

A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP:
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR



ÇAĞLAR DİNCİOĞLU

JULY 2018



A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP:
ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
IZMIR UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS

BY

ÇAĞLAR DİNCİOĞLU

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

JULY 2018

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences




Assoc. Prof. Dr. Efe BİRESSELİOĞLU

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in Social Science and International Relations.



Prof. Dr. Çiğdem KENTMEN


This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science in Social Science and International Relations.



Prof. Dr. Filiz BAŞKAN

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Filiz BAŞKAN



Assoc. Prof. Dr Müge AKNUR



Dr. Serhun AL



ABSTRACT

This thesis has been written to analyze the Anglo-American relations during the Cold War. In this regard, the historical determinants and characteristics of this close relationship between the United States of America (USA), on one side, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), on the other, will be explained by using the realist theory of international relations.

In line with this perspective and theoretical framework, it will be argued that the Anglo-American alliance was a result of power calculations of both states and their geopolitical determinants. The United States' main objective from the very beginning of the Cold War was the containment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the prevention of the spread of communism, perceived as a threat for the grand strategy of the USA. On the other hand, the UK aimed to continue its imperial policies and to prevent the rise of a potential hegemon in Europe that could be a threat to Britain's survival and interests.

Despite some breaking points and conflicts of interests, this Anglo-Saxon Transatlantic alliance flourished and created a special relationship between the USA and the UK that displays closer relations with each other than with their other allies, i.e. in the fields of security, intelligence sharing and politics.

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı Soğuk Savaş dönemi boyunca Britanya-Birleşik Devletler ilişkilerini analiz etmektir. Bu anlamda, Birleşik Krallık ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri arasındaki yakın ilişkinin tarihsel belirleyicileri ve tarihsel özellikleri realist uluslararası ilişkiler teorisi çerçevesinde açıklanacaktır.

Bu perspektif doğrultusunda, Britanya-Amerika ittifakının her iki devletin de güç hesaplarının ve jeopolitik belirleyicilerin bir sonucu olduğu bu çalışmada ortaya konulmaya çalışılmaktadır. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Soğuk Savaşın başından itibaren dış politikasının hedefinde, Sovyetler Birliği'nin dengelenmesi ve Amerikan küresel stratejisine bir tehdit olarak görülen komünizmin yayılmasının önlenmesi olmuştur. Diğer taraftan, Britanya için 2. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında temel öncelik, denizaşırı imparatorluğuna dair politikalarını bu savaş ertesinde de devam ettirebilmek ve Avrupa kıtasında kendi çıkarlarına ve hatta varlığına tehdit oluşturabilecek potansiyel bir hegemon gücün ortaya çıkmasının engellenmesi olarak şekillenmiştir.

Bazı önemli kırılma noktalarına ve çıkar çatışmalarına rağmen Britanya-Amerika ilişkileri, bu çalışmaya konu olan dönemde gelişmeye devam etmiş ve Birleşik Krallık ile Birleşik Devletler arasında, güvenlik, istihbarat ve dış siyaset konularında diğer müttefikleri ile olandan daha yakın bir işbirliği içinde bulunma halini ifade eden “Özel [bir] İlişki” ortaya çıkmıştır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my special thanks to the Izmir Economic University for affording me great opportunity to fulfill this master thesis. I would like to thank to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Balkan Devlen that gave me strong impetus to write this thesis. In addition, I thank my advisors Dr. Işık Gürleyen and Dr. Ozan Arslan who assisted in fulfilling this master thesis. My gratitude and sincere thanks go my family that have supported me through it all. My special thanks also goes to my dear niece, Ayza Lâl Topuzođlu, who brought me the luck to fulfill this master thesis.

ABSTRACT.....	v
ÖZET.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	8
1. INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY and LITERATURE REVIEW.....	10
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS	19
3. ANALYSIS OF TRADITIONAL FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE US AND THE UK BEFORE WWII.....	25
3.1. Fundamentals of the American Foreign Policy until WWII	
3.2. Fundamentals of the British Foreign Policy until WWII	
4. EMERGENCE OF THE COLD WAR, A NEW ERA IN THE UK-US RELATIONS AND THE ‘SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP’.....	41
4.1. Strategic Landscape after WWII	
4.2. Emergence of the Cold War	
4.2.1. The Yalta Conference	
4.2.2. The Potsdam Conference	
4.2.3. Creation of Western Bloc: the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan	
4.2.3.1. The Truman Doctrine	
4.2.3.2. The Marshal Plan and the Establishment of the OEEC	
4.2.3.3. The Creation of Eastern Bloc by Soviet Union	
4.2.3.4. The Division of Germany, Formation of the NATO and Western Unity	

5.	CHANGING DYNAMICS OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE UK DURING THE COLD WAR.....	54
	5.1. Disagreements and Collaborations during the Eisenhower Era in the 1950's	
	5.2. Fluxes and Refluxes in the 1960's: Skybold and Vietnam	
	5.3. The United Kingdom and the European Economic Community (EEC)	
6.	AN ANALYSIS OF THE US-UK RELATIONS TOWARDS THE END OF THE COLD WAR.....	71
	6.1. Thatcher-Reagan: Peak of the Special Relationship	
7.	CONCLUSION.....	80
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	84

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY and LITERATURE REVIEW

After the Second World War, the world order was dramatically changed and reshaped by the new power blocs. Following the total defeats of Germany, Italy and Japan, the multipolar order of the pre-WWII era vanished and a new bipolar order emerged. During this process, while the USA emerged as the biggest military and industrial power of the world, as one of the leading former great powers of the world, the British Empire entered a gradual and structural declining phase. The trademark of the post-WWII Anglo-American alliance is a result of such a process.

On one hand, despite losing its power Britain continued to be a member of the Great Powers club by managing a peaceful power transition to the United States and did not need to abandon completely its own foreign policy agenda. On the other hand, although the United States did not want to be the protector of the British territorial possessions, the atmosphere of the Cold War and the expansion of the post-WWII Soviet influence forced the Americans eventually to undertake this task.

This master thesis centrally focus on the Cold War partnership between the UK and the USA on different political issues such as nuclear, geopolitical and intelligence cooperation and it emphasizes the historical roots and structures of the Anglo-American relations in international politics.

In light of this, this research seeks to answer the following questions;

“How did this cooperation emerge and which political and which strategic conjuncture forced this cooperation?”

“How and where can we locate this relationship in the theoretical fields of International Relations (IR)?”

“What were the necessities of this partnership both during WWII and the Cold War?”

“What were the main dynamics, characteristics and nature of this partnership?”

In this regard, this master thesis comprises of five chapters and a conclusion. Following this introduction, the first chapter will provide the theoretical framework and answer the questions of why Constructivism and Liberalism do not suffice to explain the Anglo-American alliance.

The third chapter analyzes and compares the historical backgrounds and evolutions of the British and American power and foreign policies from the beginning of 19th century to the period of WWII.

The fourth chapter analyzes the conditions in the emergence of the Cold War. It also examines the positions and projections about post-WWII order of these two Anglo-Saxon states by comparing their respective power resources, political strengths and weaknesses.

The fifth chapter investigates the conflict of interests between the USA and the UK in different regions and areas of the globe and examines how they dealt with these crises.

The sixth chapter discusses the evolution of the Anglo-American alliance in the face of the changing dynamics of global and regional politics towards the end of the Cold War. Finally, this study concludes that the Anglo- American relations constituted indeed a special relationship in the spheres of economics, politics and military among others. During the Cold War, however, these close relations did not completely prevent these two powers' separate quests on different interest fields. Sometimes, these different quests crucially conflicted with each other and damaged the alliance. Nevertheless, in contrast to their other alliances, the USA and the UK knew to restore their close relationship after each crisis.

Methodology

This master thesis studies the Anglo-American relations during the Cold War by analyzing its key events, leaders and fundamental political strategies of these countries. Accordingly, the main perspectives, policies and expectations of both sides during the specific eras within the Cold War period will be examined.

In this regard, I have chosen the international relations theory of Realism as the theoretical framework for this paper and as a battering ram for the analysis of it. To capture the nature of the Anglo-American relations, the existing theories of international relations other than Realism cannot present a comprehensive perspective about the Anglo-American relations. Due to the fact that the Anglo-American alliance was shaped by power disparity among the two powers, geopolitical necessities and security threats for both, the international relations

theories of Liberalism and Constructivism could not explain such a power and state centric affair.

Starting with pre-WWII period and traditional foreign policies of both Anglo-Saxon powers, main determinants of their foreign policy-making behaviors will be examined. The WWII-era strategic positions of the USA and the UK, their respective foreign policies and the eventual strategic power shift among the two Anglo-Saxon states in world politics will also be examined. The origins and structural causes of the Cold War, key events and cornerstones in the Cold War politics are also analyzed in terms of the Anglo-American relations.

Therefore, this master thesis intends to offer a research work on the American and British foreign policies and the Anglo-American relations in the second half of the 20th century by combining the Realist international relations theory and the Cold War-era politics of the two Anglo-Saxon powers.

The empirical sources of this research consist of historical speeches of statesmen of both states as well as the interviews they granted; texts of the official accords and agreements; diplomatic correspondence and papers (as primary sources) and scholarly books, articles and biographies (as secondary sources).

Literature Review

Many scholars and specialists on the disciplines of Diplomatic History and International Relations have intensely debated the issue of the history of WWII and its events, the alliances and foreign policy decisions of states that joined the conflict. For instance, Lightbody (1999), analyzed the origins of the Cold War and its groupings, conflicts, confrontations, armaments and political panoramas of its total history (Lightbody, 1999).

Similarly, Reynolds (2006) explored the main dynamics of WWII and determinants of alliances between parties and states. Reynolds also explains the personal behaviors and their underlying reasons of the attitudes of the leaders of the USA and Britain. Reynolds also gives a comprehensive analysis of the Cold War and its dynamics in terms of the Anglo-American Alliance.

Dumbrell (2006), studied the key events and key political actors of the Anglo-American relations from the prelude to WWII to the post-Cold War era. In his book, he also presents the socio-economic reasons and determinants of this alliance between the UK and the USA. Additionally, Dumbrell answered the questions of “despite critical breaking points of this relationship how and why this alliance has survived?” The roles of cultural affinities and contrasts between the Britons and the Americans, their respective feelings and mass perceptions about their foreign policy orientations are other striking features of this book.

In addition, there are also studies that rely on century-long historical period in the Anglo-American Relations. For example, Hollowell (2001) detailed investigation is made on the British-American relations throughout a century-long period. The essays of book, is a collection that touches on all of the major dimensions of the Anglo-American relations. In a similar vein, Dobson (2002) examined the Anglo-American Relations from its beginning to end of the 20th Century. Similarly, Ovendale (1998) did another comprehensive work on this issue. Ovendale’s study begins with the American War of Independence and extends beyond the post-Cold War era. McCausland and Stuart (2006) editorial gave different perspectives on different areas such as economic/financial, security/defense and legal aspects of the Anglo-American alliance by different authors.

Leffler and Painter (2005), presented a general illustration of the strategic reasons of contradictions of the foreign policies of the two superpowers: the USSR and the USA. Jerald, Combs and Combs (1997) is one of the fundamental sources of this thesis and a well-rounded study for the American foreign policy. The article of Fontaine (1980), analyzed the crisis that threatened the transatlantic alliance until and during the 1980’s and gives a meaningful perspective with different samples. Just like Fontaine’s article Stanley Hoffman (1981) discusses also the contradictions, crisis and expectations of the members of transatlantic alliance and draws attention to origins of the divergences such as geography, history and domestic politics of these countries. Alex Danchev (2006) focused on questioning of the “specialness” of this special relationship with a critical perspective and historical line. David Reynolds (1988) gives an historical analysis of the USA-UK special relationship and concludes with the idea that the classical meaning of the “Special Relationship” during the Cold War has changed and the Britain’s political orientation became more European than

ever before at the end of the 1980's. Smith (2014) underlines the quality of the US-UK relations in line with the events of this era, especially before and after Suez Crisis. Dobson (1990) article is an analysis of a transitional era after the Suez Crisis and an examination of “reinforcement years” in terms of the economic, political and security dimensions of the “Special Relationship”.

Douglas Brinkley (1990) analyzed Dean Acheson's historical speech in 1962. In his speech, Acheson said:

Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate power role — that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on a ‘special relationship’ with the United States, a role based on being head of a ‘commonwealth’ which has no political structure, or unity, or strength — this role is about played out. Great Britain, attempting to be a broker between the United States and Russia, has seemed to conduct policy as weak as its military power (Baylis, 1997:129).

This part of the speech led to a diplomatic crisis between Britain and the United States. This article manifests the reflection of this scandalous expression on both sides. Laçiner (2001) studied the historical and cultural affinities of these two states and the historical development of the Anglo-American alliance in the view of a Turkish scholar of IR.

On the other hand, there are studies that examine the security and intelligence aspects of this relationship. Such as studies include Baylis (1981) which focused on defense and security dimension of the Anglo-American collaboration. Clark (2008) gave a detailed insight on intelligence sharing between the USA and the UK .Ruane (2006) investigated the security problems and realities of the 1950's in the Middle East in line with the Anglo-American alliance. As one of the most important moments of the USA-UK relations in the Cold War, the analysis of the Suez Crisis and its details were exposed by Varble (2003). Varble manifests various dimensions of the crisis

such as its military implications as well as the stances and expectations of Britain, Israel and France and an explanatory summary of the event.

Moreover, some works used in this thesis deal specifically with the British Foreign Policy and its history. For instance, Elst (2008), effectively summarizes the historical character and orientations of the British Foreign Policy. In a study Nutter (2004), indicates the importance of the leaders and their roles on the British Foreign Policy from Elizabeth I to Tony Blair and gives historical examples of their foreign policy preferences. White (2002) demonstrates the reflections of *Détente* era on British Foreign Policy from its very beginning to the end of the Cold War. Webster (1984), article draws attention to factors that explain the roots of the British Foreign Policy with geopolitical and historical perspectives. Deighton (1990), editorial book is a collection of articles dealing with the British Foreign Policy with different foreign policy areas and issues from 1945 to 1955. Rasmussen and McCormick (1993) stressed that unlike the elites of Britain, British public opinion and masses do not admire or appreciate the relationship between the UK and the USA. In this regard, most of the British populace were quite critical about the international actions of the US, just like other European masses. Whereas, the British elites continued to admire the United States and protect their beliefs about United States.

As another important dimension of the Anglo-American relations, the European affairs of these two powers were crucial for the security and economy of transatlantic relations during the Cold War. In this regard, there are other sources that are used in this thesis, for example; David Ryan (2003) which examines the breaking points and reflections of these key events and policies of 20th Century in the US Foreign Policy regarding Europe. Ryan's work begins with the Monroe Doctrine and traditional pillars of the US Foreign Policy and goes through the First and the Second World War periods (including the Interwar Era), the Cold War and post-Cold War years.

The study of Schwab (2005) is an analysis about the grand strategies of the United States, Great Britain and France in terms of European integration. According to this article, while de Gaulle wanted to create a political union of the Western European countries in a purified form, free from the American influence and hegemony; the Americans and the British were worried about nationalistic economic protectionism. Therefore, the Americans endorsed British membership in the EEC to boost free

market policies in the European continent. The British were pursuing a balanced relationship between the Europeans and the Americans along with the protection of Commonwealth economic interests. They also wanted to be a member of the EEC and recreate their global power status with this new perspective. Robb (2010) explores the tensions between the UK and the USA on European politics, NATO commitments and reflections that stems from the UK's accession to the EEC their times and their responses, their rivalry and common points during the 1972-3 period. In his book, Mangold (2006) examines these two important leaders of the Cold War. The book also analyzes the critical events of Hughes' book which analyzes the difficulties and contradictions in British Foreign Policy from the early years of the Cold War to 1967. The desire of *détente* with the USSR and the protection of good relations with West Germany constituted a quite sensible balance and problematic issue for the British foreign policy. On the issue of Europeanization of the British foreign policy, this book has been highly influential and beneficial for this research work.

Brummer (2012), investigated the foreign relations, economic relations, defense issues, problems and solutions of the US and the UK with the European Economic Community during the aforementioned years. In addition, it is an analysis of Britain's application for membership to the European Community and that of American reactions to this event during the Nixon-Heath era. Ellison (2007) stresses that one of the biggest threats to the Western Alliance was the French leader Charles de Gaulle and his nationalistic ambitions during the 1960's. In his book, he also explains the fundamentals of policies of De Gaulle and responses given by the Anglo-American camp, especially between 1963 and 1968.

