

**GOVERNMENT TRANSITION AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY ARMIES IN
EAST AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY**



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EAST AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY**


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ABSTRACT

GOVERNMENT TRANSITION AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY ARMIES IN EAST AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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East African countries were the former colonies of British and the inheritors of King's African Rifle (KAR). All East African countries gained independence in 1960's and experienced the East Africa mutinies in 1964. The aftermath of the mutinies was a cross road to civil-military relations. Since then the countries have diverged, Kenya and Tanzania have taken the same direction of controlling the army. Uganda's failure to deal with the mutineers made the army a powerful political instrument, that the country experienced military coups and civil wars. The coming of Museveni in 1986 brought hope but Museveni has been in office since he seized power in 1986 to the present. In addition to that, the country has never experienced peaceful government change since independence while at the same time Kenya and Tanzania have managed peaceful government transition via general elections. This thesis addresses the main research question why Kenya and Tanzania have managed peaceful government change but Uganda has failed. I argue that, the Ugandan army has been playing a crucial role in keeping presidents in power. This study relies on qualitative historical analysis (QHA). The cases will be compared and contrasted to reach conclusions.

Key Words: East Africa, Museveni, civil-military relations, government transition, Kings Africa Rifle

ÖZET

DOĞU AFRIKA'DA HÜKÜMET DEĞİŞİKLİĞİ VE ORDUNUN ROLÜ: KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZ

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Doğu Afrika ülkeleri eski İngiliz eski kolonileridir ve Kralın Afrika Tüfekleri'nin mirasçılaridir. Doğu Afrika ülkeleri 1960'lı yıllarda bağımsızlıklarını kazandılar ve 1964 yılında Doğu Afrika isyanlarına tanıklık ettiler. İsyanların akıbeti, sivil-asker ilişkileri için bir dönüm noktası oldu. Ülkeler birbirlerinden ayrıldığından beri, Kenya ve Tanzania ordunun kontrolünde benzer yol izlemiştir. Fakat, Uganda'nın, isyancılarla başa çıkamaması, orduyu güçlü bir siyasi araç haline getirmiş ve ülkenin askeri darbeler ve iç savaşlar yaşamasına neden olmuştur. 1986'da Museveni'nin göreve gelişi bir umut vaat etmişse de Museveni 1986'dan beri iktidardan ayrılmamıştır. Buna ek olarak, ülke, bağımsızlığından beri barışçıl hükümeti değişikliğini hiç deneyimlememiştir. Uganda'da bunlar yaşanırken, Kenya ve Tanzania barışçıl hükümete geçişi genel seçimlerle sağlamıştır. Bu tez, Kenya ve Tanzania hükümet değişimlerini barışçıl bir şekilde yönetebilirken Uganda'nın neden başarısız olduğunu incelemektedir. Uganda ordusunun, başkanı iktidarda tutmak için oynadığı rol bu tezde vurgulanacaktır. Bu çalışma niteliksel tarihsel analize dayanır. Uganda, Kenya ve Tanzania sonuca ulaşmak için karşılaştırılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Doğu Afrika, Museveni, sivil-ordu ilişkileri, hükümet değişikliği, Kralın Afrika Tüfekleri.



To My Lovely Mother

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	ix
ABBREVIATIONS	x
CHAPTER I	1
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Significance of the Study.....	3
1.2. Research Questions and Hypothesis.....	3
1.3. Methods and Methodology	4
CHAPTER II	6
2. LITERATURE REVIEW.....	6
2.1. Institutional Theory	7
2.1.1. Political Structure of the Society	7
2.1.2. Structure (Nature) of the army.....	8
2.1.3. Hybrid approach	9
2.2. Michel Desch's	10
2.3. Civil-Military Relations in Africa	11
2.4. Civil-Military Relations in East Africa	14
CHAPTER III.....	18
3. PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD AND EARLY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE 18	
3.1. Armies and Pre-Colonial East Africa.....	19

3.2. Colonisation and the Birth of East African Army	20
CHAPTER IV	26
4. INDEPENDENCE, MUTINIES AND ITS AFTERMATH 1960's TO 1990.	26
4.1. East Africa Mutiny	28
4.2. Tanzania.....	30
4.3. Kenya.....	33
4.4. Uganda.....	37
CHAPTER V	46
5. THE YEARS OF MULTI PART DEMOCRACY 1990's TO PRESENT.	46
5.1. Tanzania.....	47
5.2. Kenya.....	53
5.3. Uganda.....	57
CHAPTER VI.....	66
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION	66
REFERENCE	69

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure


Political Map of East Africa.....xi



ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	-	African National Congress
CCM	-	Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolution Party)
DRC	-	Democratic Republic of Congo
EA	-	East Africa
EAC	-	East African Countries/ Community
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of East African States
KADU	-	Kenya African Democratic Union
KDF	-	Kenya Defence Force
KANU	-	Kenya African National Union
KAR	-	King's African Riffle
KR	-	Kenyan Riffle
NRA	-	National Resistance Army
NRM	-	National Resistance Movement
NARC	-	National Alliance Rainbow Coalition
NCC	-	National Consultative Commission
NCOs	-	Non-Commissioned Officers
MAU MAU	-	Mzungu Arudi Ulaya Mwafrika Apate Uhuru
QHA	-	Qualitative Historical Analysis
RWAFF	-	West African Frontier Force
TANU	-	Tanganyika African Nation Union
TYL	-	TANU Youth League
TPDF	-	Tanzania People's Defence Force
TR	-	Tanzania's Riffle
UNLF	-	Uganda National Liberation Front
UPC	-	Ugandan People's Congress
UR	-	Ugandan Riffle
UPDF	-	Uganda People Defence Force
WOPC	-	Warrant Officer Platoon Commanders
FRELIMO	-	Mozambique Liberation Front
MPLA	-	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NEC	-	National Election Committee
PAC	-	Pan African Congress
RC	-	Regional Commissioner
SWAPO	-	South West Africa People's Organisation
ZANU	-	Zimbabwean African National Union
ZAPU	-	Zimbabwean African People's Union

Figure 1. Political map of East Africa



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

East Africa (EA) is a region, which consists of many countries, but this study examines Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. All EA countries were the former colonies of Great Britain and the inheritors of British colonial army; the King's African Rifle (KAR) and all countries gained independence from Great Britain in 1960's. The leaders of East Africa have been seeking to unify their countries long before independence. The first president of Tanzania Nyerere "originally hoped Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika would achieve independence not as separate nations, but as strong federations" (Harmon 2002; p.92). After the independence, Nyerere went further on commenting that, the strength of East Africa lies in unity among the three countries and the borders that were drawn by imperialist should not be obstacles to unity (*ibid* 2002). East Africa, apart from sharing historical background, the countries share borders, language and culture. Maintaining this long-term unity and togetherness, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda established East Africa Community (EAC) in 1967 but due to various reasons, the community was dissolved in 1977. In 1999, a treaty to re-establish original members, later Rwanda, Burundi, signed the community joined the community, and 2016 South Sudan gained accession to the community.

Since East African countries gained independence in 1960's, Kenya and Tanzania have maintained civil authority and peaceful government transition via elections since multiparty system was introduced in 1990's. After independence civil wars, military coups and dictators followed Uganda. In 1986, Yoweri Museveni the leader of the National Resistance Army (NRA) seized power. Museveni who before coming to power wrote in his book that "the problem of Africa and Uganda in

particular, is not the people but leaders who overstay in power” (Museveni 2000), he has been in office since he seized power in 1986. Uganda has experienced eight government changes since independence, none of them happened via elections. During the same period, Kenya has experienced four peaceful government change and Tanzania five via elections. Moreover, extending presidential terms has become a trend in the region that is why this topic worth to be studying. Among the five members of East Africa Community (EAC), only Kenya and Tanzania presidents have not extended their time in power. In the contrary, Uganda has lifted the presidential term limit from constitution.

This research analyses the government transition and the role played by armies in East Africa. The research rests on country (state) level analysis, but in reaching out the findings, individual and international levels may appear in some cases. The main research question of the study is why Kenya and Tanzania have managed peaceful governmental change but Uganda has failed? The peaceful government change is the willingness of the elected presidents to leave office once their terms end and hand over power to a newly elected leader. The hypothesis of the study is that; the army has been playing a crucial role in keeping presidents in power in Uganda.

This thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter gives the background of the study, its significances, details on the research questions and hypothesis, as well as the methods and methodology. The second chapter contains the summary of the existing literature on the civil-military relations. The chapter starts by giving the general frame work of theories of civil-military relations, then proceeds with giving the general picture of civil military relations in African context and the last part of the chapter analyses the civil-military relations in East Africa. The third chapter focuses on pre-colonial and colonial East Africa. This chapter focuses on the nature of East African societies and armies before and after colonialism up to 1960s. The fourth chapter dwells on the independence, the mutinies and its aftermath from 1960s to 1990’s. The chapter starts with a detailed account on civil-military relations in the early years of independence up to the East Africa mutinies in 1964. It goes further on explaining the repercussion caused by the 1964 mutinies and the ways deployed by East African leaders to build new armies and new civil-military relations in East Africa. The fifth chapter focuses on the years of democracy and multiparty system from 1990s to the current. The chapter starts by analysing the situations prior to the

introduction of multiparty system and explains the roles and the position of armies in East Africa. The sixth chapter is the conclusion of the study. In this chapter the results of the findings will be addressed and give a detailed discussion of the whole thesis.

1.1. Significance of the Study

The study will help understanding the presidential tenure practices in the region. In East African region, only Tanzania and Kenya leaders have ended their offices once their tenure ends. Ugandan leader Museveni, however, has been extending his tenure in the office since he seized power in 1986. The presence of Museveni has been an influence on the neighbouring countries. Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo have gone through military coups, civil wars and their leaders are former military personnel as the case of Museveni of Uganda. All the leaders of the neighbouring countries have sought to extend presidential terms so that they can still be in offices in which their actions have led to political violence in the region. This study will help in understanding the reasons for presidential terms limit extension in the region.

Secondly, the study adds to the existing literature of civil-military relations by showing the shift in the direct role of the army to an indirect role in Africa. After independence, the armies had played a direct role of ousting coups and taking control of the government. That is why the study of civil-military relations in the 1960s paid attention to political violence, praetorians, and coup d'état. However, since the 1980s number of military coups in Africa has decreased. Instead, today, the former military personnel are unwilling to leave the office. The study will help understanding how the armed forces in recent years are not seizing power but play a crucial role behind the curtains by supporting one of their own to stay in power.

1.2. Research Questions and Hypothesis

The main aim of this study is to address the following questions:

1. Why Kenya and Tanzania have managed peaceful governmental change but Uganda has failed?
2. Why the countries with similar background have developed different tendencies?

3. Which factors have led the Ugandan army to engage in politics unlike the armies in Kenya and Tanzania?

To investigate these questions, I put forward the hypothesis that, the Ugandan army has been playing a crucial role in keeping presidents in power.

1.3. Methods and Methodology

This is a case study of three East African countries. The cases will be analysed on qualitative historical analysis (QHA). QHA can be described as “two or more historical phenomena are systematically studied for similarities, differences, divergences and convergences in order to contribute to their better description, explanation and interpretation” (Kocka and Haunt 2009; p.2). In that respect, this study compares and contrasts Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. I chose these three cases because they have number of similarities and differences to be compared and contrasted. The East African countries were the former British colonies and received independence at the same period of 1960’s. Furthermore, the armies of all three countries originated from the colonial army; the King’s African Rifle. Moreover, the countries are original members of East Africa Community (EAC). Despite all these similarities, the main difference is that, Uganda had gone through civil wars and military coups while Kenya and Tanzania did not. In that respect, the QHA is the best methodology applicable for this study because QHA is a distinctive “its practitioners engage in systematic and contextualized comparison of similar and contracting cases” (Mahaoney and Reushcemeyer, 2003; p.14).

By analyzing the similarities, differences and overlapping factor, it will be possible to draw some conclusions on how the army plays crucial role in the failure of peaceful transition in Uganda and how Kenya and Tanzania have succeeded. In addition to that, as scholars of comparative politics argued, “there is always a necessity of going back to the origins of cases to analyse the process over time and in sequence” (Mahoney and Reuschemeyer, 2003; p.77; Kocka and Haunt 2009; p.77). Therefore, an analysis of the original roots of the countries is a prerequisite. Thus, the study will start analyzing the cases from pre-colonial era to present. In addition to that, national histories will be divided into phases to give a framework on how situations have been evolved, developed, converging and diverging throughout the time.

Lastly, this thesis will assess the literature and survey primary and secondary data like daily newspapers, broadcasting corporations, documents from the ministry's official websites, reports, academic books, journals and articles. Moreover, both past and present materials were cautiously selected to maintain the reliability of the study. In addition to that, a large part of the study depends on secondary data due to the minimal time and access to primary sources.



CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Before 16th century in Europe, the army had enjoyed advantage over civilians. As Machiavelli writes in 16th century, “it was then necessary to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to people, but it is now more necessary to satisfy the people rather than the soldiers because the people are more powerful” (Machiavelli 1532; p.118). The emergence and the rise of democracy all over the world have led to the position of the army to be reviewed. In democratic states, the role of army has remained in defending the state against external threats (Forman and Welch 1998; p.7; May and Selochan 2004; p.2). Before the 1960’s, scholars devoted less time in writing the military’s role in politics, but from 1960s the world experienced a high number of military interventions in Africa, Asia and Latin America. This made scholars turning their attention to political violence, praetorianism, and coup d’état (Wiking 1983, Onuwumechili 1998, Brelin 2001).

The main research question of the study is that, why Kenya and Tanzania have managed peaceful governmental change but Uganda has failed. The hypothesis of the study is that; the Ugandan army has been playing a crucial role in keeping presidents in power. There is a need to study army’s intervention (engagement) in politics. The study of military intervention in politics lies in the study of civil-military relations. By definition “civil- military relations mean the relative distribution of power between the government and the armed forces of a country” (Forman and Welch 1998; p.7). The challenge scholars’ encounter in studying civil military- relations is that, there are no clear boundaries between civilian rule and military rule because the engagement of the army is seen whenever state defence matters come (Al-Hamdi 2014). In addition to that, Huntington (1957) argued that, military interventions have

become indivisible from political modernization no matter which continent and country. Therefore, the study of military intervention in politics (civilian- military relation) in the modern states pays attention to the military's active role in less developed countries in comparison to the role it plays in developed countries. This chapter gives a detailed analysis of the existing literature on the subject civil-military relations. The first section summarizes the existing theories of civil-military relations. The theories focus on explaining the factors and situation for military to intervene in politics. The second section summarizes the civil-military relations in Africa and the third section summarizes the civil military relation in East Africa.

2.1. Institutional Theory

This theory addresses the civil-relations by looking at the internal factors of a country. The theory is subdivided into political structure of the society, the nature of the army and hybrid approach (structure and army).

2.1.1. Political Structure of the Society

Many scholars examine the intervention of military in politics by looking at the political structure of the society. Huntington (1957) and Finer (1962) for example, see the weak political structure as the main reason for military intervention. Huntington argues in every part of the world military men engage in politics to promote their interests even in Western democracies like United State. Huntington pointed out that, the only thing that differentiates the army engagement in underdeveloped countries and developed ones is that, in underdeveloped countries the army is engaged within the distribution of power and status. He concluded that military interventions happened only in less developed countries due to the lack of powerful political institutions to balance and control various groups engagement in politics (Huntington 1957).

In addition to that, Finer (1962) argues that, if there is strong public attachment to the civilian institutions; military interventions in politics will be weak. Even if intervention occurs, it will be in the form of civilian institutions. When the civilian politicians are weak or none exists at all, military intervention will find a way both in manner and in substance to intervene in politics.

2.1.2. Structure (Nature) of the army

This approach views military intervention by focusing on the nature of military institution itself. It looks at the military's "organizational structure, factional struggles, military doctrine, material or corporate interest and individual officer's political interests" (Woo 2007; p.17). Many scholars suggest that, when army is the only most organized institution, it will have political advantage over the other civilian groups in the society (Finer 1962 and Woo 2007; p.17). In addition to that, Huntington emphasizes this by addressing that, apart from politicians, military is the only association, which can control and extend their rule in the society. The other groups in the society like students, labour unions, workers, religious groups can only influence politics, but they cannot seize and control the whole society. The best they can do is to join with armed forces in controlling the state (Georgetown 2014).

