


IZMIR UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

TOWARDS A DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM IN TURKEY
DURING THE POST- 2002 PERIOD

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
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ABSTRACT

TOWARDS A DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM IN TURKEY
DURING THE POST-2002 PERIOD

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This thesis aims at analyzing whether a dominant party system is emerging within a multiparty system in Turkey since 2002. In order to make this assessment, the causes that pave the way for the rise of the Justice and Development Party, JDP, to power, and its policies are examined. This study will provide a clear assessment of the possibility of maintenance of the JDP's ascendancy. As a result, it argues that the JDP can be defined as a dominant party due to its victory in 2015 general elections in addition to its victories in both the general elections and the municipal elections since 2002.

Keywords: Political Parties and Party Systems, Party System in Turkey, Dominant Party System, Justice and Development Party

ÖZET

2002 SONRASI DÖNEMDE, TÜRKİYE’DE HÂKİM PARTİ SİSTEMİNE DOĞRU

Balođlu, Esra

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü Yüksek Lisans Programı

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Filiz BAŞKAN CANYAŞ

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Bu tezde, Türkiye’de, 2002’den günümüze, çok partili sistem içinde bir hâkim parti sisteminin oluşup oluşmadığını araştırmak amaçlanmıştır. Bu konuyu inceleyebilmek için Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin, AKP, 2002’de çok kısa sürede iktidara gelmesinin nedenleri ve AKP’nin izlediđi politikalar incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma, AKP iktidarının uzun yıllar devam edip edemeyeceđi hakkında daha doğru yorum yürütmemize olanak sağlayacaktır. Sonuç olarak, AKP’nin 2002’den beri girdiđi bütün genel ve yerel seçimleri kazanması, 2015’te dördüncü kez tekrar tek başına iktidara gelmesi onun hâkim parti olarak tanımlanabileceđini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasal Partiler ve Parti Sistemleri, Türkiye’deki Parti Sistemleri, Hâkim Parti Sistemi, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether the dominant party system has emerged since 2002, despite the legally implemented multi-party system in Turkey. The only clear explanation about the defining time period is given by Sartori. The consecutive victory of three elections by one party is the criteria to define the system as dominant. In terms of the weakness of the opposition, Sartori assumes the vote difference of 10 percent between the dominant and the opposition as the main determinant for the dominant party system. There are basically three important characteristics of the dominant party system in the competitive parliamentary systems which are; vote or seat shares in the parliament gained by the parties in the system, nature of the opposition and the last one is the duration of ascendancy (Çarkoğlu, 2011, p. 44).

The Justice and Development Party, JDP, has been the victor of four consecutive elections since it came to power in 2002. It has kept its hegemony both in the general elections of 2002, 2007, 2011, 2015 and the municipal elections of 2004 - 41.6%, 2009 - 38.3%, and 2014 – 45% of the votes. The investigations of Müftüler Baç and Keyman indicates that (2012, p. 87), the JDP has been in government since the 2002 general elections after receiving 34.3% of the votes, gaining 363 seats in the parliament. In 2007 general elections, the JDP increased its vote share to 46.7% and the party had 341 seats of the total seats in parliament. In 2011 general elections the JDP obtained the largest vote share for a third time after receiving 49.8% of the votes and the party gained 327 seats in the parliament.

Keyman states that:

As the 2002, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2014 general and municipal elections results indicate, as well as the 2010 referendum (57.88 % “Yes” vote), the dominance of the JDP in the electoral process constitutes a kind of electoral hegemony in which the party acts and governs Turkey without any strong opposition. (Keyman, 2014, p. 23)

Finally, the JDP continued to dominate the elections held in June 2015 with a vote share of 40.8%. Despite this domination, it was not able form the government as a single party. Due to the collapse of the negotiations in trying to establish a coalition government, and the recent elections held in November 2015, the JDP gained 49.4% of the votes in this election and again came to power as a single party after a break of

five months (CNN TÜRK, 2015), resulting in the JDP forming a strong majority government.

The research question of thesis; whether the JDP can be defined as a ‘dominant party’ or not. The focal points of this thesis are to examine the factors that lead to the formation of a dominant party. These factors include the JDP’s coming to power in the 2002 elections, the increase of its vote share in the subsequent elections, and the possibility of maintenance of the JDP’s ascendancy in the future. In order to explain the existing party system clearly it is necessary to examine the political parties, types of party systems and party systems which were implemented in Turkey until 2002. It is also aimed at contributing to the literature on the party systems in Turkey through explaining that the dominant party system in Turkey has emerged since post-2002 period.

As it is explained above, the JDP, which has won the elections both general and municipal since 2002, has won the elections held on November 2015 and came to power a single party for the fourth time. Furthermore, it has been able to protect its large vote share and it has been the largest party of the general and municipal elections since 2002. It has not been seen that a party has increased its vote share persistently in the history of Turkish politics (Ciddi & Esen, 2014, p. 427). The Democrat Party, DP, won successive elections in the 1950s but its vote share was decreasing. However, the JDP has won successive elections through increasing its vote share persistently (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012, p. 87). Therefore, the JDP fulfills the criteria of being a dominant party for the first time in the history of Turkey.

This thesis comprises of five chapters. In the first chapter, the research question and the structure of the thesis are introduced. As briefly explained above, the aim of this thesis is to investigate whether the JDP can be defined as a dominant party.

Second chapter has been sub-divided into two sections. First section is about political party types. The party typologies of Duverger and Neuman are dealt with in this chapter, because these are the most well-known and significant classification (Kapani, 2014, p. 184) However, these are insufficient for the explanation of today’s parties due to their inclusive and one dimensional structure. Therefore, Otto Kirchheimer introduces Catch-All party. He distinguishes this party type from others in terms of their degrees of ideology. Second section deals with the party systems. In the literature, the party systems are divided into two; the non-competitive and

competitive party systems. According to Sartori, two party system, multi-party system and dominant party systems are competitive. The one party system and hegemonic party system are non-competitive party systems (Saribay, 1998, p. 131). In this context, the party systems are respectively dealt with in this thesis.

In the third chapter, the party systems which have been implemented in Turkey are dealt with. This chapter has been sub-divided into five sections. In the first section the pre-republican period will be explained. In the second section is about the republican period. The third section covers the transition period to the multi-party system, the interruption of the multi-party systems due to the 1960, 1971 and 1980 military interventions and the systems brought about by the 1961 and 1982 constitutions. In contrast to the military interventions in 1960 and 1980, the parliament was not dissolved and a new government was formed within the parliament in the 1971 military intervention (Yalansız, 2006, p. 268). Therefore, the transition to a multiparty system again due to the constitutions of 1961 and the 1970s period will be examined in the fourth section. Lastly, the post-1980 period and the 1982 constitution will be explained in the fifth section. The most important development is the 10% electoral threshold which was established by the Election Law in 1983. It mainly aimed at the prevention of ineffective coalition governments. The main aim of this chapter is to explain the changes in the party systems of Turkey since the pre-republican period and to introduce the reasons that accelerated the rise of the JDP.

The fourth chapter tries to answer the question as to ‘whether the party system in Turkey during the post 2002 period can be defined as a dominant party system’. This chapter has been sub-divided into five sections. The first and second section deals with the main reasons that accelerated the rise of the JDP. In order to explain these reasons, the economic and political context of the 1990s will be explained. Third and four sections are about the ideology of the JDP and the 2002 elections and the beginning of ‘New Turkey’. ‘Why the JDP is defined as a dominant party’, in order to answer this question three criteria of dominant party will be examined. Therefore the fifth section is about vote or seat shares in the parliament gained by the parties in the system, nature of the opposition and the last one is the duration of ascendancy. It is necessary to investigate JDP’s performance in terms of; developments in the economy, the European Union integration process and

accordingly the new foreign policy approach in order to explain third criteria and give answer ‘How has the JDP been able to stay in power since 2002?’

In the conclusion, the JDP is prominently defined as a dominant party due to its victory in general elections and its success in the municipal elections and the referendum held in 2010. Furthermore, its ascendancy period, staying in sole power for 13 years, with the help of a 10% threshold and weak opposition, and increasing its vote share are the other details that define the JDP as a dominant party.

CHAPTER 2

APPROACHES ON POLITICAL PARTIES

This chapter comprises of two sections which are; typology of political parties and party systems. In this chapter, main subject is party systems, especially dominant party system. But before explaining the dominant party system, political parties' typology will be analyzed briefly. Therefore first chapter is about political party types. Political parties have differences in terms of their internal structure, organization, social basis, ideology etc. therefore, there are different political party typologies. The party typologies of Maurice Duverger and Sigmund Neuman are the most well-known and significant classification (Kapani, 2014, p. 184). Thus, the party typologies of Duverger and Neuman are dealt within this chapter. Duverger divides parties into cadre, mass and devotee. Neuman classifies the parties as individual representative and social integration parties. The typologies of these two authors will be examined and the similarities between them will be focused on. However, these two party typologies are insufficient for the explanation of today's parties due to their inclusive and one dimensional structure. Therefore, Otto Kirchheimer introduces and explains a new kind of party; Catch-All. Second section deals with the party systems. One-party system, Hegemonic party systems are non-competitive, but two-party system, multi-party system and dominant party systems are accepted as competitive in the literature (Saribay, 1998, p. 131).

2.1. Typology of Political Parties

Political parties can be defined as a political community that defines itself with a political tag, and tries to get, and maintain, control of the government by legal and in legitimate ways by means of a constant and stable organization (Saribay, 2001, p. 6). Whatever the nature of the political system (democratic, authoritarian or totalitarian) political parties play a role of prime importance in all modern societies. At the present time, regimes without political parties can be just encountered in the traditional regimes whose societies are out of the political modernization. In this sense, political parties must be accepted as the products of the modern state beyond all value judgments (Kapani, 2014, p. 175).

There are differences among political parties in terms of internal structure, organization, social basis, ideology and other various aspects. Parties can be divided into different types (Kapani, 2014, p. 184). We can examine political parties in terms of structure and functions. In this respect, the party typologies of Duverger and Neumann are accepted as the most known and the most important ones. (Akçalı, 1995, p. 94). Duverger classifies the political parties as Cadre, Mass and Devotee. The difference between the cadre, mass and devotee parties does not depend on the size of these parties, nor the number of the members, but on the organizational structure difference (Duverger, 1993, p. 106).

Sigmund Neumann divides political parties into two groups, the ‘Individual Representation Parties’ and ‘Social Integration Parties’, in terms of functions. These are the most important and the most recognized typologies. Today, studies of political parties are maintained through new approaches. Therefore, new categories are studied in order to fulfill the missing points in Duverger’s, now classical, typology. One of these studies is the party type defined by Otto Kirchheimer as the ‘Catch-All Party’ (Kapani, 2014, pp. 189-192). In this section, the party typologies of Duverger and Neumann are respectively examined and then the focus will be shifted to Otto Kirchheimer’s ‘Catch- All Party’, which is more extensive in terms of explaining today’s parties.

2.1.1. Duverger’s Cadre (Committee) Parties

The first examples of the cadre parties were seen in Western democracies. Cadre parties are old type parties that were formed before the general vote principle and took their source from the parliament (Kapani, 2014, p. 185). Most of the Conservative and Liberal parties in Europe and America are examples of this model (Teziç, 2001, p. 331).

It is important to bring the elite together in the cadre parties in preparation for the elections, running the election campaign and being in contact with the nominees. The members of this elite group are comprised of people who can provide support for the nominees by means of their prestige and networks. There are also technicians, who can manage the electorate and organize the campaign and financial supporters who can provide the required money. The features of great prestige, technical expertise and extensive wealth are in the forefront. While the mass party uses the

method of number of members, the cadre party uses the method of selection. Therefore, to be a member of this party has a very different meaning. The membership concept in the cadre parties is a personal notion that depends on the persons' abilities and special skills. If a member is defined as the one who contracts an engagement and then pays his dues, as in the mass party, then the cadre parties do not have members like this. Some cadre parties who are affected by the mass parties only try to imitate them and show themselves as they gather members (Duverger, 1993, pp. 107-108).

Cadre parties mobilize and organize themselves in the elections. They only do hard work during election campaigns and they conduct elections by means of committees that they establish. The nominees of the cadre parties are determined by these committees. These nominees only try to affect the public opinion during the electoral period. After the elections, the effect of these parties is of a minute amount (Akçalı, 1995, p. 95). The number of members is low in cadre parties resulting in no necessity of a solid and disciplined structure and a weak interior organization (Teziç, 2001, p. 331).

2.1.2. Duverger's Mass Parties

These parties emerged at the beginning of the 20th century long after the emergence of cadre parties, as a result of the fact that the masses involved in politics gained the right to vote. Cadre parties were first developed by the socialist parties. Afterwards, the tactic was adopted by the fascist and communist parties along with several parties in the less developed countries in recent years. However, the most important difference is the fact that whereas the socialist parties have democratic structure, the same situation is not valid for communist and fascist parties (Kapani, 2014, p. 186).

The increasing number of the membership is very important for mass parties. This importance can be emphasized through the words of Duverger:

Let's take the French Socialist Party into account. Gathering member has a fundamental basis in terms of political and financial aspects. First of all, the party aims at the political education of the proletariat and thus it also aims at the formation of the political elite which is derived from this social class and can obtain governmental power and rule. Therefore, the members are the elementary substance and activity of the party. When this party does not have members, it resembles a teacher who does not have students. (Duverger, 1993, p. 106)

As it is understood from these words, the membership is the crucial factor for the mass parties. As Daver (1976, p. 232) implies, the aim of the mass party is to make all its voters the members of the party, and to have as many supporters as possible. Mass parties are the parties that try to equalize the number of members and the number of the voters.

The socialist parties that represent the proletariat do not have the financial support of the capital circles as the Conservative and Liberal parties do. The only source for participation in the elections, and for meeting the election expenses, is the contributions from the members (Kapani, 2014, p. 186). The distinctive feature of the mass party is its appeal to the people. The contributions made by the members save the election campaign from capitalist pressures (Duverger, 1993, p. 107). In this case, in contrast to cadre parties, mass parties provide a democratic finance to meet election expenditure instead of a capitalist finance. There is actually a close link between the new structures of the parties and the development of the social structure.

As Teziç puts it:

Traditional cadre parties were representing the struggle between the conservative aristocracy and liberal bourgeoisie. The parties in the 19th century were organizing in the form of cadre parties in the elections on the basis of wealth. However, the cadre parties emerged with the development to the general vote. The mass parties were representing the struggle between the bourgeoisie and socialists and the nominees that would participate in to the elections were determined in a more democratic way. The nominees were being determined through the countrywide congresses instead of a small committee's narrow view. (Teziç, 2001, p. 331)

The members of mass parties are not just important in terms of financial support, they are also important in terms of political support. Therefore, political education and raising awareness of the members are provided. The aim here is, as Duverger explained, to raise an elite who can be involved in the government and be in power. Concordantly, the party has a feature of a school (Kapani, 2014, pp. 186-187). In this way, the mass have an active political tendency and learn how it can be involved in political life (Duverger, 1993, p. 107). The mass parties want to represent and increase a specific class or category. Thus, these parties are highly disciplined and have a centralized organization. The members of the party always have a good political education (Akçalı, 1995, p. 97).