A comprehensive study of the history of the Anglo-American relations in the second half of the 20th century reveals that the USA and the UK had been in a special relationship in the areas of economy, politics and military throughout the Cold War. However, this close relationship did not prevent them to further their own separate national interests. Divergent individual state interests led sometimes even to clashes which temporarily harmed the Anglo-American alliance. For instance, the 1983 US intervention to topple the leader of Grenada - which was a member state of the British Commonwealth, irritated seriously Britain which felt its status and prestige over a former colonial territory severely compromised. However, it is particularly

noteworthy to emphasize that the peculiarity of the USA-UK special relationship and alliance lies also in its ability to recover and to restore swiftly the partnership after the crises, unlike many other strategic alliances.

The Anglo-American relations constituted a unique form of alliance during the course of the last century. Its uniqueness was also due to the fact that the post-WWII economic decline triggered a major concern in London about losing its ties with the overseas Commonwealth countries and in turn this fear pushed the UK to peacefully hand over its leading Anglo-Saxon Great Power role to the USA in order to preserve and safeguard the British interest over the Commonwealth.

This research work aims at making a modest contribution to fill the gap in the existing corpus of master theses. This study posits that the Anglo-American alliance was a result of interest and power calculation. On one hand, the USA tried to prevent the spread of communism by its diplomatic, economic, military and nuclear power. On the other hand, the UK aimed at keeping its imperial policies and preventing the rise of a new hegemon in Europe, all of which conform to the Realist theory. These two Anglo-Saxon states tried to safeguard their respective national interests as they pursued their own foreign policy agendas. For instance, the 1967 Soviet-led Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia increased the fears of a growing Soviet power and a Moscow-orchestrated spread of communism in the United States. In order to contain such a threat, the USA supported Europe's economy through financial aid and favored the European integration. However, the British were skeptical of a swiftly recovering and even rising power of the Western continental Europe seeing it as a challenge to its own national power and interest.

The USA internalized the idea that the economic welfare of Europe was to lead to reduce the huge American defense spending aiming at containing the "communist threat" and that Europe was a very large potential market to the American products. These two convictions paved also the way for the US support to the UK's admission into the European Economic Community. Yet, the British admission into the Community was vetoed twice by the French president Charles De Gaulle. De Gaulle openly argued that the UK was to be a Trojan horse in the EEC and it was willing to be a part of the Continent's common market and economic union rather than of its structure of political integration and London wanted to protect the common interests

of the Anglo-American alliance within the Continental Europe and the European Economic Community.

Although some other theories can also explain to some extent the nature of the Anglo-American relations, the approach that I adopted for this study is the Realist approach. I did this on purpose because the Realist theory provides a clearer and more encompassing picture and analysis of the relationship. Although, a common history, common institutions and common identity could be useful in analyzing – explaining to a certain extent - the 20th century Anglo-American relations and alliance, they, however, are not holistic in explaining what really happened during the volatile Cold War era.

The Britons, who experienced invasion by the Vikings, the Danish, the Normans and the French throughout their political history developing hence an inherited suspicion and concern about the political goals of the other European powers, on one hand and the Americans on the other, internalized the idea and the need to prevent the rise of a hegemony on the European continent. This common pattern can be studied and analyzed and best be understood through the Realist “Balance of Threat” theory, the reason of alliance formation as a reaction of states that face security threats.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS

The explanation of the alliance of states or cooperation on different areas in terms of their foreign policies is one of the most complex issues of the discipline of International Relations. Despite many discussions from different angles of the IR theories, the questions of “why, how, and when states make alliance with other states?” and “how they select their partners” are continuing to protect its vividness for many. However, in the issue of the alliance creation and cooperation on strategic fields, most reliable and satisfying answers and challenging explications are given by the scholars of the realist school of thought in IR. In this sense, theoretical framework of this thesis relies on the realist theory and the analysis of the Anglo-American Relations in this thesis will be made with the realist foreign policy approaches. Before the analysis of the Anglo-American Alliance in terms of the realist international relations theory, I am going to give an answer to the question of “what is realism?”

The history of the realist school of thought dates back to Thucydides and ancient times and it is also accepted as hegemonic theory in the IR. Realism is a worldview that explains the origins and reasons of the politics, especially international politics. For the realists, human nature is inherently selfish and evil-prone. States are the main actors of international politics and international politics is deprived of a central authority that maintains the *status quo* among states and prevent them from harming each other and therefore it is an anarchical area. To secure their survival and to protect their interests from potential aggressors, states should obtain power. According to the realist theory, power is the only key factor of international politics.

The realist school of thought has different fractions in itself, like the classic realist and neo-realist schools. For instance, the classical realists think that the main reason of the conflicts and wars in international politics is the human nature. (Morgenthau, 1993: 4) States are selfish and insatiable power hungry creations like the human beings, therefore security and power are naturally their existential desires.

The Neo-realists, which are divided into two groups as the defensive and the offensive realists. They differ in their perspectives on the question of “why states

need power?" For both factions, unlike the classical realists, war and conflict comes from structural reasons and imbalances of the international system. While the offensive realists think that best way for survival and security is building hegemony and increasing power in the system, the defensive realist are prone to maintain their security without aggression and to preserve power for protection from threats.

Nevertheless, they have common points in Realist tradition in the understanding of the international system. According to these features, international system is a state-centered system, its main actor are namely states. The international system is an anarchical system where there is no supreme or hierarchical authority to regulate the system, therefore every state has to protect itself from the threats that can endangered their existence. For the realists, as in Kant's famous phrase, the natural condition is the condition of war. In this condition of vigilance and insecurity, states seek to prevent possible dangers by improving their own power (economic and military capabilities) or by sharing power with creations of alliances in the international system.

Alliances are created by two or more states in formal or informal ways with different circumstantial expectations such as diplomatic or military supports, mainly for minimizing the threats. The main reason to create an alliance for weak states is to gain protection and defense capability with a strong ally. For the stronger side, alliances are desirable in order to improve capabilities and to protect the balance of power while competing with other strong rivals. In this sense, while alliances are highly beneficial in terms of security, economy and survival of state, by contrast, those who cause others to align against them are at a significant disadvantage.

In the realist discussions about alliances, there are two main views about the reasons of the balance formation. The first one is the balance of power theory (BoT), which sees the alliance formation as a consequence of balance of power, and the second one is the balance of threat, which sees the reason of alliance formation as a reaction of states that face security threats.

As one of the cornerstones of the realist school of thought during the 20th Century, Kenneth N. Waltz, in his influential book "The Theory of International Relations", says that balancing is a sensible behavior when the victory of one coalition over another leaves weaker members of the winning coalition at the mercy of the stronger

one. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and safer provided, of course, the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking (Waltz, 1979: 126).

Stephen Walt in his influential book “**Origins of Alliances**”, in which he reformulated the views of Kenneth Waltz, claims that states make alliance because they need protection. Their alliance perspective does not come from balance of power concerns; because they need to ally with other states in terms of balance of threats. For Walt, threat perception of states that comes from threatening state, relies on various indicators, as aggregation of power, geographic proximity, offensive power, aggressive intentions. Moreover, states make alliance for different reasons such as ideological solidarity and economic aid.

The alliances are most commonly viewed as a response to threats, yet there is sharp disagreement as to what that response will be. When entering into an alliance, states may either balance (allying in opposition to the principal source of danger) or bandwagon (ally with the state that poses the major threat) (Walt, 1985:4). Additionally, Walt claims that general tendency of alliances is balancing the most threatening state rather than bandwagoning with it. At this point, the concept Bandwagoning means that when foreign policy of a relatively small state in the face of and dangerous and threatening aggressor state failed, this relatively small state follows a foreign policy strategy with choosing to join the stronger or threatening side and comfort with it to guarantee its survival and to be able to cope with the risk of aggression (Walt, 1987: 32). Stephen Walt also divides bandwagoning strategy into two groups as offensive and defensive bandwagoning strategy. In addition, Walt shows the importance of ideological proximity and solidarity of states in alliance. According to him, it is easier to choose an ally that has similar ideology and cultural values.

Walt identifies four possibilities regarding the effect of ideological proximity in the alliance formation.

First, alignment with similar states may be viewed as a way of defending one's own political principles. After all, if statesmen believe their own system of government is inherently good, then protecting

states with similar systems must be considered good as well. Second, states with similar traits are likely to fear one another less, because they find it harder to imagine an inherently good state deciding to attack them. Third, alignment with similar states may enhance the legitimacy of a weak regime by demonstrating that it is part of a large, popular movement. Fourth, the ideology itself may prescribe alignment. (Walt, 1987:34)

Despite they had not signed a formal alliance treaty, the USA and the UK were in fact in a kind of alliance relationship, and they acted with reference to the issue of European politics from the Monroe Doctrine until Pearl Harbor Attack. This natural alliance emerged with common interests of these two countries to prevent the domination of Europe by one power and to preserve the balance of power in European and World politics.

As in Stephen Walt's description, the Anglo-American alliance during the Cold War occurred with such a backdrop. In WWII, Britain was assisted by the US and an important portion of Western Europe liberated with American military intervention. After WWII, once the threat of the USSR became evident, Britain was once again in need of the American help in the face of the Soviet threat and the USA had to prevent the rise of the USSR as a new hegemony of Europe. As in Churchill's famous statements, "for four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating power on the Continent" (T.V. Paul James, 2004:33), alliance with the USA was a serious geopolitical obligation for Britain. At the same time, British economic decline became apparent in the fulfilling of the economic and military support to Greece and Turkey. In addition, the British military power was also in decline and Britain had only 847.000 men under arms, while the USSR had 2.87 million and the USA 1.36 million in 1948. In the struggle against the USSR threat, the British had no better option than an alliance with the United States. Moreover, the British did not have sufficient material power to compete with the USSR. For instance, in 1950 the USSR had a gross national product (GNP) of \$126 billion, and it was spending \$15.5 billion on defense while the UK had a GNP of \$71 billion and was spending 2.3 billion on defense (Mearsheimer, 2001:328).

In this period, this interaction between the weaker side (in this case Britain) and the stronger one (the United States) was transformed into an alliance with the realist power assessments of these countries. Thence, while the British perspective was an offensive bandwagoning strategy with the US, the US perspective was relying on a balancing strategy with Britain against the USSR. The British hoped protection against this latter with the US support, and the Americans aimed at uniting forces with Britain (first against the Third Reich during WWII and later) against the USSR. In the longer term, the gradual decline of the British power and the gradual rise of the American power during the Cold War has led to a clearer structure of this alliance and to clearer roles for both parties.

By the same token, some scholars are critical about analyzing the Anglo-American relations in terms of the alliance theories. As having critical views about theoretical assessments of the Anglo-American Alliance, Raymond Dawson and Richard Rosecrance did not agree with these analyses. Their article claims that conventional alliance theories cannot explain the Anglo-American alliance and they say, “nevertheless” this is an alliance that one of the most durable of nuclear age (Dowson & Rosecrance, 1966).

The liberal international relations theory mostly engages with international peace and cooperation in international economy and international politics. Despite the strong liberal traditions of the parties of the Anglo-American alliance and their defenses on international free trade and promoting the liberal values is not properly useful for their alliance.

Because, sometimes collective peace and free trade perspective was in conflict because of their conflict of interests and different perspectives on the solutions of global and regional problems. For instance, during the Cold War, in spite of the American skepticism and opposition, British developed commercial relations with the Chinese, the Eastern European countries and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (The USSR). In addition, in contrast to British perspectives about the Korean and the Vietnam wars, the USA entered to these wars. Similarly, the British against the American will and perspective declared a war Egypt during the Suez Channel Crisis. Owing to the aforementioned, it is apparent that the countries

struggles during the Cold War could not be comprehensively captured by employing the Liberal Approach.

The Anglo-American relations, which are historically described as a special relationship between the US and the UK, were always assessed as a complex relationship because of the human factors. For instance, the UK and the USA have a common culture, common language, common identity and ideological views for the international politics. Despite the fact that human factors and common social institutions could be useful in the constructivist analysis of the Anglo-American relations, actually they are not enough for taking a broader picture and capture an in-depth understanding for this work. The policy makers of the USA and the UK were very well aware of the international order. International order was in a situation that lacks a central authority to impose order and they have to protect their survival and interests by any means. They used the human factors to legitimize their policies and making easier. Therefore, the arguments and perspective of social constructivist approaches do not give a true explanation for the Anglo-American relations.

CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS OF TRADITIONAL FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE US AND THE UK BEFORE WWII

3.1. Fundamentals of the American Foreign Policy until WWII

The political history and perspectives of the “Founding Fathers” of the United States of America and values of Declaration of Independence deeply affected the US foreign policy. The United States have gained its independence from Britain, which was a European power, with a revolution and therefore, American policy makers had always been very skeptical about the intentions of the European powers in the Western Hemisphere. This struggle has visibly described the American foreign policy during the late 18th century and early 19th century and partly until now.

As one of the founding fathers of the USA, George Washington had drawn the limits of the American Foreign Policy in his Farewell Address on 19 September 1796. In this address, Washington recommended the refraining from joining European conflicts and preserve neutrality between them.

Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities (Washington: 2000:26).

Moreover, he wanted to preserve the neutral position of the US from permanent alliance and isolation in the Western Hemisphere and to promote free trade with all nations of the world. Although Washington was in no sense the father of American isolationism, since he recognized the necessity of temporary associations for “extraordinary emergencies,” he did counsel against the establishment of “permanent alliances with other countries,” connections that he warned would inevitably be subversive of the America’s national interest (Washington: 2000:15). Washington’s Secretary of State and the third President of United States, Thomas Jefferson, declared that the preservation of the liberty is the indispensable principle of the US

and therefore he saw the best way to preservation and development of freedom was policy of aloofness and political detachment from international affairs (Eugene R. Witt Kopf, Christopher M. Jones and Jr. Charles W. Kegley: 2008: 31).

After Washington's tenure, the isolationist perspective became visible and longstanding tenet of American foreign policy. The Convention of 1800, the Treaty of Mortefontaine between France and the United States was abrogated in line with Washington's address. Washington's non-interventionist and isolationist approaches did not prevent territorial expansionism of the United States. The Founding Fathers of United States saw that there was no contradiction between non-interventionist and isolationist discourse on one side and anti-colonial criticism of European imperialism and westward expansionism of the United States on the other. Because they considered the westward expansion was a domestic issue of the United States it could not be considered as a foreign policy issue (Kissinger: 1994: 31).

During the tenure of the third President Thomas Jefferson, the United States had purchased huge and strategically very important territories on the west side of the Mississippi River with Louisiana Purchase from France in 1803 and Florida was also later acquired from the Spanish in 1819.

In 1823, as the fifth President of the United States, James Monroe, declared a new principle for American foreign affairs, which was to be later called the "Monroe Doctrine". This principle was an integral phase of Washington's previous perspective that expresses refrain from joining European balance of power politics and it has been referred to as a "diplomatic declaration of independence"(Ryan: 2003:7).

The three main concepts of the doctrine were: "separate spheres of influence for the Americas and Europe", "non-colonization" and "non-intervention", and they were designed to signify a clear break between the New World and the autocratic realm of Europe (U.S. Department of State. The Monroe Doctrine, 1823 Office of Historian<<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/Monroe>>).With this declaration, the United States showed its "offensive realist" foreign policy, its regional ambitions and geopolitical interests in Western Hemisphere and threatened the Europeans with war in case of an intervention and colonialist acts to newly independent nations of Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine gave opportunity to the United States in the long term to concentrate its power to become a great

power in world politics and to build a regional hegemony and it legitimized geopolitical ambitions of the United States in the Western Hemisphere.

According to John Mearsheimer,

The United States established regional hegemony in the 19th century by relentlessly pursuing two closely linked policies. First one was expanding across North America and building the most powerful state in the Western Hemisphere, a policy commonly known as “Manifest Destiny”; and secondly, minimizing the influence of the United Kingdom and the other European great powers in the Americas, a policy commonly known as the “Monroe Doctrine”(Mearsheimer: 2014:239).

The Monroe Doctrine, which actually was a declaration of the quest of absolute security in the Western Hemisphere and wanted to create a state that is a completely secure from European balance of power politics, deeply affected the American foreign policy throughout the 19th and 20th centuries (Inman,1921:635-676). Its principles later became pillars of American geopolitics and world policy. David Ryan expresses that the doctrine had five decisive features on the American foreign policy:

Firstly, it was an affirmation of United States’ exceptionalism and underlined ideological differences between European states and Americans. Secondly, it created the basis for an enduring tendency in American diplomacy to conduct a policy based on geographical and ideological sphere of influence. Thirdly, the doctrine enhanced the image of the United States as a power that supports decolonization, while itself was free to colonize the West. Fourthly, opportunism, unilateralism or “independent internationalism” were characteristic features of the Doctrine. Fifthly, the Doctrine enhanced the tendency to extend national security interests beyond mere survival (Ryan: 2003:9).

