therefore possibly more inviting, forms of political communication (Constant, 1988, Urbinati, 2006, pp. 1-17)

Constant argues among Tocqueville, (2000, pp. 238) that the representative government, modern liberty, is an invention of the moderns. Constant argued that the exercise of the negative liberty (Berlin, 2002) is a political invention of the moderns, but the representative imaginary has shown its existence through epochs. Constant elaborates through an illustration of Lacedaemonian republic or the ancestral Gauls (Constant, 1988, p. 309) that representative government, a staple of modern liberty, was unknown in ancient times. Ancient societies were more direct in their political engagement, lacking the concept of representing public opinion through elected officials (Ibid, pp. 310). Constant was correct in his argument that the scholars claiming to find modern systems of government from the ancients were mistaken (Ibid, pp. 309). Even though Constant, among Tocqueville (2000, pp. 238) argued, that the exercise of the modern liberty is a political invention of the moderns the

representative imaginary has shown its existence through epochs. Indeed the systems of government following the principles of modern liberties did not exist, but the cognitive capacity that both liberties entail can be detected in across the history.

Even the most autocratic ancient leaders were not able to lead alone without their representative bodies, trustees and bureaucrats, nor were they unaware of the wants and needs of the people (Hekster, 2019, pp. 11). This representational thinking might have not had a form of a modern liberal government, nor a motivation towards democratic citizen rights. However, for example, the first Roman Emperor Augustus´s case shows an example of representative imagery and social prediction capacities from the ancient. Augustus skillfully shaped his position of sole rule in ancient Rome, learning from Caesar's assassination to avoid overtly monarchic appearances. He strategically accumulated powers and honors, seemingly presented by existing institutions rather than actively pursued. In his declarations, such as in the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, he emphasized this passivity, portraying himself as a prominent member of the elite rather than an outright solitary ruler. This educated approach understanding others´ perspectives allowed him to perfect his political rhetoric towards solidifying his power whilst maintaining the semblance of republican values (Cooley, 200, pp. 89-99).

In Augustus case, the public´s voice was heard through leaders' representational imaginary. Was he an unjust man with perfected rhetorical skills, maybe. But it is possible, that even through some unjust actions a capacity of representational thinking and intersubjective judgment with inevitable democratic possibilities can develop through the history.

Historical accounts may help us see that, despite of the representative political structures are modern inventions (Constant, 1988, Tocqueville, 2000), we can see traces of democratic evolution throughout the history. In other words, the evolution of political intersubjective judgment, and the skeptical capacities of enlarged mentality (Wolin, 2016, pp. 80-81). This evolution towards the moral education of the citizens, that the institutions have to achieve as well as the public´s influence on the leaders (Constant, 1988, pp. 237) has not started from the modern times. It has roots as long as human communities (Hekster, 2019). While Constant set a

foundation to the discussion on the dichotomy of public and private liberties, the capacity of representation prevails as a foundational human capacity. This capacity operates through the representational faculty of imagination as discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis. The democratic application of this capacity has been cultivated throughout the human history, creating a spreading, evolving democratic culture and habits, just like he addresses the French revolution as an set of "*useless experiments*" (Constant, 1988, pp. 309), or how Augustus had to use a intersubjective judgment, his self-love of his own survival in a political form (Hekster, 2019).

Moving on from this ancient illustration of the development of human political capacities, in the next chapter I will elaborate on another thinker from the past with a striking relevance to the contemporary discussions on the symbiotic relationship between political participation and representation. In the next chapter the discussion on this symbiosis will continue with the support of Alexis de Tocqueville's observations on the participatory institutions of the 19th century America.

3.3 *Tocqueville and the American Township System*

Alexis de Tocqueville, a French bureaucrat, scholar and a politician offered extraordinary observations of the American democratic practices and culture from the early 19th century. Tocqueville, a French bureaucrat and a political observer, moved past the immediacies of his observations to dissect the deeper layers of democratic societies in particular in the context of the American political and cultural experience. His magnum opus Democracy in America (2004) remains a highly relevant text for its detailed examination of early American democracy. Tocqueville's fascination with America was rooted in how the "*equality of conditions*" of a newly formed nation reshaped its social hierarchies and political structures (Tocqueville, 2000, pp. 79). In this chapter, my aim is not to provide an exhaustive study on Tocqueville - such a task would far exceed the bounds of this thesis. Instead, I will concentrate on observations of the American township system

and the American democratic habits reflectively to the arguments presented in the previous chapters.

Fascinated by the political turmoil of the past, especially the French revolution and its independent effects in the world, Tocqueville embarked on an observational journey to the United States of America. He took upon the task of understanding why and how have the citizens of America achieved a federal participatory system balancing the participatory needs whilst the private liberties are secured by the constitution. Tocqueville appointed much of the responsibility of this achievement to the extraordinary character of the American people and their democratic spirit. In his book Democracy in America (2000) Tocqueville discusses the roots of democracy in Puritan America and New England's early self-governance. His analysis includes the federal constitution, designed to support and moderate democratic self-rule. Tocqueville points out that people hold ultimate power through or in spite of the Constitution, and cautions against majority tyranny. Tocqueville can be understood as a liberal who seeks to defend both, moderation as well as freedom (Tocqueville, 2000, pp. 20). In his observations, Tocqueville captured the unique blend of liberty and equality in the 19th century America. In his work he explores the dynamics between individualism, associations and the influence of the majority. Tocqueville's observations provide a thought provoking basis of American society while revealing both its strengths and inherent vulnerabilities. Due to these reasons "Democracy in America" (2000) is still and essential touchstone in political theory and the study of democratic governance. Tocqueville's works, through their depth and discernment, give shape to analytical approach, drawing connections between political structures, societal norms, and underlying philosophical principles. (Scleifer, 2006, Welsh, 2006)

Before discussing the main topic of this chapter, the participatory powers of Tocqueville´s America, it is necessary to elaborate on his arguments of the point of departure of the American people. For Tocqueville Americans were lucky to have escaped the absolute powers in Europe. The emigrants from Europe were informed by the terrors they escaped, while being educated by the enlightenment. Above all, Tocqueville argues that the American people could enjoy their democratic freedom due to the "mores" , a latin term which he describes the customs, norms, behaviors,

and moral and intellectual habits of the American people. These mores are strengthened and sustained through the family culture, education, civic activity and political participation all in combined creating and sustaining a civilized citizenry. For Tocqueville, participation in local governance was not merely an act of exercising rights; it was educative. Citizens learned the art of governance, compromise, and the importance of considering diverse perspectives, creating a cultural base for mores. He argues, that when an institution or has entered the realm of mores it is almost impossible to destroy it. Despite of being a string advocate and admirer of the American democratic participatory institutions and habits, Tocqueville had realistic skepticism towards the possibilities of tyranny of the majority ignited by the participatory powers.

According to Tocqueville, spirit of political participation is rooted in the "mores" of the American people; "*Township freedom therefore eludes, so to speak, the effort of man. Thus it rarely happens that it is created; it is in a way born of itself. It develops almost secretly in the bosom of a half-barbaric society. It is the continuous action of laws and mores, of circumstances and above all time that comes to consolidate it. Of all the nations of the continent of Europe, one can say that not a single one knows it*." (Tocqueville, 2000, pp. 122) For Tocqueville townships seemed to be born "*from the hands of God*" as these local governing units emerged naturally wherever people gathered together (Ibid, pp. 122). The action of participation therefore, can be seen as a natural tendency of people. It seems that for Tocqueville the emergence of participatory institutions and laws is an inherent result of the intergenerational development and cultivation of the mores.