Furthermore, Huntington offers a remedy for military intervention. Huntington argues that military professionalism is the only thing, which desists from armed forces from intervening apart from having the advantage of being most organized and possessing weapons. The term military professionalism is a "set making the difference between a conscripted army and regular army and is characterised by professional skills, social responsibility, and corporative loyalty" (Woo 2007; p. 17). According to Huntington (1968) the military professionalism can be determined by the kind of control mechanism civilian leaders adopt against the army organization—either "subjective" or "objective" control. Once civilian leadership adopts an objective control, the military will maintain high level of military professionalism and subordinate themselves to civilian leadership. In this model, the civilian leaderships will manage to control the high-ranking officers of the army and politicise them. This will make the army to be more into to the military related issues. On the other hand, there is a clear dichotomy between civilian leadership and the military in objective control mechanism, which guarantees the autonomy of the army. Huntington (1968) underlines that military professionalism is one of the key factors that forbears the armed forces to intervene in politics, the higher the professionalism lower the intervention of the army in politics and vice versa.

Moreover, Huntington's definition of military professionalism is highly debated among scholars. This made a division of scholars in the study; some consider professionalism as the primary factor that abstains from military intervention, some

take it irrelevant and some considers it increasing the degree of military takeover. Scholars have raised ambiguity on the Huntington's definition of the word professionalism. For Huntington, military professionalism is characterised by professional skills, social responsibility, and corporative loyalty, but in other countries professionalism is determined by the country and the academy, the corps attended (Wiking 1983).

In addition to that, Finer (1962) reviewed the definition raised by Huntington and underlined the points of professional skills which makes the army in their field, social responsibility which makes the army more responsible to defending of the state and dealing with military concerned matters, and corporative loyalty makes the army more loyal to the citizens who are their client. As Huntington concluded that, the highly professional army will be loyal to any group in the society that will be elected and have legitimacy. Finer (1962) argued that, the world has seen highly professional corps intervening in politics good examples are Germany and Japan and Finer went far that it will be illogic to explain the army in such cases as not full professionalism.

Lastly, Wiking (1983) argued that, there is a possibility of the army to go against the civilian government and seize power in Huntington's definition of professionalism. Since the army commander has the power to modernize, organize, train and propose the size of the budget to run military activities. The demand of the army can be truly in the nature of defending the state with its professional, if it happens, the civilian government fails to allot the sufficient needed budget. There is a possibility of the army to go against the civilian government and seize power. Thus, according to Wiking the time of misunderstanding between the army and civilian, the professional corps have suitable environment to intervene in politics.

2.1.3. Hybrid approach

Hybrid approach claims that, military intervention in politics is caused by the results of political structure of the society and the army. Finer (1962) argued that, military intervention in politics happen when the society provides disposition (the mood and motive to intervene) and opportunity to intervene. Disposition only is insufficient for military to intervene until the social environment provide the chances for military to intervene. The military always intervenes in politics whereby, the civilian regime

fails to control the state and the armed forces come as the saviour of the nations. Recent examples can be seen in the removal of Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi of Egypt, Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, in both cases the armed forces intervened after the civilian leaders failed to control the states.

In the cases where the disposition and opportunity come together the armed forces appear to be the best align of the people. Whenever there is only disposition in the state normally, armed forces face obstacles to intervene. The recent example can be seen in Turkey 15th July coup attempt that, “Turkish case proves that even a heavily influential army can be brought back to the barracks, if the civilians have enough legitimacy and popular support to__do so” (Diamint and Mikail 2012). In general, the institutional theory has tried to address the question of why military intervene into politics by viewing the structure of the society, the army itself and by a mixed factor of the structure of the society and the nature of the army. Institutional theory apart from explaining why military intervene into politics it has shortcomings in the following ground. The scholars pursued institutional theory paid much attention in the occurrence and absence of military coups. The theory failed to touch other aspects of civil-military relations such as indirect military influence over politics and decision making process thus according to Woo (2007), it makes institutional theory snap-shot theory that accounts for only part of complex civil-military interactions. In addition to that, institutional theory has paid less attention in exogenous factors for the military intervention in politics. The theory has dealt with endogenous factors like internal structure of society and the army; the good theory would have sought to explain also exogenous factors in causing the military intervention.

2.2. Michel Desch’s

Michel Desch’s theory of civil-military relation suggests that, military intervention in politics is determined by the internal and external factors. Michael Desch’s theory suggests that whenever the external threats are high and internal threats are lower the civilian control will be high and vice versa. Michael Desch supported his theory by examining the United States of America after the cold war era and he concluded that “clearly, the less challenging international threat environment of the post-Cold War period has made the civilian control of the United States (US) to deteriorate” (Nielsen 2005:). For the case of U.S. Desch argued that, even though the civil control

weakened after the cold war (the lower external threats and high internal threats) the U.S, armed forces did neither disobey the civil government nor attempt to overthrow it.

In addition to that, Desch's theory manages to give detailed information on how the external factors and internal factors can pave the way to the military intervention in politics. The theory suggests that the higher the external threats and lower internal threats result to high civilian control and the lower the external threats and high internal threats result to the lower the civilian control (Homan 2003). The dilemma brought by the theory is that there is a possibility of civilians to become authoritative and repressive when the civilian control is high. In addition to that, when the civilian control is lower there is a possibility of the army to be powerful and take control of the government.

In general, theories of civil-military relations, the institutional theory and Desch's theory tend to explain the question why military intervene in politics. Theories came out with different findings; the institutional theory finds out that the causes of military intervention in politics can be seen internal by looking at the structure of the society, the nature of the army and by looking both the structure of the state and the army itself. While Desch's theory suggests that military intervention is a result of both outside factors and inside. Even the both theory offer detailed framework on understanding the civil military relations. The theories fail to explain specific cases because some of them were drawn on the reflections of Western politics and the time they were drawn, other countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America were still colonies.

2.3. Civil-Military Relations in Africa

Many African countries started to gain independence in 1960s. The post-independence Africa was followed by political violence, praetorianism, and coup d'état. At the time more than two third of African countries had experienced varying degrees of military intervention in politics. As Wiking puts "violent attempt to oust civilian governments had been more often than the general elections" (Wiking 1983; p. 9). In addition to that, Forman and Welch added that, "the quickest route to the presidential palace, it was quipped, lay in bullets—not in ballots" (Forman and

Welch 1998; p. 7). That is why most of the earliest studies of civil-military relations in Africa sought on addressing the causes of military interventions.

Since 1980, the world has seen a decrease in the number of military attempt and successful ones. Still some cases are still seen in the world for instance recently military coup attempt in Turkey and in Burundi. The decline of military coup has led scholars to pay less attention to the study of military intervention. In addition, there is a shift of military intervention from direct rule to indirect rule. Lindberg and Clark (2011) argues that once military coup has occurred, the armed forces can re-establish a pattern of military influence in politics either through subsequent electoral victory of the military leader or installed leader for instance in Mauritania, the Central Africa Republic and Togo or successive military interventions against elected governments as in Guinea Bissau.

Moreover, CNN write Kwok in his article men in uniform and in parliament. Kwok (2010) argued that military played a great role in supporting the government and it acts as a tool to crush down all opposition voices and appointing active or retired officers to hold government jobs. Kwok addresses that the army uses its territorial commands organization to ensure the loyalty of regional government. That makes the survival of the president and its regime in the hands of the army. In addition to that, Thomson (2010) has agreed with Huntington that all armed forces participate in political process to a certain degree. Even in well-developed countries like United States and France, military officers involved in politics when it comes to formulating defence policies and budget issues. Despite their involvement in politics Thomson argued that, the differences between the professional soldiers with political ambitions in the West and Africa is that, in the Western democracies before taking power soldiers give up from their military commands. They participate in the electoral process as civilian and abide with all democratic norms. In contrary to their counterparts in Africa who held offices illegally and always uses their military power and violence to gain political power and legitimacy.

Furthermore, many scholars have devoted their work on addressing civil-military relations in Africa. Scholars of this study have demarcated on the question whether the civil-military relations theories provided by scholars like Huntington, Finer and Desch fit to explain African civil-military relations. Scholar like Wiking (1983) has

acknowledged the institutional theory in analysing the reasons for the military interventions in Africa. Wiking addressed the internal factors like social-economic conditions and nature of the army as the main factors for the military interventions in Africa. Wiking went further by acknowledging that military intervene in politics when a society provides it with both disposition and the opportunity to intervene. Furthermore, Ngara, Esebonu and Ayabam (2014) in addressing the emerging resurgence of African military in politics have pointed out that, leadership crisis is a key factor for military intervention in politics. African states soon after independence were trapped by legitimacy crisis culminating in widespread violence and conflicts. In order to face opposition challenges African leaders, become more authoritative and repressive to everyone who was seen as the enemy of the state. Apart from the few, democratic process in many African states was taken by political class as the way to accumulate power. “national constitution was amended at will to extend tenure of leaders in power, human rights abused, opposition excluded, corruption enthroned, economies mismanaged, and elections rigged in favour of approved candidates’ inter-alia” (Ngara, Esebonu and Ayabam 2014; p. 2). Therefore, the political and economic failure of many African states created political crisis in the states, which gave armed forces opportunity to intervene in African politics.

In addition to that, various scholars like N’Diaye (2002), Lupogo (2001 and 2010), Luanda (2005 and 2006), Parson (2007) and Stubbs (2005) in analysing the civil military relations of different African countries have agreed with Huntington on the emphasis of professionalism as one of the main factor that keeping the army away from politics. In contrary to that, various scholars like Auma-Osolo (1980), Emizet (2000) and Omari (2002) have argued that, it is difficult for African civil-military relations to be studied on the bases of Western theories. Auma-Osolo in assessing the civil military relations of Nigeria, he argued that, military professionalism is not satisfactory that prevent the army from politics. In addition to that, Emizet (2000) in analysing Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) under Mobutu’s regime, he refutes Huntington’s professionalism and arguing that politicised army better explains DRC’s civil military relations than Huntington’s professionalism.

In general, the theories of civil military relations offer the general understanding of civil military relations in Africa despite the fact that there some disagreement among scholars. In addition to that, most of the explanations given by scholars tend to

explain direct intervention of military in politics. There are no sufficient studies on indirect role of the army in politics and this is because most of the studies of civil-military relations were written when the army was direct overthrowing civilian government and seizing power. Lastly, apart from some scholars refuting Huntington's emphasis on professionalism, it remains as one of the great factors that keep the army away from politics in many African countries.

2.4. Civil-Military Relations in East Africa

Scholars have written about the civil-military relations in East Africa (EA). The commonality that the scholars have in the study is tracing the civil-military relations of East African countries from the colonial army (Luanda 2005; Lupogo 2001, 2006, 2010; Stubbs 2005; Parson 2007; Otunnu 1987). All EAC armies were under the British King's Africa Rifle (KAR). The KAR was a British multi-battalion regiment, which was originated in Kenya, Uganda, Malawi and Somalia later Tanzania. The battalion was composed of British and African soldiers (Lupogo 2001, Barany 2004). In addition to that, Barany (2004) has acknowledged during the colonial era the civil-military relations were characterised by clear boundaries between the army and the civilian authorities. The army was left with the task of "recruiting, training, discipline, and strategic advice" (Barany 2004; p. 599). The armies were trained to be submissive to civilian authorities and armies were not performing the task beyond their sphere. Moreover, Streets puts an emphasis that, the army being out of politics has been inherited from British army. That "the British army has been, and remain an apolitical institution removed from the concern of civil policy and party" (Streets 1999; p.219).

Moreover, at the time of independence, the KAR was given to the respective East African countries. The colonial 6th and 25th battalions of KAR were given to Tanganyika and the name changed to Tanganyika Rifle. The 4th battalion was given to Uganda under new name of Uganda Rifle. In Kenya the 3rd, 5th and 11th battalions were given to Kenyan new independent government under the new name of Kenya's Rifle (Barany 2004). The civil-military relations in East Africa deteriorated in the early years of independence because of the various reasons. Firstly, the armies of East Africa did not play a role in the struggle for independence (Luanda 2005; Lupogo 2001, 2006). During the struggle of independence, the East African armies were the colonial army and the KAR was used to quell down anti-

colonial resistance (Parson 1999). This makes the leaders of the new independent East African countries not to support the army because they perceived the armies as the colonial armies in the independent states. For instance, in the case of Tanzania, Lupogo (2001) pointed out that, the first President of Tanzania Nyerere, did not like the army, mainly because of its strong colonial tradition. In that, respect Lupogo argued that, at the time the civilian government dominated the power and the army was running its own affairs.

Secondly, the armies of the new independent governments continued to be under the British control and influence. Lupogo (2001, 2005) explains the situations of Tanganyika Rifle that the army continued to be under the command of Brigadier Douglas who was the commander of KAR in Tanganyika and his fellow British officers. In addition to that, the authority from the Ministry of Defence acknowledged that there were no mutual and close relationship between the Chief of Tanganyika Rifle Brigadier Douglas and any of the country's political leaders. Barany (2004) in analysing the armies of East Africa, he marked that “the native soldiers could wonder with good cause if they serve in the army of their own sovereign state or they continue to serve the colonial army” (Barany 2004; p. 602). In general, there were no clear civil-military relations in East Africa in the early years of independence.

Lupogo (2001) says as the civilian government was dominating the politics and the army was ignored. In the January of 1964, the armies of East Africa mutinied. The mutiny started in Tanzania, spread to Uganda up to Kenya. The mutineers in all three countries demanded Africanization of the army and the wage increase. Professors Otunnu emphasises that the situation in East Africa was exacerbated by the rigid command structure, which made it impossible the soldiers to express their grievances directly, speedily, and in a non-violent manner to those in authority. In addition to that, the British soldiers (Colney 2016) quelled the mutiny in all countries.

For the case of Tanzania, president Nyerere wanted to build a new army that will not pose a threat to the nations. Thus, Nyerere disbanded the Tanzania rifle and he ordered the Youth party members to join the army “I request TANU Youth League [TYL] members wherever they are to go to enlist. We shall reconstruct our republic army from TYL members.” (Mazrui and Rothchild 1996; p.88; Launda 2005;

Lupogo 2001, 2010, Thomson, 2010; Stubs 2005). In addition to that “Nyerere was serious and quite emphatic about integrating the military into the ideological machinery of the sole ruling party, TANU/ASP” (Barany 2014; p. 303). In addition to that, countries took different path in dealing with the mutinies.

Furthermore, Kenya’s President Jomo Kenyatta built civil-military relations by disbanding the mutineers from the army and maintain the professionalism of the army (Parson, 1999; Stubs 2005). Because Kenya has large number of ethnicities, among them there are large ethnic groups, which can dominate other minorities. Due to this factor “Kenyan political elite have supported the army's apolitical status because it has not been able to turn the military into a reliably partisan institution” (Parson 2007; p. 60; 70). In addition to that, Parson (2007) argued that, even though leaders of Kenya have been changing the composition of the army to favour their ethnic groups, the professionalism of the army has been maintained throughout, that is why Kenya is one among few African countries, which have not experienced military rule.

Moreover, in Uganda scholars have addressed the presence of centralized clans; with large ethnic groups and the absence of strong political party to unite people have played a great role for the Ugandan leaders to use the army as political tool. The British High Commission in Uganda commented on Obote’s use of the army, that “the armed forces are not only serious liability to the national finances, but also a potential hazard to Obote himself as well as the country as a whole” (Parson 2003; p.199). The use of the army as a political tool made the Ugandan army a very powerful institution in the country that could not hesitate to overthrow any government when the army sees its interests are jeopardised. In addition to that, Forman and Welch (1998) have argued that, countries, which have experienced authoritarian rule and civil wars, encounter difficult challenges in the process of making their military forces political neutral and subject to the types of control necessary for meaningful democracy.