Following the Monroe Doctrine, the United States continued to Westward expansion and demographic changes on the Native American people. Congress passed a law, which was called the “Indian Removal Act”, to remove Native Americans from the Southeast to the west of the Mississippi River in 1830. Following this law, indigenous peoples were forced to move from their lands in favor of the United States’ geopolitical expansion and many of them lost their lives in the process. In 1845, the United States annexed the ten-year old Republic of Texas (former Spanish and later Mexican province of Tejas). In 1846, following the annexation of Texas, disputed lands between Texas and Mexico between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande led to the American-Mexican War. As a consequence of this clash of arms, the United States conquered over half of the Mexican territory and became a continental state with Gadsden Purchase in 1853. Gadsden Purchase adjusted the disputed borders between the United States and Mexico. In the meantime, in the north, the Oregon Boundary Dispute with Britain was over.

Thus between the years of 1846 and 1848,

The United States’ territories had grown by 1.2 million square miles, or about 64 percent. The territorial size of the United States, according to the head of the Census Bureau, was now “nearly ten times as large as that of France and Britain combined; three times as large as the whole of France, Britain, Austria, Prussia, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland and Denmark together... and of equal extend with the Roman Empire or that of Alexander (Mearsheimer: 2014:244).

Along with the territorial expansions of the 19th Century, United States’ real strategic or geopolitical threat that faced was not outside of it; on the contrary, it was within it: the danger of Civil War that emerging from slavery problems of the Southern and Northern states of United States, its meaning was the possibility of United States breaking apart from inside. In 1861, Civil War became apparent and United States practically divided two groups. Northerners won a decisive victory over Southerners called as Confederacy followers. As a result of this bloody the Civil War, the United States lost more than 600.000 people (Kennedy: 1988: 179).

After four years of the Civil War, United States economically, politically and militarily turned into a hegemonic power in the Western Hemisphere. Nevertheless, the United States had not a powerful army or big military capacity to influence world politics or to pursue great power politics. For example, the United States had 34.000 military personal in 1880 while Russia had 791.000, France had 543.000 and Britain had 367.000 (Kennedy: 1988: 253).

In addition, the United States' population dramatically increased in the second half of the 19th century. Between 1850 and 1900, approximately 16.7 million immigrants came to the United States and with this increase the US population almost more than tripled (Mearsheimer: 2014: 246).

Moreover, in the decades following the Civil War, the United States emerged as a major industrial power and surpassed Europe's leading economies such as Britain, Germany and France. Such a power concentration gave the opportunity to back its foreign policy and to protect its national interests. It is a historical truism that the US has gained its Great Power status after the victory on the Spanish-American War in 1898, which gave it control over the fate of the Cuba, Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico, and also when it began building a sizeable military machine (Mearsheimer: 2014: 234).

In the 19th century, the American foreign policy was completely relying on the expansion of the state to secure from external and internal threats and to become hegemon of the Western Hemisphere. Without becoming hegemon, the United States had no chance to impose its policies outside of the Western Hemisphere. The struggles of the European powers among themselves facilitated the growth process of the US. While the United States was expanding its territories across the continent, it also established commercial relations with other states to increase its power through free trade and free market capitalism. Thus, between the times of the Civil War and the Spanish-American War, the United States' industrial potential and capacity dramatically increased (Loveman,2012)

As an economically colossal power, the United States could not be neutral anymore among the European or Asian balance of power struggles. In parallel with Theodore Roosevelt's presidency, most of the American policy makers saw that their national interests were intersecting with power struggles outside the Western Hemisphere as

well. US strategic calculations and goals were relying on the prevention of any hegemonic power both in Asia and Europe.

During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Theodore Roosevelt clearly declared the unfavorability of the Russian victory for the United States' national interest and indirectly supported the Japanese (Kissinger: 1994:27). The rise of Germany in Europe during the two World Wars led the United States policy makers to rethink the European balance of power and to prevent any possible hegemonic power in Europe. Therefore, Germany's hegemonic rise made the US closer to British and French and Americans pursued a policy to contain Germany in Europe.

The United States 'entering to WWI was a result of the Germany's lead the war and the US' entering related with the prevention of the Germany. Nevertheless, the United States' entry into WWI was not as an allied power, rather it was an associate power. President Wilson's liberal idealist discourse just the opposite to the European colonial powers and he wanted to create a world that does not include colonialism. Wilson was leading follower and supporter of self-determination of nations. He also was promoting the democracy as sole legitimate form of government and free market capitalism as an integral part of democracy. Furthermore, Wilson's liberal idealism was composing of global liberal-democratic ideology, which later called as the Wilsonian internationalism, was recommending international organizations to regulate international problems among states and extinguishing enmities and balance of power politics of 'Old World of Europe'.

Interestingly, the United States' entry to WWI served the recovery of American economy. United States entered the war with a depth of \$3.7 billion with surfaced in 1918 with a credit of \$3.8 billion (Ryan: 2003: 23). Moreover, the United States entry to WWI led to increase its influence at European and global scale and served her national interests such areas trade and ideological influence. The collapse of European empires such as Austria-Hungarian Empire, Tsarist Russia, Ottoman Empire, Germany and exhausting Britain and France facilitated the rise of the American influence on the European continent and at global scale. During this period, the United States continued to increase naval and land power capabilities.

If Germany had emerged as sole hegemon after WWI, it would be threatening for the United States' national interests in the world. After WWI, the United States preferred

to refrain from balance of power politics of Europe once again and sustained its traditional isolationist position until WWII. The refusal of US Senate to approve Versailles agreement and accession to League of Nations resulted with more problematic world and failure of the League of Nations.

Nearly two decades after the WWI, Germany once again ambitious about European hegemony and destroyed the balance of power. The danger of sole hegemony of Germany in Europe and its alliance relations were producing terrible threats for the USA security and her sphere of influence. Towards to 1940's, President Roosevelt several times underlined the needs of strategic understanding changes on foreign policy, criticized the Monroe Doctrine, and stressed its inadequacy about current strategic threats that the United States faced (Kissinger: 1994:383).

Then, despite non-interventionist public opinion, US was forced to enter WWII through Pearl Harbor attacks of Japanese in 1941. Four days after attack on Pearl Harbor, Germany officially declared war against the USA and American troops landed in Europe 1943.

3.2. Fundamentals of the British Foreign Policy until WWII

As in the US example, Britain has an unconquerable geography that shaped her foreign policy throughout the history. Britain separated from European continent with important sea masses and this feature gives the British a geopolitical supremacy over her enemies who aim to conquer the British land mass. Nevertheless, Britain was occupied by several European powers in history, such as Vikings, Normans, Danish and French (Elst: 2008:7). Because of these terrible memories, British rulers and foreign policy makers had always been sensible for the European powers and their intentions about Britain. However, most of the time, the geopolitical location gave the British a strategic shield from the aggressors. The geopolitics of Britain provides British a strategic isolation from the European or other invaders and functioning as a barrier. This geographical location had also enabled to improve unique the British customs, political culture, political institutions and law mentality.

In spite of the uniqueness of her socio-political structure and differences from continental European countries, British had always been affected by the European balance of power system. In this point, Mearsheimer says that the Great Britain had

followed an offshore balancing strategy as similar with the US in terms of European balance of power system. However, while British had feeling threats about their survival from Europe's potential hegemon; on the contrary, US had never been faced a survival threat from Europe's potential hegemon (Mearsheimer: 2014: 216-50). Nevertheless, as the USA, the Great Britain had always followed policies that prevent the decay of balance of power system in Europe to prevent the rise of a hegemonic power on the continent. Geographical character of Britain had differentiated her balance of power and security understanding from European powers. While European states were pursuing a policy that serves to increase its territorial size, British did not it. However, together with European powers, Britain shared the idea of preventing of the rise of a hegemon on the continent. This difference stemmed from the security perspective, because while the Europeans was seeing their survival guarantee was consisting of territorially expansion at the expense of their rivals, neighbors. British security understanding was different from them and British had never wished to territorially expansion on the continent. Rather than Europe, Britain's expansion policies were relying on her colonial policies in the Africa, Asia and the Western Hemisphere (Mandelbaum: 1989: 14).

Despite being seen as a contradictory perspective, Britain's approach to the continental strategy was consisting of two dimensional policy to the Europe. Britain's contradictory policy was that while she was continuously desiring not to intervene the European balance that include domestic and foreign affairs of states of Europe, she also was following a regulatory policy for European system to protect herself from threats.

The British offshore balancing strategy towards Europe was supported with geographical and economical interest description to pursue its policies. Economically, The British had always been an ardent follower of free trade either in Europe and world scale and she also had been sensitive about its commercial relations with her colonies and dominions. Threats for her colonies and commercial relations had always led to British vigilance. These geographical and economical threats had always obliged to the British have a powerful and functional naval power. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the Royal Navy had successfully fulfilled its duty and protected British interests.

In the wake of the French Revolution, Europe's imperial states faced with a destructive revolutionary threat that comes from revolutionary France and her ruler Napoleon Bonaparte. Bonaparte was in the search of hegemony in Europe via exporting revolutions in the traditional empires. Throughout the search of hegemony of France, Britain stayed most important opposition to Bonaparte with the collaboration of Continental powers. In this manner, British PM William Pitt sent a letter to Tsar of Russia in 1805 to make an alliance against the French's hegemonic ambitions. This letter was a remarkable sign of the British worries about European equilibrium. As a result of that process a coalition that is able to defeat the Napoleon was made and the Great Britain's desires became realized.

Defeat of the Napoleon and successful Congress of the Vienna had changed the geopolitical landscape of the continent and built international order in Europe. Until the Crimean War, Europe never witnessed a war between great powers of Europe. According to Vienna Settlement, great powers were agreed upon the territorial status quo, which they created in 1815, and not to allow territorial changes without the approval of great powers.

According to Mandelbaum;

Over the course of the next hundred years after the defeat of the Napoleon, the European governments' sense of what their security required changed. Their fear of revolution abated, or at least the tactics they adopted to resist is shifted. The perils of wars seemed less daunting, the goal of equilibrium less important, and the claims of Europe as a whole less pressing. The British definition of security, by contrast remained the same. Britain's relationship to the Continental powers on the matter of collective approaches to security therefore underwent a reversal. At the outset of the hundred years between the defeat of Napoleon and outbreak of WWI Britain was, in a sense, the least enthusiastic supporter of international collaboration- or rather, enthusiastic about the least extensive form of collaboration. By the end of this period, British were more committed than any of other great powers to a collective approach, and then any of the other great powers

to a collective approach, and they remained more committed after WWI (Mandelbaum: 1989: 19).

After the solution of the problem of the Napoleon and balance of power in Europe in Vienna, British-led “Concert of Europe” applied in the problems of the redistribution of the territories that taken from Napoleonic France.

According to Sheehan,

The Concert of Europe acted as a mechanism for transfer ring territory between the smaller and weak states. But it was not able to achieve the same success when the territorial disputes between two great powers. However, not collapse, it simply went into abeyance until a subsequent issue arose upon which the great powers were disposed to compromise. Lord John Russell, on behalf of the British government, neatly encapsulated this outlook in 1852, on the eve of the system’s collapse, declaring that, “any territorial increase of one Power...which disturbs the general balance of power in Europe, ...could not be a matter of indifference to this country, and would no doubt be the subject of a Conference, and might ultimately, if that balance was seriously threatened, lead to war (Sheehan: 2000:132).

The Concert of Europe or post-Vienna consensus while was applying to European power struggles in Continental Europe, at the same time, it was applied the Eastern Question. The term of Eastern Question was meant to the management of gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and on the issues of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire. In this scope, Britain supported the Greek Independence from Ottoman Empire with the Great Powers of Concert of Europe.

The German Confederation was created with 39 German states and Belgium gained its independence from Holland, provided that neutrality between great powers. The Great Britain attached special importance to Belgium and Eastern Question because of her strategic interests. Turkish Near East had strategic implications about India’s

security for the Great Britain and Belgium had strategically vital importance for the Channel ports and the British Naval power. Furthermore, dissolution of the Ottoman Empire could strengthen the Russia and might change the balance of power. Despite his liberal views about the best model of government, the British PM Palmerstone compromising his views. As an ardent follower of equilibrium in the Europe, he opposed the Hungarian Revolution against Austria in 1848 to protect Habsburg Monarchy and to maintain order.

However, breaking out Crimean War ended Vienna Order and balance of power in the Europe and British entered war with France to protect Ottoman Empires territorial integrity from Russian attack. Following the Crimean War, Europe has witnessed three wars between great powers and resulted with the unification of Germany and unification of Germany. The British position to these wars was not to intervene. The British decision makers saw the emergence of Germany as a bulwark against France and Russia, namely a positive factor to the European equilibrium.

This time had also the time of stay away from the European balance of power politics for Great Britain. Because, Germany's industrial rise and political prevail on the continent as most pro-status quo power, provided a secure atmosphere for Europe and British concentrated on their colonies whole over the world.

During the 17th and 18th Century, called as "*Pax Britannica*" industrial capacity and economic wealth of the British was remarkable and this economic power easily transformed to military strength to pursue its economic and political interests in the world. The boundaries of the British Empire during the 19th century were reaching to every corner of the world, and she was calling as "*the Empire on which the sun never sets*". The Indian subcontinent was the jewel of the imperial crown, despite the losses of colonies in favor of the United States in the American War of Independence; still, the right of sovereignty in the Canada was belonging to the Great Britain. Empire's shadow was reaching from China's coasts to Cape.

However, in the course of the time, Britain lost its vividness to pursue its Great Empire's overseas positions. Domestic economic pressures on the taxation and macroeconomic policies and demanding on social reforms were step by step limiting the sustainability of the colonial policies and unveil the economic fall of Great Britain. The bloody and protracted the Boer Wars in South Africa led to huge

expenditures and the idea of the expensiveness of colonial polices once again became apparent.

The rise of Germany in Europe, Japan in East Asia, and the United States in Western Hemisphere during the second half of the 19th Century decreased the relative power sharing of Britain and forced to change her policies or power transitions in favor of newly rising powers.

The United States and the Great Britain had long-term enmities from the American War of Independence. The American colonies had revolted to the British rule to gain their self-determination. During the American Civil War, British supported the Confederacy to divide United States and came close to intervene in favor of Confederacy. However, the unveiling of weakening of the British relative power sharing in the world and harmony of interest in some issues such as determination on the dissemination and protection of the free trade whole over the world and imperial policies of both of them changed this enmity in favor of the United States. The rise of the German naval power and the threatening behaviors against the Great Britain's colonial policies forced to abandonment of British "*Splendid Isolation*" policy. "Between 1904 and 1906, Great Britain withdrew its remaining garrisons from the West Indies and form Canada. This in the words of Arthur Campbell Turner meant a "strategic abandonment" of the Western Hemisphere" (Ovendale:1998:9).The British concessions in favor of the United States continued throughout of late 1890's and early 1900's. This period resulted with the Anglo-American rapprochement about many policies and British withdrawal from the superpower position and mutual supports were continued. The Americans supported the British during the Second Boer War and the British supported the Americans in the American-Spanish War. Britain approved the annexation of Philippines and Hawaii and Open Door policy on China supported with both of them. As one of the most difficult diplomatic problems of this period, Canadian Border issue between the United States and the Great Britain was solved peacefully in line with the American perspective. The rapprochement era serves as a basis of the Anglo-American partnership for the 20th Century the Anglo-American Special Relationship.

The weakening position of the Great Britain at the world scale and the rise of Imperial Japan during the end of 18th Century, led to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in

1902. Instead of struggle with the challenge of Japanese fleet in the Far East possessions, interests and trade, Britain preferred rapprochement with Japanese peacefully and signed a neutrality treaty. As in the United States rapprochement, The British gave strategic concessions to the Japanese. However, in contrast to the Anglo-American Alliance, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance ended in 1923 and once again, Japanese became strategic threat to the British interests until WWII.

Germany's industrial and economic rise increased its geopolitical ambitions against the Great Britain. Global naval supremacy of Britain faced a serious threat with the German naval build-up and the risk of the compelling of British Navy became a possibility. According to Mandelbaum;

The British were not opposed in principle to accommodating German aspirations. There was even some sympathy for the German desire for a larger "place in the sun." But the British could not tolerate a naval challenge. The Royal Navy was, after all, the guardian of the empire's lifelines. Maritime supremacy was one of the two central pillars of British security policy. Still, it was not strictly true that Britain would tolerate no other naval power of any consequence. The British tolerated, indeed came to terms with, the United States and Japan, both of which had built fleets. The source of this tolerance, however, was the fact that the American and Japanese fleets were based on the other side of the world. Germany was next door. That made for an irresolvable problem (Mandelbaum: 1989: 50).

Consequently, mutual distrust and such an armament race increased the escalation between two European powers and paved the way of WWI. British endeavors to prevent such a great power war were inconclusive and could not avoid its break out.