Townships, in their essence were local political institutions. Townships were the closest political institution to the citizen, after them came the county and then the state. Townships would be bound to the state legislation, but were independent to decide on the local issues i.e. state would issue a requirement for a public school system, but the township was responsible to executing this system in its own.

The townships were the center of social and political discussions and deliberation. Such deliberations and simultaneous protection of private and communal rights as well as the dynamic functioning of the community required a cognitive leap beyond personal experiences. These voluntary groupings of townships showcased the

enlarged mentality in action. Individuals came together not just for personal or economic benefits, but to address shared concerns and realize communal objectives. In the context of my arguments, individual freedoms were naturally harmonized with collective responsibilities.

Active participation fosters a better-informed electorate, which in turn supports the quality of representation. Tocqueville had concerns about the "tyranny of the majority" in democratic societies without a freedom of association (Tocqueville, 2000, pp. 222). However, the township system, with its intimate scale and emphasis on local autonomy acted as a buffer. By the division of power to the grassroots level, the system ensured that larger, potentially overbearing majorities could not easily trample over local minorities. Here, participation strengthens representation by diversifying it, making it more responsive and resistant to monolithic majoritarianism.

In the townships, the power was divided between multiple towns officials all dedicated to their specific tasks, for example, a constable was in charge of execution of the law, a clerk responsible of certificates and an accountant for the financial matters of the township. The representative task of a township between the state and the local level was appointed to selectmen, elected officials who would communicate the needs between the town and the state. Selectmen were the executors of the popular will. They would act on their private responsibility, but when it came to introducing changes and new policies, they hand to consult to the source of their power; the town members. The townships were a dynamic institution combining elements from participatory and representative democracy. The representative powers were not strong enough to call the system a "thin" model of democracy (Schumpeter, 1962), it was fully free from the limitations of the federal constitution. However, the townships, usually were built by of approximately 1000 town members fitting it in the spatial limitations appropriate for the participatory liberties of the ancients to be enjoyed (Constant, 1988, pp. 312). None of the European nations of the time had managed to create institutions like Townships. This, Constant appointed to the reluctance towards monarchical structured by the American people. He argued, that the traces of monarchy in the European republics had left a trace of mores from the monarchical culture (Ibid, pp. 196). Therefore, American democracy could

flourish as it was established to a fresh soil with competent, enlightened people with a common aim to construct an equal state. As understood from Constant´s account the political environment of his contemporaries in Europe was heavily biased towards favoring the liberty of the moderns. In America, without the burden of past monarchies, and their distinctive mores the liberty of the ancients had its significant place in the spirit of the citizens.

For Tocqueville, townships were more than just administrative units; they were "*schools of democracy"* (2000, pp.122). The regular town meetings and the direct involvement of citizens in local affairs trained Americans in the art of governance and the spirit of public duty. Even though I do not connect the education of enlarged mentality as a public duty or necessarily direct participation in politics, the settings described by Tocqueville foster the development of this capacity when the social engagement happens in a form of civic relations that possibly antagonistic yet facilitated (Barber, 2003, Constant, 1988).

Yet, Tocqueville was not free of anxieties in his American exceptionalism; his anxieties arise from the similar notions as Constant´s criticism of the modern liberty (Constant, 1988, pp. 326) Traceable to the rise of commerce, Tocqueville was concerned of individualism, which makes citizens withdraw from their public and civic activities in order to pursue their private freedoms and pleasures (Forde, 2010, pp. 9).

In sum, one could argue that Tocqueville's admiration for the American township system challenges modern democratic systems that have become increasingly centralized and bureaucratic (Bobbio, 1987, Wolin, 1994). Like in Constant´s account (1988), one might ask have the moderns in the pursuit of efficiency, drifted away from the natural symbiosis of participation and representation? A symbiosis, which the township system in the Federal America so well embodied. Rather than seeing these as either paradoxical or co-original, Tocqueville's observations invite us to envision a democracy where they exist in a dynamic, enriching, and mutual relationship.Moving on from Tocquevilles observations of the township system, his another central observation of American democratic culture was the American jury system with its participatory qualities.

Tocqueville believes that the biggest benefit of the jury is its role in shaping judgment and enhancing society´s intelligence. For Tocqueville the jury is a free, always open school where each juror interacts with knowledgeable individuals while exercising their rights. Through their jury duty, the jurors gain practical knowledge on their nation´s laws made understandable by the professionals present, such as the lawyers, judge and through the litigant´s emotions. Tocqueville argues that the practical intelligence and political savvy seen in Americans largely stem from their extensive use of juries in civil cases. The jury's usefulness to litigants may be debatable, but its value to those deciding the cases is undeniable. For Tocqueville it is one of the most effective educational tools for the public that society can utilize (Tocqueville, 2000, p p. 61,121)

At first, the jury seems to be about representation. It is a reflection of the larger society, chosen to represent a cross-section of the citizens. But what truly stands out in de Tocqueville's observations is how this representation organically morphs into participation. Jurors symbolize the community. In addition, they engage in political action by actively engaging in deliberation, dialogue, and decision-making. In the jury system, enlarged mentality is an operative necessity for in an aim for intersubjective judgment. Jurors must depart from personal biases and predilections, immersing themselves in the broader perspectives of the case. Jurors are citizens who actively participate in molding justice whilst employing their capacity of enlarged mentality. For Hannah Arendt, it was the lost treasure of the American democratic system (1963) that institutions fostering civil participation were not integrated to the constitutional structure of the new federal republic. However, due to being part of the mores in the past, those lost institutions still have their faint, but resistant echoes in the American jury system and the spirit of civic engagement of today.

3.4 *Conclusion*

Constant’s distinction between the liberty of the ancients and that of the moderns presented us with two unique forms of freedom, each with its own virtues and

vulnerabilities in their quests of ensuring participation whilst protecting the freedom. On a first glance Constant seemed to be an advocate for the liberty of the moderns, but he surprised the reader towards the end of his work with a reminder of the importance not to forget to allow the freedom of the ancients flourish, too. I believe Constant had understood the meaning of the liberties beyond the practical, legal or administrative aspects. The two freedoms represent the two dichotomies of the human experience. This experience would not be shared and understood as a universal human condition without both cognitive faculties that also make up the passions and motivations in the redemptive side, and the rational and apprehensive of the skeptical side.

My take on Tocqueville was not an exhaustive study on his political philosophy. Instead I picked two participatory institutions from his observations to illustrate the existence of democratic enlarged mentality and the redemptive and skeptical sides of democracy in the historical perspective. Tocqueville´s observations revealed that once in America a balance between the ancient liberty and the modern form was in close reach. However, drawing from Constant´s anxieties of the risks that both of the liberties entail, one might ask is it only momentarily in an episodic nature a history a truly robust synthesis of the two liberties might exist?

Form here I will continue to elaborate on the contemporary accounts of Benjamin Barber (2003) and Nadia Urbinati (2004). Barber lays out an extremely detailed vision of strong democracy, with institutional proposals strikingly similar to the townships described by Tocqueville. Furthermore, Urbinati introduces a dıfferent creative solution to the democratic anxieties on hand, but with a focus on the power of imagination in the representative tasks.

CHAPTER 4: FROM HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS TO CONTEMPORARY REFLECTIONS

As we continue from the early juxtapositions of participation and representation of the 19th-century France and America, illuminated by the insights of Tocqueville (2004) and Constant (1988), we transition into a world occupied with contemporary challenges and expectations. The democratic principles we have explored so far have stood the test of time, but as with any living political thought, democratic theory too must evolve, adapt, and reflect the world it resides in. The heartbeats of the earlier thinkers still resonate in the layers of modern political thought, but with new tones and tempos, as well as new terminological interpretations that we must attune ourselves to.