In addition to that, various scholars like Assensoh and Assensoh, 2001 Ottunu 2016, Lupogo 2001, 2010; Stubs 2005, Parson 2005 and Luanda 2005 have acknowledged the mutinies of January 1964 were the cornerstone for the establishment and development of civil-military relations in East Africa. For instance, Professor Otunnu

(1987) stressed that; the mutinies were the crossroads in civil-military relations in East Africa. Moreover, the way in which each government addressed the challenge to its authority was a reflection of the powers of the individual government at that time, but it was also of crucial significance in shaping the future role of the military in East Africa. In addition to that, some scholars have argued that Uganda's failure of handling the mutiny in the January of 1964 brought the army in politics and Kenya and Tanzania have managed to maintain civil rule because of their success in handling the mutinies of 1964 (Otunnu, 1987; Stubs; 2005; Thomson, 2010).

In spite, some scholars have raised disagreement of Huntington's emphasis on military professionalism. Scholars who have disagreed with Huntington's professionalism in explaining some African cases, their analysis was done when many of African countries were under single party rule, that is why they argued politicised army idea was fitting in some countries like Nigeria, Tanzania and DRC. Since 1990's many African countries have embraced democratic multipartism and the only professionalism can keep the army neutral from the competing political parties. To sum up the literature review chapter has provided general picture of existing civil-military relations. Even though the theories of civil-military relations provided, some scholars argued to be Western oriented and not fitting African cases. I argued yes, the whole theories may not fit in explaining every case but the theories provide guidance in understanding why Kenya and Tanzania have managed peaceful governmental change but Uganda has failed. In addition to that, it brings to the argument of this thesis by showing how the military plays a crucial role in keeping presidents in power in Uganda hence the failure of peaceful government change.

CHAPTER III

PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD AND EARLY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE

The East African countries, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda were former British colonies and inheritors of King's African Rifle. They gained their independence in 1960's; Tanganyika (Tanzania) in 1961 followed by Uganda in 1962 and Kenya in 1963. Since they become independent, Kenya and Tanzania have experienced peaceful change of government via elections, with Tanzania five times and Kenya four times. Even though, both Kenya and Tanzania have managed peacefully government transitions, Kenya has gone further by ending ties with the old revolution party, which fought for independence, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). In Tanzania, the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM/ Revolutionary party) has been in power since its inception in 1977 and all five presidents have come from the same ruling party.

In contrary, to peaceful transitions in Kenya and Tanzania, Uganda has experienced eight government changes since independence; none of those came via elections. An important political act in Ugandan politics has been Yoweri Kaguta Museveni and His National Resistance Movement (NRM). Museveni seized power in 1986. He and the NRM were viewed as the saviours of Uganda because, the leaders before him, Milton Obote and Idd Amin were characterised by brutal and personal rule. Museveni brought political stability, peace and economic growth. In his early years of power, he received credit across the global including "as one of the new leaders of Africa" (Barkan 2011; p.6). In addition to that, the president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, for example claimed that "President Museveni has been at the head of a country faced with the task of ending years of conflict and instability and replacing

them with peace, freedom, and development (Museveni 2000; p. XIV). However, since 1986 Museveni has been holding power as the president of Uganda marking his 31 years in office, while in the same period Kenya has experienced three regime changes and Tanzania has experienced four.

In that respect, this thesis addresses the question why Kenya and Tanzania have managed peaceful governmental change but Uganda has failed? I argue that the Ugandan army has been playing a crucial role in keeping presidents in power. In addition to that, understanding the political circumstances in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, there is a need to trace back to the roots of the East African countries, which can be divided into four periods. The first period is pre-colonial and colonial period, from the last quarter of 19th century to 1960s. Second period is the early years of independence, mutinies and its aftermath from 1960s to 1990s. The last phase is the years of democracy and multi-party system from 1990s to present.

3.1. Armies and Pre-Colonial East Africa

Understanding the roots of contemporary East African armies, politics and tradition may trace back to colonial era, notably the last quarter of eighteenth centuries. The nature of the societies in East Africa marked the nature, functions and organization of armies in pre-colonial East Africa. Two types of societies existed in Africa in general in this period, the centralized societies and decentralized societies (stateless states). In addition to that, “in both centralized and decentralized societies, the clan was the main unit or "cell" of social organization” (Kasozi 1994; p17). The centralized clans were highly organized politically, socially, and economically. The organized political authority held by a chief or a king. The chief would be responsible for providing security and stability that made military services mandatory to the members of the society. Tradition local tools like spears and arrows equipped the armies. Later, the Arab merchants brought guns to East Africa, which began to replace the local spears as weapons of warfare (Otunnu 1987; Peers 2005). Examples of centralized states in East Africa included Banyankole, Buganda, Bunyoro, and Toro, which are found in today’s Uganda.

In contrary to the centralized clans, the political authority in decentralized societies was not centred in the chief or king, rather based on lineage or age system (Kasozi 1994). The decentralized societies were divided into small clans. Each clan had a

leader who was responsible for the safety of his subject. The lack of a single and acceptable political authority in decentralized societies made it impossible to raise large armies. However, this does not mean that the armed troops had a small role in the clans. For example, the pastoralist societies like Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania, Karamajong and Iteso of Uganda raised armies for capturing and protecting cattle. In general, the pre-colonial armies of East Africa increased internal stability (law and order) and protected the society from external invaders (Peers 2005). In addition, the military was used by and against migrants. Drought, diseases, search for green pastures and water were important driving forces for migration. However, migrants encountered resistance from other societies on their migration routes. Both sides raised armies to defend themselves from aggression. More over the centralized societies with larger armies used military power to expand their states, whereas decentralized societies used their armies for defence purposes.

3.2. Colonisation and the Birth of East African Army (The King's African Rifle)

The partition of Africa in the last quarter of 19th century gave European powers new areas of influence. Kenya and Uganda came under British influence, while Tanganyika (currently known Tanzania) came under the Germany's influence. The new colonial powers demanded military troops to maintain internal law and order and to protect the region from other European rivals. For those purposes, Britain and Germany recruited indigenous Africans to build local armies.

Britain established the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) in the West Africa and King's African Rifle (KAR) in East Africa. The King's African Rifle (KAR) was a British multi-battalion regiment, which was originated in Kenya, Uganda, Malawi and Somalia (Lupogo 2001; Barany 2004). The East Africa British Chartered Imperial company established the KAR dated back to the early years of British conquest, the army. It was established to take care of local operations of the East Africa British company, to protect trades and maintain law and order. On the other hand, Germany established the protection force Schutztruppe in Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania. Like the KAR, Germany companies to protect their interest in the region and to crush down local revolts established Schutztruppe. Furthermore, both German and British companies collapsed after having financial problems. The governments of Britain and Germany took control of the army's operations. This changed the role of the army from protecting the interest of the Imperial companies

to protecting the interests of the Germany and British governments in East Africa (Thomson, 2010). In addition to that, Tanganyika (Tanzania) forces continued to be a part of German East African forces until the end of the First World War. The end of the First World War made Germany to lose its colonies to other imperial powers, Tanganyika was taken under British protectorate, and Burundi and Rwanda were taken to Belgium protectorate (Peers 2005; *ibid*, 2010). The attachment of Tanzania to the Great Britain protectorate made Tanzania forces to be added to KAR.

Furthermore, the recruitment was one of the crucial pillars of British military system. Britain used martial race system to recruit people in the army in its colonies. Because some “tribes, religious, caste or social groups with masculinity in character and loyalty were seen fitting more for military service” (Liebau 2017; p.1, Barany 2004; Parson 1999). The “martial race” system was developed in India, after the 1850 Indian army revolted against Britain. After the revolt, British commanders started to recruit from ethnic groups that will not pose a threat to their authority in India, for example, the “Sikhs, the Gurkhas of Nepal, and members of the Ksatriya (warrior) castes were better suited for military service than others were” (Barany 2004; p.599). Thus, martial race was modified to be the criteria for recruitment not only for Britain but also to other imperial European countries. For instance, France used this method in recruiting colonial army in West Africa. The French commanders argued that Tukolo, Malinke, Wolof and Bambara were suitable for the army in West Africa (Parson 1999).

In East Africa, Kenyan battalions were composed of Kamba, Kalenjin and Samburu. “The Kamba ethnic in particular had been regarded by the British as a martial race” (Stubbs 2015; p.71). The same was true for Acholi and Langi in Uganda. “Especially the Acholis were deemed as the military aristocracy of Uganda by colonial officials” (Assensoh and Assensoh 2001; p.152). In Tanzania, recruits came from Yao, Hehe and Kuria ethnics groups. In all three countries, other ethnicities were considered as not martial race and they were not recruited in the army. The martial race policy made the KAR to be dominated by few ethnic lines.

Moreover, Tanzanian case was different because of lack of large ethnic groups. In the region, Tanzania has the largest ethnic composition of more than 126 ethnic groups. Apart from that, there are no large ethnic groups, which are large enough to

dominate other groups like in Kenya and Uganda, where Kikuyu and Baganda composed 20 percent and 16.9 percent of the population respectively. "Thus when the 6th Battalion of the King's African Rifles was raised by British administrators at the end of World War I, soldiers were recruited from widely dispersed ethnicities across the country and no ethnicity held dominance" (Barrany, 2004; p.599; Oudraog, 2014; p.17; Zirker 2015).

Furthermore, the "martial races" policy appealed to the small, medium and rural residing ethnicities, ending up in the recruitment of Kamba, Kalenjin, Samburu in Kenya and ignored the Kikuyu and Luo which were the largest ethnicities residing in urban Kenya (Parson, 1999). In Uganda Britain recruited mostly from the north of Uganda where the small and medium tribes reside. Britain did not recruit people from the southern Uganda where the big societies and Kingdoms like Buganda, Bunyoro, Banyankore and Toro existed. The martial race ended dividing Uganda into two blocks of southerner and northerners (Ottunnu1987).

In addition to that Parson (1999) argues that, the recruitment of Africans to KAR in East Africa was appealing to the societies in which economy was about to extinct or reconstructed by the colonial rule. This left those societies like Kamba, Kalenjin, Acholi, Hehe and Yao with no option than to be recruited in the army. Because "military services offered notable social and economic benefits that many African soldiers were attracted to it as a sufficient payment for hardship and loss of self-freedom that attached to military discipline" (Parson 1999; p.674). Societies, which had alternatives, that their economies were not affected by colonial rule resisted from being recruited to the army. For instance, Maasai people are considered to be one of the most powerful warriors in East Africa who could make strong soldiers but they refused to be recruited in the army because they kept a very large portion of land which allowed doing their pastoralists activities (Parson 1999). The same applicable Kikuyu and Baganda the largest ethnics in Kenya and Uganda were not a part of the martial race because they enjoyed other economic privileges from the colonial rule.

Moreover, the KAR was composed of British soldiers and African soldiers, the upper ranking officers were the British soldiers, few Africans occupied lower position in the army and majority of African were normal (private) soldiers. This means that all the commands in the army came from British officials. "African soldiers had no

access to military secrets, plans or policy, they were told what to do and how to do it” (Lupogo 2010; p.77). Moreover, the advancement of African soldiers in the KAR was not an easy task, even though someone had all criteria for promotion. In theory, it was estimated that it would take in total 18 years for an African soldier private soldier to become a sergeant in the colonial army; “two years to become lance corporal, six years to become corporal, and 10 years to reach sergeant, but in practice very few Africans were promoted to the high ranking positions” (Luanda 2005; p.297). After the Second World War, two things started to change in the army. African soldiers started being promoted but only to a Non-commissioned officer (NCO) and warrant officer platoon commanders (WOPCs). Apart from being promoted to NCO and WOPC, African soldiers were not trusted to act on their own, still they had no fully command in their positions. “The African WOP commander would, however, take charge when it came to such arduous tasks as foot slogging. However, the African WOPC would have to report to the British subaltern for orders regarding every administrative, tactical or logistical decision” (Luanda 2005; p. 28).

The KAR involved in various missions under British rule, the first task KAR had to maintain internal peace and order. In East Africa, it played a crucial role in handling the sporadic rioting, civil unrest, non-cooperation and resistance from various indigenous movements in the region for instance Mau-Mau emergence in Kenya. In addition to that, “between the two world wars the colonial armies in Africa were little more than a loosely organized and military-based gendarmerie” (Barany 2004; p.599). It is estimated that, half a million African soldiers fought in the Second World War, Tanzania’s colonial army first served in East Africa against the Italians in Abyssinia (current Ethiopia) and then against the Japanese in India and Burma. In their East African campaign Britain used over 50,000 troops of African soldiers between the periods of 1914 to 1988 (Nation Army Museum: 08).

Moreover, another crucial pillar of British colonial armies was the separation of armies from politics. This has been inherited from British army that “the British army has been, and remain an apolitical institution removed from the concern of civil policy and party” (Streets 1999; p.219). There were clear boundaries between the army and the civilian authorities. The army was left with the task of “recruiting, training, discipline, and strategic advice” (Barany 2004; p.599). The colonial army was working within their status and qualification.

Generally, both the army of pre-colonial and colonial East Africa did not fall in the category of modern states armies, because the modern states armies are armies of a respective country. The armies existed during this time were either tribe army during pre-colonial and colonial army which comprised battalions of many colonial states. In addition to that, the role of the modern armies is subjected to the defence of the nation against the external aggressions but the pre-colonial and colonial armies were subjected to maintain peace and stability inside and outside. Lastly, there were no political institutions like the one existing in independent states. Apart from all that, the pre-colonial and colonial phase has helped in understating the establishment and factors determined the armies in East Africa.

In addition to that, though the colonial army was not a modern single state army, the colonial army was one of the professional army in the world. As Huntington (1957) argued that military professionalism is the only thing, which refrain armed forces from intervening apart from having the advantage of being most organized and possessing weapons. Even though scholars like Finer (1962) had criticized Huntington's professionalism that is not the key factor that can restrain military from intervening into politics because in the world history some highly professional soldiers have intervened into politics. Apart from Finer's critic, Huntington's professionalism remains the only factor, which can best explain the pre-colonial and colonial era.

Moreover, Michel Desch argued that, military intervention in politics is determined by the internal and external factors whereby when the external threats are high and internal threats are lower the civilian control will be high and when the external threats are lower and internal threats are high the civilian control will be lower. Even though British faced threats from other colonies in East Africa in both cases of high and low internal and external cases the King's African Rifle remained non-interventionist in politics during colonial era. In that case, Michel Desch's theory has provided the understanding that intervention can be caused by both internal and external factors but the theory failed to explain the colonial era.

To sum up, pre-colonial East Africa was characterized by centralized and decentralized societies and all the centralized societies existed in today's Uganda. In addition to that, the nature of the armies in pre-colonial East Africa was determined

by the nature of the society whereby big and strong armies existed in centralized states and small armies in decentralized states. Moreover, the pre-colonial East African armies do not fall in the category of modern armies because the modern armies are state armies, and at that time, East Africa had no unified states the armies. Even though pre-colonial phase cannot be analysed based on modern civil-military relations, it gives a general background that armies had existed in East Africa and which factors had determined them. Moreover, apart from British recruitment based on ethnic prejudice and segregation British managed to establish Western civil-military relation in region. The KAR was apolitical (professional) army, a policy that was inherited from the British outstanding army. The KAR continued to be under British colonial rule until the years of independence. The 1960s were the years of independence of many African countries, even though the struggle for independence started earlier than that. East African countries were among the early countries to get independence. As in the colonial process East African, countries did not have an army of their own, then how can these countries stand without outstanding armies to protect the territorial integrity of these countries. What will be the position of the King's African rifle, then how will the martial race policy fit in the new independent states, what challenges will it bring to these highly diversity newly independent states and will the British civil-military relations be maintained after independence? The following chapter addresses the years of independence, the mutinies and its aftermath.

CHAPTER IV

INDEPENDENCE, MUTINIES AND ITS AFTERMATH 1960s TO 1990.

The struggle for independence in Africa started early but 1960s was the climax of it. Ghana was the first African country to gain its independence in 1957 from Britain. East African countries were among the earlier countries to gain independence in 1960s. Tanzania was the first country to obtain independence in December 9th of 1961 under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, followed by Uganda in October of 1962 under the leadership of King Edward Mutesa and the last was Kenya in December 1963 under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta. In addition to that, all East African countries got independence from the same colonial master Great Britain.

Moreover, during the independence, the King's African Rifle, which was the colonial army, consisted of battalions from Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda were dissolved and given to East African countries (Luanda, 2005, 2006; Lupogo 2001, 2010). Thus, the colonial 6th and 25th battalions of KAR were given to Tanganyika and the name changed to Tanganyika rifle. In Uganda, the 4th battalion was given to the new government and the name changed to Uganda rifle. In Kenya the 3rd, 5th and 11th battalions were given to Kenyan new independent government under the new name of Kenya's rifle (Parson 2007).