2.1.3. Duverger's Devotee Parties

This is the third classification of Duverger. These parties can be found in democratic as well as in authoritarian regimes, but mostly tends to emerge in authoritarian regimes. The main characteristic of these parties is its charismatic leader. In addition, the ruling elite directs and controls the party. The recruitment of membership is based on a selection criteria and probationary period. During this period, the candidate for the membership is tested in terms of loyalty and ideological orthodoxy. The pyramidal party structure exists and the militia group constitutes a wide basis combined with a vertical relationship. Revolutionary and forceful rhetoric is used and these parties are more disciplined, inflexible in terms of ideology, and more cohesive. The most important examples of devotee parties are Hitler's Nazi Party and the Communist parties of France and Italy after 1945 (Jackson & Jackson, 1997, pp. 315-316).

2.1.4. Neuman's Individual Representation Parties

The scope of individual representation parties is limited with the election campaigns, and with the activities in the parliament and in the government. The duty of the members of the party is only to provide the majority in election campaigns in order to come to power (Teziç, 2001, p. 332). These parties are flexible in terms of discipline and ideology, and members are not expected to participate actively. Also, there is no effort made to keep the behavior of the members under control (Kapani, 2014, p. 189). Therefore, they are also named as limited parties. The most important function of the party is to present candidates and to win the elections, with candidates being under no firm discipline afterwards. The political parties in the USA (Republicans and Democrats) are typical examples of individual representation parties (Teziç, 2001, p. 332).

2.1.5. Neuman's Social Integration Parties

Social integration parties are the new type of political parties which emerge as the result of the mass movements and the expansion of political participation. The aim of this political community is to integrate the masses which are alone and removed from their own environments because of the industrialization and urbanization with the society. In contrast to individual representation parties, these

parties are not mechanisms just active in the election periods in order to come to power (Kapani, 2014, p. 190). The other difference from individual representation parties is the fact that it establishes continuous relations with its members through gathering them under the same roof of ideology and organization. In other words, it is interested in the social lives of its members (Teziç, 2001, p. 332). In these parties, the support of voters depends on the basis of a specific social class. The primary examples of the democratic integration parties are the socialist parties in continental Europe. According to Kapani, it is seen that there is a similarity between the typologies of Duverger and Neumann. The cadre parties have similarities with the individual representation parties; and the mass parties have similarities with the social integration parties (Kapani, 2014, pp. 190-191). Duverger's perspective is based on the structural and organizational features of the parties. The organizational differences of the parties are related to the party's origin, its social basis and its organizational needs. On the other hand, Neuman's perspective is related with the functions of the parties in the process of political participation (Süer, 2011, p. 53).

These typologies are insufficient to explain today's parties because of the fact that they are not fully inclusive and one dimensional. Therefore, new kinds of parties have developed. The most known of them is Otto Kirchheimer's Catch-all party.

2.1.6. Otto Kirchheimer's Catch-All Party

According to Otto Kirchheimer, mass integration parties make concessions to their ideologies and organizational structure. As a result of this, they become catch all parties (Süer, 2011, p. 58). Catch-all parties were developed after the Second World War. This party type is neither a cadre party, nor mass party, nor social integration party in the real sense. The Catch-all party tries to appeal to a widespread electorate mass as much as possible (Kapani, 2014, p. 192). In other words, these parties appeal to the electorate rather than their members differently from the mass and social integration parties. This means decreasing the role of the individuals who are the party members. In this regard, the ideological attitudes of catch all parties are flexible, and the pragmatic orientation of them outweighs (Teziç, 2001, p. 333). The main aim of this party is to gather the votes of the marginal electorate, whose number increases due to the sociological changes, through a moderate program and so to win the elections through expanding their social base. The Christian Democrat Parties in

Germany and in Italy, the German Social Democrat Party and the Ressemblent pour le Republic are all examples of catch all parties in continental Europe. It can be said that the political parties in Turkey are classified within this category (Kapani, 2014, p. 193).

2.2. Party Systems

The party system is the interaction formed by the political parties in a political system with the political system and each other. The traditional series of analysis of one party system emphasize the number of the political parties in the political system; one-party, two-party and multi-party. Recently, some researchers have reached the opinion that the analyses based on the number of the party are not adequate. The aim of defining the party system is to have information, explanation and power of estimation about how the party systems function; therefore, it is not sufficient to use this as a base (Turan, 1986, p. 121). Duverger defines party systems with the coexistence type of the many parties. Apart from the state in which a one-party system is implemented, multi parties coexist in each state. The party systems of the states are defined by the type of this coexistence. Duverger accepts the number of the parties as the basic criterion and thus he divides the party systems into three groups; one-party, two-party and multi-party (Özbudun, 1964, p. 30). This classification, which is based on the numbers of the parties, is criticized by other authors and it is proposed that this numerical criterion is inadequate for classification of the party systems (Özbudun, 1979, p. 111). Duverger has an important place in the use of number criterion for classification of party systems and in this triple classification of the party systems. However, it is not accurate to indicate that Duverger just used the number of the parties in defining the party systems as a basis (Saribay, 1998, pp. 129-130).

While classifying the party systems, besides the numerical standard, factors such as; power proportion of the parties, their mutual relations, sociological features, ideological attitudes and behaviors must be taken into account (Kapani, 2014, p. 194). These factors show the reality of the fact that the numerical criterion is not only but probably the most important criterion (Özbudun, 1964, p. 44).

The party numbers, their interior structure, ideologies, the alliance and the opposition types shows certain stability in every state for a term; therefore, it should

be possible to explain the party system of a state. The comparative analysis of the party systems helps us to determine the clear similarities and differences among some of them. In this way, the general features of the party systems can be explained. In terms of this view, the generally accepted classification by political scientists is the classification between the one-party system and multi-party system. This classification is only valid for the analysis of the party systems as a basis; because it is widely accepted that the multi-party systems correspond to western democracies and one-party systems correspond to communist or fascist regimes. However, it cannot be said that this statement is always valid. For example, the multi-party system is used as a standard for the maintenance of the feudal hegemony in the African states, which recently gained their independence, instead of adopting the Western democracy. In contrast, sometimes the one-party system means the effort of democratization in some states. The status of the RPP in Turkey, until the transition to the multi-party regime, can be given as an example. In addition, the multi-party systems establish a link between the multi-party systems and one-party systems in the case of realization of the hegemonic-party concept (Çam, 1968, p. 210).

The dual classification of Competitor party systems and Non-Competitor party system was introduced in the literature especially by Sartori, La Palombara and Weiner due to criticisms of the views that use the numbers of the parties as a basis in the literature (Öz, 1996, p. 16). According to Sartori, two-party systems, multi-party systems and dominant-party systems are the competitor party systems. Non-competitor party systems include the one-party system and hegemonic party system (Sarıbay, 1998, p. 131). In this section, the party systems are dealt with.

2.2.1. One-Party System

If we explain the one party system in the words of Daver (1976, p. 233) “the one-party system is a typical dictatorship system. There is only one party in this party system.” In the one-party systems, the power struggle among the parties and the change in power does not exist as only one-party is always in power. This system does not allow other parties to become involved in the government. Elections and the control of parliament are not meaningful in the one-party systems. The rule of law generally consists of non-approved forms (Teziç, 2001, p. 344). In other words, this is a legally and de facto one-party system. The establishment and the activities of

other parties are decisively banned. A real one-party system is entirely monopolistic and disallows any kind of competition over, struggle for and, share of power (Kapani, 2014, p. 195).

In the one-party systems, the parties transform themselves into a constitutional institution. Therefore, the party takes its place over the other constitutional institutions as the legal and only rightful party. The one-party is established to propagate a determined ideology and to work under that ideology. The one-party always appears in transition periods and they come to power through benefiting from the weakness of this period. The implication is that they appear with the aim of preventing any crisis, disintegration and war or winning the war in order to legalize themselves (Akçalı, 1995, pp. 114-115).

2.2.2. Hegemonic Party System

In contrast to the one party system, the existence of the other parties is not banned in the hegemonic system and these parties can form an opposition to the hegemonic party according to the votes they get. (Teziç, 2001, p. 343). However in this system, the competition for power is not under equal conditions. Even though the existence of parties other than the party which has the absolute advantage and the full control over the state are allowed, they are not opposition parties in real terms. They are more like ‘satellite parties’ of the hegemonic party and the fact that they compete with the hegemonic party; the change in power is not possible) (Yanık, 2003, p. 274). In other words, one party gets the majority of the votes consistently in the elections and forms the government alone in the hegemonic party system. The hegemonic party gets continuity of being in power and in the use of political authority as in the one party system (Teziç, 2001, p. 343). In contrast to the hegemonic party system, other parties have the same conditions in the election campaigns as the dominant party in the dominant party system. A change in power is possible. In other words, the system is pluralist in terms of its essence (Özbudun, 1964, p. 41). However, although more than one party legally exists, one of them is practically dominant in political life, similar to the hegemonic party system (Turan, 1986, p. 124). The parties in the communist regimes of China, Poland and East Germany can be given as examples of the hegemonic party system (Kapani, 2014, p. 198).

2.2.3. Two-Party System

The two-party system is a party system which is directed by two main parties that have an equal chance to obtain power. Although there are a certain amount of secondary parties in the system, just two of them can obtain enough elective and legal power (Heywood, 2014, p. 335). The two-party system implemented in the Anglo-American states is the most appropriate system for the developed representative democracies. A major party has the majority in congress, and parliament, and it is also in power in this two-party system. The other second major party represents the main opposition party (Daver, 1976, pp. 233-234). In other words, it does not mean that there are just two parties in the two-party system. There are more than two parties in the state in which the two-party system is applied; but there are just two parties in the elections for power. This is due to the fact that the smaller parties do not have enough power to be involved in and share the governmental power (Kapani, 2014, p. 198).

The main feature of this system is the fact that one-party, from the major parties, can form a government without forming a coalition by means of getting the majority in parliament. In this context, it is possible to deal with the pure two-party system. Examples of the pure two-party system are England, USA, New Zealand and Australia. According to Özbudun, Canada and Austria can also be included in the two party systems. The DP and the RPP were dominant between 1950 and 1960 and therefore these years can be called the period of the two-party system in Turkey (Özbudun, 1979, p. 129). Furthermore, if none of the two major parties can get the majority required for the formation of the government alone, there is a requirement of a third party. In this situation, the existence of a supported two-party system can be introduced. Thus, the pure two-party system is moved away from. French political scientist Jean Blondel named the supported two-party system as the two and a half party system (Teziç, 2001, pp. 340-341).

Akçalı examines the causes that lead to the two-party system in two sections; the legal causes and the socio-economic causes. The implementation of the single sort majority election system can be viewed as a legal cause (Akçalı, 1995, p. 107). The single sort and single named majority system leads to the fact that the election competition takes place among two major parties; because it does not increase the number of the parties in the country. The electorate knows that their vote for the third

party is wasted thus they prefer to vote for the one of the two major parties. Therefore, the accumulation of votes for the two major parties prevents the development of the third party (Teziç, 2001, p. 341). The other factor that leads to the two-party system is the socio-economic causes. The socio-economic causes generally arise as the two main counter views in every country. These counter views can mostly become the political parties. The formation of the parties in the USA and England can be given as examples of this situation. As explained before, the difference of opinion between the federalists (Republicans) and anti-federalists (Democrats) when the 1787 dated Federal Constitution was prepared in the USA, paved the way for the formation of these two parties; the Republican Party and the Democrat Party (Akçalı, 1995, p. 107).

As mentioned above, the minor parties do not play important roles in the two-party systems. The number of their representatives is very small. However, when the party in power and the opposition party are equipollence, the minor parties play the role of changing the balance; then their importance increases. The minor parties resolve in time, but sometimes the third party can make progress and replace one of the two major parties. For example, the Liberal Party was resolved in time in England and was replaced by the Labor Party, which became the major party (Daver, 1976, p. 234). As it is understood from the information above, the accumulation of the legal and the socio-economic causes pave the way for the formation of the two-party system.

A small difference in votes is enough for a change of the government if the dominant two parties have almost equal standing in the two-party systems. Due to this small vote difference, it is possible to see changes of the government in the short term. In contrast to this, if the difference between two major parties in terms of vote and representation is very large, for the opposition party to come to power can be impossible for a long time. The fact that one of the two major parties is in power for a long period of time and, the fact that same party gets the regular support of the majority shows the two-party system does not function. In this context, the dominant party system is closed rather than the two-party system (Çam, 1968, pp. 214-215). Both of the two major parties in the two-party systems are the parties with majority bent. Majority bent plays an important role in the psychology of the parties. The party with the majority bent knows that it will be in power one day despite the fact that it is still in opposition. This changes the character of the party and makes the

party realist. The party with the majority bent cannot easily engage in the demagogy. It gives importance to the concrete problems rather than theoretical problems. It focuses on the limited and defined reforms instead of the revolutionary and practically impossible principles. The main reason for the above is the fact that it knows that one day it will be invited for the implementation of its program. Extreme commitments and demagogy are clear disadvantages of the party (Özbudun, 1964, p. 41). In short, the functioning of the two party systems, prompts parties to be moderate, realistic and responsible. Both of the parties have a tendency to be in power through softening their attitudes in order to get the votes of the independent electorate. For this reason, two-party system is the system that represents the responsibility of the parties to the electorate in the most appropriate way (Özbudun, 1979, pp. 131-132).

Similarly, Kapani also emphasizes two important points regarding the two-party system. These are the provision of political stability and the clear and precise determination of the political responsibility of the parties to the electorate. In short, the change of power between two parties is possible in the two-party systems. This criterion is highly important for the differentiation of the two-party system from the dominant party system. The possibility of change of power makes the parties more responsible and realistic. In other words, the parties avoid making commitments that they cannot realize. Thus, the political stability is provided to a large extent (Kapani, 2014, p. 201).

2.2.4 Multi-Party Systems

The most important feature of the multi-party systems is the fact that more than two parties are active in political life and none of them can get the majority to stay in power permanently (Teziç, 2001, p. 339). In other words, it is necessary that one-party never has the continuous dominance over the other parties. In contrast, due to the realization of the dominant-party, it is not possible to talk about the multi-party system in terms of the functioning of the regime. If there are more than two parties in a political situation, and thus the competition for power in a country, the fact that one-party only gets the majority in an election is not generally seen. The exception to this situation is seen in less developed countries with the dominance of the dominant party, which functions as the bridge between the one-party system and the multi-

party system, over the political life. There are also some exceptions to this situation. The fact that the Justice Party, JP, which was established in 1961, formed the government by means of gaining an absolute majority in the last two elections due to the cultural, historical and sensational causes can be given as an example of exception to the general tendency despite the proportional election system. Nonetheless, in order for the parliamentary majority to be realized in the multi-party systems, a coalition is obligatory in the parliamentary system. This kind of majority forming a coalition is more unharmonious, unbalanced and less heterogeneous compared to the two-party systems' majority which depends on one-party (Çam, 1968, pp. 210-211).