The post-WWI era, as of its results, was opposite the 1815 Vienna settlement. In 1815, all great powers agreed to non-intervention against each other and sustain a stable the balance of the power system. However, Paris summit did not bring such a consensus among the great powers. Moreover, unlike the post-Vienna settlement's protectionist vision about traditional empires and prevent the dissolution of them

with nationalist movements and nation states, during the post-WWI era, traditional empires were divided and many new ethnic nation states emerged. That was another negative factor on the failure.

Despite the German's defeat, the great powers were not together to make a peaceful stable order in the Europe. As one of those, Russian government was in the hands of extremist communists and they did not want to part of traditional balance of power politics in Europe and it could not guaranteed a peace during the post-WWI. French and British could not manage that process and this would lead to another great war that similar previous one.

By the same token, despite being one of the victors of the Great War, the strategic priorities of British foreign policy did not changed and British followed their traditional isolationist foreign policy during the 1920's and 1930's.

In this point, Mandelbaum says;

Britain's strategic position was the same in 1919 as it had been in 1815. The war had changed many things, but not geography. The two main requirements for British security persisted: naval supremacy to safeguard the trade routes and imperial communications; and a balance of power in Europe so that no continental state could threaten the British Isles. The outcome of the war made it easier in some respects for the British to ensure their security. German military power was broken. The German fleet was scuttled at the end of the war. But the burden of security was in some ways heavier in 1919 than it had been in 1914. The British Empire had grown larger with the addition of some of the Middle Eastern possessions of the Ottoman Empire, including the province of Palestine, within whose borders lay the city of Jerusalem, and much of Mesopotamia to the north. The cost of maintaining the empire was raised, as well, by the beginnings of nationalist stirrings, particularly in India and Egypt. Britain was therefore in no better position than before to take a major military role on the Continent while carrying out its imperial responsibilities. The subsidy that a contrived

European balance provided remained indispensable (Mandelbaum: 1989:67).

	<i>World</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>USSR</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Japan</i>
1913	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1920	93.2	122.2	59.0	92.6	70.4	12.8	95.2	176.0
1921	81.1	98.0	74.7	55.1	61.4	23.3	98.4	167.1
1922	99.5	125.8	81.8	73.5	87.8	28.9	108.1	197.9
1923	104.5	141.4	55.4	79.1	95.2	35.4	119.3	206.4
1924	111.0	133.2	81.8	87.8	117.9	47.5	140.7	223.3
1925	120.7	148.0	94.9	86.3	114.3	70.2	156.8	221.8
1926	126.5	156.1	90.9	78.8	129.8	100.3	162.8	264.9
1927	134.5	154.5	122.1	96.0	115.6	114.5	161.2	270.0
1928	141.8	162.8	118.3	95.1	134.4	143.5	175.2	300.2
1929	153.3	180.8	117.3	100.3	142.7	181.4	181.0	324.0
1930	137.5	148.0	101.6	91.3	139.9	235.5	164.0	294.9
1931	122.5	121.6	85.1	82.4	122.6	293.9	145.1	288.1
1932	108.4	93.7	70.2	82.5	105.4	326.1	123.3	309.1
1933	121.7	111.8	79.4	83.3	119.8	363.2	133.2	360.7
1934	136.4	121.6	101.8	100.2	111.4	437.0	134.7	413.5
1935	154.5	140.3	116.7	107.9	109.1	533.7	162.2	457.8
1936	178.1	171.0	127.5	119.1	116.3	693.3	169.2	483.9
1937	195.8	185.8	138.1	127.8	123.8	772.2	194.5	551.0
1938	182.7	143.0	149.3	117.6	114.6	857.3	195.2	552.0

Figure 1: “Annual Indices of Manufacturing Production 1913-1938” (Source: Kennedy: 1988: 299)

The relative power sharing of Great Britain continued to be gradually decreased, as far as its power decreased, Britain became closer to United States. PM Chamberlain’s appeasement policy over Germany failed and showed weakness of Britain in the European politics. Continental Nazi threat and imperialist grand strategy of the Germany, once again forced to British decision makers to prevent the rise of a continental dominator. The expenditures of preventing Germany from achieving a mastery of Europe during WWII consumed the British resources and the decline of the British Empire was accelerated.

	<i>Japan</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>USSR</i>	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>U.S.</i>
1930	218	266	162	722	512	498	699
1933	183 (356) [387]	351 (361)	452 (620)	707 (303)	333 (500)	524 (805)	570 (792)
1934	292 (384) [427]	455 (427)	709 (914)	3479 (980)	540 (558)	707 (731)	803 (708)
1935	300 (900) [463]	966 (966)	1,607 (2,025)	5,517 (1,607)	646 (671)	867 (849)	806 (933)
1936	313 (440) [488]	1,149 (1,252)	2,332 (3,266)	2,933 (2,903)	892 (911)	995 (980)	932 (1,119)
1937	940 (1,621) [1,064]	1,235 (1,015)	3,298 (4,769)	3,446 (3,430)	1,245 (1,283)	890 (862)	1,032 (1,079)
1938	1,740 (2,489) [1,706]	746 (818)	7,415 (5,807)	5,429 (4,527)	1,863 (1,915)	919 (1,014)	1,131 (1,131)

Figure 2: “Defence Expenditures of Great Powers 1930-1938” (Source: **Kennedy:** 1988: 296)

CHAPTER 4 : EMERGENCE OF THE COLD WAR, A NEW ERA IN THE UK-US RELATIONS AND THE ‘SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP’

4.1. Strategic Landscape after WWII

The strategic outlook of the world and the great powers fundamentally changed after WWII. Germany, Japan and Italy defeated and their strategic threats to World Order completely removed. As victorious power of WWII, the USSR and the USA emerged two most powerful nations. Unlike the destructive impacts of the war on the financial and industrial capabilities of the states that participated the war, the American economy dramatically grown and United States transformed an economic powerhouse of the world. According to Paul Kennedy, The USA was the only great power that become richer rather than became poorer at the end of the War. United States had and half of the World’s industrial production and possessed the \$20 billion gold reserves of the \$ 33 billion of the World (Kennedy: 1989: 357).

Furthermore, United States had possessed the biggest naval power even more than that of Royal Navy of Britain. Despite the demobilization in its army, it could easily said that it was controlling the skies and seas of the world by its incomparable war machine and by monopoly on the nuclear arms.

Despite its victorious position, Britain was continue to lose its relative power share during the War and crucially spent its economic sources and because of the War’s destructiveness, its industrial capacity corroded and therefore, the War released the British’s weaknesses once again. Alan P. Dobson underscore this situation with the passage that in the below,

On 7 December 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote to President Roosevelt: ‘The moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies.’ Fifteen months of war reduced Britain, the world’s greatest trading nation and creator of the largest ever empire, to de facto international bankruptcy. More than anything else, that dictated the course of Anglo-American economic relations over the following five years. British bankruptcy was stark evidence of the shift in power in Anglo-American relations. The solution

to Britain's economic problem came with Lend-Lease and the combined production boards. These measures allowed Britain to continue her war effort, and the USA, after the State Department took over responsibility from the Treasury for working out consideration for US aid, abandoned any thought of cash payments. As a result Britain received approximately \$21 billion net of aid. However, although Britain did not pay cash, costs were involved. Lend-Lease enabled Britain to concentrate on war production and abandon export markets as making things for profit took second place to the needs of war supply. It also made the UK highly dependent upon the USA. Those three things taken together — abandonment of exports, the decimation of peacetime production, and dependence upon the USA— placed Britain in a situation which made it difficult to resist US demands for non-cash payments (Dobson: 2002: 84).

The decline of the British economic power triggered the relative decline in the British military capability. British clearly left behind both the USSR and United States. In this regard, Mearsheimer draws a dramatic picture about it:

Between 1939 and 1945, United Kingdom mobilized about 5.9 million troops, United States mobilized roughly 14 million, and the Soviet Union mobilized approximately 22.4 million. When WWII ended in 1945, the UK had about 4.7 million troops under arms, the Americans had roughly 12 million and the USSR had about 12.5 million. Regarding army size, the UK raised 50 divisions over the course of WWII, while United States raised 90 divisions the USSR raised 550 divisions, although they were somewhat smaller than American and British Divisions. Of course, all three military establishments shrunk quite drastically in size after WWII. But the United Kingdom was still no match for the USSR. The Soviets had 2.87 million men under arms in 1948, whereas the UK had only 847.000. The United States figure for that year was 1.36 million. Furthermore, both American and Soviet

military establishments grew significantly in size after 1948, while the British military shrunk in size (Mearsheimer: 2014: 328).

As I expressed the previous chapter, traditionally the British foreign policy was relying on the maintaining of equilibrium in the European Continent and prevent to the rise of a potential hegemon on the continent. In the post-WWII period, British economy was far behind the USA and the USSR and this negative trend of British economy structurally affected the British foreign policy. In this era, relative shrinkage of British economy embodied over the colonial policies of the Empire and abandonment of the protectorate position of Greece and Turkey in favor of the United States.

“By 1950, the USSR had a gross national product (GDP) of \$126 billion, and it spent \$15.5 billion on defense. The UK had a GNP of \$71 billion and spent \$2.3 billion on defense” (Mearsheimer: 2014: 328). Such a negative size of United Kingdom’s relative power share naturally prevented to impose her traditional foreign policy in the face of the risk of Soviet hegemony in Europe without helps of United States.

The USSR was one of the most miserable countries at the end of the war and they lost 7.5 million soldiers during the conflict, 10 to 15 million civilians killed by German attacks and their total losses had reached 20-25 million of souls(Kennedy, 1989: 362).

Despite its “victorious great power” status after WWII and sole hegemonic candidate of Europe, the Soviet Union’s economic assets and production capacity was crucially crippled by the Nazi German invasion. The Soviets had lost an important part of the agricultural and industrial materials during the invasion.

According to Kennedy,

Of 11.6 million horses in occupied territory, seven million were killed or taken away, as were 20 out of 23 million pigs, 137,000 tractors; 49,000 grain combines and large numbers of cowsheds and other farm buildings were destroyed. Transport was hit by the destruction of 65,000 kilometers of railway track, loss of or damage to 15,800 locomotives,

428,000 goods wagons, 4,280 riverboats, and half of all the railway bridges in the occupied territory. Almost 50 percent of all urban living space in this territory, 1.2 million houses were destroyed, as well as 3.5 million houses in rural areas (Kennedy, 1989: 362).

In the face of such destruction, The USSR had to restore its industrial infrastructure and improve their war-devastated economy. Therefore, they were in need heavily industrial equipment helps of the USA. However, these loans would not be realized without political concessions of Russians to Americans and uncompromising Stalin leadership facilitated the removing of this policy. Because, Soviet leaders evaluated this lend-lease policy as a suspicious approaches of United States (Gaddis: 1972:196).

4.2. Emergence of the Cold War

The emergence of the Cold War was a result of different strategic and global ideological differences about the Post-War European order that coming from the days of the war-time diplomatic meetings and conferences. During the war, the British and the Americans endeavored to make plans, which create an economically prosperous the Europe that secured from the structural reasons of outbreaks of wars in the continent. Moreover, they were determined not to repeat the destructive faults of the past that made after WWI. They were not in the search of a punitive peace conditions on the Axis powers and therefore, the Morgenthau Plan, which would destroy the economic infrastructure and the production capability of the Germany, would be a stillborn plan and in lead with the USA, the British would work for the economic recovery of the Germany and the Europe.

At the same time, Britain's colonial anxieties, the USSR security perceptions and communist expansiveness and the United States' liberal internationalist optimism were in clash. While the British want to protect their imperial possession in their colonies, the USA was in the search of a liberal world order that relies on free trade and self-determination of nations (Ryan: 2003:54). The United States' liberalism was clearly in a contradiction with British desires. Moreover, the USSR was aiming to create a sphere of influence in its immediate neighborhood, especially in Eastern and Central Europe. These strategic and ideological differences were feeding worries of each other of them. Despite compromising behaviors of Roosevelt on Soviets that led

to harsh criticisms in his country, war-time alliance was not preserved. As can be seen in the below, these disagreements on the post-War order were not resolved with permanent peace agreements and led to the Cold War splits. The defeat of Axis powers and the final victory did not bring lasting peace since war-time allies could not agree on the conditions of peace. The Soviet stubbornness led to new conflicts among great powers and war-devastated the Europe turned into a new conflictions area and divided to bloc, which were created with the Soviet geopolitical ambitions and ideological sphere of influence and plans of the USA. Ironically United States was more conciliatory than the British side towards to the USSR during the last periods of the War.

Roosevelt's policy of trying to engage their active co-operation in world security, and the expectation, later rendered redundant by the success of the atom bomb, that Soviet help would be needed to defeat the Japanese, were the main reasons behind this. At the end of the war the USA had no intention of staying in Europe for long and the rapid rate of demobilization shows that she was not seeking confrontation (Dobson: 2002:93).

Moreover, unlike the United States that quickly demobilized its military powers on the continent in a few months, Soviet Union did not demobilize its military presence after the war. Furthermore, while Soviet leadership felt surrounded by Western powers and approached skeptical about their intentions and called their policies as "imperialist expansion", the USA was anxious about the Soviet intentions and decisiveness on the communist expansion on the continent as well as Moscow's decisiveness about borders and geopolitical expectations. In this way, the US assessed the attitude of the Soviets as a breaching of the articles of Yalta Conference about self-determination of nations and democratization in Eastern Europe.

After his major archival works on the earlier history of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis claimed that the Cold War was a creation of generally authoritarianism and in particular Stalin (Gaddis: 1997: 294). This argument seeming true, because of the Stalin was acting as an imperial power in Europe and adamantly followed a policy that providing expansion of the USSR Even from the beginning of the war-time grand coalition to after War period, Stalin wanted to territorially expand its country and recognition of Soviet Union's borders that they had possessed before the German

invasion. However, for the sake of the sustaining of the grand coalition against the Nazi Germany, which was evaluated as most important threat in the Europe, the territorial demands of the USSR ad postponed until the war end.

By 1945, the USSR had annexed the Baltic States and regulated the borders of Poland westwards to create a buffer zone between Germany and Russia to prevent a prospective German threat in the future. Stalin used to such threat perceptions of himself as an excuse of his imperialistic policies. In the face of Soviet dominance in the Eastern Europe, in the beginning British side was following a policy that recognizing the Soviet policies in the Eastern Europe, American side saw the Russian actions as a reminiscent of old diplomacy and acquisition of new colonies, the establishment of sphere of influences (Combs and Combs: 1986:294).

4.2.1. The Yalta Conference

Towards the end of WWII, the defeat of the Axis powers seemed inevitable and the Allies was in the seeking of reorganization of the post-war international order in Europe. For this reason, the leaders of the USA, the USSR and the Great Britain met in Yalta in the early days of February of 1945.

In the beginning, all of them had different priorities and agendas. Roosevelt wanted that Stalin helps the Western allies to defeat Japan and to push Mao Zedong towards a coalition with Chiang Kai-shek; recognition of the right of the self-determination of the Poles in the Poland; to make an agreement on the Germany that would permit it to remain strong economically to contribute to the Europe's recovery and prosperity (Combs and Combs: 1986: 303).

Stalin's priorities consisted of guaranteeing of the security of the USSR through the creation of friendly regimes that could be house for the Soviet troops in the strategic areas of Eastern Europe such as Romania and Poland. These approaches of Stalin would be embodied with the creation of communist regimes in those areas. Stalin also wanted huge reparations from Germany, but Roosevelt and Churchill initially rejected this idea, because they thought such huge reparation could be risk to the German economy and indirectly European economic recovery. They reminded the faults of the memories about reparations after WWI. Nevertheless, despite

Churchill's opposition, Roosevelt accepted the \$10 million of \$20 million in German reparations to send Soviets.

Churchill and the British side also wanted to strengthen France as a balancer power in the European equilibrium. At the end of Yalta, they agreed to occupy Germany, demilitarized and divide the country into four zones with the accession of France and create the United Nations. In this way, they reached a consensus and not a decisive agreement about the criteria of the post-war order.

4.2.2. The Potsdam Conference

The last of the Allied conferences took place from 17th July to 2nd August 1945 in Potsdam after the victory in Europe against Axis powers. At the same time, between Yalta and Potsdam, significant developments were experienced, such as Germany surrendering on May 8 and European Wars ended, the first atomic bomb successfully tested by the USA in New Mexico, Truman becoming the President of the USA in place of Roosevelt who died in April, and Churchill transferring power to Clement Attlee because of election defeat. Only Joseph Stalin was personally present at all the Allied conferences.

Before the Conference, Stalin had gained significant geopolitical advantages on the countries that were taken from Nazis and he had begun to build the communist puppet governments in those countries and redrew their borders.