Furthermore, the armies in most African countries did not play any crucial role in the process of obtaining independence (Lupogo, 2001; Stubbs 2015). Because during the struggle for independence the newly independent African armies were colonial, armies and they were used to crush down the freedom movement. In addition to that, the independent nations did not have the budget to support the army or external

threats to need an army to protect it from them (Parson, 2003; Luanda, 2005). These reasons made the many African armies not to feature in the plans of the leaders. Furthermore, some African leaders went far by not seeing the importance of having an army in their states. For instance, the president of Togo Sylvanus Olimpio commented that "we cannot be an independent nation with an army of some sort" (Bell 1965; p. 3). In contrary to that, the first president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere commented that "you cannot do without an army in these times, but it is clear that implicit, and sometimes explicit, consideration of national prestige enters in as well" (*ibid* 1963; p.3)

Moreover, at this early stage of independence the civil-military relations were not at great important to be given attention by political leaders. Leaders thought that, they were obliged to unite fragmented African tribes under one nation, building the economy and social life of people like dealing with poverty, providing necessary services like health and education (Parson, 2007). In addition to that, apart from the colonial army was given to the new independent country, the armies were still under British authority and the British soldiers occupied high number of officers in the army. "The native soldiers could wonder with good cause if they serve in the army of their own sovereign state or they continue to serve the colonial army" (Barany 2004; p. 602). In addition, even though the army was serving their sovereign states, the wage structure was still colonial wage structure. The soldiers had wanted to see the British gone after the independence and they are promoted to replace them. In addition to that, at the early years of independence "the situation was worsened by the rigid command structure which made it extremely difficult for the soldier to express their grievances directly, speedily and in a non-violent manner to those in authority" (Otunnu 2006: p. 225). That made the soldiers of East African armies to mutiny in 1964, demanding the Africanization of the army (replacing British soldiers) and wage increase (Parson 2003; 2007, Otunnu, 1987; Otunnu, 2016; Lupogo, 2001; Stubs 2015). This chapter will examine the independence, the mutinies and its aftermath from 1960s to 1990s, as briefly elaborated below;

4.1. East Africa Mutiny

The January of 1964 was a tense month for East African countries, the newly independent African countries experienced revolt from their soldiers. It was just three years after independence in Tanzania, two years in Uganda and two months for the newly African government in Kenya. It all started in Zanzibar (Unguja and Pemba Islands). On 12 January 1964, the majority Africans under the leadership of John Okello had overthrown the Arab Sultanate. Zanzibar was a British protectorate found few miles away from the cost of Tanganyika and Kenya. She got independence in 1963 from Great Britain. When British left in 1963, the power was passed to the minority Arab sultanate that had colonized Zanzibar before the coming of Britain in the region. On 12 January the majority black Africans overthrew Arabs on which is known as Zanzibar revolution which ended the Arab Sultanate in Zanzibar.

Zanzibar revolution inspired the East African soldiers to revolt against their governments, which had ignored to listen to them. The revolt started in Tanganyika (Tanzania) speeded to Uganda and ended in Kenya. It all started in the night of 19 January at Corito (Currently Lugalo) barracks in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, spread to Kalewa barracks in Urambo Tabora to Nachingwea a new barrack (Lupogo, 2001, Parson 2003; 2007; Global Army Security Tanzania 2000). The armies of Tanganyika rifle revolted seeking an audience with the President to explain their grievances. The soldiers went out with guns and holding countries strategic positions. The mutineers while seizing the Capital of Dar es Salaam ended up in “rioting, looting and killing 20 people and at least 100 others were injured” (Conley Jan 26 1964). In addition to that, the mutineers headed to the state to see the president Nyerere and his deputy whereby they could not be found. The minister of security at the time Oscar Kambona agreed to meet with the mutineers and negotiate with mutineers in their barracks and the government promised to solve their problem (Parson, 2003).

As it was in Tanzania, the Uganda rifle soldier has mutinied to push their government to meet with them. The revolt started at the Jinja barracks in Kampala, the Ugandan soldiers took similar path to that taken by Tanzania soldiers. The soldiers went out and seized the capital Kampala, holding hostages the British soldiers and the British high commissioner. Furthermore, in Kenya, at the Lanet

barrack (11th Barrack) nearly 500 soldiers revolted against their British superiors with the demand of meeting with the president Jomo Kenyatta to explain their grievance (Parson, 2003; 2007). Their fellows of Tanzania and Uganda who had mutinied inspired the Kenyan soldiers and the government agreed to negotiate with them. Kenya soldiers saw the actions of their fellows as an opportunity to express their troubles to their government. The Kenyan mutineers received different response from their fellows in Tanzania and Uganda had received. The Kenyan President Kenyatta refused to negotiate with the mutineers, he condemned the act as “a “grave betrayal” of Kenya's African leaders and the people” (Conley Jan 26 1964). Kenyatta said if soldiers were loyal to the colonial British, they should be more loyal to the independent African government (Parson, 2003).

Furthermore, the British armies ended the mutinies in all three countries. The East African leaders, Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere and Milton Obote sought help from the British army to end up the revolt. British commands troops were deployed in all the three countries and within a short period, African soldiers were surrounded and forced to surrender (Parson 2007). Apart from East African soldiers had mutinied in 1964, their intention was not to seize power and take control of the government, the soldiers wanted only to be heard and their problems to be solved by civilian leaders because the armies were abandoned by that time (Lupogo, 2001; 2006). In addition to that, apart from East African mutineers were easily quelled by British troops. The mutiny incidence awakens the East African leaders that an army can pose great problems if serious measures are not taken. Reminded that at the time in West Africa, the army under the leadership of Eyadema had already overthrown Sylvanus Olympio in Togo and Congo Kinshasa (DRC) East Africa border sharing neighbour the military under Mobutu Seseko had already overthrown Patrice Lumumba. In addition to that, seeking help from British troops to topple down mutineers were perceived as a shame to new government, that the East African countries were not ready for independence. Just within a short period, the political leaders have failed to keep stability and failed to solve their internal affairs (Parson, 2003).

Moreover, the mutinies had made civil-military relation to paid much attention. As the President of Tanzania addressed, “Tanganyika has to reorganise and rebuild its army. We cannot afford a large or elaborate military establishment nor does our foreign policy require one. But our army must be efficient.” (Luanda 2005; p.301). In

addition to that, Nyerere on a radio broadcast said “no popular government can tolerate an army that disobeys its instructions; an army that does not obey laws and orders of the people's Government is not an army of that country” (Colney, 1964; p.1). Hence, East African countries did not have external threats (Foreign policy) to need an army, the construction of the East African armies deeply depended on the internal factors of the three countries. So before addressing the measures and ways taken by East African leaders to deal with the mutiny and the construction of the new and modern army it is better to understand the political situation the countries were in after independence and the measures deployed by each country to create civil-military relations as briefly elaborated below.

4.2. Tanzania

Tanganyika got independence on 9th December 1961 under the leadership of Julius Nyerere and his revolutionary party Tanganyika African Nation Union (TANU). After independence, Julius Nyerere served as the first Prime Minister until 1962 when he became the first President of Tanganyika. In 1964 after Zanzibar revolution and Tanganyika mutiny, the two countries merge to form a United Republic of Tanzania. The union did merge only the two countries, but also the two parties Tanganyika African Nation Union (TANU) and Afro Shiraz party (ASP) of Zanzibar merged (1977 Changed to Chama Cha Mapinduzi [CCM]/ Revolutionary party). Moreover, Tanzania is a biggest country in East Africa, with large diversity societies. Tanzania has 126 ethnic groups each possess different culture and language but one language known's Swahili (Lupogo, 2001) unite all ethnic groups. At the years of independence, African leaders had a task of uniting these ethnic groups to a single one nation. British divide and rule system left a legacy in the region; the British system was favouring some minorities and ignoring others. This made the favoured ones to see themselves more superior than others because they had access to education and other colonial privileges. These reasons made most of African leaders to favour one party system. They claimed multi-party system would have exacerbated these ethnic differences.

In addition to that, Tanzania's revolutionary party TANU, the party that struggled for independence had already been very strong, spread national wide and Nyerere had full control of the party and the country (Parson, 2007). The party was another factor, which brought Tanzanian's ethnic groups together. By 1964, only the army

was not integrated in the society. Another thing that helped Tanzania was that apart from British martial race system favoured tribes like Hehe, Yao and Kuria, Tanganyika rifle soldiers were recruited from widely dispersed ethnicities across the country (Barany, 2004; Ouédraog, 2014). Furthermore, even though socialism was a political ideology Tanzania was a non-alignment country throughout the cold war. After the mutiny in 1964 Tanzania's president Nyerere wanted to build a people's army; an army that will not pose a threat to the nation and that will not be a ballot box of a country (Lupogo 2001; 2006). Thus after the mutiny Nyerere disbanded the Tanzania rifle and replaced it with his party members. As he was quoted, "I request TANU Youth League [TYL] members wherever they are to go to enlist. We shall reconstruct our Republic's army from TYL members." (Mazrui and Rothchild, 1996; p.88). Nyerere had a strong party (TANU) and following the socialist ideology countries like China the army was embedded within the party. "Nyerere was serious and quite emphatic about integrating the military into the ideological machinery of the sole ruling party, TANU/ASP" (Barany 2014; p. 303). In addition, Nyerere wanted to build the army from the scratch with full members of his party. This would make sure the loyalty of the army as long as he had the power over the party (Lupogo2001). Nyerere wanted the soldiers to understand the politics of their country. To politicize the army, Nyerere merged the soldiers training with politics. In army's academy, the soldiers were trained to be soldiers and receiving political classes at the same. The idea of a political army buried with a new premise that urged soldiers and police officers to become party members and to participate actively in political affairs (Global Security Tanzania). Moreover, the army was included in the country's building program. For instance, army played crucial role in various programs in the country for instance in the establishment of village hood in Tanzania, the army played a role of placing people in the new village (Thomson, 2010).

Moreover, Nyerere introduced national service in Tanzania that acted as the main entrance to other professionals. It was compulsory for the youth and civil servants to serve in the army first before holding other post in the society. Nyerere wanted soldiers and civilians to be integrated to form mutual relations. Nyerere wanted to remove the colonial army legacy that soldiers are more superior to African civilians. That notion made the army to be feared by civilians hence the isolation of the army.

But keeping the soldiers and the civilians would make understand each other and form good relation.

During Nyerere's time, the army was allowed to actively participate in politics. Army was given the civil rights like other civilians, which the colonial army had highly restricted. Tanzanian soldiers were allowed to elect in elections and be elected. In addition, they were allowed to participate in political rallies in uniform (Luanda 2005 2006). In addition to that, Tanzania soldiers enjoyed holding posts in the government because they were also the members of the ruling party. Nyerere had introduced hats system (*Kofia mbili*) in the army; the system whereby the army commander is also a leader of political party. Even though Nyerere feared, *Kofia mbili* system would put in danger the discipline in the army because army is characterized by command and orders but politics is characterized by argumentations (Luanda, 2005). In maintaining the discipline in the army, Nyerere addressed the army commanders; "you do give orders and argumentation is restricted. We want a professional army. Military commanders should be professionalised to the highest possible standards (*ibid* 2005; p. 304).

Furthermore, apart from Tanzania followed socialism ideology, even the formation of the army and the party is a socialist policy Nyerere maintained ideology neutrality in the army. During the cold war, Nyerere did not allow the army to be influenced by neither socialism nor capitalism. He tried to maintain neutrality in the army so as not to divide the army based on ideologies. Nyerere had accepted to deal with deal with socialist countries (Russia) and capitalist countries (USA). Tanzania People Defence Force (TPDF) had military relations with Russia and USA and it was accepting military aid from both camps. This helped the TPDF to stay united and loyal to Nyerere's government and party TANU (Lupogo 2005, 2010).

Another factor, which helped Tanzania to build civil military relations, was the presence of foreign policy. Immediately after independence, no East African countries had foreign policy, which was one among the reasons for East Africa mutiny in 1964. By 1970's one of the main foreign policy of Tanzania was to participate in the struggle for independence of Southern African countries. By 1970s, many African countries had achieved independence and few had remained under colonial rule. The remained countries had established war of liberation against their

colonial masters. Tanzania was a centre for the Southern Africa Liberation Movement. It offered material and moral support, hosted troops and parties of the freedom fighters. The African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) of South Africa, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia (Chachage and Cassam 2010; South African History Online, 2016). All these countries freedom fighter's troops were camping in Tanzania. Their presence helped the TPDF to concentrate on military staffs because the troops were trained and practised with the Tanzanian army. Moreover, Tanzania went to war with Uganda in 1978 resulting Idd Amin of Uganda annexing a Tanzania region (Kagera) which is close to Tanzania-Uganda border. The war ended with victory for TPDF, which was the first victory Tanzania army, had achieved in defending its border.

Nyerere after staying in power for 24 years retired (ng'atuka) from his presidential post in the end of 1985. Ali H. Mwinyi who was the leader of Zanzibar succeeded him. Nyerere had created a personalized army from his party, the coming of another president was not a problem to the president and army because the new president took control of the party were the Tanzanian army was derived from. Even though the politicisation of the military that happened in Tanzania corroded the professionalism of the military, and especially its corporations, discipline and leadership deteriorated (Luanda 2006, p. 20). The TPDF remained loyal to Nyerere himself and his predecessors (Lupogo, 2003; 2006, Luanda, 2005, Parson, 2007).

4.3. Kenya

Kenya was the last country in East Africa to gain its independence in 1963 under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta who served also as a prime minister first before becoming the first President of Kenya under his party Kenya African Democratic Union (KANU). Kenya has a vast more than 70 ethnic groups with different languages and culture. The difference is that Kenya has large ethnic groups which have been struggling for power. The ethnic groups, which have the large population in Kenya, are Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba and Kalenjin (Mukwedeya, 2016, World Atlas 2016). During the struggle for independence leaders from ethnic groups united to strike against the British but after independence ethnicities turned into competing

factions struggling for control over the material rewards of state power (Parson, 2007). Kikuyu and Luo dominated the post-independence politics of Kenya. Other minorities merged together to form a party under the name of Kenyan Africa Democratic Union (KADU) to counteract the Kikuyu-Luo dominance (*ibid* 2007)

In the army Kamba, Kalenjin and Samburu composed the largest part of the army because during the British colonial rule they were martial race ethnic groups. “The Kamba ethnic in particular had been regarded by the British as a martial race” (Stubbs 2015; p. 71), making Kamba people the largest composition in the army. This posed a dilemma in the early years of independence the Kikuyu and Luo the largest tribes holding the government post and political sphere and the other large ethnic groups of Kamba and Kalenjin holding the command power in the army. “Many Kikuyu openly referred to the Kenya rifle as the ‘ KADU’ army (Parson 2007; p. 60).

Moreover, the first task after the independence to Jomo Kenyatta was the national building by uniting fragmented ethnic groups struggling for power. Jomo Kenyatta wanted first to have full control of the country by forming a central government which represented all groups in the society. This could not be successful in the existence of more than one party in the country; Kenyatta dissolved KADU and merged it with KANU (Parson, 2007 and Jonyo 2003). Therefore, Kenya had one de facto party KANU as it was in Tanzania TANU. In Tanzania, Nyerere had just resolved the Tanzania rifle and replaced it with his party youth members because Nyerere had controlled the party and Tanganyika rifle was country wise recruited that make an absence of dominant ethnic groups in the army. Even though both Kenyatta and Nyerere had strong parties, the Kenya rifle was affected much by British martial race that Kamba and Kikuyu dominating the army. This made Kenyatta not to follow Nyerere’s path of recruiting party members in the army.

That first measure Kenyatta did was to discard the mutineers from the army, as it was the case in Tanzania. Kenyatta condemned the mutineers for betraying their country. Kenyatta questioned the army if soldiers had served colonial army with loyalty and respect, why have they failed to show the same to their motherland. Kenyatta promised the soldiers to be dealt firmly (Parson, 2003). The mutineers were trialled to the martial court. Kenyatta wanted to set an example to the soldiers that, what the

mutineers have done cannot be tolerated so that the incidence never reappears in the future.