4.1. *Introduction*

From here, this thesis will cover some of the contemporary arguments of political participation and representation with the guidance of the respected political thinkers Nadia Urbinati (2006) and Benjamin Barber (2003). Urbinati and Barber both lay interesting, and quite differing positions on the topic. While Barber explicitly states that representative democracy is not democratic at all, Urbinati aims to offer a novel perspective, arguing both that when properly considered, representative institutions and practices might be more democratic than they seem at first sight, and that they could be improved to be more inclusive and participatory. The thinkers although have a drastically contrasting perspective whether political representation can be democratic, they both propose innovative solutions to reform and complement the current representative system to make it more democratic, both thinkers in their different perspectives.

4.2 *Benjamin Barber and Strong Democracy*

Within contemporary democratic theory, Barber's "*Strong Democracy*" (2003) stands out as a confident and detailed argument for a participatory model of governance. At its core, strong democracy defends the idea that democracy is not just a formal institutional mechanism. Instead, Barber argues it to be a living process that thrives on continuous civic engagement and deliberation.

Barber sets up his defense for strong democracy by identifying the problems of modern liberal democracies. He portrays a critique of liberal democracies being a "*thin*" theory of democracy (Barber, 2003, pp. 4), a mode of democracy often described as the Schumpeterian model (Schumpeter, 1962). This thin model has its understandable popularity stemming from the aftermath of the World War II, after the Nazi German crimes against humanity. The thin model can be understood as a response to the fear of populism and the tyranny of the majority (Elliott, 1994). Furthermore, like Wolin´s approach (2016) Barber also displays a skeptical attitude towards liberal representative democracy. Liberal representative democracy is not a completed project and that it does not represent the end of history (Fukuyama, 1993). On the contrary much like Arendt (1973), Barber argues that contemporary representative democracy suffers from a huge democratic deficit.

Instead of concerning securing public justice Barber argues the current liberal democratic system keeps people apart and mainly concerns in advancing interests. Like Constant recognized the risks of the participatory mode, ancient liberty, Barber recognizes that the thin form of democracy is indeed capable of resisting the arbitrary powers on the individual liberties such as privacy and property matters. However, the liberal thin democracy is very inefficient in protecting justice, participatory values and citizenship (Barber, 2003, pp. 3-4). In relation to Hamilton´s famous quote describing mankind as beasts (Parsons, 2006), Barber criticizes liberal democracy as a form of zoo-keeping, where the citizens are seen metaphorically as untamable animals which should be kept separate in their uncontrollable aggressiveness, furthermore this metaphor of political zoo-keeping would depict the civil society "*a jungle*" (Barber, 2003, pp. 20-25). For Barber "*Representation is incompatible with" freedom because it delegates and thus alienates political will at the cost of genuine*

self-government and autonomy" (Barber, 2003, pp. 145). In his account the representative system of liberal democracy takes away the citizens´ responsibility of their values, beliefs and actions. Unlike Hamilton (Parsons, 2006, Hamilton, 1778, 1788), Barber does not fall in to describing groups of individuals with stereotypes or symbols. Instead, I believe Barber´s metaphorical explanation of the thin democratic theory and its critical understanding of human nature reveals liberal theory´s tendency to reduce human beings into a stereotype of the mass of others as discussed in the end of the chapter 2 of this thesis. However, the essence of enlarged mentality and its developmental capacities are not confined only to individual lifespan. The evolution of democratic enlarged mentality is part of the general democratic development of the human kind. Therefore, the evolution in language and in democratic enlarged mentality can play a part in the defense of the historical thinkers in this account.

Perhaps the most striking yet sometimes indirect anxiety of Barber seems to be how liberal democracy sees the human nature. This anxiety lures as a basis of the various critiques of thin democracy. Liberal, thin democracy does not have future-oriented trust in human capacity of evolvement and co-operation. I see the thin democratic view as a lack of understanding the human experience. The inherent ever-existed variety of capacities in human existence from l`amour de soi-même to l`amour propre (Rousseau, 1980), from redemptive passions to the pragmatic abilities (Canovan, 1999) - notions of which in the first glance can seem distant and even contradictory, but which have correct positions in a puzzle creating a much bigger picture where every piece has its co-operational function. As discussed in the chapter two, at times it is almost impossible to realize the parts that construct the whole, and most of the times this realization of not understanding does not even happen.

Barber sees the current thin democracy as a shield protecting capable citizens from their self, thus blocking any possibilities of self-development and shared innovative future-orientedness (Barber, 2003, pp. 25). This over-reaching skepticism and distrust of people makes them powerless and therefore politically apathetic, not the other way around (Ibid, pp. 272). Reflecting to the arguments elaborated in the second chapter of this thesis, there is no room for collective creativity in the thin model of democracy. Although Barber does not buy in to the republican idea of

unitary politics that claims human soul and the "*affects man´s higher nature*" (Ibid, pp. 118), I argue that in a liberal thin model of democracy a crucial and integral part of human capacity is left without a space to flourish. Without referring to unitary politics, imagination ignited by exposure to others, diverse deliberation and enlarged mentality have no secured arenas to be enjoyed or developed in thin liberal democracies.

Barber calls liberal democracy portraying these human dualities as schizophrenic and perverse, something that has to be controlled, or the beast will escape its cage. He argues that in the thin liberal model, freedom is indistinguishable from selfishness and does not serve either the possibilities of participation and unity, neither the self-governance nor the shared work of political action (Ibid, pp. 22-24).

In his own model of strong democracy, Barber defines human nature quite differently than his liberal counterparts. Barber rightfully does not confine his depiction of human nature in the dichotomy of good or bad. According to the strong democratic theory human nature can, and is both; co-operative and antagonistic, benign and malevolent (Barber, 2003, pp. 215). Barber quotes Montaigne in his account for a spirit of social man: "*The virtue assigned to the affairs of the world is a virtue of many bends, angles, and elbows, so as to join and adapt itself to human weakness; mixed and artificial, not straight, clean constant or purely innocent*" (Barber, 2003, pp. 216, Montaigne, 1965, pp. 758).

Understanding the social human nature with diverse capabilities, Barber describes a community with strong democratic principles. Barbers sees strong democratic community as a possibility for individuals to develop and transform. Similarly to his proposal on neighborhood assemblies, strong democratic community is not a collection of friends. Instead, as a community binds together through civic ties is a product of conflict rather than consensus. Barber argues, however, that as an transformative community, its participants cannot remain total strangers to each other. In his description of a strong democratic community, Barber implicitly hints towards the concept of democratic enlarged mentality: "*Only in strong democratic community are individuals transformed. Their autonomy is preserved because their vision of their own freedom and interest has been enlarged to include others; and*

their obedience to the common force is rendered legitimate because their enlarged vision enables them to perceive in the common force the working of their own wills" (Barber, 2003, pp. 232). From here, it is possible to see the presence of democratic enlarged mentality in Barber´s vision of transformative communities. It is precisely about continuous engagement with diverse voices, without the emotional expectations of private friends, and the antagonisms can be turned into deliberation through the facilitated leadership system.