In Potsdam, despite the rejections of most of the demands of Stalin such as bases in Straits, recognition of Romanian and Bulgarian governments, the British and Americans temporarily accepted the Soviet annexations and the new borders set at the Oder-Neisse line.

The Potsdam Agreements also endorsed vast movements of population in the Eastern Europe and Germany. The heads of state of Big Three did nonetheless agree on the practical arrangements for Germany's demilitarization and abolishment of Nazi party and its institutions, and the trial of war criminals and the amount that should be paid in reparations. At Potsdam, the three Great Powers were divided by their fundamentally different political visions. Following the Yalta Conference, tensions and differences gradually became apparent between United States and Soviet Union.

4.2.3. Creation of Western Bloc: the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan

4.2.3.1. The Truman Doctrine

Following the wartime allies conferences, the Western powers were increasingly concerned from the spread of Communist activities taking over the governments with support of Soviet Communism. In Central and the Eastern European countries, the Communist parties played an active role in coalition governments such as in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, France, Belgium and Italy, sometimes even excluding other parties from power. Moreover, Greece was in the midst of a civil war that the communist played a crucial role in. Finally, since the autumn of 1946 Turkey was threatened by the Soviets to take concession their prospective plan for Mediterranean geopolitics. On 5 March 1946, Winston Churchill gave a historical speech in the Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri and this speech later would be called the “*Iron Curtain Speech*”. In this speech, Churchill by recognizing the United States as the most powerful state in the world, underscored the importance and necessity of the “*special relationship*” that referred to a closer alliance between United States and the British Commonwealth and the Empire. Furthermore, Churchill by saying, “*from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the continent*” pointed to the emergence of strategic and ideological lines between Western Power and the Soviet Union and urged a new European Unity. In this way, Churchill put in to words the British perspectives about the future of the World and Europe (Churchill, *Iron Curtain Speech*<https://www.cia.gov/library/reading room/docs/1946-03-05>).

In such a critical juncture, on 12 March 1947, US President Harry Truman redefined the Roosevelt’s foreign policy and declared new foreign policy principles that aimed at containing the USSR and protecting its allies from the Communist threat through financial and military aid programs. In this way, the United States of America showed decisiveness on the defense of free world and positioned itself as the only protectorate of liberties and this regimes.

Truman’s new approach to the USSR was a clear sign that he accepted the views of George Kennan who was an American chargé d’affaires in Moscow. He sent an

8,000-word telegram to the Department of State detailing his views on the USSR and U.S. policy toward the communist state.

According to Gaddis,

By stressing the importance of internal influences on Soviet diplomacy Kennan's Long Telegram of 22 February 1946, provided Washington officials with a convincing rationale for the "get tough with Russia" policy toward which they had already been moving. Further concessions to Moscow would be futile (Gaddis: 1972:316).

In this report, Kennan argued that the Soviets from the times of Tsars, had always been expansionist and aggressive and will always be an expansionist and aggressive state. Furthermore, they had a fundamental misunderstanding of the capitalist system and therefore, it is impossible to cooperate with them about post-war order, because their basic instincts had always been relying on their distrusts about foreign world with deep hostility (Kennan: 1951: 112).

By combination of new political and economic approach about the USSR and Europe, Truman prepared an aid package of around \$400 million for Greece and Turkey. This new doctrine provided a legitimate basis for the United States' activism during the Cold War. By preparing this package, in line with the doctrine of "containment", the USA showed its support for Turkey to resist Soviet claims to rights over naval bases in the Bosphorus. Truman Doctrine was also a sign of the end of American isolationism after WWII.

4.2.3.2. The Marshall Plan and the Establishment of the OEEC

In the scope of the policy of containment of the Soviets, Europe's economic revival and restoration was vital. By reviving Europe's economy, the US would prevent the Soviets from becoming a hegemonic power over all of Europe. Soviets would use for benefit the weaknesses of the European countries by supporting its communist networks in those states (Leffler and Painter: 2005:25).

Moreover, the pro-Soviet Czech coup increased the fears about the USSR and communist influence in the Western Europe. Therefore, in lead of Truman's Secretary of State, George Marshall, an economic policy was prepared to a plan that would later be known as the "Marshall Plan" to strengthen the European countries. The following countries: Denmark, France, Austria (with the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Belgium, Ireland, Iceland, Greece, Italy (and San Marino), the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Norway (with Madeira and the Azores), Switzerland, Sweden (with Liechtenstein), the UK and Turkey signed the Marshall Plan.

They suddenly founded a Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC), which created a report in order to establish the priorities for the European economy. At the same time, the Americans clearly persisted that these countries should control the management and distribution of the funds themselves. Hence, The CEEC assembled a permanent institution in order to achieve this purpose. These 16 countries signed a declaration so as to set up the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) on 16 April 1948 in Paris. Marshall Plan or European Recovery Program ensured a motivation and basis for the European economic cooperation and for the European integration later. According to Dobson,

In the European Recovery Program (ERP), or Marshall Plan as it is commonly known, the USA wanted Britain to lead the movement for European reconstruction. The USA envisaged a regional economic system emerging in Europe that would prosper through intra-European trade and a European system of currency convertibility. To underpin all this, and to provide a political pay-off for the economic discrimination that the USA would have to suffer in the short and medium term, there was to be European integration, which would result in a strong Western political bloc that would be able to help contain communism (Dobson: 2002: 96).

The preparation and implementation of the Marshall Plan was a product of a collective Anglo-American understanding and British Foreign Secretary Ernest

Bevin played a crucial role in that process with the Undersecretary of the United States Department of State States Dane Acheson and Secretary of State George Marshall (Reynolds: 2006: 317).

4.2.3.3. The Creation of Eastern Bloc by Soviet Union

In August 1949, the USSR tested its first atomic bomb, then, in 1953, its first hydrogen bomb was successfully tested. The claims of the USSR as a world power would no longer be disputed. The Soviet's communist networks began to struggle to fight for the taking power in the Central and Eastern European countries. The leaders of non-Communist parties faced serious problems and repressions they were either discredited, intimidated or subjected to show trials leading to their imprisonment or even execution. In two or three years, The Soviets influence and spreading of communism became apparent and their coordination center was established by the delegates of communist parties of the USSR, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Italy and France on 22 September 1947. During the constitutive Comintern meeting, Russian delegate Zhdanov provided the approval of the members about the Soviet Doctrine that had divided the world into two camp, as anti-imperialist democratic bloc and imperialist and anti-democratic bloc. However, the myth of the coherence of the communists in those countries collapsed and the signs of its internal inconsistencies were seen as in the refusal of the Yugoslav communists to follow the policies that dictated by Cominform. Having grouped the world into two opposing blocs, the USSR created a program of economic cooperation with the Soviet bloc countries known as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) in 1947.

4.2.3.4. The Division of Germany, Formation of the NATO and Western Unity

The issue of Germany's revival was first and foremost important and problematic issue among war-time allies after WWII. While the USA saw the Germany's revival and restoration crucial for European economic recovery and political stability, Russian, British and French were hesitated for their prospective security plans. Hesitation of these powers was understandable because Germany had risen twice and destroyed these countries and world stability in the past.

In 1945, the Allies had started to organize their particular occupation area in the Germany. The Americans invaded the South, the British the West and North, France the South-West, and the Soviets Central Germany. The Eastern part was invaded by Poland, excluding the town of Königsberg (renamed Kaliningrad) and its enclosed area, which was extended by the USSR on 30 August 1945, the Inter-Allied Control Council, was established. In 1946, the destiny of the German satellite states and of Bulgaria, Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland was designated in Paris by separate peace treaties. “On 28 July 1946, the United State suggested a proposal for economic unification of the invaded zones. Faced with the refusal of France and the USSR, the British and Americans decided to unite their zones economically and, in December of the same year, created the Bizone.”(CVCE, “*The Cold War (1945–1989)*”). Available from (<<http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/unit/55c09dcc-a9f2-45e9-b240-eaef64452cae>>). Deterioration of the relations on Germany and the unification of the sectors of Western powers accelerated the polarization. The attempt to create a new monetary policy and formation of new currency (*Deutsche Mark*) instead of *Reichsmark* was seen as a unilateral action by the Soviet Union. The USSR harshly react to the gradual division of Germany and the creation of West Germany as a new state by imposing a total blockade of the Western sectors of Berlin on 24 June 1948, in scope of this action, railways, roads and canal access from West was stopped and access to Berlin by road, rail and water was impossible until 12 May 1949.

Upon this act, Truman decided to supply aids by airlift to Berlin and to show his determination and deterrence, negotiated with Britian to use British land for B-29 aircrafts that could strike major Russian cities. Rising tensions with the Soviet Russia made the British and the Americans closer in the defense of Europe. In this regard, Dobson gave important details about Anglo-American defense alliance;

In 1947 a UK-US Security Agreement was signed which divided up the world into areas of responsibility for signals intelligence between the USA on the one hand and Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand on the other. In 1946 General Carl Spaatz, US Air Force Commander, visited Britain and agreed with Air Chief Marshal Lord Tedder that five RAF bases should be prepared to take US B-29 bombers. That paved the

way for developments two years later. In 1948, as a direct consequence of the Soviet blockade of Berlin, US bombers were based in Britain. There was no formal agreement governing this until October 1951, long after the bombers had been modified to carry atom bombs. With such ease Britain did become a forward nuclear base for the United States. Little has been done subsequently to alter these loose arrangements (Dobson: 2002: 96).

By the same token, post-war was also a critical juncture in the British foreign policy. Ernest Bevin played a crucial role in that era by urging the unity of democratic bloc against communist threat. Also Anglo-American close military relations continued to until the formation of the NATO despite all the negative developments between two states. As minister of foreign relations of the Great Britain, Ernest Bevin by seeing the inevitability of the dependence always wanted to continue a “special relationship” in the military relations between United States and Great Britain.

This was a clear sign of the British acceptance of the supremacy of United States in the Anglo-American relations. Similarly, William Strang who was Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs prepared a new foreign policy strategy to describe the direction of British grand strategy in the face of the new realities of Britain and the world. According to this draft, Britain had no option but to rely on United States, and Commonwealth's and Western European's had no power to deter Soviet expansionism and communist threat. On 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by twelve contracting parties.

CHAPTER 5: CHANGING DYNAMICS OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE UK DURING THE COLD WAR

5.1. Disagreements and Collaborations during the Eisenhower Era in the 1950's

Despite the successful wartime alliance and peaceful power transitions between the USA and the Great Britain, relations between them were not too easy. Several times, these relations deteriorated on the different political solutions, defense and security approaches and different national interest understandings during the post-War period. Differences in the perspectives mostly stemmed from the foreign policy priorities. For Americans, first issue was fighting against communism and the containment of the USSR at global level. In contrast to the Americans, British prioritized the protection of their national interests at global level rather than fighting with communism or the containment of Soviet Union (Dobson: 2002: 115). In line with these facts, it could be said that the collisions of the special relationship on the Korean War and the Suez Crisis were results of these different understandings.

In this respect, the Brits were more benign about the fall of China to protect their interests on the Hong Kong and commercial interests on China, unlike the Americans, the Brits were pro-appeasement on China. This policy had resulted with the recognition of the China by the Great Britain in 1949. During the Korean War, while Britain argued that the China could not be a follower of the USSR in terms of its different characteristic regarding Communism, America defended the view that Chinese would follow the policy of Soviets and be easily controlled by Russia. For Britain, Chinese and Soviet communism were different and the Chinese interpretation was quite different from that of the Soviets. It was relying on orthodox-Marxism-Leninism and quite xenophobic. On the contrary, Americans were thinking that the Chinese communism was identical with that of the Soviets.

At the same time, after the post-War restoration, especially from the beginning of Eisenhower's tenure, the Americans began hinting to the revision of special relationship on the grounds that special relations in the military and political issues with the Brits could alienate the other allies and Britain had to be a normal ally among others.

In this respect, one of the most important aspects of these disagreements was the nuclear issue. During the War, there was collaboration on the use and share of

nuclear technology between the United States and the Great Britain, and regarding an equal partnership since the Quebec Agreement that was signed by Roosevelt and Churchill in 1943. By the end of war, and in the early periods of the Cold War, this disagreement became apparent. From this period, United States began to refuse the sharing of the military and industrial secrets of atomic energy. In August 1946, the McMahon Act was passed in the House of Representatives of the USA which prohibited the exchange of any atomic information between the USA and any other nation (Baylis: 1981: 24). Moreover, the Americans hinted that consultation with Brits regarding the use of nuclear bombs could limit their freedom of action. This decision criticized Britain that had most important bases for the use of weapons. The Britain's worries were coming from the possibility of the being the Soviet's first nuclear target and they expected to be consulted by the US on the use of nuclear weapons. Despite previous tensions about the consultations, the US decision makers assured the Brits about joint action.

These initiatives to limit mutual interdependence in favor of the US increased the British suspicions about the Americans and felt the need for the independent British nuclear deterrence in terms of the British policy makers. The Nuclear technology was also seen as a lifesaver by the British elites to lessen the expenditures of conventional forces and to remain a great power .Ovendale claims that while Churchill was seeing the nuclear independence and deterrence -especially by having hydrogen bomb- as a way of remaining as a great power, Chancellor of the Exchequer R. A. Butler was seeing the nuclear technology in security matters would lessen the military expenditures (Ovendale: 1998: 102). As a result of this process, the Brits gained nuclear self-deterrence by testing first atomic bomb in 1952 and hydrogen bomb during the years of 1957-59. Having successful testing atomic bomb, Britain expected a returning into the past's closer relationship in the field of nuclear weapons and atomic energy. According to Dumbrell, "the original decision to develop an independent deterrent was taken against the background of perceived isolationist and anti-British sentiment in Washington, especially in the US Congress." (Dumbrell: 2006:161).Nevertheless, the US congress revised the Mac Mahon Act in line with the more exchange about nuclear technology in 1954.

Another problematic issue between the Americans and the Brits were the new developments in the Middle East region as a reflection of the decrease of British power at the world scale.

The independence struggle of the Jews in Palestine and their endeavors to establish a Jewish state adversely affected the Anglo-American relations during the post-War period. The British side had mandate authority in Palestine region and because of this situation they were highly anxious about tensions between Jew and Arabs. Therefore, possible partitioning of that region in favor of the Jews was assessed as a threat for security of the British interests by hatred of Arabs. But the powerful Zionist Lobby in the Washington directed the American policy on the region. During the First Arab-Israeli War, Britain had to be loyal to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, in which Britain was obliged to assist Egypt in case of attack and that unless the Israelis withdrew, Britain would fulfil its treaty obligations (Ovendale: 1998: 85). In the end, British desires to stop the Israeli attacks and aggressions remained inconclusive. Moreover, Zionist Lobby's policies over Washington forced British withdrawal from Palestine and cut the British arm sails to Arabs during this era.

At the same time, Britain wanted to gradually “get the US into the Middle East” instead of themselves because of the decrease in their power to control the region. British perspective was aiming to secure their interests by the American power. Paradoxically, while Britain wanted the US to play a hegemonic role in the Middle East, they also saw their interests in Middle East as greater than that of the United States because of their dependence on oil and their experience in the Middle East was greater than the Americans (Smith, 2014). This embodied perspective coupled with the overthrow of the Iran's nationalist Prime Minister Mossadeq who nationalized the British owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which at the time was Britain's largest single overseas asset. The British and American secret services toppled Mossadeq by a joint action. In this solution, the Brits wanted to retake their Iranian oil company, while the Americans wanted to get rid of a suspicious leader who could collaborate with the Soviets (Carlston, *Six Myths about the Coup against Iran's Mossadegh* <<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/six-myths-about-thecoupageainst-irans-mossadegh-11173>>).

Nevertheless, after this process “British perspective failed and “the share of British capital invested in the oil industry of the Middle East dropped from 49 to 14 per cent, and the British share of oil production from 53 to 24 per cent. The American share increased from 44 to 58 per cent, and the American companies controlled 42 per cent of the capital. The image of British power faded in Arab eyes” (Ovendale: 1998: 104).

Most important disagreement issue of the Anglo-American relations during the 1950's appeared on the Suez Crisis in 1956. Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was the Egyptian leader at that time, had decided to take the control of Suez Canal through nationalization with the intention of using the Canal revenues in the funding of Aswan Dam building on the Nile. Before the nationalization, the West had already offered financial aid for the Dam project to prevent his rapprochement with the USSR, mainly for economic reasons. Similarly the Iran crisis, and the overthrow of Mossadeq, the British saw the Suez Canal nationalization by Nasser as a vital threat to their interests in the Middle East and want to destroy Nasser's reign by use of force. Anthony Eden, who was British Prime Minister at that time, miscalculated the timing of operation without consultation to Baghdad Pact members and with the United States. Eden calculated that American support would forthcoming on account of the nature of the Anglo-American alliance and Nasser's connections with Moscow (Dumbrell: 2006: 58).

