Egeli, Sitki2023-06-162023-06-1620212575-1654https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1942681https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14365/1800Satellites in Earth's orbit fulfill important functions in support of NC3 - nuclear command, control, and communication infrastructures of nuclear-armed states. Yet high confidence placed in those satellites' uninterrupted availability is based on shaky grounds and potentially dangerous. Ever since the placing in orbit of the first satellites, state and non-state actors have persistently pursued ways to harm them or to interrupt or compromise their services. Among the range of options to achieve such destruction or interference are kinetic and non-kinetic attacks executed by other satellites and craft that are themselves positioned in space. Recent technological advances in so-called proximity operations have rendered such space-to-space engagements more achievable, effective, and attractive. On the downside, the real-life efficiency of space-to-space engagements is subject to important limitations and unknowns. Augmenting the potential and attractiveness of space-to-space engagements in anti-satellite role though are the limitations of space situational awareness and the consequent difficulties encountered in prompt and unfailing detection and attribution of space-to-space intrusions. This dangerous and destabilizing property of space-to-space operations holds the potential of complicating nuclear-armed states' endeavor to preserve the coherence of their NC3 - a situation whose negative ramifications on strategic stability could be serious and potentially catastrophic.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAnti-satellitecommand and control (nuclear)space-to-space warfarearms control (space)strategic stabilityArticle10.1080/25751654.2021.19426812-s2.0-85108839018