For strong democracy natural freedom is just a mere abstraction, and dependent relationships are the reality. As in Barber´s account the human essence is social, the aim for politics is not to save the natural freedom from politics itself, but to pursue and seek for artificial freedom "*within and through politics*" (Barber, 2003, pp. 216). I share the account of human being inherently social beings with nature that cannot be reduced into good or bad- not individually nor collectively. Even though Barber does not share Tocqueville´s view on townships coming from "*directly from the hand of God*" (Barber, 2003, pp. 267) he describes an understanding of human as social beings with capacity to both, co-operation and antagonism the establishment of political relations similar to my arguments on the synthesis of enlarged mentality and Canovan´s two faces of democracy. The townships are an illustration of an inherent human social dependency thus a political capacity. In Baber´s view, citizens´ ability to unite around common goals and engage in collective actions does not result from innate altruism or inherent benevolence. Rather stems from their civic mindset, or what Barber calls "*democracy as a way of living*" (Barber, 2003, pp.117) which in turn requires specific participatory institutions that encourage participation

According to Barber, democracy requires a shared public sphere where individuals actively engage with diverse perspectives, similar to Arendt's envisioning of individuals placing themselves in others' shoes. Barber proposes a comprehensive solution for the weaknesses of thin liberal democracy: strong democratic institutional implementations (Barber, 2003, pp. 117-120). He has designed these institutions to thicken the thin model of liberal democracy with realistic criteria. Strong democratic institutions should answer to the liberal anxieties of irrationalism, participatory communities and intolerance. Barber does not envision strong democracy as a

revolutionary program, but a political strategy compatible with the existing liberal institutions (Barber, 2003, pp. 262).

Barber seeks to find an institutionalized model of participation instead of relying on episodic eruptions of collective political action. In other words, Barber recognizes the importance of the pragmatic requirements of secured political participation through appropriate institutional channels. The main institution introduced in Barber´s proposal is the neighborhood assemblies. Drawing from Tocqueville´s observations of the American township system and the local spirit of liberty (2000) and Arendt´s reminder of Jefferson´s words on the dangers of public power when the only instance the public voices can be heard is the Election Day (Arendt, 1965, pp. 256). Barber envisions neighborhood assemblies as local participatory institutions with a physical space for meeting, venting out frustrations as well as socialization. These assemblies although creating more participation through participation, are not personal friend groups, but deliberative institutions for diverse voices from strangers as well from the familiars. (Barber, 2003, pp. 189). As any groups of people, also neighborhood assemblies would naturally create its own leadership dynamics. Barber distinguishes the different leading types preferring facilitated leadership over the natural leadership. By natural leadership he means leadership resulted in the variety of assertiveness as well as persuasion and rhetorical skills of individuals. Natural leadership can be welcomed for citizens to realize their potential and purpose, but in democratic setting facilitated leadership which ensures the rotation and division of power instead of relying on individual charisma fits the strategy of strong democracy the best (Ibid, pp. 240-241). Consequently, he argues that displaced attempt of reforms would further alienate and disenfranchise citizens. Even worse hastily implemented reforms could even disrupt the existing safety measures of the liberal democracy without providing any substantial benefits meantime (Barber, 2003, pp. 264).

Barber proposes neighborhood assemblies as forums for public discussion on local, regional, and national issues. These neighborhood assemblies would meet regularly, allowing for flexible and citizen-generated agendas. Their initial role would encompass ensuring local accountability, public deliberation, and acting as an ombudsman/public advocate. Over time, they could evolve to become voting

constituencies for referenda and legislative assemblies for local statutes. Additionally, Barber argues that acknowledging the necessity of a political base of committed democrats for the realization of strong democracy is vital, as the recognition of the challenges of engaging a public typically mobilized around private interests. Vital, in the sense like Constant (1988) also argued that the prioritization of commerce weakens the political engagement of the citizens, while political participation itself would create more participation in turn. This argument, that Barber shares has a resemblance on Tocqueville´s account on political culture and habits (Tocqueville, 2000), and essential notion for the intergenerational democratic development. As Arendt rightly states, human change is inevitable, but the velocity differs (Arendt, 1979, pp. 78). The jump from ancient to modern political traditions (Constant, 1988) might have happened fairly fast in the context of the history of humanity. However a true accumulation of the democratic traditions and habits happen in a continuum of political engagement, through tacit and institutionalized passing of culture.

Civic education holds a central role in the fruitful passing of democratic culture and habits (Bobbio, 1987, Habermas, 2001) and for Barber it facilitates the conditions of citizenship. Barber categorizes three different forms of civic education, formal pedagogy, private social activity and participatory politics (Barber, 2003, pp. 233). In accordance to the strong democratic theory public civic education remains relevant in its task to provide the citizens crucial information about their rights as well as laws accompanying thin democratic politics. As for the private social activities, Barber encourages overlapping local activities for example national community boards, engagement with religious and spiritual communities and for example referendum campaigns (Barber, 2003, pp. 235). This exposure to various different local communities enhances expansion of the perspectives, therefore contributing to the democratic enlarged mentality. Lastly, the only completely successful type of democratic education is political participation itself. Only through political participation citizens may gain political experience, and strengthen man´s natural capacity of self-government (Barber, 2003, pp. 236) In these three different types of civic education we can see outlets for Canovan´s two faces of democracy. The redemptive side can flourish in the private social activities, whilst enlarged mentality can be developed though the overlapping activities between different communities.

The skeptical side gains food for thought in the public civic education, where the expression of the redemptive passions and values are not central. However, in the political participation, both, redemptive and skeptical sides have space to flourish enhanced by the development both of these faces receive in the various private activities and public civic education. The redemptive side flourishes for its future-oriented nature motivated by the passions and beliefs of the citizens, as the skeptical side is always present though the predictive capacities and faculty of imagination as suggested in the chapter 2.

Deliberative democracy is regarded as a hallmark of popular participation, faces a critique from liberal representative democrats (Tremblay, 2001). The proponents of liberal democracy tend to view ordinary citizens as lacking the capacity for effective deliberation, suggesting that democracy should instead be conducted by experienced, prudent representatives. This perspective can be found in the Madisonian idea that representation acts as a filter, tempering popular passions in the process of selecting capable delegates (Landemore, 2020). However, Barber´s view posits that deliberation is exactly what ordinary citizens engage in when they adopt the mindset of citizens. He criticizes deliberative democracy not having trust in the ordinary citizen´s deliberation capacities. According to Barber, the bias of deliberative democracy, that it appoints the task of deliberation only to the "*seasoned representatives*" without trusting the deliberative capabilities of the citizens (Sward, 2009, pp. 225). Barber´s perspective acknowledges that transitioning from being merely a consumer or rights-bearing individual to a fully-fledged citizen is a complex process, which highlights the ambitious goals of strong democratic theory. It necessitates civic education, real-life political experiences and sustained political engagement like discussed above. Contrary to the doubts of some deliberative democrats Barber´s view asserts that ordinary people possess the inherent capacity of evolving into judicious and deliberative citizens. This evolvement happens through education, community involvement, and political participation (Saward, 2009, pp. 225). A way, where citizens are not just spectators but active co-authors of their collective destiny (Ibid, pp. 119).

In this thesis, grounded in a theoretical thought-experiment, Barber's framework stands as a resounding affirmation of the conviction that within the structural

boundaries of liberal representative democracies. The preference for participation is not only viable but also imperative, safeguarding the dynamic essence of democracy and preventing the disenchantment of the citizens. A one of the central aspects in the discourse advocating for a symbiotic relationship between participation and representation is the realm of civic education, a shared sentiment visible in the texts.