Therefore, the Brits secretly colluded with the French and the Israelis to use force, and on 29 October 1956 the Israelis started the operation by invading the Sinai Peninsula. After ostensible ceasefire calls, Britain and France jointly began the operation two days later (Varble: 2003: 7). As real determining power in the Crisis, the United States' policy makers initially seemed to condone the idea of force, but as the crisis deepened, they decided that the Britain and France had to be stopped and punished for their actions.

From the beginning, the Americans were angry because of the existence of several factors. Firstly, they did not consult the Americans for the start such an operation and the Americans could be a difficult position in the eve of presidential elections. Secondly, Suez Operation coincided with the Soviet invasion in Hungary and this action could destroy the moral and propaganda superiority of the West against

Soviets and Third World. The United States' global war on communism and containment of the USSR policies could be endangered and the Middle Eastern countries could get closer to the Soviet Union with the invasion of Egypt by the Western Bloc's countries. As a result of this combined reasons, Eisenhower decided that he had to stop and forced the withdrawal Britain. Therefore, American policy makers decided to punish Britain by economic blockade and cut British efforts to get help from the IMF. The sterling crisis occasioned by Suez and exacerbated by the Americans gave Macmillan no option but to recommend acceptance of Eisenhower's demand that they halt the military operation. Relations abruptly collapsed and Britain faced an unprecedented pressure from United States. British policy makers and public felt betrayal insomuch that in a diplomatic meeting as an important character of British policy Rab Butler said "*if the UN did not 'act with firmness to bring about immediate clearance of the canal Great Britain would withdraw from the UN and the situation might even reach the point where the US would be asked to give up its bases in Great Britain'*" (Dobson: 2002:118).

Suez crisis result with a shameful defeat for the British and French and most crucial dimension of this crisis was the ending of the British Empire and the remarkable increase in the American engagement over the Middle East. Suez also demonstrated differences and the fragility of Special Relationship. Besides, it showed the British weaknesses in the face of the United States and unveiled the reality of that Britain cannot start a military operation without approval of the United States anymore. After Suez Crisis, United States quickly recovered the alliance by economic assistance and military agreement. Despite quick return from Crisis, Suez representing the post-War nadir in the Anglo-American Relations. The Suez Crisis also ended the political career of Eden as Prime minister and Harold Macmillan became new British Prime Minister in the early days of 1957.

After Suez, British and American political elites strived to leave behind the remnants of the crisis in the context of the "special relationship". Soon after the Macmillan came to power in Britain, Americans proposed to deploy the intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) on Britain and at the Bermuda meeting it was confirmed that Britain was to receive sixty of them. Bermuda meeting was held in 21-24 March 1957 between Eisenhower and Macmillan and Eisenhower later described the

meeting ‘as the most successful international conference that I had attended since the close of WWII’ (Baylis: 1981: 59).

The decisions that were taken at the Bermuda led to a new closeness between the United States and the UK. Especially, Britain developed a new defense policy in April 1957 that relying on mostly nuclear deterrence. By adapting of nuclear technology in all branches of defense institutions, Britain calculated a serious decrease in manpower for 1962. According to a new plan, the numbers of British servicemen in defense institutions would decrease from 690.000 to 375.000 in 1962 (Ovendale: 1998: 121).

At the same period, Eisenhower Doctrine was prepared to take more responsibility of the United States by drafting the new policy to describe the increasing American military and economic aids towards to Middle Eastern countries in order to prevent the Soviet from benefiting from the power vacuum that occurred from the British withdrawal from the region.

Upon launching of the Soviet’s Sputnik that was first artificial satellite for space investigations, the Anglo-American relations gained a new momentum and dynamism in 1957. After Sputnik, British Prime Minister Macmillan immediately invited to the United States and agreed to developments and productions of new weapons by adopting the principle of pooling resources.

New policy aimed to strengthening relations by creating new inter-dependence between the US and the UK. As a natural result of the getting close again, the United States removed the **MacMahon Act** that restricted the information and industrial exchange between allies. This trend accelerated with the **Agreement for Cooperation on Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes** on 3 July 1958.

According to this agreement, the UK turned into the only ally state that takes significant information on the design and the production of the nuclear warheads from United States. This agreement clearly posited the UK into a true special ally and this closeness was later called as preferential relationship.

5.2. Fluxes and Refluxes in the 1960's: Skybold and Vietnam

The 1960's in the Anglo-American Relations began with the famous "*wind of change*" speech of Harold Macmillan. This historical speech made by Harold Macmillan in the Parliament of South Africa, in Cape Town that was symbolically significant location for the British colonialism on 3 February 1960. As in the India's independence in 1947, African states and the British possession in Africa gained independence from the British Empire vanished at the end of this process. In this speech, Macmillan declared that the government of the UK intended to grant independence to the African colonies of the Empire. In this speech Macmillan said that "*the wind of change is blowing through this continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact* (Macmillan Speaks of Wind of ChanginAfrica,BBC,3February1960,<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/February/3/newsid_2714000/2714525.stm>).

Strategic decolonization decisions taken by Harold Macmillan were implemented in line with cost-effectiveness principals of the empire. As pointed out before, decolonization policies of Britain was supported by the US as an integral part of American's liberal idealism. However, the US later began to take the responsibility of military and economic burden of newly independent states and fight to prevent their affinity with the USSR.

As the first serious crisis in the Anglo-American Relations during the 1960's, Skybolt Crisis damaged defense relations between two states in the 1962 and once again unveiled its fragility as in the Suez. British side had wanted to have this air launched missile system built its independent nuclear capability from United States and Eisenhower had made a gentlemen's agreement in 1956, but the process faced an unexpected cancellation from the Kennedy government without consultation. Moreover, Americans did not give full explanation to the British, and expressed the cancellation with technical and cost-effectiveness reasons. Blurry picture of the cancellation triggered the British suspicions and they felt that the United States was intentionally trying to pressure Britain out of the nuclear club. These doubts were improved by Robert McNamara during the NATO ministerial meeting in the Athens in the spring of 1962 and at Ann Arbor in June of 1962. On the latter occasion, the Secretary of Defense clearly identified limited nuclear capabilities to perform

independently as being expensive, dangerous, tended to obsolescence and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. Afterwards McNamara asserted that he had not been referring to the British. This disclaimer, but, did little to dispel the impression in London that his Ann Arbor speech was directed as much at Britain as France. Upon the British disappointment, one more destructive remark came from former United States Secretary Dean Acheson in early December 1962. In his historical West Point speech he said,

Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate role - that is apart from Europe, a role based on a 'special relationship' with the United States, a role based on being head of a 'Commonwealth' which has no political structure or unity or strength and enjoys a fragile and precarious relationship by means of the sterling area and preferences in the British market – this role is about played out. Great Britain, attempting to be a broker between the United States and Russia, has seemed to conduct policy as weak as its military power (McCrary, *Dean Acheson, National Interest and the Special Relationship*, National Interest, 9 January 2013 <<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/dean-acheson-national-interest-the-special-relationship-7946>>).

Acheson's remarks deepened that the anti-Americanism in Britain either at societal level or at elite level. Prime Minister Macmillan assessed this expression as a calculated insult to the British nation.

At Nassau in the Bahamas during the 18-21 December 1962, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan met and negotiated different matters such as Congo, India and Test-Ban Treaty but Skybolt issue and nuclear deterrent desires of the British became main topic of this meeting. Kennedy under pressure the American delegation not to provide Polaris, and trying to explain the inconveniences by referring the French objections and suspicions and possible upsetting from various the European countries. The Americans wanted to create a multilateral nuclear force in Europe to cope with the difficulties over West Germany, at the same time, Britain

demanding representation as a disruptive act to the Western Unity and centralization of nuclear forces of West. By the way, they also wanted improvement in British application to EEC. In this way Americans tried to delegitimize the British demand about independent nuclear deterrence in Europe. However, Prime Minister Macmillan opposed to the multilateral force on grounds that it could lead to nuclear proliferation and assured the Americans that he had talked with De Gaulle shortly before Nassau and he would not object to the British independent nuclear deterrence. In addition, Macmillan pointed out main complexity between the Britain and France in EEC application process was not nuclear issue, it was agricultural policies.

At the end of the meeting, on the contrary to the views of American delegates as a close friend of Macmillan, Kennedy accepted to give British Polaris missiles as a compensation for Skybolt and Macmillan taken what he wanted.

According to Baylis,

The 'extraordinary ambiguity' of the agreement was further reflected in the contradiction between multilateralism and independence. According to Paragraph Eight Britain's Polaris fleet would be 'used for the purposes of international defense of the Western Alliance in all circumstances' except 'when Her Majesty's Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake'. But as Andrew Pierre quite rightly points out, it is very difficult indeed to imagine 'Britain considering the use of nuclear weapons in circumstances other than those involving the supreme national interests'. In effect, therefore, although the British force was ostensibly committed to the proposed multilateral force, in practice, Macmillan had secured the independence as well as the continuation of the British deterrent which he considered so necessary (Baylis: 1981: 74).

After successful outcomes at Nassau, the British policy makers confessed the importance of nuclear deterrence demands of their country and described the reasons of why Britain needed her own nuclear force. According to this strategy, the UK had to be free from United States' nuclear umbrella in the face of prospective crisis and

relatively to be independent from her. Further, it would provide insurance from the divergences on the national interests and grand strategy as in Suez.

Another remarkable event in the Anglo-American relations occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis at the time of the Skybolt Crisis between two states. The Cuban Missile Crisis had a destructive threat for the world that could trigger a nuclear war between two great powers. As a junior partner of the United States, the United Kingdom remained relatively silent and passive in such a crucial great power escalation and played a secondary role in the headquarter of the American side. According to Baylis, relative silence and passivism of the UK stemmed from imbalanced power in the face of such an escalation (Baylis: 1981: 76).

After assassination of Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson became the 36th President of the United States and heavily focused on the Vietnam issue. Conflicts in Vietnam were continuing from the mid-1950's. Upon becoming president, however, Johnson immediately focused on Vietnam: on 24 November 1963, by saying "the battle against communism ... must be joined ... with strength and determination." Vietnam was an important segment of the United States in its Cold War containment plans against communism under the fear of the Domino theory. During the War, despite American pressures, the Brits never committed their troops in Vietnam to combat against Vietnamese guerrillas and did not give a comprehensive diplomatic support.

According to Ellis,

There were three main reasons for this refusal to contribute armed forces. Firstly as co-Chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference the British might well have a role to play in finding peace. Secondly, they were already over-stretched militarily in the Far East through their commitment of 50 000 troops to the Malaysian struggle against Indonesia. And thirdly, the war in Vietnam was increasingly unpopular at home and therefore presented the British government with domestic political problems. By 1966 the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) was deeply divided on the Government's policy of support for US action in Vietnam (Hollowel: 2001: 193).

However, United States was in need of the diplomatic support from the UK in the face of its legitimacy crisis among world scene about her intervention in Vietnam that was increasingly harming the United States' position. Nevertheless, Britain ostensibly gave military support by sending its military advisers and soldiers on the understanding that they never fight with guerrillas. As a result of the British approach, alliance between the USA and the UK weakened substantially during this era. In the background of unwillingness and weakness of the British support on Vietnam there were different reasons. For instance, the British were hesitating because of their economic decline diminishing their power and threatening domestic stability. Moreover, European matters were more important in terms of the British grand strategy and the American bogging down in the Vietnam quagmire and in the Far East Asia was unwanted thing for the British policy makers.

5.3. The United Kingdom and the European Economic Community (EEC)

As was underlined in previous chapters, Britain had always been skeptical about continental Europe and this perspective continued after the post-War period. However, Europe dramatically changed after War and reconstructed in lead of the United States and transformed into a heaven of stability and prosperity. From early times in the post-War period to late 1950's, the British policy makers approached scornfully the continent by prioritizing its special relationship with the United States. In a private conversation with Charles de Gaulle in 1944, Winston Churchill had said *"Whenever we have to choose between Europe and the open sea, we shall always choose the open sea. Whenever I have to choose between you and Roosevelt, I shall always choose Roosevelt."*(Lee: 1982: 200). In addition, one of the inconveniences of the United Kingdom was stemming from the federalist approach about the governmental structure of integration. French and some members of six was in favor of federal union, the UK opposed to federal system and wanted confederal Europe.

However, the US had always been follower of a policy that aims to integrate Europe either politically or economically in line with global strategy against the spreading of communism and Soviet hegemonic threat to Europe. In addition, European integration would be a preventive organization for Germany. According to this view,

if Germany rises again aggressively integrated Europe could halt German threat with coordinated policies.

The political and economic integration of Europe also saw as a furthering cause for political and economic efficiency in the continent by the United States' policy makers. Moreover, the Americans favored integration because they saw a traditional similarity between the American federalism and European integration. Another importance of the American perspective on integration was the expectation of the easing of defense burden of United States with prosperous and stable Europe. Furthermore, a prosperous Europe could be supportive for global free trade and American products and needs. Therefore, United States always strongly supported the integration of Europe and the joining of Britain into this integration and always been emphasized that United States do not see the integrated Europe as a rival but partner.

By the same token, despite her ostensibly supportive approach the UK did not share the American position and favorability for the European Steel and Coal Community and European Economic Community. In the 1951 and 1956, Britain two times refused to be member of European integration to refrain from its responsibilities on the grounds that economic protectionism of organization and tried to keep herself away from this grouping.

In 1958, Britain tried to persuade the French President, Charles de Gaulle, to direct the EEC broader and more pro-free trade line, but De Gaulle rejected. Upon this reaction, British created the European Free Trade Area with Outer Six (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland) in 1960. As time went by, the success of the EEC was observed and the EFTA countries increasingly turned their direction to EEC.

Britain apply to EEC was closely related with her economic troubles at home and abroad. Especially at the early 1960's British decline in economic sphere was clear and her economy became uncompetitive in the face of EEC. Despite her gradual withdrawal from the colonies and cut-backs in her defense policy, the problems of sterling that stemmed from its convertibility, and relative decline harshly affected the British economy and balance of payments of the UK. Upon the unstoppable relative decline of the British economy, United Kingdom's policy makers, which once upon a

time harshly opposed EEC, decided to apply EEC to cope with economic problems by EEC's successful system and to gain more independence from United States by becoming a powerful member of union (Dobson: 2002: 125)

According to Lee,

In one respect the EEC was remarkably successful. De Gaulle described as an 'economic miracle' the rapid enrichment of all six member states and the creation of the world's largest single trading bloc. Between 1958 and 1967 the exports of the EEC as a whole trebled, while the volume of world exports only doubled. The indices of the gross national product showed a similar improvement; taking the 1953 index as 100, the GNP of the EEC had increased to 188 by 1965, in comparison with 154 for EFTA and 149 for the United States. Progress was also made in implementing the economic targets of the Treaty of Rome. By July 1968 all internal barriers had been eliminated on industrial goods, iron, steel, coal and agricultural produce; a common agricultural policy and uniform tax system (based on VAT) had been introduced, a common external tariff was in operation, and the member states had adopted a concerted policy on tariff negotiations with countries outside the EEC (Lee: 1982: 202).

The memories of Suez led to the British skepticism about the United States' credibility and British policy makers saw the EEC membership as a solution for it. Nevertheless, in strategic orientation of the UK, United States remained closest ally. At the same time, the USA support for the British membership seen as a diminishing factor to the protectionist EEC policies and improving thing to global free trade by American policy makers. For American elites, British membership was not contradictory for the special relationship with the United Kingdom. On the contrary, policy makers in EEC and especially France saw the Anglo-American special relationship as a suspicious thing. De Gaulle accused of the United Kingdom of wanting to become a Trojan horse in EEC.

According to Dobson,

Perhaps most important of all, was the symbolism of Britain's close link with the USA, which placed her Europeanness in question, not least in the mind of General de Gaulle. Furthermore, he feared that Britain would challenge his leadership of Europe and be an American Trojan Horse that would influence European policy on the basis of Atlantic rather than European interests (Dobson: 2002: 126).

The UK's special relationship with the US and the desires of De Gaulle for more independent foreign policy in terms of France that United States would not influence her decisions, would cause France's exit from NATO's military structure in 1966 and also De Gaulle ordered out thousands of US troops stationed on French soil and at NATO headquarters, then in a Paris suburb.

The UK applied to join the EEC in 1961 and was refused by French veto in 1963. Just a few days' later developments in the Anglo-American nuclear defense co-operation in the Nassau provided further substance for de Gaulle's suspicions and he decided to veto British entry into the EEC. The veto was also against US hopes for their plan for a politically stronger, more stable Europe which, with the British encouragement, might have been receptive to an Atlantic free-trade area of benefit to America's ailing exports. According to the French President Charles de Gaulle, Britain's accession could lead to absorption of common market by the UK and the USA (Dinan: 2006: 155).

