The 'bon Pour L'orient Front: Analysis of Russia's Anticipated Victory Over the Ottoman Empire in World War I

Abstract

In this article, I argue that during World War I the Imperial Russian High Command underestimated the task of defeating the Ottoman Empire and therefore neglected, quantitatively and qualitatively, the Caucasian Front: the northwestern Black Sea coast; eastern Anatolia; the southwestern Caucasus region; and northwestern Iran. The reason why Russia failed to provide adequate resources for this front was because its leading officials perceived the war as the final hour for the Ottomans, and thus their empire would be dissolved, finally settling the Eastern Question in Russia's favor. Nevertheless, Russia did not simply wait for the expected Ottoman collapse, but between November 1914 and December 1916, its Caucasian Army launched many military operations along the Caucasian Front. Although the Russian forces achieved several victories, ultimately they fell short of their goals to break Ottoman resistance, conquer eastern Anatolia and dominate northwestern Iran. The unexpected revolution that erupted in March 1917 ended the rule of the Romanov dynasty and also effectively ended Russia's war efforts against the Ottoman Empire.