TR Dizin İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / TR Dizin Indexed Publications Collection

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14365/4

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Author: search.filters.author.Egeli, SitkiInstitution Author: search.filters.institutionAuthor.Egeli, Sitki

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  • Article
    Citation - WoS: 3
    Citation - Scopus: 5
    Turkey Embarks Upon Ballistic Missiles: Why and How?
    (Forsnet, 2017-12-01) Egeli S.; Egeli, Sitki
    From the late-1980s, and in response to the rapid spread of ballistic missiles in her neighborhood, Turkey has opted to add a symmetrical ingredient to her traditional policy of asymmetrical response, and began developing and deploying her own ballistic missiles. Additionally, thanks to the rapid technological progress during the last 10-15 years, shorter range ballistic missiles have been rendered attractive weapon systems even for countries like Turkey with access to advanced air power assets. Thanks to multi-phased development program, Turkey has recently deployed ballistic missile with a range of up to 300 km, whereas development work has been underway on longer-range derivatives. Paying tribute to geostrategic, technological, cost, and foreign policy considerations, the optimum range bracket for Turkey’s ballistic missiles appears to be around 800 kilometers. Recent calls for ballistic missiles of much longer ranges (e.g. 2,500 km) do not correspond to Turkey’s geostrategic and security circumstances. Rather than being the products of careful cost-benefit analyses, those calls appear to be the outcomes of unarticulated competitive reasoning and instincts. Combined with controversial and puzzling statements coming from the individuals close to Turkey’s top decision-making circles, they are seen and treated as further signs of Turkey’s latent nuclear weapon aspirations. © 2017, Forsnet. All rights reserved.
  • Article
    Citation - WoS: 11
    Citation - Scopus: 14
    Making Sense of Turkey's Air and Missile Defense Merry-Go
    (Center Foreign Policy & Peace Research, 2019) Egeli, Sitki
    At some point during 2013, Turkey's political authority began to treat the in-country development and production of long-range air and missile defense systems as a priority. Soon after, they announced their decision to favor a Chinese offer that came complete with licensed production and the promise of technology transfer. Yet, with this decision came NATO's objections and challenges around integration and information security. The 2015 decision to rollback the pro-China decision, and opt instead for the indigenous development of air and missile defense systems (in close conjunction with a foreign technological and industrial partner) was triggered by Turkey's disillusion with the content of China's technology transfer package. Subsequently, this new partner became a team comprising France and Italy; Turkish industry tied itself to this team in developing Europe's next-generation missile defense capability. Then came the Turkish government's 2017 decision to purchase off-the-shelf, standalone S-400 systems from Russia. This decision was an anomaly, and had all the characteristics of a top-down decision cycle running afoul of technical, operational, and industrial criteria. Turkey's political figures have justified the S-400 order by citing the benefits of in-country production, access to technologies, not to mention the West's refusal to sell comparable systems; but these justifications have been refuted by the Russian side and/or in discordant statements by Turkish institutions, authorities, and political figures themselves.