Britain applied the second time for the EEC membership in 1967. Prime Minister Wilson aimed at having influence on European public and policy makers by negotiating with De Gaulle and to create positive perception about the British membership, even if second application would fail. This strategy was consisting of the undermining of De Gaulle's excuses. This strategy continued until the lifting of the French blockade on the British accession at the time of De Gaulle's successor Georges Pompidou who lifted the veto to enlargement at The Hague Summit in 1969.

According to Parr,

Wilson's policy towards the European Community in the first term of office did have a more coherent rationale than some authors would suppose. Wilson was pragmatic, and his policy developed in response to external events. Nevertheless, it was never inevitable that Wilson would apply for membership of the EEC while de Gaulle was still in power, thus, it was still the shock of the July 1966 sterling crisis that precipitated the Prime Minister towards an initiative. Second, that 1967 was a turning point in the reconciliation of Britain's political class to a European future. Wilson did address the political importance of Community membership with the Cabinet to secure ministerial support for the unconditional application, but he did not gain agreement on the terms under which Britain would accede to the Community. Third, that despite de Gaulle's veto, Britain's second application was a watershed in British relations with the Community. The British initiative brought further evidence of the eclipse of Gaullist dominance within the EEC. France's vision of a Europe of Six, a vision hitherto illustrated as commensurate with the Community's own interests, would not survive the Five's preference for an enlarged EEC. British membership of the Community in the future was virtually assured (Parr: 2006: 164).

However, the French President Charles de Gaulle, once again underlined that he will veto Britain's application to join the Common Market. He warned France's five partners in the European Economic Community (EEC) that if they tried to impose the British membership on France it would result in the break-up of the community. At a news conference at the Elysée Palace in Paris, attended by more than 1,000 diplomats, civil servants and ministers as well as journalists, General de Gaulle accused Britain of a "deep-seated hostility" towards European construction. All five - Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and Germany - have said they would support negotiations towards British membership and only France remained opposed (De Gaulle Says 'Non' to Britain, BBC, 27 November 1967, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/November/27/newsid4187000/4187714.stm>>).

However, in the years the landscape of the political arena in Britain and France changed. Charles de Gaulle retired from politics in 1969 after protracted domestic tensions as student protests of the 1968 and labor activism in France. In addition to escalating domestic and political tensions, de Gaulle was defeated in a controversial referendum in the 1969. In Britain, pro-EEC conservative politician and experienced in EEC negotiations Edward Heath, elected as a Prime Minister of UK. While opening doors of EEC for United Kingdom, United States continued her supportive policies on Britain entry. When British Prime Minister assured the French President Georges Pompidou regarding with his anxieties about the UK's special relationship with the USA and British position about the EEC, the Americans did not opposed to the Brits.

Despite their complexity, accession negotiations ended with Heath's acceptance of Treaty of Rome and Common Agricultural policy of EEC and the United Kingdom became a member of EEC in January of 1973 and the British people approved with referendum by 1975. Following accession, Britain forced the EEC for a new common foreign policy towards the United States. After Britain's accession to EEC relations between the UK and the US changed and gained a new momentum.

According to Dumbrell,

President Jimmy Carter declared that he is an ardent supporter of greater integration. For Carter, a strong, united Europe was a precondition of the 'trilateralism' (a new capitalist world balance between the US, Japan and Western Europe) favored in the early years of the Carter administration. As foreign secretary and as prime minister, James Callaghan presented himself as a salesman for Carter's plans for international economic cooperation. In March 1974, Callaghan told the House of Commons: 'I must emphasize that we repudiate the view that a united Europe will emerge only out of a process of struggle against America'. He held to this line in his dealings with Britain's EC partners. Even in the Carter years, however, US-EC trade disputes, notably over textiles, did occur" (Dumbrell: 2006: 2003).

For the solutions of disputes and difficulties, the British perspective became more Eurocentric. Until Thatcher-Reagan era, United Kingdom's approach to United States' expectations for the Cold War struggles sometimes contradicted and remained relatively cold; nevertheless she did not face a strong American pressure. For instance, the British sided with her European partners in the face of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 to prevent the creation of a perception of the role of a supporter of the Israelis against Arabs and to their antagonisms against the European powers. Arabs had the embargo power against the West and this was a crucial threat for the Western Europeans. As a result of this policy, Britain rejected to supply spare parts needed for Israel's military equipment and on 10 October 1973 Washington indicated its annoyance at London for refusing to supply spare parts for Israelis. Moreover, the British Prime Minister Heath, declined the American plans on the usage of the British Bases in Cyprus to arm supplies to Israelis. However, in the Middle Eastern Crisis of 1970's, the British had lesser maneuver capability because of power disparity than the USA.

Despite the expectations about the termination of the Anglo-American alliance, relations closely continued. The UK was an indispensable ally in terms of its crucial importance in military side. Britain had second naval power in the NATO that control the Channel and the Eastern Atlantic and had serious economic might. As in the British example, the United States was indispensable ally for the British in terms of its unique and unrivalled military, economic and political power. In addition to interdependence of allies, the existential threat for their security and political power, Soviet threat was continuing to exist and this strategic reason continued to strengthen the relationship between themselves.

CHAPTER 6: AN ANALYSIS OF THE US-UK RELATIONS TOWARDS THE END OF THE COLD WAR:

As we underlined in the previous chapter, the British political power declined following its economic decline during the 1950's, 60's and 70's. According to general perception, for the Americans, the UK transformed into an ordinary ally because of her unstoppable decline in that era. Upon their decline, the Brits, to regain their significance and power they joined the EEC and their preference became Europe rather than the USA. Contradictorily, the United Kingdom's economic and political decline had gained her more independence from United States. However it did not mean a barrier for their special relationship. Even in the crisis times, specialness of their relationship continued in this areas and world views of them. As Dobson said:

These contradictions did not rule out the possibility of clashing interests and communications breaking down, as in the Suez and Skybolt affairs, or differences intruding upon normally good relations to disrupt things in less spectacular ways. But, if the general pattern of easy co-operation remained possible and normally in place, and was evident, especially in times of crisis, then there were good grounds for the use of the term 'special relationship' (Dobson: 2002: 149).

6.1. Thatcher-Reagan: Peak of the Special Relationship

The history of the Anglo-American relations, on a large scale, had been shaped by the power relations, threat perceptions, shared interests, common sentiments and strategic commonalities between the United Kingdom and the United States. Personal relationships did not play a decisive role on the general scope of relations. Without personal closeness and friendship, this power centric alliance continued until the Margaret Thatcher-Ronald Reagan era. Margaret Thatcher elected as Prime Minister of the UK in 1979 and remained at this post until 1990. Ronald Reagan elected 40th President of United States in 1980 and until 1989 he served in this position.

Closeness of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan was stemming from their common beliefs about domestic and world politics. Thatcher and Reagan were ardently champions both domestically and internationally liberal capitalist economic system and civil rights and political freedoms.

According to Ovendale,

The two first met in London in April 1975 and established a rapport. Much of this was based on a common hatred of Communism and a suspicion of the Soviet system, dubbed the 'Evil Empire' by Reagan. But Mrs. Thatcher was harder on the Russians than even Reagan: in January 1976 she warned the West that the Kremlin was after world domination and wanted to consign the democracies to 'the scrap heap of history'. The Soviet army newspaper, Red Star, called her the 'Iron Lady'. On her first visit to see Reagan, between 25 and 28 February 1981, Mrs. Thatcher assured the President that 'we in Britain stand with you. . . . Your problems will be our problems and when you look for friends we will be there (Ovendale: 1998:149).

Margaret Thatcher travelled to Washington to congratulate the Reagan immediately after his inauguration and this visit facilitated their friendship and mutual sincere relationship. This was also a beginning for the Anglo-American Relations that provided a shared understanding about their global policies and world affairs for the next years in their tenure. In this meeting, British side pledged their contributions for the solutions of the crisis and instabilities that they faced at that time. For instance, Thatcher assured the Americans about her support on the rapid deployment of force, designed to cope with sudden and aggressive moves by the Soviets or their sponsored agents. Despite smallness of the British capacity, the British support was important to legitimize the American perspective as had always been. Despite their supreme power capacity, the Americans had always been aware of their needs that they should be supported by global public opinion and their European allies.

Thatcher and Reagan inherited a highly complex world and its political questions from their predecessors. The Cold War tensions between the US and the USSR had

risen on account of the deployment of SS-20 nuclear missiles on the Eastern Europe by the Soviets. The Americans had responded by deciding to deploy neutron bomb and this proposal faced a reaction from Europe. At the same time in nuclear missile tensions, The US and the USSR were seeking ways of a significant nuclear arms reduction but this search of reconciliation did not resulted in success.

The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets in 1979 was another tension-boosting event between two great powers. The Americans had increased their defense budget and took precautions to prevent the Soviet expansion in Central Asia in line with Carter Doctrine. According to this Doctrine, the United States would employ military force against any country that attempted to gain control of the Persian Gulf region. The East-West relations were in such a critical juncture and Thatcher and Reagan had to deal with these issues and Soviet aggressiveness. Thatcher was a defender of a view that takes into account the American supremacy. For Thatcher, only the US could solve such global problems regarding West's security and prosperity and only American resources could be enough for this mission. Thatcher was convinced of the need for a strong response to be taken towards the Soviets in lead of the Americans. In this regard, Reagan adopted similar views as that of Thatcher and followed a hardliner policy against the USSR and American leadership supported by Thatcher. Common perspectives about the Cold War and its threats accelerated their friendship and strengthened the alliance.

In this regard, Dobson says,

There were four factors that determined Mrs. Thatcher's attitude towards the USA in the sphere of defense. The first was her inclination to be well disposed towards the USA, strengthened by her personal friendship with Reagan and a wish for close co-operation. The second was her reassertion of Britain's importance in world affairs. The third was her conviction that only the USA could maintain the West's security. And the fourth was a fear that vestiges of isolationism, and exasperation with both Western Europe's criticisms of US leadership and refusal to shoulder its fair share (in America's judgment) of the costs of the defense

of the West, would result in a US withdrawal from Europe (Dobson: 2002: 151).

After the Thatcher's gestures support for Reagan, Reagan responded with counter support for the United Kingdom. Reagan government declared the American readiness to give submarine-launched ballistic missile, Trident, to the British and underlined the importance of the British independent deterrence. Despite little the British contribution for R&D costs, the American gave them to the UK and showed the continuation of special relationship in nuclear field. In parallel with this, the Anglo-American intelligence relationship regained its dynamism and British reliability for the Americans.

During this era, the British supported the American policy on Afghanistan, which aimed at providing aid to rebels to repulse the Russians and on Poland that was criticizing the imposing of martial law to crush *Solidarność* (Solidarity Movement) by the communist government of Poland. This anti-communist rhetoric of the British and the American policy makers also gained public attention by this conformity.

Notwithstanding their shared discourse about the Soviet expansionism and communist pressures, the British continued to follow their traditional pragmatic foreign policy in the early years of 1980's. For instance, despite the American boycott calls to the 1980 Olympics as a response of the invasion of the Afghanistan by the USSR, the British side ignored it. Moreover, despite the United States' close relationship with the Israel, the UK as a member of EEC, participated European Economic Community Venice Declaration that acknowledged the greater role of Palestine Liberation Organization in the Israel-Palestine Peace Negotiations (Ovendale: 1998: 148).

Another remarkable conflict between the UK and the USA during the 1980's was the Invasion of Grenada. The US was already sensitive about the spread of communism in the Central America and the Caribbean sponsored by Cuba and the USSR long before the Crisis. The overthrow of leftist Prime Minister by a more radical leftist leader triggered the rise of the USA threat perception about this issue. The Americans decided to overthrow new leader by using force but the problematic issue for the Anglo-American relations was that Granada was a member of the British Commonwealth. This decision of the Americans was harshly criticized by

Britain and it had the possibility that without British reaction to American invasion the Brits felt that they would lose their prestige after the victorious Falklands War. Therefore, Francis Pym, the Foreign Secretary between 1982 and June 1983, commented that '*the usual close co-operation between London and Washington failed completely on this occasion*' (Dobson: 2002: 157).

This reaction was not welcomed by the American public and in this matter, Dobson says;

This was a slight to Britain's newly refund dignity that Mrs. Thatcher could not let pass unremarked. Francis Pym, Foreign Secretary 1982 to June 1983, commented: 'the usual close co-operation between London and Washington failed completely on this occasion'. Mrs. Thatcher criticized the USA, and Pym's successor, Sir Geoffrey Howe, was equally disturbed by what was widely perceived in Britain as cavalier American behavior. But the Americans did not see it like that. They saw Britain as a pernicky and ungrateful ally: where was the *quid pro quo* for support in the Falklands War? Newspaper reports in the USA were highly critical of the way Thatcher and her colleagues had reacted. The whole episode went deeper than just a breach of diplomatic etiquette, it demonstrated the willingness of the USA to back up its anti-communist rhetoric with actions, whereas Britain, even under Mrs. Thatcher, was more pragmatic in the way she chose to deal with the communist menace(Dobson: 2002: 157).

As an integral part of American approach for the fight against communism and Soviet influence on the Western Hemisphere and anywhere else in the world, Reagan showed his decisiveness by declaring Reagan Doctrine in 1985. During its declaration Reagan said the following:

We must stand by our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and

secure rights which have been ours from birth. He concluded, "Support for freedom fighters is self-defense (The Reagan Doctrine is announced, History, 6 February 1985 <<http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-reagan-doctrine-is-announced>>).

In contrast to British pragmatism, the USA crucially supported the United Kingdom at the expense of a loss of the anti-communist leader in the South America during the Falkland Islands Crisis. Argentinian dictator Galtieri invaded controversial Falkland Islands by using military force and with a *fait-accompli* in April 1982. In the beginnings of the Crisis before the use of force, Reagan administration approached the dispute as a mediator between the UK and Argentina's, but after harsh reactions Reagan administration radically changed its policy. Unlike the previous President Carter's approach to protect anti-communists in the Western Hemisphere, Reagan abandoned that policy by supporting the British. When Argentinian invasion began, Reagan condemned Argentinians and declared that he will support the British if they needed it.

According to Dobson,

The support was very important, if not vital, to the British military campaign. Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, aviation fuel, equipment and supplies all flowed freely from the US Defense and Navy Departments. The US facilities on Ascension Island were made available to the British as a staging-post on their long trek to the South Atlantic and, perhaps most important of all matters of substance from the Americans, they supplied intelligence about Argentine military plans and movements. It took six weeks, over 250 British lives and a brilliantly executed campaign to recapture the islands. The prestige of Mrs. Thatcher and of Britain in general rose internationally, and nowhere more so than in the USA, where the overwhelming majority of people rejoiced at the British victory (Dobson: 2002: 155).

As in different dimensions, the contradictory nature of the Anglo-American special relationship showed itself on the economic sphere during the 1980's. Unlike their similar approach socio-economic issues, Thatcher and Reagan administrations followed different ways in international economic relations. For instance, relatively high interest rates of the United States led to volatility for the international economy and this policy damaged the British economy. In addition the US and the UK differentiated in their trade relations towards the Soviets and the Eastern European economies. As mentioned before, British pragmatism showed itself in this field as in done before.

Furthermore, the US declaration for new security project SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) as in other European states worried the UK. According to this project, the US was aiming to increase its deterrence in its defense through increasing Space technologies and so it wanted to decrease the importance of nuclear weapons. For the European perception, at the end of this initiative the US military existence in Europe could severely decrease and destroy the European and the British self-deterrence. As times goes on, the USA reconciliation efforts to reduce nuclear weapons with the USSR angered and disturbed Thatcher administration. The British Foreign Secretary Howe, in a speech at the Royal United Services Institute in March 1985, openly criticized the concept of SDI. Notwithstanding their anxieties and angers, the British had no choice but to watch the process between the Unites States of America and the USSR. After few years of Howe's complaints, despite some conflictions breakings, the Americans and the Russians finally agreed on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty in 1987(US Department of State. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles(INF Treaty))' <<https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm> narrative>).

According to Dobson,

While all this was going on, Mrs. Thatcher was uneasy and repeatedly cautioned the President about the possible dangers of his policies. After Reykjavik she flew to Washington for urgent talks and urged Reagan to

reaffirm both US commitments to the defense of Western Europe and the need to modernize remaining nuclear weapon systems. Only after receiving them did she agree to support the INF treaty. If Reagan had not had such respect and affection for her it is doubtful that her hectoring and overt interference would have been tolerated. When George Bush came to power in 1989, Mrs. Thatcher had to adopt a more low-key approach, allow the President to have more of a say in their conversations and, as she later put it, have 'no hesitation in eating a little humble pie' in order to secure British interests (Dobson: 2002: 159).