The parties in the multi-party systems rarely have a tendency to plurality in contrast to two-party systems. They come to power by sharing it with other parties. Therefore, to burden their partner party with the responsibility of failure is always possible. In other words, the system encourages the parties to engage in demagoguery and defend the practically impossible programs (Özbudun, 1964, p. 41). In short, the party has the opportunity to burden the responsibilities of the unrealized commitments to the other parties. Therefore, the commitments before the elections are excessive and the possibility of realizing them is suspected (Çam, 1968, p. 211).

Sartori (1970) divides the multi-party system into the two groups of moderate multi-party system and excessive multi-party system. According to the author, if there are five or less parties (with the condition of more than two) in a country it is possible to talk about the moderate multi-party system. If there are more parties than five, it is then possible to talk about the excessive multi-party system. In the moderate multi-party systems, the ideological differences among the existing parties in the country are not huge. All of the parties have similar views on the basic problems (Özbudun, 1979, pp. 133-134). At the same time, the excessive tendencies against the existing regime are not powerful. The parties have common views about the fundamental problems of the regime. The parties in countries like Netherlands, Sweden and Norway are grouping in two tendencies and the use of power and change in power are realized between these tendencies. This situation resembles the two-party system (Teziç, 2001, p. 339). The parties are grouped around two fundamental tendencies or two polar tendencies. In this sense, the system is bipolar. The change in power is possible among all parties in the moderate multi-party

system. The election struggle among the rival parties leads the parties to be moderate, responsible and realistic. As it is understood, the moderate multi-party system resembles the two-party system in many ways (Özbudun, 1979, p. 134). The most prominent features of the excessive multi-party system is not plurality of the parties, it is the plurality of the political polarization. There are many differences of fundamental opinions among these poles. There is complete division between the parties and the consensus over the regime is very low. This situation leads to the instability in the regime (Kapani, 2014, p. 203). The experience in Turkey and Italy proves this argument. An excessive multi-party system is not preferred because of the fact that it leads to instability and it is insufficient in providing solutions to the state's problems (Demir, 1998, p. 148).

It was emphasized above that the numerical criterion is not enough for the classification of the party systems. It has been shown after detailed analysis that the classification of one-party, two-party and multi-party depends on the differences among the sociological essence of the parties rather than the numerical difference (Özbudun, 1964, p. 41).

2.2.5. Dominant-Party System

Although there are many similarities among the dominant-party system and the one-party system, these two must not be confused with each other. Many parties can be involved in regular elections, through the participation of the people in a competitive environment (Heywood, 2014, p. 337). In contrast to the one-party system, the dominant party gains an advantage over the other parties due to the crowd and disunity of its opponents (Teziç, 2001, p. 343). In the dominant party system, government is ruled by one party that has been in power for a long period of time, as a result of free and fair elections. We cannot talk about a determined period in defining a party to be a dominant party (Heywood, 2014, p. 337).

As explained above, there are three significant features of the dominant party system in the competitive parliamentary systems. The first one is the vote or seat shares in the parliament gained by the parties in the system; the second is the nature of the opposition and the last one is the duration of ascendancy.

The only clear explanation about the defining time period is given by Sartori. According to Sartori (1976), the consecutive victory of three elections by one party is

the criteria to define the system as dominant party system (Çarkoğlu, 2011, p. 44). These three criteria will be examined under the JDP case at the last chapter in this study.

As explained above, many parties are legally allowed in the dominant-party system. The minor parties, other than the dominant-party, are the real and independent opponents which compete in elections equal conditions. Therefore, the system is pluralist in terms of its essence (Özbudun, 1964, p. 41). In dominant party system even though there are many legally allowed parties, just one party dominates the political activities (Turan, 1986, p. 124). In other words, only one of these parties is much more powerful when compared to the others in terms of gaining votes from the electorate and the majority in parliament. If this situation of power and dominance shows stability and continuity, a dominant-party system emerges. The minor parties function as the opposition in the dominant party systems and sometimes have the opportunity to affect the political decisions (Kapani, 2014, pp. 196-197). Changes in the government do not take place as a result of dominant party's coming to power in consecutive elections. Therefore dominant party can dominate politics for a long period of time (Özbudun, 1964, p. 42).

First the dominant party must come to power by receiving the highest number of votes and seats in the parliament and therefore, establishing a single party government in consecutive elections. Second, the nature of the opposition party plays a significant role in the establishment of a dominant party system. In this context, the opposition must be divided and weak in terms of agenda setting, policy shaping and bargaining position within the party system. Such weaknesses of the opposition parties enable the formation of a dominant party system. (Çarkoğlu, 2011, p. 44). In addition to this, the dominant party guarantees further electoral success and stays in power through its policies that provide social and economic developments.

Although the dominant party system is defined as pluralist and dependent on the competition, it does not necessarily have to have a democratic quality due to the non-existence of the possibility of change in power. Neglecting the views of the opposition is perceived as the requirement of this system and thus this is an attitude far from democratic.

Heywood's view is that:

The dominant party system is characterized by a weak and inefficient opposition. If the criticisms and the protests come from the parties that are not

seen as an opposition, they can easily be neglected. The dominant party system can perpetuate itself psychologically. A pure democratic political culture requires the masses to be on the safe side and, more importantly, willing to overthrow unsuccessful parties. (Heywood, 2014, p. 338)

In terms of the weakness of the opposition, Sartori assumes the vote difference of 10% between the dominant party and the parties in the opposition as the main determinant for the dominant party system (Çarkoğlu, 2011, p. 45). Dominant parties remain in power for a long time to shape the political culture of their countries. During their rule these parties make economic, democratic and social progress and therefore, portray themselves as respectful parties in the international arena.

There are various examples of the dominant party system in the world. The most prominent example of a dominant party in the world is the Liberal Democratic Party, LDP, of Japan. It remained in power for nearly 54 years since its establishment in 1955, until its defeat the polls in 2009. The Norwegian Labor Party is another example; it remained in power for 30 years, between 1935 and 1965. The Swedish Social Democratic Party also stayed in power for 44 years between 1932 and 1976. African democracies can also be regarded as the examples of dominant party systems. (Çarkoğlu, 2011, p. 45). In addition to this, the National Congress Party in South Africa, the Congress Party in India and the Christian Democrat Party in Italy are the examples of dominant party in the world. The LDP is explained in detail below because it is the most prominent example of the dominant parties in the world. As the second example the African National Congress Party is explained.

The Liberal Democrat Party in Japan remained in power from the 1950s until 2009, except from a short period in 1993. The success of the LDP is related to the post-war economic growth and the electoral system (Burden, 2015, p. 346). After the Second World War, the USA invaded Japan and it could be able to get its independence with the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952. At the same time, the rapid economic growth began. The economic growth was higher than the world average until 1973. The economic growth lasted despite of its lower average in the 1980s. The LDP was established in 1955 as a conservative party which embraces the conservative peasants and town people. In other words, the LDP represented the conservatives and supported the alliance with the USA. The other wind of Japan politics was the liberal-left. The difference between these two winds, the conservative and the liberal-left was related to their perspectives towards the alliance

with the USA. In contrast to the LDP and the conservatives, the liberal left wing parties, the Communist Party (CP), the Socialist Party (SP) and the Social Democrat Party (SDP) were opposing to the alliance with the USA. The LDP and the SDP were the two prominent parties that shaped the Japan party system. The SDP was the main opposition party against the LDP until 1993. It was supported by the intellectuals and the trade unions; but it could not reach to the peasants. The ideology of the SDP was its prominent feature and it could not be able to produce policies that reach to the masses. Therefore, it could not come to power alone. The SDP demanded supporting the North Korea, recognizing the South Korea and denuclearization. These demands undermined reaching to the masses. At the same time, the emphasis on the Orthodox-Marxist tradition in the SDP's manifestos was found odd by the conservative Japan people. On the other hand, the LDP produced policies that embraces masses and stayed in power alone for 38 years. The government and the different social groups intertwined and shaped Japan politics during the LDP's ascendancy. The LDP also strengthened the entrepreneurs. In addition, it pursued the liberal economic policies, supported the large companies and pursued social policies that embrace all different social groups. It was able to support the small and medium sized business as well as it gained the support of the peasants. It also balanced the different social groups. In the 1993, the LDP lost power due to the corruption (Büyükbaş, 2013, pp. 54-57).

The LDP stayed in power through legitimate means. Its electoral success depended upon its successful economic performance. Staying in power for a long period of time also enabled the LDP to establish relation with the bureaucracy. In other words the ruling party established the links with the bureaucracy which enabled it to be reelected. The bureaucrats in Japan were recruited according to their technical knowledge and they had kind of autonomy deriving from the universities in terms of promoting public officials. They were not linked with the dominant party in terms of their recruitment and promotion. However, the bureaucrats were able to reach highest positions and the most of the public officials were supplied by the universities. The link between them was established due to their reaching positions such that they could advise to the ministers. In other words, they could acquire the great political influence. It also got the financial support of the business. Furthermore, it received the demands of the sectors linked with the opposition. The LDP was also successful in terms of playing the role of mediator between the state

and the society through linking the different social groups with the state machinery (Crespo, 1995, pp. 200-205).

Although the LDP lost the power due to the corruption, it remained being in power through participation to the coalition governments in the 1990s. It gained the largest vote share in the 2001 elections and had 239 deputies in the House of Representatives. The electoral system was changed in 1998 and the new electoral system was also in favor of the LDP as well as the old one. It increased its vote share in the 2005 general elections such that it initiated the reforms in order to eliminate the public deficit (Büyükbaş, 2013, pp. 58-59). Burden (2015, pp. 347-348) admits that the LDP's electoral success can be explained with its strategy that is dismissing the president, accused of corruption. As the president and his cabinet were dismissed, the LDP did not lose power. In other words, the personnel of the LDP dissociated itself from the unpopular president and his cabinet. Therefore, it could be able to take the advantage of the asymmetries in public opinion and structural relationships between the party and its leadership to refrain from damaging public judgments (Burden, 2015, p. 349).

Another significant example of a dominant party is the African National Congress (ANC) party. ANC was the leading party of the liberation movements which opposed to the apartheid regime in the South Africa. The ANC presents itself as being the standard bearer of democracy (Giliomee, et al., 2001, p. 161). The ANC has established its dominancy on the elections since 1994. This dominancy was strengthened by the weak opposition in a competitive political system. It has won three executive elections and controls all provincial governments. In addition, it won the local government elections in 1996 and 2000. Its vote share was 63%, 66% and 70% in the 1994, 1999, and 2004 national elections respectively. The dominancy of the ANC is accepted as the main characteristic of the post-apartheid regime in the South Africa (Reddy, 2005, pp. 278-279).

The ANC is the alliance of the various ideological traditions, past alliances and supporters who has different background. It stayed as a roof for the four different traditions: the experience of exile, civil resistance movement, the global anti-apartheid movement and the pre-1960 leadership. Although the ANC accepts this diversity as a positive value enhancing, it refuses to recognize them as the factional groups. The conflict between these factions within the party becomes visible during appointment of the leadership positions and the corruption. Therefore, the internal

conflict management is developed as authoritarian and bottom-up consensus seeking process. As a party that struggled against the apartheid regime, it strongly associates its discourses with democracy. The weak opposition also contributed to the electoral success of the ANC. The opposition represents diverse interests in South Africa (Reddy, 2005, pp. 284-287).

The ANC came to power through the anti-apartheid struggle and it became the symbol of a formidable moral power such that it shaped the will of the civil society and the ANC was able to remove all constraints on its actions, even its shift from non-racism and liberal democracy. The opposition was regarded as illegitimate and the criticism of the government was regarded as the racial oppression that demanded by the white minority on order to hold back the black advancement. In addition, the party gained huge control over the appointments to the positions both within the party and the public service, parastatals and statutory bodies. The disparity between the public funds to the ANC and the parties in the opposition and the ANC's control of the public broadcaster contributed to the dominance of the ANC (Giliomee, et al., 2001, pp. 170-173). In conclusion, the ANC has been able to stay in power through adopting its party organization to the changing institutional structure of African politics. Furthermore, it has played a key role in shaping the framework of the political orders (Reddy, 2005, p. 292).

These examples of dominant parties either remained in power as a single party for a long period of time or they were indispensable partners of other parties in terms of formation of coalition governments. In addition, they were the actors that met the political demands of an important social basis.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PARTY SYSTEMS IN TURKEY

In this chapter, the party systems implemented in Turkey since the pre-republican period, are explained. This historical process is given in order to explain the transition of the multi-party system to the dominant party system during the post-2002 period. This chapter is divided into five parts as Pre-republican Period, Republican Period, Transition to Multi-Party System, Transition to a Multi-Party System Again with 1961 Constitution and 1970s Period and Post-1980 Period: Restoration of Party Politics and 1982 Constitution.

The establishment of political parties, free elections and, the development of the opposition were the inception of the development of democracy in Turkey as it was in every democratic country. Political parties are the mechanisms which present the opinion of the people and they elect the government by means of them (Karpat, 2009, p. 7). As explained in the first part of this study, when historically examined, parties were generally born in response to conflicts in societies. Accordingly, when reasons for the emergence of parties in Turkey are investigated we understand that they emerged as the results of the conflicts among groups. The conflicts between the centre that was represented by both the ruling elite in the Ottoman Empire (and in the Turkish Republic) and the periphery caused the emergence of the political parties. The centre was symbolized by the Palace, the bureaucracy of Tanzimat, the Party of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası-PUP) and finally by the RPP, which was dependent upon the civil military bureaucracy. The social class, which is composed of the local elites and the peasants, had the opportunity of representation through certain parties. The DP was born as a focus of the opposition. Besides that, the conflicts in the ruling elite paved the way for emergence of other opponent parties. The Party of Freedom and Understanding (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası) against the PUP and the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) against the RPP can be given as examples of parties which emerged in this way (Sarıbay, 2001, p. 34).

Karpat (2009, p. 9) states that “political parties are the two cornerstones of the democratic regime being both the government and the opposition; so, politics in Turkey, which depends upon the popular sovereignty, began this way.”

It is possible to examine the history of the political parties in Turkey in two periods; the pre-Republican period and the Republican period. Firstly, the multi-party system followed by the one-party system was implemented in the pre-republican period. In the republican period, the one-party, two-party and the multi-party systems were implemented. It is also possible to chronologically classify the party systems in Turkey. The multi-party system was implemented in the periods of 1909-1913, 1920-1923, 1945-1950, 1961-1980 and the post-1983 period. The two-party system was implemented in the period of 1950-1960. The one party system was implemented in the periods of 1913-1918 and 1923-1945. Finally, the political parties were totally banned in the period of 1960-1961 and 1980-1983. Since 1983, the longest-termed multi-party system has been implemented in Turkey (Yanık, 2003, pp. 281-282). In this chapter, the formation of the party systems which are implemented since the pre-republican period and the republican period until 2002 is dealt with.