Even though I disagree with Barber on democratic participation and representation being paradoxical concepts, I find valuable insights from his work to support the thesis statement bridging democratic participation and representation to a co-operational symbiosis. Through a democratic take on Arendt´s conceptualization of enlarged mentality through Barbers understanding on the importance of thickening thin democracy and political civic education. This education entails exposure to pluralist viewpoints, which in my argument, when being exposed to can strengthen the capacity of democratic enlarged mentality. Barber´s account on civic education is a practical exposure to public deliberation in the accessible neighborhood assemblies (Barber, 2003, pp. 270),

From here we will continue to examine the arguments of another contemporary political theorist. Nadia Urbinati´s book on representative democracy will illustrate another contemporary view on

4.3. *Nadia Urbinati and Representative Advocacy*

To proceed deeper in to the contemporary discussions on democratic participation and representation, we shall shift our gaze to the work of Nadia Urbinati. She is a distinguished political theorist and professor in Columbia University in the United States. She is known primarily for her scholarly work on democracy and the theory of representation (Urbinati, 2000, Accetti and Urbinati et. al. 2016). She is an academic with a profound interest in the historical and contemporary aspects of democratic theory, the conditions and features of representative democracies, and the critical analysis of populism and direct democracy. Urbinati's research often looks into the intersection of normative democratic theory, and the functioning of political institutions in contemporary societies. One of her significant contributions to

political theory is her examination of the concept of representative democracy, which she reinterprets and defends against criticisms commonly leveled by proponents of direct democracy (Urbinati, 2006).

In this section, I will introduce Urbinati's main arguments and contributions as well as their implications for understanding contemporary democratic theory and practice. Furthermore, I will also demonstrate it´s close relation, of which my democratic re-interpretation of Arendt´s concept of enlarged mentality, thereby binding political participation and representation together as co-operational, symbiotic concepts.

One of Urbinati's key arguments centers on the notion of representation itself, which she views as a dynamic and ongoing process, rather than a static contractual agreement between the electorate and their elected officials. She argues that participation and representation are neither paradoxical. But nor are they "*...a merely a pragmatic alternative for something, that we, the modern citizens can no longer have*" (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 10) Urbinati´s proposals challenge traditional notions of representative democracy that equate it with just delegation of authority. She argues that representation should not be reduced to a mechanism for selecting leaders, but should be understood as a possibility for complex interaction between the elected and the electorate, extending beyond the electoral process into the continuous exercise of political judgment and action (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 26-27, 30-35).

Urbinati also discusses the concept of "*indirectness*" in politics, particularly in democratic theory, where direct rule has often been idealized (Urbinati, 2006, pp.13,38). She critiques this preference for directness, emphasizing that the modern discovery of representation has not weakened the democratic ideal. Instead, she posits that representative democracy enriches democratic participation by allowing for a more nuanced and comprehensive engagement with the citizens. This engagement is mediated through the complex interplay of ideas, opinions, and policies, rather than through the simplistic aggregation of individual preferences (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 30,39).

Reflecting on Urbinati's argument for the value of representative system and therefore the indirectness in democratic politics, we find a possible intersection with the analytical framework of this thesis that emphasizes a democratic take on enlarged mentality synthetisized with Canovan's dual aspects of democracy (Canovan, 1999), arguing for a symbiotic, co-opreational view of political participation and representation. Urbinati challenges the conventional adoration of direct democracy, suggesting that the modern evolution of representative democracy has not diluted but rather deepened democratic engagement (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 5). This viewpoint opens a multi-layered dialogue with the established analytical frame.

Firstly, we can consider the aspect of enlarged mentality as a cognitive capacity for understanding and predicting others' viewpoints. Urbinati's support for indirectness (2006, pp. 5) in politics aligns with this facet, by facilitating a representative process where diverse perspectives and experiences are not only represented but also interpreted and anticipated. In a direct democratic setting, the immediate expression of the public's will is paramount. However, the indirect approach championed by Urbinati allows for a more reflective and anticipatory political engagement. Representatives, acting as mediators, are required to employ an enlarged mentality to navigate the complex web of public opinion, anticipating future implications of present decisions, and reflecting the collective aspirations and concerns of their constituents.

Secondly, Urbinati's indirectness finds a parallel in the concept of democratic enlarged mentality as a tool for navigating the duality of democracy, as described by Margaret Canovan (1999). In the redemptive face of democracy, the focus is on ideals and aspirations – a realm where indirectness can allow for the distillation of collective dreams into actionable policies. In contrast, the pragmatic or skeptical face recognizes the limitations and messiness of real world politics, where indirectness serves as a mechanism to pragmatically translate complex societal needs into feasible governmental actions. The representative's role, steeped in enlarged mentality, becomes crucial in balancing these dual aspects of democracy - understanding and integrating the idealistic aspirations with the pragmatic realities of governance.

Urbinati's argument implies that indirectness does not forsake the redemptive promise of democracy but rather grounds it in pragmatic realities - fostering the sensitivity and genuinity of those redemptive beliefs and passions, enabling a balanced, realistic pursuit of democratic ideals.

Urbinati challenges the perception of society as just an aggregation of individuals with isolated preferences and needs. She argues that representative democracy transcends this simplistic view by understanding the complex relationship of beliefs, opinions, and interpretations. Her perspective can align with the co-operational idea of participation and representation through applying the ideas presented in the theoretical frame of this thesis: The faculty of imagination, central to enlarged mentality, allows for this deeper engagement with the plurality of citizen voices. According to Urbinati, representative system works as a creative social body, encouraging like-minded people to engage in development of speech and political persuasion in order to defend their cause as a dialogical practice (2006, pp. 37). Being represented as a group sets a tone for deliberative processes and thus for democratic education as well as the creation of democratic habits (Tocqueville, 2000, pp. 65, 262, 297)

Urbinati´s assessment of elections and voting in representative democracy further illustrates this point. Urbinati posits that elections are not just about quantifying votes but about interpreting and weighing the complex matrix of opinions and political influences. This approach resonates with our democratic interpretation of enlarged mentality, where intersubjective judgment - understanding and predicting others' viewpoints play a crucial role. Elections, in this sense, are not just about choosing representatives but about shaping a narrative that links voters through time, forming a continuum of political opinions and decisions. Elections, in her view, are not just about selecting leaders; they are also about reflecting and shaping the collective will and the political direction of society (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 112, 134-135.). This perspective highlights the importance of elections in shaping the political narrative and the policy direction of a country, underscoring their significance beyond the act of voting.

In her text, Urbinati explores the interesting relationship between representation, advocacy, and the concept of voice in the context of democracy. She references the ancient Greek principles of *isonomia* (equal distribution of suffrage) and *isegoria* (equal distribution of political voice), emphasizing their importance in a balanced representative framework (2006, pp. 40) According to Urbinati, such a balance allows for an equitable measurement of the people's will. Indirectness and ballot secrecy, she argues, act as protective mechanisms, ensuring not only the security of socially vulnerable individuals but also providing a channel for all citizens to express their genuine, and potentially controversial, opinions which we can interpret to resonate with individual liberty. Specific bravery or openness to direct confrontation is not expected from everyone who seeks to get their voice heard.

I argue that this arrangement aligns with the democratic interpretation of enlarged mentality, which, while adept at understanding and envisioning, stops short of facilitating direct action. This suggests that citizens may be more effectively engaged in democratic processes when the fear of immediate confrontation with opposing views is mitigated. In this context, the capacity for intersubjective judgment, rooted in the faculty of imagination, simultaneously presents both a challenge and a solution within the dichotomous democratic framework. It addresses the human need for social and political participation – *vita activa*, as a form of self-actualization (Arendt, 1998, pp. 12-18), while also recognizing the necessity for individual liberty, privacy, and what I call right to self-alienation.