Second, measure was Kenyaization of the army. Kenyaization meant countrywide recruiting in the army to replace the discarded mutineers. Also recruiting soldiers that will reflect all ethnic groups in the country, so that to remove the all tradition of British martial race. Two ethnic groups of Kamba and Kalenjin dominated the Kenyan army. The “Kamba and Kalenjin each comprised approximately one-third of the forces, with the remainder including a wide spectrum of Kenya's other ethnic groups” (Parson 1999; p. 1). Kenyatta understood the danger posed by the domination of the Kamba and Kalenjin in the army. Instead of Kenyaization of the army, Kenyatta practised Kikuyuization of the army. Kenyatta started to recruit soldiers from his ethnic tribes to counterbalance the number of Kamba and Kalenjin in the army. The Kikuyu who were not in the army at all since colonial era few years after the mutiny they were many as Kamba and Kalenjin in the army and they were doubled in the army in 1970’s after the British soldiers had left the Kenyan army (Parson 2003; 2007)

Third was the establishment of special security force under the name of General Service unity (GSU). The GSU originally was a paramilitary army of the colonial police; Kenyatta re-established it and granted it with modern weapons. The GSU was a separate and independent force from the army and the police. Kenyatta wanted to counterbalance the Kenyan army. GSU was established to make the Kenyan army not only the armed force in the country. Moreover, General Security Unity “recruited many Kikuyu’s from President Kenyatta’s area of birth” (Assensoh and Assensoh 2001; p. 100). The Unity was full of Kikuyu to the extent it was nicknamed as Kikuyu’s army. In addition to that, Kenyatta established GSU to balance the number of Kamba and Kalenjin in the army.

Furthermore, General Service unity was the unity for political actions. Kenyatta knew using the army for political gains is bringing the army into politics; the nature of the Kenyan army did not allow the army to be used as a political tool because of its complicated ethnic composition. Kenyatta understood using such kind of an army to crush down his opponents would result to the divisions in the army. However, using GSU with full of Kikuyu won’t bring division in the unity. In addition to that,

he knew his tribe men Kikuyu holding marginal number in the army apart from majority of officer corps are from his tribe. Another reason for the creation and reliance of GSU for political mission was that GSU could never take control and seize power by its own (Parson, 2007).

Another factor that played a crucial role in the construction of civil military relation in Kenya was the external threat. The time followed after independence East African countries did not have external threats (foreign policy) which made them to disregard the army and its services by the time after the mutiny Kenya had a threat from Somali. An area in the Northern part of Kenya full occupied by Kenyan Somali's origin wanted to secede from Kenya and join Somalia. The army had put all its effort in taking down the Somali secessionist movement in the Northern Kenya, which the army was very successful. The succession helps build professional norms of military conduct beyond the somewhat facile reasoning that struggled to maintain such conduct as a virtue in and of itself (Kenya Profile: 72).

Apart from all ethnic manipulation and Kikuyuization in the army, Kenyatta had never trusted the army. It is not only Kenyatta but also the Kenyan elites saw the army as a political advantage; they did not allow seeing any group approaching the army for its political gain. Even though for a leader to be secured from coups needs to keep his tribe men close to him. In addition to that “the Kenyan political elite have supported the army's apolitical status because it has not been able to turn the military into a reliably partisan institution” (Parson 2007; p. 60; 70). That is why Kenyatta preferred the army to stay away from politics contrary to Nyerere who politicized the army, and Obote, who used it as a political tool. Kenyatta preferred to use General Service unity and policy forces because he knew that those forces could not seize power on their own like the army.

Jomo Kenyatta served as the president of Kenya until in 1978 and died in the office in that year. Kenyatta apart from favouring his tribe men in the army he left an apolitical army in Kenya. After his death, the factions among the Kikuyu were struggling for power of who will replace Kenyatta. To solve the problem between the Kikuyu's factions someone out of Kikuyu ethnic group had to step in and that was Kenyatta's vice president Daniel Arap Moi, a Kalenjin. Moi had the support of prominent leaders in Kenya like Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu who served as Moi's vice

president (Parson, 2007). Moi came to power and found that the composition in the army has changed drastically. His tribe men the Kalenjins who had dominated the army during the British colonial rule and after independence have lost their dominance because of Kikuyuization of the army done by his predecessor Kenyatta. Despite the fact that the Kalenjin holding large number as in the general army the high in the ranking posts Kalenjins were lagging behind, the composition had shifted in favour of Kikuyu and Kamba. Moi saw this as the threat to be surrounded by men coming from other tribes. Moi wanted to have people in the army who will defend him in the difficult times.

Moi introduced Kalenjization in the army, as it was Kikuyuization for his predecessor. He started elevating and recruiting the Kikuyu in the army (Parson 2007). The elimination of Kikuyu in the army threatened other ethnic groups in the army. It was not that long in 1982, the army plotted a coup to remove Moi from power but the coup was not successful one. After the failed coup Moi cleansed Kikuyu from the Air force and replaced them with the people, he could trust (Wanyande, 2003). Moreover, in the General Security Moi followed the footsteps of his predecessor Kenyatta. Moi purged the Kikuyu's and replaced them with his tribe mates Kalenjin. In Moi's reign, the GSU served the same purpose as it was during Kenyatta reign. To sum up apart from the two Kenyan presidents Kenyatta and Moi were tribalists, manipulating the army in their favour, but they managed to create apolitical army in East Africa unlike their counterparts Nyerere and Obote. Even though the Tanzanian army was politicised the army was loyal to civilian like the Kenyan army.

4.4. Uganda

Uganda was the second country to gain independence in East Africa in ninth of October 1962 after Tanzania under the president King Edward Mutesa. Uganda is another very diversity country like Tanzania and Kenya with many ethnic groups. The ethnic groups have divided the country into two regions the Southern region the Bantu speakers, where the largest ethnicities and Kingdoms exist; the Baganda, Banyoro, Banyankore and Toro. The Northern region resided by Nilotic speakers; the Karamajong, Acholi, Langi and others. Apart from all countries of East Africa, having a vast of ethnic groups Kenya and Uganda have large ethnicities which compose high percentage of the total population like Baganda composed 16.9

percentage of the total population. In addition, and had many centralized societies, the Baganda, Banyoro, Banyankore and Toro which have Kingship system unlike Kenya and Tanzania (Otunnu 1987; Barkan 2011; Zirker 2015).

The existence of large number of centralized societies in Uganda had posed a problem since before the independence. In Kenya and Tanzania all groups had united to fight for independence of their full countries, things were quite different in Uganda. Even before independence, different ethnic groups had started competing over controlling the country. Some ethnic groups challenged the liberation movements; some went far by seeking independence of their own societies (Otunnu 1987; Kasozi 1994). During the independence, the British gave independence to the Uganda as a united country. For fragmented Uganda to stand, a coalition was needed to unify the regions. Thus, the parliament of Uganda made King Edward Mutesa from South president and Apollo Milton Obote from North as the Prime Minister.

Furthermore, in the army, the Acholi and Langi from the North (Otunnu 1987; Parson 2003; Zirker 2015) dominated the Uganda rifle. During the colonial era, British used the division of Uganda to achieve its policy of divide and rule. British martial race system favoured the people of North, the Langi and Acholi. “Especially the Acholis were deemed as the military aristocracy of Uganda by colonial officials” (Assensoh and Assensoh 2001; p.152). The large part of the army composed by the people from the North where the Prime minister comes from was a threat to the President King Mutesa that is why he did not favour the Africanization of the army after independence; he favoured keeping the British soldiers in the army than giving commanding power to his challengers. So the unification of Uganda depended on the alliance between the Northern (holding army/ Milton Obote) and Southern (Centralized states/ Edward Mutesa) holding posts in the government (Otunnu 1994; Rubongoya 2007).

Moreover, Uganda failed to produce strong political party unlike Kenya and Tanzania. Kenyatta and Nyerere had used the influence of their parties to build the country and integrate the army. Uganda had a coalition party of Ugandan People’s Congress/Party (UPC) under Milton Obote and Kabaka Yeka (KY) under the Baganda. The coalition failed to faction well because of differences among the members of two coalition parties. The UPC-KY failed to perform well because the

most leaders drew power and support from their regions than from the core of the party. Therefore, the party stood as a confederation of ethnic and district branches than a national unitary party. There were struggle and misunderstanding between the two parties and within UPC. These difficulties hindered the progress of unifying Uganda as a single country. After the mutiny of 1964 stages to build, the country and civil-military relations had to be taken apart from the internal political instability. The initial stage of integrating the army was dealing with the mutineers but in Uganda unlike Kenya and Tanzania, the mutineers were not discarded from the army (Stubbs 2015; Parson 2007). The two East African countries had discarded the mutineers from the army, while other soldiers were tried and jailed.

The Prime Minister, Milton Obote failed to follow the path of Nyerere and Kenyatta because he failed to raise a strong party. The army was the only solution for him to unify the country. Obote appealed to the use of force to consolidate power and to unite the country unlike his counterparts Nyerere and Kenyatta (Parson 2007; Stubs 2015). Even though Nyerere had created civil-military relation by politicising the army, unlike Obote, Nyerere did not use the army as a political tool. Uganda had a different case no strong party and the army is ethnical divided. The most things that had hindered the unification of Uganda were the existence of large centralized societies, which had Kingship system. The Southern people where large Kingdom resides are more loyal to their Kings than to their government (*For King and Country*). Obote banned the Kingdoms in Uganda and because he did not have a strong party. Obote had to turn to the army to unify Uganda. The army under General Idd Amin was used to destroy the Kingdoms in Uganda. This act made the King of Baganda and the President of Uganda to flee to United Kingdom and this was the first coup made by the Ugandan army (Otunnu 1987; Kasozi 1994).

Furthermore, Milton Obote secured full control of the country with the help of the army in return he granted the armed forces with high pay and privileges. Milton Obote turned Idd Amin as his political instrument to crush all his opponents. In 1966, Milton Obote became the president of Uganda after he sent the army to overthrow Edward Mutesa. He abrogated the existed constitution and banned multi -parties in Uganda (Kasozi 1994). This giving his party UPC full control of the country as it was to his counterparts Kenyatta and Nyerere. The reason preferring single party was

the same reason of other African leaders that multi-party system divides people on basis of their religion and ethnic lines.

Furthermore, Milton Obote continued the British legacy of recruiting the people from North to the army. Since colonial era, the people from North dominated the army. Obote followed the footsteps of his counterpart Kenyatta who recruited his tribe mates Kikuyu in the army and General Security Unity. As quoted one member of the parliament expressed his grievances on the recruiting teams "...When they (recruiting teams) go to the north, they spend two to three months, but when they come to South, they spend here one day" (Daily Monitor 2002). Recruiting favouring the President's ethnics brought tensions among other societies who were demanding representation in the army.

Milton Obote instead of integrating the army in the societies like his counterparts, he used the army to strengthen his power in the country. He controlled "the military appointments and could appoint nominated members of parliament totalling one third of the sitting elected members of the National Assembly" (Parson 2003; p.198). Obote did not know he was creating security dilemma. The more he used the army to secure his power the more the army was getting into Ugandan politics and the more vulnerable Obote became to the army. Obote made a mistake that Kenyatta had seen in Kenya; Obote puts too much trust in the army. The army became a very vital institution in Ugandan politics because the army knew that the president is in power because of them. The army had become very strong and indiscipline that no one could stand against it. The British High Commission in Uganda commented on Obote use of the army that "the armed forces are not only serious liability to the national finances, but also a potential hazard to Obote himself as well as the country as a whole" (Parson 2003; p.199).

In 1971, the Ugandan army had written another coup history in Uganda by overthrowing the Ugandan president Milton Obote. Milton Obote was out of the country for Commonwealth summit and General Idd Amin overthrew him, the man he elevated from Chief of Staff to the Chief Commander of all Ugandan forces had turned against him. Obote failed to manipulate the army as Kenyatta did; in Ugandan army apart from the Northern, people had large number in the army but Acholis who were the British martial race outnumbered his ethnic tribe Langi.

Obote also failed to put his tribe men in the high-ranking position in the army like what Kenyatta did. Kenyatta knew that he could not outnumber the Kamba and Kalenjin in the army, what he did was to put his fellow Kikuyu's in the high-ranking position to secure himself from coups. Milton Obote failed that people out of his tribe held the high-ranking positions, as Idd Amin who was the Chief of the army was a Nubian. 1971 Amin took control of country and Milton Obote fled to Tanzania to his college Julius Nyerere to seek refuge.

Idd Amin came to power while understanding the politics of Uganda and the dominance of Acholi and Langi in the army. Amin removed the Baganda from important position and tried to change the army's composition to fit his interest as his predecessor did. "One year After Amin came to power the size of the army grew rapidly to over 12,000 at the end of the 1972, most of the recruits coming from Moslems (Kwaka and Nubians) tribes of the president's home territory" (Otunnu 2006; p. 78, Zirker 2015). Furthermore, Amin did worse than his predecessor did; he created his regime based on threat and fear many people were killed and many other fled the country during his regime. In addition to that, the existence of Amin did not pose a threat to only Uganda but all the neighbouring countries and the Western world.

In 1978, Uganda and Tanzania went to war after Amin attacked a region in Tanzania. The war lasted for two years ended with the defeat of Idd Amin. After the defeat, Amin fled the country. Tanzania had won the war against Amin because of the support Nyerere had from the Western countries and from Ugandan Nationalist Liberation Forces. Prominent Ugandans who went exile during Amin's reign like formed anti-Amin troops in exile. For instance, the overthrown president Milton Obote, Professor Yusufu Lule who was the former principle of Makerere College and Binasisa had formed forces against Amin. During the war Ugandan Nationalist, forces had joined with Tanzania's army to overthrow Idd Amin. I argue that if not the help of Tanzania and the rest of the world no man in Uganda would have manage to overthrow Amin from power in Uganda because he had managed to tame the army in his interest. In addition, he managed to change the army's composition in his favour.

After the overthrow of Amin, a conference was held in Moshi Tanzania to discuss the future of Uganda. An interim government was proposed. Professor Yusuf

Kironde Lule, the former Principal of Makerere University College, who went into exile when Amin came to power, became the chairperson of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF). From Baganda ethnic group, Lule was appointed as the fourth President of the Republic of Uganda at the conference held in Moshi Tanzania.

When Lule came to power in 1979, Idd Amin had gone with his tribes Nubians and Kwaka and the army was dominated by the original British martial race Langi and Acholi (Zirker 2015). Lule drafted a plan to disband the Ugandan army and replace it with countrywide ethnic composition. The restructuring program of Lule was perceived as a threat to Langi and Acholi, which were dominant in the army. On May 1979 just two months after Lule sworn the president of Uganda, he was overthrown by National Consultative Commission (NCC). The reasons for Lule to be overthrown by the NCC was that, he failed to follow the Moshi pact (that put Lule in power) but scholars have different opinion on this according to Mutibwa (1990; p. 130).

“Lule was removed from power in 1979 mainly because of an attempt to shift the ethnic composition of the army away from the Acholi. Lule had talked about what kind of army Uganda should have. He had mentioned basic academic and literacy requirements; he had stressed the importance of recruitment policies, which took into account the nationalities profile. In daring to shape the new Ugandan army, the vital constituency, he was inadvertently trying to cut some raw nerves and it is because he dared talk about the future of Uganda army that Lule was actually overthrown. The other reasons were a mere smoke screen”.

In the same year of his appointment, Godfrey Lukongwa Binaisa substituted Lule from Baganda tribe. In his reign, Binaisa tried to follow the footsteps of his predecessor Yusufu Lule. Binaisa wanted to reform the army by recruiting people from all countryside. As it was to his predecessors, Binaisa faced challenges and attacks from the Acholi and Langi (Mutibwa 1990). In addition to that, Binaisa wanted to restore the discipline in the Ugandan army, the instrument that prevented army's intervention in politics that the Ugandan army had lost. Binaisa removed General David Oyite Ojok who was the army chief of staff and appointed him as the Ugandan ambassador to Algeria. His appointment as a Ugandan ambassador to Algeria General Ojok took it as the demotion and president's strategy to send him away. On 12 May 1980 the day, that president removed Gen. Oyite Ojok, from his

position as the army chief of staff, the Military Commission overthrew the same day president Binaisa from office. After the removal of Binaisa on May 1980, a President Commission was formed as an interim government until elections are set. The leaders who made the President Commission were Paulo Mwanga, Yoweri Museveni, Oyite Ojok and Tito Okello and others. December 1980 the election was held and the former President Milton Obote and his party Ugandan People Congress came victorious. The elections returned Obote to power were contested for not being free and fair. Yoweri Museveni who was a member of President Commission contested the elections that gave Obote victory were not free and fair. To resist Obote's regime Museveni formed rebel group National Resistance Army (NRA) that was waging guerrilla war against Obote's regime.