3.1 Pre-republican Period

The PUP was the most important political party of the Ottoman Empire among the political parties that were established before the foundation of the Republic. The Second Constitutional Monarchy was the period in which first legal political parties were established. To explain in the words of Sarıbay “the Second Constitutional Monarchy was an important inception for the formations of the political parties through the transformation of the political committees.” Restoration of the Constitution of 1876 allowed for the parties to engage in the political activities freely through freedom of association (Sarıbay, 2001, p. 36). The PUP was established in 1889; it gained its legal status with the proclamation of the Second Constitutional Monarchy and finally gained the majority of the First Parliament in the elections of that year (Aliefendioğlu, 1999, p. 99). The PUP remained in power from the proclamation of the Second Constitutional Monarchy in 1908 until the end of the First World War (until the dissolution of the party in 1918, with the exception of a short period of time) (Yücel, 2006, p. 5). The Second Constitutional Monarchy was the beginning of the multi-party system (Tanör, 2004, p. 333). The PUP implemented the multi-party system (until 1913) within a short period of time during its government. This situation emerged with the recognition of the freedom of

association in 1909. However, the changes which restricted the freedom of organization on the Law of Associations made this freedom unavailable. For this reason, the multi-party system was totally abandoned after 1913. The PUP, which came to power and ended the absolute authority of the sultan, established another type of despotic regime. According to Kongar and Daver, the PUP, which was known as the party which brought liberty to the people, established the dictatorship of the one-party rule after the elections with stick (sopalı seçim) (Yanık, 2003, p. 278).

After the PUP came to power with the 1908 revolution, it became dependent on its military members and its influence over the army. The intervention of the military directly to the politics triggered the opposition against the PUP government. After 1910, the opposition re-emerged and a number of political parties were established. The Party of Moderate Liberals (Mutedil Hürriyet Perveran Fırkası) and the Party of Fundamental Ottoman Reforms (Islahat-ı Esasiye-i Osmaniye Fırkası) were established towards the end of 1909, which were old enemies of the PUP. In 1910 the People's Party (Ahali Fırkası) and in 1911 the New Party (Hizb-i Cedid) were established by the dissident Unionists. The PUP government was relying on its majority in the parliament in terms of controlling the government, the palace and the bureaucracy. Due to the increasing opposition movement against it, the PUP resorted to violence during the elections held in the spring of 1912 in order to keep its majority (Zürcher, 2004, pp. 101-103).

The PUP came to sole power between years of 1913 and 1918. Other political parties, which represented the different opinion of other social groups, also emerged at that time. The opposition at that time did not last long because of a lack of prospective opinions and thus they were easily suppressed by the PUP. The Ottoman Empire entered the First World War by the decision of some of the PUP leaders, with the opposition being excluded from the decision making process. The fact that the political decisions were not made accordingly to the democratic rules and the exclusion of the opposition from the decision making process delayed both the development and consolidation of democracy and made understanding it complex. The first opposition movement in Turkey emerged on solid basis but it was suppressed by the government (Karpat, 2009, p. 9).

3.2. Republican Period

In the period of the establishment of the republic, the RPP, which was established with the name of People's Party (Halk Fırkası) and then renamed as the Republican People's Party, dominated the political life as the one and dominant party until 1945 (Aliefendioğlu, 1999, p. 100). According to Tunaya, RPP showed the tendency of being one and inclusive. However, the system that the RPP brought became a kind of provisional dominant party system (Tunaya, 1975, p. 439). The experiment of transition to the multi-party system was realized in the Republican period. The Progressive Republican Party, which was established in 1924, and the Free Republican Party, FRP, which was established in 1930 were the parties that emerged. However, they only survived for a very short period of time. The one party system was implemented in Turkey between the years of 1923 and 1945 (the period of 1923 and 1945 was the one-party period in which the RPP came to sole power) (Yanık, 2003, p. 279). The efforts for the trial of the multi-party system in the early republican era were insufficient. The Great Depression in 1929-1930, and the failure of the multiparty experiments in 1924 and in 1930 during the period of battle readiness of the Second World War caused the delay in the transition from the one party system to a multi-party system (Yalansız, 2006, p. 19). Therefore, it is accepted that the multi-party regime of Turkey began in 1945. The period of the multi-party period was interrupted between the years of 1960-1961, 1971-1973 and 1980-1983 (Tanör, 2004, p. 333).

The opposition emerged in 1924 under the Progressive Republican Party, but it was dissolved by the government in 1925 with the aim of suppression of the opposition and the dissolution of the institutions that were defended by the opposition. The democracy in Turkey received a big blow with the suppression of the opposition. The one-party system endured and the RPP had a free hand.

As Karpat states:

Ataturk who had actually a democrat spirit, and wanted to establish a regime based on popular sovereignty, understood that the government without the opposition can cause a disaster, and thus he tried to revive the opposition through causing the establishment of the FRP in 1930. (Karpat, 2009, p. 10)
However, this party was closed down by the controllers of the RPP for uprising against the republican regime. Thereafter, every opposition movement was perceived as a reactionist and every precaution was accepted as permissible for the civilization

(Karpat, 2009, p. 10). Until the end of the Second World War, there was the monist and authoritarian rule of Inonu, who was the president of the republic at that time. Political life was under pressure and it was not possible to see any seeds of pluralism. Power was concentrated on a single person who was both the leader of the party in the government and the president of the republic, resembling the authoritarian regimes at that time in Europe. The first liberalizing signs were seen in 1944 in the one party regime (Kara, 2014, pp. 278-279).

3.3. Transition to Multi-Party System

The transition to democracy in Turkey began with the establishment of the opposition party between 1945 and 1946 (Karpat, 2009, p. 11). In other words, the transition to democracy began with the transition to the multi-party system. The important development, which made Turkey rank among the democratic states at the end of the Second World War, was the placement of the Soviet Union among the winners of the war and its territorial claims. In addition, the Soviet Union proclaimed that it would not renew the Agreement of Friendship and Non-Aggression of 1925 which was not suitable under the new conditions (Haytoğlu, 1997, p. 50). In this context, the anxieties about the security of Turkey due to a Soviet threat after the end of the Second World War, revealed the requirement of being close to the Western World; which meant the adoption of their rules of political regime (Saribay, 2001, p. 51). In the words of Kalaycıoğlu (2001, p. 54), “Turkish politics took a very sharp, and relatively sudden turn, toward multiparty politics through a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy in 1945.” As soon as the Second World War ended, the Turkish elite made an effort for the transformation of the country from the single-party system to the multiparty system in the second wave of a democratization movement; as called the ‘Global Democratization’ movement by Huntington (Akgün, 2001, p. 71).

According to Ahmad:

The external factors were the main determinants of the political change in Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey became an important regional power during the Cold War. The threat of Soviet Russia on Turkey accelerated the relationship with Washington. Allied Turkey was crucial for Washington. Therefore, Turkey was included in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan (Financial aid for the recovery of the European economy) which were provided by the USA in 1947. (Ahmad, 2010, p. 129)

In this period, Turkey required a large capital inflow, which could only be provided by the USA (Ahmad, 2010, p. 122). Close relations with the West necessitated the transition to the multi-party system. (Ahmad, 2014, p. 261). Thus the main determinant for the transition from the one-party system to the multi-party system was the requirement of gaining the support of the Western power against the threat of Soviet Russia (Kara, 2014, p. 278). According to Tanör (2004, p. 337), the persistent closure with the Western powers revived their political regime of democracy. Ahmad (2014, p. 264), explained that if Turkey closed to Europe, it would have a liberal political regime which was respectful to the human rights and the rule of law.

Tanör (2004, p. 344), tried to answer the question of ‘What is the situation of transition to the multi-party system in Turkey within the model of transition to democracy in the world?’ He emphasized three main areas on this subject in the political science literature. The first area is Reformation; the initiation of the transition to democracy by the authoritarian rulers themselves; the second area is Rupture; the dissolution of the old regime by the use of force; and the last area is Agreement; transition through reconciliation. According to Özbudun, the transition in Turkey after the Second World War can be explained under the Reform Model (Özbudun, 1993, pp. 22-23).

The president of the republic at that time (1945), Inonu, remarked that he was ready for the reformations in the political system and adopting it in line with the changes in the world through reference to the victory of democracy over fascism in his speech at the opening of the assembly in 1945. In addition, he dealt with the deficiency of the Turkish system, which was the lack of opposition, and also mentioned it is suitable for the establishment of an opposition party. As in the Reform Model mentioned before, the decision of the president of the Republic was the beginning of the multi-party system as well as this the maintenance of the status quo in the alliance between military-bureaucracy, land owners and the bourgeoisie became impossible (Ahmad, 2014, pp. 125-126). In this political context, the decision of the RPP was finalized. The establishment of the DP in 1946 was the most important sign of the determination of the transition to the multi-party system (Sarıbay, 2001, p. 52). Timur (2003, p. 23), argues that “the establishment of the DP was the product of the transformation of Turkish social order caused by the policy pursued during the Second World War.”

A suitable environment in the rest of the world for the transition of Turkey to a multi-party system had emerged. However, it was not the only determinant of Turkey's transition. There was discontent derived from the economic, social, political and cultural implementations of the one-party regime in Turkey. In other words, the one-party rule was not effective anymore and the opposition, which could initiate a change, did not emerge. Actually, the political context was suitable in Turkey for the transition to the multi-party systems. The conditions for the transition were almost ready. The experiments of transition to the multi-party system in 1924 and 1930, the principle of republic based on national-democratic sovereignty and the idea of enlightenment were already on the agenda. Therefore, the transition was accepted as natural (Tanör, 2004, pp. 337-338).

The establishment of the DP during the rule of the RPP, and its coming to power in free elections, were seen as revolution for some. The most important factor that affected the RPP for the transition was the fact that it lost the support of the bureaucrats and the intellectuals. Nonetheless, the various problems caused by the Second World War and the precision of the intellectuals to the international stream of thought and to the freedom played a crucial role (Timur, 2003, p. 30).

The years between 1946 and 1950 were the transition years and both parties (the RPP and the DP) were trying to win the elections (Ahmad, 2014, p. 130). Karpat explains that the period between 1946 and 1947 were critical years in terms of implementation of the multiparty system.

Karpat asserts that:

The amendment of some undemocratic laws in 1946 provided sufficient freedom to enable the establishment of opposition parties, but no real basis to assure them equality with the government party. The period between 1946 and 1947 was the most important period to root the multi-party system in Turkey. It ended with the provision of the freedom of action and the equality to the opposition parties by the Republican Party. (Karpat, 1959, p. 169)

After the Progressive Republican Party and the FRP, the first opposition was inaugurated by the National Development Party in 1945. It was followed by the DP in 1946. In addition to this, the RPP produced the opposition from within. It produced the DP from within in 1945 just as it produced the Republican Progressive Party in 1924 and the Free Republican in 1930 (Tunaya, 1975, pp. 445-447). In this context, the real opposition existed in 1945 when the transition to the multiparty system was proclaimed. The first election of the multi-party system was held in 1946

and the RPP remained in power. The DP came to power in the elections of 1950. As a result, the RPP became the main opposition party between 1950 and 1960 (Sarıbay, 2001, p. 46). Although the RPP maintained its majority, the first viable opposition emerged from the first free, but not so fair, election held in 1946 with the newly established DP. On the other hand, the Republican ruling elite turned power over to the elite of the DP peacefully after the first truly free, and fair, elections in 1950. The existence of the majoritarian electoral system set the scene for the DP to capture a commanding majority of seats in parliament and the 27 years domination of the RPP ended (Akgün, 2001, pp. 71-73).

The fact that the DP came to power in the elections of 1950 was seen as a milestone in the history of modern Turkey. The party in government accepted the will of the people and it was seen as a rupture for democratic process in that period in which the conflict between the communist authoritarianism and 'free world' emerged (Ahmad, 2010, p. 127).

Frank Tachau states that:

According to Professor Erik Zürcher, the 1950 election is a more important divide in Turkish political history than the more commonly recognized official demise of the Ottoman Empire and declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The 1950 election ushered in a new political era. (Tachau, 2000, p. 130)

The policies implemented during the war years created both the environment for the opposition from within various parts of society and also from the ruling group, by incentive of the same ruling group. Therefore, the authoritarian regime in Turkey replied to the interior discontent and to the international developments with democracy. The most important point in this context is the fact that political parties up to the DP were the results of the movements within the ruling elite (military-bureaucracy) and had no influence from the people. The DP was established by a group from the ruling elite that reached the people. The collaboration of the ruling group paved the way for more a suitable environment for the development of this party. As we know, parties which were established lacking this collaboration before and after the DP were either suppressed or taken under control (Timur, 2003, pp. 33-35).

Apart from the DP, more than 20 parties were established in the same period; but they did not have to the support of the electorate to effect the government due to insufficient party organization and programs. The votes were dominantly directed to the RPP and the DP. Thus, it is widely accepted that there was a two-party system in

the period between 1946 and 1960. The most important feature of the two-party system is the dominance of the two main parties (i.e. RPP-DP) in the political life. The electorate generally votes for these two parties and the choice of the electorate does not differ. As explained in the first part, the acceptance of the majoritarian electoral system was the important factor which caused the two-party system. (Yalansız, 2006, pp. 19-20). According to Yalansız, “the feature of the majoritarian system is the fact that the party nominates candidates in proportion to their population and all candidates are elected when that party obtains the majority of the votes” (Yalansız, 2006, p. 38). In this system, the electorate vote for one of two parties with which they feel themselves best associated in order for their votes not to be vain. It is not possible to develop this for the third and smaller parties due to the fact that the votes pass regularly between the two parties. Although this feature of the two-party system seems negative in terms of the emergence of the multi-party system, it is stated that the two-party system provides stable governments and a strong executive. However, the implementation of the majority vote system in the period between 1946-1960 caused a decline in the rate in the RPP representation, and thus a weakening of the opposition from comparison of the percentage of votes the RPP gained against the number of deputies it had in parliament. As a result, firstly the RPP followed by the DP used undemocratic methods to stay in power and mostly used their authority to prevent of the government in that period. On the other hand, the RPP inaugurated the multiparty system at that time; but the incumbency willingness of the DP paralyzed democracy, as a result, the military coup in 1960 occurred. The main importance of the 1960 coup in terms of Turkish politics is the fact that it changed the two-party systems (Yalansız, 2006, pp. 20-21).

Turkey experienced three military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980. In contrast to the military interventions in 1960 and 1980, the parliament was not dissolved and a new government was formed within the parliament in the 1971 military intervention (Yalansız, 2006, p. 268).

3.4. Transition to a Multi-Party System Again with 1961 Constitution and 1970s Period

The multi-party system was returned with the Constitution of 1961 approved through the popular vote (Yanık, 2003, p. 280). The 1961 Constitution had clauses regarding the political parties and party groups. The institutional, operational and ideological attitudes of the political parties were reordered under a special law. The limited multi-party system was approved and the establishment of extreme parties was banned. In other words, the establishment of anti-secular, fascist, communist, racist and militarist parties was banned. The Constitution of 1961 accepted the laicism as an ideological principle and the laicism dominated the Constitution in contrast to the other written Constitutions of 1876, 1921, 1924 (Tunaya, 1975, pp. 453-454). The Constitution of 1961 was totally different from the previous one. It introduced the system of two chambers. The Grand National Assembly was composed of deputies who were elected according to the proportional representation system for a four year period. The Senate was composed of members who were elected with a majority vote for a three year period. The president of the republic was elected with the two thirds majority vote of parliament by the deputies for a seven year period. The Constitution of 1961 paved the way for, and guaranteed, the return to the multi-party system, the freedom of thought, association, press and expression and other freedoms (Ahmad, 2014, pp. 155-156).