As pointed out before, another confliction between the United Kingdom and the United States was the Middle East. Britain and Europe depended on the Middle East for most if not all of their oil. As such out of the fear for an embargo by the Middle Eastern countries Britain had sided with her European allies and opted a mediatory policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, increasing capacity of North Sea Oil during the 1970's and 1980's relieved British policy maker's hands and they gained relative independence to make strategic decisions in the Middle East without previous hesitations (North Sea Oil: Facts and Figures, BBC, 24 February 2014<<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-26326117>>). Unlike the British, needs of Europeans for Middle Eastern oil continued and their policy for Middle Eastern Crisis mostly composed of reconciliatory calls. This disparity forced Britain to take different political positions and decisions in terms of the Middle East.

After gaining more independent position due to the discovery of the North Sea Oil, the Britain supported America more conveniently. Despite previous tension about Venice Declaration of 1980 between the US and the UK, Brits supported the Americans more than her European allies had. The British contributions for American efforts appeared in Lebanon campaign. During the withdrawal of Israeli troops after Lebanon Civil War and Israeli invasion, in this process the Americans were trying to facilitate the withdrawal of Israeli troops and stabilize the region.

Another British contribution for the United States of America in Middle East was in the bombing of Libya by the Americans via the British bases and military helps. After reaching the conclusion that Libyan Leader Qaddafi was connected in the

terror attacks in Europe, he was accused of sponsoring terrorism that occurred in different locations of Europe and targeted Americans. Despite European doubt about this attack, the Brits sided with the Americans without hesitation.

Reagan's departure from his post triggered the expectations that expressed special relationship between the US and the UK would end. As we mentioned before, despite different divergences, Reagan and Thatcher mostly acted in a harmonious way to cope with their shared problems. The coming to power of Bush coincided with one of the greatest geopolitical earthquakes of the 20th century. The USSR's dissolution and German Unification taken place in this period. United States' policy makers indicated that Washington might favor a special relationship with the European Community as a whole and West Germany in particular. British suspiciousness about unification of the Germany and EEC was not welcomed by the Americans. In the face of such a critical juncture, despite relative cooling in the Anglo-American Alliance it did not ceased because of their mutual need to each other.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

This study is an attempt to reveal the true nature of the US-UK special relationship by examining their historical foreign policy traditions and geopolitical determinants in the light of historical trends in the Cold War.

At the end of this study, as I tried to explain by using IR theories on alliances, it is clear that both the United States and the United Kingdom are historically off-shore balancer states. Moreover, both of them are protected by large masses of water and have thus geographic features making them almost 'unconquerable'. Because of these features, the UK and the US have always been followers of a certain policy, which emphasizes the prevention of emergence of hegemonic powers in their environments and especially in the Europe. For both Anglo-Saxon states, a European hegemon could seriously harm their interests and challenge their possessions in the world and at home. Because of this very reason, the US entered into the First and the Second World Wars as well as the Cold War later on.

After WWII, the Soviet Union, under the leadership of its hardliner dictator Stalin, challenged the new socio-economic and security architecture of Europe and the World. Upon defeating Germany, the USSR became the sole potential – and indigenous - hegemon in Europe and attempted to dominate continental Europe by using its puppet organizational political movements. The United Kingdom's choice to adopt American strategic policies against the USSR was a result of such a political climate. Furthermore, the UK had an empire in the process of dissolution and was thus in gradual decline in the global power hierarchy. The gradual decline of the United Kingdom after WWII, as the weaker side of the US-UK partnership, it forced the UK to adopt an offensive bandwagoning strategy with the United States. This dimension of the relationship was discussed in the theoretical framework section.

As I have underlined before, this study's methodology is composed of an analysis of the American and British historical policies by using the Realist international relations theory with a corpus of scientific sources including scholarly books, articles, and quantitative data material.

This Master thesis is composed of five chapters and the conclusion. Following the introduction, the second chapter aimed at providing a methodological framework and to answer the question of why constructivism and liberalism do not suffice in explaining the Anglo-American alliance.

As for the chapters, after the introductory part, the methodology aimed to provide a methodological framework and to answer the question of why Constructivism and Liberalism do not suffice to explain the Anglo-American alliance. I argued that, Liberalism and Constructivism were not adequate to reveal the essence of the “Special Relationship” while the Realist thinking appropriately gave the fundamental explanations of the dynamics in this partnership. The interest based political understanding in the US-UK special relationship and differentiated interests of both countries have enabled the explanation of the nature of relationship from only a Realist lens. While they were in a special and unique relationship of alliance, they were also seeking to protect their interests conflicting each other sometimes. This interest-based feature of the “relationship” has always been there, even during the Thatcher-Regan Era in the 1980’s.

The second chapter focused on the Realist international relations theory and the Realist approach regarding “alliance creation” as well as the relevant literature review.

The third chapter sought to analyze and compare the historical backgrounds and evolutions of the British and American power and foreign policies from the beginning of 19th century to WWII. It can be said that the two states experienced moves in opposite direction. While the American foreign policy perspective evolved from isolationism to global player role, the British perspective evolved from global balancer position to local balancer position in line with their power resources’ changing dynamics. While the Brits have lost their unique power capacity to dominate the world affairs, Americans have gained impressive economic and political power to dominate the world. Indeed, starting with the late 19th and through the 20th centuries, the Brits made serious concessions in favor of the Americans. This period resulted in an Anglo-American rapprochement and British withdrawal from a global position of strength. The special relationship evolved into a state in which the power hierarchy has irreversibly changed.

In the fourth chapter, the emergence of the Cold War was examined by focusing on the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan and the creation of the Cold War security blocs. At the beginning of the Cold War, Britain, as a former global power, had lost its significance and the US has overtaken its new status as the Western superpower. After WWII, the Americans had emerged as an economic and military superpower and the Britain had begun to lose its imperial territorial possessions due to the rapid decrease of their economic and military capacity.

The fifth chapter examined the disagreements and collaborations between the 1950's and the 1980's. In this way, this section served as an explanatory chapter to understand the contradictory essence of the "Special Relationship". As I have expressed before, in spite of the "specialness" of the US-UK relationship, it had a conflictual dimension as well on different areas beginning with the start of the Cold War. For instance, while the Americans were prioritizing the fight against communism on world scale, the Brits were in search of their national interests rather than fighting against communism and containing the USSR. Moreover, the Americans did not want to share the control of their nuclear power with the Brits and this process resulted in the launch of the British nuclear self-deterrence.

The Suez Crisis was the most important conflictual event between the two parties of the "Special Relationship" and peaked the mutual suspicions during the early Cold War. However, the Anglo-American relations were swiftly restored. Nuclear and atomic sharing concessions of the United States were particularly helpful in relaunching the Special Relationship with the UK after the Suez Crisis. Similarly, the Skybold Missile Crisis seriously damaged the Special Relationship but at the end of the day the Americans gave the Polaris missiles as a conciliatory gift to the British. Nevertheless, mutual suspicions played an important role on the relations and the British perceived at times that they are an "ordinary ally" of US. With such feelings, the Brits used the EEC membership as a new route/dimension for their foreign policy and to decrease their dependence on the United States.

The sixth chapter included an analysis of the Thatcher-Reagan Era. Despite similar world views and common understandings on many issues between Thatcher and Reagan, the US and the UK experienced once again differentiated interests and

conflicts on their foreign policies. For instance, the invasion of the Grenada and use of force to overthrow the leftist leader of the country by the USA triggered in 1982 a serious crack in the Special Relationship. Because of the British Commonwealth membership of Grenada, the US military intervention was not welcomed by Britain. Yet, the USA supported the UK during the Falklands War in 1982 after its attempts of mediation between Argentina and the United Kingdom failed.

Another conflicting field of interest was in international economy. Unlike their similar approaches in socio-economic issues at national levels, Thatcher and Reagan administrations followed different paths in international economic relations. For instance, relatively high interest rates of the United States led to volatility in international economy and this policy harmed the British economy. In addition, the US and the UK differentiated in their trade relations with the Soviet and Eastern European economies, where the British pragmatism manifested itself.

Constructivism shares the idea that world is socially constructed and common culture, common language, common identity play central role in order to create deep relations through strong institutions. However, the Anglo American relations stick to interest and power calculations. According to the Realist theory, anarchy is the lack of the legitimate authority. In order to survive, states need to be ready for war and that threat comes from outside. Liberal theorists define and associate their ideas with the “*Laissez Faire*” economic system. However, this economic approach is not always sufficient to build and consolidate an international order within a highly anarchic environment.

Thus, although some other theories of international relations can also explain, to some extent, the nature of the Anglo American relations, I have embraced the Realist theory in my attempt to define and explain this Transatlantic connection through interest, power, and anarchy.

To sum up, Britain and the US had always been in a special relationship on many dimensions, economically, politically and militarily, during the Cold War. However, these close relations did not prevent their individual quests on different fields of interest. At times these different perspectives seriously conflicted with each other and temporarily even harmed the alliance, nevertheless – and unlike in different cases of disputes with their other allies - they always restored their close partnership.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aldrich, Richard J. 2004. “*Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation*”, *International Affairs* 80, 3(2004), 733-755.

Baylis, John, 1981. “*Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1980: The Special Relationship*”, London. The Macmillan Press LTD.

Brummer, Justin Adam, 2012. “*Anglo-American Relations and EC Enlargement, 1969-1974*”, PhD Thesis in University College London.

Brinkley, Douglas, 1990. “*Dean Acheson and the ‘Special Relationship’: The West Point Speech of December 1962*”, *The Historical Journal*, Volume 33, Issue 3 September 1990, pp. 599-608.

Combs, Jerald A. and Combs Arthur G., 1986. “*The History of American Foreign Policy Volume 2: Since 1900*”, Second Edition, New York. The McGraw-Hill.

Clark, David B., 2008. “*A Bridge over Troubled Waters: the Vital Role of Intelligence Sharing in Shaping the Anglo-American Special Relationship*”, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School.

Danchev, Alex, 2006. “*The Cold War ‘Special Relationship’ Revisited*”, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 17 (3), 2006, pp.585-592.

Deighton, Anne, 1990. “*Britain and the First Cold War*”, New York. Palgrave Macmillan.

Dobson, Alan, 1990. “*The Years of Transition: Anglo-American Relations 1961-1967*”, *Review of International Studies* Vol. 16, No. 3 (July, 1990), pp. 239-258.

Dinan, Desmond, 2006. “*Origins and Evolution of the European Union*”Oxford.Oxford University Press.

Dobson. Alan P. 2002. “*Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers*”, London. Routledge.

Dumbrell, John, 2006. “*A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq*”, London. Palgrave Macmillan.

Ellison, James, 2007. *“The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963-68”* New York. Palgrave Macmillan.

Elst, Philip Vander, 2008. *“The Principles of British Foreign Policy”*, London. The Bruges Group.

Eugene R. Wittkopf, Christopher M. Jones and Jr. Charles W. Kegley, 2008. *“American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process”*, Seventh Edition, Belmont, CA. Thomson Wadsworth.

Fontaine, Andre, *“Transatlantic Doubts and Dreams”*, Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1980, Volume 59, No 3, (December, 1980), pp.580-588.

Gaddis, John Lewis, 1972. *“The United States and the Origins of Cold War, 1941-1947”*, New York. Columbia University Press.

-----1997. *“We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History”*, New York. Oxford University Press.

Hollowell, Jonathan, 2001. *“Twentieth Century Anglo-American Relations”*, New York. Palgrave Macmillan.

Hoffman, Stanley, 1981. *“The Western Alliance: Drift or Harmony?”* International Security Volume 6, Number 2, fall, 1981, pp. 105-125.

Hughes, R. Gerald, 2007. *“Britain, Germany and the Cold War: The Search for a European Détente 1949–1967”*New York. Routledge.

Kennan, George, 1951. *“The Sources of Soviet Conduct”* within *“American Diplomacy 1900-1950”*, London. The University of Chicago Press.

Kennedy, Paul, 1988. *“The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000”*, London. Unwin Hyman Limited.

Kissinger, Henry, 1994. *“Diplomacy”*, New York. Simon-Schuster.

Laçiner, Sedat, 2001. *“ABD - İngiltereİlişkileri: ‘Özel’ Birİlişki, (USA - UK, A Special Relationship)”*, Ankara.AsamYayınları.

Lee, Stephen J., 1982. *“Aspects of European History, 1789–1980”*, London and New York. Routledge.

Leffler, Melvyn P., and Painter, David S., 2005. *“The Origins of Cold War: An International History”* Abingdon Oxon. Routledge.

Lightbody, Bradley, 1999. *“The Cold War”*, London. Routledge.

Mandelbaum, Michael, 1989. *“The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries”*, New York. Cambridge University Press.

Mangold, Peter, 2006 *“The Almost Impossible Ally: Harold Macmillan and Charles de Gaulle”* New York. I.B. Tauris.

Mearsheimer, John, 2014. *“The Tragedy of Great Power Politics”*, New York. W.W Norton & Company.

Nutter, Deborah Winslow, 2004. *“British Political Leadership From Churchill to Blair: A Focus on Foreign Policy”* The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Summer 2004.

Ovendale, Ritchie, 1998. *“Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century”*, London, Macmillan Press.

Parr, Helen, 2006. *“Britain’s Policy towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role, 1964–1967”*, New York. Routledge.

Paul, T.V., Wirtz, James J. and Fortmann, Michel, 2004 'Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century"

Rasmussen, Jorgen and McCormick, James, 1993. *“British Mass Perception of Anglo-American Special Relationship”*, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 108, No. 3 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 515-541.

Reynolds, David, 2006. *“From World War to Cold War Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s”*, New York. Oxford University Press.

Reynolds, David, 1998. *“Rethinking Anglo-American Relations”*, International Affairs 65, No. 1 (1988): 89-111.

- Robb, Thomas**, 2010. "*Henry Kissinger, Great Britain and the 'Year of Europe': Tangled Skein*" Contemporary British History 24(3): September 2010, pp. 297-318
- Ruane, Kevine**, 2006. "*Anglo-American Relations, the Cold War and Middle East Defense, 1953-1955*", Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 4(1) 2006, pp. 1-25.
- Ryan, David**, 2003. "*The United States and Europe in the Twentieth Century*", New York. Routledge.
- Samuel Guy Inman**, 1921, "The Monroe Doctrine and Hispanic America, Journal of Duke University Press, Vol.4 No.4. (Nov, 1921), pp.635-676.
- Schwabe, Klaus**, 2005. "*Three Grand Designs: The U.S.A, Great Britain, and the Gaullist Concept of Atlantic Partnership and European Unity*", Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 3(1S), 2005, pp. 7-30.
- Seehan, Michael**, 2000. "*The Balance of Power: History and Theory*", New York. Routledge.
- Smith, Simon C.**, 2014 "*The Anglo-American Special Relationship and the Middle East 1945-1973*", Asian Affairs, Vol. XLV, No: III, pp. 425-44.
- Varble, Derek**, 2003. "*The Suez Crisis 1956*", Oxford. Osprey Publishing.
- Webster, Sir Charles**, "*Fundamentals of British Foreign Policy*", International Journal, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Autumn, 1948), pp. 320-326.
- White, Brian**, 2002. "*Britain, Detente and Changing East-West Relations*" London. Routledge.

WEB SOURCES

BBC News, “1967: De Gaulle Says 'Non' to Britain – Again”, Available from (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/27/newsid_4187000/4187714.stm>).

Date of Access: 20. 04. 2017

BBC News,” *North Sea oil: Facts and figures*”, Available from (<<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-26326117>>).

Date of Access: 28. 04. 2017

BBC News, 'Macmillan Speaks of Wind of Change in Africa', Available from (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/February/3/newsid_2714000/2714525.stm>).

Date of Access: 17.07.2017

Carlston, Morgan, “*Six Myths about the Coup against Iran's Mossadegh*”, National Interest. Available from (<<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/six-myths-about-the-coup-against-irans-mossadegh-11173>>).

Date of Access: 31.03.2017

Churchill, Winston, “*Iron Curtain Speech*”,

Available from (<<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1946-03-05.pdf>>).

Date of Access: 28.03.2017

CVCE, “*The Cold War (1945–1989)*”. Available from (<<http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/55c09dcc-a9f2-45e9-b240-eaef64452cae>>)

Date of Access: 05. 04. 2017

McCrary, Lewis, “*Dean Acheson, National Interest and the Special Relationship*”, National Interest January 9, 2013.

Available from (<<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/dean-acheson-national-interest-the-special-relationship-7946>>)Date of Access: 12.04.2017

US Department of State, “*Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)*”

Available from (<<https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm#narrative>>).

Date of Access: 25.04.2017

Washington, George, 2000. “*Washington’s Farewell Address to the People of the United States*”, 106th Congress 2nd Session Senate Document No: 106–21, Washington.

Available from (<<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CDOC-106sdoc21/pdf/GPO-CDOC-106sdoc21.pdf>>).

Date of Access: 25.03.2017