Milton Obote returned to the politics of Uganda for the second time and as the seventh president of Uganda for the second time. Milton Obote came to power well understanding the politics of Uganda. Obote wanted to correct his mistakes that led Amin ousted him from power. He knew very well for him to secure his position as president he needed the support of his tribe mates in the army. In 1960, Amin had overthrown him because of small margin of Langi in the high officer corps. Milton Obote comes from the North too but his tribe mates Langi are outnumbered by British martial race Acholi to be more in a safe place Obote needed more Langi in the army and in commanding position. Reshuffling the army brought the usual dilemma that he and the rest had faced. 1985 the history repeats itself, "It was another Obote's failure to establish control over the army that proved his undoing; and in May 1985 he was ousted from power in another military coup and forced into exile a second time" (The Telegraph October 2015). The removal of Obote was followed by military government under General Tito Lutwa Okello who ruled the country until January of 1986.

Moreover, General Okello failed to rule Uganda, which resulted into a juggle of chaos. This created a power vacuum in the country and it was an excellent opportunity for General Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) who was waging guerrilla wars against Obote's regime. In January of 1986, Museveni had seized the capital Kampala and announced that he has taken the country. Museveni became the eighth president of Uganda in 1986. Yoweri K. Museveni seized power in 1986 after waging six years' guerrilla war against Obote's government. Museveni

was among the leaders who lost 1981 election that gave Obote the victory. The elections were claimed not to be free and fair. To show that he is not agreeing with the cheating done in the elections, Museveni went to the bush and since 1981 with his rebel group National Resistance Army (NRA) had been waging guerrilla war against Obote's government. Museveni even before coming to power had outlined the problems facing Uganda and African in general. The main problem Museveni had seen generally in Africa and Uganda in particular was "not the people but the leaders who want to overstay in power." (Murori, 2017; p.1).

Before 1990, it was uniform in African continent for leaders to overstay in power and Museveni saw it as one of the big problems that Africa was facing at the time. Moreover, Museveni promised to restore democracy in Uganda, for many years Uganda had been a country where by the army determines whom to rule and for how long. Since independence in 1962, Ugandans have not enjoyed "government of the people, by the people, and for the people."(Museveni, 2005; p.257). In addition to that Museveni promised to restore security and stability which the Ugandan people have not enjoyed since independence the country had gone through civil wars, mass murders and coups which have led to hundreds dead and fleeing the country. Furthermore, since pre-colonial era Uganda had a problem of disunity between the north and south region, division based on ethnics and religion. Museveni promised to restore national unity and eradication of all forms of sectarianisms in Uganda, which had brought all problems in Uganda (Museveni, 200).

In general, at the early years of independence, East African leaders were concerned much on building the nation, the army and civil-military relations were not given much political attentions (Luanda 2006). At this stage East African, country did not have strong political institutions, which are the reason for the army to intervene in politics in 1964. Moreover, to that even though the army had mutinied their aim was not to seize power and take control of the governments, their aim was to be heard and their problems to be solved by the governments (Lupogo 2001). In addition to that, Finer (1962) argues that, the military intervenes in politics when the society has provided disposition (the mood and motive to intervene) and opportunity to intervene. At the time East African mutineer's revolt, there was no support from the civilian that is why apart from there were weak institutions the mutineers were easily quelled by the British troops.

The mutinies of 1964 were the cross to the civil-military relations in East Africa. In addition to that the mutinies allowed East African leaders to build the army and civil-military relations from the start. In addition to that apart from East African leaders had used different ways to build civil-military relations, having strong political institutions like parties had helped Kenya and Tanzania to build royal and discipline armies.

In contrary to Uganda the absence of strong institutions had led the Ugandan army to be strong and intervene in politics. Apart from Tanzania and managed to create royal armies which were submissive to the civilian authority, Kenya had managed to create professional (political active) army in contrary to Tanzania created political active army. Even though, politicising the army is incompatible with the theories of civil military relations and as Luanda (2006:20) argued that, the politicisation of the army that happened in Tanzania corroded the professionalism of the military, and especially its discipline and leadership deteriorated. Nyerere had managed to create one of the royal armies in Africa. Moreover, Omari (2002; 98-99) in case of Tanzania argued that, at the time “professionalism was not the ideal; rather the Defence Force should be and integrated party of the society”. In this respect some African scholars like Auma-Osolo (1980), Emizet (2000), Omari (2002) have refuted the Huntington’s professionalism as the main factor that keeps the army from intervening and they suggested that some cases like Tanzania’s case, civil-military relations are better explained by politicised army than Huntington’s professionalism.

Furthermore, presence of external threats had managed Tanzania and Kenya to build their civil-military relations as Michel Desch’s theory suggest that, the high the external threats and the lower the internal threats the high the civilian control and vice versa. In contrary to Uganda apart that, the country had high internal threats and lower external threats that is why the army ended up intervening in politics. Last, 1990s were years of multiparty democracy in Africa. The following chapter analyses the new phase of multiparty democracy, the chapter will analyse the shifting from single party to multiparty and the how the new civil-military relations will be built to match with multipartism.

CHAPTER V

THE YEARS OF MULTI PART DEMOCRACY 1990's TO PRESENT

Multi-party system was not a new thing in East Africa and Africa in generally. Multi parties existed in Africa even before independence. During the time for struggle of independence in many African countries, parties were established to fight for independence and liberation movements. Multi parties existed until during the early years of independence. The nature of African societies was seen not compatible with the Western mode of democracy. The revolutionary leaders of Africa thought that the Western multi-party democracy would worsen the existing divisions in their countries. In addition to that, colonization worsened the divisions of African societies by align and favouring some ethnicities and ignoring others. To unify African societies in early years of independence, multi-party Western democracy was not an option to be taken by most of African leaders. Freedom fighters like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania argued that, multiparty could bring nothing apart from misfortunes in Tanzania. Nkwame Nkrumah of Ghana favoured single party system because multi-party is a divisive. Sekou Toure of Guinea pursued single party because the country was a socialist country and socialist ideology demands single party. Other claimed that multi-party democracy had no root in Africa; it is a Western thing (Thomson 2010).

In East Africa, single party was favoured with the same reasons explained above. In Kenya, the president Jomo Kenyatta had dissolved the Kenyan African Democratic Union (KADU) and merged it with his party Kenya African National Union to form a central government (Parson 2007). In Tanzania, the Tanganyika African Nation Union (TANU)/ Afro Shiraz Party (ASP) later *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM)

(Revolutionary Party) was the sole party existed in Tanzania from 1961 to 1980s. In Uganda, the opposition parties Democratic Party (DP) and Kabaka Yeka (King only) were banned by President Milton Obote in 1969 and remained his party Ugandan People's Congress as the de facto party in the country. In 1980s after the overthrow of the President Binaisa, multi-party was re-established and followed by an election, which brought Obote in power in 1985. In addition, when Museveni and his National Resistance Army came to power in 1986, party activities were banned in Uganda and no party democracy was introduced in Uganda (Izama 2011; Mugaju and Oloka-Onyango, 2000; Carbone, 2008).

Moreover, because of internal factors and external factors African countries started to adopt multi-party democracy in Africa in 1990's. The institutions existed in Africa at that; time favoured the single party system. In East Africa by the 1990's apart from having single party and multi ethnic groups Kenya had managed to create one of an apolitical army in Africa. In Tanzania Nyerere had created a political active army. In Uganda Obote's use of the army in politics has led the army to be very active and strong institution in Uganda which determines who can rule and for how long. Museveni brought a light in Uganda after managing to bring back the army to the barracks. This chapter opted to address the years of independence in East Africa to present. The chapter looks at the situations of each country, reforms made to accommodate the multi-party system and how each country built civil-military to accommodate multi-party democracy. In addition, the last part will answer my research question why Kenya and Tanzania have managed to peaceful regime change and Uganda has failed. Last, this chapter will justify my hypothesis that military plays a crucial role in keeping presidents in power in Uganda.

5.1. Tanzania

First President of Tanzania Nyerere was one among the African leaders who was reluctant to embracing multi-party democracy in Tanzania. Due to the existence of multi ethnics in Tanzania "multiparty democracy could bring nothing apart from misfortunes in the country" (Thomson 2010; p. 112). But in the 1990s constant pressure from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) pushed Tanzania to consider embracing multiparty democracy Then the President of Tanzania Ali Hassan Mwinyi formed a commission under the Chairmanship of Tanzania Chief Justice Francis Nyalali to investigate on whether the country wants to

follow multi-party or stick to single party system. The Nyalali Commission walked through the country collecting people's opinion on whether the country should adopt multiparty or single party should prevail. The result of Nyalali Commission was that, "77.2 per cent of those interviewed (36,299) preferred Tanzania to continue with one-party system", (Nyirabu 2002; p.103) but the Commission recommended that the country should adopt multiparty democracy apart from the majority of the population was in favour of single party system. After the Nyalali's recommendation Tanzania official introduced multi-party system in 1992 (Nyairabu 2002). Apart from the recommending, the country to accept multiparty system the Commission recommended the changes in the constitution to should be made to accommodate the multi-party democracy. The reforms in the constitution "popularly referred to as the 'Forty Laws', called for the separating the party from state institutions, including the civil service and the security sector, in order to reflect and respond to the new political environment of a multi-party democracy" (Rupiya, 2005; p. 31).

After the establishment of multi-party system in 1992, the first multi-party election was scheduled in 1995. Tanzania's 1995 election was the first multi-party election in Tanzania and the second multi-party election in the East Africa after Kenya in 1992. The 1995 elections were won by CCM, the party that was the national party existed since colonial era with wide spread mobilization and support contended with new and week parties with no strong wide support. The ruling party has "dominated political competition since the introduction of multi-party elections, winning all five (phases) elections between 1995 to 2015" (Nyaluke and Connolly 2013; p. 2). In addition to that, unlike Kenya, Tanzania has failed to produce strong opposition in comparison to Kenya but the Tanzania's opposition is strong compared to Ugandan oppositions.

However, apart from the ruling party CCM being dominating the Tanzania politics, Tanzania has been experiencing peaceful governmental transition from one president to another. Since the establishment of multi-party system, three presidents have handed power peacefully. In East Africa Tanzania is leading for the presidents handling power peacefully followed by Kenya even though Kenya has gone far by experiencing ruling parties handling over power to the opposition. While in Uganda neither handling power within the leaders of the same party nor from one party to another. The constitution of Tanzania limits presidents to two terms of five years

each. The leaders of Tanzania have been respecting the constitution and so far all have handed power at the end of their terms.

In addition to that, the reforms recommended by the Nyalali commission did not end only in political arena; it was extended to the security forces of the country. After the mutiny of 1964 Nyerere disbanded the Tanzania Rifle and replaced it Tanzania People's Defence Force which comprised by the TANU youth members. During the single party, the ruling party (TANU/CCM), had "created new security sector structures complete with a new set of civil military relations, based on party principle adherence" (Rupiya 2005; p. 3). During the establishment of multi-party Nyalali Commission recommended reforms that the army and other security forces that will reflect all parties. The Commission recommendations are as briefly elaborated below.

First was the keeping military out of politics; during the single party era there were no difference between the party and the army. Since 1964 after the East Africa mutiny Tanzania People Defence Force was embedded in the ruling party of Tanzania. During that time soldiers were allowed to attend political rallies in uniform and other political meetings were held in the army barracks (Lupogo 2001, 2010). Moreover, soldiers enjoyed holding positions in the government. In addition to that, TANU membership was a ticket to join Tanzanian army. The Nyalali Commission proposed the army to stay out of politics. Even though the Nyalali Commission retained civil right to soldiers that they can cast vote in the civic election, soldiers were restricted to attending political rallies in uniform and showing allegiance to any political party in the country (Lupogo 2001). Furthermore, "political parties were not to interfere in military recruitment; and that those members of the armed forces who also held party political positions had to choose between a civilian status in the party or a career as a professional soldier" (Baregu 2004; p. 39, Luanda 2005; Luanda 2006). Some soldiers remained in the party holding their positions in the army and some like Jakaya Kikwete who became the third president of Tanzania between 2005 and 2015; Abdurhaman Kinana the secretary general of the ruling party. They had retired their post in the army and joined politics as civilians and this is the difference that can be seen between Tanzania and Uganda. In Tanzania, leaders had to leave the army and joined politics as civilians but in Uganda President Museveni came to power as a soldier in 1986. In Tanzania President Kikwete who was a former soldier

the army did not play any role in his coming to power but Museveni came to power with the help of the army that is why he has been depending on the army on his staying to power.

Moreover, the recommendations made by Nyalali Commission helped Tanzania to create a new civil military relation where by Tanzanian army has remained out of politics. According to Luanda (2006) stable civil-military relations depends on a great extent on the professionalism of the Armed Forces. The Tanzanian army has been receiving credits from scholars as one of the exceptional army in East Africa. The army that was embedded in the party's politics has been transformed to be one of professional army in the region. Apart from that, the retired and still in office military personnel of the Tanzania army have been enjoying holding post in the government as it was during the single party. The army officers have been appointed in the positions of District Commissioner (DC) and Regional Commissioners (RC) the positions that are direct appointed by the President himself in advice with the Prime Minister. Even though the positions of DC and RC can be held by any one as article 36 section 2 of the constitution which states that "the President shall have the authority to appoint persons to hold positions of leadership responsible for formulating policies for departments and institutions of the government". Most of the positions of DC and RC have been given to the ruling party (CCM) members or to the people who have played a role to the ruling party winning elections. In addition to that, the DC and RC are members of Security Committee in their regions and those who are members of the ruling party are members of the ruling party District Political Committee in their respective regions. That one of their duty is to present the interest of the ruling party in the region. In addition to that, the RC and DC have been accused of harassing and embarrassing oppositions in their regions. The DC and RC have power to order security forces to arrest anyone in the region and detain him for 48. The RC and DC have been ordering the arrest of opposition leaders without following procurers for the claim of maintaining peace and security in the region. The question comes if the RC and DC who are members of political serve the interest of the ruling party in the region, army officials who are RC and DC serve whose interest.

In addition to that, the current president John Magufuli apart from being praised for his hard working since he came to power in 2015, he has been preferring army

officials and police officers in the government posts than his predecessors. Even though the president and other leaders justified that, president preference is for security reason that “he appointed several senior retired and still in office army and police officers as RCs of border regions with a high crime rate caused by refugees and cross-border criminals” (The Guardian March, 2007). Furthermore, President preferring soldiers because of ethics and discipline the soldiers have. That he wants to export ethics and discipline from the army to the government he argues that, when he came to power the government had lost ethics and discipline (The Guardian, 2016). Furthermore, president Magufuli went further in his appointment of retired Colonel Ngemela Lubinga who was the chief spokesperson for the Tanzania People Defence Forces (TPDF) to be the publicity secretary for international affairs of the ruling party CCM. Colonel Lubinga retired from the army on December 2, 2016 and after eleven days later he was appointed by the President and the Chairman of the ruling party Magufuli to be a member of the ruling party’s National Executive Council (NEC) and the publicity secretary for international affairs of CCM (Msuya, 2016). The question comes here is that; there is short period between his retirement from the army and his appointment in one of the top party’s positions. The retired Col. Lubinga responded to the criticisms of his appointment by saying that he joined the party before the introduction of multi- party, when it was mandatory to have a CCM membership card. On re-introduction of multi-party system in 1992, the military confiscated the membership cards from the officers and kept them until after their retirement (The East African, 2016; Msuya, 2016). Lubinga went on saying that he is a member of CCM since 1979, he has just resumed where he ended. This means that Col. Lubinga did not quite from the party in 1992 when multi-party system was introduced, in contrary to the Tanzania constitution article (1977) 147 section 2 which states that “it is hereby prohibited for any member of the defence and security forces to join any political party, save only that he shall have the right to vote”. In the following section under the same article the constitution makes clear that “the expression “member of the defence and security forces” means a member in the service of the Defence Forces, the Police Force, the Prisons Service or the National Service, whether on temporary or permanent terms”.