This duality poses a critical balance. If the emphasis on individual liberty and privacy is overly pronounced, we risk normalizing political disengagement and societal alienation outside of its occurrence as an eccentric outlier resulting in a free choice. Conversely, if the pressure for participation becomes too forceful, it could heighten social apprehensions, also facilitated by the same root with ideals – the faculty of imagination. These socially predictable anxieties can potentially restrict the exercise of equal voice to only those who are innately confident or skilled in the art of rhetoric by alienating the cautious, and further strengthening the skilled through the understanding of their dominating position when it comes to other´s

social apprehensions and the lack of deliberation skills. According to Urbinati, the equal opportunity of every voice being heard *"…minorities remind the majority, that it is just one possible majority*" (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 42) Discreetness, therefore, offers a vital space for a more diverse populace to engage in democratic habits and deliberation, driven not by coercion or fear, but by a genuine interest in their causes simultaneously generating more awareness of the existence of pluralist opinions. This balanced approach fosters a democratic environment where participation is encouraged, yet not at the expense of individual liberty and privacy.

Moving on with Urbinati´s key arguments, according to her representation in a democratic setting should not only repeat the constituents' immediate desires but should also anticipate and respond to their evolving needs and concerns. This anticipatory function requires people to engage in what she terms "*as if*" reasoning (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 124) - a form of imaginative, reflective judgment about laws and policies as if they were legislators themselves. This imaginative leap is essential for crafting policies and laws that are fair, inclusive, and forward-looking. This perspective resonates with my aim to conceptualize a symbiotic framework for participation and representation. Elections become a junction point where individual voices (participation) are harmonized into a collective decision (representation). They are not just endpoints but integral parts of an ongoing democratic conversation, reflecting and shaping the political narrative. Like mentioned in the previous paragraph, elections serve as an encouragement for equal participation fostering the group and identity formation of the citizens whilst enabling a multi-layered arenas for deliberation with different proximal development possibilities for democratic habits, persuasion skills as well as strengthening the capacity of enlarged mentality and the as if reasoning . By self-determining one´s desired participation level, a respectful harmony between the two dichotomies – redemptive and skeptical (Canovan, 1999), individual and public autonomy, can be reached.

We can find this view aligning with the notion of democratic enlarged mentality, as it requires voters and candidates alike to engage in a process of understanding and

anticipating the needs and aspirations of the broader community, not just their immediate interests.

Urbinati's analysis also extends to the concept of popular sovereignty in the context of representative democracy. She challenges the traditional view that equates popular sovereignty with direct participation, arguing that this perspective overlooks the role of representation in articulating and actualizing the will of the people. In her view, popular sovereignty in a representative democracy is expressed not only through direct participation but also through the complex mechanisms of representation that translate the people's will into actionable policies and laws (Canovan, 1999, Habermas, 2001) Urbinati's work touches upon the relationship between partisanship, impartiality, and representation. She explores how democratic processes balance the need for representatives to be advocates for their constituents while also maintaining a degree of impartiality necessary for the broader public good. This balance, she argues, is critical in ensuring that representation in a democracy does not descend into factionalism or become a mere reflection of societal divisions (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 174).

Stemming from her arguments criticizing the non-engaging, alienating representative system whilst appreciating representation´s positive aspects she introduces her proposal representative advocacy to bridge the disconnection between representatives and the citizen. Urbinati does not only rely on the electoral process as a connective tissue but introduces advocacy as a vital, continuous interaction between the representative and the represented though her conceptualization of representative advocacy.

Urbinati's proposal shifts the role of representatives from passive agents, merely reflecting the desires of their electorate, to active proponents of their constituents' needs and aspirations, to impartial advocates with a closer connection with their electors (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 46-47). This approach requires a profound engagement with and understanding of the constituents' concerns, transforming representatives

into genuine advocates rather than just the delegates that Urbinati criticizes the current alienating representative structures fosters (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 64). This transformation from delegates to advocates is pivotal for Urbinati's vision of democracy, as it challenges the traditional view of politics as a simple collation of individual preferences. She posits that the democratic process is significantly enriched when representatives actively interpret and articulate these preferences into a cohesive policy vision. Shifting from a distant representative, into a more cause-engaged advocate does not just link the voters and their advocates as representatives closer together, strengthening the individuals' perception in the value of participation, but this proposal simultaneously transforms representation into a more participatory instrument. According to Urbinati, advocates impartially slide to the citizens´ issues they represent. Through the advocate´s engagement with the plurality of opinions and values they become democratic deliberators with passionate stances for the opinions and values they defend developing the democratic culture and habits (Tocqueville, 2000, pp. 262, 297), it also holds the potential to elevate the quality of legislative deliberation (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 46). Representatives, equipped with a deeper grasp of the diverse and evolving perspectives of their constituents can indeed bring more comprehensive insights to policy debates. This enriches the legislative process, fostering discussions that are deeply rooted in the complexities and subtleties of policy issues, moving beyond the superficialities that often bother the political discourse.

Beyond enhancing representative model of democracy, Urbinati's concept of advocacy redefines political accountability. It proposes a setting where representatives are continuously engaged and responsive, not just during election cycles but throughout their entire term (Urbinati, 2006. pp. 46-47). This ongoing, dynamic form of accountability ensures that elected officials remain consistently attuned to the changing needs and aspirations of those they represent. The democratic understanding of enlarged mentality entails both, constant deliberation in order not be distracted by the episodic orientation of intersubjective judgment that this capacity allows as well as the predictive nature of democratic enlarged mentality, where the elected officials are expected practice their *techne* - also through a cultivated skill of rhetoric in order to answer to the changing needs of the represented.

In Urbinati's framework, what she calls a strong form of representative democracy bridges the gap between total electoral delegation and individual direct action, emphasizing a proactive, responsible, and dynamic role for representatives (Kestilä-Kekkonen and Korvela, 2017, pp.103-104). This notion connects with the principles of associative democracy like seen in Tocqueville (2000, pp. 220-225), a specialized mode of managing diverse interests, and thus aligns with the concept of strong representative democracy in facilitating a liberal democratic model of broad regional interest representation, as opposed to the narrower focus on specific issues within a multifaceted societal context, making Urbinati´s vision of strong form of representative government an ideal study for the purpose of this thesis.

The insights drawn from Urbinati's analysis offers an interesting ground to explore the main argument of the thesis that enlarged mentality is indeed a democratic capacity that can bridge representation and participation symbiotically. Urbinati's exploration of the democratic process in particular the interplay of ideology, judgment and the as if reasoning, intersects meaningfully with Arendt's concept of enlarged mentality when viewed through a democratic lens.

Urbinati elaborates the role of "*as if*" (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 124-126) reasoning in democratic judgment. Urbinati´s understanding of as if is a concept that I argue, connects with the take on enlarged mentality as a democratic capacity which allows for an imaginative leap into the perspectives of others. This imaginative leap is not rooted in empathy, but rather in a rational and objective engagement with the views and conditions of others. It creates a space where citizens can engage in the "as if" of collective decision-making, deliberating and deciding as if they were in the position of others crafting policies and laws that are fair and inclusive.

"Fictional reasoning is an aid to the development of desirable actions—not simply actions themselves; to a set of inferences that are functional to the performance of some desirable actions. It provides us with new resources "for thinking about ourselves and our situations, and in this sense it deeply influences our language, emotions, and action …" (Urbinati, 2006, p. 124)

This reflective judgment connects with Canovan's (1999) portrayal of the redemptive and skeptical faces of democracy. Redemptive democracy seeks to harness the aspirational elements of politics, the collective values and societal cohesion that emerge from shared democratic participation. Here the "as if" reasoning becomes redemptive, as it encourages individuals and policymakers to consider and act upon the collective good guided by an enlarged mentality that contemplates the welfare of the community as a whole.