The 1961 Constitution introduced a relatively liberal political environment. It provided freedom of speech and encouraged an associational life. In this political context, socialist ideas and movements prevailed among Turkish intellectuals, academicians, journalists, schoolteachers and university students. (Akgün, 2001, pp. 75-76). Politics had a totally different image in the 1960s when compared with the previous decade, because the freedoms that were guaranteed by the 1961 Constitution enabled ideological politics and thus Turkey became highly politicized (Ahmad, 2014, p. 166). In this time, the number of political parties increased and cleavages in the voter base was seen. The proportional representation system was accepted which paved the way for the representation of minor parties (Yalansız, 2006, p. 21).

The political life of the DP ended in 1960 but its cadre remained the efforts of reorganization. As a result the JP, which appears as the successor to the DP, was

established (Sarıbay, 2001, p. 57). In that period, the Republican Peasant Nation Party- RPNP and the New Turkey Party- NTP were established. The establishment of these parties caused the activation of more than two parties in political life and the multi-party system gained functionality. After 1960 there was the existence of the moderate multi-party system; the moderate multi-party system can emerge if there are five parties, or less, but with the condition of there being at least two. In two-party systems, the party which obtains the majority in parliament forms the government. In contrast, in the moderate multi-party systems the governments are formed as coalition governments or a minority government; however, the government is formed by a single party. In the moderate multi-party system, ideological divisions between the parties are not well defined. In this period, there was an alliance between the JP, the NTP and the RPNP which all bear political resemblance. However, the voter base is divided when more than two parties is active in the political life. As a result of this, none of these parties can gain the majority of the votes in order to form the government alone (Yalansız, 2006, p. 21). A proportional representation system is intended to make it difficult for a single party to capture an overwhelming majority of parliamentary seats (Tachau, 2000, p. 134). Therefore, the parties form coalition governments through allying. The first coalition government in the history of the Turkish Republic is established in 1961 with the alliance of the RPP and the JP (Yalansız, 2006, p. 69). The coalition of the RPP and the JP lasted until 1962. The second coalition government, composed of the RPP, the NTP and the RPNP, was established in 1962 and incumbent until 1963 (CNN TÜRK, 2015). Parties based on ideologies started to be established after 1965. For the first time a socialist party, the TLP gained 15 seats in parliament in 1965 (Akgün, 2001, p. 76).

Kalaycıoğlu states that:

The liberal regime of the 1961 Constitution, the idea of limited government, checks and balances between the branches of the Turkish government, and the vigorous milieu of the interest groups were all blamed for the political instability of the late 1970s. (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, p. 277)

At the beginning of 1971, anarchy and socio-economic problems dominated Turkish politics. The 1971 coup aimed at forming a government which pursued the reforms on the basis of democratic principles and Kemalist ideology (Ahmad, 2010, p. 165). The implementation of the laws and providing order are prioritized. The left

wing groups were suppressed in order to protect the order and the laws. Teachers' unions and clubs in Universities were strictly controlled. Youth branches were closed down and all meetings and seminars of trade bodies and trade unions were forbidden. The publishing of newspapers were stopped and the sales of the books were taken under control. All left wing publications were prohibited, but publications of the right wing groups continued. In this period, the Constitutional amendments were focused. Planned amendments covered almost all of the branches and the institutions of the state; trade unions, press, radio, television, universities, State Council, Constitutional Court, assembly, senate and the Supreme Court of Appeal. All rights given to citizens in the 1961 Constitution that allowed people to participate in politics were removed and fundamental freedoms were banned. This situation is explained as an effort to protect of the unity of the state, the national security and public order of the Republic. The constitutional amendments were not discussed in the public sphere due to the harsh suppression (Ahmad, 2014, pp. 177-182).

In 1973, the political activity based on the political parties re-emerged. The minor parties of the right wing, the DP, the National Action Party, NAP, and the Republican Trust Party were not perceived as threats. However, the National Salvation Party, NSP, created some skepticism, but it was the third party of the elections held in 1973, after the RPP and the JP. The coalition government of the RPP and NSP was formed in 1974.

The establishment of the extreme left parties after 1974 sharpened the ideological divisions in Turkey and caused the emergence of the excessive multi-party system, which can occur if there are more than five parties in a country. In the excessive multi-party system, there are ideological divergences and controversies regarding the main problems of the state. The existence of multiple extreme left and extreme right parties paves the way for the multiple polarizations. In this political context, the collaboration of centre parties with extreme parties becomes difficult and in general, the coalition governments of centre-right or centre-left are established (Yalansız, 2006, pp. 22-23). As explained above, the coalition government of the RPP and the NSP are examples of this. The RPP, which took the majority of votes, was unable to form a single party government after 1973 elections and subsequently formed a coalition government with the NSP in 1974. However, this coalition was short-lived and collapsed in the same year (Sarıbay, 2001, p. 63). The NSP was the first Islamist Party that entered parliament. Although, it played an important role in

the coalition governments of the 1970s, it stayed outside parliament since the introduction of the electoral threshold of 10% (Akgün, 2001, p. 80). In general, coalition governments which are formed within excessive multi-party systems are short-lived. As Turkish experience shows, the excessive multi-party system causes parties to be interested in the short-term problems, which address their electorate, with the attitude of partisanship. The period between 1973 and 1979 in Turkey was the era in which the excessive party system was clearly seen. After the coalition of RPP and NSP, the center rights, the JP and Republican Reliance Party, RTP, and radical right NAP, and the NSP formed a coalition by merger under the name of the “Nationalist Front”. The failure of these coalition governments paved the way for the RPP to establish a coalition or minority government which was supported by means of transfers and minor parties (Yalansız, 2006, p. 23).

It can be noted that the volatility, fragmentation and ideological polarization are the main characteristics of the excessive multi-party system in Turkey during the late 1970s. Turkey experienced various combinations of four coalition (nationalist front governments) and two minority governments in the period between 1973 and 1980. The political violence increased with time and the streets and the university campuses became the scenes of conflicts between the militants from left and right wing groups which turned upside-down law and order. The political parties gradually lost their ability to peaceful conflict resolution (Akgün, 2001, p. 78). As a result, the implementation of the multiparty system was again ended with the 1980 military coup.

3.5. Post-1980 Period: Restoration of Party Politics and 1982 Constitution

With the 1980 military coup, the complete political activities of the parties were banned. The fact that the parties could not reconcile with each other and the multi-party system led to the destabilized polarization were the reasons for this ban. It is stated that the ban of the political parties was held in order to remove the reasons that prevented the functioning of the democratic system. The contradiction to this point is the fact that the political parties were the indispensable elements of the democratic system (Sarıbay, 2001, p. 64). In other words, the ban on the political parties which are the most important elements of the democratic system and representatives of the different opinions, could not pave the way for development of

democracy. The political parties were banned; their political activities were restricted and they were taken under control and supervision. The political parties were interrupted by the 1960 military coup; but they were completely banned by the 1980 military coup (Yanık, 2003, pp. 280-281).

Following the 1980 military intervention a new Constitution was adopted in 1982 and the bicameral system, which comprised the National Assembly and Senate of Republic and introduced by the 1961 constitution, was abandoned by the 1982 Constitution. The authority to legislate was given to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, composed of 400 deputies. Thus, the unicameral system was re-established. The aim was the implementation of the two party systems in contrast to the excessive multi-party system after 1980. The main focus was to prevent excessive division of political structure and to form a new and stable one (Yalansız, 2006, pp. 23-24).

Kalaycıoğlu states that:

The 1982 Constitution was designed not only to put the Turkish political system in order but also to provide the necessary tools for the government to deal effectively with political instability. If the 1961 Constitution stood for liberal democracy, the 1982 Constitution provided for law and order. (Kalaycıoğlu, 2007, p. 277)

In 1983, when the National Security Council decided to hold elections, the transition to the “limited multi-party system” was planned. In line with this, two new applications were introduced; these were the veto mechanism and the 10% national-level electoral threshold. Political parties were restricted at their establishment phase through the veto mechanism. The election threshold meant that the party has to get 10% of the votes nationwide to be able to represent deputies to parliament. The aim was to reduce competition among a large number of parties through elimination of the minor and weak parties. Consequently, only three political parties, the Motherland Party, MP, the National Democracy Party and the Populist Party participated in the 1983 elections and the demanded “moderate multi-party system” was realized; with changed roles. In other words, the number of parties before the coup d'état on 12 September was just two more than the number of the parties after 12 September; this meaning the military regime was not able to prevent the polarized party system (Sarıbay, 2001, p. 65). Thus the 1982 constitution did not achieve its aim.

Turkey experienced the rise of political Islam and polarization of ethnic identities in the 1990s. The rise of the Welfare Party, WP, was the sign of the upsurge of political Islam. Furthermore, the ethnic identities were politicized as a reaction to the NAP. Despite the active political existence of Islamist and Nationalist parties in the 1970s, they could not obtain the majority of votes to form a government alone and most of the time they remained marginal. However, the WP and the NAP were able to get 16.9% of the votes and get 62 seats in parliament through alliance in the 1991 elections. The rise of Islamist parties endured to the 1994 municipal elections, in which they gave an impressive performance. The WP increased its votes and emerged as the largest party in the national elections of 1995 after gaining 21% of the votes. Similarly, the ultra-nationalist NAP was able to double its support in the same elections (Akgün, 2001, p. 80). In the 1999 election, the Democratic Left Party, DLP, was the first party to emerge with 22% of the votes and 25% of the parliamentary seats. However, the major surprise of the national election in 1999 was the NAP; gaining 18% of the votes and 24% of the seats. Therefore, it became the second largest party in parliament after the election of 1999. Another major surprise of the 1999 election was that none of the parties were able to win one quarter of the total votes, and thus seats. The electoral support of the Islamist Virtue Party, VP, which was the successor of the banned WP, decreased from 21% to 15% of the votes, relegating it to third place (Tachau, 2000, pp. 142-143). This means that the political parties failed to pass the 10% national-level threshold in the 1999 election resulting in a coalition government being maintained in Turkey. None of the parties could get the majority of the votes in order to form a government alone; so the coalition government of the DLP, the NAP and the VP was formed. This government held an early election and after the election in 2002 the period of JDP rule commenced (CNN TÜRK, 2015). Due to the 10% electoral threshold, the JDP and the RPP were the only parties that could take seats in parliament after the 2002 election. The JDP won the election and took 363 seats in parliament (Yalansız, 2006, pp. 24-25).

Since 1983, the long lived competitor multi-party system has been implemented. In the latter period, the excessive multi-party system was implemented (Yanık, 2003, p. 281). In general, the existence of the multi-party system is related to the existence of democracy. However, the existence of the multi-party system does not always mean the existence of democracy. Democratization was held even during

the one party rule in Turkey. The continuity of the parliament in that period, the understanding of the national sovereignty, the participation of the people in political life, radical reforms, and secularism can be given as examples. Nonetheless, every political regime in which the multi-party system is implemented cannot be called purely democratic (Tanör, 2004, pp. 333-334). Turkish democracy emerged from collusion in the Cold War years and the FRP was taken as an example. In contrast to the FRP, the DP's rise to power can be best explained by the difference of the international political context and the success of the DP leaders. However, Turkish democracy did not allow for expression of the social democratic opinions for a long time during those years. In other words, the DP totally abused its program (Timur, 2003, p. 150).

The nature of the multi-party system, its attempted establishment being during the period after the Second World War was the hegemonic party system in which the opposition parties apparently existed rather than the pluralist party system (Yanık, 2003, p. 274). The main objective was to complete the democratic appearance via this form of opposition party. The opposition party against the RPP existed as a mechanism of criticism and control and would not raise any claim to come to power for many years (Kara, 2014, pp. 280-281). The RPP did not implement enough reforms that provided the legal guarantee for the survival of the opposition during the transition period. It is understood that, the aim was not the active participation of the opposition party in political life but in contrast it was the existence of the opposition in principle. Furthermore, the attitude of the RPP towards the opposition did not change during the time of the DP. The DP, which had a more liberal and pluralist discourse, did not maintain the same attitude after its coming to power in 1950. After 1950, the DP maintained an understanding of the fact that the majority winning the election was perceived as the people, in contrast; the minorities, which were defeated in the poll, were ignored. This situation progressed to the claim of removing the opposition. The period between 1950 and 1960 (the rule of the DP), was the period in which the competitive and the pluralist political system was not realized and the opposition could not be institutionalized (Kara, 2014, pp. 287-288). This situation is the indicator of the fact that every multi-party system does not provide a pure pluralist democracy. According to Timur (2003, p. 153), the democracy in Turkey is a problem about the future not about history.

In the post 2002 period Turkey has had a multi-party system in which the opposition exists in principle and the party in government is highly dominant in practice. Since its victory in the 2002 election, the JDP has formed a single party government for 13 years. In other words, the JDP has obtained the majority of the votes since 2002, which means it does not need to make an alliance with any other party. In the next chapter, it will be investigated whether the Turkish party system can be defined as a dominant party system under the JDP rule. In this context, its coming to power in a relatively short period of time, its electoral victories through increasing its rate of votes, its policies and the possibility of the maintenance of the JDP government will be discussed.

CHAPTER 4

DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM IN TURKEY DURING THE JDP PERIOD

This chapter includes an assessment of the dominance of the JDP. In order to define it as a dominant party, three characteristics (that includes vote or seat shares in the parliament gained by the parties in the system, nature of the opposition, and duration of ascendancy) of the dominant party system are examined in order to analyze whether it fulfills these three criteria. However, before explaining its fulfillment these criteria, JDP's ideology and the discourse of Beginning of '*New Turkey*' will be examined. In addition, it is important to examine the social and political context that paved the way for the rise of the JDP to power to define the JDP as a dominant party. In order to give a clear explanation, this chapter does not only focus on the ascendancy of the JDP since 2002 but gives a brief background of the political and economic context of the 1990s.

4.1. Political Crisis in 1990s

The 1990s was the time of conflicts of identity, religion on the basis of secular-Islamist, and ethnicity. The first conflict was the rise of political Islam. The WP had been increasingly appealing to the masses since 1987 and finally became the largest party of the 1995 elections in less than two years. It was able to get 22.4% of the votes in the 1995 elections and was the only pro-Islamist party to capture more than 12% of the votes. After the elections in 1995, the WP formed a coalition government with the TPP; which caused a secular reaction. This also led to the polarizations among the Sunni and Alevi sects. The second conflict was rise of the Kurdish separatist movement in the 1990s greatly contributed to the rise of the Islamist WP. On one side the NAP was becoming active on the basis of its nationalist orientation, defined as being opposite to Kurdish nationalism, the WP was becoming active on the basis of the unitary force of Islam. On other the NAP was excluding Kurdish people, the WP was including Islamists, conservatives, as well as Kurdish people, on the basis of the Ottoman heritage of the *millet* system. Therefore, it was able to the appeal masses (Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006, pp. 369-374).

The other conflict was about identity, the foreign policy preferences of the parties which formed coalition governments show their struggle in defining Turkey's

identity. The focal point which revealed the identity struggle of the political parties was the Customs Union (CU) agreement with the EU. The true Path Party, TPP, advocated the adoption of the CU which could pave the way for the full membership. Another supporter of this agreement was the RPP. On the other hand, the DLP likened the CU agreement to the Sevres Treaty, and the WP refused to recognize the CU agreement and displayed anti-western attitudes. Kurdish groups and the NAP adopted different attitudes towards the agreement; on one hand the Kurdish groups were demanding the increase of pressure from Europe to Turkey in terms of human rights without membership, while on the other, the NAP was refusing membership in terms of sovereignty (Secor, 2001, pp. 539-549).