Moreover, even if Col. Lubinga had quite from the party in 1992, and soldiers are allowed to pursue any carrier after retirement the time span of his retirement in the

army and his appointment in the party was very short considers the position he was appointed in requires enough experience in the party and politics. Moreover, President Magufuli appointed Major General Gaudence Milanzi as the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. These cases rise doubts that the ties existed during single party period between the ruling party and the army are still prevailing up to now. Moreover, the chairman of National Committee for Constitutional Reforms (NCCR-Mageuzi) an opposition party commented on President Soldier's appointment, even though we (Tanzania) shifted from single party to multi-party system and article number 10 in the constitution which stated Tanzania is a single party country was removed from the constitution, practical Tanzania is still under single party rule (Mjema, 2016). Moreover, apart all Tanzania Presidents have been appointing army officials in government post the current President has gone further in appointing army officials in the post like publicity secretary for international affairs of CCM, permanent secretary of the ministry, administrative secretary of regions and district.

Lastly, apart from the ties between the party and the army still exist in Tanzania like in Uganda. Tanzania leaders are not using the army as a political tool like in Kenya and unlike in Uganda that the army involves direct in politics in favour of president Museveni. In addition, presence of strong ruling party in Tanzania has refrained leaders to use the army for their individual gains individual as will be see in Ugandan case. In Tanzania, the ties are between the ruling party CCM, the army, not the president, and the army like in Uganda. Moreover, if Tanzanian army is political, it ensures the continuation and domination of the ruling party in politics and not to single leader. That is why TPDF is not seen direct involvement in politics, the army has been respecting the civilian rule that is why Tanzania under the same party has experienced peaceful government transition since 1995 the first multi-party election was held. My question is, will the TPDF remain none interventionist when the opposition wins the elections and takes power? I argue that TPDF's current apolitical nature will be seen when the power passes peaceful to the oppositions and if it remains apolitical, but now the army may be seen apolitical and submissive to the government because of tradition ties between the army and the ruling party.

5.2. Kenya

Multi-party system in Kenya was established in December 1991 and 1992 Kenya had its first multi-party election, which restored President Moi to power. The journey to multi-party system was not an easy one as it was to other African countries in general. African leaders were still reluctant to multi-party system. In Kenya President Moi described “multi-party democracy as being a party of foreign ideology peddled by some unpatriotic people with borrowed brains” (Patel 2001; p158). External factors played great role in the establishment of multi-party democracy in Africa in general. After the end of Cold War in 1990’s, external donors like World Bank had pushed Kenya to adopt multi-party system. The external donors had threatened to reduce if not stopping offering loans and financial assistance to Kenya if the country does not allow multi-party democracy. Kenyan President not to jeopardize his relation with Western countries had to welcome multi-party system in Kenya.

Apart from external push, Kenya was one among the few African countries, which the call for multi-party system came from within. In the end of 1980’s, Kenyans were pushing their government to make reforms in the constitution to allow formation of other parties. In 1966, an opposition party was established under the name of Kenya African Democratic Union. The party was seen as a block towards unity and stability in Kenya because of the fragile ethnicities existing in Kenya and Kenya stickled to single party (Stubbs, 2005). In 1982 after failure of a coup attempt done by the Kenya Air Force unity against President Moi, he strengthened the existence of one party system in Kenya by making Kenya African Union as the only party in Kenya and prohibiting the establishment of other parties in Kenya (Throup and Hornsby, 1998). Prohibition of other parties continued to exist until the end of 1980 where by leaders and civilians started calls for reformations that will allow multi-party in Kenya. In Kenya, rallies and protests were held to push the government to accept multi-party system. In 1991, the leaders of opposition in Kenya established Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) under the leadership of Oginga Odinga (Former Vice-President 1964-66). FORD was established to awaken and mobilize people to push the government to allow multi-party system. By “May 1991 FORD was officially announced illegal by Moi’s regime” (Throup and Hornsby, 1998; p.77-8).

Following the external demand from donors and internal push, “Kenya African National Union (KANU) party reluctantly repealed the Section 2A of the constitution which had hitherto prohibited the formation of other political parties in Kenya.” (Patel 2001; p.156) and on December 1991 multi-party system was official established in Kenya. The establishment of multi-party democracy in Kenya brought back the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) a party that was banned early by Moi’s government. Apart from FORD, the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) was another major party established in Kenya at that time. Kenya held its first election in 1992, which the ruling party KANU under Moi came out victorious. The ruling party KANU was successful in the first two elections of 1992 and 1997. KANU enjoyed support from large portion of Kenyan population because the party had existed since before the independence and it was the only party in Kenya since 1967 to 1991 while, other parties were new and they could not manage to mobilize people country wide in short period of time. In addition to that, “lack of cohesiveness and inability of Kenyan opposition parties to form alliance against KANU in both presidential and parliament election of 1992 and 1997 made Moi and KANU to become victorious” (Tordoff, 1997; p.16). In 2002 Kenya President Moi after 24 years in power was blocked by the constitution to run for the fourth term. Since then, Kenya constitution limits Presidents to two terms of five years each (Tordoff, 1997; Throup and Hornsby, 1998)

Moreover, ethnicity has become a major driving factor in the in the formation of political parties in Kenya. Even though the question of ethnic struggle is not a new phenomenon in Kenyan politics, introduction of multi-party democracy has proved the fear that African leaders had, that multi-party system would trigger the division among multi-ethnic African societies. The formation of Kenya political parties has been in line with ethnic groups. For instance, KANU the party was the national party of Kenya appealing the support from all ethnic groups; the party’s top leaders were reflecting the tribe of Chairmen. In 2002 KANU was under the national Chairmanship of “Moi a Kalenjin, the organising secretary Nicholas Biwott a Kalenjin, acting secretary general Julius Sunkuli a Kalenjin, director of elections William Ruto a Kalenjin, and the deputy treasurer Kipng’eno Arap Ng’eny a Kalenjin” (Jonyo 2003; p.161). In addition to that, Democratic Party of Kenya (DP)

under the leadership Mwai Kibaki a Kikuyu enjoyed large supports from Kikuyu the biggest ethnic group in Kenya and the same applicable in other parties in Kenya. Furthermore, the defeat of opposition parties in first two elections; Kenyan politics have been characterized by coalitions. Even though the coalition of parties in Kenyan politics can be traced since 1994; the defeat of 1992 election brought together oppositions to the formation of umbrella party the United National Democratic Alliance but because of the “differences on the issue of reform strategy, the Alliance withered away before the 1997” (Wanyande 2003; p.109). Prior to the 2002, the ruling party KANU under Moi merged with National Development Party (NDP) under the leadership of Raila Odinga to form a new KANU. The alliance of KANU and NDP could not last longer because of the Chairman of KANU nominated the son of first President Uhuru Kenyatta as the president candidates in the elections of 2002. The nomination of Uhuru Kenyatta as the president candidate made Raila Odinga to establish another coalition under the name of National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), which brought together 13 opposition parties (Wanyande, 2003).

In addition to that, in 2002 elections National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) a coalition of opposition parties became victorious under the presidency of Mwai Kibaki. The victory of Mwai Kibaki in 2002 changed the history of Kenya and East Africa in general. Kenya was the first country in East Africa to see an opposition party wins the elections. “The opposition was worried about whether Moi would hand over power” (Jonjo 2003; p.112) because it has been a custom for the ruling party not to handle over power peaceful in many African countries. The peaceful transition of power from KANU to NARC in 2002 ended the domination of KANU in Kenya’s politics. The 2002 elections did not only end the ties of KANU, it was the cornerstone to the development of democracy in Kenya. Then country experienced not only a peaceful regime change but also a change of parties in which Tanzania and Uganda has not achieved yet. Even though Tanzania had experience regime change through multi-party system since 1995, in Kenya it was the first time in the country and the first time in the region seen the ruling party KANU that had been in power since 1963 up to 2002 accept electro defeat and peaceful handling power to the opposition party, which won the election. In addition to that, in the elections of 2012, another transition of parties was seen bringing to power the son of first president of Kenya Uhuru Kenyatta to power through The National Alliance (TAN).

Furthermore, apart from Kenya had managed to create apolitical army during single party system the country being fragile to the post-election violence in East Africa Kenya has managed to produce strong opposition in comparison to Tanzania and Uganda. Present of strong opposition has helped Kenya not only peaceful power handling of leaders but also parties. More over the Kenyan constitution was reformed to be compatible with the introduction of multi-party democracy. Where did the army fall in the politics of the multi-party democracy in Kenya?

After the 1992 multi-party elections, Arap Moi continued to be the President of Kenya. When Moi came to power just rules of the game changed but the regime did not change thus in the army too nothing had changed. Moi continued keeping Kalenjin in the commanding offices in the army to protect himself from the coups. The differences started to be seen when the regime change in 2002 and 2012. The presidents of Kenya have been following footsteps of their predecessor Kenyatta and Moi of holding top ranking positions to their tribe members. For instance, when Kibaki, a Kikuyu came to power in 2002, most of the officer corps were Kalenjin. Kibaki started to elevate his tribe mates Kikuyu in the high-ranking position in the army. For instance, “prior to Kibaki's election in 2002, there were no Kikuyu military heads but by 2005, four out of six of the top military positions were held by Kikuyu” (Stubbs 2015; p.78). In addition to that, the formation of coalition in Kenya reflects in the army.

The leaders now have been considering the position of other ethnic in which the coalition is formed in the army. The manipulation and calculation of ethnic composition in politics is reflecting the Kenyan army. Leaders are either placing their tribe mates in high-ranking position of the army, the tribes that are members in the party coalition or members of small ethnic groups like Kenya-Somalis and Cost tribes, which consists less percentage in the population and with no political influence or ambitions to seize power.

Apart from that, Kenyatta's legacy of putting the army away from politics is still prevailing in Kenya. Kenyan leaders have been restructuring the army time to time to fit their interest but none of the leader has made an army political tool in Kenya

(Parson, 2007). Moreover, the election competition is not between the allied parties but also the ethnic groups (Jonjo, 2003). Since 1992 Kenya has been experiencing

ethnic clashes and violence after elections and “the multi-party democracy has been responsible for ethnic tensions, blood shade and chaos” (Patel 200; p.160). The post-election violence has resulted to the injuries and death of hundreds in Kenya. Apart from Kenya experiencing post-election violence, repeatedly the army has continued to remain apolitical. The army has never intervened in all cases of violence neither in the support of the government nor civilians. From the first president to the current one, Kenyan leaders have been “relying on the police, the civilian security services, and the paramilitary General Service Unit as government agents of coercion” (Parson 2007; p.170). Last creating professional (political neutral) army has not only saved the country from the succession of coups and counter-coups but also it has helped the development of democracy in Kenya. In East Africa Kenya is the only country that opposition parties have been winning elections and the ruling parties accepting electro defeat in Tanzania and Uganda that has not happened yet since the establishment of multiparty in 1992, apart from Tanzania has experienced governmental transition all the presidents come from the ruling party CCM.

5.3. Uganda

The calls from inside and outside the countries had pushed Kenya and Tanzania to embrace multi-party democracy in the early 1990's. In Uganda transition to multiparty democracy took, a different path from the one was used by Kenya and Tanzania. In Uganda President Museveni had a different understanding of democracy, “when I talk of democracy, I should not be confused with those who are talking about multi-parties” (Museveni 2000; p.176). Museveni had the same arguments like other African leaders on accepting multiparty democracy that the existence of ethnic, religion and region factions that struggle for power make democracy unfit in Uganda. He added that each country could decide which way to use to achieve democracy in the relation of it circumstances. Museveni (2000) argues that, if the population manage to control the top leaders' through regular elections and leaders became submissive to elections and leaders are thrown whenever the electorate, democracy, rejects them and accountability can be achieved without imposing Western from of democracy in Uganda.

In that respect, in the early years of Museveni's regime party system was banned in Uganda to prevent Uganda from the problems and divisions that could be brought by multiparty democracy, instead Museveni introduced the movement system (no party

system) (Matirip 2011; p.161; Carbone, 2005). By definition, the movement (no party) is a system whereby all people will participate in politics as individual under the umbrella of National Resistance Movement (NRM). “That all candidates for elective offices would stand without party label to be evaluated on their own merit the idea was to prevent the re-emergence of parties that drew support from ethnic or regional constituencies had torn Uganda apart” (Barkan 2011; p.65). The movement system prohibited leaders running through the ticket of parties, “parties were allowed to have head offices but not to have branches in different regions of the country so as to keep people unified all over the country” (Matirip 2010; p.162). The leaders who formed different parties were incorporated into Museveni’s government not as leaders of political parties but as individuals without the ties of their parties.

Furthermore, Uganda held the two general elections in 1996 and 2001 under the movement system, and in all elections, President Museveni came out victorious. In addition to that, after almost two decades of no party politics in Uganda, in 2005 multi-party system was restored in Uganda (Matirip 2010; Barkan 201; Carbone, 2005). The NRM, which was in principle the only party in Uganda since 19986, has been winning the election because of being challenged by weak opposition parties. Furthermore, the early years of Museveni’s regime was characterized by political, social and economic stability but in recent years the country has turned “into an old system of personal rule dependent on patronage for its survival” (Barkan 2011).

In general, apart from Museveni rejected party system in the years of his regime, 2005 multiparty system were restored in Uganda that makes Uganda as the last country in East Africa to embrace multiparty democracy. As it was to his counterparts of Tanzania and Kenya leaders, Museveni had a task to build new civil-military relations in Uganda that could accommodate the years of democracy and that will loyal and submissive to his authority. Museveni followed the footsteps of Tanzania’s first president in creating the civil-military relations in Uganda. In 1964 after the East Africa mutinies Nyerere disbanded the Tanzania Rifle (RF) and replaced it with party members. In Uganda, the National Resistance Army (Museveni’s Rebel Group) was split into two wings of political wing under the name of National Resistance Movement (NRM) and military wing under the original name of National Resistance Army (NRA). The NRA was nationalized to be the Ugandan

army under the name of Ugandan People's Army (UPDF) (Kategaya, 1990; Kasfir, 2002; Mwenda, 2007).

In addition to that, since Museveni did not end his ties with the army; since he came to power in 1986 Museveni continued to serve as the president of Uganda, the Minister of Defence since 1986 to 2001 and serving as soldier in the army up to 2004 (Africa Confidential 14.05.2004; Carbone, 2008). In addition to that, Tangri and Mwenda (2010) have argued that even though Museveni has retired his posts as the Minister of Defence and a soldier in the UPDF, Museveni remains as the de facto serving member in the army. More over Thomson (2010) has marked the difference between the professional soldiers with political ambitions in the West and Africa is that in Western Democracy the professional soldiers with political ambitions in the West and Africa. In Western democracies before taking power, soldiers give up from their military commands. They participate in the electoral process as civilian and abide with all democratic norms in contrary to their counterparts in Africa who hold power while in military uniform. The continuity of Museveni had posed a threat to the neutrality of the army (professionalism) because the Museveni as the president of Uganda is the head of all security forces, the general in the army and the chairperson of the ruling party where the army originated.

Moreover, Museveni followed the footsteps of his predecessors of favouring his tribe members in the army. Since colonial era the Ugandan army was dominated by the British martial race the southern tribes the Langi and Acholi. After the independence, the northerners Langi and Acholi continued to dominate the army because the first Prime Minister and the second President of Uganda Milton Obote came from the north. Even though President Amin tried to change the army composition by favouring his own tribes Kwaka and Nubian, the army was still dominated by northerners. The removal of Obote and the return of Obote in 1980s had brought back the dominance of Langi and Acholi in the army. Since President Museveni came to power the top army commanders have been coming from the southern especial the President's tribe the Ankole (Brett 1995; Izama 2001). In 1986, the top six military commanders who were promoted to the position of generals came from the tribe of the President. Moreover, at the time "westerners accounted 64 percent of all positions in the army with high percentage to president's tribe mates" (Lindeman 2010; p.29). Furthermore, in the lower ranking level President Museveni has tried to

balance the ethnic composition than his predecessors. Museveni has introduced a quota system in the army, “a system whereby each district has a percentage of men who will join in the army to have countrywide recruited army” (Muhereza and Omurangi 1998; p.199). Even though Museveni established quota system to balance the ethnic composition in the army, Banyankole’s dominance in the army remains firmly entrenched. In addition to that, even though Museveni has followed the path of Kenyan leaders of changing the composition of the army in favour of his tribe, Kenyan leaders have managed keeping the army out of politics in contrary to Uganda.