On the other hand, the skeptical face of democracy acknowledges the complex realities and imperfections of governance is complemented by the "as if" reasoning as well. It brings a pragmatic edge to the concept of democratic take on enlarged mentality, as it necessitates an objective and critical engagement with the limitations and challenges of the democratic process. This reasoning can support a pragmatic approach to representation trough an emphasis of the need for an ongoing dialogue between elected officials and their constituents. Thereby, it fosters a continuous loop of participation. Arendt discussed critically the faculty of imagination and its two-faced capabilities in her text Lying in Politics (1972). As imagination is the basis of the capacity to lie, it is the simultaneously the uniquely human faculty that enables humanity to create new, think about non-existing and strive for making it reality:

"*Human action inherently introduces novelty, even if not created from scratch. To pave the way for action, we often need to alter or discard existing elements. Such transformations can only occur if we mentally detach from our physical reality, envisioning alternative possibilities. This implies that the capability to deny objective truth (the power to lie) is closely linked to the ability to shape reality (the power to act), both springing from imagination. The mere act of contradicting evident truths, like stating it is sunny during rain, is not just a given. It highlights our adaptability in the world, both sensorially and intellectually, but also our distinction from being only a fixed component of it. This autonomy offers the latitude to modify our surroundings and innovate. The cognitive freedom to either acknowledge or reject existence, to affirm or deny beyond mere concurrence or opposition, is pivotal for action. And indeed, action is the essence of politics*." (Arendt, 1972, p. 5)

Urbinati’s emphasis on the fictional nature of sovereignty and the general will resonates with the vision of an enlarged mentality that is inherently democratic in its possibilities. Representational judgment, as discussed in the text, centers on the concept of 'as if' reasoning, which transcends the binary of true/false and delves into normative assessments of right and wrong. This approach, illustrated through Cesare Beccaria's theory on juridical judgment (Beccaria, 1963), suggests that decision-making should be guided by hypothetical scenarios that prioritize just outcomes over empirical facts. In politics, this translates to viewing sovereignty not as a tangible entity but as an ideological construct that is essential for applying principles like liberty and equality to real-world situations. A method of reasoning which facilitates the creation and application of laws by connecting abstract democratic principles with the concrete circumstances of society. It shifts focus from mere physical presence to the representation of ideas and conditions within a normative framework. Therefore it plays a critical role in shaping ethically sound and pragmatic policies in a democratic setup. On the other, hand ideologist judgment relates to how the concept of sovereignty gains political relevance in the realm of representative politics (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 120). This approach moves beyond the limitations imposed by a purely ontological understanding of will and presence, alongside with the constraints of a formalistic methodology. Essentially it frames sovereignty not as a rigid, pre-defined entity but as a dynamic political idea that is shaped and redefined through the processes and practices of representative governance.(Urbnati, 2006, pp.119-124) Derived from this elaboration, it is possible to reflect enlarged mentality as a tool for the democratic process that offers a way to consider diverse viewpoints and potential actions without falling into the trap of empathetic alignment hindering the attempts of objective judging. As the faculty of imagination is representative in its essence, he “as if” reasoning provides a conceptual bridge between the two by offering a method for citizens and representatives to deliberate and judge in a manner that is both inclusive and forward-thinking. In this light I argue that the democratic capacity of enlarged mentality, supported by the redemptive aspirations and pragmatic realities illustrated by Canovan (1999) and discussed through Urbinati´s (2006) account of “as if” reasoning highlights the belief that participation and representation are symbiotic in their core essence.

I argue that there are similarities between Urbinati's discussion on representation "as if" and Hannah Arendt's concept of enlarged mentality. Urbinati's focus on the faculty of imagination as a representative tool offers food for analysis. Imagination in this context is not just a flight of fancy but a cognitive capacity that enables representatives to envision potential outcomes and scenarios. In a way like the way a chess player anticipates moves: before a strong experience a mindful calculation is necessary, but as an expert the cultivated skills transform into intuition. This anticipatory function of imagination finds a counterpart with Arendt's enlarged mentality (1998) as well as with Urbinati´s concept of advocacy as representation (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 44-49) in the function´s capacity to consider various viewpoints and outcomes. The realization of this anticipatory function suggests a more nuanced form of representation, one that transcends only relaying of constituents' desires and thereby enters the realm of proactive governance. This form of representation acknowledges the complexity of human needs and aspirations, the redemptive and pragmatic sides (Canovan, 1999).

Urbinati's "*as if*" reasoning (2006, pp. 124-126), when applied to the political arena considers both, what is and what could be. This mode of thinking is in addition to deception or falsehood also about the power of possibility and potential. This mode is an exercise in hypothetical reasoning that can be profoundly democratic. When politicians and citizens engage in as if reasoning, they are shaping the future while responding to the current affairs. Here Arendt's enlarged mentality can find its most potent application combining the two capacities introduced in the previous chapters of this thesis. Objective judging for another and to predict which enables individuals to mentally simulate different scenarios and perspectives fostering a decision-making process that can be both inclusive and innovative.

Participation more than the act of voting or voicing an opinion, it entails also involves engaging with diverse voices and perspectives and contributing to a shared vision for the future. In a similar manner representation is more than a simple delegation of authority: it is an ongoing dialogue and a continuous process of adapting and responding to the evolving needs and aspirations of the electorate. A similar call for ongoing democratic habits and involvement can be found in the undertones of Barber´s (2003) and Tocqueville´s (2000) works. This dynamic

process requires representatives echo the current sentiments of their constituents as well as to anticipate future needs and concerns. This is a task made possible through the imaginative leap that Urbinati emphasizes (Urbinati, 2000, pp. 119-124).

The attempt to synthesize Arendt's and Urbinati's ideas stresses the need for a democratic education system that goes beyond the basics of civics. The education called for would emphasize critical thinking, intersubjective pluralist engagement, and the development of a foresightful mindset. Individuals would be prepared to participate in democracy and equally importantly to shape it and to seek agency. Here, rhetoric in this framework becomes a tool for enlightenment enabling politicians to communicate complex ideas and forge a common understanding among diverse groups.

Even though the integration of enlarged mentality and "as if" reasoning into democratic processes does hold significant potential, it is crucial to recognize their limitations. These cognitive functions are not foolproof despite of the vast possibilities. They rely on the individual's capacity for intersubjective judgment, understanding, and foresight. These capacities can be glitched by personal biases, traumas and limited personal experiences. Therefore, a democratic society must be vigilant and critical, constantly re-evaluating its approaches and strategies to ensure that they serve the collective good and not just a select few. In sum, the attempt to synthesize Urbinati's (2006) account on representation "as if" and Arendt's concept of enlarged mentality provides a theoretical possibility for understanding the co-operative nature of participation and representation. The role of imagination, and foresight in creating a responsive and inclusive political system are highlighted in this perspective. This view however, also invites a critical examination of the potential pitfalls and biases inherent in these cognitive processes aiming for a balanced and realistic approach to the topic.

Moving back to the historical chapter, it is possible to see the interconnectedness of the following: Tocqueville's observations on American democracy. Particularly his focus on the educative power of the jury system and the townships illustrates a historical example of democratic education in action. The functions of township system is actually synchronous with Urbinati's exploration of deliberative processes

and the imagination based “as if” reasoning, both highlight the formative role of democratic institutions and practices in shaping citizens' capacity for participatory governance.

Tocqueville saw the American jury system as a “*school of democracy*” (Tocqueville, 2000, pp. 311), where citizens learn the practical skills of governance and the virtues of civic engagement. In a similar manner the townships functioned as guards of participatory democracy Townships demonstrated how localized decision-making and active citizen involvement are key to the health of a democratic society. These institutions provided the citizens with opportunities to engage in the very type of “as if*”* (Urbinati, 2006, pp. 124-126) reasoning that Urbinati describes. The imaginative, reflective judgment about laws and policies as if they were legislators themselves.