It is also necessary to deal with the party system between 1991 and 2002. The governments established during this period were mainly fragmented and vulnerable coalition governments. The first and foremost feature of this was high fragmentation. There were mainly three blocks, composed of the centre-right (MP and TPP), the social democratic left (RPP and DLP) and the Islamist and nationalist extreme right (WP/VP and NAP). However, the number of parties in the parliament changed frequently after elections, since (the party switches of the parliamentarians) caused the emergence of new and short-lived parties in the parliament. Thus formation of a coalition became a complicated task. The factionalized parliament led to the dispersion of political power among two or more parties that formed coalition governments. This deteriorated policy making, implementation and progress. When a fragmented party system is coupled with volatile electoral bases in a highly competitive political context, the formation of stable and effective coalition governments becomes harder, even impossible. Turkey experienced short-lived and ineffective coalition governments in the 1990s due to a fragmented party system and volatile electoral basis. The existing tension between the Islamists and the secularists also created a division in society and thus in politics. Thus, the weakness and ineffectiveness of the coalition governments and, the increased tensions between Islamists and secular groups paved the way for the 1997 military interventions. The military's influence increased due to the perception of the rise of Kurdish separatism and Islamists fundamentalism as threats to the territorial integrity of the country and secularity of the Republic. Therefore, the post-modern coup of 1997 was timely (Sayarı, 2007, pp. 203-205). All these political instabilities in the 1990s also

contributed to economic instabilities. The economic problems at that time, on which the political instabilities contributed, constitute the basis of rise of the JDP to power.

4.2. Economic Crises in 1990s

Turkish economy was also under the political failures in the 1990s and performed under capacity for a decade. During that period, Turkish economy becomes fragile due to high inflation, external debt, high budgetary deficit and high current account deficit. In addition, increase of public deficit, the failure to carry out projected reforms regarding banks, over-valuation of the exchange rate and non-adjustment of devaluation resulted in a high current account deficit. The coalition governments of the 1990s were ineffective in taking measures for these problems. Therefore, Turkey experienced one of the most severe economic crises in her history in 2001 (Karagöl, 2013, p. 21). In addition to the ineffectiveness of the coalition governments in terms of dealing with the economic problems, the numerous corruptions also led to loss of credibility in the centre-right parties in the eyes of electorate (Gümüşçü, 2013, p. 231).

Sayarı clearly explains that:

...The periodic economic crises that Turkey experienced in the 1990s stemmed largely from the unwillingness of the parties serving in the coalitions to curb government deficits, impose fiscal and monetary discipline, and effectively fight inflationary pressures. Operating in a highly competitive political environment, which was characterized by wide swings in voter preferences and shifting parliamentary majorities, parties in the governing coalitions instead generally opted for populist economic policies. As a result, Turkey experienced protracted high levels of annual inflation rates, which averaged 78% during the 1990s. The country's economic struggles became magnified following the financial crisis in 2001, which was one of the worst in recent Turkish history... (Sayarı, 2007, p. 199)

In short, in the 1990s, the parties were fighting with each other rather than finding solutions to the political problems of Turkey. Furthermore, their ineffectiveness in the political arena also affected the economic sphere, which was boosted in 2001. The most important result of this political context was probably the disappointment of the electorate towards the parties of the coalition governments in the 1990s. Surveys done before the 2001 elections showed the disappointment of the electorate. 26.1% of the respondents declared that they would not vote for any of the existing political parties. The turnout rate was the lowest, 79%, since 1977 (Çarkoğlu

& Hinich, 2006, p. 373). This disappointment played a crucial role in the victory of the JDP in 2002 elections despite its newly established organization.

According to Tepe (2010, pp. 146-148) there were two crises in the 1990s which played a crucial role in the rise of the JDP. The first was the collapse of the first generation Islamist parties in the 1990s, which stemmed from the tradition of 'National Vision' and were the predecessors of the JDP. The second was the economic crisis of 2001, which directly affected the whole social strata. These two crises changed the traditional structure of Turkish politics; being the conflict between the centre the secular elite and, the periphery, the traditional. The division between the centre and the periphery changed. Demographic, social and geographical changes in Turkey, the decrease of economic activities of state and, the reinterpretation of Islam in different areas along with its expansion changed the economic and political alliances in domestic politics. The main engine for this change was the new and rising bourgeoisie; the Anatolian Tigers. They began to play a crucial role in the political sphere. Furthermore, these crises eased the conflict between the secular groups, the financial sector, the small bourgeoisie and the working class which brought them closer together. After providing the political and economic context of the 1990s, the ideology of the JDP will be explained.

4.3. Ideology of JDP

In order to define the position and policies of the JDP, it is necessary to make a comparison with other Islamist parties, in other Muslim countries, and with its more Islamist predecessors, especially with its predecessor, the WP. The most important difference is that the social basis of the JDP in Turkey is not limited to conservative Muslims. The JDP expanded its electorate through the inclusion of most of Turkish society in terms of a social and geographic basis. Although most of the leaders of the JDP come from the roots of the WP, they preferred pluralism through leaving the tradition of the '*National Vision Movement*' and including the values, albeit limited, dependent on beliefs in terms of social and cultural problems on the basis of 'passive secularism'. They were clearly promising the process on Turkey-EU relations (Özbudun & Hale, 2010, p. 242).

The National Vision Movement first emerged in the 1970s and it is composed of several traditional Sufi, or non-Sufi, Islamic groups. It represents the active

political engagement of the Islamist groups as alliances in the elections. Its political stance was confrontational with the West and the Westernization agents of the Kemalist regime. In other words, it was becoming dissent to the identification of modern civilization with Western Civilization. In the 1980s, this discourse mainly became an ideology which proposed the alternative value and meaning system to the Western generated ideologies. It gained oppositional position against the West. In the 1980s, its discourse was based on anti-EU policy and the collective transformation of society according to the Islamic ideal. It also emphasized the degeneration of the Western civilization and presented itself as the only source of all goodness (Çayır, 2008, pp. 64-69).

The WP and its successor, the VP, in the 1990s mainly came from the tradition of National Vision. The WP inevitably became the partner of coalition governments in the 1990s as a result of conflicts of centre-right parties. The leader of the National Vision, Necmettin Erbakan became the first Islamist prime minister of Turkey. The political achievement of the WP in the 1995 elections, and its active involvement in short-lived coalition governments provided the political experience for the current leaders of the JDP (Tepe, 2010, p. 149).

The coalition government of Erbakan, was forced to resign by the military due to anti-secular political activities in 1997 and, the WP, were banned from all political activities by the Constitutional Court. Afterwards, the WP was replaced by a new party; the VP. A split within the VP emerged with its closure; traditionalists and the modernists. This split ended with the foundation of two new parties after the closure of the VP by the Constitutional Court in 2001. The former established the Felicity Party, FP, and the latter founded the JDP (Hale & Özbudun, 2009, pp. 4-5). The experiences of the WP and the VP showed the inadequacies of the Islamic vision of the past. The modernist young generation of the WP was aware of the requirement of the revision. The polarizing Islamic discourse could not live in the secular structure of Turkish politics and the modernists adopted an ideology of 'Conservative Democrat' with a pro-European discourse. They also welcomed the prominent Islamic intellectuals and this was the beginning of 'new Islamism' (Çayır, 2008, p. 74).

The political identity of the JDP was transformed into the '*Conservative Democrat*' identity as a result of the experiences of its predecessors in the 1990s. Timur (2014, p. 19) argues that the JDP's proclamation of its '*Conservative*

Democrat' identity played an important role in terms of getting foreign support. In other words, the JDP was not planning to become enemy of the West as its predecessor Islamist parties, were. Moreover, it would not see the European Union as a Christian Club. This newly established party would try to be included in the European Union in a way resembling the Christian Democrat parties of Europe.

There was awareness in the ranks of the party regarding the attachment of the Turkish population to democracy and secularism, as well as its attachment to the religion. The JDP leaders tried to show that they claimed a conservative democratic ideology which does not polarize society as well as trying to show their new understanding of politics; free-from politicization of religion, populism and corruption (Duran, 2008, pp. 81-82). This new understanding of politics is composed of three levels. The first is the adoption of human rights and democracy discourse. The second is the mobilization of social support as a source of legitimacy against the confrontation with the military and the judiciary. The last is the formation of a democratic liberal alliance with the secular sectors (Dağı, 2010, pp. 129-131).

For the JDP to define itself as the centre-right party, its commitment to the parliamentary democracy and secular constitutional structure of Turkey, and its commitment to integrate the market based economic liberalism with the norms based on tradition and community enabled it to widen social support and global legitimacy (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012, p. 90). The JDP is alliance in the sociological senses as well as it is the alliance of political powers. The studies of the JDP figure out it as the social alliance which contains the important part of the population in rural area, tradesmen and craftsman, inhabitants in slums and the Islamist bourgeoisie. The new rising bourgeoisie, whose roots are in Anatolia, is seen as the driving power of this coalition (Özbudun & Hale, 2010, p. 84). According to İnel (2003, pp. 297-299), the JDP is the representative of the new middle class comprising craftsmen and tradesmen in the provinces, in addition to this small and medium sized entrepreneurs.

4.4. 2002 Elections and the Beginning of '*New Turkey*'

According to Keyman (2014, pp. 25-27), Turkey has been in the process of transformation in the name of *New Turkey*. The JDP's hegemony in the elections gave it the majority to form the government alone and it effectively deepened the

transformation process by means of its successful domestic and foreign policies. It has been able to gain widened support by means of this transformation which means we are in the era of post-military tutelage, and post-secularism. The JDP reshaped the judiciary in order to eliminate the tutelary power mechanism. These are examined in further part in detail. Furthermore, its success in the 2011 general elections consolidated its position and paved the way for the pursuit of transformation, which also contributes to its electoral success. Therefore, 2023 Vision of the JDP is neither utopian, nor unachievable. As a result, the JDP's victory in the general elections of 2015, and its coming to sole power for the fourth time, strengthens this possibility.

The fragmented party system, which caused the coalition government explained above, ended with the general elections of 2002. The JDP won the 2002 elections as a dominant party and obtained the single party majority to form the government alone via the 10% threshold. Thus the government formation became less complicated. During the 1990s, the elections were followed by a lengthy bargaining process for the formation of the coalition government. After the elections of 2002, the formation of the government became easier with the single party majority of the JDP. Moreover, the environment for policy formulation, implementation and continuity became more favorable (Sayari, 2007, pp. 205-206).

The JDP was born in a political context of the distrust of society to the existing political parties; because ideologies and loyalty to the leaders were not the main determinant of the new party system, in addition to the existing economic crisis. Furthermore, the political opposition was weak and there was a salient alliance of various and polarized groups though they were alienated to the politics. Therefore, the distrust of the politics rose in society in terms of its operation and effective solution production. In other words, stabilizing the economy at all cost was the common ground of the different social groups. The JDP claimed the fulfillment of the different expectations of the different social groups. On the one hand it undertook the task of providing an identity, which does not conflict with the system to the Islamists. Furthermore, it committed itself to economic stability and a more participatory public sphere (Tepe, 2010, pp. 151-152).

It can be said that the main engine of the rise of the JDP was its successful economic performance. After it came to power in 2002, the JDP provided development which increased the JDP's share of votes in the 2007 elections. The main factor behind the electoral success of the JDP in the 2007 elections was its

economic performance between 2002 and 2007. The JDP government was able to decrease the chronically high consumer price inflation to a single digit. This was the most important problem within Turkey and the voters were impressed by this performance which decreased the existing high consumer price inflation. It is the highly accepted opinion that it was rewarded in the ballot box as a result of this successful economic performance (Kalaycıoğlu, 2010, p. 43).

Huntington explains that Turkey is a divided society. On one hand, there is political elite who see themselves as the part of the West. On the other hand, there is a society which rejects this identification and sees itself as part of the Muslim Middle East. The rise and development of the Islamist movements in Turkey since the 1970s, and the emergence of the JDP, which has remained in power since 2002, confirm the debate with which Huntington contributes to. There are two perspectives which explain the emergence and rise of the JDP. The first perspective deals with its rise in terms of the Muslim world. This perspective assumes that the JDP is a glimmer of hope for the Muslim world. The fact that the JDP came to power signifies that democratic rule is possible even though the party in power has the roots based on belief. The second perspective argues that the JDP is a political party from which radical Islamists have expectations of imposition of an authoritarian Islamic state (Özbudun & Hale, 2010, pp. 13-14). Apart from these perspectives, the rise of the JDP cannot be explained solely depending on a single parameter. First of all, the JDP was able to draw lessons from the political failures of the 1990s. In addition, it also performed well in terms of stabilizing the economy after the 2001 crisis. Through transformation of its ideology, which derived its sources from the split within its predecessor, it was able to adapt itself to the secular politics. Having analyzed the ideology of the JDP, the next section of this thesis will determine whether the party system in Turkey can be defined as a dominant party system since 2002.

4.5. Three Criteria of Dominant Party System

4.5.1. First Criteria: Vote or Seat Shares in the Parliament

The Turkish parliamentary system has had the undemocratic condition of a 10% threshold since the 1980 military coup (Çarkoğlu, 2011, p. 44). This electoral threshold is one of the highest thresholds in the world. It prevented the fragmented political parties in the 2002 elections from obtaining seats in the parliament which

provided a great advantage to the JDP in order for it to take two thirds of the parliament with one-third of the popular vote. The sole opposition party, which was able to surpass 10% threshold in the 2002 elections, was the RPP (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012, p. 88).

The domination of the centre-right political parties was ended with the increased political polarization, 10% electoral threshold, the depleted old patronage networks after 1999 and the economic crisis in 2001. The highly fragmented political party system had started to stabilize (Ciddi & Esen, 2014, p. 427). In short there are basically two determinants that explain the rise of the JDP from the elections in 2002 and getting the majority of the votes. The first one is the ineffective coalition and the second one is the 2001 economic crisis. The coalition governments of the 1990s paved the way for the emergence of the latter.

When the JDP came to power in the 2002, Turkey was under the effect of the 2001 economic crisis. It was overcome with the help of the IMF but the burden of the bankruptcies of banks and companies was on the people; nearly 2000 people lost their jobs due to the economic crisis. In this context, the people liquidated the parties that formed the coalition government in the 2002 election (Timur, 2014, p. 25). In short, the political and economic context of the 1990s set the ball rolling for the rise and dominance of the newly established JDP.

The parties which formed the coalition governments and the opposition parties before the elections in 2002 failed to get enough votes to pass the 10% threshold. They could not remain in parliament after the 2002 elections and saw themselves as the losers of the election. In contrast to these parties, the JDP was able to get 34.% of the votes and formed the government alone with the help of the undemocratic 10% electoral threshold (Keyman, 2010, p. 100).