Furthermore, Museveni has maintained the traditional of his predecessors of using the army as a political tool; since there are no clear boundaries between the army, the party and the president (Kategaya 1990; Kasfir 2002; Mwenda 2007). Like his predecessors Obote and Amin, President Museveni has been using the army to strengthen his power in the country. The only difference between Museveni and His predecessors is that Museveni has managed to control the army. The army is not a powerful institution like it was before whereby the army could overthrow any leader at any time it wants. The army is not torturing and rooting civilians like the time of Obote and Amin. Museveni has managed to return the army to the barracks but the army is acting on his interest and not for Ugandan interest. As Rubongoya (2007) Carbone (2008), Tangri and Mwenda (2010) argued that, the military has continued to play a central role and appear to be a core constituency of the NRM government. This can be seen during election campaigns the army is used to arresting, intimidating; suppressing the oppositions, and directing people how to vote. In all Ugandan elections since 1986 “the army has been accused in involving in misconduct such as openly campaigning for President Museveni, electoral malpractice, staffing ballot boxes and directing voters on how to vote” (Veyel ,2007; p.387; Rubongoya 2007; p. 150; Muhumuza 2009; p. 35; Tangri and Mwenda 2010; p. 35; Kagoro 2015; p.166)

Moreover, in different occasions the army officers have been reported to intimidate people on who to vote for instance in 1996 elections Major General Kahinda Otafiire, currently the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs publically declared that “if anyone except Museveni won the presidential elections, the newcomer would be overthrown within 24 hours” (Hills 2000; p.93). Furthermore, in 2001 elections, Lieutenant General Henry Tumukunde, current retired from the

army reminded voters that, “regardless of whom they vote for, President Museveni would still rule because they (NRM) possess guns” (Tangri and Mwenda 2010; p. 44). In contrary to Tanzania, apart from the army can be affiliated with the ruling party CCM, the TPDF and Kenyan army are not seeing outside during the elections or elections campaign even though in the case of suppressing oppositions the Special Forces like the General Special Unit in Kenya and Field Force Unity in Tanzania have been preferred. In East Africa Kenya is the country that has experienced many post-election violence which resulted to the death of many people but in all cases the army has remained neutral neither supporting the government nor against it (Parson, 2007).

In addition to that, there is a rising of president’s family members in the army. Apart from the Ugandan People’s Army being dominated by the people from south in the high-ranking, President Museveni has been raising members of his family in the army to secure coup threats from the army. President’s young brother Salim Saleh, apart from being retired he has been playing a crucial role in the Ugandan army. Salim Saleh was one among the soldiers that waged guerrilla war with Museveni in the bush. When Museveni seized power in 1986 Salim Salih was promoted to the rank of General in the army and he served as the “first army commander and President’s senior advisor on military affairs” (Kagoro 2005; p.168).

Furthermore, the quick rising of president’s son Major- General Muhozi Kainerugaba has brought debates in the Uganda. Muhoozi is the president’s first son who joined the army in 1999, within a short period of time Muhoozi has elevated to the position of Major- General in the army. Muhozi before being promoted on May 2016 to the position of Major – General, he serves as the head of “elite Special Force Command (SFC) which provides security to the president, members of the first family and other sensitive installations in the country” (Bwire May 16, 2016). SFC is “a brigade considered to have been the most lethal with the largest formation, most immense fire power, and best trained and best paid force in the country” (Carbone 2008; p.47; Tangri and Mwenda 2010; p 4; Kagoro 2015; p168)

More over when Muhoozi was promoted to the position of Brigadier in 2013, General David Sejusa a military veteran and former Chief of Intelligence who fought with Museveni in the forest accused President Museveni for wanting to create a political dynasty in Uganda. General Sejusa revealed that the president is preparing

his son to be the next president of Uganda. In 2013 General Sejusa flee to the United Kingdom after making allegations that the Ugandan “officials were plotting to kill people who opposed Museveni's plan to transfer power to his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba” (The Guardian February 2016, Buchanan July 14 2016).

In addition to that, on May 2016 Muhoozi was promoted to the rank of Major General in the army and the Presidential Adviser of Special Operating. Muhoozi's quick and unusual promotion in the army has escalated the tension in Uganda that the president is making his son to take his place as the president. “The former Ugandan minister Mike Mukula reported telling the American embassy official in Kampala that he believed the President was preparing his son as a successor”. (Kasasira 2016). Even though Major General Muhoozi has attended many military schools and academies like Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Egyptian Military Academy, United States Army Command and General Staff College and South African National Defence College, but his quick promotion to the rank of Major-General at the age of 42, a quick rising that no other officer in Ugandan army has achieved. Muhoozi has brought suspicious and tense debate in Uganda that his promotion is unusual and it is the preparation to take power after his father. The rising of Salim Saleh and Museveni's son Muhoozi shows how Museveni is securing his position in the army.

Moreover, there are much interconnectedness between the party and the army in Uganda. Even though the NRA was divided into two wings, the political wing which formed NRM and the army wing, which was nationalized to form Uganda People's Army; it seems that there are no clear demarcations between the party and the army. The 1995 Uganda constitution allowed the military to elect ten serving officers to represent the military constituency in the national legislative assembly (Carbone 2008, Posner and Young 2007). The aim of Military Members of the Parliament is to represent the interest of the army in the parliament. However, in practise the military MP's have been working in line with the ruling party NRM. The military MP's have added the number of ruling party members in the parliament and those who have been tried to oppose or act against the wishes of the ruling party “have been recalled to the army and punished” (Rubongoya 2007; p.169; Muhumuza 2009; p.35).

In addition to, that the constitution of Uganda has vested the office of the President power to elect the Residence District Commission (RDC) which the constitution of 2005 raised the number from 66 to 112. Most of the RDC are the members of the ruling party who have lost in the elections or members of the party who have played a role in the process of bringing president in the election (Barkan 2011). The RDCs stand as the Presidents in their districts, the chairpersons of the Security Council in the district, representing the interest of the party in the region and eyes and ears of the President. Apart from most RDCs are the ruling party members some of them are retired army officers and the veteran soldiers who fought with President Museveni in the forest. In addition to that, Tanzania has the same case like Uganda of appointing serving military officers and retired ones as Districts and Regional Commissioners. The questions to be addressed here is that if the RDCs who are members of the ruling party represent the interest of their parties in the region how about the RDCs who are serving army officers and retired one whose interests do they represent while all of them are the appointees of the same President himself.

In both countries, the RDCs have been accused of harassing, intimidation and suppressing oppositions in their districts because the RDCs have a power to order security forces to arrest anyone in their districts. Apart from both countries appointing soldiers as RDCs, Tanzania has a very strong party CCM (Revolutionary party) that the RDCs represent the interest of the ruling power in regions in Uganda since there is no strong party the RDCs have been keeping and strengthening the Museveni rule in Uganda. That makes him to stay him for long time in power while in Tanzania it is a party not a person.

Last, there are statements that have been made by the Presidents and the army officers in Uganda illustrating openly how the army is a core factor for the power and the prevailing of the President Museveni. On several occasions President Museveni has been quoted publicly asserting that, “the Ugandan People Defence Force (UPDF) is his army and he would not accept the leadership of someone else” (Muhumuza 2009; p.35; Kagoro 2015; p.168). Moreover, General Aronda Nyakairima, then Chief of Defense Forces, explicitly declared, “we [the military] liberated this country in 1986 and we shall not allow bad characters to come back to power, we will fight all these forces [the opposition]” (Muhumuza 2009; p. 36; Tangri and Mwenda 2010; p.44; Kagoro 2015; p.115). Such kind of statements

proves that the power of president is driven from the army unlike Kenya and Tanzania that is why Tanzania and Kenya have managed peaceful power transition and Uganda has failed since 1986.

To sum up, the years of the 1990s started with the reluctance of East African leaders to accept multiparty democracy but external and internal forces had forced the countries to embrace multiparty democracy. The shift from single party to multiparty democracy required the new civil-military relations to accommodate the new system because the old of civil-military relations were built upon single party system. Kenya and Tanzania built civil-military relations by creating political institutions, which kept the army out of politics as the institutional theory suggests. In Uganda even though political institutions, the existence unclear demarcation between Museveni, the party and the army as hindered the development of professional army in Uganda. In addition to that, Museveni had managed to change the nature of the Ugandan army from intervening and overthrown civilian government. Since 1986 Museveni came to power, Uganda has not experienced another coup. However, Lindberg and Clark (2011) either argued that once military coup has occurred, the armed forces can re-establish a pattern of military influence in politics through subsequent electoral victory of the military leader or installed leader, this can be clearly seen in Ugandan army. The army has been working in supporting and ensuring the existence of Museveni in power.

Moreover, some the successes of few African countries like Nigeria, DRC and Tanzania to build civil military relations through politicised army had made some scholars like Auma-Osolo (1980), Emizet (2000) and Omari (2002) to refute the Western theories of military relations in analysing African cases. The scholars have argued that, the civil –military relations of Nigeria, DRC and Tanzania relations are better explained by politicised army than Huntington’s professionalism. It cannot be denied that those countries had managed to produce loyal and discipline armies by politicizing the military institution. The point to make that at the time that happened all the countries were under single party system so the army was integrated to the machinery of the party but since 1990’s African countries have shifted to multiparty democracy so that the army should be apolitical so that to allow equal and fair participation of all parties in the country. The army should only accept to work under

any civil-government that elected by the people. The army being affiliated to a certain party hinders free and fair participation of parties, as it is the case of Uganda.

The Ugandan army has been publically supporting president Museveni and his party NRM that has made the failure of Museveni leaving power in Uganda. The fact of a political army does not hold water in multiparty democracy. Even though theories of civil-military relations offered by Huntington and Finer may not feet to analyse each and every East African case, Huntington's professionalism holds maximum strength in keeping army out of politics.

Last, there is a shift from direct role to indirect role of the army. In the post-independence to 1980s, the army used to overthrow civilian leaders and take control of the government, as Kwok (2010) argued that military played a great role in supporting the government and it acts as a tool to crush down all opposition voices and appointing active or retired officers to hold government jobs. This case is clearly seen in Uganda and to some degree in Tanzania. In both countries, the military personnel have been enjoying holding different post in the government, the posts that in one way or another may suppress oppositions. In contrary, Kenyan leaders had established an apolitical (neutral) army since after the mutiny in 19964 that made it easy for the country to create civil-military relations during multiparty system. Furthermore, Kenyatta legacy is still prevailing in Kenya, setting military composition to fit the interest of leaders and keeping the army out of politics. In Tanzania, the political active civil-military relation established after the mutiny in 1964 no longer fit in the multipart system. In addition to that, this shows that the politicised army that some African scholars have pointed out is no longer valid in multiparty democracy. In Tanzania, the Nyalali Commission proposed a new way that have been keeping Tanzania army out of politics but the ties between the ruling party and the army are still visible. The only thing that differentiates Tanzania and Uganda is that, the army in Tanzania is in support of the continuity of the party in power not in the leaders. In Uganda Museveni has managed to control and end the coup tendencies of the Ugandan army. However, the army has been in various cases in the support of the continuity of Museveni in power and that brings us to my argument that army plays a crucial role in keeping presidents in power in Uganda.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This thesis sought to address government transitions and the role played by armies in East Africa. The study examined the civil-military relations in East Africa since pre-colonial era to answer the research question, why Kenya and Tanzania have managed peaceful governmental change but Uganda has failed. This thesis employed country level and individual level analysis and various theories of civil-military relations. Even though the theories failed to explain each case of East Africa, they provided general understanding of civil-military relations and they provided the reasons for military interventions and offer remedy for controlling military intervention.

By using comparative historical analysis, the main findings show that, in the first phase during the pre-colonial period, armies existed in East Africa apart from the armies were not modern state armies. During the colonial period, the British had managed to create a professional army in East Africa. During the whole period under the British Authority, King's Africa Rifle was political neutral. In second phase, during the early years of independence there were no civil-military relations in East Africa (Luanda 2003, Lupogo 2001; 2003 and Parson 2003; 2007). Moreover, until the outbreak of the mutinies in 1964 all East African countries were the same political and economic. The mutinies were not only the cross road to civil military relations but also the divergence of the East African countries. Strong political institutions and availability of external threats in Kenya and Tanzania had helped to the creation of loyal and discipline armies apart from Tanzania had failed to create professional one. The success of Tanzanian army had created debate among scholars

that, the existed civil-military relations are Western based theories that they don't fit in explain African cases. Scholars like Auma-Osoto (1980), Emizet (2000), and Omari (2002) have refuted the Huntington's professionalism as the main factor that keeps the army from intervening and they suggested that politicised army better explains some cases like Tanzania's case, civil-military relations than Huntington's professionalism.

Huntington has put an emphasis on the professionalism of the army as the main factor for keeping the army out of politics. Furthermore, in contrary Uganda failed to create strong political institutions which could refrain the army from intervention, the Ugandan army had become the determinant of who should rule and for how long during the whole period after mutinies. Museveni had managed to control the army from its nature of overthrowing civilian government because since he came to power in 1986 no coup has happened in Uganda but apart from this, the army has been keeping its tradition of determining who should rule and for how long.

Furthermore, the third phase of 1990's was dominated by shift from single party to multiparty system. Even though East African leader were reluctant from adopting multipartism, external and internal forces had pushed to accept it. The shift had required the new civil-military relations. Kenya had produced professional army early after the mutiny so it was not difficult for the leaders to rebuild the civil-military relations. In Tanzania, under the presidency of Ali Hassan Mwinyi the reforms were made to that changed Tanzania civil-military relations from political active to apolitical (professionalism). Apart from this change, the ties between the ruling party and the army are still visible. Even though these ties were seen during period of president Mkapa and Kikwete (3rd and 4th), the continuity of the ties have been so visible under the current president Magufuli on his preference of current serving and retired military personnel in the government. Even though, these ties have been existing in Tanzania the presence of strong institutions have been refraining Tanzanian army from intervening into politics. Thus, Tanzanian and Kenyan army have been determining or installing leaders in power. In contrary to Uganda, the absences of strong political institutions have demolished the lines between the army, the president and the party. The Ugandan army apart from changed its nature making coups the army has been indirectly supporting Museveni. As Kwok (2010) argued that military played a great role in supporting the

government and it acts as a tool to crush down all opposition voices and appointing active or retired officers to hold government jobs.

Moreover, the political active civil-military relations that was developed by Tanzania and other African countries, that some scholars had suggest that can explain civil-military relations in Africa is no longer work now. The time scholars like Auma-Osolo (1980), Emizet (2000), Omari (2002) suggesting majority of the African countries were under single party system but now all the countries have embraced multipartism, that the army should be political neutral so that to allow equal and fair participation of all parties. In addition to that, apart from the civil-military relations theories do not explain at best the current indirect role of the army in politics still Huntington's principle holds great value in abstaining from all forms of military-intervention in politics.

Furthermore, this study did not intend to develop new theories of civil-military relations but through analysing the research question it can be studded that some scholars' contribution in the study are no longer valid in explaining the development of civil-military relations in East Africa. Even though there is a shift of the role of the army from direct role of violence and coup making, of which the existing theories intended to explain, Huntington's professionalism still hold great value. Moreover, apart from the theories have explained to some extent the development of civil-military relations in East Africa the role of individual leader cannot be ignored. Apart from many African countries adopting multiparty democracy, still African countries have not developed strong political system like Western countries. Thus, the development of civil-military relations is affected by individual leaders as seen in the development of civil-military relations in East Africa. The scholars and policy makers should study in detail the relations between president Museveni and the army to understand why Museveni is not leaving power because his presence has been badly influencing the neighbouring countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic of Congo and South Sudan, the countries that have gone similar path with Uganda and their presidents are former military personnel.

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