This hands-on approach to democracy aligns with the concept of enlarged mentality. This connection is visible in the perception towards citizen political development; the dialogues and deliberation with diverse populace continuously enhance the capacity of individuals to think beyond their immediate, personal experiences and to consider the broader collective needs and potential actions. Tocqueville’s democratic education, which Urbinati’s deliberative processes echoes aids in formularting an understanding that the decisions one makes must reflect the perspectives of the wider community.

4.4 *Conclusion*

In this chapter on the contemporary accounts on participation and representation, my aim is not to synthesize the accounts of Urbinati and Barber. Despite having similar goal to increase democratic participation in the existing liberal systems, the foundational critiques to the liberal democracy is vastly different. If we compare Urbinati´s and Barber´s positions, it is possible to see Barber´s strong democracy as an institutional implementation taking a form of a compromise. He is a realist and understands the strong support for the liberal democracy in his country of origin the US. On the other hand, Urbinati´s critique of current liberal democracy might sound

similar in her call for more citizen engagement and thickening of the thin. Yet, she argues that the representation is an integral part of participation if done correctly.

Reflecting on the historical insights provided by de Tocqueville (2000) and Constant (1988), it is possible to see that the perspectives of the symbiotic nature of individual and public liberties has existed since the debates have emerged. Tocqueville's observations on the American democratic model with a particular focus on the jury system and township governance highlights some early examples of participatory democracy in practice. Tocqueville and Constant both understood the importance of education and self-development which I have discussed in the terms of developing the capacity of enlarged mentality. Constant's discourse on the liberties of the ancients compared with the moderns offers a crucial historical setting. It clarifies the shifting nature of freedom and its critical and ongoing role in the democratic history and future. These perspectives from the past serve as essential tools in grounding the discussion on the complexities of liberties, participation and representation.

Juxtaposing these historical insights with Urbinati's and Barber's contemporary theories under covers discussion full of possibilities for democratic thought. Urbinati's exploration of representation "as if" and the faculty of imagination as a representative tool offers a pathway to imagine more inclusive and participatory forms of representative democracy. Her argument that representation can enhance political participation when coupled with mechanisms for institutional mechanisms offering stability resonates with the notion of enlarged mentality and co-creative implementations. This perspective can allow a more informed imaginative and anticipatory approach to governance.

Further alignments with the arguments of this thesis can be found in Barber's concept of strong democracy with its focus on active civic engagement and deliberation. Barber's vision challenges the conventional structures and the current realm of representative democracy by advocating for a more dynamic and participatory model with truly active citizenry. His vision in has a resemblance in Urbinati's (2006)

emphasis on the imaginative and anticipatory aspects of representation, as well as civic and democratic education. In these details we can see similar aspirations in Urbinati´s proposal with Barber´s highly critical view on liberal democracies.

As all of the perspectives are synthesized and contrasted it is possible to reaffirm the argument that political participation and representation are not mutually exclusive or originating from completely isolated sources. The democratic capacity of enlarged mentality coupled with the redemptive aspirations and pragmatic realities of Canovan's dual faces of democracy (1999) can provide a view of how these elements can coexist and enrich each other as discussed in the chapter 2.

In the context of thesis, the analytical framework constructed around Arendt's concept of enlarged mentality as a democratic capacity forms the cornerstone for integrating the thoughts of contemporary writers like Urbinati and Barber. This framework, while deeply rooted in historical perspectives can find its true potency in its application to contemporary democratic theories. It serves as a bridge, connecting the insights of Constant and the observations of Tocqueville with the modern understandings of participation and representation.

In examining the perspectives of modern democratic theorists as outlined in this, it becomes evident that despite their varying stances on whether democratic participation and representation are paradoxical or co-original, a common thread emerges. This shared aspect is rooted in the democratic capacity of enlarged mentality, revealing essential similarities in their viewpoints.

Urbinati's explorations of the representative process, particularly her focus on "as if" reasoning and the imaginative aspect of representation (Urbinati, 2000, pp. 119,126), brings a new depth to our understanding of representation within the democratic process. Her perspective suggests that representation is a creative, anticipatory, and deliberative engagement with the electorate’s aspirations and needs instead of just transmission of the will. It is deliberative engagement with the electorate’s

aspirations and needs. I argue this aligning with the concept of democratic enlarged mentality, which posits that understanding and predicting the perspectives of others is a critical democratic skill. In this light, representation becomes an active, creative process that involves foresight and the ability to see beyond immediate circumstances.

Similarly, Barber's advocacy for strong democracy, emphasizing active participation and deliberation, resonates with the dynamic nature of democratic participation as envisioned in the chapter two. Barber’s model transcends traditional boundaries of representative democracy, advocating for a more involved and engaged citizenry. This is participation in the sense of continuous, dialogic process that shapes and reshapes the democratic mores (Tocqueville, 2000) The democratic capacity of enlarged mentality fostering an environment where diverse voices are not only heard but are also integral to the decision-making process.

My arguments on the co-operationality of participation and representation aim to serve as a melting pot where the ideas of these contemporary thinkers meld. I aim to elaborate on how enlarged mentality as a democratic capacity finds its position for navigating and perhaps explaining the complexities of modern democracies. This capacity highlights both the imaginative deliberations in representation and the active engagement in participation. Furthermore, it highlights the interdependence of participation and representation, where each element enriches and informs the other.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have attempted to synthesize Canovan´s two faces of democracy with Arendt´s concept of enlarged mentality to argue for its inherent democratic capacities. Reading in to the historical and additionally to the contemporary disputes, I would like to highlight some key arguments presence in the texts throughout my thesis.

While all of the authors, Constant, Tocqueville, Barber and Urbinati vary in their perspectives, a similar theme is evident. Liberal democratic systems are not democratic enough. There is awareness towards the risk of populism (or tyranny of the majority in the historical accounts), but the alienation and lack of political self-expression imposed by the "thin" liberal democracies is the motivation for all of the diverse accounts of the respected thinkers. In the terms of this thesis, we can analyze that the redemptive face cannot flourish when the skeptical face is in charge. However, reading to the texts of the selected thinkers, it is possibly that the redemptive face will never be able to reach a full existence without falling to its own inadequacies. The relationship with the two faces is co-dependent and yet when they cannot exist alone, there is a string tendency of dominance of another. The dominance of the redemptive face have been witnessed in the populist uprisings in the world, while the skeptical face, when in charge, has its ongoing alienating and de-motivating effect all around the liberal democracies. The balance is not easy to reach as both of the faces require a dominant position in order to be satisfied. Redemptive face can never be expressed and felt enough if there are limitations set by the skeptical side. The skeptical face, with its endless distrust and embarrassment to its redemptive brother, cannot be in peace without governing the "beast" of redemptive passions and believes. This co-dependent dichotomy, I believe is a foundational part of the human experience, also witnessed and felt in the faculty of imagination and intersubjective judgment as discussed in the chapter two.

Here, I would like to clarify how is my proposal of the co-operational, symbiotic perspective different than Habermas´s co-originality thesis. Admittedly my

perspective has a plethora of similarities with the Habermasian one, but I believe my angle of approach different in its path to the similar conclusion. Habermas identifies the co-originality stemming from the legitimacy of laws and constitutional framework to enable the co-originality of the private and public liberties. I however, base my understanding of the co-operational positioning to the human capacity of imagination, and intersubjective judgment. The general result of the arguments might be quite similar, but my approach stems from the aim to understand the human experience and the tendencies of redemptive and skeptical sides of politics from within.

Apart from arguing for the co-operational capacities of political participation and representation, the objective of this thesis was to showcase my learning and interest in political theory acquired during my MA studies. Building on this, I am keen to further explore the complexities and dichotomies discussed and studied in political theory.

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