Historical a Priori as Form of Life: the Rationality of Social Practices in Foucault's Archaeology in Terms of Wittgensteinian Criteria

Abstract

The concept of rule permeates Foucault's methodological formulations concerning the object of his investigation, but he offers few explicit discussions of the epistemological status of such rules. My claim is that the explication of Foucauldian rules in terms of Wittgensteinian criteria clarifies their epistemological status, and thereby enables one to formulate a novel conception of the historical a priori, one that is defensible against recurrent objections which charge that Foucault's theoretical reflections confuse concepts that are distinct. Foucault and Wittgenstein are best seen as articulating a sense of intelligibility in which forms are integral to content and meaning is not abstracted from social practices. 'Form of life' increases the conceptual cogency of 'historical a priori,' whereas the latter delineates what it would be like to take the former's historicity seriously. © 2024 Özgür Gürsoy.