Since 2002 the JDP has been in government through increasing its vote share. Its vote share was 34.3% in the 2002 general elections and it rose to 46.7% in the 2007 general elections. It was able to form the government alone and got an overwhelming majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) (Kalaycıoğlu, 2010, p. 29). The JDP regained the largest vote share (49.8%) in the 2011 elections (Çarkoğlu, 2011, p. 43). It won victory in three consecutive municipal elections (2004, 2009, and 2014) in addition to its success in the general elections (Keyman, 2014, p. 21). The JDP continued its electoral success in the last general

elections held in November 2015. It gained 49.4% of the votes and formed the government alone (CNN TÜRK, 2015).

As mentioned before, in terms of the weakness of the opposition, Sartori assumes the vote difference of 10% between the dominant party and the opposition as the main determinant for the dominant party system (Çarkoğlu, 2011, p. 45).

Table 1 Vote Share and Differences of JDP and RPP in General Elections

	2002	2007	2011	June 2015	November 2015
JDP	34.3%	46.7%	49.8%	40.8%	49.4%
RPP	19.4%	20.9%	26%	25%	25.3%
Vote Differences	15%	25%	24%	15%	24%

Table 1 shows that; the vote difference between the JDP and the RPP was 15% in the 2002 elections. This difference increased from 15% to 25% in the 2007 elections. The difference in the 2011 elections was 24%. The difference between the RPP, the main opposition party, and the JDP is 24% (CNN TÜRK, 2015). As a result, the JDP increased its vote share persistently, and gained the control of the majority of the seats in the TGNA. Its electoral success in the 2011 consecutive general elections was sufficient for the consideration of the transition of the Turkish party system to become a dominant party system. The JDP experience makes this possible. It can be said that the divided and weak opposition mainly contributed to the rise of the JDP as the dominant party. Therefore the JDP, which has formed the government alone since 2002, won the elections in 2011 and fulfilled the three consecutive elections criteria of Sartori (Çarkoğlu, 2011, pp. 44-45). In addition to the electoral victory of the JDP in the 2011 elections, the most important result of that election is its consolidation of its voter base (Çarkoğlu, 2011, p. 58). There has not been a political party which increases its vote share persistently in the political history of Turkey since the beginning of the multiparty politics (Ciddi & Esen, 2014, p. 427). In the 1950s, the DP showed a similar performance in terms of winning three consecutive elections but the JDP is different because its vote share persistently rose in contrast to the DP's declining vote share (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012, p. 87). Furthermore, its electoral success in the general elections in November 2015, 49.4%

vote share, contributed to the debates of the JDP's dominancy. The JDP formed the government alone for the fourth time.

The municipal elections in March 2004 and March 2009 set the scene for the same developments. In spite of the decline of its vote share from 42% to 38.8% in the March 2009 elections; the opposition also had the same disappointment. Despite declining votes, the JDP won most of the provincial mayorships; but the opposition could not show the same performance. None of the political parties were able to obtain electoral momentum. In other words, these two elections showed the weakness of the opposition parties in terms of ending the majority government of the JDP. In addition to this, in the 2014 municipal elections the JDP raised its share of votes from 43% to 45% (Keyman, 2010, p. 101). In short, the JDP was able to form a strong majority government after each election that it participated in.

There are two important results of this electoral strength in a political environment. First of all, the JDP got electoral hegemony, meaning an increasing gap between the incumbent party and the opposition parties, which none of the other political parties in Turkey could achieve. This signifies that JDP will be the most probable winner of the next elections. In other words, this electoral hegemony creates a disappointment in the opposition so that their members do not believe their party can win the elections. The difficulty for the opposition to end the JDP rule increases as the electoral hegemony of the JDP endures, leading to pessimism in the voters of the opposition parties (Keyman, 2010, p. 101). Secondly, this electoral hegemony paves the way for the legitimization of the JDP rule in the eyes of the voters due to the large proportion of votes and association of democracy with the ballot box. The elections become simple mechanisms for legitimization of who governs and also contributed much to the consolidation and fortification of the rule of the JDP. Furthermore, the electoral hegemony increasingly turns towards dominance (Keyman, 2014, pp. 22-23).

These consecutive electoral victories of the JDP since 2002 formed a quake in Turkish politics and modernity (Keyman, 2010, p. 100). It is explained that the JDP has taken victory in successive general elections since 2002 apart from the general elections of June 2015. This means that the JDP fulfills the first criteria of the dominant party system which was the vote or seat shares in the parliament gained by the parties in the system.

4.5.2. Second Criteria: Nature of Opposition

The policy orientations of the opposition composed of the RPP, the NAP and the Kurdish groups is necessary to deal with in order to make a clear explanation of their fragmentation. Therefore, the focus will be on their policy orientations since 2002 elections. Firstly the RPP will be explained and then the NAP will be dealt. Lastly, the opposition made by the Kurdish groups will be clarified.

Turan (2006, pp. 560-564) explained that the RPP represented elitist modernism moderated by social democratic rhetoric since its reestablishment in 1992. He dealt with the three legacies that the RPP had in order to explain its electoral stagnation during the 1990s. These three legacies resulted with incoherence in terms of developing practicable policy alternatives. The first legacy was that of the modernizing single party that liberated the state from the foreign occupation and the modernization which meant the westernization was also included in this legacy. Being the party that led the transition to multi-party system was the second legacy. Despite of allowing transition to multi-party system, the distrust of the RPP members towards the rival politicians in terms of undoing Kemalist revolutions generated a tendency in the RPP to side with the bureaucratic and military elite. The last legacy was that of adoption of the new ideology of 'left of centre'. In 1966, the party gained an identity which was in favor of large masses. The adoption of 'left of centre' ideology meant the transformation from the party of elites to the party of commons. The new ideology meant also that the party closed to the social democracy, planned economy and social improvements. In other words, the RPP was attempting to reach masses as the leftist groups increased in the 1960s (Kiriş, 2012, p. 400). The RPP did not go through the process of redefining of its ideology after the mid-1990s; instead it went on forming its political orientations on the basis of Cold War paradigms. The RPP regained its elitist identity towards the end of the 1990s. Furthermore, it tended to side with the military in terms of the civil military relations (Tosun, 2010, p. 34).

Tosun clarifies that:

...From the reestablishment of the RPP in 1992 until 2010, the party was characterized by authoritarian, militaristic and bureaucratic methods to reshape and educate Turkish society. The RPP always placed the interest of the state over the demands of Turkey's citizens. ...The RPP held and introverted, nationalistic view and it generally remained distant from the demands of democratization and liberalization coming from the society... (Tosun, 2010, p. 34)

Since it defines itself as the defender of the secular republic, it represents secularized side of the religion-secularism polarization. As the JDP represents the grand coalition of the right, the RPP becomes disadvantageous and appears as the main opposition party from the general elections of 2002, 2007 and 2011 (Kiriş, 2012, pp. 408-409). After, Kılıçdaroğlu became the leader of the RPP; he could not provide specific solutions to specific problems of Turkey such as headscarf issue, Kurdish question and the EU. His approach to the headscarf issue was moderate but it was not based on the discourse of freedom and individual rights. Furthermore, his position towards the relations with the EU is unclear and he also oversimplified the Kurdish issue. In short, the leader change in the RPP brought more moderate outlook but it did not bring ideological transformation. It was unable to identify the Turkey's current problems and to produce specific policies to these problems; instead it went on making politics as criticizing and identifying itself on the opposite side of the JDP (Tosun, 2010, pp. 35-39).

As for the second opposition party in the parliament, the NAP represents the extreme nationalism in Turkey. It defines its nationalism in contrast to the Kurdish nationalism since the mid 1990s. It also adopts a vague Anatolian Islam understanding which reconciles Islamic and nationalistic discourses and restricts Turkish-Islamic synthesis to the private sphere (Aras & Bacık, 2000, pp. 49-56). Furthermore, Bacık (2011, p. 172) argues that the NAP has operated with a vague party identity since 1960s. Its identity is composed of different and contradictory elements like, Kemalism, statism, militarism, and Ottomanism. It means that the unclear positions towards different political issues. These strategies also provided the NAP to distance itself from the split between the conservatives and Kemalists. However, increasing polarization between the Kemalists and conservatives during the post-2002 period invalidated these strategies. At the beginning of 2000s, the level of transparency was increased due to the political conflicts and the process of democratization. Accordingly, the political actors and their discourses were more open when compared to twenty years ago. In addition, the actors were expected to show their manifest positions towards the major issues of Turkish politics, like headscarf issue. The increasing polarization between the Kemalists and conservatives urged the NAP to take a clear position and invalidated these strategies (Bacık, 2011, pp. 172-177). As it is explained above its strategies became invalid after the transformation of the Turkish politics since 2002.

Although it was the member of the coalition government after the 1999 elections, it was failed to enter parliament in 2002 elections. It opposed to reforms demanded by the EU and privatization of the state owned enterprises during its membership to the coalition government (Bacık, 2004, pp. 821-826). In the 2007 elections, the NAP maintained the same attitude towards the EU membership even it claimed that the EU membership would not be the fate of Turkey (Başkan & Gümrükçü, 2012, pp. 39-40). The lack of the ties between the party and the business community also prevented it reaching to voters. Thus it became a closed system which blurred the party identity of the NAP in the minds of the electorate. Most importantly, its electoral manifesto in the 2011 elections included the strong emphasis on the survival and unity of Turkish state, but it was not meeting the demand of the citizens and far from providing solutions to the daily issues in Turkish politics (Bacık, 2011, pp. 177-185).

The Kurdish parties, which have been active in Turkish politics since the 1991 elections, have showed electoral ups and downs. However, their electoral basis has showed a territorial tendency (Yeğen, 2011, p. 147). The Democratic People's Party, which entered the 2002 elections, but this party was banned by the Constitutional Court due to its activities against the democratic republic, equality and the laws and principles of the state. Its successor, the Democratic Society Party was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 2009 due to the same reasons. The Peace and Democracy Party entered the 2007 elections. All these parties were ethnically oriented and they were supporting the EU membership for the extension of freedom of speech, cultural rights and democratization process (Başkan & Gümrükçü, 2012, pp. 32-33).

The electoral ups and downs of the Kurdish parties through the 2002, 2007, 2011 and 2015 elections is related to the JDP's perspective towards the Kurdish issue and entering to the elections, especially 2002, 2007, and 2011 elections, with the independent candidates in order to pass 10% threshold. The JDP launched the Kurdish initiative but slowing down of the process created a disappointment among Kurdish people. Therefore, the JDP could not lasted its rivalry position vis a vis the Kurdish party (Yeğen, 2011, pp. 149-152). The Kurdish party that entered the 2011 elections, the Peace and Democracy Party oriented its electoral campaign to the regionalization. In terms of regionalization, it supported a decentralized government which was based on the regional parliament that controlled the education, culture,

health services, social security, agriculture, industry etc. The central government could be responsible for foreign affairs, finance and defense services. Both of them could be jointly responsible for the judicial and security services. In the 2011 elections, the Peace and Democracy Party was able to enter the parliament by means of its independent candidates. Furthermore it increased its vote share from 5.19% (2007) to 6.65% in 2011 (Başkan & Güney, 2012, pp. 169-170). In the 2015 general elections, the People's Democratic Party, which was established in 2012, participated as a party; it gained 13.1 of the total votes in June and 10.8% of the total votes in November (CNN TÜRK, 2015).

The secular orientation of the Kurdish party was criticized by the conservatives and it started to adopt more inclusive political orientation. The invitation of the Kurdish representative from other Kurdish parties and the non-Muslims to the "Democratic Society Congress" increased its vote share (Yeğen, 2011, pp. 152-153).

In short, the opposition parties, the RPP, the NAP, and the Peace and Democracy Party were fragmented in terms of their different policy orientations. The RPP was maintained its political status as an elitist party, the NAP, and the Peace and Democracy Party produced policies on the basis of either Turkish or Kurdish nationalism. Furthermore, the JDP's policies that were more inclusionary created the bond between the conservatives and became a roof for the right wing groups. As the right is united under the JDP's roof, the different and specific policy orientations of the opposition parties prevented the emergence of an effective opposition against the JDP and eventually contributed to its rise. Thus, the weak and inefficient nature of opposition and its electoral failures, as explained above, fulfills the second criteria as well as it contributing to the dominance of the JDP.

4.5.3. Third Criteria: Duration of Ascendancy

How has the JDP been able to stay in power since 2002? The JDP started on its reform-based politics in order to stay in long term power. It made attempts at reforms in the spheres of democracy, foreign policy and economy. In terms of democratization, the JDP government initiated the democratic opening process in order to deal with the Kurdish issue. The Armenia-Turkey dialogue was initiated for the enhancement of peace and the visa requirement for Syrians was abolished in

order to enhance the relationship between Turkey and Syria in terms of foreign policy. Lastly, the economic reforms were initiated to revitalize the economic performance. These policies can be assumed to be attempts to stay in power (Keyman, 2010, p. 101). In short, the JDP government's political performance in terms of its reforms in democratization, economy and foreign policy form the basis of its social support (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012, p. 89) Therefore, in this part deals with the JDP's Performance: Economy, European Union Process and Foreign Policy.

4.5.3.1. Economic Performance

In the 2002 election, the main priority of the electorate was the economy due to the crisis that erupted in 2001. This tendency continued and was observed in the 2007 elections. The economic crisis made economic performance the main determinant for party preference of the electorate. The JDP differentiated itself from its predecessors the WP and the VP in terms of its economic stance. In contrast to the WP and the VP, which were against the capitalist system, the JDP left the anti-capitalist stance and emphasized the strength of private enterprise. Moreover it argued for the integration of Turkish economy with global economy and privatization (Hale & Özbudun, 2009, pp. 99-100).

The JDP introduced itself to the electorate as a progressive party in terms of adaptation to the advantageous dimensions of the global economy. It showed strong commitment to structural reforms and fiscal stability principles of the IMF's plan. The economic development was higher than expected within the short period of two years. Similarly, the inflation was also lower than expected as a result of the strong commitment of the JDP to the plan. The degree of commitment of the JDP was the main determinant for the Foreign Direct Investment. It was also able to have a surplus in the balance of payments and maintain this despite of the high interest rates. In addition, the reforms in the banking system were maintained and this led to the stronger banking and financial system, and to flexibility in Turkish economy in terms of external and internal shocks. Moreover, it initiated the struggle against corruption which was a chronic problem in Turkey after the transition to a neo-liberal economy (Öniş, 2010, pp. 266-268).

In addition to its successful performance in economics, the JDP was able to establish patronage networks which contributed to widen its social support and focused on the service oriented policies. First of all, the JDP was successful in terms of gaining the support of the rising new bourgeoisie. The municipalities gained important authority for distribution of construction permits and were in agreement with the JDP related business in terms of meeting their municipal requirements. On the other hand, the central government established close links with the new bourgeoisie in terms of handing out contracts and providing credit. Moreover, the health care reform, cheap housing project, income assistance and distribution of consumer goods to disadvantaged groups by means of municipalities were crucial services that the JDP provided during its ascendancy. The establishment of close links with the new bourgeoisie and the service oriented policies of the JDP provided the expansion of the social basis and determined its success in the further elections. Its successful policies in terms of balancing the fiscal and monetary policies, macroeconomic governance, patronage, low inflation and low budget deficit and stable exchange rates ameliorated the living conditions for the disadvantaged groups (Gümüşçü, 2013, pp. 232-233).

4.5.3.2. European Union Process

The European Union process is important to deal with because it is the main milestone in the ascendancy of the JDP government. In other words, the commitment to European integration was the first and the most important step of the newly established and Islamic rooted party in order to survive in Turkish politics vis a vis the military.

In 1999, the European Union recognized Turkey as a candidate state. This decision taken in Helsinki started the new process of reformation with the full commitment of the JDP. In order for the EU to start accession negotiations with a candidate state, it was expected to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria which envisions democratic stability, respect of human rights, rule of law and protection of minorities (Sarıgil, 2010, p. 40). The adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria revealed the challenge of eliminating the military tutelage on day to day politics in Turkey (Toktaş & Kurt, 2010, p. 388).

The military played a crucial role in Turkish politics. Since it defined itself as the guarantor of democracy and secularism, Turkish politics experienced several military interventions. Furthermore, the 1982 constitution enhanced the superiority of the military over civilian politics (Özbudun, 2000, pp. 107-121). Turkish democracy is mainly characterized by the involvement of the military in public affairs combined with its identification as European. In other words, Turkish democracy has been shaped by the guardian and vanguard roles of the military (Cizre, 2004, p. 107).

As the JDP's prominent leaders experienced the military intervention in 1997, they used the Europeanization as a strategy for elimination of the military and strengthening of their existence in the political arena. Thus the leaders of the JDP proclaimed that EU membership is the natural result of the modernization of Turkey and the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria would be the breakthrough for the modernization of Turkey. (Dağı, 2010, p. 132).

Saatçioğlu clearly explains the willingness of the JDP to adopt the Copenhagen criteria by means of comparing its first and second terms in power. The paragraph below shows the instrumentalization of the Europeanization as a strategy for its survival;

...Specifically, during its first term in power, as a new and Islamic-rooted party, the JDP closely relied on civilianization and other liberalizing reforms in order to ensure its political survival vis-a-vis the military-judicial secular establishment suspicious of its commitment to secular, democratic norms. In contrast, having firmly established itself as Turkey's leading political force after the 2007 elections; the JDP's dependence on the EU agenda for power purposes has lessened. Having 'survived' vis-à-vis secular 'rivals', the party could now freely pick and choose among the given reform areas in order to consolidate its power position. The incentive of survival, followed by the consolidation, thus provided the causal dynamic behind the observed variation in Europeanization. By marginalizing the military as a political actor, civilianization reforms enhanced the JDP's power and have thus been kept since 2002. In contrast, having initially adopted enough rule of law and fundamental freedoms to liberalize the political arena for religion-based politics, the JDP government could afford to ignore further democratization in these areas as doing so would further enhance its power. (Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 88)

Thus the EU process is mainly shaped by the adoption of the key reform measures during the first term of the JDP ascendancy. The particular requirement of the Copenhagen Criteria was concerned with the military tutelage in Turkish politics. The requirement was the clear-cut, and constitutional, separation of the civil military

relations. Thus, Turkey must have the same standards of democratic control of armed forces as member states (Toktaş & Kurt, 2010, p. 388).

The reform packages were adopted between 2001 and 2004 in order to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria. The first reform package was initiated by the coalition government of the DLP, the MP, and the NAP. The first reform package could be adopted towards the end of 2001 due to long bargaining process over the political reforms. The changes that these reform packages brought about can be summarized, in the words of Müftüler Baç:

Under the broader headings of increased legal protection of social, cultural, and political rights of all Turkish citizens, irrespective of religious and ethnic origin, the role of the military in Turkish politics, and the freedom of expression in Turkey. The most important political changes were related to the role of the military in politics through the judiciary; the State Security Courts; and through the National Security Council, the Turkish Penal Code and its articles on the freedom of expression and association; the death penalty; transparency of the public sector and violations of human rights (Müftüler-Baç, 2005, pp. 21-22).

The first reform package was brought on the 3rd of October 2001. In February, March and August of 2002 three more packages were adopted. After the JDP came to power in November 2002, it started to adopt the EU process. It, as having established the majority government, adopted seven further reform packages in addition to the one initiated by the coalition government (Müftüler-Baç, 2005, pp. 22-25). The success of the JDP in making and pursuing reforms brought the opening of the accession talks with the EU in 2005. This also contributed to its political strength, because the start of the accession talks and the democratic reforms made the JDP appeal to both the Liberal and centre-right constituency (Gümüüşçü, 2013, p. 236).

On the one hand the JDP government was taking steps for the civilianization of politics in the name of the EU process. On the other hand, it refrained from any direct confrontation with the military on critical issues and distanced itself from political Islam during its first term of ascendancy. It is also important to note that the military did not oppose the reforms pursued in the name of the EU process even though it limited its role in politics. The main reason for this was the cessation of accusations regarding the blocking of the EU-led democratization process by civilians. Thus the military showed full commitment to the further integration with the EU. (Toktaş & Kurt, 2010, pp. 392-393). Musil (2015, p. 88) argues that the

reforms made in the name of the EU process paved the way for a strengthening of the position of the JDP government vis a vis the military.

To sum up, the harsh conditions for the survival of the JDP in Turkish politics directed the party to make commitment to the EU reform agenda. Adoption of the EU norms provided the legitimacy for the JDP's 'conservative democracy' ideology and its compatibility with European democratic values. Furthermore, the JDP's extended electoral support and commitment to European norms crucially contributed to, and consolidated, the power of the JDP vis a vis the military, whose influence over politics eventually eliminated (Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 91).

4.5.3.3. Foreign Policy

The effects of the EU process can be seen directly in the norms and practices of foreign policy as well as in domestic politics. In the 1990s, Turkey adopted the foreign policy based on the use of coercive strategies against external threats. In this respect, the neighbors were perceived as security threats and the hard-line tools were predominantly used in dealings with Greece, Iran, Syria and Iraq. The main tools and the conduct in foreign policy have changed significantly as a result of the EU accession process. Foreign policy is conducted on European norms and the practices are based on multilateralism and use of diplomatic and economic means in dealing with international problems and conflicts (Gürsoy, 2010, pp. 228-230). In other words, the foreign policy of the JDP government is conducted on the basis of the use of soft power and development of friendly relations with all neighbors of Turkey. In contrast to the fixed foreign policy position of Turkey in the 1990s, the JDP adopted the initiative of 'zero problems' with its neighbors. In this context, the initiatives of the JDP government for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute on the lines of the Annan Plan and the increase of the economic interdependence with Georgia are the important examples of this initiative (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009, p. 9). Furthermore, Greece and Turkey initiated a new rapprochement which paved the way for the increase of the dialogue between them at the levels of both bureaucracy and civil society. Turkey developed good relations with her Middle Eastern neighbors in terms of economic activities, trade and investment (Gürsoy, 2010, p. 230).

In addition to 'the zero problems with neighbors' initiative, the strategic depth perspective of Davutoğlu directly influenced the foreign policy conduct of the JDP

government (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009, p. 9). In the essence of this strategic depth perspective, it is argued that Turkey must have the role of stability and security provider in the neighboring regions (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 81). According to Terzi (2010, p. 21), the strategic depth initiative aims at making Turkey a regional power which uses its Ottoman heritage in the surrounding region as a cultural advantage and contributes to the conflict resolution and regional stability of the region. Furthermore, this perspective also emphasizes the strategic location of Turkey as being the central country at the core of the Afro-Eurasian landmass. In other words, Turkey has multiple regional identities which cannot be reduced to a single character and enable her to extend its influence simultaneously to Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Caspian and the Mediterranean. Thus, a more pro-active approach to the Middle East and friendly relations with the Arab world are developed as well as EU membership being pursued. Stating the central location of Turkey in the Afro-Eurasian landmass and the proactive perspective to the Middle East and Arab world is actually implying the role of Turkey as an energy corridor. In this respect, the revived relations with Russia as the main natural gas supplier of Turkey, her engagements to the Organization of the Islamic Congress in addition to her engagement to the EU, and the initiatives for natural gas and the crude oil pipelines projects signifies the role that Turkey played as a regional and energy transit country, for the land-locked Caspian energy by means of alternative and safe routes to Russia and Iran (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009, pp. 9-11).

The other dimension of the JDP's foreign policy is its incorporation of civil society. This incorporation cannot be distinguished from the EU process. According to Terzi (2010, pp. 67-77), the EU process has incorporated civil society dialogue to its official relations with Turkey by means of providing financial sources in order to introduce the social and cultural life in Turkey to the public in Europe. This encouraged the opportunity for civil society organizations to take the public attention in Turkey to the global, regional and domestic issues and this encouragement paved the way for them to affect foreign policy. In the respect, the business organizations like TÜSİAD, TOBB, and MÜSİAD became able to engage in the transnational economic relations in the different regions in the worlds. For example, the TOBB actively pursued the political incentives in the pursuit of economic incentives in different regions in the world, from Europe to the Middle East. In terms of the

human rights NGOs, they became active with the incentive of the EU process and they became able to pressure the JDP government in terms of promoting human rights. They are effective especially in terms of Turkey's ratification of the international human rights documents. The most important example of the human rights NGOs, which actively functioned since the start of the EU process, is Amnesty International. The other significant examples are the civil initiatives between Greece and Turkey for reconciliation, the Turkish Greek Friendship Association, and the civil societal activities between Northern and Southern Cypriots which paved the way for Annan referenda (Terzi, 2010, pp. 67-77).

The proactive foreign policy which envisioned the regional and global engagements provided the outward looking profile (Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012, p. 91). In short, the commitment to global economy, the service oriented governance and the adoption to the secular order were the focal points of the JDP in terms of their coming to power. After its successful economic performance, it strategically used the reforms required for EU membership to strengthen its existence in the political arena. Thus, the JDP maintained its weight over the politics and extended its electoral hegemony. This means that the JDP fulfills the third criteria of the dominant party system is the duration of ascendancy.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The main aim of this thesis is to investigate whether the party system in Turkey has been transformed into a dominant party system. The main reason for this investigation is the JDP's victories in both the general and municipal executive elections since 2002. Therefore, despite the legal implementation of the multi-party system in Turkey, the JDP has dominated the elections since 2002. Thus the emergence of the JDP as the victor in the elections reminds the existence of dominant party system in practice. According to Sartori, a political party can be defined as a dominant party if it wins the three consecutive elections (Çarkoğlu, 2011, p. 44); in accordance with this, the JDP can be defined as a dominant party. The JDP has won the general elections with a vote share enabling it to form the government alone since the general elections of 2002. In other words, it has the victory of four general elections and has formed the government alone, except the elections held in June 2015. Thus, the JDP fulfills the dominancy criteria of Sartori.

In the first chapter, the research question and the aim of this thesis is introduced. In the second chapter, the political party typologies and party systems are explained. The dominant party system, which is related to the main research question, is dealt in detail. In the third chapter, the party systems that have been implemented in Turkey since the pre-republican period are explained. This historical period is necessary to show the difference of the dominant party system from other party systems. In the fourth chapter, the factors that led to the rise of the JDP as the dominant party are discussed. It is also examined whether the JDP fulfills the three criteria of the dominant party. In terms of fulfilling these criteria, the JDP's vote or seat shares in the parliament, the nature of the opposition and the duration of the JDP's ascendancy are discussed. It is reached that the party system in Turkey has shown the characteristics of the dominant party system and the JDP can be defined as a dominant party.

The JDP has won the general elections (2002-2007-2011-2015) as well as the municipal elections (2004-2009-2014) and the referendum held in 2010. Finally, it came to power alone in the general elections held in November 2015. This means

that the JDP fulfills the first criteria of having victories of three consecutive elections.

The dominant party systems have weak and divided opposition, free and relatively fair elections in contrast to the one-party systems, and the dominant party's power to shape the political culture due to long periods of ascendancy. In Turkey, the opposition has been divided and non-effective since 2002. In other words, the opposition parties could not produce the policies that embrace various groups of society. The RPP, the main opposition party, has been the elitist party that could not reach to the masses. In addition, the lack of definite political ideology has contributed to its electoral failures. As the second opposition party, the NAP, pursued the policies based on Turkish nationalism which led to discrimination of other ethnic identities, especially the Kurdish people, in Turkey. The rise of political polarization among the Kemalists and the conservatives made the unclear ideology of the NAP dysfunctional. As the NAP, the Kurdish parties pursued policies based on the Kurdish nationalism and regionalism. The over-emphasis on the Kurdish nationalism prevented it becoming the party of the whole country. However, it could not reach to the masses due to its ethnic political orientation. In short, the opposition parties could not produce alternative policies; rather they oriented their policies to criticizing the JDP. In other words, a lack of effective opposition is the main determinant in the dominance of the JDP. Therefore, the opposition has been weak and ineffective in Turkey since 2002; this means that the second criterion is fulfilled.

In terms of the duration of the JDP's ascendancy, it has been able to stay in power for 13 years. In order to explain its ability to stay in power alone, its policies that provided this ascendancy period are examined. Therefore, its rule is examined in terms of its performance in economics, foreign policy and the EU process. It came to sole power in the context of the political and economic crisis. Furthermore, the fact that it was able to produce solutions to the economic and the political problems of Turkey, and the fact that it reaches to the people in terms of meeting their needs directly contributed to the JDP's staying power for 13 years. In addition to the political stability that the JDP brought with the help of the 10% threshold, the achievement in economy sustained its electoral victories. The EU process that was adopted by the JDP for the legitimacy of its governance became the main contributor to its electoral success. In addition to its successful economic performance, the democratic transition and foreign policy, activism based on the norms and use of soft

power which was brought by the EU process, also contributed to the JDP's extending its electoral base.

On the other hand, the rule of the JDP aimed at democratization in the beginning of its ascendancy. As it gained confidence in the ballot box, its rule became more authoritarian. Despite the stability in economics that the JDP provided by means of its successful policies, the democratic conditions are not consolidated. Furthermore, its dominant position in the political arena creates doubts about the consolidation of democracy while it is consolidating its power. The consecutive electoral success of the JDP legitimizes its political power. In other words, the democracy is associated with the ballot box in the eyes of the people (Keyman, 2014, p. 23). This association undermines the consolidation of democracy because the political authority no longer needs legitimacy for its policies. As Heywood (2007, p. 378) asserts the dominant party system is inherently contradicting democracy because of the non-existence of alternatives to allow for a change of incumbent party, causing the people to take the incumbent party for granted. Thus, the persistence of the JDP government can cause the deterioration of this strong state tradition.

Furthermore, the debates on the presidential system imply that the new mode of governance, for which the JDP argues is the centralization of the power, is in the hands of the executive accelerating the emergence of an authoritarian regime instead of the consolidation of democracy (Keyman, 2014, p. 30). It is necessary to indicate that the 10% threshold was one of the most important points which contribute to the JDP's formation of government.

In terms of shaping the political culture, the JDP government has been in power for 13 years. Thus, 'the 2023 Vision' of the JDP can be a guideline for shaping the political culture of Turkey. As words of Keyman (2014, p. 25), 'it is neither unattainable nor a utopia', it certainly seems much more attainable for the JDP after the general elections held in November 2015. Finally, it can be maintained that the Turkish party system during the post-2002 period can be defined as the dominant party system since it fulfills the three criteria of the dominant party system as explained above.

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